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B.V. All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2019 NXP B.V.
Segment Line Manager, Powertrain & Electrification
PL Drivers & Energy Systems
Vincent M. McNeil, Ph.D.
Functional Safety High Voltage
Traction Inverter Reference Platform
October 2019 | Session #AMF-AUT-T3659
COMPANY PUBLIC 1
Session Goal
• Technical Presentation
• Go through the ISO 26262 Process with Example of Power Inverter
• Understand NXP Reference Design Safety Concept
COMPANY PUBLIC 2
COMPANY PUBLIC 2
• Following the ISO26262-2018
− Part 3: Concept Phase Inverter
− Part 4: Technical Safety Requirements
− Part 5: HW Safety Architecture
− Part 6: SW Safety Architecture
Agenda
COMPANY PUBLIC 3
NXP Offer to the State-of-the-Art xEV Architecture
48 V or > 60 V
(e.g. 400 V)
* only in (P)HEVs, BEVs, omitted in 48 V MHEV systems
** bidirectional in 48 V systems
*** as in exisiting ICE-based vehicles
AC
M
M
~
=
ACDC
Charger*
=
=
DCDC**
=
~
=
~
Motor control Motor(s)
M
LV
lead-acid
or Li-Ion
Battery
BMS
BMS
DC
12 V
HV
Li-Ion
Battery
48 V and HV
Modules
12 V-bus
Modules***
Hybrid Control
Unit (HCU)
Wed 12th 5pm: GD3100 Next Advanced Isolated
of High Voltage Gate driver
Thru 13th 9am: Cost optimized HV BMS MC3377x
Thru 13th 1:30pm: Next Gen Processor solutions
for advanced HEV and Safety Domain
Wed 12th 4pm: High Voltage Safe reference
design Introduction
Thru 13th 2:30pm: Functional safety concept of
High voltage traction Inverter
Thru 13th 3:30pm: Mathworks Model based Design
with NXP Greenbox II
Wed 12th 10:45am: S32K Complete portfolio
update
COMPANY PUBLIC 4
eMotor Inverter Reference Design
• Traction eMotor power inverters convert DC
from HV battery to multi-phase AC
• Output power & efficiency critical at operation >300V
• Output power requirements ranging up to 200+ kW
• Functional safety requirement at ASIL-C/ ASIL-D
Yesterday we studied how an Inverter work…
Today we are going to study how to make sure it fails safely
COMPANY PUBLIC 5
What Can Go Wrong in a Traction Inverter?
Unintended self
acceleration while in
stop
Unintended reverse
speed wheel while in
stop or parking
Unintended loss of
torque while driving
(overtaking)
Unintended over
torque while driving
Traction
hazards
Braking
hazards
Unintended self braking
while driving at high
speed
Unintended
regeneration inside the
HV Battery that could
result in fire hazard
Unintended self
braking while driving
at low speed
COMPANY PUBLIC 6
ISO26262-2018 Standard
“Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning
behavior of E/E systems”
NXP Safety Assure Process
COMPANY PUBLIC 7
ISO26262-2018 Standard
NXP Safety Assure Process
“Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning
behavior of E/E systems”
COMPANY PUBLIC 8
ISO 26262-2018 Standard
NXP Safety Assure Process
NXP Safety Enable
NXP Safety enablement
NXP value
proposition
Assumptions
for analysis
Hazard and risk
assessments
Safety Goals
System Safety
Concept
FMEA, FTA,
FMEDA
Test Safety
mechanism
Test Safety
mechanism
Validate safety
assumptions
“Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning behavior
of E/E systems”
COMPANY PUBLIC 9
Part 3: Item Definition
COMPANY PUBLIC 10
Part 3: Concept Phase
• Item definition
• HARA
• FSC
COMPANY PUBLIC 11
Example of Assumptions and Safety Goals
Safety goal ASIL
SG1: Avoid unintended acceleration while in stop D
SG2: Avoid unintended acceleration , torque lock or over
acceleration torque while driving
B
SG3: Avoid reverse torque D
SG4: Avoid sudden loss of acceleration torque B
SG5: Avoid self-braking torque while driving at high speed D
SG6: Avoid self-braking torque while driving at low speed B
Unintended self
acceleration while in
stop
Unintended reverse
speed wheel while in
stop or parking
Unintended loss of
torque while driving
(overtaking)
Unintended over
torque while driving
Traction
hazards
Braking
hazards
Unintended self braking
while driving at high
speed
Unintended
regeneration inside the
HV Battery that could
result in fire hazard
Unintended self
braking while driving at
low speed
Assumption:
• Single permanent magnet motor PMSM
• No clutch
-> Cannot open motor phases at high speed!
(Back EMF, High braking power, SG5 violation)
* Exercise was done as a example (with Severity, Exposure,
Controllability Matrix)
** One possible example, customer can have different safety goals
COMPANY PUBLIC 12
Functional Safety Requirements
FSR1: “We need to guarantee the
received command is correct and the
communication alive.”
FSR2: “We need to guarantee the
sensors measurements are correct.”
FSR3: “We monitor the torque to detect a
fault of torque processing.”
FSR5: : “When a fault of communication,
sensors or control is detected we need to go
to the appropriate safe state”.
FSR4: : “We need to guarantee the
information we send to VCU, and report
fault”.
COMPANY PUBLIC 13
Functional Block Analysis
Example for function Command • For each of this block:
− Defined FR and FSR
− Decompose functional safety requirements
− Available inside application notes:
“Functional Safety concept of HV Traction
Inverter”.
COMPANY PUBLIC 14
Part 4: System Design
COMPANY PUBLIC 15
Part 4: System Design
• Technical Safety
Requirements
• System Architectural
Design
• Technical Safety Concept
COMPANY PUBLIC 16
Technical Safety Concept
System Functional details decomposition
COMPANY PUBLIC 17
Safe State (1/2)
• Preferred safe state = 0 Torque control or Degraded Torque control
In 0 Torque control we keep PWM the IGBT, but the control request an Iq = 0
which will lead to no torque and will not violate any safety goal.
This safe state has the advantage to be easily restarted, and avoid sudden
loss of torque (ramp down). It requires to have a fully functional control and
sensors measurement. This strategy will be applied for communication failure
with VCU for example.
• Three phase Open at low Speed
M
This safe state open all the Phases of the Inverter. This safe state is
only acceptable at low speed (see next slide). It is a preferred safe
state when vehicle is stopped or at low speed.
When the speed is unknown or when higher than the maximum
back EMF allowed, the preferred safe state will be 3 phases short.
COMPANY PUBLIC 18
PMSM + No Clutch + 3PO = Braking Hazard at High Speed
M
BEMF
VBAT
Braking current • Back EMF > Battery voltage
• Regeneration current
• Braking torque
Depending on your motor in can generate:
~100Nm braking ~ 100kW Braking Power
Violation of safety Goal !
SG5: Avoid self-braking torque
while driving at high speed
COMPANY PUBLIC 19
Safe state (2/2)
3 Phases Short
This safe state LS Short is the preferred safe state when the speed
is high or unknown (loss of control). The control of the high side or
low side needs to be fully functional to close one or the other.
M
M
We must adapt the reaction if the Fault is in High side (BATT to Phase Short ) or low side!
Requirements:
• We need to detect the side and type of failure
• We need to have at least the high side or the low side to work
COMPANY PUBLIC 20
High Level Failure Modes
High Level System Fault Condition Safe State
Failure of communication 0 Torque control
Failure of control or sensor at low speed 3 Phase Open
Failure of control or sensor at high speed Active short
(HS or LS based on the
fault)
Loss of control capability (MCU/SW) or speed information
missing
Active short LS
COMPANY PUBLIC 21
Fault Reaction of Sensor (Easy!)
COMPANY PUBLIC 22
Technical Safety Concept
System Functional details decomposition
COMPANY PUBLIC 23
Technical Safety Concept Example
• Inside the safety concept
for each functional block
you will find:
− Technical requirement
− Technical safety requirement
− Reaction and safe state for
safety manager
TSR_ CUS _004: [CURRMEAS_OOR_ERR]
TSR_ CUS _005: [CURRMEAS_PLAUS_ERR]
COMPANY PUBLIC 24
Technical Safety Concept Example
Technical requirement
Technical safety requirement
Reaction and safe state for safety manager
COMPANY PUBLIC 25
Principle for SPF and Failure Matrix
Function
Detection=
Safety
mechanism
Reaction
Safety goal violation
Function Safety
Mechanism
Reaction
Function x SM x Safe State y
… … …
Failure matrix
COMPANY PUBLIC 26
Principle for Latent Fault
Function
Detection=
Safety
mechanism
Reaction
Latent fault
We check for all the latent fault once at Init.
COMPANY PUBLIC 27
Fault Reaction of Motor Interface
(a Little Harder!)
COMPANY PUBLIC 28
Technical Safety Requirements
System Functional details decomposition
COMPANY PUBLIC 29
Motor Interface Implementation1/2
The GD3100 will detect the fault of the IGBT, and
Motor phase using DESAT, Short circuit, VGE
monitoring, temperature, and some additional voltage
that could be the DC bus or the Phase voltage
1
Critical fault (like short circuit) will need a quick
reaction from the GD3100, without any MCU feedback.
The GD3100 will turn off the gate quickly (but not
abruptly) with some configurable waveshapping to
maintain the IGBT in an Off position.
2
VGE comparator verify the measure
value of the gate (through AMC pins)
and the commands. It guarantee the
communication path, gate drive and
gate drive logic
3
The bidirectional communication
has several safety mechanism to
detect the integrity of the
message (CRC...) and the loss of
communication (watchdog...)
4
PWM and PWMALT is a safety
mechanism to guarantee the
command does not allow shoot-
through and respect dead time
5
The GD3100 reports a fault by pulling the INTB pins and
by sending a 5% duty cycle on AOUT pins. The INTB
pins of all the HS and LS are connected through an OR
gate, the AOUT are individually connected to the eTPU
for analysis
7
COMPANY PUBLIC 30
Motor Interface Implementation (2/2)
• Each gate driver reports fault by
Daisy Chain (HS or LS)
• GD3100 flag are analyzed and
changed to system Fault
[MOT_SHORTCUT_HVN_ERR]
• System Fault are sent to safety
manager for reaction
VCCOV
VCCREG
UV
VSUPOV
OTSD_
IC
OTSD OTW CLAMP DESAT SC OC
BIST_
FAIL
VDD_
UVOV
DTFLT SPIERR
CONFCR
C_ERR
VGE_FL
T
COMER
R
VREFUV VEE
WDOF_
FLT
8
COMPANY PUBLIC 31
Motor Interface Highlight
• Remember Safe State slide:
• Highlights:
− Quick protection to protect against short circuit
− Fault reporting to identify HS or LS and fault criticality (SPI, INTB, AOUT)
− Analyze fault and react on system
− We must have independence of HS and LS or we can have a fault without
3PS possibility!
COMPANY PUBLIC 32
Fault Reaction of Processing and
Safety Manager (a little harder!)
COMPANY PUBLIC 33
Motor Control Algorithm
Motor control developed in QM
COMPANY PUBLIC 34
Motor Control Algorithm
Motor control developed in QM
Safety mechanism to verify it
inside the lockstep
COMPANY PUBLIC 35
Safety Manager
COMPANY PUBLIC 36
Safety Manager
COMPANY PUBLIC 37
Safety Manager
COMPANY PUBLIC 38
Technical Safety Requirements
COMPANY PUBLIC 39
Part 5: HW Design
COMPANY PUBLIC 40
Part 5: HW Design
• HW Safety Requirements
• HW Architecture Design
• HW Metrics (FMEDA with
IC system failure mode)
COMPANY PUBLIC 41
HW Architecture Highlight
• High level overview:
− 1) Decomposition QM and ASIL-D:
▪ Functional traction motor control
QM(D)
▪ Safety Manager ASIL-D
− 2) Three phase short at high speed
for Back EMF and SPF:
▪ Independent HS and LS driver
▪ ASIL D gate driver
− 3) Safety logic to do three phase
short during MCU failure
COMPANY PUBLIC 42
Vepco Hardware
Leadership ASIL-D
Certified MCUs
Smart, flexible
Fail-safe SBCs
FS65
Traction Motor
Inverter Systems
Advanced Si IGBT
Power module
Integrated Isolated
HV IGBT gate driver
COMPANY PUBLIC 43
Part 6: SW Design
COMPANY PUBLIC 44
Part 6: SW Design
• SW Safety Requirements
• SW Architecture Design
• SW Verification
NXP
COMPANY PUBLIC 45
Software Architecture WIP Function Safety
Mechanism
Reaction
Function x SM x Safe State y
… … …
COMPANY PUBLIC 46
NXP Safety Enablement
COMPANY PUBLIC 47
Safety Enablement
• Followed the ISO 26262 Standard
for NXP Components
• Proposed TSC, HWSC, SWSC for
Inverter to be re-used by customer
• We make available the Safety
Application Notes, and safety Lib.
COMPANY PUBLIC 48
Control Flow from Torque to Wheel
COMPANY PUBLIC 49
VCU Interface
COMPANY PUBLIC 50
CAN Messaging
• Two CAN path:
− FS65 Path
− TJA1051 NXP transceiver
• FS65 functions are:
− Power for all sensor, driver,
MCU, Comm
− Key Safety Mechanism for MCU:
▪ Check MCU, Clock, Power Supply
− Bring the system into safe state
− Latch on / latch off system
COMPANY PUBLIC 51
FS65: Integrate MCU Safety Monitoring Capabilities
Independent Fail Safe State
Machine
✓Physical & Electrical
independance to fit for ASILD
✓Power Management
Monitoring Unit (UV / OV)
✓Analog & Digital Built In Self
Test to minimize Latent Faults
✓Own Reference & Supply to
Reduce Common Cause
Failure
Fail Safe Pin (FS0b) :
✓Redundant System Fail Safe
enabler
✓Second Fail Safe pin to assert
safety path with configurable
delay after failure
Advanced Watchdog
✓Challenger
✓Replace external MCU
Monitoring
MCU Monitoring
✓FCCU : Fault Collection
Control Unit
✓Monitor Dual Core Lock Step
Modes MCUs
RSTb – Fail Silent Mode
✓Configurable RSTb activation
giving more system availability
HW Redundancy
✓Vcore external Monitoring
Safety SBC
FS65
Safety MCU
COMPANY PUBLIC 52
MCU and SW Architecture
COMPANY PUBLIC 53
MPC5775E: Traction Inverter MCU
Cores
Z7 Functional core (QM)
Z7 Safety Core (lockstep)
Interconnect Isolation
Cross bar with end to end ECC
MPU for isolation
Memory
4M Flash
512K RAM
Peripherals
FlexCAN (4) + CRC
SPI for gate driver and FS65
ETPU for (next slide):
- CA-PWM + ADC Trigger
- SW Resolver and diag
eQADC
SD ADC (for resolver)
Security
Crypto Security Engine
For OTA Update
Safety
FCCU, ECC, SWT, Lockstep
CMU PMU…
And Latent fault check (BIST,
ECC Fault Injection)
COMPANY PUBLIC 54
SW Architecture
• Performance core:
− Mostly use for Motor Control
− Re-use NXP Enablement
(SDK, App notes,…)
− Enable customer or offer
professional partner (Vepco)
to develop their own Motor
control
• Safety core:
− Implement Safety Concept of
NXP product (MCU+ AAA
product)
− Help customer to achieve
ISO 26262
COMPANY PUBLIC 55
FOC Control for Traction Inverter
COMPANY PUBLIC 56
SW Enablement
Motor control Application
• Develop your own using service layer
• Buy professional code (Vepco)
• Use NXP Matlab Model Base Toolbox
Service
• Reusable and modifiable basic source code
NXP SDK
• NXP Software development kit
• FreeRTOS or bare-metal with OS
interface layer
• Production-ready drivers with MISRA
C 2012 compliance
https://www.nxp.com/support/developer-
resources/run-time-software/s32-
sdk/s32-sdk-for-power-architecture-
devices:S32SDK-POWER-
ARCHITECTURE
eTPU code
• Advance Motor control already optimized
• Customer can customize/optimize it
COMPANY PUBLIC 57
Where to Find the Software?
Visit our web at
www.nxp.com/evinverterplatform
for more information.
https://www.nxp.com/support/developer-resources/evaluation-and-development-boards/ultra-reliable-dev-
platforms/mpc57xx-mcus-platforms/ev-power-inverter-reference-platform:RDPWRINVERTER
COMPANY PUBLIC 58
PWM to IGBT/SiC Drive
COMPANY PUBLIC 59
GD3100 Architecture & Product Features
Features:
Applications:
• HEV Motor Inverters
• HV UPS Inverters
Advanced gate driver for high voltage power IGBTs with integrated high voltage isolator.
ASILC/D compliant
Logic Block 1
SCLK
CSB
MOSI
MISO
SPI
PWM
FSSTATE
INTB
Config, DT Control,
Cross Conduction,
Flt Management,
Safing
VSUP
TSENSEA
AMC
GH
VEE
(2 pins)
DESAT
GND1
(2 pins)
GND2
(2 pins)
RX TX
INT
DATA_IN
DATA_OUT
PWMALT Serial
Comm
GL
RX TX
Logic Block 2
CLAMP
ISENSE
TEMP IGBT
AMUXIN
TX RX
NC13
PWM
TX RX
TEMP IC
AOUT Duty Cycle
Encoder
VCC
VREF
(5 V, 1 %,
20 mA)
GND2
VCCREG
AMUX &
10-bit
ADC VCC
Serial
Comm
Fault
Management,
Conf.
Registers,
fault registers,
Gate control
logic,
ASIL test
control
FSENB
VDD
Gate Drive
Control
Active Vce
Clamp,
Desat
Charge and
Discharge
Control
Active Miller
Clamp
IGBT
Current
Sense
Safing
Logic
Deadtime
Control
IGBT Temp
Sense
Power
Management 1
VCCLV,
Bandgap,
References,
Oscillators
UV/OVLO, etc.
Power
Management 2
VCCHV,
Bandgap,
References,
Oscillators
UV/OVLO, etc.
NC2
FSISO
INTB/
VGEMON
• High gate current capability 10A peak source/sink current
• ISO 26262 ASIL C/D compliant
• Integrated galvanic isolation in compact 10 x 18 mm SOIC
• Separate outputs (GL/GH) to IGBT gate
• Active Miller Clamp (AMC) reduces need for turn off assist
circuitry
• Fast short circuit protection via direct feedback through i-
sense IGBTs with soft shutdown.
• Programmable Desaturation Detect level, Two Level Turn
off
• Minimum programmable deadtime of 500ns
• Integrated temperature sense for system warning and
ultimately soft shutdown for system protection
• Compatible with 200V to 1700V IGBTs, power range
>125kW
• Compatible with 3.3V and 5V IOs
32-Pin
SOIC-WB
COMPANY PUBLIC 60
Motor Interface Implementation 1/2
COMPANY PUBLIC 61
Motor Interface Implementation (2/2)
• Each gate driver reports fault by
Daisy Chain (HS or LS)
• GD3100 flag are analyzed and
changed to system Fault
[MOT_SHORTCUT_HVN_ERR]
• System Fault are sent to safety
manager for reaction
VCCOV
VCCREG
UV
VSUPOV
OTSD_
IC
OTSD OTW CLAMP DESAT SC OC
BIST_
FAIL
VDD_
UVOV
DTFLT SPIERR
CONFCR
C_ERR
VGE_FL
T
COMER
R
VREFUV VEE
WDOF_
FLT
8
COMPANY PUBLIC 62
IGBT/SiC to Motor Phase
COMPANY PUBLIC 63
Fuji 750V/800A 6-in-1 Power Inverter Module
Features
• 750V/800A 6-in-1 3-phase power inverter module
• Reverse-conducting IGBT with integrated temperature sensor
• Integrated ‘i-Sense’ current sensor for fast over-current detection
• 162mm × 117mm × 24mm compact direct-cooling water-jacket
aluminum housing with new thin fin structure
• Flange structure at cooling water IN/OUT for 30% lower thermal
resistance vs conventional fin type heat sink.
• 175℃ guaranteed operating temperature range
Application Example
• 70~120kW motor output power
− Fsw = 6kHz
− Coolant temp = 65℃
− Coolant flow rate = 10L/min
− Vdc = 450V
− Ipeak = 460Arms @ 1s
− Icont = 430Arms
Top view
Bottom view
COMPANY PUBLIC 64
High Level Inverter Specification
• Automotive Optimized EE – Simple Mechanical
• What if you need 150KW peak?
− Change IGBT and Motor
− Keep same architecture
• Open design, Adapt it to your Spec !
COMPANY PUBLIC 65
Sensor Feedback to Close the Loop
COMPANY PUBLIC 66
Current and Voltage Sensing
Current Sensing HV Battery Sensing
COMPANY PUBLIC 67
MPC5775E: SW Resolver
eTPU + SD_ADC= SW resolver
eTPU Engine
A executes
functions:
• Resolver_EXC
• Resolver_ATO
• PWMM
eTPU Engine
B executes
functions:
• Resolver_DIAG
• Resolver_EXT
RAPOL
• AS
SCM
SDM
COMPANY PUBLIC 68
eTPU B
eTPU-Based RDC – Block Diagram
eTPU A
SDADC
Resolver
Cos
Sin
Output
Excitation
Amplifier
DIAGnostics
Angle
Tracking
Observer
Angular Position
Angular Speed
EXC
SIN
COS
Diagnostic Measures
Diagnostic Flags
EXCitation
Generator
Shared
Data
Memory
(SDM)
ADC1
ADC0
eDMA
eDMA
MPC5775E
Angle
EXTrapo-
lation
Angular Position
Angular Speed
trigger
Shared
Code
Memory
(SCM)
Input
resistor
network
External HW
On-chip HW
On-chip SW
TE Core
Fault
reporting
Command
integrity
check
Sensor
plausibility
check;
includes
RDC
checker
Torque
monitoring
NTE Core
Command
processing
Torque
control
Motor
state
measur
ement
Status
reporting
Safety
Manager
COMPANY PUBLIC 69
And We are Closing the Loop…
COMPANY PUBLIC 70
What About Functional Safety…
• Safety is the longest part of
the development
• Enable with:
− Part 3,
− System Part 4 and
− Safety lib Part 6
NXP Safety enablement
NXP value
proposition
Assumptions
for analysis
Hazard and risk
assessments
Safety Goals
System Safety
Concept
FMEA, FTA,
FMEDA
Test Safety
mechanism
Test Safety
mechanism
Validate safety
assumptions
Functional safety concept:
• “What if… fails…”
• See more in tomorrow’s session
COMPANY PUBLIC 71
NXP High Voltage Traction Offer
COMPANY PUBLIC 72
NXP/Vepco Enablement Kit
Design Documentation
Visit www.nxp.com/evinverterplatform for more
information on acquiring the kit with the
following documentation:
− Inverter specification
− Schematic and layout recommendation
− Safety concept Application notes
− NXP SDK and motor control enablement
− Dyno Test and efficiency results
− NXP components and safety
documentation
COMPANY PUBLIC 73
NXP High Voltage Traction Offer
• Everything you need for:
− Spin a Motor
− Evaluating on a dyno
− Design your own PCB and
build your own A sample
− Understand NXP recommend
Safety architecture
Evaluation Package
A Sample
Pre-Production Package
B Sample
Safety customization (IC,
Software, System…)
• Everything you need for:
− Customize a motor/Gearbox to
your own Specs (Different Form
factor, Power Voltage)
− Customize Inverter
− Customize Professional Motor
Control software
− Quick time to market
• Everything you need for:
− Adapt NXP Safety concept to
your own Assumptions of Use
− Support for Safety Analysis
− Customize software Lib
Visit www.nxp.com/evinverterplatform
COMPANY PUBLIC 74
NXP’s Power Inverter Platform
NXP Reference Design Differentiators:
• System safety concept based on NXP’s Safety IC & ISO
26262 methodology
• Optimized BOM solution to comply with ASIL-D requirements
• Automotive Quality Proof-of-concept available for Dyno testing
• Scalable offer with professional design partners (e.g. Vepco) can
reduce customer’s engineering efforts significantly
• Open hardware, enablement software and safety concept to
support prototype development
NXP Components
• GD3100 (6x) - Isolated IGBT gate driver with <2us over-current protection
• MPC5775E - Advanced motor control ASIL-D MCU with software resolver
• FS65 - Robust ASIL-D SBC with fail-silent and Grade 0 capabilities
• TJA1042 - Redundant CAN bus interface with low power standby
PCB assembly Vepco ref Design Matching 150kW PM Motor
NXP Early Success Story
High Volume production for HEV
Successfully re-use 75% of analysis for SiC design
Successfully re-use 90% for IGBT, save R&D time
…A lot more to come
Availability:
• Website and Distribution → Now
COMPANY PUBLIC 75
NXP Offer to the State-of-the-Art xEV Architecture
48 V or
> 60 V (e.g. 400 V)
* only in (P)HEVs, BEVs, omitted in 48 V MHEV systems
** bidirectional in 48 V systems
*** as in exisiting ICE-based vehicles
AC
M
M
~
=
ACDC
Charger*
=
=
DCDC**
=
~
=
~
Motor control Motor(s)
M
LV
lead-acid
or Li-Ion
Battery
BMS
BMS
DC
12 V
HV
Li-Ion
Battery
48 V and HV
Modules
12 V-bus
Modules***
Hybrid Control
Unit (HCU)
Wed 12th 5pm: GD3100 Next Advanced Isolated of
High Voltage Gate driver
Thru 13th 9am: Cost optimized HV BMS MC3377x
Thru 13th 1:30pm: Next Gen Processor solutions for
advanced HEV and Safety Domain
Wed 12th 4pm: High Voltage Safe reference design
Introduction
Thru 13th 2:30pm: Functional safety concept of High
voltage traction Inverter
Thru 13th 3:30pm: Mathworks Model based Design
with NXP Greenbox II
Wed 12th 10:45am: S32K Complete portfolio update
NXP and the NXP logo are trademarks of NXP B.V. All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2019 NXP B.V.

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NXP Functional Safety High Voltage Low voltage

  • 1. Company Public – NXP, the NXP logo, and NXP secure connections for a smarter world are trademarks of NXP B.V. All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2019 NXP B.V. Segment Line Manager, Powertrain & Electrification PL Drivers & Energy Systems Vincent M. McNeil, Ph.D. Functional Safety High Voltage Traction Inverter Reference Platform October 2019 | Session #AMF-AUT-T3659
  • 2. COMPANY PUBLIC 1 Session Goal • Technical Presentation • Go through the ISO 26262 Process with Example of Power Inverter • Understand NXP Reference Design Safety Concept
  • 3. COMPANY PUBLIC 2 COMPANY PUBLIC 2 • Following the ISO26262-2018 − Part 3: Concept Phase Inverter − Part 4: Technical Safety Requirements − Part 5: HW Safety Architecture − Part 6: SW Safety Architecture Agenda
  • 4. COMPANY PUBLIC 3 NXP Offer to the State-of-the-Art xEV Architecture 48 V or > 60 V (e.g. 400 V) * only in (P)HEVs, BEVs, omitted in 48 V MHEV systems ** bidirectional in 48 V systems *** as in exisiting ICE-based vehicles AC M M ~ = ACDC Charger* = = DCDC** = ~ = ~ Motor control Motor(s) M LV lead-acid or Li-Ion Battery BMS BMS DC 12 V HV Li-Ion Battery 48 V and HV Modules 12 V-bus Modules*** Hybrid Control Unit (HCU) Wed 12th 5pm: GD3100 Next Advanced Isolated of High Voltage Gate driver Thru 13th 9am: Cost optimized HV BMS MC3377x Thru 13th 1:30pm: Next Gen Processor solutions for advanced HEV and Safety Domain Wed 12th 4pm: High Voltage Safe reference design Introduction Thru 13th 2:30pm: Functional safety concept of High voltage traction Inverter Thru 13th 3:30pm: Mathworks Model based Design with NXP Greenbox II Wed 12th 10:45am: S32K Complete portfolio update
  • 5. COMPANY PUBLIC 4 eMotor Inverter Reference Design • Traction eMotor power inverters convert DC from HV battery to multi-phase AC • Output power & efficiency critical at operation >300V • Output power requirements ranging up to 200+ kW • Functional safety requirement at ASIL-C/ ASIL-D Yesterday we studied how an Inverter work… Today we are going to study how to make sure it fails safely
  • 6. COMPANY PUBLIC 5 What Can Go Wrong in a Traction Inverter? Unintended self acceleration while in stop Unintended reverse speed wheel while in stop or parking Unintended loss of torque while driving (overtaking) Unintended over torque while driving Traction hazards Braking hazards Unintended self braking while driving at high speed Unintended regeneration inside the HV Battery that could result in fire hazard Unintended self braking while driving at low speed
  • 7. COMPANY PUBLIC 6 ISO26262-2018 Standard “Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning behavior of E/E systems” NXP Safety Assure Process
  • 8. COMPANY PUBLIC 7 ISO26262-2018 Standard NXP Safety Assure Process “Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning behavior of E/E systems”
  • 9. COMPANY PUBLIC 8 ISO 26262-2018 Standard NXP Safety Assure Process NXP Safety Enable NXP Safety enablement NXP value proposition Assumptions for analysis Hazard and risk assessments Safety Goals System Safety Concept FMEA, FTA, FMEDA Test Safety mechanism Test Safety mechanism Validate safety assumptions “Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning behavior of E/E systems”
  • 10. COMPANY PUBLIC 9 Part 3: Item Definition
  • 11. COMPANY PUBLIC 10 Part 3: Concept Phase • Item definition • HARA • FSC
  • 12. COMPANY PUBLIC 11 Example of Assumptions and Safety Goals Safety goal ASIL SG1: Avoid unintended acceleration while in stop D SG2: Avoid unintended acceleration , torque lock or over acceleration torque while driving B SG3: Avoid reverse torque D SG4: Avoid sudden loss of acceleration torque B SG5: Avoid self-braking torque while driving at high speed D SG6: Avoid self-braking torque while driving at low speed B Unintended self acceleration while in stop Unintended reverse speed wheel while in stop or parking Unintended loss of torque while driving (overtaking) Unintended over torque while driving Traction hazards Braking hazards Unintended self braking while driving at high speed Unintended regeneration inside the HV Battery that could result in fire hazard Unintended self braking while driving at low speed Assumption: • Single permanent magnet motor PMSM • No clutch -> Cannot open motor phases at high speed! (Back EMF, High braking power, SG5 violation) * Exercise was done as a example (with Severity, Exposure, Controllability Matrix) ** One possible example, customer can have different safety goals
  • 13. COMPANY PUBLIC 12 Functional Safety Requirements FSR1: “We need to guarantee the received command is correct and the communication alive.” FSR2: “We need to guarantee the sensors measurements are correct.” FSR3: “We monitor the torque to detect a fault of torque processing.” FSR5: : “When a fault of communication, sensors or control is detected we need to go to the appropriate safe state”. FSR4: : “We need to guarantee the information we send to VCU, and report fault”.
  • 14. COMPANY PUBLIC 13 Functional Block Analysis Example for function Command • For each of this block: − Defined FR and FSR − Decompose functional safety requirements − Available inside application notes: “Functional Safety concept of HV Traction Inverter”.
  • 15. COMPANY PUBLIC 14 Part 4: System Design
  • 16. COMPANY PUBLIC 15 Part 4: System Design • Technical Safety Requirements • System Architectural Design • Technical Safety Concept
  • 17. COMPANY PUBLIC 16 Technical Safety Concept System Functional details decomposition
  • 18. COMPANY PUBLIC 17 Safe State (1/2) • Preferred safe state = 0 Torque control or Degraded Torque control In 0 Torque control we keep PWM the IGBT, but the control request an Iq = 0 which will lead to no torque and will not violate any safety goal. This safe state has the advantage to be easily restarted, and avoid sudden loss of torque (ramp down). It requires to have a fully functional control and sensors measurement. This strategy will be applied for communication failure with VCU for example. • Three phase Open at low Speed M This safe state open all the Phases of the Inverter. This safe state is only acceptable at low speed (see next slide). It is a preferred safe state when vehicle is stopped or at low speed. When the speed is unknown or when higher than the maximum back EMF allowed, the preferred safe state will be 3 phases short.
  • 19. COMPANY PUBLIC 18 PMSM + No Clutch + 3PO = Braking Hazard at High Speed M BEMF VBAT Braking current • Back EMF > Battery voltage • Regeneration current • Braking torque Depending on your motor in can generate: ~100Nm braking ~ 100kW Braking Power Violation of safety Goal ! SG5: Avoid self-braking torque while driving at high speed
  • 20. COMPANY PUBLIC 19 Safe state (2/2) 3 Phases Short This safe state LS Short is the preferred safe state when the speed is high or unknown (loss of control). The control of the high side or low side needs to be fully functional to close one or the other. M M We must adapt the reaction if the Fault is in High side (BATT to Phase Short ) or low side! Requirements: • We need to detect the side and type of failure • We need to have at least the high side or the low side to work
  • 21. COMPANY PUBLIC 20 High Level Failure Modes High Level System Fault Condition Safe State Failure of communication 0 Torque control Failure of control or sensor at low speed 3 Phase Open Failure of control or sensor at high speed Active short (HS or LS based on the fault) Loss of control capability (MCU/SW) or speed information missing Active short LS
  • 22. COMPANY PUBLIC 21 Fault Reaction of Sensor (Easy!)
  • 23. COMPANY PUBLIC 22 Technical Safety Concept System Functional details decomposition
  • 24. COMPANY PUBLIC 23 Technical Safety Concept Example • Inside the safety concept for each functional block you will find: − Technical requirement − Technical safety requirement − Reaction and safe state for safety manager TSR_ CUS _004: [CURRMEAS_OOR_ERR] TSR_ CUS _005: [CURRMEAS_PLAUS_ERR]
  • 25. COMPANY PUBLIC 24 Technical Safety Concept Example Technical requirement Technical safety requirement Reaction and safe state for safety manager
  • 26. COMPANY PUBLIC 25 Principle for SPF and Failure Matrix Function Detection= Safety mechanism Reaction Safety goal violation Function Safety Mechanism Reaction Function x SM x Safe State y … … … Failure matrix
  • 27. COMPANY PUBLIC 26 Principle for Latent Fault Function Detection= Safety mechanism Reaction Latent fault We check for all the latent fault once at Init.
  • 28. COMPANY PUBLIC 27 Fault Reaction of Motor Interface (a Little Harder!)
  • 29. COMPANY PUBLIC 28 Technical Safety Requirements System Functional details decomposition
  • 30. COMPANY PUBLIC 29 Motor Interface Implementation1/2 The GD3100 will detect the fault of the IGBT, and Motor phase using DESAT, Short circuit, VGE monitoring, temperature, and some additional voltage that could be the DC bus or the Phase voltage 1 Critical fault (like short circuit) will need a quick reaction from the GD3100, without any MCU feedback. The GD3100 will turn off the gate quickly (but not abruptly) with some configurable waveshapping to maintain the IGBT in an Off position. 2 VGE comparator verify the measure value of the gate (through AMC pins) and the commands. It guarantee the communication path, gate drive and gate drive logic 3 The bidirectional communication has several safety mechanism to detect the integrity of the message (CRC...) and the loss of communication (watchdog...) 4 PWM and PWMALT is a safety mechanism to guarantee the command does not allow shoot- through and respect dead time 5 The GD3100 reports a fault by pulling the INTB pins and by sending a 5% duty cycle on AOUT pins. The INTB pins of all the HS and LS are connected through an OR gate, the AOUT are individually connected to the eTPU for analysis 7
  • 31. COMPANY PUBLIC 30 Motor Interface Implementation (2/2) • Each gate driver reports fault by Daisy Chain (HS or LS) • GD3100 flag are analyzed and changed to system Fault [MOT_SHORTCUT_HVN_ERR] • System Fault are sent to safety manager for reaction VCCOV VCCREG UV VSUPOV OTSD_ IC OTSD OTW CLAMP DESAT SC OC BIST_ FAIL VDD_ UVOV DTFLT SPIERR CONFCR C_ERR VGE_FL T COMER R VREFUV VEE WDOF_ FLT 8
  • 32. COMPANY PUBLIC 31 Motor Interface Highlight • Remember Safe State slide: • Highlights: − Quick protection to protect against short circuit − Fault reporting to identify HS or LS and fault criticality (SPI, INTB, AOUT) − Analyze fault and react on system − We must have independence of HS and LS or we can have a fault without 3PS possibility!
  • 33. COMPANY PUBLIC 32 Fault Reaction of Processing and Safety Manager (a little harder!)
  • 34. COMPANY PUBLIC 33 Motor Control Algorithm Motor control developed in QM
  • 35. COMPANY PUBLIC 34 Motor Control Algorithm Motor control developed in QM Safety mechanism to verify it inside the lockstep
  • 39. COMPANY PUBLIC 38 Technical Safety Requirements
  • 40. COMPANY PUBLIC 39 Part 5: HW Design
  • 41. COMPANY PUBLIC 40 Part 5: HW Design • HW Safety Requirements • HW Architecture Design • HW Metrics (FMEDA with IC system failure mode)
  • 42. COMPANY PUBLIC 41 HW Architecture Highlight • High level overview: − 1) Decomposition QM and ASIL-D: ▪ Functional traction motor control QM(D) ▪ Safety Manager ASIL-D − 2) Three phase short at high speed for Back EMF and SPF: ▪ Independent HS and LS driver ▪ ASIL D gate driver − 3) Safety logic to do three phase short during MCU failure
  • 43. COMPANY PUBLIC 42 Vepco Hardware Leadership ASIL-D Certified MCUs Smart, flexible Fail-safe SBCs FS65 Traction Motor Inverter Systems Advanced Si IGBT Power module Integrated Isolated HV IGBT gate driver
  • 44. COMPANY PUBLIC 43 Part 6: SW Design
  • 45. COMPANY PUBLIC 44 Part 6: SW Design • SW Safety Requirements • SW Architecture Design • SW Verification NXP
  • 46. COMPANY PUBLIC 45 Software Architecture WIP Function Safety Mechanism Reaction Function x SM x Safe State y … … …
  • 47. COMPANY PUBLIC 46 NXP Safety Enablement
  • 48. COMPANY PUBLIC 47 Safety Enablement • Followed the ISO 26262 Standard for NXP Components • Proposed TSC, HWSC, SWSC for Inverter to be re-used by customer • We make available the Safety Application Notes, and safety Lib.
  • 49. COMPANY PUBLIC 48 Control Flow from Torque to Wheel
  • 51. COMPANY PUBLIC 50 CAN Messaging • Two CAN path: − FS65 Path − TJA1051 NXP transceiver • FS65 functions are: − Power for all sensor, driver, MCU, Comm − Key Safety Mechanism for MCU: ▪ Check MCU, Clock, Power Supply − Bring the system into safe state − Latch on / latch off system
  • 52. COMPANY PUBLIC 51 FS65: Integrate MCU Safety Monitoring Capabilities Independent Fail Safe State Machine ✓Physical & Electrical independance to fit for ASILD ✓Power Management Monitoring Unit (UV / OV) ✓Analog & Digital Built In Self Test to minimize Latent Faults ✓Own Reference & Supply to Reduce Common Cause Failure Fail Safe Pin (FS0b) : ✓Redundant System Fail Safe enabler ✓Second Fail Safe pin to assert safety path with configurable delay after failure Advanced Watchdog ✓Challenger ✓Replace external MCU Monitoring MCU Monitoring ✓FCCU : Fault Collection Control Unit ✓Monitor Dual Core Lock Step Modes MCUs RSTb – Fail Silent Mode ✓Configurable RSTb activation giving more system availability HW Redundancy ✓Vcore external Monitoring Safety SBC FS65 Safety MCU
  • 53. COMPANY PUBLIC 52 MCU and SW Architecture
  • 54. COMPANY PUBLIC 53 MPC5775E: Traction Inverter MCU Cores Z7 Functional core (QM) Z7 Safety Core (lockstep) Interconnect Isolation Cross bar with end to end ECC MPU for isolation Memory 4M Flash 512K RAM Peripherals FlexCAN (4) + CRC SPI for gate driver and FS65 ETPU for (next slide): - CA-PWM + ADC Trigger - SW Resolver and diag eQADC SD ADC (for resolver) Security Crypto Security Engine For OTA Update Safety FCCU, ECC, SWT, Lockstep CMU PMU… And Latent fault check (BIST, ECC Fault Injection)
  • 55. COMPANY PUBLIC 54 SW Architecture • Performance core: − Mostly use for Motor Control − Re-use NXP Enablement (SDK, App notes,…) − Enable customer or offer professional partner (Vepco) to develop their own Motor control • Safety core: − Implement Safety Concept of NXP product (MCU+ AAA product) − Help customer to achieve ISO 26262
  • 56. COMPANY PUBLIC 55 FOC Control for Traction Inverter
  • 57. COMPANY PUBLIC 56 SW Enablement Motor control Application • Develop your own using service layer • Buy professional code (Vepco) • Use NXP Matlab Model Base Toolbox Service • Reusable and modifiable basic source code NXP SDK • NXP Software development kit • FreeRTOS or bare-metal with OS interface layer • Production-ready drivers with MISRA C 2012 compliance https://www.nxp.com/support/developer- resources/run-time-software/s32- sdk/s32-sdk-for-power-architecture- devices:S32SDK-POWER- ARCHITECTURE eTPU code • Advance Motor control already optimized • Customer can customize/optimize it
  • 58. COMPANY PUBLIC 57 Where to Find the Software? Visit our web at www.nxp.com/evinverterplatform for more information. https://www.nxp.com/support/developer-resources/evaluation-and-development-boards/ultra-reliable-dev- platforms/mpc57xx-mcus-platforms/ev-power-inverter-reference-platform:RDPWRINVERTER
  • 59. COMPANY PUBLIC 58 PWM to IGBT/SiC Drive
  • 60. COMPANY PUBLIC 59 GD3100 Architecture & Product Features Features: Applications: • HEV Motor Inverters • HV UPS Inverters Advanced gate driver for high voltage power IGBTs with integrated high voltage isolator. ASILC/D compliant Logic Block 1 SCLK CSB MOSI MISO SPI PWM FSSTATE INTB Config, DT Control, Cross Conduction, Flt Management, Safing VSUP TSENSEA AMC GH VEE (2 pins) DESAT GND1 (2 pins) GND2 (2 pins) RX TX INT DATA_IN DATA_OUT PWMALT Serial Comm GL RX TX Logic Block 2 CLAMP ISENSE TEMP IGBT AMUXIN TX RX NC13 PWM TX RX TEMP IC AOUT Duty Cycle Encoder VCC VREF (5 V, 1 %, 20 mA) GND2 VCCREG AMUX & 10-bit ADC VCC Serial Comm Fault Management, Conf. Registers, fault registers, Gate control logic, ASIL test control FSENB VDD Gate Drive Control Active Vce Clamp, Desat Charge and Discharge Control Active Miller Clamp IGBT Current Sense Safing Logic Deadtime Control IGBT Temp Sense Power Management 1 VCCLV, Bandgap, References, Oscillators UV/OVLO, etc. Power Management 2 VCCHV, Bandgap, References, Oscillators UV/OVLO, etc. NC2 FSISO INTB/ VGEMON • High gate current capability 10A peak source/sink current • ISO 26262 ASIL C/D compliant • Integrated galvanic isolation in compact 10 x 18 mm SOIC • Separate outputs (GL/GH) to IGBT gate • Active Miller Clamp (AMC) reduces need for turn off assist circuitry • Fast short circuit protection via direct feedback through i- sense IGBTs with soft shutdown. • Programmable Desaturation Detect level, Two Level Turn off • Minimum programmable deadtime of 500ns • Integrated temperature sense for system warning and ultimately soft shutdown for system protection • Compatible with 200V to 1700V IGBTs, power range >125kW • Compatible with 3.3V and 5V IOs 32-Pin SOIC-WB
  • 61. COMPANY PUBLIC 60 Motor Interface Implementation 1/2
  • 62. COMPANY PUBLIC 61 Motor Interface Implementation (2/2) • Each gate driver reports fault by Daisy Chain (HS or LS) • GD3100 flag are analyzed and changed to system Fault [MOT_SHORTCUT_HVN_ERR] • System Fault are sent to safety manager for reaction VCCOV VCCREG UV VSUPOV OTSD_ IC OTSD OTW CLAMP DESAT SC OC BIST_ FAIL VDD_ UVOV DTFLT SPIERR CONFCR C_ERR VGE_FL T COMER R VREFUV VEE WDOF_ FLT 8
  • 63. COMPANY PUBLIC 62 IGBT/SiC to Motor Phase
  • 64. COMPANY PUBLIC 63 Fuji 750V/800A 6-in-1 Power Inverter Module Features • 750V/800A 6-in-1 3-phase power inverter module • Reverse-conducting IGBT with integrated temperature sensor • Integrated ‘i-Sense’ current sensor for fast over-current detection • 162mm × 117mm × 24mm compact direct-cooling water-jacket aluminum housing with new thin fin structure • Flange structure at cooling water IN/OUT for 30% lower thermal resistance vs conventional fin type heat sink. • 175℃ guaranteed operating temperature range Application Example • 70~120kW motor output power − Fsw = 6kHz − Coolant temp = 65℃ − Coolant flow rate = 10L/min − Vdc = 450V − Ipeak = 460Arms @ 1s − Icont = 430Arms Top view Bottom view
  • 65. COMPANY PUBLIC 64 High Level Inverter Specification • Automotive Optimized EE – Simple Mechanical • What if you need 150KW peak? − Change IGBT and Motor − Keep same architecture • Open design, Adapt it to your Spec !
  • 66. COMPANY PUBLIC 65 Sensor Feedback to Close the Loop
  • 67. COMPANY PUBLIC 66 Current and Voltage Sensing Current Sensing HV Battery Sensing
  • 68. COMPANY PUBLIC 67 MPC5775E: SW Resolver eTPU + SD_ADC= SW resolver eTPU Engine A executes functions: • Resolver_EXC • Resolver_ATO • PWMM eTPU Engine B executes functions: • Resolver_DIAG • Resolver_EXT RAPOL • AS SCM SDM
  • 69. COMPANY PUBLIC 68 eTPU B eTPU-Based RDC – Block Diagram eTPU A SDADC Resolver Cos Sin Output Excitation Amplifier DIAGnostics Angle Tracking Observer Angular Position Angular Speed EXC SIN COS Diagnostic Measures Diagnostic Flags EXCitation Generator Shared Data Memory (SDM) ADC1 ADC0 eDMA eDMA MPC5775E Angle EXTrapo- lation Angular Position Angular Speed trigger Shared Code Memory (SCM) Input resistor network External HW On-chip HW On-chip SW TE Core Fault reporting Command integrity check Sensor plausibility check; includes RDC checker Torque monitoring NTE Core Command processing Torque control Motor state measur ement Status reporting Safety Manager
  • 70. COMPANY PUBLIC 69 And We are Closing the Loop…
  • 71. COMPANY PUBLIC 70 What About Functional Safety… • Safety is the longest part of the development • Enable with: − Part 3, − System Part 4 and − Safety lib Part 6 NXP Safety enablement NXP value proposition Assumptions for analysis Hazard and risk assessments Safety Goals System Safety Concept FMEA, FTA, FMEDA Test Safety mechanism Test Safety mechanism Validate safety assumptions Functional safety concept: • “What if… fails…” • See more in tomorrow’s session
  • 72. COMPANY PUBLIC 71 NXP High Voltage Traction Offer
  • 73. COMPANY PUBLIC 72 NXP/Vepco Enablement Kit Design Documentation Visit www.nxp.com/evinverterplatform for more information on acquiring the kit with the following documentation: − Inverter specification − Schematic and layout recommendation − Safety concept Application notes − NXP SDK and motor control enablement − Dyno Test and efficiency results − NXP components and safety documentation
  • 74. COMPANY PUBLIC 73 NXP High Voltage Traction Offer • Everything you need for: − Spin a Motor − Evaluating on a dyno − Design your own PCB and build your own A sample − Understand NXP recommend Safety architecture Evaluation Package A Sample Pre-Production Package B Sample Safety customization (IC, Software, System…) • Everything you need for: − Customize a motor/Gearbox to your own Specs (Different Form factor, Power Voltage) − Customize Inverter − Customize Professional Motor Control software − Quick time to market • Everything you need for: − Adapt NXP Safety concept to your own Assumptions of Use − Support for Safety Analysis − Customize software Lib Visit www.nxp.com/evinverterplatform
  • 75. COMPANY PUBLIC 74 NXP’s Power Inverter Platform NXP Reference Design Differentiators: • System safety concept based on NXP’s Safety IC & ISO 26262 methodology • Optimized BOM solution to comply with ASIL-D requirements • Automotive Quality Proof-of-concept available for Dyno testing • Scalable offer with professional design partners (e.g. Vepco) can reduce customer’s engineering efforts significantly • Open hardware, enablement software and safety concept to support prototype development NXP Components • GD3100 (6x) - Isolated IGBT gate driver with <2us over-current protection • MPC5775E - Advanced motor control ASIL-D MCU with software resolver • FS65 - Robust ASIL-D SBC with fail-silent and Grade 0 capabilities • TJA1042 - Redundant CAN bus interface with low power standby PCB assembly Vepco ref Design Matching 150kW PM Motor NXP Early Success Story High Volume production for HEV Successfully re-use 75% of analysis for SiC design Successfully re-use 90% for IGBT, save R&D time …A lot more to come Availability: • Website and Distribution → Now
  • 76. COMPANY PUBLIC 75 NXP Offer to the State-of-the-Art xEV Architecture 48 V or > 60 V (e.g. 400 V) * only in (P)HEVs, BEVs, omitted in 48 V MHEV systems ** bidirectional in 48 V systems *** as in exisiting ICE-based vehicles AC M M ~ = ACDC Charger* = = DCDC** = ~ = ~ Motor control Motor(s) M LV lead-acid or Li-Ion Battery BMS BMS DC 12 V HV Li-Ion Battery 48 V and HV Modules 12 V-bus Modules*** Hybrid Control Unit (HCU) Wed 12th 5pm: GD3100 Next Advanced Isolated of High Voltage Gate driver Thru 13th 9am: Cost optimized HV BMS MC3377x Thru 13th 1:30pm: Next Gen Processor solutions for advanced HEV and Safety Domain Wed 12th 4pm: High Voltage Safe reference design Introduction Thru 13th 2:30pm: Functional safety concept of High voltage traction Inverter Thru 13th 3:30pm: Mathworks Model based Design with NXP Greenbox II Wed 12th 10:45am: S32K Complete portfolio update
  • 77. NXP and the NXP logo are trademarks of NXP B.V. All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2019 NXP B.V.