NHSMUN 2016 African Union

COMBATTING BOKO HARAM
AU
GIRLS’ SECONDARY EDUCATION
IN AFRICA
BACKGROUND GUIDE
African Union
IMUNAInternational Model United Nations Association
Prepared by the International Model United Nations Association (IMUNA)
National High School Model United Nations (NHSMUN)
© IMUNA, 2015. All Rights Reserved

Costanza Cicero
Secretary-General
University of Bologna
Shaan Pattni
Director-General
Pennsylvania State University
Jinny Jung
Conference Director
University of Michigan
Zach Hauser
Director of Security
Pomona College
Maunica Malladi
Chief of External Relations
University of Alabama
Jennifer Padilla
Chief of Staff
University of Southern California
Kevin Burchill
Chief of Administrative Affairs
George Washington University
Nicholas Rigler
Under-Secretary-General
University of Washington
Elettra Di Massa
City University London
Joy Cui
University of Pittsburgh
Meghan Agostinelli
Georgetown University
Nika Arzoumanian
New York University
Elliot Weiss
Brown University
NHSMUN is a project of the
International Model United Nations
Association, Incorporated (IMUNA).
IMUNA, a not-for-profit, all volunteer
organization, is dedicated to furthering
global issues education at the secondary
school level.
NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS
2 March 2016 – 5 March 2016
Dear Delegates,
Welcome to Regional Bodies of NHSMUN 2016! My name is Nika Arzoumanian, and I am
the Under-Secretary-General of Regional Bodies. I have previously served as the Assistant
Director for the Council of the European Union (2014) and the Director of the Historic
Security Council (2015), making this my third year on NHSMUN staff. My staff experiences
have thus far been extremely rewarding and full of incredible delegates and engaged debate. I
look forward to making this year’s committees just as brilliant!
I was an active member of my high school Model UN team; training younger team members
and guiding them through their conference experiences made me realize how much I enjoyed
bringing the positive experience of NHSMUN to others. Fortunately, I get to continue doing
that through my work at NHSMUN 2016. Currently I am a junior at New York University
majoring in Political History. Outside of academics, I am the Executive Web Editor of the
NYU Journal of Politics and International Affairs and apart of several local service
organizations including the National Organization for Women’s New York City branch. In my
free time, I love trying new foods, yoga, playing card games (and winning), and being an
unabashed bookworm.
Regional Bodies (RBO) provides a unique experience within the NHSMUN framework for
delegates to understand the distinct conflicts facing specific areas of the world today. Reduced
gridlock and often-similar state goals offer RBO delegates an opportunity to craft
comprehensive solutions that are cohesive. Our topics represent a variety of international
issues—from the political crisis of ISIL in the Arab world or of cyberterrorism in Europe, to
the economic challenge of mitigating income inequality in Asia, to the culturally and socially
charged issues of girls attending secondary school in Africa, or preserving indigenous rights in
the Americas. Regardless of topic, RBO delegates will be challenged to approach these issues
with a fresh and critical eye.
NHSMUN staff puts countless hours into preparing for this conference and making it a
positive experience for those who attend. Your Directors spent a large portion of their
summers working on the Background Guides that will support your research, and your
Assistant Directors have worked very hard to gain a deep understanding of your topics as well.
Please do not hesitate to reach out to your dais pairs or myself; they are excited to get to know
you! I am looking forward to seeing you working with them during the conference.
Until then, good luck with your research and preparation! If you have any questions, please do
not hesitate to contact me!
Best Regards,
Nika Arzoumanian
Under-Secretary-General, Regional Bodies
regional.nhsmun@imuna.org

Costanza Cicero
Secretary-General
University of Bologna
Shaan Pattni
Director-General
Pennsylvania State University
Jinny Jung
Conference Director
University of Michigan
Zach Hauser
Director of Security
Pomona College
Maunica Malladi
Chief of External Relations
University of Alabama
Jennifer Padilla
Chief of Staff
University of Southern California
Kevin Burchill
Chief of Administrative Affairs
George Washington University
Nicholas Rigler
University of Washington
Elettra Di Massa
City University London
Joy Cui
University of Pittsburgh
Meghan Agostinelli
Georgetown University
Nika Arzoumanian
New York University
Elliot Weiss
Brown University
NHSMUN is a project of the
International Model United Nations
Association, Incorporated (IMUNA).
IMUNA, a not-for-profit, all volunteer
organization, is dedicated to furthering
global issues education at the secondary
school level.
NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS
2 March 2016 – 5 March 2016
Dear Delegates,
Let me begin by saying that I could not be more excited to welcome you to NHSMUN 2016!
My name is Eric Beeler, and I am Director for the African Union (AU). This will be fifth year
at NHSMUN and my second year on staff. Last year, I served as the Assistant Director of the
African Union, and so I look forward to continuing the incredible work of last year’s delegates.
After graduating from high school, I took a gap year to pursue Chinese language studies at
Changzhou Senior High School in Jiangsu, China. Currently, I am a sophomore at the George
Washington University, majoring in International Affairs with a concentration in International
Economics and a minor in Chinese. I participate on the Model United Nations team and sit on
the executive board of the International Affairs Society. Additionally, I’m involved in Student
Government as a representative of the Elliott School of International Affairs. If you do not
catch me debating in these capacities, you might find me working as a Chinese tutor at the
GW Language Center or enjoying my favorite pastime: Netflix, a bag of popcorn, and a cold
Coca-Cola.
I am so excited to work with you to find comprehensive solutions to the topics of Combatting
Boko Haram and Girls’ Secondary Education in Africa. These topics are not only important to
the member-states of the African Union, but also affect other countries outside of the African
continent. For example, the influence of Boko Haram has been expanding far beyond
Northern Africa in recent years, even to the extent of swearing allegiance to the Al-Qaeda
terrorist organization. Through a nuanced and dedicated approach to these two topics, this
session of the African Union will have the opportunity to make a lasting impact on world
affairs.
As your Dais, my Assistant Director and I are eager to meet each and every one of you. Please
do not hesitate to approach me with any questions, whether they relate to the specific topics
or anything else. I encourage all NHSMUN delegates to take this incredible opportunity in
March to develop a new understanding of world issues and create new friendships! As we
approach the conference, be sure to follow our Twitter account @NHSMUN_AU for
updates!
Sincerely,
Eric Beeler 
Director, African Union
@NHSMUN_AU
au.nhsmun@imuna.org

NHSMUN 2016
AU
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A Note on the NHSMUN Difference.................................................................................................... 1
A Note on Research and Preparation ....................................................................................................3
Committee History ................................................................................................................................4
Simulation..............................................................................................................................................7
Topic A: Combatting Boko Haram .......................................................................................................9
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................................9
History and Description of the Issue........................................................................................................................10
Current Status ...............................................................................................................................................................18
Bloc Analysis.................................................................................................................................................................22
Committee Mission......................................................................................................................................................24
Topic B: Girls’ Secondary Education in Africa ................................................................................... 26
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................26
History and Description of the Issue........................................................................................................................27
Current Status ...............................................................................................................................................................32
Bloc Analysis.................................................................................................................................................................35
Committee Mission......................................................................................................................................................38
Appendix A: Nigeria and Cameroon Border Map............................................................................... 40
Research and Preparation Questions ...................................................................................................41
Topic A..........................................................................................................................................................................41
Topic B...........................................................................................................................................................................41
Important Documents ......................................................................................................................... 42
Topic A..........................................................................................................................................................................42
Topic B...........................................................................................................................................................................42
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 43
Committee History and Simulation...........................................................................................................................43
Topic A..........................................................................................................................................................................43
Topic B...........................................................................................................................................................................48

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A NOTE ON THE NHSMUN DIFFERENCE
Esteemed Faculty and Delegates,
Hello and welcome to NHSMUN 2016! My name is Shaan Pattni, and I am this year’s Director-
General. I hope you are as thrilled as I am about the NHSMUN conference this year! Our staff has
been working tremendously hard all year to ensure that you have an engaging, educational, and
enriching experience in committee. NHSMUN strives to assure that the quality of our debate and in-
committee interaction is unmatched. NHSMUN focuses on the educational value of Model UN. We
believe that the experiences in our committee rooms extend skills originally developed in the
classroom, and prepare students to become future leaders. NHSMUN thrives on well-researched,
realistic, and diplomatic debate. We are very proud of the substantive program for NHSMUN 2016
and look forward to the vibrant discussion and cooperation in committee!
NHSMUN Practices
In order to fulfill our mission, our conference has adopted practices that are key to the continued
tradition of excellence in our committees and the NHSMUN difference.
NHSMUN prohibits the usage of personal electronics during committee in order to ensure that
delegates do not gain an unfair advantage in debate. We feel strongly that the interpersonal
connections made during debate are enhanced by face-to-face communication. Enforcing a strict no
laptops policy also helps us to ensure that all our delegates have an equal opportunity to succeed in
committee.
The Dais is permitted a laptop for the purposes of communicating with respective Under-Secretary-
Generals and other Senior Staff Members as well as attending to administrative needs. The Dais will
only be limited to using their laptops for NHSMUN purposes, and the majority of their focus will be
on the needs of the committee. In addition, we staff a dedicated team in our office to assist in typing
and formatting draft resolutions and working papers so that committee time can be focused on
discussion and compromise.
An additional difference that delegates may notice about NHSMUN is the committee pacing. While
each BG contains two topic selections, NHSMUN committees will strive to have a fruitful
discussion on and produce resolutions on a single topic; prioritizing the quality of discussion over
quantity of topics addressed. In order to respect the gravity of the issues being discussed at our
conference as well as the intellect of our delegates, NHSMUN committees will focus on addressing
one topic in-depth. BGs contain two topics in order to allow delegates to decide what problem
ought to be prioritized, a valuable discussion in and of itself, and to safeguard against the possibility
that an issue will be independently resolved before conference.
NHSMUN uses a set of the Rules of Procedure that is standardized across all IMUNA-brand
conferences. These rules provide a standardized system of operation that is easily translated across
committee or conference lines. While the general structure and flow of committee will be familiar to
any delegate who has previously participated in Model UN, there may be slight procedural
differences from other conferences. All delegates are encouraged to review the Rules of Procedure

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before attending the conference in the Delegate Preparation Guide and are welcome to direct
questions to any member of NHSMUN Staff.
While NHSMUN does distribute awards, we feel that it is crucial to de-emphasize their importance
in comparison to the educational value of Model UN as an activity. NHSMUN seeks to reward
delegations that excel in the arts of compromise and diplomacy. We always prioritize a dedication to
teamwork over solitary achievement. Directors will judge delegates on their ability and willingness to
cooperate with their peers while always maintaining an accurate representation of country policy.
At the core of the NHSMUN philosophy is an emphasis on education and compromise. As such,
we do not distribute awards to individual delegates, with the exception of committees where
students represent their own separate delegation (ICJ and UNSC, for example). Instead, awards will
be distributed to delegations that exhibit excellence across all committees. The awards system is
standardized so as to give equal weight to delegations of all sizes. Awards will also be offered for
schools that demonstrate excellence in research and preparation based on the position papers
submitted by their delegates. Detailed information on the determination of awards at NHSMUN will
be available in the Faculty Preparation Guide and online in November.
As always, I welcome any questions or concerns about the substantive program at NHSMUN 2016
and would be happy to discuss NHSMUN pedagogy with faculty or delegates. It is my sincerest
hope that your experience at NHSMUN 2016 will be challenging and thought provoking.
Best,
Shaan Pattni
Director-General, NHSMUN 2016
dg.nhsmun@imuna.org

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A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION
Delegate preparation is paramount to a successful and exciting National High School Model United
Nations 2016 Conference. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that
will be discussed in your committee. These papers are designed to give you a description of the
topics and the committee. This Guide is not intended to represent exhaustive research on every
facet of the topics. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully explore the topics and be able to
identify and analyze the intricacies of the issues. Delegates must be prepared to intelligently utilize
their knowledge and apply it to their own country’s policy. You will find that your state has a unique
position on the topics that cannot be substituted by the opinions of another state.
The task of preparing and researching for the conference is challenging, but it can be interesting and
rewarding. We have provided each school with a copy of the Delegation Preparation Guide. The
Guide contains detailed instructions on how to write a position paper and how to effectively
participate in committee sessions. The Guide also gives a synopsis of the types of research materials
and resources available to you and where they can be found.
An essential part of representing a state in an international body is the ability to articulate that state’s
views in writing. Accordingly, it is the policy of NHSMUN to require each delegate (or double-
delegation team) to write position papers. The position papers should clearly outline the country’s
policies on the topic areas to be discussed and what factors contribute to these policies. In addition,
each paper must address the Research and Preparation questions at the end of the committee
Background Guide. Most importantly, the paper must be written from the point of view of the
country you are representing at NHSMUN 2016 and should articulate the policies you will
espouse at the conference. All papers should be typed and double-spaced. The papers will be read by
the director of each committee and returned at the start of the conference with brief comments and
constructive advice.
Each delegation is responsible for sending a copy of their papers to the committee directors via our
online upload process on or before January 22, 2016. Complete instructions for online submissions
may be found in the Delegate Preparation Guide. If delegations are unable to submit an online
version of their position papers, they should contact the Director-General (dg.nhsmun@imuna.org)
as soon as possible to find an alternative form of submission.
Delegations that do not submit position papers to directors or summary statements to the
Director-General will be ineligible for awards.

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COMMITTEE HISTORY
Prior to the formation of the African Union (AU), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and
the African Economic Community (AEC) were working in conjunction to build a better Africa. The
OAU Charter was adopted on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with 32 signatory
governments, its first two official members being South Africa and Libya.1
Following its
establishment, the OAU gained 21 more member states, resulting in 53 members total.2
But it soon
became evident that the OAU was not adequately able to manage all the challenges of a continent in
transformation. There was a growing realization of the need for greater efficiency and effectiveness
by the OAU, which was largely divided between the independent countries and those that were still
dependent on France. There was also a further split in ideology between support for the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the Cold War. The leader of
Ghana at the time, Kwame Nkrumah, was the predominant voice of socialist philosophy, while Felix
Boigny of the Ivory Coast led the pro-capitalist faction. These divisions ultimately made it difficult
for the OAU to take unified action on internal conflicts.3
Thus, the Abuja Treaty establishing the AEC was adopted on 3 June 1991 and entered into force on
12 May 1994.4
Because the OAU was primarily concerned with the continent’s political matters,
economic and developmental issues were left unaddressed until the formation of the AEC, sought
to foster the economic, social, and cultural integration of Africa. Ultimately, however, despite the
efforts of its Charter Review Committee, the OAU was unable to transform itself sufficiently to
effectively address the issues of Africa as the continent approached the new millennium.
Consequently, an OAU/AEC summit held in Sirte, Libya in September 1999 called for the
establishment of a new regional body, the AU.5
The OAU was officially disbanded in 2002 and
immediately replaced by the AU.6
The formation of the AU finally allowed for the regional conflicts
of member states to be overseen and dealt with by a body empowered to address these concerns.
Members
The AU assumed all 53 members of the OAU, and covers the entirety of the African continent with
the exception of Morocco who withdrew its membership in May of 1982.7
Morocco withdrew
membership over the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in the AU in
1982.8
This was due to a civil conflict between SADR and Morocco concerning the ownership of the
Western Sahara territory. Morocco refuses to become a member unless SADR withdraws
1 “Organization of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU),” International Relations & Cooperation, last modified 12 Feb.
2014, http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm.
2 Ibid.
3 “Organisation of African Unity,” South African History, last modified May 2009,
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/organisation-african-unity-oau.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 “Transition From the OAU to the African Union,” African Union Summit, last modified May 2002,
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm.
8 Ibid.

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membership. The Central African Republic was suspended from the AU after rebels seized power of
the country and Egypt was temporarily suspended after the rebel leader Al-Sissi ousted President
Mohammed Morsi in 2013. Guinea Bissau also temporarily lost membership in 2012 due to rebel-
takeover. South Sudan, which seceded from Sudan on 9 July 2011, was the last country to join the
AU on 27 August 2011 and makes up its 54th
member state.9
As of October 2014, Central African
Republic is the only member state, which is still currently under suspension from the Union.
Mandate
The Assembly is the AU’s primary decision-making body, meeting at least once a year and adopting
decisions by two-third majority vote.10
The powers established in the OAU Charter were translated
into the AU Constitutive Act Article 9 during the transition period.11
The AU has many specific,
smaller goals that support its primary vision: “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven
by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena.”12
The AU is the world’s only
regional or international organization that explicitly recognizes the right to intervene in a member
state on humanitarian and human rights grounds. The AU drew this guideline among with many
others based on the recommendations of a 2001 report from the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty titled The Responsibility to Protect. The report asserts that “sovereign
states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from unavoidable catastrophe-from mass
murder and rape, from starvation-but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that
responsibility must be borne by the broader community states.”13
However, the Assembly of the AU
is only able to decide on intervention in or sanctions against Member States according to specific
circumstances provided for in the AU Constitutive Act. The AU has displayed this commitment to
peacekeeping with its involvement in the AU/UN joint peacekeeping force in Darfur since 2003
when it helped mediate a cease-fire between the government of Sudan and rebel groups.14
The AU
has also had semi-successful peacekeeping interventions in Burundi and Uganda. Given the AUs
limited experience with peacekeeping on the continent relative to other UN bodies, the Assembly
requires extensive political and material support from the international community to deliver on its
own regional commitments to peace and security.
The Commission of the AU is the Secretariat entrusted with executive functions. The Commission
accompanies the Assembly as a key organ that plays a central role in managing the AU, it is guided
by principles to ensure it acts transparently and accountably. Assembly members elect a Chairperson
each year that holds office for a one-year term.15
The Commission in its entirety consists of the
Chairperson, deputy Chairperson, nine Commissioners, and staff members.16
In concurrence with
other, smaller organs, the Commission drafts and prepares strategic plans for the Executive Council,
designed to prepare Assembly sessions and make decisions on policies in areas of common interest
9 Ibid.
10 “The African Union,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified 1 Sept. 2009, http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-
saharan/african-union/p11616.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 “Organization of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU),” International Relations & Cooperation, last modified 12
Feb. 2014, http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm.
16 Ibid.

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to the member states. The Commission involves eight common subdivisions, including: peace and
security, political affairs, infrastructure and energy, social affairs, human resources – science and
technology, trade and industry, rural economy and agriculture, and economic affairs.17
With all of its
internal bodies and subdivisions, the AU is concerned with all prevalent matters of the continent
that hinder its welfare.
Present Projects
In July 2001 the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was adopted by Algeria,
Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa. NEPAD’s primary objectives are property eradication,
sustainable development, and integrating Africa into the global economy.18
It focuses on establishing
partnerships with industrial countries for increased aid, foreign investment, and market access. In
2002, NEPAD was placed under the purview of the AU.19
In March of 2007, NEPAD leaders
decided the partnership should be integrated into the regular structures and processes of the AU.20
The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) was formed in 2004.21
This body has the ability to
intervene in conflicts to protect the security of the continent. It has fifteen member states, elected
for two or three terms, with equal voting rights.22
The PSC also oversees the establishment of a
permanent African security force, the AU Standby Force (AUSF). The AUSF Headquarters are
currently in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It had planned to have five or six brigades of 3,000 to 5,000
troops stationed around Africa by 2010. The goals for 2010 were not fully met and have therefore
been extended until 2015 when the AUSF hopes to reach Full Operational Capability (FOC).23
The AU is also aiming to eliminate all remaining civil conflicts within the continent that have
continued to hinder achieving the AU’s goals. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo has concerned many of its bordering states, particularly over the unremitting battle for
control of its basic natural resources including valuable rich minerals. This conflict is also similar to
that between SADR and Morocco, who invaded and occupied Western Sahara in 1976 through the
present.24
Talks between Morocco and SADR resumed in 2008 for the possibility of integrated rule
of the West Sahara but no progress was made in this effort to compromise.
17 Ibid.
18 “The African Union,” Council On Foreign Relations, last modified 1 Sep. 2009, http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-
saharan/african-union/p11616.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 “AU In A Nutshell,” African Union, last modified June 2014, http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell.

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SIMULATION
Simulation of the African Union (AU) Assembly will be carried out primarily in accordance with the
standard NHSMUN Rules of Procedure. One notable difference is that the AU is a regional body,
meaning that membership is limited to countries geographically located in Africa. This is different
from most other NHSMUN committees, which are specialized to deal with a certain type of topic
and grant membership based on a variety of factors other than location. Delegates should also
remember that the AU is the only international organization that explicitly recognizes the right for
one member state to intervene in another for the purpose of protecting the latter’s civilians and
human rights. As unlawful crimes and practices are commonly witnessed in Africa, it is considered
the duty of each member state to ensure that its neighboring countries are indeed aiming to fulfill
the objectives of the AU. However, delegates should also be aware that the Assembly of the AU is
only able to authorize intervention in or sanctions against Member States according to specific
circumstances provided for in the AU Constitutive Act. In accordance with the Constitutive Act and
with a two-thirds majority vote, the AU has the authority to impose economic and political
sanctions, authorize military interventions, and take initiatives and action it deems appropriate to
ensure the well-being of Africa. Each Member State should emphasize diplomacy with bordering
countries, as the prosperity of this continent is dependent on communal aid and support.
Both topics included in the background guide are prevalent, current-day issues that the continent of
Africa has been trying to overcome for years. Each delegation should thoroughly consider its
position within each topic prior to entering committee, because it is not likely both topics will be
discussed during the conference. Upon the first committee session, delegates will debate setting the
agenda and vote to determine which topic the committee will discuss first. The expectation is that
the chosen topic will be discussed comprehensively in all of its aspects.
As the conference progresses, debate should focus in on dealing with the nuances of the topic.
Debate will start off with the Speakers’ List and then quickly move to other forms of caucusing
including moderated and unmoderated caucuses. The Speakers’ List and moderated caucus are
considered to be “formal” debate, which entails speaking to the rest of the committee on a position
with a set time limit. When delegates are recognized to speak, they should state their country and
concretely discuss their country’s position in the allotted time period. In contrast, informal debate is
conducted through unmoderated caucuses, which are commonly used to discuss country positions
in a more unstructured manner that does not require permission from the Dais to speak. As formal
debate gives each delegation the opportunity to share their position with the rest of committee, it is
generally most effective to spend the majority of each committee session in formal debate.
During the first committee session, delegates will be introduced to the two members of the Dais: the
Director and the Assistant Director. The Dais will ultimately serve as the moderators of debate
during each committee session. Both members of the Dais are experts on the committee topics and
thus should be used as a resource for any and all questions regarding the AU, topics, and rules of
procedure.

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As chair of the committee, the Dais maintains the right to temporarily suspend the rules if necessary
and ensure that decorum is kept. When the committee is in formal debate or voting procedures,
delegates should be especially respectful to the current speaker and remain silent unless recognized
by the Dais to speak. The Dais will be mindful of each country’s membership in the committee and
their right to speak, and will recognize all those wishing to participate in formal debate.
Since all member states of the AU geographically share land, resources, and in some cases militaries,
it is essential to be considerate of other states as potential resources and allies. The main objective of
the AU is broad: to unite the continent in all aspects to ensure a better future for all Africans. For
this reason, it is imperative that delegates remember to remain diplomatic at all times and stay true to
their country’s foreign policy. Delegates should not deviate from their country’s stance on an issue,
as they are there to represent their state’s government. The AU’s goal over the course of the
conference is for all member states to join in creating a comprehensive and realistic resolution that
will put the AU one step closer to addressing the continuing problems that hinder the full
development of the region, both as a whole and as its individual member states.

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TOPIC A: COMBATTING BOKO HARAM
INTRODUCTION
Violent extremism has become a persistent threat on the African continent, from the shocking 2013
Nairobi Westgate Mall attack by Boko Haram and multiple assaults on Kenya’s coastal region by al-
Shabaab, to the kidnapping of over 200 Chibok schoolgirls and a slew of bombings in Nigeria by
Boko Haram in 2014.25
These instances of violence undermine the region’s prospects for economic
growth, slow or even halt investment, jeopardize the welfare of its citizens, contribute to famine, and
destabilize governments and public institutions. In July 2014, Central Bank of Nigeria Deputy
Governor Kinsley Moghalu explained that “the security situation has affected farmland production
and that has led to [an] increase in food prices for some of the poorest [Nigerian] communities.”26
In
northern Nigeria, the agricultural sector has become a prime target for militants in need of supplies
– farmers live in fear while grazing animals. Furthermore, transportation of agricultural goods has
become riskier and therefore more expensive, and many local workers have fled to the south,
causing a labor shortage in the region.
On 23 May 2014, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) released a communiqué
that officially designated the extremist group known as Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, and
noted that the activities of Boko Haram “pose a serious threat not only to Nigeria but also to the
region and the continent as a whole.”27
Over the past decade, Boko Haram has developed from a
local Salafi-Jihadi group – defined as a transnational religious-political ideology based on a belief in
violent religious warfare and the fundamentalist religious movement of returning to “true” Islam –
into one of the most prominent African extremist groups.28
Its terrorism tactics vary from guerilla-
like attacks against state militaries, national governments, and Christian populations to sophisticated
suicide attacks and mass murders of target population groups. In one such example of these guerilla-
like attacks in early June 2014, Boko Haram militants in the Borno state of northeastern-Nigeria
disguised themselves as soldiers and opened fire on a church compound, killing more than twenty
civilians.29
25 Jideofor Adibe and Julie Biau, "Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2015," Africa Growth Initiative at the
Brookings Institute, No. 1 (Jan. 2015): 1-2,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/01/foresight-africa/foresight-africa-full-report-
FINAL.pdf?la=en.
26 Kathleen Caulderwood, “Boko Haram And Nigeria's Economy: Why The Poorest Suffer Most,” International Business
Times, 31 July 2014, accessed 4 Aug. 2015, www.ibtimes.com/boko-haram-nigerias-economy-why-poorest-suffer-most-
1645190.
27 PSC/PR/COMM/2, (CDXXXVI), “Terrorist Activities of Boko Haram,” 23 May 2014, accessed 4 Aug. 2015,
https://www.issafrica.org/pscreport/uploads/psc.436.press-statement-terrorism.-nigeria.-23.05.2014.pdf.
28 Assaf Moghadam, “Defining and Confronting the Salafi-Jihad,” John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies of Harvard
University, last Modified 16 Feb. 2008, www.blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/02/defining-and-confronting-the-salafi-
jihad.
29 Lanre Ola, “Nigerian Islamists Attack Villages, Churches Near Chibok, Dozens Killed,” Reuters, 29 June 2014,
accessed 4 Aug 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/29/us-nigeria-violence-idUSKBN0F40IL20140629.

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In Nigeria alone, Boko Haram has engaged in war with the country’s police and army, raided and
kidnapped children from schools, and displaced millions of ordinary citizens. Accounting for the
death of more than 10,000 Nigerians and the displacement of nearly 1.5 million African civilians,
Boko Haram’s brutal extremist campaign has wreaked havoc on Northern Africa.30
With the
Nigerian government struggling to quell forward expansion by Boko Haram, violence has flooded
into the neighboring countries of Chad, Cameroon, and Niger.31
As such, aggressive
counterterrorism efforts by the African Union are crucial to the sustainable development of a
peaceful and financially sound African continent, as terrorist activities by Boko Haram directly
inhibit social development and economic growth in the communities in which they inhabit.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE
Religious Conflict
Religion is often the spark for disputes and armed conflict throughout the world, especially in
Africa. Since Arab expansion in the eighth century and European expansion in the fifteenth century,
Africans have almost completely converted from their indigenous and traditional religions to
Christianity and Islam. Today, the Republic of Togo remains the only country in the region where
traditional African religions constitute a majority of the population. Although conflicts are often
caused by a variety of other factors, such as ethnicity and race, religion is at the heart of many of the
current and recent atrocities on the continent.
In Nigeria, the populations of Christians and Muslims are nearly equal in number. The northern
Nigerian people primarily practice Islam, while the south is home to followers of traditional religions
and Christianity.32
In 1999, religious conflict threatened to upset a short-lived period of stability
throughout the country. When the establishment of Sharia law occurred in several Muslim-majority
northern states, despite the secular constitution of Nigeria, the Christian community largely
disapproved. From 2000 onward, occasional riots between Christian and Muslim populations have
resulted in thousands of deaths.33
Since the Islamist extremist group Boko Haram began an armed
rebellion against the secular government in early 2009, religious conflict throughout the country has
spiraled into a more violent phase.34
Religious conflict is prevalent throughout the African continent and is not limited to the Nigerian
borders. For example, the recent independence of South Sudan has brought attention to the
rampant religious and political conflict in the Sudanese region. Since the Republic of Sudan declared
independence in 1956, only about ten out of the 59 years following have been truly peaceful.35
These
six decades have been filled with the violence and bloodshed of two civil wars.36 Similar to the
30 Tony Johnson and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 10 July 2015,
www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.

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situation in Nigeria, the majority of Muslims in Sudan are Sunni; Sunnis are densely concentrated in
the northern region of the country, while Christians dominate the south.37
In 1947, despite religious and cultural differences, the British and Arab Egyptian colonizers decided
to make Sudan one country.38
This led to the first civil war, which extended from 1955 to 1972 and
claimed the lives of 500,000 people, of whom only one in five was considered an armed combatant.39
Hundreds of thousands more were forced to leave their homes.40
Between 1983 and 2005, a second
civil war between the North and South erupted, and nearly two million lives were lost to bloodshed,
famine, and disease.41
Four million people in Southern Sudan were displaced.42
The war in Darfur
began in 2003, when rebels took up arms, accusing the government of unfair practices in the region.
The United Nations (UN) estimates that as many as 300,000 people may have died.43
Then on 9 July
2011, South Sudan declared independence.44
Although religion is a major factor in the Sudanese
conflicts, it is not the only one. Many analysts have described the wars in the oil-rich country as a
fight over resources, which explains the influence that natural resources and land have on terrorist
activities throughout the world.
Religious conflict is hardly limited to the situation in the two examples above, Nigeria and Sudan:
rather, it is a contributing factor to conflict throughout the entire African continent. Other
prominent examples of countries where religious conflict still permeates throughout the country
include the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Republic of the Congo, and Uganda.
However, it is of vital importance to note that religion cannot be perceived as the only contributing
factor to conflict throughout the region, but that the scarcity of land, resources, and political
uncertainty all contribute to the nurturing of conflict as well. Delegates should remember that Boko
Haram is a complex extremist organization with an extensive network of goals and tactics that will
require a comprehensive solution to address.
Origins of Boko Haram
The radical group now known as Boko Haram began to emerge in early 2002, when a coalition of
like-minded Islamist extremists retreated to Madiguri, a mainly Muslim city in northeastern Nigeria,
to establish a separatist community based upon strict Islamic principles.45
At that time, the group
was known as Jama'atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da'awati wal-Jihad, which translates to “western education is
37 Tjaart Barnard, "The Role of Religion in African Conflict: The Cases of Nigeria and Sudan," Stellenbosch University, No.
1 (March 2014): 7,
http://www.academia.edu/715044/THE_ROLE_OF_RELIGION_IN_AFRICAN_CONFLICTS_THE_CASES_OF
_NIGERIA_AND_SUDAN.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Matthias Basedau and Johannes Vüllers, "Religion and Armed Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990 to 2008," German
Institute of Global and Area Studies, No. 1 (Sep 2010): 12, accessed 11 July 2015, http://www.eisa-net.org/be-
bruga/eisa/files/events/stockholm/Basedau-Vuellers_Religion-Conflict-Africa_100819.pdf.
44 Ibid.
45 Mike Smith, "Explaining Nigeria’s Boko Haram and Its Violent Insurgency," Africa Check, 24 March 2014, accessed 12
July 2015, www.africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-explaining-nigerias-boko-haram-and-its-violent-insurgency/.

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forbidden.”46 The group’s leader was a young, Islamic preacher named Muhammed Yusuf; he held a
strict fundamentalist interpretation of the Quran and claimed that the British colonial creation of
Nigeria had imposed a Western, un-Islamic way of life on Nigerian Muslims.47
Yusuf argued that the
modern Nigerian lifestyle strayed too far from the traditional Islamic way of life.48 He advocated for
a pure, simple Islamic lifestyle and constructed a mosque for the group, then known as Jama'atu Ahl
as-Sunnah li-Da'awati wal-Jihad (“Group of the Sunni People for the Calling and Jihad”) on land
owned by his father-in-law.49
The mosque quickly became a place of refuge for Nigerian Muslims
who wished to adhere to a traditionalist interpretation of the Quran.50 As such, the group remained
relatively calm, focusing on recruiting new members and gathering resources.51 Although occasional
clashes with the police occurred during this time, they were short-lived and never evolved into an
organized armed struggle against Nigerian authorities.52
Relative to the present, the early stages of Boko Haram’s development were comparatively calm.
From early 2002 to mid-2009, Boko Haram’s extremist activities were primarily run through
underground networks of terrorist cells operating between the Cameroonian and Nigerian borders.53
Many international scholars argue that prior to 2009, Boko Haram had little intentions of seeking to
violently overthrow the Nigerian government.54
In order to build grassroots support for their cause,
the organization focused on consolidating its power in the primarily Muslim northern region of
Nigeria, spreading its propaganda against Western education through the creation of alternative
fundamentalist schools, and attacking symbols of government authority.55 Despite, this relatively
calm period, clashes between Muslims and Christians encouraged the group to radicalize and seek
recruits from the largely impoverished northern Nigeria.56
After several attacks against Maiduguri’s city police forces, the Nigerian authorities retaliated against
Boko Haram on 26 July 2009 in a massive crackdown on Boko Haram’s activities, known as
Operation Flush II.57
In a violent campaign that stretched over a week in length, the Nigerian
authorities met opposition by Boko Haram militants in the northern Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe,
Bauchi, and Kano. Although Nigerian forces eventually quelled protests, the weeklong campaign
claimed the lives of over 800 people, including over 300 Boko Haram militants and 30 local police
officers.58
On 30 July 2009, Boko Haram leader Muhammed Yusuf was captured and publicly
executed at the police state headquarters in Maiduguri.59
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Sharon Bean, Andrew McGregor and Jacob Zenn, "Boko Haram: A Militant Leadership Monitor Special Report," The
Jamestown Foundation, No. 1 (Jan 2012): 3, http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/pics/MLM_Special_Report_-
_Boko_Haram_Cover.pdf.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Alejandro Castro-Reina et al., "Boko Haram Recent Attacks," University of Maryland, last modified May 2014,
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.

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In the aftermath of Operation Flush II, the extremist group vowed to avenge their leader and
reportedly changed its tactics, which led to intensified terrorist attacks throughout Nigeria.60 Under
the leadership of Yusuf’s former deputy, Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram aggressively launched
attacks against Nigerian authorities. In 2010, only one year after Operation Flush II, members of
Boko Haram carried out an array of suicide bombings and assassinations throughout northern
Nigeria and staged a prison break in Bauchi that freed more than 700 high-profile prisoners.61
The
Bauchi prison break marked the start of a new and increasingly violent stage in the evolution of
Boko Haram, where the group’s armed operations had become more frequent and advanced in
nature. After these attacks, Boko Haram emerged as a deadly and sophisticated terrorist group in
northern Africa that continues to seriously threaten the entire region.
Before 2010, Boko Haram was merely one of many radical groups in northern Nigeria, but that has
quickly changed in recent years. Boko Haram has transitioned from a small, radical group using low-
level guerilla tactics to a sophisticated terrorist organization engaging in outright warfare.
Throughout 2010 and 2011, its terrorist activities were indiscriminately violent, characterized by
targeted assassinations of prominent Nigerian politicians, the destruction of western educational and
medical institutions, and countless confrontations with local police forces.62
During this time period,
Boko Haram also began to launch attacks of much greater scale and intensity, targeting the Christian
minority of northern Nigeria with a number of high-profile attacks on churches and prominent
religious leaders. Boko Haram’s terrorist activities between 2010 and 2012 utilized suicide bombs for
a total of eleven attacks.63
On 26 August 2011, Boko Haram launched their first aggressive offensive against the international
community by claiming responsibility for a bombing at the United Nations Headquarters in Nigeria
that killed a total of 23 people.64
The homemade bomb destroyed the lower floor of the building,
smashed almost all of its windows, and wounded 76 people.65
The bombing of the UN office in
Nigeria marked an increase in the sophistication of the organization’s attacks and an escalation from
local to international targets. International scholars have suggested that the 2011 United Nations
office bombing marked the development of Boko Haram’s global ambitions and signified the
organization’s cooperative efforts with other terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda’s North
African branch.66
If this path towards escalated conflict and strict Islamic radicalism continues in the
coming years, Boko Haram has the potential to become the most significant threat to peace and
stability in all of Africa.
60 Ibid.
61 Ioannis Mantzikos, “The Absence of the State in Northern Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram,” African Renaissance,
No. 7 (Aug 2010): 57-62, http://reference.sabinet.co.za/document/EJC10348.
62 John Davis, Terrorism In Africa: The Evolving Front in the War on Terror (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010), 18.
63 Alejandro Castro-Reina et al., "Boko Haram Recent Attacks.”
64 Senan Murray and Adam Nossiter, “Suicide Bomber Attacks U.N. Building in Nigeria,” The New York Times, last
modified 26 April 2011, accessed 12 July 2015, www.nytimes.com/2011/08/27/world/africa/27nigeria.html.
65 Ibid.
66 Ely Karmon, “Boko Haram’s International Reach,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol 8 No. 1 (May 2014): 4-8,
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/326.

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Case Study: Nigeria
With Africa’s largest economy and most populous country, Nigeria has more than 174 million
people, consists of nearly 350 different ethnic groups, and has a total of 250 languages.67
The
country is divided between the Muslim cattle herders in the North and the Christian farmers in the
South, with only about 10% of the population belonging to indigenous African sects.68
Nigeria has
long struggled with how to govern itself, in light of a long and complicated conflict between
Christian and Muslims over political power. Particularly in the states of Kaduna, Plateau, Nasarawa,
and Benue, the central part of the country struggles with sectarian violence due to religious and
cultural collisions.69
In total, according to the Council on Foreign Relations Nigeria Security Tracker,
more than 34,000 people have been killed in Nigeria since 2011.70
Despite a per capita income of more than USD 2700 and a plethora of natural resources, Nigeria is
one of the world’s poorest countries.71
Economic disparities between Northern Nigeria and
Southern Nigeria are particularly abrupt. More than 61% of the population lives on less than USD
one per day, but dire poverty is heavily concentrated in the North.72
In the North, 72% of the
population lives in poverty, compared to a 35% poverty rate in the Niger Delta and 27% poverty
rate in the South.73
Mass poverty, social inequality, and intense religious fervor that have spawned Boko Haram reflect a
deep frustration that many Nigerians have with the Nigerian government. This environment has
facilitated the rise of various radical groups across a multitude of diverse causes and ideologies
across the country. The country’s oil-producing southeastern region is home to various militant
groups, namely the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the Niger Delta
Liberation Front.74
In 2014, one such organization from the country’s crude oil-producing Niger
Delta claimed responsibility for a series of explosions that coincided with the celebration of
Nigeria’s 50th independence anniversary on 1 October 2010.75
The Niger Delta Liberation Front has
continued to perpetuate violence in southeastern Nigeria, but are vocal regarding the situation with
Boko Haram, condemning Boko Haram as a mechanism for continued northern political control of
the country in recent years.
67 “Nigeria,” United States Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 25 July 2015.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html.
68 Ibid.
69 “Nigeria,” World Bank, last modified 2015, accessed 20 July 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria.
70 “Nigeria Security Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 20 July 2015, http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria
security-tracker/p29483.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Elisha Bala-Gbogbo, “Nigeria’s MEND Rebels Threaten Future Attack on Oil Industry” Bloomberg Business, 27 Jan
2014, accessed 7 Aug 2015, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-27/nigeria-s-mend-rebels-threaten-future-
attack-on-oil-industry.

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At the moment, Boko Haram controls an area of Nigeria roughly the size of Lithuania; however, it is
in a region that does not pose an immediate threat to the national government.76
Many of the factors
that have ignited Boko Haram’s attacks are commonly seen across Nigeria: in particular, the political
manipulation of religion, ethnicity, and disputes between supposed local groups and migrant
communities over the distribution of public resources.77
Economic issues are also at play, with deep-
seated economic and employment inequalities bringing further destabilization to Nigeria. Similar to
other parts of Nigeria, the North, where Boko Haram is most prominent, suffers from the
compounding problem of economic despair and the uncertain, community-based distribution of
public resources.
As the birthplace of the modern-day Boko Haram, Nigeria is an important country to study. It
provides lessons for the international community in building a framework to combat the extremist
organization as it expands beyond the borders of northern Nigeria. Although Boko Haram is still
primarily focused in the Nigerian region, reports have shown that it is rapidly expanding into the
borders of other countries.78
As such, only a thorough understanding the economic, political, and
social situations under which Boko Haram was conceived can the African Union begin to develop a
comprehensive action plan to address the organization.
International Ramifications
Boko Haram is an immediate threat to peace, security, and stability in the northwest and central
regions of Africa. Recent attacks beyond the borders of Nigeria have demonstrated Boko Haram’s
serious danger to Nigeria’s neighbors, as well as the ensuing impact on countries outside of this
immediate vicinity. For example, on 28 December 2015, Boko Haram fighters in Nigeria crossed the
border to the Cameroonian border town of Achigachia.79
Global intelligence analysts assert that this
might have been an attempt by Boko Haram to establish control over a significant portion of
Cameroon’s northern region, including cities such as Amchide, Makari, Waza, Mokolo, and
Guirvidig.80
Although the move failed, the initial success in Achigachia highlights the potential for
more sustained Boko Haram operations throughout the African continent.81
Through such
aggressive actions beyond the borders of Nigeria, Boko Haram’s actions align it to more established
jihad networks such as Al-Qaida and its affiliates in Africa with the potential to evolve into a much
greater threat across the continent.
Regional Violence
76 Fred Burton, “Boko Haram's Territorial Ambitions May Expand From Nigeria to Cameroon,” Stratfor Global
Intelligence, 6 Jan 2015, accessed 7 Aug 2015, www.stratfor.com/analysis/boko-harams-territorial-ambitions-may-expand-
nigeria-cameroon.
77 Richard Downie, "Inequality: Collective Insecurity in the Sahel: Fighting Terror with Good Governance," The
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, No. 16 (March 2015): 4-6, http://journal.georgetown.edu/spotlight-on-16-1-
inequality-collective-insecurity-in-the-sahel-fighting-terror-with-good-governance/.
78 Adam Nossiter, “French Family Kidnapped in Cameroon,” New York Times, 19 Feb 2013, accessed 7 Aug 2015,
www.nytimes.com/2013/02/20/world/africa/seven-members-of-french-family-kidnapped-in-cameroon.html.
79 Abdoulaye Bathily, “Central Africa: UN Envoy Urges Regional Response to Combat ‘Dangerous Cancer’ Boko
Haram” United Nations News Centre, 19 Jan 2015, accessed 25 Aug 2013,
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49837.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.

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The number of attacks Boko Haram has been able to execute in neighboring countries exemplifies
the extent of Boko Haram’s regional spread. The Komadougou Yobe River naturally divides most
of the border between Niger and Nigeria, but many people, including members of Boko Haram,
easily cross on foot through knee-high water when the river is at lower levels. In February 2012,
authorities in Niger arrested fifteen suspected Boko Haram members in the city of Diffa, Niger and
seized homemade explosives and grenades.82
Furthermore, suspected Boko Haram members were
arrested in the Zinder region of Niger in September 2012.83
In October 2012, Niger and Nigeria signed an agreement on joint border patrols, with the aim of
restricting movement of illicit arms and militants across the border.84
Nigerian nationals first began
seeking refuge in Niger in late 2013, and the increase of Boko Haram-related violence in the region
in recent years has caused the number of refugees to grow. This has led to a rapidly developing
humanitarian crisis. Niger has yet to establish refugee camps for the more than 50,000 Nigerians
who have fled the violence in Borno state.85
Furthermore, Boko Haram attacks have reached the
town of Diffa in Niger, which means that people who once hosted refugees are being displaced
themselves.86
With this growing refugee crisis and a deficiency of camps, many officials fear these
areas could become new recruitment targets for Boko Haram. While for the moment Nigeria’s
neighbors are dealing with relatively minor acts of violence; the prospect of serious regional violence
is becoming imminent. 87
Border Control
The African region confronts a wide array of threats on state borders, ranging from terrorists to
transnational criminals smuggling drugs or weapons to unauthorized migrants intending to live and
work illegally. Through heightened border control and a more unified framework throughout the
continent, the AU can work to contain the spread Boko Haram’s terrorist activities. One of the main
difficulties for Nigerian security forces patrolling the border with Cameroon is a lack of
infrastructure, allowing Boko Haram to set up strategic bases and training camps in the desert or
forested areas of the northern Nigerian-Cameroon border region. Boko Haram has consistently used
Cameroon as a rear base for carrying out attacks in Nigeria. For example, in early February 2013,
Boko Haram kidnapped seven French citizens in Cameroon near the Nigerian border, marking the
first major incident by the group outside of Nigeria.88
This kidnapping of French citizens is an
example of the terrorist group engaging in actions that threaten international security. The delegates
of this committee will have to devise solutions that will mitigate these occurrences.
82 Thomas Fessy, “Niger Hit by Nigeria’s Boko Haram Fallout,” BBC News, 22 April 2014, accessed 7 Aug 2015,
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27111884.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Boureima Balima, “Niger Region Struggles to Cope with Boko Haram Exodus,” IRIN, 29 June 2015, accessed 29 Aug
2015, www.reliefweb.int/report/niger/niger-region-struggles-cope-boko-haram-exodus.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.

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Furthermore, on 19 December 2013, a group of Boko Haram militants crossed the border from
Cameroon into Banki, Nigeria and attacked the military Kur Mohammed Barracks in Bama.89
The
attack was particularly devastating to the Nigerian military because it came only days after Boko
Haram destroyed parts of the Maiduguri air base.90
Nigeria recently negotiated a security agreement
with Cameroon to grant its troops access to Boko Haram settlements near the border, which have
become the new haven for its fighters. The agreement ensures that Nigeria is not accused of
violating the sovereignty of Cameroon when troops launch air or ground assaults against Boko
Haram hideouts across the border. See Appendix A for a map of the towns and villages claimed by
Boko Haram along the Nigeria-Cameroon Border.91
The Cameroonian military has also set up tighter border controls in the northern region to guard
against possible militant infiltration by Boko Haram fighters.92
A rapid response military unit has
also been deployed, and many tourist hotels in the region now have armed guards. However,
Cameroonian military officials admit that it is impossible to completely secure Cameroon’s longest
border.93 In the end, the two countries have agreed to conduct separate, but coordinated, border
patrols.94
Regional Military Intervention
Idris Deby, the President of Chad, has warned other African leaders of the insecurity in the Lake
Chad region based upon “the permanent threat” posed by Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb. As such, he has called for the establishment of a joint deterrence force, which would be
composed of military forces from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and the Central African
Republic.95
Africa’s response to the terrorist threat created by extremist groups such as Boko Haram has been
plagued by the failure of states to work together effectively. For example, the relationship between
Nigeria and Cameroon is a prime example of these unfortunate shortcomings. In order to combat
Boko Haram, close cooperation between neighboring countries is critical to success. These
partnerships would allow military forces to easily patrol once-poorly guarded international borders
and launch offensive attacks on both sides. However, this situation is far from reality, since Nigeria
denies Cameroon’s military the right to pursue terrorists into its territory.96
In Cameroon, there are
strong suspicions that the authorities, despite their denials, have fueled the insurgency by
cooperating with the European Union (EU) to pay ransoms to free European hostages held by
Boko Haram.97
89 Clement Ejifor, “Borno Attacks: 50 Terrorists, 15 Soldiers Killed – Military Reveals,” NAIJ TV, 24 Dec 2013,
accessed 7 Aug 2015, www.naij.com/54984.html.
90 Ibid.
91 Clement Ejifor, “Borno Attacks: 50 Terrorists, 15 Soldiers Killed – Military Reveals.”
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Daniel Tovrov, “Eradicate Boko Haram: Chadian Leader,” International Business Times, 1 May 2012, accessed 7 Aug
2015, www.ibtimes.com/eradicate-boko-haram-chadian-leader-693973.
97 Ibid.

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At the 2015 summit in Ethiopia, African heads of state and government decided to establish a
standby army comprising 7,500 troops to help West and Central African countries currently battling
Boko Haram.98
Despite this small force, the AU is still extremely far away from developing a
sustainable, rapidly-deployable peace enforcement or peacekeeping force that would both deter and
defeat armed terrorist groups.99
For example, the planned African Standby Force is very behind
schedule, and the interim organ, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, is still only
just beginning to develop sufficient military capabilities.100
As such, it will require the coordination of
both regional and global security task forces to ensure the safety of all civilians from the danger of
terrorists groups such as Boko Haram.
CURRENT STATUS
Recent Attacks by Boko Haram
From the span of 2009 to 2013, Boko Haram was held responsible for more than 2.34% of about
34,000 terrorist attacks worldwide.101
As evidenced, the extremist group is among the most deadly
and violent in the world. In Nigeria, Boko Haram accounted for more than 80% of all terrorist
attacks between the years of 1970 and 2013 for which a terrorist group was identified as responsible,
even though Boko Haram violence only begun in earnest in 2009.102
Deaths from Boko Haram’s
attacks represented nearly 70% of total fatalities terrorist attacks in Nigeria during this time period.103
In comparison, the next most active group in Nigeria was the Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta (MEND), which carried out more than 70 attacks and killed approximately 280,
beginning in 2006.104
In order to better understand the nature and frequency of Boko Haram’s
attacks, a select number of recent events have been compiled for delegates’ reference.
27 June 2009
On 27 June 2009, Boko Haram orchestrated ten violent attacks against a variety of targets including
a customs office, a primary school, a number of police stations, a federal prison, a state
unemployment bureau, several churches, and several local residences.105
These sudden attacks and
the response by the Nigerian police force resulted in the deaths of more than 300 people, including
nearly 200 civilians.106
4 November 2011
98 Jason Warner, “Complements or Competitors?: The African Standby Force, the African Capacity for Immediate
Response to Crises, and the Future of Rapid Reaction Forces in Africa,” Harvard University, No. 8 (March 2015): 58,
http://scholar.harvard.edu/jasonwarner/publications/complements-or-competitors-african-standby-force-african-
capacity-immediate.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 “Country Report on Terrorism,” United States State Department, last modified 2014, accessed 4 Aug 2015,
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/index.htm.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ioannis Mantzikos, “Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighboring Countries: A Chronology of Attacks.”
106 Ibid.

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On 4 November 2011, Boko Haram militants planned a series of coordinated attacks across the
Yobe and Borno state of Nigeria.107
Boko Haram was responsible for attacking at least six churches,
four police stations, the military Joint Task Force Office, the State Security Services building, a local
university, and a number of local businesses.108
This attack had a devastating impact on the
economic situation of the Yobe and Borno states, and many of these communities are still
attempting to recover. At the end of the attacks, Boko Haram claimed public responsibility for the
attacks and over 60 deaths.109
25 December 2011
On Christmas Day, 25 December 2011, Boko Haram conducted an attack on the St. Teresa Catholic
Church in Madalla, Nigeria.110
A total of four car bombs were detonated, while the church was full
of people attending Christmas mass.111
The explosion not only destroyed cars in the area, but also
did significant damage to the church itself. In the end, 37 people were killed and 57 were injured.112
6 July 2013
On 6 July 2013, assailants carrying a Boko Haram banner set fire to the Government Secondary
School in the Potiskum local government district of the Yobe Nigerian state.113
While school
children and staff attempted to flee the burning schoolhouse, Boko Haram assailants open fired,
killing 46 and wounding four.114
Several days later, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attack
in an online video.115
17 September 2013
On 17 September 2013, Boko Haram assailants carrying heavy weaponry dressed in military
uniforms to set up illegal and fake roadblock checkpoints in the Borno state’s Beni Shiek village.
Approximately 142 people were killed at these checkpoints, while countless others were wounded
and robbed of their belongings.116
Recently Suggested Solutions
There are no straightforward or easy solutions to the scourge of Boko Haram and other extremist
organizations in the African continent. On the one hand, the countries and regions in which Boko
Haram resides bear primary responsibility for dealing with them. Unfortunately, the most affected
countries lack the leadership, political stability, and resources to truly eliminate Boko Haram’s
extremist activities in Africa. Thus, the African Union must collectively deal with the issue of Boko
Haram not just in the short-term, while also seeking to help architect a long-term approach to
permanently address the issue.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.

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To effectively support the efforts of Nigeria and its neighbors in confronting Boko Haram, it is
important for the AU to encourage regional cooperation. Following the call for renewed efforts and
increased mobilization on counterterrorism efforts adopted during the Kampala Session in July
2010, the African Union appointed a Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in
October 2010.117
A prominent example of this would be the 7,500 AU-led counterterrorism forces
that were mobilized in Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin in February 2015 by the Special
Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.118
Because the threat of terrorism requires more
than just a militaristic or security response, individual governments and sovereign militaries should
work with the AU to support efforts to promote development in throughout Africa, including the
improvement of health, education, and social services in the region.
By increasing literacy rates among the general public, the African Union can begin to curb radical
propaganda. Using religion as a force of propaganda, political or terrorist leaders often simply
fabricate ideas and claim that they are aligned with the Quran. Since those who are unable to read
cannot check the accuracy of such statements, radical terrorist groups disproportionally influence
many lower-educated groups. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), in
Nigeria 51% of the population of 170 million are illiterate and therefore a direct target for
recruitment into terrorist groups.119
The Nigerian government has acknowledged that further
education will help equip Nigerian citizens with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed for
economic self-sufficiency, poverty reduction, and sustainable development and is consequently
making strides to address the illiteracy problem throughout the country. 120
The ultimate goal of the African Union would be to stop terrorism before it starts by strengthening
community resilience and creating environments that are inhospitable for terrorist recruitment.
Many scholars have asserted that, unless the African Union expands beyond a militaristic response
to terrorism and develops an increasing role for developmental practices and social empowerment,
the African continent may continue to suffer a long period of cyclical violence.121
Through youth
empowerment, including education and vocational training, strengthening local governance
capabilities, and improving access to the news media, the African Union can begin to create peaceful
alternatives for demographic groups that are typically most vulnerable to extremist ideologies.
The African Union can work with individual countries to restrict terrorists’ and terrorist
organizations’ travel throughout the region and their ability to fundraise, exchange, and store
financial resources. Under the 2001 Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism, the African Union
recognized “the growing threat of terrorism in the continent and the growing linkages between
terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crimes, money laundering, and the illicit
117 Assembly/AU/Dec.289-331, “Decisions, Declarations, Resolutions,” 25 July 2014,
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_25_27_July_2010_BCP_ASSEMBLY_OF_THE_AFRIC
N_UNION_Fifteenth_Ordinary_Session.pdf.
118 Ibid.
119 Anthony Lake, “Progress for Children,” United Nations Children’s Fund, No. 10 (April 2012): 43,
http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Progress_for_Children_-_No._10_EN_04232012.pdf.
120 Ibid.
121 John Davis, Terrorism In Africa: The Evolving Front in the War on Terror (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010), 291.

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proliferation of small arms and light weapons.”122
This protocol aimed to offer assistance to other
African Union countries that need technical, financial, or strategic aid in the development of
advanced border control and financial monitoring capabilities against terrorist organizations.123
An example of a program would be the Terrorist Interdiction Program (also known as the Personal
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System), which was created through a partnership
between the African Union and the United States of America.124
This program provides partner
countries in Africa with border security assistance to identify, disrupt, and deter intra-continental
terrorist travel.125
Other efforts are underway to boost regional cooperation and combat terrorist groups. The Lake
Chad Basin Commission Security Initiative includes the establishment of a Regional Intelligence
Fusion Unit.126
Another program to establish a Joint Operational General Staff Committee in
southern Algeria has seen participation from Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania.127
Although these
plans offer some opportunity for optimism, it has yet to be established as to whether these plans will
be truly effective.
Ties with Terrorist Organizations
Although Boko Haram can easily be identified as the principal extremist organization in Nigeria, it
also holds important weight in any conversation on terrorism throughout the region. In order to
draft a comprehensive response to extremist organizations in Africa, it is critical to look beyond the
horizon of Boko Haram and delve into the other organizations that share close connections to Boko
Haram.
As of 22 May 2014, the United Nations Security Council officially added Boko Haram to the list of
entities and individuals linked to Al-Qaeda that are targeted by substantial sanctions and an arms
embargo.128
Al-Qaeda has worked extensively with Boko Haram over its development, including
training militants who are now key members of Boko Haram’s leadership. In 2010, Al-Qaeda
released public statements offering training, supplies, and recruits to support Boko Haram’s
efforts.129
Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram have conducted joint efforts in Mali, which makes the
increasingly sophisticated partnership between these two extremist organizations of upmost concern
to the region.130
When the French military and the African Union states’ forces intervened in Mali, it marked a new
period of opportunities for the internationalization of Boko Haram’s terrorist activities. Additionally,
122 “The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework,” African Union Peace & Security, last modified 11 June 2014,
www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct.
123 Ibid.
124 “Terrorist Interdiction Program,” United States Department of State, last modified 2009, http://2001
2009.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16663.htm.
125 Ibid.
126 Jideofor Adibe and Julie Biau, "Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2015.”
127 Ibid.
128 “Country Report on Terrorism,” United States Department of State.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.

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Ansar al-Dine – a violent offshoot of Boko Haram – has facilitated the closer connection between
Boko Haram and other jihadist groups fighting in the region through joint military the possibility for
military training, combat experience, and operational cooperation.
According to United States (U.S.) military intelligence, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab share similar
ideologies and future goals.131
In 2011, a Boko Haram member reportedly received training and
technical support from the Al-Shabaab network in northern Somalia before launching a terrorist
attack on the United Nations headquarters in Abuja.132
Further cooperation between Boko Haram
and Al-Shabaab could prove devastating for the region, as it has the capacity to transport the tide of
violent extremism across African borders.
BLOC ANALYSIS
Although most of Boko Haram’s terrorist activities have been concentrated inside the borders of
Nigeria, the repercussions of Boko Haram’s extremist activities reach far beyond the borders of any
one country or region. After the UN office bombing in Abuja on 26 August 2011, Boko Haram
transitioned from an exclusively Nigerian terrorist group to an international jihadist organization. In
all, the vast extent of Boko Haram’s membership, the indiscriminate and brutal characteristics of its
attacks, the complexity of the African religious and ethnic divides, and the sheer instability of the
region transform the terrorist organization into an immediate and toxic regional threat.
The following bloc positions are formulated on a general basis and are by no means completely
representative of an individual country’s position. There are a multitude of factors that must be
considered when formulating a country’s position, and these bloc positions are only the starting
point for more in depth, country-specific research. With the most visible violence by Boko Haram
largely concentrated in the northern African region, sub-regional bloc analysis will give delegates the
opportunity to explore the different influences that Boko Haram has throughout the entire African
continent. In both position papers and throughout committee debate, delegates will be expected to
show a broad understanding of their country’s position.
Northern and Western Africa
Due to the largely Islamic demographics in Northern Africa and West-Central Africa, countries in
these regions are directly affected by the impacts of Boko Haram. While the terrorist organization
has not carried out any significant attacks in these regions, these countries are still prone to the wave
of Islamic extremism brought-forth by terrorist activities. If Boko Haram continues to maintain
partnerships with foreign terrorist groups, organizations, such as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria or Al-Shabaab in Somalia could
begin cooperating in tandem with Boko Haram.
In March 2015, Boko Haram officially pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State.133
The symbolic
move highlights increased coordination between jihadi movements across North Africa and the
131 “Country Report on Terrorism,” United States Department of State.
132 Ibid.
133 Tomi Oladipo, “Analysis: Islamic State Strengthens Ties with Boko Haram,” BBC News, 24 April 2015, accessed 7
Aug 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32435614.

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Middle East and prompted an appeal from Nigeria's government for greater international help in
tackling the Boko Haram insurgency.134
Furthermore, the Islamic State’s infrastructure, resources,
and military capabilities in the region will enable Boko Haram to expand its operations and control
even faster in North Africa. As such, North Africa has a particular interest in addressing the Boko
Haram as the African arm of the Islamic State.
Another consideration is the vulnerability of some of the countries in this bloc. Many are recovering
from destabilizing social, political, and economic events that have made their populations
susceptible to the influences of Boko Haram. For example, many West African countries are exiting
a devastating Ebola outbreak that has drained resources of governments and its populations. Any
offensives or attacks from Boko Haram would further stretch the government capabilities. In
addition to Ebola, a few countries have dealt with uprisings, coup d’états, and own rebel groups. In
Mali, the government has been in a constant battle with the Tuareg rebel groups (Tuaregs are an
ethnic minority in Mali) who continue to undermine its legitimacy.135 Burkina Faso recently survived
another military coup d’etat from a general, while Tunisisa has recently transition to democracy,
albeit a fragile one.136 The growing influence of Boko Haram combined with the fragile state of
many countries in this bloc represent an enormous threat to the progress and stability to this region.
Delegates in this region should aim to work collaboratively with neighboring countries and the
African Union to address the immediate security and humanitarian concerns brought upon by Boko
Haram insurgents in the region. Northern and Western African countries will likely suffer the most
direct effects of Boko Haram’s militant activities, and thus the demand for military and humanitarian
assistance has been immense. Additionally, delegates should proactively work towards a solution that
not only seeks to bring about the long-term dissolution of Boko Haram, but also addresses the
short-term repercussions of their actions.
Eastern and Central Africa
As a country in Eastern Africa, Nigeria shares land borders with the Republic of Benin in the west,
Chad and Cameroon in the east, and Niger in the north.137
The country’s coast lies on the Gulf of
Guinea in the south, and it borders Lake Chad to the northeast.138
Boko Haram has shown to have
little respect of national borders in recent years, specifically targeting Cameroon and Niger as it seeks
to expand its zone of operations. On 19 January 2015, Boko Haram militants raided the small
Cameroonian village of Mabass, killing three people and abducting nearly 80 elementary-aged
children.139
This attack and abduction was the first of many to come on Cameroonian soil, as
neighboring Chad deployed troops to support Cameroon’s forces in the area.
134 Ibid.
135 Devon Douglas-Bowers, “The Crisis in Mali: A Historical Perspective on the Tuareg People,” Global Research, last
modified 1 Feb 2013, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-crisis-in-mali-a-historical-perspective-on-the-tuareg
people/5321407.
136 “Burkina Faso Charges General Who Led Failed Coup,” The New York Times, 7 Oct 2015, accessed 8 Aug 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/world/africa/burkina-faso-charges-coup-leader.html?_r=0.
137 “Nigeria,” United States Central Intelligence Agency.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.

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Due to the proximity to the hub of Boko Haram, countries in the Eastern and Central African
region should pay particular attention to the issue of terrorism. These countries are most likely to
see the spillover of violence into their sovereign borders, which is of top concern to many governing
authorities in the region. In January 2012, Nigerian officials declared the temporary closure of its
borders with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to prevent cross-border activities of Boko Haram who
have converted the southern Chad into their base of operations.140
Besides border control measures
to better contain the movement of Boko Haram militants, Eastern and Central African countries
have also been actively dedicating troops to the cause of combatting Boko Haram in the last year
and have shown that the issue is no longer Nigerian, rather a violent crisis of regional magnitude.141
Similar to Northern and Western African countries, delegates in this region should proactively work
towards a solution that addresses the immediate security and humanitarian concerns brought about
by Boko Haram, while also seeking to pursue the long-term dissolution of the Boko Haram
network. In order to do this, delegates should work towards cooperative legal, militaristic, and social
partnerships as well as attempting to pool upon the resources of the greater African Union.
Southern Africa
Although Southern Africa is geographically far from the religious extremism of the Northern region,
violence caused by Boko Haram throughout the North has the potential to cause political instability
across the entire continent. Since Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer and most populous state,
the internal instability provoked by the expanding violence of Boko Haram could have major
regional and global implications.
While delegates in this region may not feel directly or immediately concerned by Boko Haram’s
militant activities, they should work cooperatively to address Boko Haram in order to build a strong
African framework against terrorist activity and to ensure the safety of their citizens in the future.
Lacking a strong military arm, the African Union is largely incapable of deterring a large militant or
extremist group. As such, delegates in this region should focus on developing immediate
humanitarian solutions to discourage Boko Haram’s development while also working to establish an
adequate security response to future threats from similar groups.
COMMITTEE MISSION
The African Union’s mission is “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its
own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena.”142
Evident in the regional and
international cooperation that has already taken place against Boko Haram militants, delegates will
have the opportunity to work with existing frameworks to come up with a more concise and
comprehensive solution. By pooling together the resources and extensive knowledge of the diverse
body of the African Union, delegates will be able to make a solid stance against extremist activities in
the region for years to come. As such, the region desperately needs a comprehensive, African-led
initiative to ultimately end Boko Haram’s insurrection in the continent.
140 Ely Karmon, “Boko Haram’s International Reach.”
141 Daniel Tovrov, “Eradicate Boko Haram: Chadian Leader,” International Business Times, 1 May 2012, accessed 7 Aug
2015, www.ibtimes.com/eradicate-boko-haram-chadian-leader-693973.
142 “Vision of the African Union,” The African Union, last modified 2003, http://www.au.int/en/about/vision.

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Due to the complex history of Nigeria and the west central African region, all delegates will need to
thoroughly understand the historical, socioeconomic, religious, and political situation in Nigeria. A
resolution by the African Union must regard all aspects of the issue of terrorism in west and central
Africa. First, this body needs to address the immediate concerns of impending violence and
displaced persons in the region. Second, the African Union should cooperate in order to implement
policies that address the root causes of terrorist activity in Africa that were mentioned in this
background guide. Although not limited solely to these topics, some root causes may include low
education levels and literacy rates, youth unemployment, weak law enforcement capabilities, and
deeply rooted socioeconomic gaps. Only when all of these topics are thoroughly addressed by the
committee can the African Union begin to work towards making a lasting impact in Nigeria and
beyond.
The pressing threat of violent terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram is of urgent concern to
the countries represented in the African Union. To address all aspects of the topic, it will require the
consolidated efforts of all the countries of the African Union. Only then will Africa truly experience
peace and prosperity.

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TOPIC B: GIRLS’ SECONDARY EDUCATION IN AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
Many countries within the international community have insisted that education is a human right: an
essential experience that enables both boys and girls achieve their full potential in society. Yet
millions of children in Africa – mostly girls – do not attend school. Across the continent, the need
for true gender equality in education is attracting increasing attention. On 31 January 2015, the
African Union annual summit ended with a public declaration that 2015 would be the “Year of
Women’s Empowerment and Development.”143
However, despite the recent spotlight given to the
importance of achieving gender equality, receiving a basic education is still an uphill fight for young
girls living in Africa. Girls remain woefully outnumbered by boys in African schools: they constitute
nearly 60% of the children who should be enrolled in school but, in fact, often do not attend.144
In
Africa, boys remain 1.55 times more likely to finish secondary education than girls.145
Education serves as one of the most critical areas of empowerment and development for African
women. A rough calculation estimates that over 24, million girls across the continent do not attend
primary school.146
Of those who do have the opportunity to enroll in school, 9% more girls than
boys drop out before the end of the sixth grade.147
This is problematic not only because the
education of girls is essential to promoting gender equality, but also because it is critical to
addressing the full spectrum of 21st-century challenges faced by the region. Research demonstrates
that devoting resources to youth education is one of the most effective, high-yielding investments in
development that a country can make. With only 28% of African youth enrolled in secondary
school, approximately 90 million teenagers are still struggling to find employment in low-paid,
informal sector jobs.148
Research shows that Africa cannot build economic success on failing
education systems. The Brookings Institute estimates that Africa will need to generate 45 million
additional jobs for young people over the next decade; however, this will not be possible if these
education systems are not promptly fixed.149
In contrast, by investing in education, countries have
the ability to achieve tremendous social and economic success for generations to come.
A key impediment to accomplishing gender equality in African education is that it cannot be
addressed in a vacuum; rather, educational institutions are visible examples of the inequalities that
exist in the larger African society. In order to achieve legitimate gender equality in education, it is
143 Assembly/AU/DEC.1(XXIV), “Year of Women’s Empowerment and Development,” 31 Jan 2015,
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20569%20-%20587%20(XXIV)%20_E.pdf.
144 Ana Revenga and Sudhir Shetty, “2012 World Development Report on Gender Equality and Development,” The
World Bank 12, No. 1 (Dec 2012): 11, https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/7778105-
1299699968583/7786210-1315936222006/Complete-Report.pdf.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 T. Paul Schultz, “2012 World Development Report on Gender Equality and Development,” The World Bank, last
modified Dec 2012, https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/7778105-
1299699968583/7786210-1315936222006/Complete-Report.pdf.
149 Ibid.

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necessary that girls and boys alike have equal conditions, treatment, and opportunities overall.
Educational institutions are influenced by the same destructive societal, cultural, and religious forces
that perpetuate gender‐based discrimination in the first place. On the other hand, educational
institutions can also have positive ripple effects on the wider community and society, contributing to
enormous change. For example, the behaviors and beliefs formed by young people at school can
have a lasting impact on gender relations within a country. Since educational systems are both
influenced by and influence a variety of external forces, they are instrumental to perpetuating or
alleviating gender disparities around the world. It will be the goal of this committee to address the
gender gap in African secondary education and therefore provide a future framework for the
advancement of gender parity throughout the entire continent.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE
Importance of Secondary Education
The topic of access to secondary education is a growing concern for the global community; as access
to primary education opportunities increase throughout the region, so does the demand for
secondary education. Secondary education represents the crucial link between general education and
the labor market or higher education opportunities.150
According to research by the Clinton Global
Initiative, “every year of schooling a girl receives increases her individual earning power by 10% to
20%, while the return on secondary education is even higher – about 15-25%.”151
Furthermore, a
girl’s access to a quality secondary education can positively impact her ability to earn higher wages as
an adult, influence her to marry later in life and have fewer children, and reduce her susceptibility to
sexual diseases, such as human immunodeficiency virus and acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(HIV/AIDS).152
The age at which young girls enroll in secondary school is a particularly vulnerable time. During this
time, they undergo the transition into adulthood and begin to be of suitable age for work. Currently,
this is when African girls’ chances of remaining in school reduce dramatically. Transition rates to
secondary schools for children overall remain only around 64% across Sub-Saharan Africa, however,
the split for girls is even more evident.153
In Guinea, the transition rate for girls is as low as 26% in
some of the most rural communities.154
Across the whole population, however, overall enrollments
in secondary education have seen modest progress in the last decade from 28% to 41%.155
This
progress includes an increase in girls’ enrollment from 26% to 36%.156
But these statistics include
huge variations among regions and countries. For example, enrollment rates in secondary school are
150 Alex Amouyel, “Why Invest in Adolescent Girls,” Clinton Global Initiative, last modified 24 Sep 2014,
www.clintonglobalinitiative.org/ourmeetings/PDF/actionareas/Why_Invest_in_Adolescent_Girls.pdf.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Eva Iverson, “State of Girls’ Education in Africa,” Education for Change, accessed 25 July 2015,
http://efc.idnet.net/publications/State%20of%20Girls'%20Education%20in%20West%20Africa_ENG.pdf.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.

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almost one-third lower in conflict-affected countries. And out of all refugees enrolled in secondary
schools, only 30% are girls.157
Many studies have concluded that women who are economically self-sufficient and are able to
control their own financial assets tend to have fewer children, while fertility rates have also shown to
be inversely related to national income growth.158
Furthermore, fertility is lower among better-
educated women and is often higher among women whose families own more land and assets.159
Girls and young women delaying marriage and having fewer children gives way to increasing per
capita income, higher savings, and more rapid economic growth. Additionally, the impact of
investing in girls can be intergenerational. A mother with a few years of formal education is
considerably more likely to send her children to school, breaking the chain of poverty.160
Despite small improvements throughout the continent, significant barriers still exist in girls’ access
to, retention in, and transition between different levels of education. In particular, the quality of
education offered to young girls can be worse than the quality for boys, and girls who remain in
school often face discrimination both within schools and in their communities. In Rwanda, for
example, the girls’ enrollment rate for primary school is 97%, but less than 13% of those girls will
move on to attend secondary school.161
Not only is there an indisputable gender divide seen amongst boys and girls in the transition to
secondary school, but girls are also more likely to drop out once they have begun. Statistics on the
completion of secondary school by girls are not available in most African Union countries, but has
been reported as low as 4% in Niger and 9% in Burundi.162
In working to find a solution to the
gender gap apparent in the African educational system, the African Union will need to address many
aspects of the topic, such as encouraging girls’ transitions from primary to secondary school,
improving the completion rate, and ensuring that boys and girls enjoy equal access to educational
resources and opportunities.
Poverty and Education
One of the biggest obstacles to the education of Africa’s young girls is poverty, which some argue
presents an even bigger obstacle than the tradition of girls not attending school. The direct and
indirect costs of getting an education, such as uniforms and textbooks, remain one of the most
frequently cited barriers to African children’s enrollment and retention in education.163
In South
Africa, although studies have shown that children have seldom been denied registration due to non-
payment of fees, data has shown that humiliating punishments are common.164
Examples of
157 “The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education,” UNESCO, last modified Oct 2011,
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001907/190743e.pdf.
158 T. Paul Schultz. “Fertility and Income,” Yale University, last modified Oct 2015,
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~pschultz/cdp925.pdf.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
161 Comprehensive Analytical Profile: Rwanda (Brazzaville: The World Health Organization, 2015).
162 Eva Iverson, “State of Girls’ Education in Africa.”
163 Ibid.
164 Veerle Dielteins and Sarah Meny-Gibert, “In Class? Poverty, Social Exclusion and School Access in South Africa,”
Journal of Education, No. 55 (March 2012): 136-138, http://www.pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/Dieltiens-and-Meny-
Gibert.pdf.

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