The document argues that the court should grant the motion to suppress evidence in the case of People v. Kippen for two reasons:
1. Kippen's detention was not justified and unreasonable because the officer lacked specific, articulable facts indicating criminal activity. The only reason for the stop was that Kippen's 1979 vehicle lacked a shoulder harness, which was not required.
2. The evidence found in Kippen's pocket during a pat down search should be suppressed because the officer exceeded the scope of a reasonable weapons search under Terry. By determining the bag contained an illicit substance without evidence, the officer acted on an impermissible hunch rather than reasonable inference based on experience.
Powerpoint from textbook Business Law - the ethical, global, and e-commerce environment to accompany BA 330 course at the University of Alaska Fairbanks.
The formal appearance of an accused person to hear, and to receive a copy of, the charge against him or her, in the presence of a judge, and to then enter a plea of guilty or not guilty.
Powerpoint from textbook Business Law - the ethical, global, and e-commerce environment to accompany BA 330 course at the University of Alaska Fairbanks.
The formal appearance of an accused person to hear, and to receive a copy of, the charge against him or her, in the presence of a judge, and to then enter a plea of guilty or not guilty.
Judgment is a decision of a court regarding the rights and liabilities of parties in a legal action or proceeding. Judgments also generally provide the court's explanation of why it has chosen to make a particular court order.
This is a comparative study on the concept of illegally obtained evidence between Malaysia, United Kingdom, United States of America and the concept from Islamic Perspective.
There are ground rules to Search & Seizure. The 4th Amendment protects you from “unreasonable search and seizures.” The police may stop a vehicle when they have reasonable suspicion to believe a traffic offense has been committed, but they must follow certain rules. If you suspect the police overstepped their constitutional authority during your search, and it was unlawful, you should consult an attorney to discuss your legal options.
when all the facts of a case are heard, and a judge or jury makes the final decision about the court case. An offender can waive their rights to a jury trial and just have the judge make the ruling in a bench trial.
Discontinuance request submitted by the Professional Standards Department to the Humberside Police Appeals Body (HPAB). Evidence of Humberside Police's continued and deliberate use of obfuscation tactics to ensure that serious criminal misconduct of senior officers serving with Humberside Police, raised in July 2017, have been successfully covered up and never investigated. (Complaint refs: CO/400/18 – CO/49/18 – CO/498/17 – CO/886/17 – CO/535/17).
Judgment is a decision of a court regarding the rights and liabilities of parties in a legal action or proceeding. Judgments also generally provide the court's explanation of why it has chosen to make a particular court order.
This is a comparative study on the concept of illegally obtained evidence between Malaysia, United Kingdom, United States of America and the concept from Islamic Perspective.
There are ground rules to Search & Seizure. The 4th Amendment protects you from “unreasonable search and seizures.” The police may stop a vehicle when they have reasonable suspicion to believe a traffic offense has been committed, but they must follow certain rules. If you suspect the police overstepped their constitutional authority during your search, and it was unlawful, you should consult an attorney to discuss your legal options.
when all the facts of a case are heard, and a judge or jury makes the final decision about the court case. An offender can waive their rights to a jury trial and just have the judge make the ruling in a bench trial.
Discontinuance request submitted by the Professional Standards Department to the Humberside Police Appeals Body (HPAB). Evidence of Humberside Police's continued and deliberate use of obfuscation tactics to ensure that serious criminal misconduct of senior officers serving with Humberside Police, raised in July 2017, have been successfully covered up and never investigated. (Complaint refs: CO/400/18 – CO/49/18 – CO/498/17 – CO/886/17 – CO/535/17).
Chapter 12 Searches, Seizures, and Arrests 447# 151053.docxbartholomeocoombs
Chapter 12: Searches, Seizures, and Arrests 447
# 151053 Cust: Cengage Au: Hall Pg. No. 447
Title: Criminal Law and Procedure Server: __________________
K
Short / Normal
DESIGN SERVICES OF
S4-CARLISLE
Publishing Services
In 2006, this decision was extended to parolees in Samson v. California,78 where
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit suspicion-
less, warrantless searches of parolees. On the continuum of punishment, the Court
noted, a parolee enjoys less privacy than probationers and only slightly more than
prisoners. Significant to the Court in Samson was the consent of the parolees, who
were given the option of remaining in prison; the large number of parolees at large;
the interest of the state in monitoring parolees for reintegration; and recidivism. The
Court pointed to the likelihood of recidivism, as opposed to the general population,
in its Knights opinion as further support for the decision to subject probationers to
greater oversight.
Administrative Searches
Although outside the content of this text, be aware that so-called administrative
searches often require less than probable cause and a warrant to be conducted. This is
largely because the purpose of such searches is not to detect and punish criminals. In-
stead, it is to protect the public from health and welfare threats, the violation of which
are typically punished with fines, the disciplining of a license, or a similar noncriminal
sanction. For example, warrantless inspections of restaurants, groceries, other highly
regulated industries, public school students, and the work areas of public employees
must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even though probable cause is not
required for any of them.
In most instances, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement is satisfied
in the administrative context if there is either (1) reasonable suspicion or (2) a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme in place. If the latter, the scheme shall define the authority
of inspectors, define the inspection itself, and provide a rationale for the inspection.79
ArreST
One of the most serious interferences with a person’s liberty is to be physically seized
by a government. Equally, arrest plays an important role in effective law enforcement.
Because of the significant impact arrest has on a person’s life, the right to arrest is
limited by the Fourth Amendment.
Defining Arrest
Generally, an arrest is a deprivation of freedom by a legal authority. As you have already
learned, seizures by the police take two primary forms. First, at the lower end of the
spectrum is the Terry v. Ohio seizure. Such seizures occur whenever a person reasonably
believes that he or she is not free to leave. In addition, the seizure must be as brief as
possible and be of limited intrusion to the person detained. The Court addressed the
question whether passengers of vehicles are seized during traffic stops in the 2007 case
Brendlin v.
This matter concerns a police conduct complaint submitted 8 November 2015 which was initially dealt with by way of Local Resolution. The outcome (which was appealed and referred to the IOPC) was provided on 3 April 2017. On completing the review, the IOPC deemed the statutory conditions were not met for the matter to be suitable for local resolution and directed the force to fully investigate the complaint, taking into consideration further information such as evidence in support of alleged collusion between the police, CPS and Courts.
SAMPLE CASE BRIEFCaption Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523 (.docxrtodd599
SAMPLE CASE BRIEF
Caption:
Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523 (1891)
Facts:
Two boys were in a classroom during school hours; the class had just been called to order by the teacher. The defendant reached across the aisle with his foot and kicked his toe against the plaintiff’s shin. Afterward, the shin area became infected, and the plaintiff eventually became lame.
Procedural History:
The case was originally brought before the circuit court. A trial in the circuit court resulted in a Plaintiff’s verdict. The Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The case was reversed for error, and the Court awarded a new trial. The case was tried again and resulted in another Plaintiff’s verdict. The Defendant appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
Issue:
Whether a boy satisfied the intent element of battery when he kicked another boy in the knee (while in class) and, as a result, the knee later became infected and diseased.
Rule of Law:
In an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery, the plaintiff must show either that the defendant intended to do the act and the act was unlawful or that the defendant intended the ultimate result. If the intended act is unlawful, then the intention to commit it must necessarily be unlawful.
Holding:
Yes. Because the defendant’s intentional act of kicking the plaintiff was unlawful, his intention to kick plaintiff was also unlawful. Defendant was at fault for any harm resulting from his unlawful act.
Rationale:
Here, the boy did not intend the end result (injuring his friend’s leg so severely), but he did intend to kick him in the shin during a time (class in session) and a place (the classroom) where this action (the kicking) was unlawful. Because he intended the act (kicking) and the kick was unlawful, he satisfied the intent element of battery.
794 Va. 797 SOUTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES
does not establish the presence of such a
danger.
The trial court expressed its reasoning as
follows,
Driving under the influence has inherent
dangers [when] a vehicle [is] being operat-
ed by someone who’s impaired by alco-
holTTTT Considering the evidence as a
whole, it [was] a dark, wet, and curvy
road[.] [T]here was an accident [and Coom-
er’s] blood alcohol content at the time of
the accident was .10 to .11, well over the
presumption of intoxication set forth by
the laws of the Commonwealth of Virgi-
niaTTTT An accident of the type that one
would expect to be occasioned because
one’s abilities to respond to situations and
safely operate a motor vehicle had been
impaired through the use of alcohol.
We do not in any way condone Coomer’s
actions in operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated and with her child in the car. Her
actions support her conviction for DUI. How-
ever, the mere speculative possibility of harm
alone was insufficient for conviction pursuant
to Code § 18.2–371.1(B)(1) in this case. As
such, the trial court’s finding was plainly
wrong.
III. .
C H A P T E R 5Warrantless Searches236[T]he most ba.docxRAHUL126667
C H A P T E R 5
Warrantless Searches
236
[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that “searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.” . . . In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of
internal subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents may appear unrealistic or
“extravagant” to some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental
constitutional concepts.
—JUSTICE POTTER STEWART, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971)
CHAPTER OUTLINE
HOT PURSUIT AND OTHER EXIGENCY
SEARCHES
Hot Pursuit
Other Exigencies
THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
An Overview of Vehicle Search Rules
The Automobile Exception
Search Incident to Arrest Meets the Automobile Search
Searches of Containers in Mobile Vehicles
AUTOMOBILE INVENTORY SEARCHES
BORDER AND EXTRATERRITORIAL SEARCHES
Border Searches
Extraterritorial Arrests and Searches
REGULATORY SEARCHES AND THE SPECIAL
NEEDS DOCTRINE
Origins of the Doctrine and Administrative Searches
Fire Inspections
Early Special Needs Cases: Creating a Doctrine
Drug Testing
LAW IN SOCIETY: RACIAL PROFILING AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Racial Profiling and the “War on Drugs”
The Discovery of Racial Profiling
The Political Reaction to Racial Profiling
Is Racial Profiling a Rational Policy?
The Costs of Racial Profiling
SUMMARY
LEGAL PUZZLES
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT:
THOUGHTFUL CONSERVATIVES: CLARK,
HARLAN II, STEWART, AND WHITE
Tom C. Clark
John M. Harlan II
Potter Stewart
Byron R. White
KEY TERMS
administrative search
automobile search
border
border search
crime scene investigation
exception
emergency aid doctrine
exigency exception
extraterritorial
fixed checkpoint
hot pursuit
impound
in loco parentis
inventory search
pervasively regulated
industry
roving patrol
special needs doctrine
warrantless search
M05_ZALM7613_06_SE_CH05.QXD 1/11/10 5:09 PM Page 236
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S
Warrantless Searches 237
Warrantless searches are of enormous practical importance to police work. Despite the
Supreme Court’s preference for a search warrant, warrantless searches are far more common.
Every warrantless search is conducted without prior judicial review but is subject to judicial re-
view after the fact. Nevertheless, a search based on an officer’s assessment of probable cause is
more likely to be arbitrary than one subjected to the warrant process.
This text has already discussed several kinds of warrantless searches: plain view, consent,
search incident to arrest, and the Terry stop and frisk. Each is based on a different rationale and
is held to different legal standards. An item lawfully seized in plain view, for example, involves
no Fourth Amendment interest or expectation of privacy because the officer is in ...
Pick two of the types of criminal acts discussed in the readings and.docxrowthechang
Pick two of the types of criminal acts discussed in the readings and conduct an internet search for cases in which a security professional was charged with those particular offenses. Explain in detail the facts of the case, why you selected it and the outcome of the case.
Technical Requirements
•
Your paper must be at a minimum of 2-3 pages (the Title and Reference pages do not count towards the minimum limit).
•
Scholarly and credible references should be used. A good rule of thumb is at least 2 scholarly sources per page of content.
•
Type in Times New Roman, 12 point and double space.
Reference
Nemeth, C. (2011). Private Security and The Law-4th Edition (4th ed.). Waltham, MA: Elsevier
Butterworth-Heinemann.
Lola Rabon, Appellee, v. Guardsmark, Inc., Appellant No. 76-2398 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
571 F.2d 1277; 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12576 November 9, 1977, Argued February 16, 1978, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Sol Blatt, Jr., District Judge.
DISPOSITION: Reversed.
CASE SUMMARY: PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant security company sought review of a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina which granted summary judgment to appellee injured person in her action which sought damages from the security company after the injured person was sexually assaulted at her place of employment by a security guard employed by the security company.
OVERVIEW: The security company provided security services where the injured person was employed. The injured person was sexually assaulted by a security guard employed by the security company and sought to find the security company liable for the attack. The district court found that, under state law, the security company would have a higher standard of care because the assault occurred at the place where the security company's business was carried out and because it was committed with a gun supplied by the security company. The court noted that only common carriers owed its patrons the highest degree of care. The court, however, disagreed with the district court's extension of that standard of care to the security company. The court found that the cases which extended the highest degree of care to the employer all involved common carriers and that it was unclear from the law the reasons for the state's adoption of the higher standard of liability. The court refused to extend liability to the security company for the unauthorized acts of its employee without some reasonable basis in the law and noted that S.C. Code § 56-646.1 et seq. was a licensing statute and did not impute liability. (Lola Rabon, Appellee, v. Guardsmark, Inc.)
There are three reasons usually given for the extraordinary liability of common carriers. First, the contract of passage between the carrier and the passenger is said to contain an implied assurance that the passenger will be transpor.
Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014) 134 S.Ct. 2.docxjoellemurphey
Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)
134 S.Ct. 2473
Supreme Court of the United States
David Leon RILEY, Petitioner
v.
CALIFORNIA.
United States, Petitioner
v.
Brima Wurie.
Nos. 13–132, 13–212. | Argued April 29, 2014. |
Decided June 25, 2014.
Opinion
Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
These two cases raise a common question: whether the
police may, without a warrant, search digital information
on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been
arrested.
In the first case, petitioner David Riley was stopped by a
police officer for driving with expired registration tags. In
the course of the stop, the officer also learned that Riley’s
license had been suspended. The officer impounded
Riley’s car, pursuant to department policy, and another
officer conducted an inventory search of the car. Riley was
arrested for possession of concealed and loaded firearms
when that search turned up two handguns under the car’s
hood.
An officer searched Riley incident to the arrest and found
items associated with the “Bloods” street gang. He also
seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket. According
to Riley’s uncontradicted assertion, the phone was a “smart
phone,” a cell phone with a broad range of other functions
based on advanced computing capability, large storage
capacity, and Internet connectivity. The officer accessed
information on the phone and noticed that some words
(presumably in text messages or a contacts list) were
preceded by the letters “CK”—a label that, he believed,
stood for “Crip Killers,” a slang term for members of the
Bloods gang.
At the police station about two hours after the arrest, a
detective specializing in gangs further examined the
contents of the phone. The detective testified that he “went
through” Riley’s phone “looking for evidence, because ...
gang members will *2481 often video themselves with
guns or take pictures of themselves with the guns.” App. in
No. 13–132, p. 20. Although there was “a lot of stuff” on
the phone, particular files that “caught [the detective’s]
eye” included videos of young men sparring while
someone yelled encouragement using the moniker
“Blood.” Id., at 11–13. The police also found photographs
of Riley standing in front of a car they suspected had been
involved in a shooting a few weeks earlier. . . .
Prior to trial . . . , Riley moved to suppress all evidence that
the police had obtained from his cell phone. He contended
that the searches of his phone violated the Fourth
Amendment, because they had been performed without a
warrant and were not otherwise justified by exigent
circumstances….
II
The Fourth Amendment provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particula ...
Darren Chaker, opinion by federal court on privacy issues, and in federal case. Important issues in privacy and internet are addressed in lawsuit, very useful cases discussed.
Chiefs Counsel Chiefs Counsel Should Police Officers Wh.docxmccormicknadine86
Chief's Counsel
Chief's Counsel: Should Police Officers Who Lie Be Terminated as a
Matter of Public Policy?
By Elliot Spector, Attorney at Law; and Associate Professor, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut
n September 5, 2007, the State of Washington published the first opinion holding that a police officer who
lies should be terminated as a matter of public policy. In Kitsap County Deputy Sheriff’s Guild v. Kitsap
County, the sheriff terminated Deputy LaFrance for untruthfulness and erratic behavior. An arbitrator agreed
that LaFrance had repeatedly been untruthful but was not convinced that termination was the proper form of
discipline; the arbitrator therefore ordered him returned to full duty. Eventually the case found its way to the
appellate court, which concluded that the arbitration award was unenforceable as against public policy.1 It relied
primarily on the sheriff’s conclusion that LaFrance was not fit for duty due to Brady concerns about his ability to
testify. In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a prosecutor must release information
favorable to an accused upon request;2 therefore, if LaFrance were to testify in a criminal proceeding, the
prosecutor would be legally and ethically obligated to disclose his history of untruthfulness to defense counsel.
“Put simply, LaFrance’s proven record of dishonesty prevents him from useful service as a law enforcement
officer. To require his reinstatement to a position of great public trust in which he cannot possibly serve violates
public policy.”3
Supreme Court Rulings
The U.S. Supreme Court decision of United Paper Workers International Union v. Moscow, Inc., recognized
that a court might set aside an arbitration award if the arbitration award creates an explicit conflict with other
laws and legal precedents.4 The effect of this public-policy decision in Washington State is that if officers are
found to be intentionally untruthful, any appeal of their termination will be limited to the issue of whether the
untruthfulness was proven. If so, no arbitration panel or judicial authority will be able to reduce the penalty.
In order for the Washington court to overturn the arbitration award, they had to find an explicit, well-defined,
dominant public policy. To make such a finding, the court had to point to some case or statutory law that
created such a public policy. The Washington court turned to Brady without articulating the extensive case law
supporting its position.
Following Brady, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Giglio v. United States, held that when the reliability of a given
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls
within the rule that suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial irrespective of good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.5Together, the Brady and Giglio decisions hold essentially that the credibility of a government
witness amoun ...
Chiefs Counsel Chiefs Counsel Should Police Officers Wh.docxbissacr
Chief's Counsel
Chief's Counsel: Should Police Officers Who Lie Be Terminated as a
Matter of Public Policy?
By Elliot Spector, Attorney at Law; and Associate Professor, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut
n September 5, 2007, the State of Washington published the first opinion holding that a police officer who
lies should be terminated as a matter of public policy. In Kitsap County Deputy Sheriff’s Guild v. Kitsap
County, the sheriff terminated Deputy LaFrance for untruthfulness and erratic behavior. An arbitrator agreed
that LaFrance had repeatedly been untruthful but was not convinced that termination was the proper form of
discipline; the arbitrator therefore ordered him returned to full duty. Eventually the case found its way to the
appellate court, which concluded that the arbitration award was unenforceable as against public policy.1 It relied
primarily on the sheriff’s conclusion that LaFrance was not fit for duty due to Brady concerns about his ability to
testify. In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a prosecutor must release information
favorable to an accused upon request;2 therefore, if LaFrance were to testify in a criminal proceeding, the
prosecutor would be legally and ethically obligated to disclose his history of untruthfulness to defense counsel.
“Put simply, LaFrance’s proven record of dishonesty prevents him from useful service as a law enforcement
officer. To require his reinstatement to a position of great public trust in which he cannot possibly serve violates
public policy.”3
Supreme Court Rulings
The U.S. Supreme Court decision of United Paper Workers International Union v. Moscow, Inc., recognized
that a court might set aside an arbitration award if the arbitration award creates an explicit conflict with other
laws and legal precedents.4 The effect of this public-policy decision in Washington State is that if officers are
found to be intentionally untruthful, any appeal of their termination will be limited to the issue of whether the
untruthfulness was proven. If so, no arbitration panel or judicial authority will be able to reduce the penalty.
In order for the Washington court to overturn the arbitration award, they had to find an explicit, well-defined,
dominant public policy. To make such a finding, the court had to point to some case or statutory law that
created such a public policy. The Washington court turned to Brady without articulating the extensive case law
supporting its position.
Following Brady, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Giglio v. United States, held that when the reliability of a given
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls
within the rule that suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial irrespective of good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.5Together, the Brady and Giglio decisions hold essentially that the credibility of a government
witness amoun.
The Legality of Search and Seizure in DUI CasesDavid Franks
This book provides an insider's perspective on best practices for identifying and litigating Fourth Amendment violations in Driving Under the Influence cases. Leading defense attorneys guide the reader through the proper search and seizure procedures and NHTSA standards that law enforcement should follow during the initial stop, investigation, and DUI arrest.
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II. Argument
A. The Court should grant the Motion to Suppress Evidence for Kippen
because the facts of his case do not meet the rules for reasonable and
objective detention.
As affirmed in People v. Lloyd, “The reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a
detention is measured solely by an objective standard. . .whether a Fourth Amendment violation
has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and
circumstances.” 4 Cal. App. 4th 728 (Ct. App. 1992). Furthermore, according to People v.
Wells, “to be reasonable, the officer's suspicion must be supported by some specific, articulable
facts that are reasonably consistent with criminal activity.” 38 Cal. 4th 1078 (2006). These rules
set the standard very clearly for the determination of legal detention. The facts of People v.
Kippen do not meet this standard for a variety of reasons as will be demonstrated, consequently
his detainment was not justified.
Lloyd did not meet the standard for legal detention because the detaining officers found
the defendant standing next to a business at three o’clock in the morning where a silent alarm
was triggered. 4 Cal. App. 4th at 728. These factors gave officers reasonable suspicion to detain
Lloyd. In Wells, officers detained the defendant because the vehicle she was driving met the
description of an anonymous tip reporting the vehicle swerving. 38 Cal. 4th at 1080. The tip was
specific regarding the type of vehicle, the estimated year of manufacture, location and time.
These details in their entirety are objective and articulable reasons that gave the officers legal
authority to make the stop.
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In Kippen, the reason the officer made the stop was the lack of a shoulder harness on his
1979 vehicle that was not required to have one, which he later identified as a Ford Mustang. This
sole reason for the stop does not constitute legitimate cause for suspicion of a crime and is
indicative of the officer’s subjective inclination to make the stop. Nor does the officer’s
statement that Kippen displayed “objective signs of intoxication” meet the legal standards as set
forth in the aforementioned cases. The officer’s opinion of objectivity does not replace
articulable facts, of which he did not supply. He in fact did not describe a single detail of any of
these “signs” when he approached Kippen.
Both reasonable suspicion and probable cause fall under the jurisprudence of the Fourth
Amendment, which protects American citizens from unreasonable stops, searches and seizures.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. This fundamental standard of protection is also illustrated in People v.
Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal. 3d 807 (1970). In this case, officers pulled over a vehicle
for speeding and noticed a “furtive gesture” after making the stop. Id. at 810. The officers
interpreted this gesture as a sign the defendants were hiding contraband and proceeded to open
the car door and look inside, finding the seeds and stems of marijuana. The officers then
searched the vehicle and made arrests after finding pot under the seats. Id. at 811. The California
Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s motion to suppress evidence, reasoning that “guilty
significance has been claimed for gestures or surrounding circumstances that were equally or
more likely to be wholly innocent.” Id. at 812.
Our case is very similar in that the officer who pulled Kippen over stated he saw him
buckle his seat belt as he was approaching the vehicle. The action of buckling is akin to a furtive
gesture and cannot be used by the officer as objective evidence to detain Mr. Kippen.
Furthermore, the court reasons in People v. S.C. of Yolo County that “every motorist knows that
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the approaching police officer will in all likelihood ask to see his driver's license and registration.
The observed movement, therefore, might well be nothing more than the driver's act of reaching
for his wallet so as to have his license ready for inspection.” Id. at 812. This statement
emphasizes the high standard of objectivity necessary to create reasonable suspicion and how
furtive gestures do not meet that standard. In our case, Kippen was just as or even more likely to
be making a nervous movement or reaching for his wallet to show the officer his identification
than he was buckling his belt.
Re Tony C. provides additional illustration of the standard for objective reasonableness
necessary for an officer to make a detention. 21 Cal. 3d 888 (1978). The facts of the case saw
two African-American teenagers walking down a sidewalk during the middle of the day in a high
crime area. Id. The officer who detained them did so because of previously reported burglaries in
the area as well as suspecting the youths of truancy. Id. at 889. Upon detention, one of the youths
was found to have stolen property from a recent burglary and arrested. Id. The ruling of the
California appellate court was to suppress the evidence, which the Supreme Court affirmed, as it
was the fruit of an illegal stop. Id. at 891. The stop was illegal because “there is nothing
suspicious in the sight of two school children walking along the sidewalk during the noon hour,”
despite the burglary reports and potential for truancy. Id. This case further demonstrates how
strict the standard of reasonableness is in determining if a detention is legally justified. In our
case, there was nothing reasonable about Kippen getting pulled over for driving a car that was
patently old and therefore not subject to the shoulder harness rule, especially considering there
were no other indications of criminal behavior.
The Court in Re Tony C. asserts “The facts must be such as would cause any reasonable
police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience to
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suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question.” Id.
Kippen was driving a car that was 37 years old, which by rational definition qualifies it as
markedly antiquated. So much so that a reasonable police officer should have not thought it
justified to pull over. In Kodani v. Snyder, the court states “It may well be that some cars are of
such antique vintage that an officer would not reasonably expect to find a shoulder harness in
them. In such an uncommon situation, the absence from sight of a shoulder harness would not
reasonably imply a violation of the mandatory seat belt law and could not support a lawful stop
of the vehicle.” 75 Cal. App 4th 471 (Ct. App. 1999). However, that’s exactly what the officer in
our case did. It wasn’t reasonable for him to do so because in his line of work, officers are
expected to easily identify cars based on the objective descriptions given of them, just as the
officers did in People v. Wells, 38 Cal. 4th at 1080.
The totality of the evidence against Kippen amounts to a man properly driving through an
intersection in a 1979 Ford not legally required to have a shoulder harness, the officer stating he
witnessed Kippen making a gesture to buckle his lap belt, and the officer witnessing signs of
intoxication of which he did not articulate. Taken together, a justified detention of Kippen cannot
be substantiated. The proof is significantly weaker than in the preponderance of cases where the
courts of appeal ruled to suppress evidence based on the illegal detention of the defendants.
B. The Court should grant Motion to Suppress Evidence for Kippen
because the facts of his case do not warrant searching for contraband in the
context of conducting a Terry frisk for a weapons search.
The rule justifying this conclusion is that “the requirements for a weapons search are not
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as strict if the officer has probable cause to arrest, but. . . even a search incident to such an arrest
must remain reasonable in scope." Yolo, 3 Cal. 3d at 829. The officer’s pat down of Kippen did
not stay within the bounds of reasonability as he could not unequivocally determine that the
plastic bag he felt was in fact an illicit substance. An authoritative explanation of reasonable
scope is found in Terry v. Ohio: “In determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such
circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience. 392 U.S. 1 909 (1968).
A hunch was exactly what the arresting officer in Kippen was acting on because there
was no way for him to determine the contents of a bag by touch alone, no way for him to make a
reasonable inference. Indeed, the consistency of powdery substances can be one indicator of their
character, but that would require intrusive rubbing of the substance with the officer’s fingers,
which is beyond the scope of a weapons pat down. Therefore, the officer infringed upon
Kippen’s Forth Amendment rights, which protect against unreasonable search and seizure.
The Supreme Court has adjudicated additionally in this area, which further strengthens
the argument for suppression. In Minn. v. Dickerson, the court argues “if the protective search
goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under
Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.” 508 U.S. 366 (1993). The officer in Kippen indeed went
beyond a mere weapons search. In Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), the court found that
what officers perceived as contraband, which in this case was stereo equipment, did not
ultimately qualify as admissible under the plain view doctrine, even though subsequent
investigation revealed it to be stolen. This was due to the officers not being able to definitively
determine at the time of arrest that the equipment was in fact stolen, but only later upon
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inspecting the serial numbers. Id. at 323. If this evidence was suppressed, a bag with a powdery
substance in Kippen’s pocket must be as well as it was evidence not in plain view and not
demonstrably illegal.
Furthermore, the facts in Minn v. Dickerson are directly relevant to Kippen. Officers in
this case observed the defendant walking out of a known drug house, and when he noticed the
officers, abruptly changed direction and headed toward an alley. Id. at 366. The officers detained
the individual and conducted a Terry frisk, during which the officer noticed a “lump” in the
defendant’s pocket. Id. The Court ruled “because this further search of the respondent's pocket
was constitutionally invalid, the seizure of the cocaine that followed is likewise
unconstitutional.” Id. at 368. The seizure was invalid because “the incriminating character of the
object was not immediately apparent to the officer.” Id.
This scenario is exactly analogous to Kippen. The officer conducted a Terry frisk and
found what he thought to be the equivalent of a lump of drugs. It was determined that the
officer’s assumed the substance was contraband in Minn. v. Dickerson, just like the officer did in
Kippen, without having objective proof. Id at 370. Therefore, the evidence must be suppressed in
our case as well due to the unconstitutional manner in which it was seized.