People may conform or maintain their independence from .docx

People may conform or maintain their independence from
others, they may comply with direct requests or react with
assertiveness, or they may obey the commands of authority or
oppose powerful others in an act of defiance. In this chapter,
we examine the factors that lead human beings to yield to or
resist social influence.
Social Influence as “Automatic”
Before we consider the explicit forms of social influence
depicted in d Figure 7.1, whereby individuals choose whether or
not to “go along,” it’s important to note that as social animals
humans are vulnerable to a host of subtle, almost reflex-like
influences. Without realizing it, we often crack open an
involuntary yawn when we see others yawning, laugh aloud
when we hear others laughing, and grimace when we see others
in pain. In an early demonstration, Stanley Milgram and others
(1969) had research confederates stop on a busy street in New
York City, look up, and gawk at the sixth-floor window of a
nearby building. Films shot from behind the window indicated
that about 80% of passersby stopped and gazed up when they
saw the confederates.
Rudimentary forms of automatic imitation have been observed
in various animal species, such as pigeons, monkeys, hamsters,
and fish (Heyes, 2011; Zentall, 2012). There is even evidence to
suggest that “cultures” are transmitted through imitation in
groups of whales, as when humpback whales off the coast of
Maine use lobtail feeding, a technique in which they slam their
tail flukes onto the water, then dive and exhale, forming clouds
of bubbles that envelop schools of prey fish to be gulped. This
complex behavior was first observed in 1980. By 1989 it was

measur- ably adopted by 50% of the whale population in that
area (Rendell & Whitehead, 2001). Even more recently,
researchers using a “network-based diffusion analysis” found
that up to 87% of whales that adopted this technique learned it
by exposure from other humpbacks (Allen et al., 2013). Similar
observations in other species have led animal scientists to
suggest that many nonhuman animals form and trans- mit
cultures in this manner to succeeding generations (Laland &
Galef, 2009).
Do humans similarly imitate one another automatically, without
thought, effort, or conflict? It appears that we do. Controlled
studies of human infants have shown that some time shortly
after birth, babies not only look at faces but (to the delight of
parents all over the world) often they mimic simple gestures
such as moving the head, pursing the lips, and sticking out the
tongue (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Ray & Heyes, 2010).
Studying 162 infants from 6 to 20 months old, Susan Jones
(2007) found that imitation developed at different rates for
different behaviors. Using parents as models, she found, for
example, that infants mimicked opening the mouth wide,
tapping their fingers on a table, and waving bye-bye before they
mimicked clapping hands, flexing their fingers, or putting their
hands on the head.
You may not realize it, but we humans unwittingly mimic each
other all the time. You might not know you’re doing it, but
when you are in a conversation with someone, chances are you
are subtly mirroring them as you speak: nodding when they do,
sitting back, leaning forward, scratching your face, or crossing
your legs. To demonstrate, Tanya Chartrand and John Bargh
(1999) set up participants to work on a task with a partner, a
confederate who exhibited the habit of rubbing his face or
shaking his foot. Hidden cameras recording the interaction
revealed that without realizing it, participants mimicked these

motor behaviors, rubbing their face or shaking a foot to match
their partner’s behavior. Chartrand and Bargh dubbed this
phenomenon the “chameleon effect,” after the reptile that
changes colors according to its physical environment (see d
Figure 7.2).
There are two possible reasons for this nonconscious form of
imitation. Char- trand and Bargh theorized that such mimicry
serves an important social function, that being “in sync” in
terms of their pace, posture, mannerisms, facial expressions,
tone of voice, accents, speech patterns, and other behaviors
enables people to interact more smoothly with one another.
Accordingly, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) turned the tables in a
second study in which they instructed their confederate to match
in subtle ways the mannerisms of some participants but not
others. Sure enough, participants who had been mimicked liked
the confederate more than those who had not.
Two additional sets of findings further demonstrate the social
benefits of mimicry. First, research shows that people mimic
others more when they are highly motivated to affiliate—say,
because they are similar to these others or are feeling
excluded—than when they are not (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013;
Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Lakin et al., 2008). Second,
research shows that when participants interact with others who
exhibit negative, antisocial behaviors— say, in their tone of
voice—mimicry backfires and causes the participants to be
perceived unfavorably (Smith-Genthôs et al., 2015).
Social mimicry is so powerful that it can influence us even
when the mimicker is not a real person. In a study entitled
“digi- tal chameleons,” Jeremy Bailenson and Nick Yee (2005)
immersed college students, one at a time, in a virtual reality
environment in which they found themselves seated at a table
across from an avatar, a human-like person that looked
something like a three- dimensional cartoon character. This
avatar proceeded to argue that students should be required to
carry identification cards at all times for security purposes. In

half the sessions, his back-and- forth head movements perfectly
mimicked the participant’s head movements at a four-second
delay. In the other half, he repeated the head movements of an
earlier recorded participant. Very few of the students who were
mimicked were aware of it. Yet when later asked about the
experience, they rated the avatar as more likable and were
persuaded by its speech more if it imitated their head
movements than the previous participant. The human impulse to
mimic others may have adaptive social value, but these types of
effects can also be found in nonsocial situations. In one study,
Roland Neumann and Fritz Strack (2000) had people listen to an
abstract philosophical speech that was recited on tape in a
happy, sad, or neutral voice. Afterward, participants rated their
own mood as more positive when they heard the happy voice
and as more negative when they heard the sad voice. Even
though the speakers and participants never interacted, the
speaker’s emotional state was infectious, an automatic effect
that can be described as a form of “mood contagion.” The same
can be true about the way we mimic the language we hear in
other people’s expressions and speech styles. To illustrate,
Molly Ireland and James Pennebaker (2010) found that college
students answering essay questions or working from excerpts of
fictional writing tended in subtle ways to match the language
style of the target material to which they were exposed—for
example, in terms of their use of personal pronouns (such as I,
you), conjunctions (such as but, while), and quantifiers (such as
many, few).
It is also important to realize that mimicry is a dynamic process,
as when two people who are walking together or dancing
become more and more coordinated over time. To demonstrate,
Michael Richardson and others (2005) sat pairs of college
students side by side to work on visual problems while swinging
a hand- held pendulum as “a distraction task.” The students did
not need to be synchro- nized in their swinging tempo to get
along or solve the problems. Yet when each could see the
other’s pendulum, even without speaking, their tempos

gradually converged over time—like two hearts beating as one.
Conformity
It is hard to find behaviors that are not in some way affected by
exposure to the actions of others. When social psychologists
talk of conformity, they specifically refer to the tendency of
people to change their perceptions, opinions, and behavior in
ways that are consistent with group norms.
Using this definition, would you call yourself a conformist or a
nonconformist? How often do you feel inclined to follow what
others are saying or doing? At first, you may deny the tendency
to conform and, instead, declare your individuality and
uniqueness. But think about it. When was the last time you
attended a formal wedding dressed in blue jeans or remained
seated during the national anthem at a sports event? When was
the last time you tweeted an unpopular con- trarian position for
others to see? People find it difficult to breach social norms. In
an early demonstration of this point, research assistants were
recruited to ask subway passengers to give up their seats—a
conspicuous violation of the norm of acceptable conduct. Many
of the assistants could not carry out their assignment. In fact,
some of those who tried it became so anxious that they
pretended to be ill just to make their request appear justified
(Milgram & Sabini, 1978).
With conformity being so widespread and seemingly so natural
to human nature, it is interesting and ironic that research
participants in North America who are coaxed into following a
group norm will often not admit to being influenced. Instead,
they try to reinterpret the task and rationalize their behavior as
a way to see themselves in as independent (Hornsey & Jetten,
2004). But there is a second reason why people do not see
themselves as conformist. In a series of studies, Emily Pronin
and others (2007) found that people perceive others to be more
conforming than themselves in all sorts of domains—from why
they bought an iPad to why they hold a popular opinion. Part of
the reason for this asymmetry is that people judge others by

their overt behavior and the degree to which it matches what
others do, but they tend to judge themselves by focusing inward
and introspecting about their thought processes, which blinds
them to their own conformity.
People understandably have mixed feelings about conformity.
On the one hand, some degree of it is essential if individuals are
to maintain communities and coexist peacefully, as when people
assume their rightful place in a waiting line. Yet at other times,
conformity can have harmful consequences, as when people
drink too heavily at parties, cheat on taxes, or tell offensive
jokes because they believe others are doing the same. For the
social psychologist, the goal is to understand the conditions that
promote conformity or independence and the reasons for these
behaviors.
The early Classics In 1936, Muzafer Sherif published a classic
laboratory study of how norms develop
in small groups. His method was ingenious. Male students, who
believed they were participating in a visual perception
experiment, sat in a totally darkened room. Fifteen feet in front
of them, a small dot of light appeared for two seconds, after
which participants were asked to estimate how far it had moved.
This procedure was repeated several times. Although
participants didn’t realize it, the dot of light always remained
motionless. The movement they thought they saw was merely an
optical illusion known as the autokinetic effect: In darkness, a
stationary point of light appears to move, sometimes erratically,
in various directions.
At first, participants sat alone and reported their judgments to
the experimenter. After several trials, Sherif found that they
settled in on their own stable perceptions of movement, with
most estimates ranging from 1 to 10 inches (although one
participant gave an estimate of 80 feet!). Over the next three
days, people returned to participate openly in three-person
groups. As before, lights were flashed and the participants, one
by one, announced their estimates. As shown inFigure 7.3,
initial estimates varied considerably, but participants later

converged on a common perception. Eventually, each group
established its own set of norms.
Some 15 years after Sherif’s demonstration, Solomon Asch
(1951) constructed a very different task for testing how people’s
beliefs affect the beliefs of others. To appreciate what Asch did,
imagine yourself in the following situation. You sign up for a
psychology experiment, and when you arrive, you find six other
students waiting around a table. Soon after you take an empty
seat, the experimenter explains that he is interested in the
ability to make visual discriminations. As an example, he asks
you and the others to indicate which of three comparison lines
is identical in length to a standard line.
That seems easy enough. The experimenter then says that after
each set of lines is shown, you and the others should take turns
announcing your judgments out loud in the order of your seating
position. Beginning on his left, the experimenter asks the first
person for his judgment. Seeing that you are in the next-to-last
position, you patiently await your turn. The opening moments
pass uneventfully. The task and discriminations are clear and
everyone agrees on the answers. On the third set of lines,
however, the first participant selects what is quite clearly the
wrong line. Huh? What happened? Did he suddenly lose his
mind, his eyesight, or both? Before you have the chance to
figure this one out, the next four participants choose the same
wrong line. Now what? Feeling as if you have entered the
twilight zone, you wonder if you misunderstood the task. And
you wonder what the others will think if you have the nerve to
disagree. It’s your turn now. You rub your eyes and take
another look. What do you see? More to the point, what do you
do?
d Figure 7.4 gives you a sense of the bind in which Asch’s
participants found themselves—caught between the need to be
right and a desire to be liked (Insko et al., 1982; Ross et al.,
1976). As you may suspect by now, the other “participants”
were actually confederates and had been trained to make
incorrect judgments on 12 out of 18 presentations. There seems

little doubt that the real participants
knew the correct answers. In a control group, where they made
judgments in isolation, they made almost no errors. Yet Asch’s
participants went along with the incorrect majority 37% of the
time—far more often than most of us would ever predict. Not
everyone conformed, of course. About 25% refused to agree on
any of the incorrect group judgments. Yet 50% went along on at
least half of the critical presentations, and remaining
participants conformed on an occasional basis. Similarly high
levels of conformity were observed when Asch’s study was
repeated years later and in recent studies involving other
cognitive tasks. For example, recent research demonstrates
strong conformity effects on memory—as when an eyewitness is
influenced by the report of a co-witness
(Gabbert et al., 2003; Horry et al., 2012). Asch-like conformity
effects are also found in the perceptual judgments of 3- and 4-
year-old children (Corriveau et al., 2009; Corriveau & Harris,
2010).
Let’s compare Sherif’s and Asch’s classic studies of social
influence. Obviously, both demonstrate that our visual
perceptions can be heavily influenced by others. But how
similar are they, really? Did Sherif’s and Asch’s participants
exhibit the same kind of conformity and for the same reasons or
was the resem- blance in their behavior more apparent than
real?
From the start, it was clear that these studies differed in some
important ways. In Sherif’s situation, participants were quite
literally “in the dark,” so they naturally turned to others for
guidance. When physical reality is ambiguous and we are
uncertain of our own judgments, as in the autokinetic situation,
others can serve as a valuable source of information (Festinger,
1954). In contrast, Asch’s participants found themselves in a
much more awkward position. Their task was relatively simple,
and they could see with their own eyes which answers were
correct. Still, they often followed the incorrect majority. In
interviews, many of Asch’s participants reported afterward that

they went along with the group even though they were not
convinced that the group was right. Many who did not conform
said they felt “conspicuous” and “crazy,” like a “misfit” (Asch,
1956, p. 31).
Worldwide, 3.05 billion people, accounting for over 42% of
Earth’s population, have access to the Internet (Internet World
Stats, 2015). This being the case, you may wonder: Do the
social forces that influence people in the face-to-face
encounters studied by Sherif and Asch also operate in virtual
groups whose other members are nameless, faceless, and
anonymous? The answer is yes. McKenna and Bargh (1998)
observed behavior in various online blogs in which people with
common interests posted and responded to messages on a whole
range of topics, from obesity and sexual orientation to money
and the stock market. The social nature of the medium in this
virtual
Why Do People Conform?
The Sherif and Asch studies demonstrate that people conform
for two very different reasons: one informational, the other
normative (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Crutchfield, 1955;
Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
A Need to Be rightThrough informational influence, people
conform because they want to make good and accurate
judgments of reality and assume that when others agree on
something, they must be right. In Sherif’s autokinetic task, as in
other difficult or ambiguous tasks, it’s natural to assume that
four eyes are better than two. Hence, research shows that
eyewitnesses trying to recall a crime or some other event will
alter their recollections and even create false memories in
response to what they hear other witnesses report (Gabbert et
al., 2003).
When people are in a state of uncertainty, following the
collective wisdom of others may prove to be an effective
strategy. In the popular TV game show Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire? contestants who were stumped on a question were
able to invoke one of two human forms of assistance: (1) calling

a friend or relative who served as a designated “expert”; or (2)
polling the studio audience, which casted votes by computer for
instant feedback. Overall, the “experts” were useful, as they
offered the correct answer 65% of the time. Illustrating the
wisdom of crowds, however, the studio audiences were even
more useful, picking the right answer 91% of the time
(Surowiecki, 2005). These days, relying on the collective
wisdom of large numbers of other people is something we do all
the time. When you look to buy merchandise on Amazon.com,
you will see average customer situation was “remote.” Still,
these researchers found that in newsgroups that brought
together people with “hidden identities” (such as gays and
lesbians who had concealed their sexuality), members were
highly responsive to social feedback. Those who posted
messages that were met with approval rather than disapproval
later became more active participants of the newsgroup. When it
comes to social support and rejection, even remote virtual
groups have the power to shape our behavior (Bargh &
McKenna, 2004; Kassner et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2000).
Why Do People Conform?
The Sherif and Asch studies demonstrate that people conform
for two very different reasons: one informational, the other
normative (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Crutchfield, 1955;
Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
A Need to Be rightThrough informational influence, people
conform because they want to make good and accurate
judgments of reality and assume that when others agree on
something, they must be right. In Sherif’s autokinetic task, as in
other difficult or ambiguous tasks, it’s natural to assume that
four eyes are better than two. Hence, research shows that
eyewitnesses trying to recall a crime or some other event will
alter their recollections and even create false memories in
response to what they hear other witnesses report (Gabbert et
al., 2003).
When people are in a state of uncertainty, following the

collective wisdom of others may prove to be an effective
strategy. In the popular TV game show Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire? contestants who were stumped on a question were
able to invoke one of two human forms of assistance: (1) calling
a friend or relative who served as a designated “expert”; or (2)
polling the studio audience, which casted votes by computer for
instant feedback. Overall, the “experts” were useful, as they
offered the correct answer 65% of the time. Illustrating the
wisdom of crowds, however, the studio audiences were even
more useful, picking the right answer 91% of the time
(Surowiecki, 2005). These days, relying on the collective
wisdom of large numbers of other people is something we do all
the time. When you look to buy merchandise on Amazon.com,
you will see average customer satisfaction ratings from 1 to 5
stars and product reviews; similar ratings can be found on
Zagat, Yelp, and OpenTable for restaurants; Expedia.com and
Trip- Advisor for hotels; Rotten Tomatoes for movies, and, well
you get the idea.
A Fear of Ostracism In contrast to the informational value of
conformity, normative influence leads people to conform
because they fear the consequence of rejection that follows
deviance. It’s easy to see why. Early on, research showed that
individuals who stray from a group’s norm tend to be disliked,
rejected, ridiculed, and outright dismissed (Schachter, 1951).
Although some people are more resilient than others, these
forms of interpersonal rejection can be hard to take (Smart
Richman & Leary, 2009). In a series of controlled experiments,
people who were socially ostracized—for example, by being
neglected, ignored, and excluded in a live or online chatroom
conversation—react with various types of emotional distress,
feeling alone, hurt, angry, and lacking in self-esteem (Williams
et al., 2002; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). Even being left out of a
three-way text-messaging conversation on a cell phone can have
this effect on us (Smith & Williams, 2004). Kipling Williams
and Steve Nida (2011) note that the research on this point is
clear: Some people become so distressed when they are ignored

or excluded from a group, even one that is newly and briefly
formed, that they begin to feel numb, sad, angry, or some
combination of these emotions. Over time, ostracism becomes a
form of social death, making it difficult to cope.
Why does being ostracized hurt so much? Why, for example,
have some teenage victims of cyber bullying, re- acted with
such devastation that they committed suicide? Increasingly,
social psychologists are coming to appreciate the extent to
which human beings, over the course of evolution, have needed
each other in order to survive and to flourish. According to
Geoff MacDonald and Mark Leary (2005), our need to belong is
so primitive that rejection can inflict a social pain that feels just
like physical pain. You can sense the connection in the way
people describe their emotional reactions to social loss using
such words as “hurt,” “brokenhearted,” and “crushed.” Social
neuroscience research lends provocative support to this
linkage. In brain-imaging studies, for example, young people
who were left out by other players in a three-person Internet
ball-tossing game called “Cyberball” exhibited elevated neural
activity in a part of the brain that is normally as- sociated with
physical pain (Eisenberger et al., 2003). In some instances,
people who are excluded report feeling a heightened sensitivity
to pain; in other cases, the experience leads them to feel numb
(Bernstein & Claypool, 2012).
If there is a silver lining, it is that social pain can have positive
motivating effects. Once feeling rejected, people seek to re-
affiliate with others, which should increase their sensitivity to
social perception cues that signal opportunities for inclusion. In
a study that tested this hypothesis, Michael Bernstein and others
(2008) found that research participants who were led to feel
socially rejected or excluded became more accurate in their
ability to distinguish between true smiles, which betray
happiness and an openness to interaction, and “masking” smiles,
which do not express a genuine emotion. Even young children
are highly sensitive to cues that signal ostracism. In one study,
4- and 5-year-old children were shown a cartoon video in which

a character repeatedly approached a group at play and was
either accepted into the group or excluded. Shortly afterward,
all the children were asked to “draw a picture of you and your
friend.” Interestingly, those who saw the social rejection
version of the cartoon drew pictures that placed themselves and
their friend closer together and that adults rated as more
affiliative (Song et al., 2015).
On final point about being ostracized is important: The effect
depends on the source of exclusion and the cultural context. In a
fascinating series of studies designed to address this question,
Ayse Uskul and Harriet Over (2014) compared farmers and
herders in the Eastern Black Sea region of Turkey—two groups
that shared the same geographical space, national identity,
language, and religion. The farmers, who grow tea and other
products, show a high level of interdependence within their
social network, having to rely heavily on family and neighbors.
In contrast, the herders, who sell cattle and dairy products, tend
to be more individualistic and independent, moving between
neighboring towns and interacting with strangers and others
outside their immediate social circle. In one study, participants
were asked to visualize themselves as the character in a vignette
who was socially excluded either by a close other person or by a
stranger. They were then asked to rate in various ways how they
would feel about themselves. Two important results consistently
emerged. First, both groups were more distressed about being
excluded by close others than by strangers. Second, the herders
felt worse about being excluded by strangers than the farmers
did. As a cultural subgroup that relies on strangers to make a
living, herders did not make the same ingroup- outgroup
distinction that the farmers did. In this domain of social
influence, as in others, cultural context plays an important role.
Distinguishing Types of ConformityIn group settings, both
informational and normative influences are typically at work.
Consider the Asch experiment. Even though many of his
participants said they had conformed just to avoid being differ-
ent, others said that they came to agree with their group’s

erroneous judgments. Is that possible? At the time, Asch had to
rely on what his participants reported in interviews. Thanks to
recent developments in social neuroscience, however,
researchers can now peer into the socially active brain. In an
ingenious medical school study that illustrates the point,
Gregory
Berns and others (2005) put 32 adults into a visual-spatial per-
ception experiment in which they were asked to “mentally
rotate” two geometric objects to determine if they were the
same or different (see d Figure 7.5). As in the original Asch
study, participants were accompanied by four confederates
who unanimously made incorrect judgments on certain trials.
Unlike in the original study, however, participants were placed
in an fMRI scanner while engaged in the task. There were two
note- worthy results. First, participants conformed to 41% of the
group’s incorrect judgments. Second, these conforming
judgments were accompanied by heightened activity in a part
of the brain that controls spatial awareness—not in areas as-
sociated with conscious decision making. These results suggest
that the group altered perceptions, not just behavior.
Conformity effects on Perception
In this study, participants tried to determine if pairs of
geometric objects were the same or different after observing the
responses of four unanimous confederates. Participants followed
the incorrect group 41% of the time. Suggesting that the group
had altered perceptions, not just behavior, fMRI results showed
that these conforming judgments were accompanied by
increased activity in a part of the brain that controls spatial
awareness. Berns et al., 2005
The distinction between the two types of social influence—
informational and normative—is important, not just for under-
standing why people conform but because the two sources of
influence produce different types of conformity: private and
public (Allen, 1965; Kelman, 1961). Like beauty, conformity
may be skin deep or it may penetrate beneath the surface.
Private conformity, also called true acceptance or conversion,

describes instances in which others cause us to change not only
our overt behavior but our minds as well. To conform at this
level is to be truly persuaded that others in a group are correct.
In contrast, public conformity (sometimes called compliance, a
term used later in this chapter to describe a different form of
influence) refers to a more superficial change in behavior.
People often respond to normative pressures by pretending to
agree even when privately they do not. This often happens when
we want to curry favor with others. The politician who tells
voters whatever they want to hear is a case in point.
How, you might be wondering, can social psychologists ever
tell the difference between the private and public conformist?
After all, both exhibit the same change in their observable
behavior. The difference is that compared with someone who
merely acquiesces in public, the individual who is truly
persuaded maintains that change long after the group is out of
the picture. When this distinction is applied to Sherif’s and
Asch’s research, the results come out as expected. At the end
of his study, Sherif (1936) retested participants alone and found
that their estimates continued to reflect the norm previously
established in their group—even among those who were retested
a full year after the experiment (Rohrer et al., 1954). Similar
results were recently reported in a study in which college
students rated the attractiveness of various faces, were shown
the average higher or lower results from other students, and
then re-rated the same faces—one, three, or seven days or three
months later. In this situation, the conformity effect lasted
three to seven days (Huang et al., 2014). Yet in contrast to these
results, Asch (1956) himself had reported that when he had
participants
d Figure 7.6 Distinguishing Types of Conformity
People made judgments under conditions in which they had a
high or low level of motivation. Regardless of whether the
judgment task was difficult or easy, there were moderate levels
of conformity when participants had low motivation (left). But
when they were highly motivated (right), participants

conformed more when the task was difficult (as in Sherif’s
study) and less when it was easy (as in Asch’s study). From
Baron, R. et al., (1996). Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology vol 71 (pp. 915–927).
write their answers privately, so that others in the group could
not see, their level of conformity dropped sharply (Deutsch &
Gerard, 1955; Mouton et al., 1956).
In a study that showed both processes at work, Robert S. Baron
and others (1996) had people in groups of three (one
participant, two confederates) act as eyewitnesses: First, they
would see a picture of a person, then they would try to pick that
person out of a lineup. In some groups, the task was difficult,
like Sherif’s, since participants saw each picture only once for
half a second. For other groups, the task was easier, like
Asch’s, in that they saw each picture twice for a total of 10
seconds. How often did participants conform when the
confederates made the wrong identification? It depended on how
motivated they were. When the experimenter downplayed the
task as only a “pilot study,” the conformity rates were 35%
when the task was difficult and 33% when it was easy. But
when participants were offered a financial incentive to do
well, conformity went up to 51% when the task was difficult
and down to 16% when it was easy (see d Figure 7.6). With
pride and money on the line, the Sherif- like participants
conformed more and the Asch-like participants conformed less.
Table 7.1 summarizes the comparison of Sherif’s and Asch’s
studies and the depths of social influence that they demonstrate.
Looking at this table, you can see that the difficulty of the task
is crucial. When reality cannot easily be validated by physical
evidence, as in the autokinetic situation, people turn to others
for information and conform because they are truly persuaded
by that information. When reality is clear, however, the cost of
dissent becomes the major issue. As Asch found, it can be
difficult to depart too much from others even when you know
that they—not you—are wrong. So you play along. Privately
you don’t change your mind. But you nod your head in

agreement anyway.
Majority influence
Realizing that people often succumb to pressure from peers is
only a first step in understanding the process of social
influence. The next step is to identify the situ- ational and
personal factors that make us more or less likely to conform.
We know that people tend to conform when the social pressure
is intense and that they are insecure about how to behave. But
what creates these feelings of pressure and insecurity? Here, we
look at four factors: the size of the group, a focus on norms, the
presence of an ally, and gender.
group Size: The Power in NumbersCommon sense would
suggest that as the number of other people in a majority
increases, so should their impact. Actually, it is not that simple.
Asch (1956) varied the size of groups, using 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, or 15
confederates, and he found that conformity increased with group
size—but only up to a point. Once there were 3 or 4
confederates, the amount of additional influence exerted by the
rest was negligible. Other researchers have obtained similar
results (Gerard et al., 1968).
Beyond the presence of three or four others, additions to a
group are subject to the law of “diminishing returns” (Knowles,
1983; Mullen, 1983). As we will see later, Bibb Latané (1981)
likens the influence of people on an individual to the way
lightbulbs illuminate a surface. When a second bulb is added to
a room, the effect is dramatic. When the tenth bulb is added,
however, its impact is barely felt, if at all. Economists say the
same about the perception of money. An additional dollar seems
greater to the person who has only three dollars than it does to
the person who has 300.
Another possible explanation is that as more and more people
express the same opinion, an individual is likely to suspect that
they are acting either in “collusion” or as “spineless sheep.”
According to David Wilder (1977), what matters is not the

actual number of others in a group but one’s perception of how
many distinct others who are thinking independently the group
includes. Indeed, Wilder found that people were more
influenced by two groups of two than by one four-person group
and by two groups of three than by one six-person group.
Conformity increased even more when people were exposed to
three two-person groups. When faced with a majority opinion,
we do more than just
count the number of warm bodies—we try to assess the number
of independent minds.
A Focus on NormsThe size of a majority may influence the
amount of pressure that is felt, but social norms give rise to
conformity only when we know the norms and focus on them.
This may sound like an obvious point, yet we often misperceive
what is normative, particularly when others are too afraid or too
embarrassed to publicly present their true thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors.
One common example of this “pluralistic ignorance” concerns
perceptions of alcohol usage. In a number of college-wide
surveys, Deborah Prentice and Dale Miller (1996) found that
most students overestimated how comfortable their peers were
with the level of drinking on campus. Those who most over-
estimated how others felt about drinking at the start of the
school year eventually conformed to this misperception in
their own attitudes and behavior. In contrast, students who took
part in discussion sessions that were designed to correct these
misperceptions actually consumed less alcohol six months later.
These findings are important. Additional research has shown
that both male and female students tend to overestimate how
frequently their same-sex peers use various substances and the
quantities they consume. Whether the substance in question is
alcohol, tobacco, or marijuana, the more normative students
perceive peer usage to be, the more they consume (Henry et al.,
2011). More generally, across a range of situations and
intervention purposes, changing people’s perceptions of norms
can be used to change their behavior (Miller & Prentice, 2016).

Knowing how others are behaving in a situation is necessary for
conformity, but these norms will influence us only when they
are brought to our awareness, or “activated.” Robert Cialdini
(2003) and his colleagues have demonstrated this point in
studies on littering. In one study, researchers had confederates
pass out handbills to amusement park visitors and varied the
amount of litter that appeared in one section of the park (an
indication of how others behave in that setting). The result:
The more litter there was, the more likely visitors were to toss
their handbills to the ground (Cialdini et al., 1990).
A second study showed that passersby were most influenced by
the prior behavior of others when their attention was drawn to
the existing norm. In this instance, people were observed in a
parking garage that was either clean or cluttered with cigarette
butts, candy wrappers, paper cups, and trash. In half of the
cases, the norm that was already in place—clean or cluttered—
was brought to participants’ attention by a confederate who
threw paper to the ground as he walked by. In the other half, the
confederate passed by without incident. As participants reached
their cars, they found a “Please Drive Safely” handbill tucked
under the windshield wiper. Did they toss the paper to the
ground or take it with them? The results showed that people
were most likely to conform (by littering more when the garage
was cluttered than when it was clean) when the confederate had
littered—an act that drew attention to the norm (Cialdini et al.,
1991).
An Ally in Dissent: getting by With a Little Help In Asch’s
initial experiment, unwitting participants found themselves
pitted against unanimous majorities. But what if they had an
ally, a partner in dissent? Asch investigated this issue and found
that the presence of a single confederate who agreed with the
participant reduced conformity by almost 80%. This finding,
however, does not tell us
why the presence of an ally was so effective. Was it because he
or she agreed with the participant or because he or she
disagreed with the majority? In other words, were the views of

the participants strengthened because a dissenting confederate
offered validating information or because dissent per se reduced
normative pressures?
A series of experiments explored these two possibilities. In one,
Vernon Allen and John Levine (1969) led participants to believe
that they were working together with four confederates. Three
of these others consistently agreed on the wrong judgment. The
fourth then followed the majority, agreed with the participant,
or made a third judgment, which was also incorrect. This last
variation was the most interesting: Even when the confederate
did not validate their own judgment, participants conformed less
often to the majority. In another experiment, Allen and Levine
(1971) varied the competence of the ally. Some participants
received support from an average person. In contrast, others
found themselves supported by someone who wore very thick
glasses and complained that he could not see the visual
displays. Not a very reassuring ally, right? Wrong. Even though
participants derived less comfort from this sup- porter than from
one who seemed more competent at the task, his presence still
reduced their level of conformity.
Two important conclusions follow from this research. First, it is
substantially more difficult for people to stand alone for their
convictions than to be part of even a tiny minority. Second, any
dissent—whether it validates an individual’s opinion or not—
can break the spell cast by a unanimous majority and reduce the
normative pressures to conform. In an interesting possible
illustration of how uncommon it is for individuals to single-
handedly oppose a majority, researchers examined voting
patterns on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1953 to 2001. Table
7.2 shows that out of 4,178 decisions in which all nine justices
voted, the 8-to-1 split was the least frequent, occurring in only
10% of all decisions (Granberg & Bartels, 2005).
Gender Differences
Are there gender differences in conformity? Based on Asch’s
initial studies, social psychologists used to think that women,
once considered the “weaker” sex, conform more than men. In

light of all the research, however, it appears that two additional
factors have to be considered. First, sex differences depend on
how comfortable people are with the experimental task. In a
classic study, Frank Sistrunk and John McDavid (1971) had
male and female participants answer questions on
stereotypically masculine, feminine, and gender-neutral topics.
Along with each question, participants were told the per-
centage of others who agreed or disagreed. Although females
conformed to the contrived majority more on masculine items,
males conformed more on feminine items. There were no sex
differences on the neutral questions. This finding suggests that
one’s familiarity with the issue at hand, not gender, is what
affects conformity (Eagly & Carli, 1981). A second factor is the
type of social situation people face. As a general rule, gender
differences are weak and unreliable. But there is an important
exception: In face-to-face encounters, where people must
disagree with each other openly, small differences do emerge.
In fact, when participants think they are being observed, women
conform more and men conform less than they do in a more
private situation. Why does being “in public” create such a
divergence in behavior? Alice Eagly (1987) argues that in front
of others, people worry about how they come across and feel
pressured to behave in ways that are viewed as acceptable
according to traditional gender-role constraints. At least in
public, men feel pressured to behave with fierce independence
and autonomy, whereas women are expected to play a gentler,
more harmonious role.
From an evolutionary perspective, Vladas Griskevicius and
others (2006) suggest that people are most likely to behave in
gender-stereotyped ways when motivated to attract someone of
the opposite sex. Consistent with the stereotypic notion that
women tend to like men who distinguish themselves as
independent and dominant, whereas men prefer women who are
agreeable and cooperative, their research shows that women
conform more—and that men conform less— when primed to
think about themselves in a romantic situation. But here’s the

interesting part: When Matthew Hornsey and others (2015)
asked people in a series of experiments to indicate their
personal preferences for a romantic partner, both men and
women alike were attracted to others who are nonconformists.
This pairing of results begs the question: Why did female
participants in the first study present themselves as conformist
to attract a male partner when men in the second set of studies
consistently expressed a preference for nonconformist women?
Although more research is needed, these studies seem to suggest
that women harbor the belief that men like conformist women—
a belief, grounded in the past, that may well turn out to be a
myth.
Minority influence
In a book entitled Dissent in Dangerous Times, Austin Sarat
(2005) noted that while the freedom to dissent is highly valued
in the American national psyche, individual dissenters are often
vilified for their beliefs— especially in today’s post-9/11 war
on terrorism.
The fact is, it has never been easy for individuals to express
unpopular views and enlist support for these views from others.
Philosopher Bertrand Russell once said, “Conventional people
are roused to frenzy by departure from convention, largely
because they regard such departure as criticism of themselves.”
He may have been right. Although people who assert their
beliefs against the majority are generally seen as competent and
honest, they are also disliked and roundly rejected (Bassili &
Provencal, 1988; Levine, 1989). It’s no wonder that most people
think twice before expressing unpopular positions. In a series of
survey studies of what he called the “minority slowness effect,”
John Bassili (2003) asked people about their attitudes on social
policy issues such as affirmative action or about their likes and
dislikes for various celebrities, sports, foods, places, and
activities. Consistently, and regardless of the topic, respondents
who held minority opinions were slower to answer the questions
than those in the majority.

Resisting the pressure to conform and maintaining one’s
independence may be socially difficult, but it is not impossible.
History’s most famous heroes, villains, and creative minds are
living proof: Joan of Arc, Jesus Christ, Galileo, Charles Darwin,
Mahatma Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela, to name just a few,
were dissenters of their time who continue to capture the
imagination. Then there is human behavior in the laboratory.
Social psychologists have been so intrigued by Asch’s initial
finding that participants conformed 37% of the time that
textbooks such as this one routinely refer to “Asch’s conformity
study.” Yet the overlooked flip side of the coin is that Asch’s
participants refused to acquiesce 63% of the time—thus also
indicating the power of independence, truth telling, and a
concern for social harmony (Friend et al., 1990; Hodges &
Geyer, 2006; Jetten & Hornsey, 2011).
Twelve Angry Men, a classic film starring Henry Fonda,
illustrates how a lone dissenter can resist the pressure to
conform and convince others to follow. Al- most as soon as the
door of the jury room closes, the jury in this film takes a show-
of-hands vote. The result is an 11-to-1 majority in favor of
conviction with Fonda the lone holdout. Through 90 minutes of
heated deliberation, Fonda works relentlessly to plant a seed of
doubt in the minds of his peers. In the end, the jury reaches a
unanimous verdict: not guilty.
Sometimes art imitates life; sometimes it does not. In this
instance, Henry Fonda’s heroics are highly atypical. When it
comes to jury decision making, as we’ll see in Chapter 12, the
majority usually wins. Yet in trial juries, as in other small
groups, there are occasional exceptions where minorities
prevail—as when someone from the majority faction defects.
Thanks to Serge Moscovici and others, we now know quite a bit
about minority influence and the strategies that astute
nonconformists use to act as agents of social change
(Gardikiotis, 2011; Maass & Clark, 1984; Moscovici et al.,
1985; Mugny & Perez, 1991).
Moscovici’s TheoryAccording to Moscovici, majorities are

powerful by virtue of their sheer numbers, whereas
nonconformists derive power from the style of their behavior. It
is not just what nonconformists say that matters but how they
say it. To exert influence, says Moscovici, those in the minority
must be forceful, persistent, and unwavering in support of their
position. Yet at the same time, they must appear flexible and
open-minded. Confronted with a consistent but even- handed
dissenter, members of the majority will sit up, take notice, and
rethink their own positions.
Why should a consistent behavioral style prove effective? One
possible reason is that unwavering repetition draws attention
from those in the mainstream, which is a necessary first step to
social influence. Another possibility is that consistency signals
that the dissenter is unlikely to yield, which leads those in the
majority to feel pressured to seek compromise. A third possible
reason is that when confronted with someone who has the self-
confidence and dedication to take an unpopular stand without
backing down, people assume that he or she must have a point.
Of course, it helps to be seen as part of “us” rather than “them.”
Research shows that dissenters have more influence when
people identify with them and perceive them to be similar in
ways that are relevant and desirable (Turner, 1991; Wood et al.,
1996).
Based on a meta-analysis of 97 experiments investigating
minority influence, Wendy Wood and her colleagues (1994)
concluded that there is strong support for the consistency
hypothesis. In one classic study, for example, Moscovici and
others (1969) turned Asch’s procedure on its head by
confronting people with a minority of confederates who made
incorrect judgments. In groups of six, participants took part in
what was supposed to be a study of color perception. They
viewed a series of slides that all were blue but varied in
intensity. For each slide, the participants took turns naming the
color. The task was simple, but two confederates announced that
the slides were green. When the confederates were consistent—
that is, when both made incorrect green judgments for all

slides—they had a surprising degree of influence. About a third
of all participants incorrectly reported seeing at least one green
slide, and 8% of all responses were incorrect. Subsequent
research confirmed that the perception of consistency increases
minority influence (Clark, 2001; Crano, 2000).
Noting that social dissent can also breed hostility, Edwin
Hollander (1958) recommended a different approach. Hollander
warned that people who seek positions of leadership or
challenge a group without first becoming accepted full- fledged
members of that group run the risk that their opinions will fall
on deaf ears. As an alternative to Moscovici’s consistency
strategy, Hollander suggested that to influence a majority,
people should first conform in order to establish their
credentials as competent insiders. By becoming members of the
mainstream, they accumulate idiosyncrasy credits, or “brownie
points.” Once they have accumulated enough goodwill within
the group, a certain amount of their deviance will then be
tolerated. Several studies have shown that this “first conform,
then dissent” strategy, like the “consistent dissent” approach,
can be effective (Bray et al., 1982; Lortie-Lussier, 1987;
Rijnbout & McKimmie, 2012).
Processes and Outcomes of Minority influenceRegardless of
which strategy is used, minority influence is a force to be
reckoned with. But does it work just like conformity, or is there
something different about the way minorities and majorities
effect change? Some theorists have proposed that a single
process accounts for both directions of social influence—that
minority influence is like a “chip off the old block” (Latané &
Wolf, 1981; Tanford & Penrod, 1984). Others have taken a
dual- process approach (Moscovici, 1980; Nemeth, 1986). In
this second view, majorities and minorities exert influence in
different ways and for different reasons. Majorities, because
they have power and control, elicit public conformity by
bringing stressful normative pressures to bear on the individual.
But minorities, because they are seen as seriously committed to
their views, produce a deeper and more lasting form of private

conformity, or conversion, by leading others to become curious
and rethink their original positions.
To evaluate these single- and dual-process theories, researchers
have compared the effects of majority and minority viewpoints
on participants who are otherwise neutral on an issue in dispute.
On the basis of this research, two conclusions can be drawn.
First, the relative impact of majorities and minorities depends
on whether the judgment that is being made is objective or
subjective, a matter of fact or opinion. In a study conducted in
Italy, Anne Maass and others (1996) found that majorities have
greater influence on factual questions, for which only one
answer is correct (“What percentage of its raw oil does Italy
import from Venezuela?”), but that minorities exert equal
impact on opinion questions, for which there is a range of
acceptable responses (“What percentage of its raw oil should
Italy import from Venezuela?”). People feel freer to stray from
the mainstream on matters of opinion, when there is no right or
wrong answer.
The second conclusion is that the relative effects of majority
and minority points of view depend on how and when
conformity is measured. To be sure, majorities have a decisive
upper hand on direct or public measures of conformity. After
all, people are reluctant to oppose a group norm in a
conspicuous manner. But on more indirect or private measures
of conformity, on attitude issues that are related but not focal to
the point of conflict, or after the passage of time—all of which
softens the extent to which majority participants would appear
deviant—minorities exert a strong impact (Clark & Maass,
1990; Crano & Seyranian, 2009; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1991).
As Moscovici cogently argued, each of us is changed in a
meaningful but subtle way by minority opinion.
In Rogues, Rebels and Dissent: Just Because Everyone Agrees,
Doesn’t Mean They’re Right, Charlan Nemeth (2016) reviews
more than 30 years of research indicating that dissenters in a
group serve an invaluable purpose—regardless of whether their
views are correct. Dissenters may feel like a nuisance, she

notes, and an unnecessary source of conflict, forcing others to
defend a position that everyone else agrees with. Yet research
shows that dissent sparks innovation (De Dreu & De Vries,
2001).
Simply by their willingness to stay firmly independent,
minorities can force other group members to think more
carefully, more openly, in new and different ways, and more
creatively about a problem, enhancing the quality of a group’s
output. In one study, participants exposed to a minority
viewpoint on how to solve anagram problems later found more
novel solutions themselves (Nemeth & Kwan, 1987). In a
second study, those exposed to a consistent minority viewpoint
on how best to recall information later recalled more words
from a list they were trying to memorize (Nemeth et al., 1990).
In a third study, interacting groups with one dissenting
confederate produced more original analyses of complex
business problems (Van Dyne & Saavedra, 1996). Importantly,
Nemeth and her colleagues (2001) found that to have influence
over a group, lone individuals must exhibit “authentic dissent,”
not merely play “devil’s advocate,” a tactic that actually
bolsters a majority’s position.
Culture and Conformity
We humans are a heterogeneous and diverse lot. As a matter of
geography, some of us live in large, heavily populated cities
whereas others live in small towns, af- fluent suburbs, rural
farming or fishing communities, jungles, expansive deserts,
high-altitude mountains, tropical islands, and vast arctic plains.
Excluding dia- lects, more than 6,500 different languages are
spoken. There are also hundreds of religions that people
identify with—the most common being Christianity (32%),
Islam (23%), Hinduism (14%), and Buddhism (8%), with
Judaism (0.20%) and others claiming fewer adherents. Roughly
15% of the world’s population is not affiliated with a religion
(Adherents.com, 2015).
Linked together by historical time and geographical space, each

culture has its own ideology, music, fashions, foods, laws,
customs, and manners of expression. As many tourists and
exchange students traveling abroad have come to learn,
sometimes the hard way, the social norms that influence human
conduct can vary in significant ways from one part of the world
to another.
In Do’s and Taboos Around the World, R. E. Axtell (1993)
warns world travelers about some of these differences. Dine in
an Indian home, he notes, and you should leave food on the
plate to show the host that the portions were generous and you
had enough to eat. Yet as a dinner guest in Bolivia, you would
show your appreciation by cleaning your plate. Shop in an
outdoor market in Iraq, and you should expect to negotiate the
price of everything you buy. Plan an appointment in Brazil, and
the person you’re scheduled to meet is likely to be late; it’s
nothing personal. In North America, it is common to sit casually
opposite someone with your legs outstretched. Yet in Nepal, as
in many Muslim countries, it is an insult to point the bottoms of
your feet at someone. Even the way we space ourselves from
each other is influenced by culture. Americans, Canadians,
British, and northern Europeans keep a polite distance between
themselves and others and feel “crowded” by the touchier, nose-
to-nose style of the French, Greeks, Arabs, Mexicans, and
people of South America. In the affairs of day-today living,
each culture operates by its own rules of conduct.
Just as cultures differ in their social norms, so too they differ in
the extent to which people are expected to adhere to those
norms. As we saw in Chapter 3,
there are different cultural orientations toward per- sons and
their relationships to groups. Some cultures primarily value
individualism and the virtues of independence, autonomy, and
self-reliance, whereas others value collectivism and the virtues
of interdependence, cooperation, and social harmony. Under a
banner of individualism, personal goals take priority over group
allegiances. Yet in collectivistic cultures, the person is first and
foremost a loyal member of a family, city, team, company,

church, and state.
What determines whether a culture becomes individualistic or
collectivistic? Speculating on the origins of these orientations,
Harry Triandis (1995) suggested that there are three key factors.
The first is the complexity of a society. As people come to live
in more complex industrialized societies (compared, for
example, with a simpler life of food gathering among desert
nomads), there are more groups to identify with, which means
less loyalty to any one group and a greater focus on personal
rather than collective goals. Second is the affluence of a
society. As people prosper, they gain financial independence
from others, a condition that promotes social independence as
well as mobility and a focus on personal rather than collective
goals. The third factor is heterogeneity. Societies that are
homogeneous or “tight” (where members share the same
language, religion, and social customs) tend to be rigid and
intolerant of those who veer from the norm. Societies that are
culturally diverse or “loose” (where two or more cultures co-
exist) tend to be more permissive of dissent, thus allowing for
more individual expression. According to Edward Sampson
(2000), cultural orientations may also be rooted in religious
ideologies, as in the link between Christianity and
individualism.
Early research across nations showed that autonomy and
independence were most highly valued in the United States,
Australia, Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands, in that
order. In contrast, other cultures value social harmony and
“fitting in” for the sake of com- munity, the most collectivist
people being from Venezuela, Colombia, Pakistan, Peru,
Taiwan, and China (Hofstede, 1980). Although research shows
that the differences are even more complicated, that individuals
differ even within cultures, and that cultures change over time,
it is clear that nations on average vary in their orientations on
the dimension of individualism (Schimmack et al., 2005). The
difference can be measured in books and other written
materials—by the contents of the stories told (Imada, 2012) and

the use of the first- person singular pronouns, “I” and “me”
(Hamamura & Xu, 2015; Twenge et al., 2013).
Do cultural orientations influence conformity? Among the
Bantu of Zimbabwe, an African people in which deviance is
scorned, 51% of participants who were placed in an Asch-like
study conformed— more than the number typically seen in the
United States (Whittaker & Meade, 1967). When John Berry
(1979) compared participants from 17 cultures, he found that
conformity rates ranged from a low of 18% among Inuit hunters
of Baffin Island to a high of 60% among village- dwelling
Temne farmers of West Africa. Additional analyses have shown
that conformity rates are generally higher in cultures that are
collectivistic rather than individualistic in orientation (Bond &
Smith, 1996). Hence, many anthropologists—interested in
human culture and its influence over individuals—study the
processes of conformity and independence (Spradley et al.,
2015)
Compliance
In conformity situations, people follow implicit or explicit
group norms. But another common form of social influence
occurs when others make direct requests of us in the hope that
we will comply. Situations that call for compliance take many
forms. These include a friend’s plea for help, sheepishly
prefaced by the question “Can you do me a favor?” They also
include the pop-up ads on the Internet designed to lure you
into a commercial site and the salesperson’s pitch for business
prefaced by the dangerous words “Have I got a deal for you!”
Sometimes, the request is up front and direct; what you see is
what you get. At other times, it is part of a subtle and more
elaborate manipulation.
How do people get others to comply with self-serving requests?
How do police interrogators get crime suspects to confess? How
do political parties and charitable organizations draw millions
of dollars in contributions from voters? How do you exert
influence over others? Do you use threats, promises, politeness,
deceit, or reason? Do you hint, coax, sulk, negotiate, trick,

throw tantrums, or pull rank whenever you can? To a large
extent, the compliance strategies we use depend on how well we
know the person we target, our status within a relationship, our
personality, our culture, and the nature of the request.
By observing the masters of influence—advertisers, fund-
raisers, politicians, and business leaders—social psychologists
have learned a great deal about the subtle but effective
strategies that are commonly used. What they have discovered is
that people often get others to comply with their requests by
setting subtle psychological traps. Once caught in these traps,
the unwary victim finds it difficult to escape. Anthony Pratkanis
(2007) identified 107 methods of social influence that have been
researched and published. These tactics go by various colorful
names, including the lure, the 1-in-5 prize technique, the dump-
and-chase technique, the disrupt-then-reframe technique, and
the driving toward a goal technique. In the coming pages, some
of the best known approaches will be described.
Mindlessness and Compliance
Sometimes people can be disarmed by the simple phrasing of a
request, regardless of its merit. Consider, for example, requests
that sound reasonable but offer no real basis for compliance.
Ellen Langer and her colleagues (1978) have found that words
alone can sometimes trick us into submission. In their research,
an experimenter approached people who were using a library
copying machine and asked to cut in. Three different versions of
the request were used. In one, participants were simply asked,
“Excuse me. I have five pages. May I use the Xerox machine?”
In a second version, the request was justified by the added
phrase “because I’m in a rush.” As you would expect, more
participants stepped aside when the request was justified (94%)
than when it was not (60%). A third version of the request,
however, suggests that the actual reason offered had little to do
with the increase in compliance. In this case, participants heard
the following: “Excuse me. I have five pages. May I use the
Xerox machine because I have to make some copies?” Huh?
Read this request closely and you’ll see that it really offered no

reason at all. Yet 93% in this condition complied! It was as if
the appearance of a reason, triggered by the word because, was
all that was needed. In fact, Langer (1989) finds that the mind is
often on “automatic pilot”—we respond mindlessly to words
without fully processing the information they are supposed to
convey. At least for requests that are small, “sweet little
nothings” may be enough to win compliance.
Langer’s research shows that sometimes we process oral
requests lazily, without critical thought. In these instances,
words alone, if they sound good, can be used to elicit
compliance. Consider, for example, words that evoke the
concept of freedom. In a series of experiments, researchers
found that merely by inserting the phrase “But you are free to
accept or refuse this request” into a plea, they were able to
increase the numbers of people who agreed to donate money,
give someone a cigarette, fill out a survey, and buy pancakes.
This technique increased compliance consistently in face-to-
face requests, on the street and in shopping malls, by mail,
over the phone, and on the internet (Guéguen et al., 2013). In a
meta-analysis of 42 attempts involving more than 22,000
participants, mostly in France, Christopher Carpenter (2013)
concluded that the technique of evoking freedom through words
is consistently effective.
It is interesting that although a state of mindlessness can make
us vulnerable to compliance, it can also have the opposite
effect. For example, many city dwellers will automatically
walk past panhandlers on the street looking for a handout.
Perhaps the way to increase compliance in such situations is to
disrupt this mindless refusal response by making a request that
is so unusual that it piques the target person’s interest. To test
the effect of this pique technique, researchers had a confederate
approach people on the street and make a request that was either
typical (“Can you spare a quarter?”) or atypical (“Can you spare
17 cents?”). The result: Atypical pleas elicited more comments
and questions from those who were targeted—and produced a
60% increase in the number of people who gave money (Santos

et al., 1994). In another study, researchers who went door to
door selling holiday cards gained more compliance when they
dis- rupted the mindless process and reframed the sales pitch.
They sold more cards when they said the price was “three
hundred pennies—that’s three dollars, it’s a bargain” than when
they simply asked for three dollars (Davis & Knowles, 1999).
The Norm of reciprocity
One of us recently used Lyft for the first time. Lyft is a peer-to-
peer ridesharing company whose service connects drivers in the
area to prospective passengers via a mobile app. Founded in
2013, in San Francisco, Lyft is a taxi service that com- petes
with Uber. After arriving at the GPS-set destination and
completing credit card payment for the ride, this author
received from Lyft a request to rate the driver on a 5-point scale
(to help ensure customer satisfaction, average driver ratings can
be found on the Lyft app). That was easy. He was a 5. The car
was clean and comfortable; the ride was quick; the conversation
was interesting. The next day, this author was notified that the
driver had rated him a 5. Not only does the company seek
passenger ratings of drivers but also driver ratings of
passengers! The author/passenger being a social psychologist,
he could not resist wondering: Had he “earned the 5 rating, or
was it “payback” for his prior high rating of the driver?
A simple, unstated, but powerful rule of social behavior known
as the norm of reciprocity dictates that we treat others as they
have treated us (Gouldner, 1960). On the negative side, this
norm can be used to sanction retaliation against those who
cause us harm—as captured in the expression “an eye for an
eye.” On the positive side, reciprocity can lead us to feel
obligated to repay others for acts of kindness. Thus, whenever
we receive gifts, invitations, compliments, and free samples, we
usually go out of our way to return the favor.
The norm of reciprocity contributes to the predictability and
fairness of social interaction. But it can also be used to exploit

us. Dennis Regan (1971) examined this possibility in the
following laboratory study. Individuals were brought together
with a confederate who was trained to act in a likable or
unlikable manner for an experiment on “aesthetics.” In one
condition, the confederate did the participant an unsolicited
favor. He left during a break and returned with two bottles of
Coca-Cola, one for himself and the other for the participant. In
a second condition, he returned from the break empty-handed.
In a third condition, participants were treated to a Coke, but by
the experimenter, not the confederate. The confederate then told
participants in all conditions that he was selling raffle tickets at
25 cents apiece and asked if they would be willing to buy any.
On average, participants bought more raffle tickets when the
confederate had earlier brought them a soft drink than when he
had not. The norm of reciprocity was so strong that they
returned the favor even when the confederate was not otherwise
a likable character. In fact, participants in this condition spent
an average of 43 cents on raffle tickets. At a time when soft
drinks cost less than a quarter, the confederate made a
handsome quick profit on his investment!
It’s clear that the norm of reciprocity can be used to trap us,
unwittingly, into acts of compliance. For example, research
conducted in restaurants shows that wait- ers and waitresses can
increase their tip percentages by writing, “Thank you” on the
back of the customer’s check, by drawing a happy face on it, or
by placing candy on the check tray (Rind & Strohmetz, 2001;
Strohmetz et al., 2002). But does receiving a favor make us feel
indebted forever or is there a time limit to the social obligation
that is so quietly unleashed? In an experiment designed to
answer this question, Jerry Burger and others (1997) used
Regan’s soft drink favor and had the confederate try to “cash
in” with a request either immediately or one week later. The
result: Compliance levels increased in the immediate condition
but not after a full week had passed. People may feel compelled
to reciprocate, but that feeling—at least for small acts of
kindness—is relatively short-lived.

Some people are more likely than others to trigger and exploit
the reciprocity norm. According to Martin Green- berg and
David Westcott (1983), individuals who use reciprocity to
elicit compliance are called “creditors” because they always try
to keep others in their debt so they can cash in when necessary.
On a questionnaire that measures reciprocation ideology, people
are identified as creditors if they endorse such statements as “If
someone does you a favor, it’s good to repay that person with a
greater favor.” On the receiving end, some people try more than
others not to accept favors that might later set them up to be ex-
ploited. On a scale that measures reciprocation wariness, people
are said to be wary if they express the suspicion, for example,
that “asking for another’s help gives them power over your life”
(Eisenberger et al., 1987).
Cultures may also differ in terms of their reciprocation
wariness—with interesting consequences for social behavior.
Imagine that you bump into a casual friend at the airport, stop
for a drink, and the friend offers to pay for it. Would you let the
friend pay? Or, suppose a sales clerk in a supermarket offered
you a free sample of soup to taste. Would you accept the offer?
Theorizing that the norm of reciprocity operates with particular
force in collectivist cultures that foster interdependence, Hao
Shen and others (2011) conducted a series of studies in which
they posed these kinds of questions to Chinese college students
from Hong Kong and to European American
students from Canada. As you can see in Figure 7.7, the
students from China were consistently less willing to accept the
favor. Additional questioning revealed that these participants
were more likely to see the gift giver’s motives as self-serving
and to feel uncomfortably indebted by the situation.
Setting Traps: Sequential request Strategies
People who raise money or sell for a living know that it often
takes more than a single plea to win over a potential donor or
customer. Social psychologists share this knowledge and have
studied several compliance techniques that are based on making

two or more related requests. Click! The first request sets the
trap. Snap! The second captures the prey. In a classic and
important book entitled Influence: Science and Practice, Robert
Cialdini (2009) described a number of sequential request tactics
in vivid detail. Other social psychologists have continued in this
tradition (Dolinski, 2016; Kenrick et al., 2012). The best known
of these methods are presented in the following pages.
The Foot in the DoorFolk wisdom has it that one way to get a
person to comply with a sizable request is to start small. First
devised by traveling salespeople peddling vacuum cleaners,
hairbrushes, cosmetics, magazine subscriptions, and en-
cyclopedias, the trick is to somehow get your “foot in the door.”
The expression need not be taken literally, of course. The point
of the foot-in-the-door technique is to break the ice with a small
initial request that the customer can’t easily refuse. Once that
first commitment is elicited, the chances are increased that
another, larger request will succeed.
Jonathan Freedman and Scott Fraser (1966) tested the impact of
this technique in a series of field experiments. In one, an
experimenter pretending to be employed by a consumer
organization telephoned a large number of female home- makers
in Palo Alto, California, and asked if they would be willing to
answer some questions about the household products they use.
Those who consented were then asked a few quick and
innocuous questions and thanked for their assistance. Three
days later, the experimenter called back and made a
considerable, almost outrageous, request. He asked the women
if they would allow a handful of men into their homes for two
hours to rummage through their drawers and cupboards so they
could take an inventory of their household products.
The foot-in-the-door technique proved to be very effective.
When the participants were confronted with only the very
intrusive request, 22% consented. Yet the rate of agreement
among those who had been surveyed earlier more than doubled,
to 53%. This basic result has now been repeated over and over
again. People are more likely to donate time, money, food,

blood, the use of their home, and other resources once they have
been induced to go along with a small initial request. Although
the effect is not always as dramatic as that obtained by Freed-
man and Fraser, it does appear in a wide variety of
circumstances, and it increases compliance rates, on average, by
about 13% (Burger, 1999).
The practical implications of the foot-in-the-door technique are
obvious. But why does it work? Over the years, several
explanations have been suggested. One that seems plausible is
based on self-perception theory—that people infer their at-
titudes by observing their own behavior. This explanation
suggests that a two-step process is at work. First, by observing
your own behavior in the initial situation, you come to see
yourself as the kind of person who is generally cooperative
when approached with a request. Second, when confronted with
the more burdensome request, you seek to respond in ways that
maintain this new self-image. By this logic, the foot-in-the-door
technique should succeed only when you attribute an initial act
of compliance to your own personal characteristics.
Based on a review of dozens of studies, Jerry Burger (1999)
concluded that the research generally supports the self-
perception account. Thus, if the first request is too trivial or if
participants are paid for the first act of compliance, they won’t
later come to view themselves as inherently cooperative. Under
these conditions, the technique does not work. Likewise, the
effect occurs only when people are motivated to be consistent
with their self-images. If participants are unhappy with what the
initial behavior implies about them, if they are too young to
appreciate the implications, or if they don’t care about behaving
in ways that are personally consistent, then again the technique
does not work. Other processes may be at work, but it appears
that the foot opens the door by altering self-perceptions, leading
people who agree to the small initial request—without any
compensation—to see themselves as helpful (Burger &
Caldwell, 2003). In fact, this process can still occur even when
a person tries to comply with the initial small request but fails.

In a series of studies, Dariusz Dolinski (2000) found that when
people were asked if they could find directions to a bogus street
address or decipher an unreadable message—small favors that
they could not satisfy—they too become more compliant with
the next request.
Knowing that a foot in the door increases compliance rates is
both exciting and troubling—exciting for the owner of the foot,
troubling for the owner of the door. As Cialdini (2009) put it,
“You can use small commitments to manipulate a person’s self-
image; you can use them to turn citizens into ‘public servants,’
prospects into ‘customers,’ prisoners into ‘collaborators.’ And
once you’ve got a man’s self-image where you want it, he
should comply naturally with a whole range of your requests
that are consistent with this view of himself” (p. 74).
LowballingAnother two-step trap, arguably the most
unscrupulous of all compliance techniques, is also based on
the “start small” idea. Imagine yourself in the following
situation. You’re at a local car dealership. After some
negotiation, the salesperson offers a great price on the car of
your choice. You cast aside other con- siderations and shake
hands on the deal and as the salesperson goes off to “write it
up,” you begin to feel the thrill of owning a new car. Absorbed
in fantasy, you are suddenly interrupted by the return of the
salesperson. “I’m sorry,” he says. “The manager would not
approve the sale. We have to raise the price by another $450.
I’m afraid that’s the best we can do.” As the victim of an all-
too-common trick known as lowballing, you are now faced with
a tough decision. On the one hand, you really like the car; and
the more you think about it, the better it looks. On the other
hand, you don’t want to pay more than you bargained for and
you have an uneasy feeling in the pit of your stomach that
you’re being duped. What do you do?
Salespeople who use this tactic are betting that you’ll make the
purchase despite the added cost. If the way research participants
behave is any indication, they are often right. In one study,
experimenters phoned introductory psychology students and

asked if they would be willing to participate in a study for extra
credit. Some were told up front that the session would begin at
the uncivilized hour of 7 a.m. Knowing that, only 31%
volunteered. But other participants were lowballed. Only after
they agreed to participate did the experimenter inform them of
the 7 a.m. starting time. Would that be okay? Whether or not it
was, the procedure achieved its objective—the signup rate
rose to 56% (Cialdini et al., 1978).
Disturbing as it may be, lowballing is an interesting technique.
Surely, once the lowball offer has been thrown, many recipients
suspect that they were misled. Yet they go along. Why? The
reason appears to hinge on the psychology of commitment
(Kiesler, 1971). Once people make a particular decision, they
justify it to themselves by thinking of all its positive aspects.
As they get increasingly committed to a course of action, they
grow more resistant to changing their mind, even if the initial
reasons for the action have been changed or withdrawn entirely.
In the car dealership scenario, you might very well have decided
to purchase the car because of the price. But then you would
have thought about its sleek appearance, the scent of the leather
interior, the iPod dock, and the brand-new satellite radio. By
the time you learned that the price would be more than you’d
bargained for, it would be too late—you would already have
been hooked.
Lowballing also produces another form of commitment. When
people do not suspect duplicity, they feel a nagging sense of
unfulfilled obligation to the person with whom they negotiated.
Even though the salesperson was unable to complete the
original deal, you might feel obligated to buy anyway, having
already agreed to make the purchase. This commitment to the
other person may account for why lowballing works better when
the second request is made by the same person than by someone
else (Burger & Petty, 1981). It may also explain why people are
most vulnerable to the lowball when they make their
commitment in public rather than in private (Burger &

Cornelius, 2003).
The Door in the FaceAlthough shifting from an initial small
request to a larger one can be effective, as in the foot-in-the-
door and lowball techniques, oddly enough the opposite is also
true. Cialdini (2009) described the time he was approached by a
Boy Scout and asked to buy two five-dollar tickets to an
upcoming circus. Having better things to do with his time and
money, he declined. Then the boy asked if he would be
interested in buying chocolate bars at a dollar apiece. Even
though he does not particularly like chocolate, Cialdini—an
expert on social influence—bought two of them. After a
moment’s reflection, he realized what had happened. Whether
the Boy Scout planned it that way or not, Cialdini had fallen for
what is known as the door-in-the-face technique.
The technique is as simple as it sounds. An individual makes an
initial request that is so large it is sure to be rejected and then
comes back with a second more reasonable request. Will the
second request fare better after the first one has been declined?
Plagued by the sight of uneaten chocolate bars, Cialdini and
others (1975) tested the effectiveness of the door-in-the-face
technique. They stopped college students on campus and asked
if they would volunteer to work without pay at a counseling
center for juvenile delinquents. The time commitment would be
forbidding: roughly two hours a week for the next two years!
Not surpris- ingly, everyone who was approached politely
slammed the proverbial door in the experimenter’s face. But
then the experimenter followed up with a more modest proposal,
asking the students if they would be willing to take a group of
kids on a two-hour trip to the zoo. The strategy worked like a
charm. Only 17% of the students confronted with only the
second request agreed. But of those who initially declined the
first request, 50% said yes to the zoo trip. Importantly, the
door-in-the-face technique does not elicit mere empty promises.
Most research participants who comply subsequently do what
they’ve agreed to do (Cialdini & Ascani, 1976).
Why is the door-in-the-face technique such an effective trap?

One possibility involves the principle of perceptual contrast:
To the person exposed to a very large initial request, the second
request “seems smaller.” Two dollars’ worth of candy bars is
not bad compared with ten dollars for circus tickets. Likewise,
tak- ing a group of kids to the zoo seems trivial compared with
two years of volunteer work. As intuitively sensible as this
explanation seems, Cialdini and others (1975) concluded that
perceptual contrast is only partly responsible for the effect.
When participants only heard the large request without actually
having to reject it, their rate of compliance with the second
request (25%) was only slightly larger than the 17% rate of
compliance exhibited by those who heard only the small
request.
A more compelling explanation for the effect involves the
notion of reciprocal concessions. A close cousin of the
reciprocity norm, this refers to the pressure to respond to
changes in a bargaining position. When an individual backs
down from a large request to a smaller one, we view that move
as a concession that we should match by our own compliance.
Thus, the door-in-the-face technique does not work if the
second request is made by a different person (Cialdini et al.,
1975). Nor does it work if the first request is so extreme that it
comes across as an insincere “first offer” (Schwarzwald et al.,
1979). On an emotional level, refusing to help on one request
may also trigger feelings of guilt, which we can reduce by
complying with the second, smaller request (O’Keefe & Figge,
1997; Millar, 2002).
That’s Not All, Folks!If the notion of reciprocal concessions is
correct, then a person shouldn’t actually have to refuse the
initial offer in order for the shift to a smaller request to work.
Indeed, another familiar sales strategy manages to use
concession without first eliciting refusal. In this strategy, a
product is offered at a particular price, but then, before the
buyer has a chance to respond, the seller adds, “And that’s not
all!” At that point, either the original price is reduced or a
bonus is offered to sweeten the pot. The seller, of course,

intends all along to make the so-called concession.
This ploy, called the that’s-not-all technique, seems transparent,
right? Surely no one falls for it, right? Burger (1986) was not so
sure. He predicted that people are more likely to make a
purchase when a deal seems to have improved than when the
same deal is offered right from the start. To test this hypothesis,
Burger set up a booth at a campus fair and sold cupcakes. Some
customers who approached the table were told that the cupcakes
cost 75 cents each. Others were told that they cost a dollar, but
then, before they could respond, the price was reduced to 75
cents. Rationally speaking, Burger’s manipulation did not affect
the ultimate price, so it should not have affected sales. But it
did. When customers were led to believe that the final price
represented a reduction, sales increased from 44% to 73%.
At this point, let’s step back and look at the various compliance
tactics described in this section. All of them are based on a
two-step process that involves a shift from a request of one size
to another. What differs is whether the small or large request
comes first and how the transition between steps is made (see
Table 7.3). Moreover, all these strategies work in subtle ways
by manipulating a target person’s self-image, commitment to
the product, feelings of obligation to the seller, or perceptions
of the real request. It is even possible to increase compliance by
first asking “How are you feeling?” (Howard, 1990) or “I hope
I’m not disturbing you, am I?” (Meineri & Guéguen, 2011), or
by claiming some coincidental similarity like having the same
first name or birthday (Burger et al., 2004). When you consider
these various traps, you have to wonder whether it’s ever
possible to escape.
Assertiveness: When People Say No Cialdini (2009) opened his
book with a confession: “I can admit it freely now. All my life
I’ve been a patsy.” As a past victim of compliance traps, he is
not alone.

Many people find it difficult to assert themselves in social
situations. Faced with an unreasonable request from a friend,
spouse, or stranger, they become anxious at the mere thought of
putting a foot down and refusing to comply. There are times
when it is uncomfortable for anyone to say no. However, just as
we can maintain our autonomy in the face of conformity
pressures, we can also refuse direct requests—even clever ones.
The trap may be set, but you don’t have to get caught.
According to Cialdini, being able to resist compliance pressures
rests, first and foremost, on being vigilant. If a stranger hands
you a gift and then launches into a sales pitch, you should
recognize the tactic for what it is and not feel indebted by the
norm of reciprocity. And if you strike a deal with a salesperson
who later reneges on the terms, you should be aware that you’re
being lowballed and react accordingly. That is exactly what
happened to one of the authors of this book. After a Saturday
afternoon of careful negotiation at a local car dealer, he and his
wife finally came to terms on a price. Minutes later, however,
the salesman returned with the news that the manager would not
approve the deal. The cost of a power moonroof, which was
supposed to be included, would have to be added on. Familiar
with the research, the author turned to his wife and exclaimed,
“It’s a trick; they’re lowballing us!” She then became furious,
went straight to the manager, and made such a scene in front
of other customers that he backed down and honored the
original deal.
What happened in this instance? Why did recognizing the
attempted manipulation spark such anger and resistance? As
this story illustrates, compliance techniques work smoothly
only if hidden from view. The problem is, these techniques are
not only attempts to influence us; they are deceptive. Flattery,
gifts, and other ploys often win compliance, but not if perceived
as insincere (Jones, 1964) or if the target has a high level of
reciprocity wariness (Eisenberger et al., 1987). Like- wise,
sequential request traps are powerful only to the extent that they
are subtle and cannot be seen for what they are (Schwarzwald et

al., 1979). People don’t like to be hustled. In fact, feeling
manipulated typically leads us to react with anger,
psychological reactance, and stubborn noncompliance—unless
the request is a command and the requester is a figure of
authority.
Obedience
Allen Funt, the creator and producer of the original TV program
Candid Camera (a forerunner of the show Punk’d), spent as
much time observing human behavior in the real world as most
psychologists do. When asked what he learned from all his
people watching, Funt replied, “The worst thing, and I see it
over and over, is how easily people can be led by any kind of
authority figure, or even the most minimal signs of authority.”
He cited the time he put up a road sign that read “Delaware
Closed Today.” The reaction? “Motorists didn’t question it.
Instead they asked, ‘Is Jersey open?’” (Zimbardo, 1985, p. 47).
Funt was right about the way we react to authority. Taught from
birth that it’s important to respect legitimate forms of
leadership, people think twice before de- fying parents,
teachers, employers, coaches, and government officials. The
problem is that mere symbols of authority—titles, uniforms,
badges, or the trappings of success, even without the necessary
credentials—can sometimes turn ordinary people into docile
servants. Leonard Bickman (1974) demonstrated this phenom-
enon in a series of studies in which a male research assistant
stopped passersby on the street and ordered them to do
something unusual. Sometimes he pointed to a paper bag on the
ground and said, “Pick up this bag for me!” At other times, he
pointed to an individual standing beside a parked car and said,
“This fellow is overparked at the meter but doesn’t have any
change. Give him a dime!” Would anyone really take this guy
seriously? When he was dressed in street clothes, only a third of
the people stopped followed his orders. But when he wore a
security guard’s uniform, nearly 9 out of every 10 people

obeyed! Even when the uni- formed assistant turned the corner
and walked away after issuing his command, the vast majority
of passersby followed his orders. Clearly, uniforms signify the
power of authority (Bushman, 1988).
Blind obedience may seem funny, but if people are willing to
take orders from a total stranger, how far will they go when it
really matters? As the pages of history attest, the implications
are sobering. In World War II, Nazi officials participated in the
deaths of millions of Jews, as well as of Poles, Russians,
gypsies, and homosexuals. Yet when tried for these crimes, all
of them raised the same defense: “I was following orders.”
Surely, you may be thinking, the Holocaust was a historical
anomaly that says more about the Nazis as a group of bigoted,
hateful, and pathologically frustrated individuals than about the
situations that lead people in general to commit acts of
destructive obedience. In Hitler’s Willing Executioners,
historian Daniel Goldhagen (1996) argued on the basis of past
records that many German officials were willing participants in
the Holo- caust—not mere ordinary people forced to follow
orders. Citing historical records, others have similarly argued
that Nazi killers knew, believed in, and celebrated their mission
(Cesarani, 2004; Haslam & Reicher, 2007; Vetle- sen, 2005).
Yet two lines of evidence suggest that laying blame on this
subgroup of German people is too simple as an explanation of
what happened. First, interviews with Nazi war criminals and
doctors who worked in concentration camps suggested, at least
to some, the provocative and disturb-
ing conclusion that these people were “utterly ordinary”
(Arendt, 1963; Lifton, 1986; Von Lang & Sibyll, 1983). Second,
the monstrous events of World War II do not stand alone in
modern history. Even today, various crimes of obedience—
which may include torture, suicide bombings, and public
beheadings—are being committed in ruthless regimes,
militaries, and terrorist organizations through- out the world
(Haritos-Fatouros, 2002; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Victoroff
& Kruglanski, 2009). As seen in recent Wall Street scandals,

crimes of obedience are also found in the corporate world,
where business leaders and their subordinates “morally
disengage” from fraud and other unethical actions by denying
personal respon- sibility, minimizing consequences, and
dehumanizing victims (Beu & Buck- ley, 2004; Moore et al.,
2012). On extraordinary but rare occasions, obedience is carried
to its ultimate limit. In 1978, 900 members of the People’s
Temple cult obeyed a command from Reverend Jim Jones to kill
themselves by drinking poison. In 1997, Marshall Applewhite,
leader of the Heaven’s Gate cult in California, killed himself
and convinced 37 followers to do the same. Fanatic cult
members had committed mass suicide before, and they will
likely do so again (Galanter, 1999).
Milgram’s research: Forces of Destructive Obedience
During the time that Adolf Eichmann was being tried in
Jerusalem for his Nazi war crimes, Stanley Milgram began a
dramatic series of 18 experiments. The first was published in
the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology in 1963; the rest
were reported later in his 1974 book, Obedience to Authority.
Milgram did not realize it at the time—and neither did his
research participants—but they were about to make history in
one of the most famous psychology research programs ever
conducted.
For many years, the ethics of this research has been the focus of
much debate. Those who say it was not ethical point to the
potential psychological harm to which Milgram’s participants
were exposed. In contrast, those who believe that these
experiments met appropriate ethical standards emphasize the
profound contribution it has made to our understanding of
human nature and an important social problem. They conclude
that on balance, the danger that destructive obedience poses
for all humankind justified Milgram’s unorthodox methods.
Consider both sides of the debate, which were summarized in
Chapter 2, and make your own judgment. Now, however, take a
more personal look. Imagine yourself as one of the
approximately 1,000 participants who found themselves in a

situation much like the following.
The experience begins when you arrive at a Yale University
laboratory and meet two men. One is the experimenter, a stern
young man dressed in a gray lab coat and carrying a clipboard.
The other is a middle-aged gentleman named Mr. Wallace, an
accountant who is slightly overweight and average in
appearance.
You exchange quick introductions, and then the experimenter
explains that you and your co-participant will take part in a
study on the effects of punishment on learning. After lots have
been drawn, it is determined that you will serve as the teacher
and that Mr. Wallace will be the learner. So far, so good.
Soon, however, the situation takes on a more ominous tone. You
find out that your job is to test the learner’s memory and
administer electric shocks of increas- ing intensity whenever he
makes a mistake. You are then escorted into another room,
where the experimenter straps Mr. Wallace into a chair, rolls up
his sleeves, attaches electrodes to his arms, and applies
“electrode paste” to prevent blisters and burns. Mr. Wallace is
concerned but the experimenter responds by reassuring him that
although the shocks will be painful, the procedure will not
cause “per- manent tissue damage.” In the meantime, you can
personally vouch for how painful the shocks are because the
experimenter stings you with one that is supposed to be mild.
The experimenter then takes you back to the main room, where
you are seated in front of a “shock generator,” a machine with
30 switches that range from 15 volts, labeled “slight shock,” to
450 volts, labeled “XXX.”
Your role in this experiment is straightforward. First you read a
list of word pairs to Mr. Wallace through a microphone. Then
you test his memory with a series of multiple-choice questions.
The learner answers each question by pressing one of four
switches that light up signals on the shock generator. If his
answer is correct, you move on to the next question. If it is
incorrect, you announce the correct answer and shock him.
When you press the appropriate shock switch, a red light flashes

People may conform or maintain their independence from .docx

People may conform or maintain their independence from .docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

More from gertrudebellgrove

More from gertrudebellgrove (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

People may conform or maintain their independence from .docx