1. TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction................................................................................................................................1
Objective of the Study.....................................................................................................................4
Hypothesis........................................................................................................................................4
1.3 Research Question.....................................................................................................................4
1.4 Literature Review.......................................................................................................................4
1.5 Theoretical Framework..............................................................................................................6
1.6 Research Methodology..............................................................................................................6
1.7 Scope of the Study.....................................................................................................................6
2. 0.1 Reasons for Conflict in countries in The Horn of Africa.................................................8
2.0.2 International Factors..........................................................................................................8
2.0.2.1 Impacts of Colonialism........................................................................................................9
2.0.2 Historical Empires Legacies.................................................................................................13
2.0.3 Environmental Conditions....................................................................................................14
3.0 The Conflict in the Horn of Africa in Context.........................................................................15
3.2 Conceptual Framework of Conflict in the Horn; Actors and their Influences on Conflict in the
Horn Region...................................................................................................................................18
4. 0 Transnationalism; Kenya’s Approaches to Conflict in the Horn of Africa.............................24
4. 0.1 Impacts of Conflict and instability of the Horn of Africa on Kenya...................................24
4.1 Kenya national and regional Interests......................................................................................28
CHAPTER FIVE...........................................................................................................................31
5.0 Findings....................................................................................................................................31
5.1 Recommendations....................................................................................................................32
5.2 Conclusion.................................................................................................................32
References......................................................................................................................................33
…………………………………………………………………………………34
3. ABSTRACT
The Horn of Africa region has been characterized by perennial conflict, largely inter-state and
intra-state conflict that has plunged the region into instability. Conflict triangulation has
rendered the outcomes of conflict, which range from insecurity to the creation of refuges
inescapable for the states within the region. Protracted war has curtailed development in the
region that is endowed with resources and ideal climatic conditions. Kenya, being a relatively
stable country, is consequently affected by the regions instability, which impels her to be at the
forefront of mediating peace. Chapter One lays the basis for the study by introducing Kenya and
giving the research design. Chapter Two looks at the history of conflict in the Horn of Africa.
Chapter Three looks at the conflict in context and employs the levels of analysis to understand
the conflict. Chapter Four then studies the impacts of conflict in the Horn of Africa on Kenya
and how this has shaped Kenya’s foreign policy with regard to her relations with countries in
the Horn. Chapter Five gives the findings of the research, conclusion and offers
recommendations that could prove valuable for the future.
i
4. LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: The figure illustrates the political organization of Africa before colonization.
Figure 2: The figure illustrates the area occupied by ethnic Somalis in the Horn of Africa as
organized today.
ii
5. LIST OF ACRONYMS
IGAD-Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
SPLM/A-Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
AU-African Union
CPA-Comprehensive Peace Agreement
USIU-United States International University
GDP-Gross Domestic Product
NFD-Northern Frontier District
INGOs-International Non-Governmental organizations
KNFD-Kenyan North Eastern Frontier District
ELF-Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF-Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
SNM-Somali National Movement
SSDF-Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TPLF-Tigreans People’s Liberation Front
OAU-Organization of African Unity
LRA-Lord’s Resistance Army
USSR-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UNHCR-United Nations High Commission for Refugees
US-United States
LAPSSET-Lamu-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Project
HOA-Horn of Africa
iii
7. KENYA’S NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS: THE CASE OF THE HORN OF
AFRICA
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 Introduction
This Chapter will in essence analyze Kenyan foreign policy and what it involves after a brief
background of Kenya. It will also study its development over the years, looking at the influence
or lack thereof of Kenyan leaders on foreign policy formulation. A working definition of foreign
policy will also be given.
Located in the East Coast of Africa, bordered by Tanzania to the South, Uganda to the West,
South Sudan to the North West, Ethiopia to the North and Somali to the North East, lies Kenya
that occupies 580, 367sq. Km and characterized by tropical, arid and semi-arid climate. Kenya,
according to 2010 estimates has a population of 39 million and a GDP of $32 billion. The
country has about 42 ethnic groups and politically organized into provinces and counties
(United States Department of State, 2012).
Until late 2007, Kenya was popular as one of the most stable countries in Africa and in
particular in the Horn of Africa region that will be defined in chapter two of this piece. Kenya's
economic power, in the region, has been enabled by her strong trade ties with France, Germany,
Great Britain, Japan, United States, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia being among her main trade
partners (Adar, 2007, p. 71).
Kenya attained independence from the British in 1963, Jomo Kenyatta becoming the first
president and has since been East Africa's financial and communications hub, attracting many
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as well as investors. A 44 year streak of
relative peace was broken in this emerging democratic state following disputed elections in
2007 that spurred ethnic conflict and led to the death of about 1000 people and internal
displacement of many more. This paper does not however, assume that Kenya or the Horn of
Africa had not experienced conflict prior to colonialism. Wars of colonial resistance, struggles
for liberation and those that evolved around state formation were present, but this piece will
1
8. largely focus on the post-colonial era, except Chapter One (Hanson, 2008).
Kenya's neighbors have attracted attention due to intra and inter-state conflicts1
that have for the
longest time been predominant, especially in Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia. Conflict in
the region has led to security complexities that are felt in Kenya and has informed her foreign
policy towards countries in the Horn as will be described in this paper (Adar, 2007, p. 71).
Foreign policy is a distinct area of study that connects the study of international relations with
the study of domestic politics. It entails the implementation of a state’s goals with direct
reference to its external environment. An analysis of foreign policy therefore studies the impact
of both external and internal politics on state’s relations, especially diplomatic relations (Dunne,
Hadfield & Smith, 2008, p. 392).
The questions of security and economic development have been central to the formation of
Kenya's foreign policy at large and the two have stood the test of time given that they not only
explained Kenyatta's actions but also inform contemporary Kenya foreign policy (Wright, 1999,
p. 114).
Kenyatta largely pursued a foreign policy that gave precedence to; cooperation with
neighboring countries that was driven by the need to protect Kenya's territorial integrity, support
for liberation movements and a mixed economy that was aimed at attracting foreign investors,
especially from the West and enhancing economic growth (Wright, 1999, p. 102).
The centrality of the need to preserve Kenya's territorial integrity could not be overstated by this
regime and Kenyatta demonstrated this in September 1963 when he cautioned the British
government against negotiating away the Northern Frontier District (NFD) which had gained
claim by the Somali government. Kenyatta's foreign policy cannot be studied independent of his
cautious and conservative personality because the latter affected the former. His experience
abroad as well as his detention for about a decade in Kenya are said to have shaped his
personality that led him to avoid aggressiveness and instead focus on economic and social
1
This paper will assume that inter-state wars are wars between states recognized by the United Nations. This is relevant in
the study of Ethiopia-Eritrea war as well as the border clashes between Somaliland and Puntland which present unique
circumstances with regards to the concept of state.
2
9. modernization policies in the country's relation with other states (Wright, 1999, p.103).
President Daniel Arap Moi took office in 1978 after the death of Jomo Kenyatta and foreign
policy then transformed into an aggressive one and similarly became more controversial. Moi
could have passed for the foreign affairs minister and unlike Kenyatta who often sent
representatives for foreign missions, he attended meetings personally. The Cold war informed
his practice and led him to seek positive nonalignment that had been assumed to be the
country's position during the war (Wright, 1999, p. 103).
Moi emphasized what became known as the Nyayo philosophy that espoused the principles of
peace, love and unity that was put into practice in the region through three main themes of:
good neighborliness, peacemaking and peace-keeping (Wright, 1999, p. 104).
Good neighborliness enhanced her relations with the neighboring states, though as
realists would put it, the interest in this policy was largely guided by Kenya's greater interests
for peace and stability in the region than it was interested in having a 'good neighbor policy'
(Wright, 1999, p. 103). A study of Kenya's relationship with her neighbors proves the
vulnerability of the idea of good neighborliness given that Ethiopia is the only country that has
had a relatively stable relationship with Kenya. This is attributed to the security pact between
the two states, necessary to counter Somali aggression that threatens their territorial integrity,
this will be discussed in detail in chapter Two (Wright, 1999, p. 104).
Kenya has over the years obtained a reputation in peace-keeping and peacemaking, which has
developed into a major foreign policy tool for Kenya, with regard to her role in resolving
conflict in the region. This is traced back to her post-independence foreign policy. Moi
expended energy into initiatives to resolve conflict in Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia and
made tangible and substantial contributions to such societies (Wright, 1999, p. 106).
The current President, Mwai Kibaki, took office in 2002 and Kenya’s foreign policy interests,
that have characterized the country since independence, largely remain unchanged despite the
regime change. The questions of territorial integrity and economic development seem to still
occupy a central point and have similarly guided the Presidents decisions. The only identifiable
distinction seems to stem from his leadership style that allows for decentralization of power,
3
10. enabling significant independence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in foreign policy as well as
a leeway for other actors to impact foreign policy formulation, which include the civil society,
legislative assembly and even political parties. However the president assumes authority over
defense and intelligence units, within the framework of foreign policy (Adar, 2007, p. 85).
Objective of the Study
i) To investigate the influence of security issues in the Horn of Africa on foreign policy
formulation of Kenya
Hypothesis
Kenya’s Foreign Policy decision-making toward the Horn of Africa is influenced by
security concerns in the region.
1.3 Research Question
How has instability in the Horn of Africa informed Kenya’s foreign policy?
1.4 Literature Review
The literature that addresses the Horn of Africa conflict focuses on, in a general sense, the
causes of conflict in the Horn, and specifically, with regard to Kenya’s interests in the Horn, on
the centrality of ensuring territorial integrity and boundary by the state. The need to defend and
safeguard territory advices Kenya’s foreign policy. The relationship of the countries of the Horn
of Africa have often been analyzed from the point of view of Somalia conflict, presumably due
to the conflict’s protracted nature that has for the longest time labeled the state a ‘collapsed
state’ making it a breeding ground for terrorism (Mekhaus, 2004, p. 8).
With regard to Somalia-Kenya relations, Elmi (2010) in his book Understanding the Somali
Conflagration boldly claims that Kenya, just like Ethiopia, does not want to see a strong
Somalia re-emerge. This, the former President Moi admitted in a speech in Washington whilst
the incumbent leader of Kenya. He hinted Kenya’s fears for the revival of the ‘Greater Somalia’
concept that intended to unite the Somalis in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia that would imply
redrawing the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders. The author goes ahead to prove his plausible
hypothesis by recording the signing of a defense pact by Kenya and Ethiopia due to their shared
interests in the preservation of their territory in 1964 against Somalia’s irredentism2
(Elmi,
2
This word, for the purpose of this research implies the proposition that one state should annex the territory of another
4
11. 2010, p. 102).
Kenyan foreign policy, just as is the case in other states, is a prerogative of sovereign states,
Ochieng (1990, p, 11) records. He identifies regional stability as the backbone of Kenya’s
foreign policy, especially in the region so mired with conflicts. He however attributes Kenya’s
interests for stability to trade. He tactfully links security with economic and commercial
activities and declares the former a prerequisite for the latter two. The author goes on to claim
that security in the region is pegged on the decision by states to avoid interfering in the
domestic affairs and national integrity of other states because ‘territorial ambitions’ lead to ugly
consequences of conflict and instability that cripple the economy. Disputes, especially over
borders should be solved through negotiations and state sovereignty defended at all times
(Ochieng, 1990, p 11-16).
Menkhaus (2004), in his book Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism addresses
the debate of collapsed states and their threat to international security. Following the 9/11
terrorist attacks, collapsed states have commanded such attention as potential havens for
transnational terrorist groups. These, the author notes, have framed American and Western
policies towards Somalia and motivated the adoption of counter-terrorism measures with an
overriding emphasis placed on averting terrorist cells a base of operation in the lawless Somalia.
Mekhaus also goes on to declare that the prolonged crisis in Somalia is not simply as a result of
diplomatic incompetence, missed opportunities and external conspiracy but rather an outcome
promoted by political and economic interest groups within Somalia (Mekhaus, 2004, p 7-13).
The Horn of Africa has been devastated by military operations for more than two decades,
records Gurdon (1994, p. 22) in his book, The Horn of Africa. The author claims that the course
can be altered and the Horn redirected to a brighter future by genuine leadership that has its
people’s interests at heart. Such leaders are to define more important priorities for their states
and implement them. Gurdon points out economic development as central to the transformation
of the Horn states, its momentum suggested as capable of diminishing occurrence of ethnic and
social tension. If the country’s leaders can work together, the entire region is likely to benefit
and move towards a time of peace and progress, economic cooperation acting as the basis for
based on the common ethnicity of the people living in the two regions, also known as pan-nationalism (African History).
5
12. peace (Gurdon, 1994, p. 22).
The gap in the literature is therefore, an explanation of whether Kenya, as part of the greater
Horn, has played a role in the attainment of stability in the region by involving itself in
curtailing insecurity, assisting in establishing governance structures in the Horn states
necessitated by more than the question of disputed borders which is a challenge that has
persisted since independence. Is Kenya foreign policy towards the Horn purely geared on
preserving her territory or has the regions instability and insecurity been the basis of her foreign
policy towards the Horn?
1.5 Theoretical Framework
This piece applies political realism as the lens through which Kenya foreign policy can be
contextualized in the Horn of Africa as a unit of analysis. This is a theory that assumes that state
behavior is influenced by its selfish interests defined in terms of power. States therefore embark
on developing their defense capabilities as well as security due to the anarchic nature that
characterizes the international system (Dunne et al, 2008, p. 396).
1.6 Research Methodology
Qualitative method of research, in form of secondary data obtained from books, articles,
Masters Theses as well as internet sources are employed for this piece. United States
International University (USIU) library will be the venue from which such materials will be
obtained and internet sources accessed through desktop research.
1.7 Scope of the Study
This research paper has Five Chapters. Chapter One mainly focuses on introducing Kenya and
giving a brief history of her foreign policy within the region. The research objective, hypothesis
and research question are also highlighted. The Chapter also gives a theoretical framework upon
which the study will is analyzed and finally the research methodology used to obtain
information disseminated.
6
13. Chapter Two focuses on the historical roots of instability in the Horn of Africa that are largely
based on the legacies of colonial masters as well as the pre-colonial empires.
Chapter Three studies the Horn’s instability in context and analyzes its causes as well as
impacts. The level of analysis is also be used to establish the roles of different players in the
Horn conflict preventing a generic study of the Horn instability.
Chapter Four assesses the challenges posed by instability in the Horn of Africa to Kenya and
gives a brief overview of Kenya’s role in addressing instability in the Horn and similarly the
current situation in the Horn.
Chapter Five is the last chapter of this project and therefore gives a description of the findings,
recommendations and finally a conclusion.
CHAPTER TWO
7
14. 2.0 Historical Background of Instability in the Horn of Africa
The Horn of Africa in this piece assumes the definition given by Ofuho of the Horn as a
constituent of five states, namely, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea. However,
Kenya and Uganda are also studied within the auspices of understanding the Horn due to the
spillover of conflicts into the former states, well covered under the concept of conflict
triangulation. The states in the Horn vary in terms of strengths, political systems, capabilities
and size but the problems of conflict manifest in the same way, the recent concerns over
terrorism being the most devastating, among many other deep seated issues such as communal
perceptions and identities, geopolitical factors and historical narratives. (Mwagiru, 2004, p. 7).
To adequately articulate the present, a study of the past is inescapable.
This chapter argues that the instability in the Horn stems from historical, regional,
environmental and international factors, significantly triggered by colonization and its impacts.
In the Horn of Africa, Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia have been major sites of conflict since
obtaining independence in the 1960s. To aggravate the situation, the Somali state totally
collapsed in the 1990s transcending the popular 1648 Treaty of Westphalia that had rendered the
state the single most powerful actor in the international system. The rise of other significant
actors either as individuals or illegitimate groups became the norm in Somalia, also penetrating
into the other sates of the Horn. Numerous conflicts in the Horn have been internal in nature,
with profound effects on the neighboring states, especially Kenya, as will be discussed in
chapter Four (Mwagiru, 2004. p. 7-9).
2. 0.1 Reasons for Conflict in countries in The Horn of Africa
There are numerous reasons explaining the occurrence of conflict in the Horn as discussed as
follows:
2.0.2 International Factors
The 19th
Century remains central to the study of African international relations given that
European powers annexed vast territories in Africa, driven by the desire to control the
continents resources (Falola & Usman, 2009, p 12). By the second half of the century,
8
15. Europeans had laid claim to virtually all of Africa. The problem then became the crowding of
such people in some spheres of influence necessitating negotiations that were held in Berlin in
1884. This conference, convened to sought things out between the colonial powers, laid the
groundwork for the contemporary political units characterizing African states; the French
colonized most of West Africa; Belgians the Congo; Germans held four colonies, one in each
region; the Portuguese, one in West Africa and two in South Africa and the British, East and
Southern Africa. Britain took control of northern Somalia that includes vast areas of the present
day Somaliland and Kenya, France occupied present day Djibouti and Italy controlled most of
present day Somalia, minus Somaliland (Moller, 2009, p. 8). Sudan was colonized by Egypt and
later by Britain (de Blij & Muller, 2003). Mengisteab (2011) actually argues that, though not in
all exclusivity, the major wars in the Horn have primarily been by fought over territorial and
border issues.
As realists would best put it, states are the sole most important actors in International Relations.
They exercise sovereignty within a given territory and have no higher authority to guide their
actions. The power that states have in International Relations seems to be central to the
functioning and existence of the international system. European powers treated the colonies as
possessions. Colonies were traded off, seized and even booted in war with little regard given to
the implications. The results were permanent borders that ‘clumped’ people together which were
to be maintained uti-possidetis. The state in Africa was therefore incapacitated in terms of its
formation unlike, say those in Europe, that were a result of concession and compromise due to
social and political activity (Goldstein, 1999, p. 524).
2.0.2.1 Impacts of Colonialism
Colonialism's most evident effect, one that is a major reason for disputes, is the
establishment of boundaries that have been contested ever since. The arbitrariness of the
boundaries is evident as the respect for African political, social or economic organization was
not considered beyond the interest of the colonizers. Africa has since independence been in a
quagmire as a result of the mismatch between perceived nations and actual state boarders. The
continent had nothing resembling the contemporary state prior to the infamous scramble for
Africa in the 19th
Century, the closest were empires in the continent that were not only
organized differently but also governed differently from the idea of the Westphalia state (See
9
16. Fig 1 for map of Africa before colonization) (Goldstein, 1991, p. 12 & Mengisteab, 2011).
States were literally launched on a collision path with their neighbours, especially in the Horn
region. Some communities were fragmented and spread across boarders that hindered their
movement, for instance, the case in Somalia which has some of its people spread over the
Ogaden region in Ethiopia as well as in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya (See
map of greater Somalia in Fig 2).
States within the Horn have failed to develop a mature sense of national self-identity that
transcends tribe, ethnicity, clan and even race. Such loyalties permeate the thinking of
individuals as citizens of a particular country. Very few people in the Horn relate to the more
abstract notion of the state than to their, say tribal affiliations. Politics are similarly shaped
along these divisions and driven by the ever-shifting rivalries and alliances based on such
associations. This explains the frequent unrests in the Horn that are led by efforts of secession
such as that in Somalia, Ethiopia and more recently seen in Kenya by the Coastal societies
(Brown & Snow, 2000, p. 126).
According to one mythology, Somalis are said to have come from the Arabian Peninsula,
perhaps from Islamic missionaries dispatched from Arabia by Prophet Mohammed Himself and
there unique physical attributes are identifiable as you move across the Kenyan or Ethiopian
borders (Moller, 2009, p. 7). These occupants are seen to share common physical features with
the Somali nationals which lead to the rational conclusion of a shared descent with inhabitants
of present day Somalia. Some of such communities are nomads but the borders greatly hinder
their movement and yet they greatly rely on regional ecosystems for survival (Mengisteab,
2011).
10
18. http://imc.mbhs.edu/soc/netinvestigations/imperialism/africaprecolonial.gif
(Retreaved from www.pambazuka.org, Yellow represents the areas occupied by ethnic Somalis).
As early as 1969, Somalia and Kenya were caught up in a dispute over parts of the Kenyan
territory of the Kenyan North Eastern frontier District (KNFD) that led to a 'shifta war' between
the two states. The two share a 1200 kilometer border. Following the Kenyan independence in
12
19. 1963, Great Britain appointed a commission whose mandate was to report the public opinion of
Somalis in 'Somali region' in Kenya regarding their unity with Somali Republic. It is reported
that five out of the six 'Somali districts' favored reunification with the greater Somalia , but
ironically the British government failed to recommend the move let alone approve the
reunification or formation of any kind of consensus between the two states involved (Elmi,
2010, p. 101)
Somali and Ethiopia have on the other hand addressed the issue in a more aggressive manner.
The dispute over the Ogaden region in Ethiopia has led to three major wars between the two
states. This has enhanced suspicions by the two states over each-others actions and greatly
impacted the possibility of cooperation in the near future between the two states. Any
reconciliation and peace initiatives led by Ethiopia in Somalia, have been viewed with suspicion
and their input effected sparingly (Elmi, 2010, p. 101).
Colonialism similarly left legacies of structures for governance and systems of governance that
did not reflect the cultural values of the people of the Horn. In many instances, the ‘democratic’
systems became predatory in nature, depicted by unaccountable governments, inequality and
marginalization of citizens, leading to tension in society that at times challenged the very
existence of such regimes. Sudan is one good example of such a government that in 1983
instituted fundamentalist Islamic law to govern the state after experiencing unstable
parliamentary governments and military regimes. The government’s decision to use Sharia Law
exacerbated the rift that already existed between the predominantly Muslim north and the
Christian south, these and many other factors having been large contributors to conflict in
Sudan that led to the division of the two states, resulting in a new state, South Sudan in July
2011 (infoplease, 2005).
2.0.2 Historical Empires Legacies
Some states in the Horn of Africa had their boundaries drawn before colonial period. Africans
were organized before the coming of colonialists though as empires rather than states. Legacies
of some of these empires are still felt in the Horn of Africa region. Abyssinian Empire 6 in
present day Ethiopia, that can enable one fully understand the Ethiopia-Eritrea as well as
Mahdiyya state in Sudan, explaining the roots of the Southern Sudanese war are similarly
13
20. relevant to understanding conflict in the Horn. The empires were just renamed to form states,
clustering together different societies they had managed to annex whilst empires. These empires
similarly left behind ethnic identities fragmented in various territories (Mengisteab, 2011). The
conflicts in the Horn will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
2.0.3 Environmental Conditions
The Horn largely occupies an arid and semi-arid region that connives with conflict, which has
characterized the region for decades, to make the lives of people of the Horn more dangerous
and miserable. Drought has exerted its full toll on states in the Horn, especially Somalia where
many Somalis fled their parched homes and villages, for instance during the 1990 drought, in
desperate search for food, exposing them more directly to the effects of war. The International
Committee of the Red Cross records of 1992 show that as many as 92% of Somalis suffered
from certain degrees of malnutrition as a result of the 1990 drought (Brown & Snow, 2000, p.
126).
14
21. CHAPTER 3
3.0 The Conflict in the Horn of Africa in Context
Conflict has for the longest time affiliated Africa, exacting a heavy toll on her societies, politics
and economics. This has robbed the continent of its developmental potential and made her a
victim of exploitation and a breeding ground for corruption. The greater Horn region is one of
the most conflict ravaged regions in the African continent with the region being a site of
numerous inter and intra state conflicts over the years. The conflicts result from a number of
factors that range from the legacy of colonial times, contexts of the Cold War that tolerated
authoritarian regimes to challenges of the new era such as terrorism (Sahnoun, 1994, p. xi). As a
consequence of conflict, the Horn of Africa is now dealing with challenges of refugees,
proliferations of arms, delayed democratization, secessionist struggles, terrorism and increased
poverty levels.
This Chapter is aimed at enabling the reader to fully comprehend the situation in the Horn
region by considering the conflict in Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan as representative of the Horn
Conflict narrative. Actors in the conflicts will also be identified within the auspices of the level
of analysis framework.
a) Somalia
France, Italy, Great Britain and Ethiopia make up the powers that occupied pre-colonial Somalia
Peninsula. Independence, that took place in 1960 in the peninsula, fragmented this region,
spreading its inhabitants to present day Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. This proved a
challenge to Somali nationalists who were so resolutely focused on re-uniting all Somalis in the
15
22. region to create the Greater Somalia. This propelled Somalia to aggressive relations with her
neighbours, resulting in one of the most brutal inter-state war in Africa, the Ogaden War,
between 1977-1978, against Ethiopia as well as the Shifta Wars between Somalia and Kenya in
1963 (Feyissa & Hoehne, 2010, p.4-6).
State formation has therefore been central to conflict in Somalia, at best a costly one for her
neighbours, especially with regard to instability it causes, and at worst a threat to her
neighbours’ territorial integrity.
The question of governance is ensconced as another cause of conflict in Somalia, clanism
being the country's version of ethnicity or tribalism. The country is made up of six major clans,
Darod, Dir, Hawiye, Isaq, Digil and Mirife, each divided into more clans, sub clans and sub-sub
clans going down into lineages and extended families. After the Second World War, clanism
among Somalis favored nationalism and creation of a greater Somalia (Matthews & Ali, 1999,
p. 170).
In 1969, Maj. Gen. Mohammed Siad Barre took power under a military coup after the
assassination of President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke (infoplease). The new regime adopted an
authoritarian form of rule and due to its nature, advanced the state towards military operations,
especially in pursuit of its irredentists dream. Said Barre’s regime therefore saw the
opportunities that came with the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie in the now ‘weakened’ state of
Ethiopia which prompted Somali’s attack in 1977 and 1978. Somalia suffered defeat, which
weakened Barre’s regime and led to its fall in 1991, followed by internal territory reorganization
that saw Somaliland secede and Puntland declare autonomy from Somalia in 1991 and 1998
respectively. Anarchy has since then characterized Somalia and its perils manifest in the Horn
region as will be discussed in chapter Four (Feyissa & Hoehne, 2010, p. 5).
Attempts have been made to try and consolidate Somalia state, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)
attempts being the most memorable. In 2006, after one and a half decade of war, the ICU
appeared to, at least to a large extent, brought quiescence to Somalia. However, Ethiopia
foresaw ICU’s likelihood to return to the irredentist’s rhetoric that had informed prior
governments. Guided by interests of maintaining its territory, Ethiopia conspired with the
16
23. United States, which has always been opposed to Islamic leadership, to topple the ICU from
power. The ICU leader, Hassan Dahir Aweys was said to have links with Al-Qaida, a terrorist
group that has carried out numerous terrorist attacks in the world, including in the United States
and his name said to be in the 13224 executive order, that listed 189 individuals and
organizations designated terrorist. Ethiopia therefore directed support to the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG), instituted in 2004 in Nairobi, mediated by Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) and endorsed as Somali government (Mengisteab, 2011).
The ICU developed a radical faction, popularly known as Al-Shabab, which largely comprised
young people who had formed a force to fight Ethiopian forces, interested in weakening the
interim government. It however followed that they began to control parts of the country and
with time announced links with Al-Qaida. Countries within the region that favored the TFG,
sent troops to defend the government from Al-Shabab occupation and their assistance met with
the launching of terrorist attacks against civilians in their home states by Al-Shabab and their
cohorts. Al-Qaida is said to have cells in other states in the Horn such as Sudan. Kenya, having
been a key player in the TFG formation has been subjected to terror attacks as will be examined
in the chapter Four (BBC, 2012).
b) Ethiopia
The study of Ethiopian conflicts gives primacy to the Eritrean wars of liberation. Under a 1952
United Nations mandate, following the historical colonial epoch, Eritrea was federated with
Ethiopia. A decade later, Emperor Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea, a decision that illuminates
Eritrea’s current autonomous status. The invasion by the emperor mobilized armed resistance by
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) (Feyissa & Hoehne, 2010, p. 5).
Following a regime change in Ethiopia in 1974, the state was transformed to military rule of the
Derg. The change corresponded with the rise of a more militant liberation movement known as
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) that led Eritrea to its independence in 1993. The
prowess demonstrated by the Eritreans gained following from other groupings within Ethiopia
who resorted to challenging the centralist state in Ethiopia, Tigreans People’s Liberation Front
(TPLF), labeled as the most vocal. This faction formed alliances with other ethno-liberation
17
24. movements, creating the Ethiopians People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).
EPRDF seized power in the late 1980’s and redefined the country’s political organization by
introducing ethnic federation. However this posed new challenges of ethnocracy in the state and
could breed many other detractors to state survival (Feyissa & Hoehne, 2010, p. 5). The state’s
most protracted dispute is the 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the border, in
the environs of Badme that escalated into a full-fledged war. The Algiers Treaty, signed in
December 2000, ended the war after the commission demarcated the boundaries. However the
challenges are still manifest following reluctance by Ethiopia to neither allow for physical or
virtual demarcation of the border. Its instability as a contested frontier always spills out across
the Horn (Mengisteab, 2011).
c) Sudan
The disputes in Sudan trace their origin to the attainment of independence. The political elites of
the era, particularly those from Northern parts of the country, embraced power, in a monopoly
sense, that embraced the exclusion of others, in this case the Southerners. The Southerners’
peripheral status was not limited to state politics but also extended to development, which
prevented their incorporation to the states’ developmental projects. The Northerners also
endowed their political aspirations with religion that saw the state embrace Sharia Law as
national law as they set out to Islamize the entire state. Discontent that breed among the
Christian south was only inevitable and sparked civil war in Sudan between 1961 and 1972 and
a protracted one between 1983 and 2005, that later saw the separation of South and North Sudan
in 2011 after a peaceful referendum that preceded the secession. The two states have however
had a tense relationship, at some points escalating to open hostilities over outstanding financial
and oil related issues (Feyissa & Hoehne, 2010, p. 6).
3.2 Conceptual Framework of Conflict in the Horn; Actors and
their Influences on Conflict in the Horn Region
‘Of war men ask the outcome, not the cause’ is a truth being revealed in conflict today despite
the fact that this statement was made nearly 2000 years ago (Goldstein, 1999, p. 193). The Horn
18
25. has been known as an arc of conflict, attributable to many different factors. The conflicts that
have for so long lingered in the Horn encompass many actors, which has contributed to the
complexity of understanding the actual causes of the conflict. No single actor can be identified
as the sole cause for instability in the Horn. There exists a conglomeration of actors and
beneficiaries who facilitate the regions conflict. The conflicts in the Horn of Africa occur at
several levels ranging from inter-state conflict to inter-communal levels.
IR has sorted out the challenge of the multiplicity of actors, significant to a particular outcome,
by creating different levels of analysis. It’s a perspective in International Relations that allows
the observer to generalize actors and categorize them into disaggregated levels or units to enable
an easier breakdown of an event (Goldstein, 1999, p. 16 & 17). This section, while focusing on
actors as low as the individual to the international system, will give more attention to the role of
state, domestic and global actors in conflict in the Horn of Africa. The role of the actors
involved in the conflict is not limited to the contents of this piece, the area in inexhaustible.
i) Individuals
Countless individuals would be worth mentioning in this level due to their significant role in
conflict in the Horn of Africa. However, only two leaders, in the conflict prone countries of
Somalia and Sudan will be studied.
First is a look at President Jafaar Nimeiri, a military man who clasped power in Sudan in 1969.
During his tenure, Nimeiri executed an authoritarian form of leadership and introduced Sharia
Law and Arabic as the official language in the country. His decision seemed not to
accommodate the Christian south as opposed to the Arabic north and this triggered Sudan’s first
civil war. Coups and counter coups that had characterized Sudan since her independence also
led to Nimeiri’s overthrow from office by President Omar El Bashir (Wanyama, 2012, p. 17).
Secondly is President Said Barre of Somalia who took office in 1969. Barre was from the
Marehan subclan of the Doran clan that occupied the Southern parts of Sudan. The Northern
part of the country, home to the large Isaaq clan as well as other small clans resented leadership
by southern groups. Siyad condemned and denied political space for other clans. To further
19
26. exacerbate the situation, the resource rich north gained insignificant benefit from their resources
as the government did little to ensure equitable regional economic development. Barre sought to
transform Kisimaayo into a major livestock export trading center for Southern Somalia. This
fact, among others like his military background that informed his authoritarian regime led to
frustration, culminating in an uprising in 1988. The Somali National Movement (SNM) led the
insurrection which met initial success before being decelerated by the government that
employed sophisticated means of combat such as aircrafts and heavy weapons to suppress the
revolution. An estimated 5,000 civilians were killed in May 1988 alone under this regime. The
conflict ultimately resulted in disintegration of Somalia in 1988 after Said Barre fled Mogadishu
on January 27, 1991 leaving the state in anarchy for decades (Sahanoun, 1994, p. 5 & 6).
ii) Domestic Actors
Within the Horn of Africa, it is not uncommon for populations of neighbouring countries to
support ethnic-based insurgencies across their borders, especially if they occupy the same
region, only separated by imaginary borders that in some areas are unguarded. Therefore,
support does not have to come from the government (Mengisteab, 2011).
The Horn of Africa can also identify some domestic challenges as the fulcrum upon which
instability and conflict thrive in the Horn. Problems of nation-building have been central to
countries in the Horn given that the states comprise heterogeneous populations with different
cultures, languages and systems. There exists real as well as perceived uneven development
within states that has often advanced rebellions within states. Contemporary state nomenclature,
which ties investments in say infrastructure, social services, industrial growth and therefore
development to major cities, other regions rendered peripheral, has led to discontent among
people in such regions and in some instances sparked secession movements that further lead to
conflict within the Horn of African states (Feyissa & Hoehne, 2010, p. 135).
iii) State Actors
Governments in the Horn have also been involved in proxy wars against each other, supporting
20
27. each other’s insurgencies, and in some instances contributed to the destabilization of regimes
they have antagonist relationships with, attributable to vested interests a country may have or
particular ties shared. It is evident that every state is weaker than some combination of other
states. Somalia had in so many instances supported irredentist movements in Ethiopia’s Ogaden
region before its collapse in 1991, as well as to groups in Kenya North Eastern Province during
the Shifta wars due to its interests in uniting all Somali’s to form the greater Somali state.
Records similarly implicate Ethiopia in using this same strategy to curtail the Somali
government by aiding insurgency movements such as the Somali National Movement (SNM)
and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in Somalia which weakened the
government and redirected its attention to internal or domestic concerns, the creation of a
greater Somalia, pushed to the side-line (Mengisteab, 2011).
In Sudan, Ethiopian and Ugandan governments assisted the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLM) against successive Sudanese regimes and Sudan government retaliated this by
supporting the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group of Uganda as well as the ELF of
Ethiopia. Eritrea is associated with collaboration with Ethiopian insurgency groups against their
government and the latter similarly supporting Eritrean opposition groups (Mengisteab, 2011).
Such actions by governments within the Horn region aggravate the situation often leading to
enhanced and prolonged conflict, such support often ranging from military, moral to even
monetary support.
Alliances have also been formed as a result of perceived threats by states within the Horn.
Ethiopia and Kenya established a mutual defense pact in 1964 in response to what they
perceived as Somali threat to their national integrity through Somali’s claim of territories within
the latter states. Elmi (2010) argues that the two states are so threatened by the possibility of
peace in Somalia due to the territorial claims made by Somalia over part of their territories, that
they in some instances used the regional organization, Organization of African Unity (OAU) to
effect Somalia’s conflict.
iv) Global Factors and Actors
There are outcomes in international relations that transcend the interactions of states
21
28. themselves. In the Horn of Africa is the lingering effect of historical European imperialism. This
was a force and trend that started in the fifteenth Century that saw European powers acquire
extensive empires in Latin, Central and North America and later throughout Asia and Africa
(Goldstein, 1999, p. 31).
Arbitrary territorial divisions characterized the African continent, the Horn not an
exception. However, following the Second World War, there was a wave of decolonization that
saw most African states attain independence. This was ensued by neocolonialism due to the
long-established economic patterns that colonized states had established with their colonial
masters. The impacts of such relations are evident in the Horn of Africa given that Europe as
well as other colonial masters still depend on Africa for cheap labour, energy and minerals and
other raw materials such as oil (Goldstein, 1999, p. 32).
United States (US) and the Soviet Union/Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
became the two super powers of the post-World War Two era, the two characterized by different
ideologies, capitalism and communism respectively. US and USSR then set out to establish
third world clients as well as a network of alliances in the zero sum race, rhetorically known as
the Cold War. In the Horn of Africa, US supported Ethiopia, at least until 1974, whereas the
Soviet Union backed Siyad Barre’s military regime. In 1974, following a revolution that ended
with a military coup in Ethiopia, the new Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam established
cordial relations with Moscow shifting the Soviet’s alliance from Somalia to the larger Ethiopia.
(Moller, 2009).
USSR, given that her allies were necessitated by her national interest, which was
enhancing her influence, preferred an alliance with the much larger Ethiopia than Somalia,
leading USSR to her decision of severing links with the latter. This new relationship was
ultimately cemented in the 1977-78 Ogaden War when USSR supported Ethiopia against
Somalia, both directly, by means of arms deliveries and military advisers and indirectly as well.
The war proved detrimental to Somalia that failed to obtain US backing in the war. The Soviets
naval base at Berbera, Somalia, was considered to be of strategic importance and the Somalia
government assumed that the US would be interested in supporting Somalia so as to obtain
access to the strategic base; it was unfortunate when the US did not take the bait. The end of the
22
29. Cold war in 1989 led to the loss of the Horn’s strategic importance and the conflicts in the
region overlooked by the international community (Moller, 2009).
There is a growing importance of global-level processes and their impacts on international
outcomes. A possible complementary can be obtained from this level of analysis, for example,
the establishment of international norms, such as the rule of law, respect for human rights and
norms against the use of force. War was at some point considered a normal way to resolve
disputes but this is no longer the popular view. Wars have become less frequent and when they
do occur, efforts are made to bring the warring parties to the table to enable amicable resolution
to conflict (Goldstein, 1999, p. 32). So the role of the international community in helping
resolve conflict in the Horn needs to be revisited.
23
30. CHAPTER FOUR
4. 0 Transnationalism; Kenya’s Approaches to Conflict in the
Horn of Africa.
Instability in the Horn, as a result of conflict, as espoused in chapter Two and Three of this
piece, have Kenya at peril due to its relative stability in comparison to the countries that
comprise the Horn. Conflict triangulation, manifested in; the number of refugees in the country,
cross border banditry, trafficking of small arms and light weapons along the borders as well as
increased terrorist activities within its territory has led to involvement by Kenya in the conflict.
Nairobi has become an important center for international negotiations that have influenced the
dynamics of peace and conflict in the region (Feyissa & Hoehne, 2010, p. 6 & 133).
This Chapter focuses on the impacts conflict has had on Kenya and how this has shaped
Kenya’s foreign policy with regard to the Horn of Africa states. An analysis of the prospects of
peace in the region will bring the chapter to a close.
4. 0.1 Impacts of Conflict and instability of the Horn of Africa
on Kenya
i) Refugees
Unrest in the countries of Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan, countries that share borders with
Kenya, has led to the displacement of many civilians, some of whom choose to move into
Kenya for refuge in the face of war. Somalia, according to UNHCR 2011 records, has produced
24
31. 1.1 million refugees and Sudan 500,000. Influx of Ethiopian and Somali refugees is traced to
the 1970’s, 1991 collapse of Somalia marking a period of massive inflow of Somali refugees
into Kenya (UNHCR, 2012).
The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) set up Daadab camp in 1991,
following Somalis descent into chaos after the collapse of Barre’s regime in the same year. The
complex was intended to host up to 90,000 refugees and is located in North Eastern Kenya. Its
proximity to Kisimaayo, a town in Somalia, has rendered it an easier alternative to civilians
during conflict. Refugees can travel by road to the camp and in dire circumstances try their
chance on foot; many die on transit. The Daadab camp today hosts more than 463,000 refugees,
making it the largest refugee camp in the world. As of September 2012, refugees totaled
559,000, those residing in Nairobi and the Kakuma camp included (UNHCR, 2012).
The Kenyan government’s reluctance to issue refugees with permanent refugee status has
further exacerbated the situation. Many Somalis end up assuming unofficial residence in the
already unfettered Eastleigh quarter in Nairobi. Due to the obvious congestion in camps, as the
figures suggest, new arrivals have resorted to settling in areas around the camps further
complicating registration. For instance, out of the 433,643 refugees who arrived at Daadap
camp, UNHCR registered 7,416 individuals, as of September2012 (UNHCR, 2012).
The infiltration of refugees in Kenya has brought with it new challenges for Kenya. First, the
areas inhabited by the refugees overstretch the resources present due to the mismatch between
the available resources, vis-a-vis the population. This has also raised concerns about possible
tension between local communities and the camp residents over water, firewood and other
resources necessary for survival. The north eastern part of Kenya is also predominantly semi-
arid and as the population increases, so does the harsh realization of scarce resources become
manifest (UNHCR, 2012).
ii) Terrorism
Following terrorist attacks in 1998 and 2002 in Kenya’s cities of Nairobi and Mombasa
respectively, the country has devoted resources to counter-terror measures and formed alliances
25
32. with other states that share the aspiration to rid the world of extremists who often resort to
terrorism, its biggest partner being the United States. It is within this same vein that the Kenyan
government committed its military to go into Somalia to fight the Al-Shabab in 2011, under
United Nations backed African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the decision coming
after a series of grenade attacks, kidnappings and explosions in the Kenyan towns of Nairobi,
Mombasa as well as in Kenyan Northeastern province and its environs. According to Nairobi
US embassy records, a total of 17 attacks took place between January and July 2012. The
targets included police stations, churches, small shops and bus stations, to mention but a few.
The terrorist attacks are in response to Kenya’s invasion of Somalia and have necessitated
enhanced security that even involves frisking citizens as they go into churches, the sacredness
of Holy grounds assumed by Christians, abetting terrorist pursuit (Horowitz, 2012).
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission
operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African
Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate.
AMISOM replaced and subsumed IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia also IGASOM, which was
a proposed Inter-Governmental Authority on Development protection and training mission in Somalia
approved by the African Union in September 2006. IGASOM was also approved by the United Nations
Security Council as well (African Union, 2012).
The intense offensive staged by AMISOM has so far liberated Mogadishu that was a major strong hold
of the Al-Shabab, given that it is Somali’s capital, and recently secured Kisimayo, another major town
occupied by the Al-Shabab (un.org/apps/news/story). The terror activities have been of concern to
many states, the US at the forefront of the war against terrorism. The activities led to renewed US
interest in the continent and led them to establish a military base, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti in 2002. The force has embarked on training friendly militaries on pre-
conflict operations and intelligence gathering in the Horn states, Kenya included. Eritrea, a largely
military state is also claimed to sponsor terror activities in the Horn in its proxy wars with Ethiopia that
implies state involvement in terrorism. (Mkutu, 2008, p. 2).
iii) Influx of Small arms and Light Weapons
26
33. Conflict in the Horn of Africa has resulted in the existence of an array of weapons, devastatingly now
at the hands of civilians in conflicting societies. This has undermined governance, peace initiatives,
development, social cohesion as well as humanitarian activities. The Horn of Africa is perceived to
have had the largest infusion of small arms and light weapons3
from the Cold War as the superpowers
fought wars as well as proxy wars of domination within the continent. The Small Arms Survey places
the number of arms in circulation in sub-Sahara Africa at 30 million (Mkutu, 2008, p. 2 & 4) Siyad
Barre’s regimes’ responsive nature to the Soviets; this is within the Cold War context, entrenched
Soviets into Somali. Relations between the two states were sealed with the exchange of military
hardware for strategic military facilities. Barre distributed arms along the border communities, to erect
a buffer incase Ethiopia or Kenya decided to press its offensive against Somalia. Arms were sold in
open market and currency exchanged for life taking machines with such ease. For instance, during the
1980’s Ethiopian famine, weapons were traded for food along the NFD border (Mburu, 2005, p. 234 &
235).
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons directly correlates with escalation and
intensification of conflict in the Horn of Africa, the border regions the most vulnerable to the
endemic. The coast of the Horn of Africa enables trafficking of weapons and also piracy
activities, adding a maritime dimension to the challenges of the Horn.
Largely occupying semi-arid and arid regions, communities in the border regions, who practice
pastoralism, have enhanced cattle rustling activities as well as banditry, now employing more
sophisticated weapons. Such conflicts are often inter-communal and though sporadic and of a
lower intensity, very destructive due to the frequency of their occurrence. The raiding activities
form an aspect of traditional pastoralist culture and therefore a practice difficult to invalidate.
Such activities are rendered national issues when the manifestations of such activities transcend
borders, when pastoralists cross borders into neighbouring states or when the raids actually
encroach on the security of an entire state, as in the case of Sudanese Toposa attacking the
Turkana of Kenya. Affected communities include the Turkana, Pokot, Samburu, and
Karamajong among many more that has resulted in the loss of human life, displacement of
3
Mkutu, 2008 records the United Nations definition of small arms as including revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and
carbines, assault rifles, sub machine guns and light machine guns, while light weapons also include heavy machine guns,
hand held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-craft missiles, and mortars up to 100 mm
in caliber. Ammunition and explosives also fall under the small arms.
27
34. segments of society, increases rivalry between communities and disruption of socio-economic
activities in such areas (Mkutu, 2008, p. 3).
Kenyan government demonstrated commitment to address the problem of small arms and light
weapons in 2001 when it banned cross border trade with Somalia. The loss of a trade was such a
great sacrifice for the state (International Business Publications, 2004, p. 3).
4.1 Kenya national and regional Interests
The conduct of Foreign policy has been a prerogative of the Head of State in Kenya as
entrenched in section 16 of the constitution of Kenya. The executive is therefore the initiator,
articulator and director of foreign policy. The foreign affairs ministry is therefore responsible
for execution of policies and in some instances offers advice to the executive (International
Business Publications, 2004, p. 154). Kenya’s external relations are governed by the need to
promote an environment favorable for trade and investment and her development and prosperity
intimately tied with that of her neighbours. Diplomacy and negotiations has been used and this
is systematically changing to economic cooperation to bring about peace in the Horn, the best
example of this studied below:
The Lamu-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Project (LAPSSET), launched in March 2012
appears to be the most promising, it is not only numerous but profound. A standard gauge
railway from Lamu to Juba, with an expansion to Addis Abbaba, Ethiopia, an oil pipeline from
Juba to Lamu as well as a road network linking Lamu, Isiolo, Garissa, Juba and Addis Ababa
form the centerpieces of this great project. The hope to set up an oil refinery at Baragoi, expand
the water and communication systems in the region, link the Ethiopian and Kenya power grids
as well as transform Lamu, Isiolo and Lokichogio on Lake Turkana into resort cities are also
proposed in the project (Harbeson, 2012, p. 6).
LAPSSET corridor is an economic project whose establishment will not only enhance
cooperation between states in the Horn but has potential to concurrently curb or mitigate
conflict in the Horn of Africa. The new pipeline will open an alternative route for South Sudan
to export her oil after it failed to successfully resolve its standoff with North Sudan that is a
28
35. transit country to access to the Red Sea. South Sudan has resorted to the more costly tracking of
its products to the Indian Ocean coast, at least until the impasse with Sudan is mediated or
better yet the pipeline built. Ethiopia has similarly had its sea access stressed since 1993
Eritrean independence, forcing the former to rely on Djibouti’s port. LAPSSET offers Ethiopia a
new access to the sea through Lamu. The project is largely concentrated on the Northern parts
of Kenya that will transform the region, which has for the longest time grumbled over being
marginalized. This will attract investors which will; enable development of the area, create
alternative jobs for the local settlers who may gradually abandon banditry and cattle rustling
whose ripple effect will be security and stability and finally prevent the revitalization of
irredentists or separatist movements by the inhabitants of the region (Harbeson, 2012, p. 6)
Kenya has also hosted numerous peace brokering conferences as mentioned in the previous
chapters which have proved significant for restoration of peace in the region, especially in
Sudan and Somalia. A new president was elected in Somalia in September after the Kenyan
backed TFG successfully managed to enhance stability and peace. The Kenyan government has
also initiated intensive measures to enhance existing penal legislation to enable it deal with all
aspects of terrorism that the government has so verbally condemned as well as all its
manifestations. The terrorist activities in the region have led Kenya to call for intensified
international cooperation in the struggle against the scourge. In his inaugural speech, 2002,
President Kibaki declared his government’s commitment to ‘support and facilitate all the
positive efforts to resolve the conflicts in Somalia, Sudan and other trouble spots in Africa’. He
acknowledged the heavy burden that Kenya has to bear as a result of the regions’ conflicts,
necessitating her position at the forefront in the search for peace (International Business
Publications, 2004, p. 158).
It is upon such a backdrop that Kenya has been compelled to plough resources into security that
could have otherwise been used to enhance development, given that the Horn region had been
rendered unstable by the conflicts discussed in the paper. Kenya foreign policy towards the
Horn of Africa has therefore been shaped, largely, by conflict in the Horn of Africa. The results
of conflict in the Horn that include those studied above have proliferated to the Kenyan foreign
policy agenda and could explain her involvement in Sudan’s peace process by enabling the
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi, Kenya between the
29
36. Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on
January 9th
2005 and similar involvement in Somalia in the establishment of TFG as discussed
in the previous chapters (Wanyama, 2012, p. 29).
States are guided by numerous interests in their relations with other states, national security
often salient to any state, especially in the wake of globalization. Security seems to form a
foundation for many states foreign policy, because at its most basic, it represents a state’s
imperative of survival. Governments endeavor to deter, whenever possible and defend the state
against any possible depredations, ranging from diseases to threats as serious as nuclear ones
and if already threatened, seek to mitigate the effects as observed in Kenya’s relations with the
Horn states (Deibel, 2007, p. 125).
States economic wellbeing or prosperity of a state also informs foreign policy. Realists assert
that power is central to the study of international relations and explain actions by states in the
anarchic globe. Power is able to enhance influence and comprises, though not limited to basic
resources, economic strength, military strength as well as culture (Clemens, 1998, p. 137).
States with constrained views of power are likely to fall victim to under specification of their
interests and threats. Globalization has compelled states to promote economics beyond the
traditional domestic arena necessitating cooperation, that if not achieved can even challenge the
existence of a state by prompting the rise of irredentist movements, secessionist movements
who may be convinced that the state is not doing enough to ensure their prosperity (Deibel,
2007, p. 154).
30
37. CHAPTER FIVE
5.0 Findings
At the beginning of this research, I set out to find out the role instability in the Horn of Africa
has played in the formulation of Kenya's foreign policy. The hypothesis of this study was based
on the assumption that conflict in the Horn of Africa has influenced Kenya's foreign policy
towards the Horn of Africa. After weeks of research, this has proven to be true. Given that the
impact of conflict is so readily felt within Kenya, its policy has been shaped by the need to
bring stability in the Horn region. Chapter Four which discussed the impacts of regional
instability on Kenya directly supports the hypothesis. Kenya has been involved in peace
initiatives in the region and hosted many peace conferences with the aim of bringing peace to
the Horn of Africa. The challenges of terrorism has seen the country align itself with other states
such as the United States in a bid to suppress and finally eradicate the scourge. Kenya is also
looking at ways to prevent new conflicts as that between north and south Sudan, especially
through the LAPSSET corridor initiative.
Instability and insecurity are largely as a result of intra-state and inter-state conflicts in the states
of Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia, some of which have received in depth study in Chapter
three of this piece. The role of internal and external actors was also assessed with the aim of
fully establishing the situation in the Horn of Africa. It also reveals the complexity of the
conflict in the Horn of Africa which has characterized the region for decades.
Kenya has played a big role in peace mediation in Sudan as well as Somalia ascribed to the
31
38. existence of interdependence and globalization. However, with regards to the gap identified in
the literature review, Kenya has failed to establish locally acceptable governments given that
most conferences are held in Kenya, alienating the locals from the process. This is evident in
Somalia where the local population did not fully embrace the TFG.
5.1 Recommendations
In light of the above findings, this research acknowledges that Kenya national and regional
interests are centered on the need to address the region's instability. To ensure that peace and
stability is attained, this research offers the following recommendations:
i) Kenya's policy's orientations towards the region should embrace the cultural aspect of
the inhabitants of the Horn, especially with regard to pastoralist who consider the practice a
traditional practice that cannot be solved by economic considerations, at least if conflict is to be
solved in the long term.
ii) There is also need to go beyond negotiations by the government once it has decided to
intervene in a conflict. Follow up should be made and this included in the peace agreements so
as to ensure that the agreement is actualized. This also calls for the establishment of say Task
Units and these units given mandate to monitor specific conflicts. Such units should receive
backing from either the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or the African
Union (AU) to prevent Kenya's monopoly over the process.
5.2 Conclusion
The Horn of Africa is mired with conflict that is dovetailed with the undesirable semi-arid and
arid climate that translates into frequent drought. Kenya’s ‘success story’ in the Horn region,
however significant cannot be isolated from the impact of conflict by simply securing its
borders. Kenya’s foreign policy seems optimistic about the materialization of peace in the Horn
32
39. of Africa, demonstrated in her efforts to mediate peace and her active involvement in efforts of
regional cooperation. Conflict seems to crop up even after instances of peace. The decision by
Kenya to also include economic cooperation as a new strategy could pay off but this we can
only wait to see.
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