3. Costanza Cicero
Secretary-General
University of Bologna
Shaan Pattni
Director-General
Pennsylvania State University
Jinny Jung
Conference Director
University of Michigan
Zach Hauser
Director of Security
Pomona College
Maunica Malladi
Chief of External Relations
University of Alabama
Jennifer Padilla
Chief of Staff
University of Southern California
Kevin Burchill
Chief of Administrative Affairs
George Washington University
Nicholas Rigler
Under-Secretary-General
University of Washington
Elettra Di Massa
Under-Secretary-General
City University London
Joy Cui
Under-Secretary-General
University of Pittsburgh
Meghan Agostinelli
Under-Secretary-General
Georgetown University
Nika Arzoumanian
Under-Secretary-General
New York University
Elliot Weiss
Under-Secretary-General
Brown University
NHSMUN is a project of the
International Model United Nations
Association, Incorporated (IMUNA).
IMUNA, a not-for-profit, all volunteer
organization, is dedicated to furthering
global issues education at the secondary
school level.
NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS
2 March 2016 – 5 March 2016
Dear Delegates,
My name is Nick Rigler, and I could not be more excited to welcome you to NHSMUN 2016!
As the Under-Secretary-General of the General Assembly Mains Committees, it is my
responsibility to ensure the smooth and successful execution of the five largest committees at
NHSMUN 2016. Over the past couple of months, I have helped assist your directors with
preparing these amazing background guides, which we are very excited for all of you to begin
reading. Furthermore, they have chosen some incredible topics; this year’s topics are so
fascinating that it almost makes me wish I was a delegate again! In March, I cannot wait to see
the product of your research and preparation manifest itself in committee.
This is my third year serving as a NHSMUN staff member and my seventh year involved in
Model UN. I am a third year student at the University of Washington in Seattle, where I am
studying Cellular, Molecular, and Developmental Biology. With my degree, I hope to attend
medical school after college and pursue a career in sports medicine as a physician. Outside of
school, I am a die-hard Laker fan and my favorite thing in the world is traveling. I also love to
waterski and enjoy the outdoors!
Model UN is one of the most intellectually stimulating experiences in which you can
participate in. By digging deep your two topics, all of you will undoubtedly gain a better
perspective on our global society. Additionally, as delegates in NHSMUN’s General Assembly
Committees, each of you have the unique opportunity to share your ideas in front of more
than 300 other students from around the world, something that very few people of your age
can say they have done.
As a past delegate myself, there are a couple pieces of advice I would like to share with all of
you. First, make sure to adequately prepare yourselves for the conference. This means not only
reading your background guide and looking over the research and preparation questions, but
also doing your own outside research so you are prepared to debate either topic during
committee. Instead of having one delegate prepare for one topic and the other delegate
prepare for the other topic, I highly encourage both delegates of each delegation to be masters
of both topics. Also, when devising solutions, make sure to not only think about what your
solutions are, but also, how they will be implemented. By focusing on these two things, I am
fully confident that all five General Assembly Mains committees will pass comprehensive and
thorough resolutions!
Lastly, please feel free to reach out myself or your directors to ask questions you may have
about your committee or topics. They have worked incredibly hard to prepare these
background guides and I know for a fact that they would love to hear from all of you!
I cannot wait to see you all in March!
Sincerely,
Nick Rigler
Under-Secretary-General, General Assembly Mains Committees
mains.nhsmun@imuna.org
4. Costanza Cicero
Secretary-General
University of Bologna
Shaan Pattni
Director-General
Pennsylvania State University
Jinny Jung
Conference Director
University of Michigan
Zach Hauser
Director of Security
Pomona College
Maunica Malladi
Chief of External Relations
University of Alabama
Jennifer Padilla
Chief of Staff
University of Southern California
Kevin Burchill
Chief of Administrative Affairs
George Washington University
Nicholas Rigler
Under-Secretary-General
University of Washington
Elettra Di Massa
Under-Secretary-General
City University London
Joy Cui
Under-Secretary-General
University of Pittsburgh
Meghan Agostinelli
Under-Secretary-General
Georgetown University
Nika Arzoumanian
Under-Secretary-General
New York University
Elliot Weiss
Under-Secretary-General
Brown University
NHSMUN is a project of the
International Model United Nations
Association, Incorporated (IMUNA).
IMUNA, a not-for-profit, all volunteer
organization, is dedicated to furthering
global issues education at the secondary
school level.
NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS
2 March 2016 – 5 March 2016
Dear Delegates,
It is my honor and pleasure to welcome you to NHSMUN 2016! My name is Paxton Haven,
and I am this year’s Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL) Director. I
am beyond excited to present one of the largest and most distinct committees that the
conference has to offer. As a General Assembly Mains Committee, you will have the unique
opportunity to collaborate with the majority of the conference’s delegates while forming
solutions to some of the international community’s most challenging issues. SPECPOL’s
topics affect social, economic, and political issues of every country involved, making it one of
the most comprehensive committees in the United Nations. These two topics affect the
world’s most turbulent regions and I hope they grasp your interest and attention like they did
for me. I cannot wait to witness this committee attempt to eradicate two very polarizing and
relevant issues.
This year will be my fifth year with NHSMUN and my second year on staff. Last year, I was
the Assistant Director of SPECPOL and had such an amazing time that I decided to come
back to the same committee. As a delegate, I was on GA Mains and enjoyed the thrill of
speaking in front of such a large group of extremely intelligent students from all over the
world. When I am not working for NHSMUN, I am a sophomore at The George Washington
University studying undeclared (my parents are really proud). Outside of school and
NHSMUN, I am the External Philanthropy Chair of Zeta Beta Tau Fraternity. In my free
time, I am a huge film nerd and love binge watching horrible reality TV (KUWTK, anyone?).
Other than that, I could eat sushi for every meal and never see a tree again in my life and be
perfectly content (shout out to my fellow urbanites).
Overall, I hope this background guide provides a brief overview and analysis of these two
topics and inspires you to inquire about the world we live in. When all of you arrive in March,
we will dive right into intense and rich debate, as both of these topics are complex. Until that
time, please use this background guide to supplement your own research. While this paper is a
great place to start, please use this information to delve deeper into the topic and form unique
solutions. I look forward to seeing what kind of innovative ideas you will all present! Please do
not hesitate to email me with any questions regarding to the two topics, and be sure to check
out the committee Twitter account for updates, @NHSMUN_SPECPOL. I look forward to
speaking with all of you, and cannot express how excited I am to see what your hard work and
effort will produce!!
Peace and Love,
Paxton Haven
Director, SPECPOL
@NHSMUN_SPECPOL
specpol.nhsmun@imuna.org
5. NHSMUN 2016
SPECPOL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A Note on the NHSMUN Difference.................................................................................................... 1
A Note on Research and Preparation ....................................................................................................3
Committee History ................................................................................................................................4
Simulation..............................................................................................................................................6
Topic A: The Situation of Occupied Territories in Azerbaijan .............................................................8
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................................8
History and Description of the Issue..........................................................................................................................8
Current Status ...............................................................................................................................................................18
Bloc Analysis.................................................................................................................................................................19
Committee Mission......................................................................................................................................................22
Topic B: The Palestinian Refugee Situation in the Middle East ........................................................ 23
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................23
History and Description of the Issue........................................................................................................................24
Current Status ...............................................................................................................................................................35
Bloc Analysis.................................................................................................................................................................37
Committee Mission......................................................................................................................................................39
Research and Preparation Questions ...................................................................................................41
Topic A..........................................................................................................................................................................41
Topic B...........................................................................................................................................................................41
Important Documents ......................................................................................................................... 42
Topic A..........................................................................................................................................................................42
Topic B...........................................................................................................................................................................42
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 44
Committee History and Simulation...........................................................................................................................44
Topic A..........................................................................................................................................................................44
Topic B...........................................................................................................................................................................48
6.
7. NHSMUN 2016
SPECPOL
- 1 -
A NOTE ON THE NHSMUN DIFFERENCE
Esteemed Faculty and Delegates,
Hello and welcome to NHSMUN 2016! My name is Shaan Pattni, and I am this year’s Director-
General. I hope you are as thrilled as I am about the NHSMUN conference this year! Our staff has
been working tremendously hard all year to ensure that you have an engaging, educational, and
enriching experience in committee. NHSMUN strives to assure that the quality of our debate and in-
committee interaction is unmatched. NHSMUN focuses on the educational value of Model UN. We
believe that the experiences in our committee rooms extend skills originally developed in the
classroom, and prepare students to become future leaders. NHSMUN thrives on well-researched,
realistic, and diplomatic debate. We are very proud of the substantive program for NHSMUN 2016
and look forward to the vibrant discussion and cooperation in committee!
NHSMUN Practices
In order to fulfill our mission, our conference has adopted practices that are key to the continued
tradition of excellence in our committees and the NHSMUN difference.
NHSMUN prohibits the usage of personal electronics during committee in order to ensure that
delegates do not gain an unfair advantage in debate. We feel strongly that the interpersonal
connections made during debate are enhanced by face-to-face communication. Enforcing a strict no
laptops policy also helps us to ensure that all our delegates have an equal opportunity to succeed in
committee.
The Dais is permitted a laptop for the purposes of communicating with respective Under-Secretary-
Generals and other Senior Staff Members as well as attending to administrative needs. The Dais will
only be limited to using their laptops for NHSMUN purposes, and the majority of their focus will be
on the needs of the committee. In addition, we staff a dedicated team in our office to assist in typing
and formatting draft resolutions and working papers so that committee time can be focused on
discussion and compromise.
An additional difference that delegates may notice about NHSMUN is the committee pacing. While
each BG contains two topic selections, NHSMUN committees will strive to have a fruitful
discussion on and produce resolutions on a single topic; prioritizing the quality of discussion over
quantity of topics addressed. In order to respect the gravity of the issues being discussed at our
conference as well as the intellect of our delegates, NHSMUN committees will focus on addressing
one topic in-depth. BGs contain two topics in order to allow delegates to decide what problem
ought to be prioritized, a valuable discussion in and of itself, and to safeguard against the possibility
that an issue will be independently resolved before conference.
NHSMUN uses a set of the Rules of Procedure that is standardized across all IMUNA-brand
conferences. These rules provide a standardized system of operation that is easily translated across
committee or conference lines. While the general structure and flow of committee will be familiar to
any delegate who has previously participated in Model UN, there may be slight procedural
differences from other conferences. All delegates are encouraged to review the Rules of Procedure
8. NHSMUN 2016
SPECPOL
- 2 -
before attending the conference in the Delegate Preparation Guide and are welcome to direct
questions to any member of NHSMUN Staff.
While NHSMUN does distribute awards, we feel that it is crucial to de-emphasize their importance
in comparison to the educational value of Model UN as an activity. NHSMUN seeks to reward
delegations that excel in the arts of compromise and diplomacy. We always prioritize a dedication to
teamwork over solitary achievement. Directors will judge delegates on their ability and willingness to
cooperate with their peers while always maintaining an accurate representation of country policy.
At the core of the NHSMUN philosophy is an emphasis on education and compromise. As such,
we do not distribute awards to individual delegates, with the exception of committees where
students represent their own separate delegation (ICJ and UNSC, for example). Instead, awards will
be distributed to delegations that exhibit excellence across all committees. The awards system is
standardized so as to give equal weight to delegations of all sizes. Awards will also be offered for
schools that demonstrate excellence in research and preparation based on the position papers
submitted by their delegates. Detailed information on the determination of awards at NHSMUN will
be available in the Faculty Preparation Guide and online in November.
As always, I welcome any questions or concerns about the substantive program at NHSMUN 2016
and would be happy to discuss NHSMUN pedagogy with faculty or delegates. It is my sincerest
hope that your experience at NHSMUN 2016 will be challenging and thought provoking.
Best,
Shaan Pattni
Director-General, NHSMUN 2016
dg.nhsmun@imuna.org
9. NHSMUN 2016
SPECPOL
- 3 -
A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION
Delegate preparation is paramount to a successful and exciting National High School Model United
Nations 2016 Conference. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that
will be discussed in your committee. These papers are designed to give you a description of the
topics and the committee. This Guide is not intended to represent exhaustive research on every
facet of the topics. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully explore the topics and be able to
identify and analyze the intricacies of the issues. Delegates must be prepared to intelligently utilize
their knowledge and apply it to their own country’s policy. You will find that your state has a unique
position on the topics that cannot be substituted by the opinions of another state.
The task of preparing and researching for the conference is challenging, but it can be interesting and
rewarding. We have provided each school with a copy of the Delegation Preparation Guide. The
Guide contains detailed instructions on how to write a position paper and how to effectively
participate in committee sessions. The Guide also gives a synopsis of the types of research materials
and resources available to you and where they can be found.
An essential part of representing a state in an international body is the ability to articulate that state’s
views in writing. Accordingly, it is the policy of NHSMUN to require each delegate (or double-
delegation team) to write position papers. The position papers should clearly outline the country’s
policies on the topic areas to be discussed and what factors contribute to these policies. In addition,
each paper must address the Research and Preparation questions at the end of the committee
Background Guide. Most importantly, the paper must be written from the point of view of the
country you are representing at NHSMUN 2016 and should articulate the policies you will
espouse at the conference. All papers should be typed and double-spaced. The papers will be read by
the director of each committee and returned at the start of the conference with brief comments and
constructive advice.
Each delegation is responsible for sending a copy of their papers to the committee directors via our
online upload process on or before January 22, 2016. Complete instructions for online submissions
may be found in the Delegate Preparation Guide. If delegations are unable to submit an online
version of their position papers, they should contact the Director-General (dg.nhsmun@imuna.org)
as soon as possible to find an alternative form of submission.
Delegations that do not submit position papers to directors or summary statements to the
Director-General will be ineligible for awards.
10. NHSMUN 2016
SPECPOL
- 4 -
COMMITTEE HISTORY
The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations is the Special Political and
Decolonization Committee, otherwise known as SPECPOL. Established in 1993, SPECPOL is the
combination of the Decolonization Committee (formerly the Fourth Committee) and the Special
Political Committee. This committee’s inception took place in 1990 when the United Nations
established 1990-2000 as the “International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism.” This was
particularly important considering at the time of the United Nation’s creation, 750 million people
lived in what would be considered to be a colonized territory. Over eighty former colonies have
become independent since 1945.1
Today, in part due to the work of the Fourth Committee, this
number has drastically decreased to approximately two million, an amount SPECPOL is still
determined to address.2
SPECPOL includes all 193 Member States, uniting to alleviate developing countries’ dependencies
on former colonizing powers. The committee derives power from its mandate in Chapter XI of the
United Nations Charter, which commits to the preservation of the rights and dignities of people
living in non-self-governing territories.3
The committee passes resolutions with suggestions on the
optimal ways for the United Nations and member states to address the issues of colonized people.
According to its mandate, the Fourth Committee can discuss issues such as self-determination,
decolonization, and peacekeeping efforts. While SPECPOL was derived from the Disarmament and
International Security Committee, it takes on issues that the First Committee does not address, as
well as looking at topics with a wider scope.4
Unlike other UN committees, SPECPOL shines a
spotlight on issues pertaining to occupation, colonization, and subjugation, with the primary goal of
making all countries independent and self-sufficient from outside powers.5
Also according to its
mandate, SPECPOL is not able to take military action and many of its resolutions are passed along
as suggestions to the Security Council, which ultimately decides whether or not the plan of action
will be carried through.
Since its inception, SPECPOL has passed many resolutions addressing the quality and framework of
information technology in developing countries, paying special attention to the development of the
United Nations’ Department of Public Information.6
The Committee has also attempted to develop
a consensus among member states regarding the issue of the peaceful uses of outer space.7
Historically, SPECPOL has focused its attention
1 "Historical Background," United Nations, accessed 16 May 2011,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/history.htm.
2 "Global Issues," United Nations, accessed 16 May 2011,
http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/decolonization/index.shtml.
3 "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter XI: Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories," United Nations,
accessed 16 May 2011, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter11.shtml.
4 "Fourth Committee," United Nations, accessed 16 May 2011, http://www.un.org/ga/61/fourth/pr.shtml.
5Ibid.
6 GA/SPD/206, United Nations, accessed 19 May 2011,
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001114.gaspd206.doc.html.
7 A/C.4/58/L.1, United Nations, accessed 19 May 2011, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N03/526/63/PDF/N0352663.pdf?OpenElement.
11. NHSMUN 2016
SPECPOL
- 5 -
on issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition, SPECPOL frequently works in
conjunction with groups such as the High Commissioner on Refugees and also specialized groups
such as the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the
Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories.8
The Special Political and Decolonization committee holds a very unique role in the United Nations.
While other main committees aim to resolve current global issues, SPECPOL concerns itself with
healing countries from the lasting impact of their troubling histories. The committee’s foremost goal
is to ensure that all countries enjoy the benefits of the independence to which they are entitled, and
only when all countries are economically, culturally, and socially liberated can the world move
forward.
8 "OHCHR Documents," OHCHR Homepage, accessed 16 May 2011,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/GA/61documents.htm.
12. NHSMUN 2016
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- 6 -
SIMULATION
As members of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL), delegates will
represent the views of their respective countries throughout the duration of our debate on both the
Refugee Crisis in the Middle East and the Situation of Occupied Territories in Azerbaijan. Delegates
will be responsible for collaborating to develop resolutions for these two issues while remaining
within the mandate of SPECPOL. While these topics are new to SPECPOL, all resolutions created
will need to bear in mind that the goal of SPECPOL is to promote international peace and security.
The beauty of the NHSMUN conference is its ability to offer delegates a hands-on global education
and to allow them to experience a real work environment they would be unable to experience
elsewhere.
Upon arriving in committee, delegates will be introduced to the members of the dais, which is made
up of the Director and two Assistant Directors. In preparing for the conference by writing the
background guide and update papers, the Director and Assistant Directors have become substantive
experts on all matters related to SPECPOL, and delegates should use them as knowledgeable
resources throughout the conference. As veterans of parliamentary procedure and committee
simulation, the role of the dais is to ensure that delegates have a realistic, educational, and enjoyable
experience at NHSMUN. Should delegates have any questions on either procedural or substantive
matters, they should not hesitate to approach any of the three members of the dais for assistance.
After delegates have been introduced to the dais, they will first debate the setting of the agenda and
then progress to substantive debate, which will deepen and progress throughout the following
sessions. In a committee of this size, collaboration and decorum are essential for each and every
session. Formal debate consists of delegates adding themselves to the Speakers List to be formally
recognized before the rest of the committee for a specified length of time. When delegates appear
before the committee, it is their opportunity to give an overview of their country’s position as well
as accept questions from other delegates for clarification on policy or solutions. It is imperative that
delegates remain respectful of others during this time and observe all procedural rules in order for
delegates to be heard and for the speaker’s list to flow smoothly.
While formal debate is a key portion of our simulation, the majority of debate in SPECPOL will take
place in caucus format. Caucusing can be done in one of two ways – moderated or unmoderated.
Moderated caucuses flow similarly to formal debate. Delegates' speaking times are often shorter, and
each caucus has a specific topic that delegates must discuss in their comments. Unmoderated
caucuses suspend formal rules of debate for a designated period of time during which delegates are
free to move around the room and informally discuss policy and potential solutions with one
another. The majority of writing for working papers and resolutions will occur during these
unmoderated caucuses.
Another unique feature of SPECPOL as a committee of the General Assembly is the process by
which its working papers and resolutions are created. Solutions start out as a set
of ideas, are formatted into a working paper, then voted upon as draft resolutions, and finally
presented as resolutions in plenary if passed in committee. The length of the resolution-writing
13. NHSMUN 2016
SPECPOL
- 7 -
process, the number of delegates in SPECPOL, and the capabilities of NHSMUN Administration
will limit the number of resolutions that can be introduced, thus making collaboration and
compromise essential.
The two most important things for delegates to keep in mind throughout debate are decorum and
country policy. As a committee of the General Assembly, SPECPOL includes delegates from each
member state of the United Nations; hence, it is one of the largest committees. Each delegate will be
given equal opportunity to speak before the committee and granted each member’s undivided
attention. The alteration or suspension of rules may occur at the discretion of the dais in order to
maintain control of the committee and to preserve decorum and respect for all delegates.
Additionally, delegates are to keep in mind that country policy is the anchor for all proposals both
presented and supported by the delegate. Although collaboration is the goal, it is always secondary
to the integrity of a delegate’s country policy. The desire to compromise should never supersede the
delegate’s ability to uphold his country’s stance on the issue. With this in mind, apt preparation for
committee on policy, background, and potential solutions is imperative in order for all delegates to
maintain quality debate and to remain on task at all times.
14. NHSMUN 2016
SPECPOL
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TOPIC A: THE SITUATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
IN AZERBAIJAN
INTRODUCTION
The Nagorno-Karabakh is a landlocked mountainous region subject to an unresolved dispute
between Azerbaijan and Armenia.9
Even though the territory lies within Azerbaijan, but is
dominated by the ethnic Armenian majority, the neighboring Armenian government continues to
rule and govern through its occupation of Azeri (Azerbaijan) lands.10
Both Azerbaijan and Armenia
have been engulfed in conflict since the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Soviet
occupation defined much of these states’ political actions. As the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) had little prior knowledge to cultural and ethnic divisions within these neighboring states,
occupational lines were drawn with little consideration of the indigenous people.11
This lack of
concern created an issue of ethnic conflict that has dominated the political intuitions of these
regions to this day.
Much effort has been made by both of these regions and various international political actors to
create peace and resolution. However, continuous violations of ceasefire agreements and other
forms of violent aggression have demolished this peace.12
Both the Azerbaijani and Armenian
governments are frustrated with prolonging this peace process and have been looking towards more
violent conflict to find a victor. Despite the international community’s recognition of Nagorno-
Karabakh region as part of Azerbaijan, Armenia continues to assert its occupation and its view that
this region should strive for independence.13
Using the Armenian ethnic majority, Armenia has vast
political and physical control over this territory and Azerbaijan has recently stated that it is ready to
act.14
Delegates in this committee should look for innovative solutions that emphasize peaceful
compromise between the two states, while also assuring the ethnically indigenous Nagorno-
Karabakh people are politically represented.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE
Russia and the Origins of Middle Eastern Political Conflict
Azerbaijan’s geographical location is a quintessential aspect of its history and political status. Located
in the South Caucasus on the great divide between Europe and Asia, while also surrounded by
Russia and Iran, this state is familiar with complex religious and ethnic conflict.15
Dividing the
Islamic and Christian worlds, this region also hosts a history entwined with the two opposing
9 "Azerbaijan - Armenian Aggression Against Azerbaijan." Heydar Aliyey Foundation, 2005, accessed May 28, 2015,
http://www.azerbaijan.az/_Karabakh/_ArmenianAgression/_armenianAgression_e.html.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Tadeusz Swietochowki, "Azerbaijan: The Hidden Faces of Islam," World Policy Journal 19, no. 3 (2002): 69-76,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209821.
15. NHSMUN 2016
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- 9 -
branches of Islam.16
Azerbaijan became a battleground to the predominantly Shia Iran and the
mostly Sunni Turkey.17
This divide has been furthered through nearly 70 years of Soviet occupation,
from 1920 until the collapse of the USSR in 1991.18
In the early nineteenth century, Azerbaijani
lands in the north were seized from Iran by USSR and new frontiers were redrawn.19
In order to
promote the divide-and-rule policies of the new colonial rule, the USSR divided the Turkish-
speaking Muslims from their compatriots in Iran.20
Leaving Azerbaijan with a comparatively large
proportion of Sunnis, there became a theocratic divide between the Sunnis of the north and the Shia
south.21
As this issue is deeply rooted in an ethnic divide in which ideological differences play a large
factor, it is important for delegates to recognize the unique difficulties that accompany conflicts of
this nature and base their solutions accordingly.
The troubled Shia-Sunni relationship became a major concern for the emerging modernizing
movement of the mid-nineteenth century. This movement was defined by the secularist actions of
its leader Mirza Fathali Akhundzade, who believed that overcoming the religious divide was the
most crucial step in building a community of Azeri people.22
This Islamic sectarian split waned only
with the 1905-07 Russian Revolution, which triggered large-scale ethnic violence known as the
I’atar-Armenian War.23
Threatened by the large military power of the Armenian aggressors, Shiites
and Sunnis unified to defend their regions.24
The Russian Revolution started the March Days of
1918, a series of ethnic violence between Azerbaijan and Armenia.25
On 31 March 1918, the
Armenian military seized the capital of Azerbaijan under the Bolshevik justification of fighting
counter-terrorism towards the USSR.26
This conflict resulted in the deaths of an estimated 3,000-
20,000 Azeri people and the destruction of hundreds of Muslim shrines, mosques, schools,
hospitals, and cultural landmarks.27
The March Days of 1918 set the tone for violent outbreak as a
means of expressing ethnic tensions, therefore preempting over 100 years of escalating violence.
This conflict did not prevent the Azeri people or native Azerbaijanis from creating their own
government following the collapse of the Russian Empire during the First World War in May of
1918. On 28 May 1918, the National Council adopted the Declaration of Independence of
Azerbaijan, creating the Muslim world’s first Parliamentary Republic.28
The Azerbaijan Democratic
Republic (ADR) was responsible for a number of firsts in the Muslim world. Extending suffrage to
women and establishing the first modern-type university were just a few of the progressive political
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Tadeusz Swietochowki,"Azerbaijan: The Hidden Faces of Islam.”
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Day Donaldson, "Azerbaijan Commemorates Historic Genocide Perpetrated by Armenians: 1918 March Days,"
Guardian Liberty Voice, April 2, 2014, accessed July 27, 2015, http://guardianlv.com/2014/04/azerbaijan-commemorates-
historic-genocide-perpetrated-by-armenians-1918-march-days/.
27 Ibid.
28 Day Donaldson, "Azerbaijan Commemorates Historic Genocide Perpetrated by Armenians: 1918 March Days.”
16. NHSMUN 2016
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- 10 -
decisions made by ADR.29
However, Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, was still a center of ethnic
tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Home to a large supply of oil, 56,000 Azeri people, and
25,000 Armenians, the three main political groups of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia fought for
control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.30
The two nationalist groups, the Azerbaijani Musavat and
the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, were in constant alarm against the third group called the
Baku Soviets.31
These included citizens from Azerbaijan and Armenia who believed in the
communist system, which lead to more violence.32
On 27 March 1920, the Baku Soviet disarmed a
group of Azerbaijani soldiers, prompting an Azeri resistance and by 30 March 1920, Baku was a
scene of civil war between the three political groups.33
It is crucial for the delegates of SPECPOL to recognize these three political groups and their
motives as they define the three main political ideologies surrounding this topic. The Soviets play an
enormous role both the pre- and post-political institutions of both Azerbaijan and Armenia.. As the
Soviets used the Nagorno-Karabakh region for its resources and trading ports, the region continued
to be a source of contention. Eventually, the Bolsheviks deployed artillery, which besieged the
Azerbaijanis to sign a ceasefire on 1 April 1920.34
By the first week in April, the Bolshevik Red Army
invaded the ADR and established the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), thus ending the 23-
month reign of the first Muslim parliamentary republic.35
Due to the Azeri acceptance and cooperation with the Soviet power, the country was given
recognition of national identity, which included full rights to their own language and culture.36
However, once Joseph Stalin began to lead the USSR, these rights were merely symbolic as
oppression of Islamic culture became very prevalent and characterized Azeri political relations for
most of the remaining twentieth century.37
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 had serious political
implications for Azerbaijan and many neighboring countries, as the Islamic reawakening began to
surface.38
Finally, with the implosion of the USSR in 1991, the People’s Front of Azerbaijan was able
to fully embrace its program that called for, “a new attitude towards the Islamic religion and
culture… The People’s Front supports decisive steps towards the development of understanding
and cooperation with the world of Islam.”39
As the Azeri government would soon discover,
normalizing relations in the Islamic world comes with immense geopolitical challenges, especially in
majority-Christian Armenia.
The USSR and the Beginning Stages of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
The hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia are over 70 years old, with constant resurgence of
political conflicts throughout each country’s history. Rooted in antagonisms and brief cooperation
between the Christian and Muslim people of the South Caucasus, the collapse of the USSR in 1991
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Tadeusz. Swietochowki. "Azerbaijan: The Hidden Faces of Islam."
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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required both of these countries to establish their own governments. This context framed the
outbreak and persistence of the Karabakh war.40
However, understanding the cause of the Karabakh
war would not be possible without and in-depth look at the transitional political institutions of
Azerbaijan and Armenia post-Soviet occupation.
The method in which Soviet Occupation governed Azerbaijan, Armenia, and other surrounding
states was based on ethnicity.41
These ethnic lines would often be drawn imperfectly, but also
promote a sense of that each nationality should have its own territory.42
As Armenia, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan become more ethnically homogenous, the expression of national loyalty became a
defining characteristic of these cultures.43
Nationalism was often partnered with discriminatory and
aggressive attitudes towards the differing nation-states.44
These institutionalized ethnic divisions
caused race and religion to be embedded in the politics of these regions. With the collapse of the
USSR came the need for each of these regions to establish their own political institutions that
actually represented the indigenous people of that region. As these ethnic lines were so poorly
distributed by the USSR prior to its collapse, the two regions struggled to represent the interests of
the various ethnic groups within their territory, leading to political discontent and misrepresentation.
The roots of political conflict surrounding the Karabakh region began with the application of
Leninist nationality policy in this region. Though Nagorno-Karabakh was 55-60% Armenian in the
twentieth century, the Soviet authorities placed it within the wealthier Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan
for economic and strategic reasons.45
Karabakh was separated from Armenia by the mountainous
Lachin corridor, which was also a part of the Republic of Azerbaijan, leaving Armenia with no
contiguous border with this region.46
The ambiguity of Soviet legislation towards this region left the
international community to decide the fate of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, an issue that was not
addressed until the situation further escalated in the late 1980s.
Throughout the period of Soviet occupation, there were occasional protests from the Armenians in
Karabakh, as they perceived this control as cultural and economic restriction of their people.47
The
Azerbaijani people saw the Nagorno-Karabakh region as their homeland and therefore, the victim of
aggressive Armenian nationalism.48
Due to the institutionalized ethnic divisions caused by Soviet
occupation, the Karabakh Armenians called for a political merger of their autonomous district with
the Armenian republic.49
When this merger was vetoed by the USSR, the Armenian people began
the uprisings that triggered the long-lasting Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.50
40 Tadeusz. Swietochowki. "Azerbaijan: The Hidden Faces of Islam."
41 Ibid.
42 Laitin, David, and Ronald Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh," Middle East Policy 7, no.
1 (1999): 145-76. http://homes.ieu.edu.tr/~ibagdadi/INT435/Readings/The%20Caucasus/laitinandsuny%20-
%20Armenia%20and%20Azerbaijan.pdf.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Laitin, David, and Ronald Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh.”
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
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These riots began 13 February 1988, when a group of Karabakh Armenians gathered and made
speeches calling for the unification of Karabakh with Armenia.51
As the protest continued in the
mountain town of the Southern Caucasus called Stepankert, the demonstration gained supporters.52
While the Nagorno-Karabakh region was mainly Armenian, the remaining 40% Azeri population
became increasingly antagonized and began to form counter protests.53
As the conflict escalated, 87
Armenian deputies from the Regional Soviets, known as the leaders of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), exercised their right to call an emergency assembly for 20 February
1988.54
During this meeting, 110 Armenian deputies voted for Karabakh to join Soviet Armenia,
while the remaining Azeri deputies refused to vote.55
This was the first of many legal standoffs
between these two countries. Still under Soviet control on 21 February 1988, the governing body of
the Soviet occupied states, the Politburo, met in Moscow to discuss the conflict.56
USSR president,
Mikhail Gorbachev was dealing with nineteen other territorial disputes in Soviet territories and
feared that making concessions to one would cause discontent in many.57
For this reason, the
Communist Party’s Central Committee passed a resolution vilifying the disloyal Karabakhis and the
NKAO as “extremists.”58
As a result of serious unrest in Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow placed the region under special
administration in January 1989.59
In response to this governance, some Armenian dissidents founded
the Armenian National Movement, which quickly became the governing power of not only
Nagorno-Karabakh, but also in Armenia.60
This explains the interdependency between the
government in Armenia and the de facto leadership in Karabakh that can still be felt today. As the
majority of people living within the Nagorno-Karabakh region identify with the Armenian culture,
Armenia has been able to retain basic control over the leaders the Karabakh government. Soon after
the formation of the parallel government between Armenian and Karabakhi leaders, the Armenian
national movement openly declared to remove Moscow’s special administration.61
In August 1989, unauthorized elections were held in Karabakh with the support of the national
movement, and the “Congress of plenipotentiary representatives of the population of the
autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh” declared the region to be an independent territory of
this union.62
Ultimately, this region worked closely with Armenian government representatives to
form a parallel government that would dominate the political authority of the Nagorno- Karabakh
region to this day.63
With support from this Armenian parallel government, the Armenian
Karabakhis elected a National Council and established an Armenian defense force.64
From this point
51Thomas Waal, Black Garden Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, New York: New York University Press, 2003.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59Heiko Kruger, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis. Berlin: Springer, 2010.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
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on, the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic recognized the National Council as the sole
representative instance of the Armenians in Karabakh.65
These governments would continue to
work in tandem, adding further complications to any form of peaceful negotiation between the
legitimate owners of the territory, Azerbaijan.
Neither the USSR nor Azerbaijan recognized the National Council or their declarations as
legitimate.66
Instead, in November 1989, Moscow transferred the administrative power over
Nagorno-Karabakh back to the Azerbaijan SSR without changing its territorial status.67
This
meaning that while Azerbaijan SSR had theoretical control over the region and its government, the
physical control of the land still remained occupied by Armenia.68
Still persistent on their goals,
however, the Soviet Supreme of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh
jointly declared unification of the region with the Armenian SSR on 1 December 1989.69
Due to the
political interconnections between the Nagorno-Karabakh independence movement and the
Armenian SSR, many Armenian people within Azeri territories began to express their support for
the dominating Armenian parallel governments.70
This heightened tensions between the two
countries and ethnic violence was the unfortunate result.
1988-1991 was crucial and complex to the Nargorno-Karabakh conflict, and was filled with ethnic
violence and ideological conflicts. The capital of Azerbaijan and surrounding cities were embroiled
with riots that often escalated to beatings and murders.71
During these riots, the Armenian people
were targeted since the Azeri people believed they could not trust Armenians.72
For the Armenians,
these exterminations in Sumgait and Baku were proof that they could no longer safely live under
Azerbaijani rule.73
By 1991, Azerbaijani troops forced countless Armenians living in regions north of
Nagorno-Karabakh to leave their villages, causing the Armenians to do the same to Azeri people
living within their territories.74
Since the ethnic lines were poorly drawn by the initial USSR occupation, there were large amounts
of Azeri and Armenians within each other’s lands, a problem that still remains to this day. As a result
of ethnic cleansing, 233,700 people became refugees and 551,000 people became classified as
internally dispersed persons (IDPs).75
Today, the de facto leadership in Nagorno-Karabakh cites the
events in 1991 as justification for their breakaway.76
Through their attempts for independence, the
Armenian side expelled hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis, also committing acts of violence and
killings.77
As described by political scientists David Laitin and Ronald Suny, “The riots and killings
fatally colored the mutual understandings of these two nationalities, making each see itself as victim
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Laitin, David, and Ronald Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh."
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Heiko. Kruger, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis
75 Laitin, David, and Ronald Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh."
76 Heiko Kruger. The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis.
77 Ibid.
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and the other as oppressor.”78
As both countries forced the blame and root of violence on the other,
tensions grew higher and created the immensely polarized conflict that still exists today.
Post-Soviet Occupation and the Declarations of Independence by Azerbaijan and Nagorno-
Karabakh
The situation in the region changed drastically in the summer of 1991. On 30 August 1991, Soviet
Azerbaijan’s Supreme Soviet adopted its “Declaration on Re-Establishment of the National
independence of the Azerbaijani Republic,” which heralded the process of Azerbaijan’s
independence from the USSR.79
Four days later, Nagorno-Karabakh followed suit, initiating the
same process through the “Declaration of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh,” adopted by the
local legislative councils and the bordering Armenian-populated Shahumian district.80
However, it is
important to understand that Nagorno-Karabakh was not declaring independence from the Soviets,
but from Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh was in compliance with international and domestic Soviet
law in their appeal, but their parallel government with Armenia SSR was still unrecognized by its
governing powers.81
On 2 September 1991, the non-recognized parallel government between Armenia and Karabakh
government leaders officially declared its own republic in Nagorno-Karabakh.82
A month later, on
18 October 1991, the Azerbaijani Republic confirmed its independence by adoption of its
“Constitutional Act” on national independence.83
This formalized the national constitution of
Azerbaijan and established them as an independent government.84
In response to Karabakh’s
declaration, on 23 November 1991 Azerbaijan annulled Karabakh’s autonomy.85
In order to
continue complying with Soviet law regarding leaving the USSR, Nagorno-Karabakh held its own
referendum on independence in the presence of international observers and media representatives.86
Two days before the referendum, on 8 December 1991, Belarus, Russia, and the Ukraine declared
that the USSR no longer existed.87
Ultimately, the referendum vote approved Karabakh’s
sovereignty, with 82.2% of Karabakh’s registered voters participating in the election and 99.89% of
those ballots supporting its independence from the Republic of Azerbaijan.88
The USSR dissolved on 26 December 1991 and on 6 January 1992, the formerly proclaimed
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh declared its national independence.89
Since the USSR gave control
of the Karabakh region to Azerbaijan, the collapse of the Soviet government left Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and the region of Nagorno-Karabakh in great conflict.
78 Laitin, David, and Ronald Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh," 152.
79 “Nagorno Karabagh: A White Paper,” 2nd ed. Yerevan, Armenia: Armenian Center for National and International
Studies, 1997.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87Heiko Kruger, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis.
88 Nagorno Karabagh: A White Paper, Yerevan: Armenian Center for National and International Studies.
89 Ibid.
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Between 1992 and 1994, Armenia and Azerbaijan went to war over Nagorno-Karabakh.90
The end
of the war resulted in Armenia forcing the Azerbaijani forces beyond today’s demarcation line, into
the surrounding Azerbaijani districts.91
The Karabakh Army of Defense, with major assistance from
Armenia and Russia, was able to demolish Azerbaijan’s blockade of its capital and open it to
Armenia.92
Overall, tens of thousands of people from both ethnic groups died during these battles,
while hundred of thousands became refugees, many of which still live in refugee camps today.93
The territory of the proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh established itself as an independent
governing body on 6 January 1992. However, it is still not recognized internationally by any state
today. It is known that Armenia fully supports the independence or reunification of Nagorno-
Karabakh and finances a large sum of their budget, while also supplying troops.94
With over 20,000
soldiers in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, it is one of the most militarized regions in Europe.95
Azerbaijan continues to support the affiliation of the region to its national territory, yet offers the
region the greatest possible autonomy.96
Attempting to lay the foundation for independence, the
leaders of the Nagorno-Karabakh held a referendum on the first constitution in December 2006, but
it was not recognized internationally.97
The same applies to the presidential elections of 2007.98
The UN Security Council and various outside organizations underline Azerbaijan’s claim, and
recently the Azeri government has made it quite clear that they will not wait much longer for
Armenia to withdrawal control from Nagorno-Karabakh region. As the conflict escalates, both sides
are using previous laws to justify their territorial legitimacy. The Karabakhi people believe they have
a right to self-determination and that they followed the correct Soviet law for recognition under
their previous rule.99
The international community, however, notes that the last official recognition
of the territory was given to Azerbaijan by the USSR and uses that as a base for international law.100
It is under the mandate of this committee to peacefully figure out methods of government
intervention to prevent escalated conflict.
Failed Peace Actions by the United Nations and Independent Actors
The UN Security Council involved itself in the mediation process on 30 April 1993 due to the
Armenian Karabakhi invasion of the Kelbadjar district of Azerbaijan.101
Resolution 822
(S/RES/822) reaffirmed the “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states in the
region” and “the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Heiko Kruger, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Rovshan Sadigbayli, " The Implications of the 1993 U.N. Security Council Action for the Settlement of the Armenia-
Azerbaijan Conflict,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 3, No. 4 (2009): 342-70.
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the acquisition of territory.”102
The Security Council unequivocally established the acquisition of
these Azerbaijani districts as an “invasion” that produced the “occupation of territory of a sovereign
state” by both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh without formally condemning them.103
This
violation of international law prompted the Security Council to call for an “…immediate withdrawal
of all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar district and other recently occupied areas of
Azerbaijan.”104
Resolution 822 would be become Azerbaijan’s main claim towards legitimate
ownership of the occupied territory, but it should be noted that this resolution, along with 835 and
874, did little to create mechanisms for political mediation while simultaneously shifting authority to
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OCSE).105
Many states and outside actors have attempted to assist this conflict through peaceful means of
negotiation. The OSCE was the most active organization in the conflict.106
The peace process was
initiated by the meeting of OCSE Foreign Ministers on 24 March 1992.107
This meeting established
the Minsk Group, a group of eleven member states charged with the responsibility of preparing a
peace conference between these conflicting states within the OCSE framework.108
This framework
gave Nagorno-Karabakh the right to participate as an interested party with the status of “elected and
other representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh.”109
However, the status of Karabakh’s participation was ambiguous and led to the Minsk Group using
Armenia’s delegation as the main line of contact with the leaders of this disputed region.110
At the
final session, Nagorno-Karabakh was adequately represented and an agreement was formed that
continued the activity of the Minsk Group without interruption.111
This lasted until September 1993,
when the conflicting sides failed to agree to the “adjusted timetable” proposed by the Minsk Group,
due to the recently launched Azeri military offense.112
In September 1997, Armenia and Azerbaijan accepted peace proposals presented by the Minsk
group, which involved a two-stage settlement of the conflict.113
The first stage would withdraw the
Karabakh Armenian troops from the six occupied districts of Azerbaijan, while OCSE peacekeeping
forces would be deployed between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces.114
However, the second stage
was designed so vaguely that each party interpreted the expected results differently. According to
Azerbaijan official understanding, during the second stage, simultaneous negotiations were to be
held about the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the restoration of full Azerbaijani control over
102 S/RES/822, “Armenia-Azerbaijan” 30 April 1993,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/822(1993).
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113,Levon Chorbajian, The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh: From Secession to Republic, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire:
Palgrave, 2001.
114 Ibid.
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the Lachin corridor and Shushi.115
Armenia’s interpretation excluded any change in the military
control of Lachin or Shushi, as these are the last vestiges of military security for the Karabakh
region.116
Consequently, Azerbaijani understanding of this plan completely negated the second phase
of negotiations and both parties left angered.
There are several reasons this plan was ultimately unsuccessful and it is crucial that every delegate
understand these structural flaws in order to prevent this committee from submitting ineffective
resolutions. While the Minsk proposals stipulated the demilitarization of the “occupied territories,” it
created no mechanisms to ensure that these regions would remain demilitarized once Armenian
forces left.117
Secondly, the OSCE peacekeeping force had no set timeframe for the length of their
actions within these states, thus leading to disagreement between the mediating parties.118
Armenia
and Karabakh wanted the peacekeeping forces to remain in the region as long as possible in order to
regroup and prepare their request for independence, while Azerbaijan and other related parties
wanted the duration as short as possible so that their forces could once again take control of their
territories.119
In addition to financial shortcomings, the OSCE plan also failed to mediate the deeply
imbedded ethnic conflict that has manifested itself in a political war between Azerbaijan and
Armenia.120
Trying to use a mediation plan full of short-term frameworks to solve a long-term
conflict, the peacekeeping forces left without establishing any political or governmental mechanisms
for a stable solution. This left an opportunity for each party involved to try again to solve this crisis
through military means. 121
In addition to the peacekeeping resolutions submitted by the UN Security Council, the UN General
Assembly also recognized the immense political and social repercussions involving this conflict. On
20 December 1993, the UN General Assembly submitted a resolution that reaffirmed the need for
humanitarian assistance to Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs.122
While requesting that the UNHCR
continue to work with non-governmental organizations to assist the over one million Azerbaijani
refugees, this resolution purely focused on the humanitarian aspect of this topic. The General
Assembly allowed the conflict to remain unsolved until it once again was put on the agenda in
2006.123
Even in 2006, the proposed resolution only discussed the environmental affects of the long-
standing political conflict.124
It was not until 2008 that the General Assembly once again addressed the political and militant
status of the three regions.125
On 14 March 2008, the General Assembly submitted a resolution that
recalled the previous work of the Security Council and the Minsk Group, affirmed Azerbaijan’s
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Levon Chorbajian, The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh: From Secession to Republic.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 A/RES/48/114, “Emergency international assistance to refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan,” 20 December
2993, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r114.htm
123 Ibid.
124 A/RES/60/285, “The situation in the occupied territories in Azerbaijan,” 15 September 2006,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/285.
125 Ibid.
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territorial right to the conflict region, and “Demand[ed] the immediate, complete and unconditional
withdrawal of all forces from all the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”126
This
resolution did reaffirm the international community’s support of Azerbaijan’s territorial claims, but
provided little to no mechanisms for mediation.127
As SPECPOL is a body of the United Nations, all resolutions formed through this committee must
incorporate the Nagorno-Karabakh region as property of Azerbaijan. This is how the UN defines
this territory and therefore, delegates of this committee must work with the various political and
governmental institutions within both Azerbaijani and Armenian states to facilitate peace while
mitigating violent outbreaks. As this conflict also involves numerous Middle Eastern neighbors,
SPECPOL must acknowledge these actors and their role in solving the conflict.
CURRENT STATUS
The mostly Armenian population of the disputed region now lives under the control of the un-
recognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, a micro-nation that is supported by Armenia.128
As the
continuous cease-fires throughout the duration of this conflict have proved ineffective, recent
militant action has escalated this conflict. Azeri President Ilham Aliyev continues to assert
Azerbaijan’s claim with increasing forcefulness.129
On 8 August 2014, President Aliyev released a
statement, along with a series of tweets that stated the army of Azerbaijan is more than ready to
respond to any Armenian military aggression.130
Going as far as stating “our army, targeting Armenia
with missiles, is ready to fulfill even the order of destroying Yerevan,” arguably, the Azerbaijani
leadership is on the breaking point of starting the second Nagorno-Karabakh war.131
Both the Azerbaijani Army and the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army have
professionalized and rearmed their forces along a 100 kilometer land-mined border.132
Since the
summer of 2014, there have been many dangerous clashes between these forces that have occurred
almost daily.133
In November 2014, Azeri forces shot down an Armenian Mi-24 helicopter that was
flying over their territory and as a result, there was intense fighting on the ground as Armenians
attempted to recover bodies from Azeri land.134
During the most recent attack on 31 January 2015,
the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army “launched a preemptive attack” on several Azeri positions
and killed a number of Azeri soldiers.135
These attacks, partnered with statements of aggression from
126 A/RES/62/243, “The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan,” 25 April 2008,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/62/243.
127 Ibid.
128Jake Mulclaire, "Face Off: The Coming War between Armenia and Azerbaijan," The National Interest, April 9, 2015,
Accessed July 23, 2015, http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/face-the-coming-war-between-armenia-azerbaijan-
12585.
129 Ibid.
130Jeremy Bender, "Azerbaijan's Army Says It Is 'Ready To Fulfill Even The Order Of Destroying' Armenia's Capital
City," Business Insider, August 8, 2014, Accessed May 28, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/armenia-and-azerbaijan-
approaching-war-2014-8.
131 Ibid.
132,Jake Mulclaire, "Face Off: The Coming War between Armenia and Azerbaijan."
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
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both states involved, has caused the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenian-financed Nagorno-
Karabakh to increase their military spending, as if preparing for a full-fledged war.
As the conflict is once again reaching its climax, both countries are facing strong incentives to take
military action in the next few years. Azerbaijan knows that the UN and most of the international
community supports their territorial claims over the land and has been supplying a large arms
buildup.136
The Azeri Land Forces spent over USD one billion on armored vehicles and artillery
from Russia in 2013 and 2014 alone.137
Specifically, Azerbaijan recently acquired two batteries of
Tos-1A Buratino thermobaric heavy rocket artillery systems from Russia.138
These systems have the
capabilities of opening a gap in Armenia’s frontline trenches through a series of massive
explosions.139
As Azerbaijan is close allies with Israel, the Azeri Air Force has also slowly built up an
array of Israeli drones, invaluable for hunting Armenian artillery.140
These technologies legitimize the
severity of President Aliyev’s statements of aggression and are quite indicative of an eventual
militant outbreak.
Armenia cannot afford to match the level of military spending displayed by the Republic of
Azerbaijan. Therefore, the leaders of Armenia and Karabakh may view the military imbalance as an
incentive to act soon in order to prevent more technological buildup from the opposing party.141
Since 2012, Armenia has heavily invested in Russian-supplied upgrades for its armor, artillery, and
particularly in domestically produced drone systems.142
There has also been much speculation
around the claim that Russia has sold 9K720 Iskander short-range conventional ballistic missiles to
Armenia.143
These missiles could arm Armenia’s very small air force with the technology needed to
cripple the superior Azeri Air Force.144
All of these factors indicate that both states are ready to wage
war, with each partnered having very strong allies.
As Azerbaijan refuses to settle for anything less than full control of the area, and Armenia continues
to believe it is the right of their people to have independence, compromise over the Nagorno-
Karabakh region seems far away. Delegates should be aware of this escalating conflict and form
solutions that establish peaceful mechanisms and long-term stability. In addition, delegates should
also create resolutions that discuss and form preemptive institutions to protect the people of conflict
regions if the situation reached the level of militarized conflict. The situation of occupied territories
in Azerbaijan has reached its climax and it is the job of this committee to mediate and prepare for
any political or militarized actions of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and any other related
party.
BLOC ANALYSIS
136 Jake Mulclaire, "Face Off: The Coming War between Armenia and Azerbaijan."
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
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As this topic is current and continues to evolve daily, so do many of the relative bloc positions. The
involvement of these outside actors often acts as the only binding thread between a working
government and extreme political instability. The blocs should act as merely a guide for additional
research and should not be used as the definitive foreign policy for any delegate within this
committee.
The European Union and other Western States
On 20 July 2015, European Council President, Donald Tusk, stated, “The peaceful resolution of this
conflict remains a priority for the European Union (EU). The EU supports the negotiations aimed
at settling the conflict.”145
Through this statement, Tusk echoed the sentiment of the majority of the
international community. As the EU and other Western states support the UN’s affirmation of
Azerbaijan’s territorial claim, these states have focused on supplying aid to the victims of this
political conflict.146
Since Azeri gas is to be used in the EU’s ambitious Southern Gas Corridor
Project, many human rights violations have been ignored due to the economic value of Azerbaijan’s
political partnership.147
Conversely, as reports detailing Azerbaijan’s political corruption and imprisonment of over 90
activists and journalist have surfaced, Western support has been questionable.148
Still supplying the
same amount of humanitarian aid, in July 2015, the United States (US) Senate Appropriations
Committee specifically noted their concern about “democracy, human rights, and corruption in
Azerbaijan” and called for the release of several prisoners.149
These human rights violations and
Azerbaijan’s purchase of weapons from Russia have also made members of the EU weary of their
participation.150
The US, as well as the EU benefit from the oil provided from Azerbaijan. As the EU
and Western states do support Azerbaijan’s territorial claims, it is important to note their recently
strained relationship as it could potentially play a large role in future conflicts.
Muslim Countries
As the most affected region by this conflict, the relations between Muslim countries is extremely
important. Through backing the international community’s legal decisions on the territorial claims of
Azerbaijan and supporting the Muslim Azeri population, most Muslim countries support a peaceful
resolution in favor of Azerbaijan.151
Iran has supported Armenia financially for quite some time in
order to promote a cooperative relationship for oil, but on 24 July 2015, the Ambassador of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to Armenia, Mohammad Raiesi announced, “the official stance of Iran over
conflicts, particularly NK (Nagorno-Karabakh) settlement problem, is firm: All problems must be
solved through peaceful negotiations based on internationally accepted norms.”152
With many
145 "EU's 'priority' to End Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict," Anadolu Agency, 20 July 2015, accessed August 27, 2015.
146 Ibid.
147 Denis Corboy, William Courtney, and Richard Kauzlarich, "It's Time to Reboot Our Relationship with Russia and
Iran's Neighbors," Newsweek, July 28, 2015, accessed 27 August 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/its-time-reboot-our-
relationship-russia-and-irans-neighbors-357498.
148 Ibid.
149 "Iran Sees Only Solution to Nagorno Karabakh Conflict Peacefully," Armen Press, 14 July 2015, accessed 27 August
2015, http://armenpress.am/eng/news/813203/iran-sees-only-solution-to-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-peacefully.html.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
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refugees and IDPs still a major concern, these countries are concerned with this population’s safety
and immersion into society.
Russia and its Allies
Russia has been a significant player since its occupation of the two states in the late nineteenth
century. It has become one of the only countries supporting Armenia both financially and militarily.
In 2013, Russia pressured Armenia to abandon association agreements with the EU and join the less
wealthy Eurasian Economic Union, further straining EU and Armenian relations.153
Armenia
depends heavily on Russia for military support, while Russia uses this relationship to strong-arm
deals and relationships through Armenia.154
In addition, Russia has recently been playing both sides
of the conflict by selling over USD one million of weaponry to Azerbaijan.155
This shows that Russia
is mainly looking out for its own interest, leaving Armenia without many strong allies. This increased
interaction with Azerbaijan and Russia has caused the West to question their relationship with the
Azeri government, further increasing the political complexity of this issue.156
Russia has also entered the politics of gas supply as it is a major competitor to supply gas to the
EU’s Southern Gas Corridor project. If it does start supplying, Azerbaijan would be shut out of a
major economic deal that would impact many of its Eastern European allies.157
The role of gas must
not be undermined when considering political inclination of states. States that rely on Russia for
sources of energy and are also allies with Russia, many feel inclined to reflect Russia’s positions in
foreign policy. Oil and gas have proved to be determining factors in political relations in the past for
the Middle East, and the same applies to Russia and Azerbaijan. This could be the case in the future
for China. It currently has the capacity to become more involved in this conflict since it has been
increasing trade and regional energy projects in the Caucasus region.158
In May 2015, China rejected
a claim that it submitted an UN resolution that supported the recognition of an independent
Nagorno-Karabakh.159
Nonetheless, the country’s close ties with Russia, financial interests, and
previous act of providing Armenia with rocket systems in 1999 all suggest that China has the
potential to serve as a key player in the future.160
It is important to recognize that many Russian allies
have not developed and declared concrete positions in regards to this topic. However, like China,
they all have the potential to influence the outcome of the conflict.
South America, Central America, and Africa
153 Denis Corboy. "It's Time to Reboot Our Relationship with Russia and Iran's Neighbors."
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Fariz Ismailzade, “The Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Global Dialogue 3, No. 7 (2005),
http://worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=354.
159 Seba Aghayeva, “China Denies Recognizing Separtist Regime of Nagorno-Karabkh,” Trend News, 21 May 2015,
accessed 22 September 2015,
http://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2397587.html.
160 Fariz Ismailzade, “The Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.”
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Often time with issues of great political polarization, many states will shy away from involvement
that could complicate their relations with actors within the conflict.161
While some of these states are
allies with stronger actors, they have not taken any definitive stance other than to support the
international communities’ stride towards peaceful resolution.162
Delegates within this bloc should
not see this as a reason not to be active in committee, and view this lack of definitive stance as an
opportunity to work with the various political actors to form unique solutions to the issue without
constraints.
Some countries in this bloc, such as the Republic of Sudan and South Sudan, have experienced
similar separatist movements and territorial disputes within their own countries. Similar to major
Western powers, some of these countries are more sympathetic to Nagorno-Karabakh since
countries of these blocs have a history of territorial disputes, been colonized by European powers,
and have experience with declaring independence from other governments. For example, since
2012, Uruguay has been calling for the international community to recognize the region as an
independent republic and respect the people’s right of self-determination.163
Members of this bloc
are dedicated to establishing peaceful negotiations, and delegates are encouraged to further explore
their country’s specific position.
COMMITTEE MISSION
The political situation with the Nagorno-Karabakh region is constantly evolving. In the past, the
international community has struggled to establish long-term stabilization mechanisms for this issue,
which must be the primary concern of this committee. Corruption is a concern in Azerbaijan,
Armenia, and Nagorno Karabakh, and must be alleviated in addition to mediation between the
opposing parties. Delegates should focus on a wide array of governmental and non-governmental
institutions that will mediate this conflict peacefully, while also engaging the people and key actors.
Delegates must be aware of the severity of this situation and consider preemptive solutions in case
of militant outbreak. It is the job of this committee to prevent these kinds of situations through the
use of peaceful political strategies. Refugees and IDPs should be a concern, but neutralizing the
political and militant escalation is the main priority of SPECPOL.
While this topic is quite polarizing in nature, Delegates must be aware of their country’s policy
towards this issue and follow it strictly during committee. Delegates should look at past efforts made
by the international community and other outside actors and build upon these to form more
comprehensive and effective solutions.
161 Ibid.
162 Denis Corboy, "It's Time to Reboot Our Relationship with Russia and Iran's Neighbors."
163 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Uruguay to Recognize Nagorno-Karabakh?” Eurasianet.org, 13 September 2011, accessed 26
September 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64165.
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TOPIC B: THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE SITUATION IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
INTRODUCTION
With over five million Palestinian refugees throughout the world, nearly one and a half million
individuals live in the 58 recognized Palestine refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab
Republic, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank.164
The remaining two thirds of the refugees live in and
around the cities and towns of these receiving countries and territories.165
These people live their
lives without social and economic stability due to the highly polarized Arab-Israeli conflict. Starting
with the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948, these Palestinians are the marginalized products of decades
of political, religious, and ideological conflict within the Middle East.
Unfortunately, refugees who live in a refugee camp are often at the will of their host country without
any legal or political rights. As these camps are on land leased by the host government using local
farmers’ land, the refugees in these camps do not own any of the land or shelters they call home.166
For the refugees not fortunate enough to have an organized living community, they wander around
the Middle East as nomads with no legal recognition from any government, furthering their
exposure to exploitation and human rights abuses. Without any rights or property of their own,
these refugees are trapped within these turbulent states, constantly living in fear of escalating militant
conflicts that surround the Middle East.
This issue began with a political conflict that escalated to a militant conflict, displacing over 750,000
Palestinians starting with the first war in 1948 continuing until the end of the Yom Kippur War in
1973.167
Decades later, the same Arab-Israeli conflict has escalated and dispersed throughout the
Middle East, yielding millions of causalities. This committee must focus on the origins of this
conflict as it relates specifically to the refugee situation in the Middle East. The UN and other
outside organizations have attempted to solve issues such as the rights of the refugees, poverty
eradication, and refugee camp health standards, but have failed to work with Middle Eastern
countries to improve political relations. SPECPOL must address the immediate human rights issues
of the Palestinian refugees through innovative and diplomatic solutions that focus on governmental
mechanisms to eradicate the political conflict that is the root of the Palestinian refugee situation in
the Middle East.
164 "Where We Work UNRWA," United Nations Relief and Works Agency, 2014, Accessed 5 July 2015,
http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work.
165 Ibid
166 Ibid
167 Ibid.
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HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE
Origins of Political Conflict
As much of the world was dealing with the political and territorial repercussions of postcolonial
control, Great Britain still had control over a vast majority of the Middle Eastern region during the
beginning of the twentieth century.168
Palestine formerly comprised modern-day Israel, the West
Bank, and Gaza, but following the seizure of Ottoman Empire territory in 1917, Britain promised a
Jewish “national home” in Palestine, while failing to promise the same to the indigenous Palestinian
Arab inhabitants.169
During the First World War, large scale Jewish immigration to Palestine
occurred due to the Nazi Holocaust of the 1930s and 1940s.170
This escalated tensions as Palestinian
demands for independence and resistance to Jewish immigration led to violence and political
insurgency.171
In 1929, Great Britain offered Palestine the opportunity to establish their own government and
participate in elected assembly, but under several conditions.172
These conditions included accepting
continued British rule and the establishment of the Jewish “national home.”173
The Palestinian
community leaders refused because they believed no Jewish state should be formed in their
homeland.174
Therefore, the Palestinians lacked the experience of self-governing and state building,
and when the British mandate ended in 1948, their political and military institutions could not
prevent Israeli immigration.175
These are the building blocks of The Arab- Israeli Wars and the
Palestinian Refugee Situation in the Middle East.
As the conflict escalated and Palestine was no longer under British control, the newly formed UN
began to address the issue. After an intense two-month-long debate, the General Assembly, on 29
November 1947, adopted Resolution 181.176
More commonly known as “The Partition Plan,” it
called for the creation of the Arab and Jewish States by dividing Palestine into eight parts; three to
the Arab State, three to the Jewish state, a dividing town that separates the Arab and Jewish
divisions, and an eighth division for an International regime for Jerusalem.177
The Jewish Agency
accepted even with its dissatisfaction over the territorial limits on the proposed Jewish State,
however, the Palestinian Arabs did not accept the plan on the grounds that it violated the provisions
of the UN Charter that specifically addressed the right to self-determination of varying ethnic
communities.178
Both Palestinian and Israeli civilians mirrored this discontent, as guerilla attacks
became a daily occurrence.
168 Yezid Sayigh, "The PLO and the Palestinian Armed Struggle," The Middle East, 2005, http://fileserver.net-
texts.com/asset.aspx?dl=no&id=80451.
169Ibid.
170“Operational Guidance Note: Israel, Gaza and the West Bank,” Home Office of United Kingdom, last modified 2009,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/498ab1642.html.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Kiyo Akasaka, The Question of Palestine and the United Nations, 2008.
178 Ibid.
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On 14 May 1948, Britain relinquished control of Palestine and the Jewish Agency proclaimed the
establishment of the State of Israel on the territory allotted to it by the partition plan.179
Fighting
between the Arab and Jewish communities immediately broke out and the following day, troops
from neighboring Arab States invaded the territory to assist the Palestinian Arabs. As the Palestinian
leaders rejected the UN Partition Plan and lacked the state capacities to self-govern, the superior
military of the Zionist forces, or pro-Israeli militants, gradually began to control much of the
territory allotted to the Arab State by the partition resolution.180
After several attempts by the
Security Council for armistice, the First Arab-Israeli War came to a halt in January 1949.181
The hostilities of this war created the Palestinian refugee situation in the Middle East, with almost
750,000 Palestinians uprooted from their land.182
Many scholars believe there to be two distinct
phases of “Palestinian flight”: the civil war stage and the Arab military invasion after 15 May 1948.183
The civil war stage was characterized by the Zionist defense, where many upper and middle class
Palestinians fled in order to protect themselves from any violent aggression.184
With much of the
economically stable citizens gone, the Palestinian government struggled from a lack of social and
national cohesion.185
As Palestine and other Arab nations invaded Israel, the Palestinian civilians
became political pawns as many suffered abuses and attacks from the resulting war.186
The incidents
of massacres and explosions caused by the Israeli forces caused psychological repercussions known
as “whispering campaigns” that created increased fear in the Arab population of Palestine.187
After 1948, the Palestinian refugees found themselves under a variation of political, social, legal, and
administrative systems. Egypt placed the 300,000 refugees crowded in the Gaza Strip under military
administration, while Jordan annexed the West Bank and its refugees, which ensured the gradual
conferment of Jordanian citizenship.188
The other 100,000 fled to Syria, where the refugees were
given all rights enjoyed by Syrian nationals expect the right to run for or vote in a public election.189
The 150,000 that remained in Israel were granted citizenship, but endured de facto second-class
political and legal status.190
The Department Chair of War Studies at the King’s College in London,
Yezid Sayigh best describes the refugee situation as, “the loss of land and other immovable assets,
disruption of social and commercial networks and labour markets, and exclusion from political and
administrative power pauperized and stigmatized most Palestinian refugees, leaving them heavily
dependent on UN-organized relief and on onward migration and subject to economic and social
marginality in host countries.”191
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Waldman, Simon A. Anglo-american diplomacy and the palestinian refugee problem, 1948-51. Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid.
187 Waldman, Simon A. Anglo-american diplomacy and the palestinian refugee problem, 1948-51.
188 Yezid Sayigh. "The PLO and the Palestinian Armed Struggle."
189 Ibid.
190Ibid.
191 Ibid.
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This mass exodus of the Palestinian people, however, catalyzed the growth of Palestinian
nationalism. As these refugees pinned their hopes on the repatriation and restitution of the Arab
governments, the Palestinian Liberation movement began.
The Political Causes and Repercussions of Palestinian Liberation Organizations
As these refugees and Palestinian nationalists initiated revolutionary actions in an effort to create a
consolidated movement, small groups of political activists began to form. Perhaps the most
influential of these groups, the Movement of Arab Nationalists and the Palestinian National
Liberation Movement began to dominate the political ideology of many Palestinians and refugees
dispersed among other states.192
The Movement of Arab Nationalists believed in pan-Arab unity as
the means to garner adequate military and economic support to defeat Israel and its Western
supporters.193
The Palestinian National Liberation Movement (known as Fatah) felt that Palestine
should launch its own armed liberation struggle independent of other Arab states.194
These two
opposing ideologies would dominate the debate and insurgency surrounding the Palestinian
liberation movement to present day.
The man responsible for the official recognition of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement is
Colonel Gamal Abdul-Nasser, who is known for his overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy and his
promises to defeat Israel.195
Nasser publicly persuaded these nationalists to halt the independent
military activity and formed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) on the principles of pan-
Arabism.196
Pan-Arabism promoted Muslim states’ political, social, and economic coordination in all
matters of international and domestic relations.197
The supporters of pan-Arabism believed that
cohesion through religion was the only way to properly defend the region from Western culture and
oppressive political decisions.198
Further polarizing this issue with ideological warfare, these beliefs
spread to the refugees that have been dispersed throughout neighboring states and led to discontent
in those regions as well. Using his charismatic appeal and assistance from several layers, Nasser
established the PLO as the nationally representative umbrella organization for the Palestinians in
May 1964.199
Taking the organization to an international level, the PLO was invited to join the League of Arab
States and allowed them to form small “liberation armies” in Gaza Strip, Syria, and Iraq.200
The
formation of the PLO presented major challenges to the other independence groups, mainly Fatah
who viewed the PLO as a compliant tool of the Arab states.201
Representing a large portion of
Palestinian popular opinion, the Fatah began to launch small guerilla attacks to show their political
discontent.202
This heightened the already strained relations between Middle Eastern countries, as
many viewed Fatah as a terrorist group. While these complicated Middle Eastern relations, many
192 Ibid.
193 Yezid Sayigh. "The PLO and the Palestinian Armed Struggle."
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Yezid Sayigh. "The PLO and the Palestinian Armed Struggle."
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
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young Palestinians showed interest in joining the fight, which prompted the creation of additional
guerrilla groups. This type of aggression killed thousands of innocent people, mostly the refugees of
these regions that feel trapped by their lack of political representation and human rights.
After winning the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Israel successfully occupied Sinai, Golan Heights, the
West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza, almost quadrupling the amount of land held previously.203
This left Israel in control of all of the refugees in these areas, creating more conflict between the two
states.204
As each state was able to decide the rights of refugees in their territory, the refugees of each
region were given a variation of human, political, and economic rights under the different
governmental mandates of their host country.205
Depending on the host government’s role and
policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, some of these refugees were given full citizenship like in
Syria or treated as second-rate humans like in Israeli occupied regions of Gaza and the West Bank.
However, none were given the right to vote and all were crippled by the lack of receiving state
infrastructure. While the Fatah’s effort in this war was seen as a militant failure, it greatly benefited
their political objectives.
Hearing about their sacrifice and brave resistance, thousands of volunteers flocked to guerrilla
training camps and within months, the guerilla groups took control of the PLO’s Palestine National
Council (PNC).206
With Fatah occupying the majority of the PNC’s representative seats and Fatah
leader Yasser Arafat as its Chairman, the philosophy of militant guerilla attacks dominated the
Palestinian political arena until the early 1970s.207
With the PLO’s expulsion from Jordan in 1971,
other Middle Eastern countries began to tighten their security against militant groups, ultimately
causing the organization to reevaluate their methods of political activism.208
At the twelfth meeting of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) in 1974, the organization began to
move away from a policy of total territorial liberation in its entirety and focus on a more diplomatic
two-state solution.209
This two-state solution is a term used to refer to a political compromise to the
Arab-Isreali conflict that involves “two states for two groups of people.”210
As this type of peaceful
negotiation had seen little practice with this conflict, the PNC focused on attempting to determine
territorial boundaries that both states could agree to.211
It was at this point that the PLO discouraged
their old militant methods and was officially recognized as the “sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people” by Palestinians themselves, other Arab countries, and much of the rest of the
world.212
With the main political objective as establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza
Strip, and East Jerusalem, the PLO focused on negotiations and peace-talks with the Israeli
government.213
This diplomacy prompted the formation of a ten-point plan with many states for
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Yezid Sayigh. "The PLO and the Palestinian Armed Struggle."
208 Glenn E Robinson,,”Palestine Liberation Organization," The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Oxford Islamic
Studies Online, accessed 6 July 2015, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0618.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Yezid Sayigh. "The PLO and the Palestinian Armed Struggle."
213 Ibid.
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peaceful Palestinian independence that would incorporate state-building mechanisms and assistance
programs for refugees.214
Greatly benefiting Palestinian relations, the newly developed diplomatic
policies helped project the PLO as a major actor in Middle Eastern politics, leading to increased
assistance programs for Palestinian citizens and refugees.215
This political evolution, however, met major resistance from a minority of Palestinians. Islamic
groups, such as Hamas formed in 1988 as a rejectionist front to oppose compromise with Israel.216
As an outgrowth of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas soon spread throughout the Gaza
Strip, the West Bank, and other areas.217
This organization is a result of several outside factors,
including the First intifadah and the resulting peace-talks. Following the Palestinian uprising called
the First intifadah, the PLO agreed to enter peace-talks with the Israeli government that resulted in
the Oslo Accords.218
This agreement led to increased Palestinian colonization of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, but failed due to Israel’s continued construction of settlements in the occupied
territories.219
As a result, talks broke down in 2000 and a wave of frustration and violence came over
the Palestinian independence groups.220
A demonstration by an Israeli political candidate ended in lethal force of Israeli police at Islam’s
third holiest site soon sparked the second intifadah.221
This uprising was much more violent than the
first, accounting for more than 4,300 fatalities over the five year uprising.222
This lead to a public
fragmentation of Fatah and the PLO, as more radical groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad
gained more followers as they accounted for more Israeli casualties.223
Along with the political
discontent, the second intifadah also led to Israel’s construction of a barrier that extends into
occupied Palestinian territory, isolating villages and towns in the West Bank from the outside world.
This has caused devastating effects to the economy and job market surrounding the Palestinian
people and refugees.224
The ideological influence of non-state-actors (NSAs), such as Hamas must not be underestimated in
the discussion of this polarized issue. Due to the cultural and governmental adherence to
fundamentalist Islamic and Judaic principles practiced by both states involved, theocratic
mechanisms and institutions of thought have always played a large role in the overall political
conflict.225
This committee must recognize the immense influence these groups hold over the
population, as their actions and policies play a crucial role in the sentiments reflected by the
dispersed refugee population. Their actions not only affect the beliefs of refugees, but also influence
the way in which receiving states perceive the political and cultural actions of the Palestinian people.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
218 Glenn E Robinson. "Palestine Liberation Organization."
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
224 Kiyo Akasaka, The Question of Palestine and the United Nations.
225 Ibid.
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This often results in adverse policies towards refugee treatment, leading to limited access to the host
country’s job market and lack of political legitimacy under the law.
Although the violence subsided by the end of 2005, the conditions causing the conflict worsened.
Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank continued and the refugees were marginalized as tight
controls were placed on the movement of Palestinian goods and people, stunting economic growth.
The peace negotiations ended and many Palestinians now turned to Hamas, which won the
legislative election in 2006.226
The development of these liberation groups reflects a very pivotal
aspect of Palestinian culture and politics. Based solely on the actions of non-state actors, the
Palestinian people formed groups that created political movements and greatly altered inter-country
relations in the Middle East.227
While some failed, it is important for delegates to note the political
motives behind the actions of the PLO and other, more radical independence groups, as they greatly
affect Middle Eastern politics and the refugee situation as a whole.
The United Nation’s Attempt to Assist Palestinian Refugees
Throughout the progression of this issue, the UN has been a key political actor. Understanding the
intentions behind the specifics of the Partition Plan is crucial to fully understanding the international
community’s general stance on the issue. While the plan attempts to solve the conflict through
peaceful territorial mediation, it was more importantly the beginning stages of the two-state solution.
This term is widely referred to by Western political actors as the proper means of mediation.
However, this term is often used as a figurehead, meaning the specific boundaries of these two
states have yet to be successfully discussed with any of the involved parties.228
As the failure of the
Partition Plan illustrates, a two-state solution is at a gridlock, as Israeli aggression continues to
increase and the Palestinians continue to oppose any territorial separation. Delegates should take
note of the specific terms laid out through the Partition Plan and use this failure to determine
solutions that utilizes different and more effective means of political mediation while also focusing
addressing the needs of Palestinian refugees. It will only be through some degree of mediation that
assistance programs for refugees will be effective.
As the first Arab-Israeli War caused over 750,000 Palestinians to be displaced and become refugees,
the UN felt it was necessary to address the humanitarian issue. At its third regular session, on 11
December 1948, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 194.229
This resolution declared that the
refugees had two options: return to their homes and live at peace with the Israeli neighbors or
receive compensation for their property and land of those choosing not to return to their native
land.230
While this compensation was a good idea in theory, the resolution saw little action. The lack
of coordinated response from the UN rendered one of the only methods of legal assistance to
Palestine refugees ineffective.
226 Glenn E Robinson. "Palestine Liberation Organization."
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
229 A/RES/194, “Palestine—Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator,” 11 December 1948,
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C758572B78D1CD0085256BCF0077E51A.
230 Ibid.
