Other Important Statutory Construction Principles.pdf

Other Important
Statutory Construction
Principles

Noscitur A Sociis
• According to this maxim, where a particular word or
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible
of various meanings, its meaning may be made clear
and specific by considering the company in which it is
found||| (Co Kim Cham v. Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5a,
[November 16, 1945], 75 PHIL 371-409)

Buenaseda v. Flavier (OMB can order
preventive suspension)
• Provision: "Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.”
• When the Constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the
suspension" of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension,"
as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said
provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine,
censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis,the word "suspension" should be given the
same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific
by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is
associated||| (Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719, [September 21, 1993])

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. (Legal
gambling allowed)
• We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of
chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are
less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of
chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is
associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with
"and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only
illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented
or suppressed.||| (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., G.R. No. 111097, [July 20,
1994], 304 PHIL 428-454)

• the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a
general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of
the same class, the general word or phrase must be construed to include, or to be
restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned.||| (Aquino v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 227715,
[November 3, 2020])
• Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a
particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic
word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly
enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statute which would
repel such inference. ||| (Rotoras v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211999, [August
20, 2019])
• This shows that the "other matters" that may come under the general
clause should be of the same nature as those that have preceded them
applying the rule of construction known as ejusdem generis. In other
words, in order that a matter may come under the general clause, it is
necessary that it belongs to the same kind or class therein specifically
enumerated. Otherwise, it should be deemed foreign or extraneous and is not
included||| (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals (First
Division), G.R. Nos. 210501, 211294 & 212490, [March 15, 2021])

NPC v. Angas- whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation
for expropriated lands, the law applicable is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest
rate or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum?
• Under the doctrine, ejusdem generis where general terms follow the designation of particular things or
classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be construed to comprehend those things or persons
of the same class or of the same nature as those specifically enumerated||| (National Power Corp. v.
Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, [May 8, 1992], 284-A PHIL 39-48)
The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by
treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as including all that is embraced
in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the ground that if
the lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have not
made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used only general terms ||| (National Power
Corp. v. Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, [May 8, 1992], 284-A PHIL 39-48)
SUBJECT PROVISION: "By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended,
otherwise known as the `Usury Law,' the Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974,
has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the
rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per
cent (12%) per annum."||| (National Power Corp. v. Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, [May 8, 1992], 284-A PHIL 39-48)

• It is clear from the foregoing provision that the Central Bank circular applies only to loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits. This has already been settled in several cases decided by this
Court. Private respondents, however, take exception to the inclusion of the term "judgments" in the said
circular, claiming that such term refers to any judgment directing the payment of legal interest, which
term includes the questioned judgment of the lower court in the case at bar.
• Private respondents' contention is bereft of merit. The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of
the Usury Law, as well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416, should be interpreted to mean only
judgments involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the principle of ejusdem
generis. Under this doctrine, where general terms follow the designation of particular things or classes of
persons or subjects, the general term will be construed to comprehend those things or persons of the
same class or of the same nature as those specifically enumerated (Crawford, Statutory Construction, p.
191; Go Tiaco vs. Union Ins. Society of Camilan, 40 Phil. 40; Mutuc vs. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228).
• The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words,
by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as including all that is
embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the
ground that if the lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it
would have not made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used only general terms (2
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., pp. 395-400). LLjur
• Applying the said rule on statutory construction to Central Bank Circular No. 416, the general term
"judgments" can refer only to judgments in cases involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits.
• ||| (National Power Corp. v. Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, [May 8, 1992], 284-A PHIL 39-48)

2. Republic v. Migrino
• Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth was done during the administration of Pres. Marcos.
However, what has to be inquired into is whether or not private respondent acted as a "subordinate" of Pres.
Marcos within the contemplation of E.O. No. 1, the law creating the PCGG, when he allegedly unlawfully acquired
the properties.
• A close reading of E. O. No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the term
"subordinate."
• The Whereas Clauses of E. O. No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.
• E.O. No. 2 freezes "all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos
and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business
associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation."
• Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis,that is —
• [W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co.,Ltd. v.
Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58 (1954),citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed.,203].
•the term "subordinate" as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation
with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate
in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.
• ||| (Republic v. Migrino, G.R. No. 89483, [August 30, 1990], 267 PHIL 337-352)

3. Colgate-Palmolive v. Gimenez (non-application of the
ejusdem generis rule)
• The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law refers
only to those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food
products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that "general terms
may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by
the specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose." (Statutory Construction
by Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to
cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or
fall under one specific class. In the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors"
is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is
likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the same
classification. Thus "fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall under the category of food or food
products because they are used in the farming and poultry industries, respectively. "Vitamin
concentrate" appears to be more of a medicine than food or food product, for, as a matter of
fact, vitamins are among those enumerated in the list of medicines and drugs appearing in the
appendix to the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle", which is among those listed
preceding the term in question, includes not only those intended for slaughter but also those
for breeding purposes. Again, it is noteworthy that under Republic Act 814 amending the
above-quoted section of Republic Act No. 601, "industrial starch", which does not always refer
to food for human consumption, was added among the items grouped with stabilizer and
flavors".

Subject provision:
• SEC. 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for the payment
of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of
rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butter, fat, chocolate, malt
syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer poultry feed; textbooks,
reference books, and supplementary readers approved by the Board of Textbooks and/or
established public or private educational institutions; newsprint imported by or for publishers
for use in the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers; book paper, book
cloth, chip board imported for the printing of supplementary readers (approved by the Board of
Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under contracts perfected before the approval of
this Act, the quantity thereof to be certified by the Director of Printing; anesthetics, antibiotics,
vitamins, hormones, X-Ray films, laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and
pharmaceutical drugs necessary for compounding medicines; medical and hospital supplies
listed in the appendix to this Act, in quantities to be certified by the Director of Hospitals as
actually needed by the hospitals applying therefor; drugs and medicines listed in the said
appendix; and such other drugs and medicine as may be certified by the Secretary of Health
from time to time to promote and protect the health of the people of the Philippines shall
be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual
importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof ."
(Emphasis supplied.)||| (Colgate-Palmolive Phils., Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-14787, [January 28,
1961], 110 PHIL 874-878)

• Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly
be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the
above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those
used in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is
supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we
distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. [15], page 4831). Since the law does not distinguish
between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and
those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not
authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their
general sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms
are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection
with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is
intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature
and is to be taken in connection with other rules of
construction||| (Colgate-Palmolive Phils., Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-14787, [January 28,
1961], 110 PHIL 874-878)

4. In Re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v.
Social Security Commission (SSC)- ejusdem generis
principle applies only when there is uncertainty
• From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is
predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and
extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded.
• Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should — following the
principle of ejusdem generis — be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have the
element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase "activity of any kind"
in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry, undertaking." The contention
cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling
where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. (Grosjean
vs. American Paints Works [La], 160 So. 449). In the case at bar, the definition of the term "employer" is, we
think, sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized
for profit, like herein appellant, within its meaning. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an
exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. And, certainly, had the Legislature really
intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined
an "employer" in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it.
• It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the
employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act
excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j], subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has
been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear
indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the
scope of the law.
• ||| (In re Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. L-15045, [January 20, 1961], 110
PHIL 616-622)

Expressio Unios est Exclusio
Alterius

Expressio Unios est Exclusio Alterius
• express mention of one person excludes all others||| (Green Star Express, Inc. v. Nissin-
Universal Robina Corp., G.R. No. 181517, [July 6, 2015], 763 PHIL 27-32)
• To reiterate, the list of persons who may be considered Philippine citizens is an exclusive list.
According to the principle
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, items not
provided in a list are presumed not to be included in
it||| (Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700 (Dissenting
Opinion), [March 8, 2016])

1. To v. Cruz-Paño
• In expressly enumerating offenders not qualified to enjoy the benefits of probation under Section 9 of Presidential
Decree No 968, the clear intent is to allow said benefits to those not included in the enumeration. Hence in the case at
bar, as the Solicitor General points out, petitioner is not among the offenders enumerated in the probation
law (Presidential Decree No. 968) from availing of the benefits of probation. Therefore, he may not be disqualified from
being entitled to the benefits of probation. Some other provisions have to be sought, if any, upon which to deny
petitioner the benefits of probation which, from a reading of the law in its entirety, should with liberality, rather than
undue strictness, be extended to anyone not listed as disqualified.||| (To v. Cruz-Paño, G.R. No. L-55130, [January 17,
1983], 205 PHIL 8-14)
• Under Section 9 of said law, the disqualified offenders are the following:
• "(a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
• "(b) those convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
• "(c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment
of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos;
• "(d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of the decree; and
• "(e) those who were already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the decree became
applicable, pursuant to Section 33."
• Under the abovequoted provision, petitioner may not be disqualified from being entitled to the benefits of
probation.

2. Samson v. CA
• As a general rule, position in all branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities of the government,
including those in government owned or controlled corporations, belong to the competitive service.
The only exceptions are those expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive service and
those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. (Section 3, R.A.
2260, as amended by R.A. No. 6040). LexLib
• Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly, but
reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by
implication . . . (Francisco, Statutory Construction, p. 304, citing 69 C.J., Section 643, pp. 1092-1093,
emphasis supplied).
• Where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, it is to be construed
as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned (Martin, Statutory Construction, 1979
ed., p. 71 citing Dave's Place vs. Liquor Control Comm., 269 N.W., p. 504).
• The exceptions provided for in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended should be,
therefore, strictly construed. It follows then that on this general governing principle, the
position of assistant secretary to the City Mayor of Caloocan City should be considered as belonging
to the non-competitive service.
• ||| (Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, [November 25, 1986], 230 PHIL 59-67)

3. Catu v. Rellosa
• While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to
practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on
the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. 15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are
allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated
to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only
twice a month. 16
•
• Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations.
• ||| (Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738 (Resolution), [February 19, 2008], 569 PHIL 539-551)

4. Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
• it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.
This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would
not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.||| (Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092,
[September 1, 1994], 306 PHIL 219-236)

Challenged provision:
• "Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association
desiring to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public
welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional
Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as
provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon the filing of
a written application for a permit in the form prescribed by the
Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and
Development, the Regional Director or his duly authorized
representative may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or
temporary permit or disapprove the application. In the interest of
the public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any permit
issued under Act 4075."||| (Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092,
[September 1, 1994], 306 PHIL 219-236)

• The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be
construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the negative.
• I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from
the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 7
• It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words
"charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word "charitable" is
only one of three descriptive words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides
that "charitable institutions, churches and parsonages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation." There are certain provisions in statutes wherein these two terms are likewise
dissociated and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26 (e) (corporations exempt from
income tax) and 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross income) of the National Internal Revenue Code;
Section 88 (purposes for the organization of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation Code; and
Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the Local Government Code. prcd
• That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare
purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not
have so stated expressly.
• ||| (Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, [September 1, 1994], 306 PHIL 219-236)

5. Commissioner of Customs v. Court of
Tax Appeals
• The Bureau of Customs itself in its Customs Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 dated March 29, 1973,
does not accord the status of national port to the port of Kiwalan, nor does the list of national ports
appended thereto include the port of Kiwalan. Moreover, said memorandum circular indicates the
specific law (Public Act, Commonwealth Act, Republic Act or Executive Order) creating a particular
national port. Petitioner has not cited or brought to our attention, and we have found none, any law
creating Kiwalan Port as a national port or converting it to one.
• It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unjus est
exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned (Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 2nd Ed., 1990, pp. 160-161, and the cases therein cited). The port of Kiwalan not being
included in the list of national ports appended to Customs Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 nor
in Executive Order No. 72, it follows inevitably as a matter of law and legal principle that this Court
may not properly consider said port as a national port. To do otherwise would be to legislate on our
part and to arrogate unto ourselves powers not conferred on us by the Constitution.
• ||| (Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-48886-88, [July 21, 1993])

When expression unios est exclusion
alterius does not apply…
• "Counsel contends, in support of the above, that Act No. 2493 being complete, and
'covering the field' by implication repealed all laws relating to the practice of medicine,
powers of the Board of Medical Examiners and allied matters; hence, the said law,
expressly providing the causes for revocation of medical licenses, necessarily excluded
all others, even though embodied in prior enactments.
• "It cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples specified there can be no
other conduct of a physician deemed 'unprofessional.' Nor can it be convincingly argued that the
Legislature intended to wipe out all other forms of 'unprofessional' conduct theretofore deemed
grounds for revocation of licenses. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius should be
applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent and should not be permitted to defeat
the plain indicated purpose of the Legislature. It does not apply when words are mentioned by
way of example, or to remove doubts. (See Cyc., 1122.) If, therefore, there exists 'unprofessional
conduct' not specified in the laws, with more reason does the criminal use of opium remain a
specific cause for revocation of license.||| (Gomez v. Ventura, G.R. No. 32441, [March 29, 1930], 54
PHIL 726-734)(Gomez v. Ventura, G.R. No. 32441, [March 29, 1930], 54 PHIL 726-734)

alterius does not apply…
• It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the
acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender
through another,|||
• It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law 24 and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the
intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object
of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit — the protection and safety of victims
of violence against women and children. ACSaHc
• Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the
maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application here. It must be remembered
that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction". It is not of universal
application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering
legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the
plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.
• ||| (Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852, [September 30, 2008], 588 PHIL 532-543)(Go-Tan v.
Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852, [September 30, 2008], 588 PHIL 532-543)

alterius should be disregarded…
• Section 7 of republic Act No. 2264 provided that the vice-mayor, or in his place, the councilor who obtained the
largest number of votes, shall perform the duties of the mayor, in the event of the latter's temporary incapacity to
do so, except the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss employees. Ordinarily, his enumeration would be
interpreted as exclusive, following the principle of inclusio unius, est exclusio alterius, but where, as in the present
case, it would cause inconvenience, hardship and injury to the public interest, as it would place in the hands of the
mayor, vice-mayor, and the councilor receiving the highest number of votes, an instrument to defeat the law
investing the legislative power in the municipal council, by simply boycotting the regular sessions of the council,
this rule should be disregarded.||| (Javellana v. Tayo, G.R. No. L-18919, [December 29, 1962], 116 PHIL 1342-1352)
• Appellant likewise invokes Section 7 third paragraph of Republic Act No. 2264 2 in support of his view that the
sessions in question were null and void, as they were not presided by him or by his Vice- Mayor, or by the councilor
who obtained the largest number of votes.
• It is true that this section mentions only the vice-mayor, or in his place, the councilor who obtained the largest
number of votes who could perform the duties of the mayor, in the event of the latter's temporary incapacity to do
so, except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees. Ordinarily, this enumeration would be interpreted
as exclusive, following the general principle of inclusio unius, est exclusio alterius, but there are cogent reasons to
disregard this rule in this case, since to adopt it would cause inconvenience, hardship, and injury to the public
interest, as it would place in the hands of the mayor, vice-mayor, and the councilor receiving the highest number of
votes an instrument to defeat the law investing the legislative power in the municipal council, by simply boycotting,
as they continuously did for 4 months, the regular sessions of the council.
• ||| (Javellana v. Tayo, G.R. No. L-18919, [December 29, 1962], 116 PHIL 1342-1352)

Casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est

Casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est
• a person, object, or thing omitted must have been omitted
intentionally||| (Heirs of Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579 (Resolution),
[October 9, 2012], 696 PHIL 276-485)
• (meaning, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to
have been omitted intentionally)||| (Association of Non-Profit Clubs, Inc. v.
Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 228539, [June 26, 2019])
• Indeed, applying the doctrine of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est (meaning, a person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally),44 the fact that the 1997 NIRC omitted recreational clubs from the list of exempt
organizations under the 1977 Tax Code evinces the deliberate intent of Congress to remove the
tax income exemption previously accorded to these clubs. As such, the income that recreational
clubs derive "from whatever source" 45 is now subject to income tax under the provisions of
the 1997 NIRC.||| (Association of Non-Profit Clubs, Inc. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
228539, [June 26, 2019])

• Contrary to the posturing of PhilHealth, its charter does not authorize the
grant of additional allowances to the BOD beyond per diems. For one, while
Section 18 (d) of RA No. 7875 is entitled "allowances and per diems," its body
significantly fails to mention any other allowances or benefits besides per
diems. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention
of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in
the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exlusio alterius. Elsewise
stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum — what is expressed puts an end to
what is implied. 29 Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or
thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally. 30 If the legislature
intended to give PhilHealth the authority to grant allowances to the BOD other
than the per diems, it could have facilely mentioned so.||| (Philippine Health
Insurance Corp. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 222838, [September 4, 2018])

When the rule of casus omisus does not
apply…
• The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said
rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule
is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately
exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
• The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when
the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature
did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan
political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."
• In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites authorities to the
effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular application to statutes that should be strictly
construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed against the government since proceedings under it
are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the state.
• Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit
of fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to give "Fair warning of what the law intends to do,
if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle vs. U.S. 283,
U.S. 25, L. Ed, 816)
• The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature,
but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only
been a substitution of terms.
• ||| (People v. Manantan, G.R. No. L-14129, [July 31, 1962], 115 PHIL 657-671)

Doctrine of last antecedent
• The rule that a qualifying or relative word or clause, such as "which," "said," and
"such," is to be construed as applying to the words, phrase or clause next
preceding or, as is frequently stated, to the next preceding antecedent, and not
as extending to or including others more remote, unless a contrary intention
appears (Crawford, Sec. 193, p 331), may be applied in the present case. This rule
is known as the doctrine of last antecedent, which is both a rule of grammar and a rule
of law (Wood vs. Baldwin, 10 N.Y. S. 195) cited in PLDT v. Public Service Commission,
G.R. No. L-26762 August 29, 1975, concurring opinion of J. Castro.
• the qualifying word or phrase only restricts the word or phrase to which the qualifying
word or phrase is immediately associated and not the word or phrase which is
distantly or remotely located||| (Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. City Government
of Batangas, G.R. No. 156040, [December 11, 2008], 594 PHIL 269-304)

1. Pangilinan v. Alvendia
• Republic Act 1199, which took effect on August 30, 1954, defines "tenant" as:
• ". . . a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter's
consent, for purpose of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system";
• While "immediate farm household," according to the same Act, includes:
•". . . the members of the family of the tenant, and such other person or persons, whether
related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help
him operate the farm enterprise".
• Under the above definition of "tenant" given by Republic Act 1199, petitioners were within their
legal rights in asking assistance in their farm work from their sons-in-law or grandsons. Such relatives
fall within the phrase "the members of the family of the tenant"; and the law does not require that
these members of the tenant's family be dependent on him for support, such qualification being
applicable only to "such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or not", whom, as
they are "dependent upon him for support" and "usually help him operate the farm enterprise", the
law considers also part of the tenant's immediate household.
• ||| (Pangilinan v. Alvendia, G.R. No. L-10690, [June 28, 1957], 101 PHIL 794-798)

2. Florentino v. Philippine National Bank
• The question raised is whether the clause "who may be willing to accept the same for settlement"
refers to all antecedents "the Government, any of its branched or instrumentalities, the corporations
owned or controlled by the Government, etc., or only the last antecedents "any citizen of the
Philippines, or any association organized under the laws of the Philippines."
• The contention of the respondent-appellee, Philippine National Bank is that said qualifying clause
refers to all the antecedents, whereas the appellants' contention is that it refers only to the last
antecedent.
• Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the
Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should
be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase
from the preceding ones.
• But even disregarding the grammatical construction, as done by the appellee, still there are
cogent and powerful reasons why the qualifying clause should be limited to the last antecedent. In the
first place, to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association,
or corporation, which are not government entities or owned or controlled by the government, would
render section 2 of the Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional, for it would amount to an impairment
of the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory to note
payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal
one.
• ||| (Florentino v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L-8782, [April 28, 1956], 98 PHIL 959-964)

Subject provision:
SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all persons specified in section
one hereof and within one year from the approval of this Act, and under such rules and
regulations as may be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file requests
for the recognition of the right of the salaries or wages as provided in section one hereof, and
notice of such acknowledgment shall be issued to the applicant which shall state the total amount
of such salaries or wages due the applicant, and certify that it shall be redeemed by the
Government of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their issuance without
interest: Provided, That upon application and subject to such rules and regulations as may be
approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of indebtedness may be issued by the
Treasurer of the Philippines covering the whole or a part of the total salaries or wages the right to
which has been duly acknowledged and recognized, provided that the face value of such
certificate of indebtedness shall not exceed the amount that the applicant may need for the
payment of (1) obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory Act for which
the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or to any of its branches or
instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or control by the Government, or to any citizen of the
Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who
may be willing to accept the same for such settlement.

3. People v. Tamani
• Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:
• SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the
order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney.
• The word "must" in section 6 is synonymous with "ought". It connotes compulsion or
mandatoriness. The clear terms of section 6 leave no room for doubt that the appeal should be
effected within fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment.
• The counsel for appellant Tamani must have so understood that import of section 6 (which is
confirmed by the practice in trial courts) as evinced by the fact that his motion for reconsideration was
filed on March 1st, which was the fifteenth or last day of the reglementary period.
• The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a
copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not well-taken.
The word "promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment" (see section 6 of
Rule 120), while the word "notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is
sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis: "referring each to each; referring each phrase or
expression to its appropriate object", or "let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should
be taken distributively" (76 C. J. S. 175).
• ||| (People v. Tamani, G.R. Nos. L-22160 & L-22161, [January 21, 1974], 154 PHIL 142-167)

4. Amadora v. Court of Appeals
• The parties herein have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180
covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so,
when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
• After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion
that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In
the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall
be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall
be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in
which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo
singula singulis, "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and
"heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
• ||| (Amadora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745, [April 15, 1988], 243 PHIL 468-488)

Provision:
• Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
• The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
• Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.
• The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
• Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
• The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
• Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

When the doctrine does not apply…
• We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous application of the so-
called doctrine of last antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of Section
21. He would thereby have the enumeration of "facilities, improvements, infrastructures and
other forms of development" interpreted to mean that the demonstrative phrase "which are
offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans, etc." refer only to "other
forms of development" and not to "facilities, improvements and infrastructures." While this
subserves his purpose, such bifurcation, whereby the supposed adjectival phrase is set apart
from the antecedent words, is illogical and erroneous. The complete and applicable rule is ad
proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. 9 Relative words refer to the
nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context. In the present case, the
employment of the word "and" between "facilities, improvements, infrastructures" and "other
forms of development," far from supporting petitioner's theory, enervates it instead since it is
basic in legal hermeneutics that "and" is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used
to denote a joinder or union.||| (Mapa v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 78585, [July 5, 1989], 256 PHIL 527-535)

Provision:
SEC. 20. Time of Completion. — Every owner or
developer shall construct and provide the facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of
development, including water supply and lighting facilities,
which are offered and indicated in the approved
subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus,
printed matters letters or in any form of advertisements,
within one year from the date of the issuance of the
license for the subdivision or condominium project or such
other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.

Doctrine of Necessary
Implication

Chua v. Civil Service Commission
• The maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case
but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that: "No statute can be enacted that can
provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet
a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing
legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in
the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in
the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object
and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the
greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et
minus."||| (Chua v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 88979, [February 7, 1992], 282 PHIL 970-990)

• A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees.
We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law
but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for
early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically
excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It
can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made
a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine
its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est — A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Xxxx
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection
clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied
a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by said law.

Other Important Statutory Construction Principles.pdf

More Related Content

What's hot

Similar to Other Important Statutory Construction Principles.pdf

Recently uploaded

Other Important Statutory Construction Principles.pdf