SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 17
Download to read offline
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
1
I.) Introduction:
The phenomena of what is called the “Hollow State” where government increasingly contracts various services such
as prisons, health services, water delivery, waste removal, defense, among many other services that we take for granted as
part of our modern society is not a new trend, but rather has a long history globally, in general, as many countries today
employ some form of contracting (Milward H. P., 2000). At the heart of it, economically speaking, a public service is
meant to satisfy an essential societal need (Shetterly, 2002). Members of society, individually or collectively, usually
cannot deliver these services. The contracting out of public services is one form of privatization where the production or
the provision of public services is commissioned to the market (Milward H. P., 2000). The result of this process is that the
role of the state changes from public provider to buyer of public services (Milward H. P., 2000). The belief behind
contracting out public services is that the introduction of market elements in the production of public services increases
effectiveness and efficiency. In reality directing the contractor to supply services according to the agency’s policies and
preferences in the deliverance of various services is both a difficult and costly challenge. More importantly, government
faces the dilemma in safeguarding public interests, in terms of value conflicts, especially the balance between
effectiveness and efficiency (Milward H. P., 2000).
In the U.S., after decades of state and local government experiments with contracting out, the benefits of private
delivery of public services have proven to be elusive (Milward H. P., 2000). The practice of contracting out services has
more often resulted in the opposite of intended results in terms of higher costs, poor quality of service, increased
opportunities for corruption and diminished government flexibility, control and accountability (Milward H. P., 2000).
Practices related to contracting out public services are rooted in a distrust of government and an often-reflexive preference
for markets or civil society (Terry, 2005). This literature review highlights some of the works published by scholars across
a spectrum of disciplines: economics, political science, public administration, law, among others sought to understand its
nature, characteristics, and administrative requirements as well as its implications for democratic governance.
The growing disenchantment with the performance of the public sector has set the stage for market reforms and that
privatization is an idea drawn out of “ideological moorings” and not so much out of historical experience as this literature
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
2
review will discuss (Singh, 2003). The astonishing part about this worldwide movement away from government provision
to government procurement of these services is that there is little evidence that governments or academics know much
about how to govern or manage networks. (Milward & Provan, 2000)
II.) Key Points:
Subtheme 1: The Characteristics of the Hollow State:
The term “hollow state” is used to describe the nature of the devolution of power and decentralization of services”
from central governments to sub-national governments, in addition to third parties such as nonprofit agencies and private
firms to deliver public services. Government has several choices, it can produce public services internally, purchase public
services from external sources, or use some combination of the two (Gooden, 2008). This system raises important
questions about democratic accountability and the legitimacy of government. Alexander Hamilton warned of the danger
that the “hollow state” can bring about, long before the terminology was coined by writing that the American public's
confidence in government is "proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration (Terry, 2005)" which deserves
serious consideration by current public administrators because it potentially threatens the long-term stability of the U.S.
constitutional democracy (Terry, 2005). These Market libertarians or whatever terminology wants to use for them stood in
sharp contrast to the Keynesian welfare state created during the previous historical era (In the US, this was the New Deal
era which expanded the size of government) (Terry, 2005). Proponents of market liberalism blamed the policies of the
state for slow economic growth, inflationary wage pressures, and a multitude of other economic and social ills (Terry,
2005). The only remedy in their opinion was to dismantle the traditional administrative management practices of the
Keynesian welfare state and replacing them with management technologies under the label of the NPM (Terry, 2005).
These trends in the development of the hollow state have led to a new term being devised the inter-sectoral administration
(Henry, 2002). This is defined as the management and coordination of the relations among government agencies and
organizations in the private and nonprofit sectors for the purpose of achieving specific policy goals (Henry, 2002).
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
3
Contracting should be viewed as an economic exchange that requires for government institutions to align public
values, institutions, and service-market conditions. Public managers operate in an environment of changing social and
political values such as effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, responsiveness, equality of treatment, and service quality
(Zacchea, 2003). Critics of the reasoning justifying the hollow state phenomena believe that public management
approaches employed by government have undervalued the intangibles in public policy such as identity, pluralism, and
multiculturalism necessary for a democratic society (Zacchea, 2003). These scholars conclude now the argument put
forward by proponents of contracting services that the state needs to shed its extra baggage is now firmly entrenched in
public opinion, without specifying the complexity involved in such a task (Singh, 2003). Instead the concept of
continuous reform has been emphasized because "changing an institutional structure as large as a public bureaucracy is a
difficult chore; even changing one organization within it has been enough to defeat some experienced and skilled
practitioners (Singh, 2003)." Managers experience these values as pressures from internal or external stakeholders that
they must balance or optimize as they deliver services. There are always some conditions that lie beyond a manager’s
control. For instance, managers typically have little influence over the laws and rules governing service delivery, such as
those that allow the use of some management practices or service delivery approaches but prohibit others. (Brown,
Potoski, & Slyke, 2006) Still, all things being equal, services with inherently lower transaction costs are more favorable
contracting targets, freeing resources to lower costs or to purchase more service quality (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006).
On the other hand, services with higher transaction costs pose greater contracting problems, consuming more resources
and inhibiting a manager’s ability to optimize competing values (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006).
There has been extensive debate about what is NPM and the origins of the ideology of this movement among
scholars but there is general consensus on the theoretical foundation of NPM.
Scholars agree that public-choice theory, transaction-cost economics and principal-agent theory are important influences
that have contributed to the hollow state phenomena (Kennedy, 2006). But, what supporters of contracting out fail to
understand is that by eliminating rules and regulations disregards the important role that rules and regulations play in
strengthening the capacity and integrity of administrative institutions (Kennedy, 2006).
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
4
Subtheme 2: Factors That Lead to Privatization:
A very relevant question for public administrators during these difficult financial times, where governments at all
levels have been forced to increasingly study whether to contract out services or in certain cases even share services
amongst each other to save costs, improve the quality of service, and improve efficiency. This article describes the results
of a ten year comprehensive study conducted from 1992 to 2002 using a variety of data sources (Zullo, 2009).
This research distinguishes between both private and inter municipal contracting. There is a distinction between
the motives for private contracting and inter-municipal contracting because “Private contracting…is partially driven by an
ideological preference for reducing the size of government, an objective that inter-municipal contracting clearly fails to
satisfy. Inter-municipal contracting is used to achieve economies of scale, to take advantage of overlapping geographic
jurisdictions, and to outsource when there are legal restrictions on the delegation of governmental powers (Zullo, 2009).”
In other words, one form of contracting, private contracting, is influenced more by ideological means and the other form,
inter municipal contracting is driven primarily by economic factors. The study concludes, despite the assumption that
financial stress could lead to contracting or sharing of services, there is no evidence that fiscal stress induces privatization.
It notes that those governments with high debt levels tend to reduce publicly delivered services. The county governments
surveyed were about as likely to partner with neighboring municipalities as they are with private firms if they took such
cost saving measures (Zullo, 2009). The strongest and most reliable predictor of both private and inter municipal
contracting was the creation of new public services, not political influence or economic reasons.
On the other hand, the public administration model states in contrast to the public choice theory that local
government officials are pragmatists who supply communities with cost-effective, quality services (Zullo, 2009). This is
not to say that this theory disregards the presence of interest group pressure, but this theory emphasizes accountability to
the public as an important motivator of the decisions taken by rational public administrators (Zullo, 2009). This ideology
believes that private contracting is conditional on labor and management relations. For example, when labor relations are
contentious and where the possibility of collaboration is low (Zullo, 2009). The public administration model makes a
careful distinction between private and public goods, and appreciates a role for government in providing the latter. This
theory views governmental agencies as organizations balancing competing demands from both within and outside of the
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
5
agency, which is indeed very true in reality (Zullo, 2009). Therefore, with the proper talent, resources, and oversight
mechanisms ensuring accountability in place, public agencies can effectively deliver public goods. The conclusion from
this theory is that while fiscal stress sets in motion financial and operational reform, private contracting is not the default
option for public organizations nor it is a panacea for the shortcomings in the provision of public services from such
organizations, private contracting is merely just one strategy for service reorganization, that can be taken in lieu of
improving the existing public service workforce. It notes that governance, rather government, is a more appropriate
description of the reality of contemporary state structures, where an ever-increasing percentage of the state's work is
outsourced to for-profit, nonprofit, and faith-based organizations (Kennedy, 2006).
Subtheme 3: Criticism of the Hollow State Phenomena:
The hollow state can be traced back to the gradual expansion of government since the New Deal. The increasing
development of the hollow state has spurred rethinking the relationship between government power and fundamental
rights (Kennedy, 2006). This is because the hollow state has provoked scholars to create a new definition of government
because the boundaries between public and private sector are making are being blurred by for-profit and nonprofit
organizations that are being gradually incorporated into the fold of traditional government. A major dilemma is how this
system is affecting the constitutional system that forms the basis for American government and “depends on the
distinction between public and private to serve as a fundamental safeguard of private rights. (Kennedy, 2006)”
Critics, such as the authors cited in this literature review, state that because delivering public services has become
increasing complex, outsourcing brings with it inherent risks which include: The loss of expertise after an outsourcing
decision has been made because the government may no longer employ personnel with service delivery expertise (Brown,
Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). This in turn results in an increased dependence on service providers and possibly a reduction in
control over the delivery of a service if there are not the proper administrative procedures in place to ensure the job is
done. There is the potential for escalating costs which results from poor service delivery expertise from a contractor who
may incrementally raise the costs of providing a service as they see fit (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). In many cases, it
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
6
has been reported that contracting services has in general increased the risk of service delivery failures be it due to
deficiencies in the contracting process, or shortcomings by the service contractor, outsourcing brings with it a potential for
the non-delivery of critical services (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). The obvious concern that remains for public
administrators is whether outsourcing can deliver services in the quality, quantity and timeliness required and at a
reasonable cost (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). The fundamental question that must be carefully deliberated is therefore
whether outsourcing, or continuing to provide a service in-house, provides the level of service desired (Brown, Potoski, &
Slyke, 2006).
It is believed by many that thin regulative systems are believed to undermine the integrity of administrative
institutions and weaken their capacity to serve the common good (Terry, 2005). The effects of the hollow state are
apparent in how the federal workforce was reduced from approximately 2.3 million employees in fiscal 1990 to fewer
than 1.9 million in 1999 (Terry, 2005). Federal agencies were compelled to drastically reduced or froze their hiring efforts
for extended periods of time in line with the doctrine of NPM. One approach of NPM is the concept of liberation
management. This is based on the premise that public managers are competent and highly skilled individuals familiar with
good management practices. Proponents of this philosophy believe that the bureaucratic system with its burdensome rules,
controls, and procedures, is largely responsible for poor government performance (Terry, 2005). In other words,
bureaucracy has constrained the decision making processes, discretion, and actions of public managers by limiting their
freedom to improve government performance, so public managers must be “freed” from these bonds and “senseless red
tape” to achieve better performance (Terry, 2005). This principle provided a justification in the cutbacks in the 1990’s
under the Clinton Administration. However, these actions “reduced the influx of new people with new skills, new
knowledge, new energy and ideas (Terry, 2005)" Some agencies reported that downsizing in general led to such adverse
effects as loss of institutional memory and an increase in work backlogs hindering their ability to achieve organizational
mission (Terry, 2005).
This is not to say that the concept of utilizing performance measurement in government should be abandoned but
the literature studied indicates that in too many cases has selected the wrong targets or ignored non-quantifiable criteria
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
7
that is essential to the operations of many agencies. A well known example is the unintended effects caused by the No
Child Left Behind Act (Anechiarico, 2007). This legislation has been criticized in many academic circles because it places
undue pressure on educators to “teaching to the test. (Singh, 2003)" It has been argued that this has created a system
whose output is children who are attaining acceptable scores on the test, with innovation and variation of material
suffering not to mention the professional discretion of teachers and school administrators (Anechiarico, 2007).
Various experts assert that the result of ignoring non-standard performance criteria in effect creates the erroneous
belief that there are “one-size solutions” to improve administrative efficiency and services. Many experts in general chafe
about the rigidity of the Government Results and Performance Act (GPRA) of 1993 or the Performance Assessment
Rating Tool (PART) that puts in their view unduly powerful emphasis on performance based standards (Anechiarico,
2007).
Elliot Sclar in his book about the economics of privatization argues that the decision to contract is complicated by
the nature of public services, which is also often overlooked by proponents of contracting services (Shetterly, 2002). His
analysis notes that the key to successful contracting is the ability for the service to be adequately specified. He states that
specifying work for residential refuse collection is much different than specifying work for a mental health contract in
which the production process is complex and uncertain, and effect on patients difficult to measure (Shetterly, 2002).
Therefore, the type of service contracted influences the contract relationship and the ease with which it can be monitored
(Shetterly, 2002). Sclar notes two of the elements that constitute the cost for contracted services. He cites the comparative
cost of service provision which compares the costs for the public and private sectors to do a particular task (Shetterly,
2002). There is also the transaction cost which is the cost incurred by a public organization to select and monitor a
contractor. Therefore, administrators can derive the true cost of a contract operation as being the production cost
(normally the annual payment made to the contractor) plus the internal costs incurred by having a contract operation to
provide a fair cost comparison (Shetterly, 2002). However, in many cases the transaction cost is rarely considered, which
may lead to incorrect analysis regarding contracting a public service. The relevance of the standard economic model of
competition to public contracting was also examined. The standard economic model, advocated by market libertarians
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
8
assumes there will be “robust” competition for the services in question, but this is rarely the case in reality (Shetterly,
2002). Sclar notes that most contracting actions involve no or minimal competition and in certain cases the public sector is
the market. This is because the “effective markets” envisioned by proponents of free market principles by its very nature
requires large numbers of participants who are well informed about the quality, price, and availability of the goods being
exchanged. Such proponents fail to understand that many services tend toward monopoly provision, such as those
performed by government, because only the organization producing the service can afford the large investments in assets
that are specific to delivering that service (Zacchea, 2003).
Sclar also studied the two types of contracts that are most commonly used. One type is a complete contract
characterized as such because "...generally the contract terms effectively capture all present and future rights and
obligations between the parties. (Shetterly, 2002)" These complete contracts are in low frequency of contracting
transactions ( such as a one-time or infrequent need), where there is little uncertainty about the work to be undertaken (the
process is known and understood), and a there is a specific output desired within a specified timeframe (repairing potholes
or repaving streets) (Shetterly, 2002).The other type is the incomplete contract, which does not capture all of the present
and future rights and responsibilities of both parties. This is the most common type of contract used (Shetterly, 2002).
This type of contract is referred to as incomplete because the parties cannot predict and understand the effect of future
situations. Incomplete contracting can pose problems related to information asymmetry, which leads to two particular
problems in the principal-agent relationship governing a contract, moral hazard and adverse selection (Shetterly, 2002).
The first, adverse selection involves selection of agents in a manner adverse to the principal, for example if the
government lacks certain information related to the contractor selection decision). The other is moral hazard where the
agent acts in ways inconsistent with the goals of the principal (Shetterly, 2002). Both are caused by the principal's
inability to obtain or understand information relevant to selection of an agent and the agent's behavior in carrying out the
terms of the contract and could lead for example to “opportunistic behavior” on the part of the agent. Because of the fact
that opportunities for complete contracts are rare, and incomplete contracts are costly for government to award and
monitor, Sclar suggests relational contracting as an alternative (Shetterly, 2002). Relational contracting replaces the
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
9
formal legalistic governance structure associated with incomplete contracting with a bilateral governance structure based
on trust and cooperation between organizations, replacing an adversarial relationship with one of cooperation and mutual
benefit (Shetterly, 2002).
Subtheme 4: The Pervasiveness of the Hollow State in Society:
The presence of contracted services in government is pervasive throughout American society, we can see
examples of it in our day to day lives. For example we see the presence of the hollow state in the government ability to
coordinate an appropriate response to disasters. The rise of “third party” government has been generally impeded the
effectiveness of government responses. For example in the case of the response before and after hurricane Katrina, much
has been made of the politics behind the decision making process behind government actions related to the construction of
storm defense systems and the government response to the disaster (misplaced attention, cronyism, partisanship,
patronage, class based indifference to the poor, special interest groups, etc. (Krane, 2007)) However, the point that is often
overlooked the government response was how third party government played a role in the inadequate coordinated
government response to this disaster. Katrina is yet another example of government that was complicated by inter-
sectorial politics (Krane, 2007). In this case, there was a raging debate over insurance coverage to victims. The states of
Louisiana and Mississippi were engaged in an argument with insurance companies over the settlement of damage claims
suffered by each state's residents (and the various jurisdictions within those states) in the form of lawsuits contesting the
insurance company actions related to the cause of damage, amount of compensation, and degree of negligence by the
property owner (Krane, 2007). Because of the layered nature of insurance coverage, this compensation is only a portion of
the total claims, and the remaining claims are in dispute as to the insurers that have responsibility for the payments
(Krane, 2007).
The Hollow State can also produce deadly results. For example, there is literature that chronicles the rise of
military contractors such as Blackwater, which can be considered the most powerful private army in the world (Bryer,
2008). As described earlier, private military contractors like Blackwater pose a serious dilemma regarding constitutional
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
10
rights of an individual. Under current law both U.S. and Iraqi, security contractors are immune from lawsuits. The
Blackwater incident in 2007 has led many to question the logic of the immunity clause (Bryer, 2008). On February 27,
2007, a sniper employed by a security contractor opened fire and killed innocent Iraqi civilians (Bryer, 2008). The U.S.
Department of State had later cleared the sniper and the company of any legal wrongdoing, offering that the action taken
was within the scope of work of the contractor in its efforts to protect U.S. diplomats, which led to notoriety for
Blackwater (Bryer, 2008). The case of the Fallujah attack by the U.S. military raid is an example of how the lack of
coordination between military and private security can lead to devastating consequences (Bryer, 2008). In the Fallujah
case, military strategists had no interest in deploying troops in the city itself in order to avoid unnecessary hostilities with
city residents but the attack on civilian contractors employed by Blackwater forced a change in strategy (Bryer, 2008).
Therefore scholars have suggested placing more oversight controls on privatized military firms, such as Blackwater in the
form of “highly specified and transparent contracts that are focused on clearly defined results and permissible actions
(Bryer, 2008).”
Subtheme 5: Methods to Improve the Effectiveness of Contracting:
Once governments select a contractor, the most important task then involves monitoring and evaluating the
performance of vendors working under contract. This is because while there is truth that the practice contracting out
services under the NPM theory brings flexibility, “it is erroneous to think that without building institutions of public
accountability this would bring any substantial difference (Singh, 2003).” Well-monitored vendors are more likely to
perform according to contract specifications, thereby improving returns from contracting if there is the legal basis to do
so.
A common recommended for managers is to perform tactical and strategic planning and management in terms of
how something will get done how it will be achieved (Gooden, 2008). It is widely recognized that but without foresight
government falls behind in several areas such as technology, economy, and demography needed for operations. They
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
11
concluded that several tools and such as geographic information systems, public involvement approaches, and forecasting
methods could be used to better understand the future (Gooden, 2008).
It has also been stated that because of the fact that management decisions and actions affect many parties it is
suggested that these players should be included in the planning, management, and decision-making processes (Allen,
2007). When diverse parties are included in the planning and decision making process, they are more likely to share in the
accountability and responsibility for the outcome (Gooden, 2008).
Some managers cite eight effective practices that have technical and relationship aspects that successful managers
use in the contracting process, which are (Gooden, 2008):
1. They emphasize pre-bid planning activities and multiple needs assessment methods to accurately reflect service needs
for the area and to more equitably distribute services for various populations.
2. They monitor waiting lists and utilization of services regularly to determine who uses and needs services.
3. They rely on a large number of participants to review proposals.
4. They use a standard tool to rate them to ensure fairness and competitiveness in the proposal evaluation step.
5. They conduct debriefings as training and mediation sessions and encourage bidders to become more capable to
participate in future bidding.
6. They negotiate rates on the basis of pricing ranges, not line-item details.
7. They assist providers with program and budget support.
8. They rely on experience and technical competence to succeed.
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
12
One crucial example of various methods that have been suggested to improve the practices governing contracting
out public services is how the Obama administration done it’s part to recognize the detrimental changes that the increasing
contraction can bring about to government. His administration has attempted to produce a new "single consistent
definition" of inherently governmental functions that can be applied throughout the government (Burman, 2009/2010). In
a presidential memorandum dated March 4, 2009, he stated that: "Government outsourcing for services raises special
concerns." He goes on to say, "The line between inherently governmental activities that should not be outsourced and
commercial activities that may be subject to private sector competition has been blurred and inadequately defined. As a
result, contractors may be performing inherently governmental functions. (Burman, 2009/2010)" Obama personally
warned in his memo of the dangers associated with “over-reliance on contractors” which can weaken the “in-house
capacity that is essential to effective government performance." Obama’s actions are significant because it regards the
issue of extensively contracting public services as a real threat to government stability and authority (Burman,
2009/2010). The central issue put forward by the administration’s actions is that the issue is not so much about which laws
or policies determine the federal government’s responsibilities but how a “capable and robust” federal workforce can
effectively oversee contractor activities and facilitate communication (Burman, 2009/2010). The purpose is to give
flexibility to agencies regarding outsourcing services by providing guidelines that will allow them to choose which are to
be contracted. This means that each agency is to determine what their core competencies are, regardless of whether the
activity is widely found in the private sector (Burman, 2009/2010). For example, if meteorologists are critical to the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's mission, then it be wise to keep such staff and their operations within
the agency. Functions that are not critical to the agency operations and mission can be outsourced or shared among
agencies (Burman, 2009/2010). The guidelines put forward offer three categories of functions: Those that are inherently
governmental (e.g. determined by law or regulation or by OMB guidance), critical, but not inherently governmental
(determined by agency officials), essential, but not inherently governmental (determined by agency officials using a cost-
comparison approach to seek the "most cost-effective source of support for the organization") (Burman, 2009/2010).
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
13
Another suggestion put forward for scholarly review is by Burnier DeLysa who advocates a care-based approach
to public management, which has feminist roots from the frontier settlements in the old West. She believes that a care-
based model is relevant now because of the "real world" collapse of the housing and financial markets that triggered the
current recession in lieu of the businesslike approach to government, which includes contracting (DeLysa, 2009). She
noted that for many public administrators, especially those working at the street and agency levels, care-centered
administration is already at the core of what they do (DeLysa, 2009). She believes that public administration should return
more towards it’s roots in providing quality public service that improves people's lives and stresses caring for others, not
efficiency, at the center of administration. This sort of view was embraced during the Progressive and New Deal eras, in
part due to the advocacy of Frances Perkins, the labor secretary to FDR. In stark contrast to contemporary rhetoric about
privatization and market-based government, Perkins believed that "government in a democracy is a service agency for
these essential activities of human cooperation (Burman, 2009/2010)." A care-centered public administration as
envisioned by some would adopt a relational leadership approach that attempts to establish caring relationships both
inside and outside of the organization through collaboration, caring, courage, intuition, and organizational vision (DeLysa,
2009).
A care based approach believes that diverse administrators from varied backgrounds should use care to find
meaning and motivation in their work experiences and to communicate those experiences to others (DeLysa, 2009). More
importantly, it is important to note that this discourse need not be viewed as inconsistent with public-sector requirements
for performance measurement. It can be argued despite the role of care and relationship oriented activities in public
administration, care work and emotional labor often go unrecognized. The collective care in the form of government
programs and policies was allowed to erode or disappear altogether, forcing individuals to bear an ever higher load of
individual care costs (DeLysa, 2009). For those with economic resources, the costs could be managed and quality care
provided for themselves and their families (DeLysa, 2009). For everyone else, it could not. It is argued by care-based
government advocates that with the private sector in disarray because of the financial crisis, many people who never
thought they would need government care programs have turned to them and found them wanting (DeLysa, 2009).
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
14
The point behind these types of approaches is the emphasis to build more networks among contractors, suppliers,
within a government organization, across other departments, and external connections to the community to create an
atmosphere of greater accountability, trust, and cooperative work. In addition, there should be a rational approach to
decide which sources are critical to an organization and which activities have the best chances of improving effectiveness
if they were outsourced.
III.) Implications for Public Administrators:
The phenomenon of the “hollow state” has significant implications for public administrators in several ways. For
example, the practice of contracting out has caused numerous complications in constitutional accountability such as the
fact there is a lack of comprehensible rules defining the actions and responsibilities of the state (Kennedy, 2006). The
example of the Fourteenth Amendment is cited because this amendment had prohibited states from denying the privileges
of citizenship to persons otherwise entitled to them (Kennedy, 2006). In the subsequent years this amendment was
ratified, the courts have interpreted the content of this amendment in various different ways over time depending on the
situation. For example, the Supreme Court declared a distinction between “between state action or “public conduct” under
the procedure of due process, and “private conduct”, which falls outside of the jurisdiction of the amendment, “no matter
how unfair that conduct may be (Kennedy, 2006)." This distinction between public and private is rather vague so that the
Supreme Court has been pushed to develop rules that allow certain private acts to be attributed to government, but these
rules have proven tricky to implement. For example, there have been cases where a government funded program that is
conducted by private actor, but the courts has generally found such action to be deemed as state action (Kennedy, 2006).
In other cases, contracting can provide the means for evasion of the limits imposed by the Bill of Rights by the
government because due process scrutiny is delegated along with the authority to take actions on behalf of the government
to private partners (Kennedy, 2006). With contracting government services there are very serious constitutional and legal
issues involved. There are some characteristics of the relationship between government and private entities that help
determine whether an action can fairly be attributed to the state such as the existence, nature, and extent of government
funding; the nature and extent of government control of the activity in question; the extent to which government has
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
15
authorized a contractor to exercise government powers in which it is up to the legal community to determine who is liable
(Kennedy, 2006). The bottom line should be when government acts, it should be accountable no matter how government
chooses to perform a specific action should not alter that requirement and with contracting government services there are
very serious constitutional and legal issues involved that public administrators must deal with. Public Administrators are
faced with value conflict challenges (ex: cost-efficiency v. responsiveness) and concerns brought forward by different
constituencies before they can contract public services to other organizations.
IV.) Conclusion:
While there is extensive literature that questions the assumptions made by proponents of free market principles
and New Public Management techniques that are intended to make government more responsive, effective, and business
like there is a continual debate on what direction governments at all levels should take to provide public services. The
contracting proponents typically have roots in economics and cite contracting as a way to reduce service costs through
competitiveness and economies of scale. On the other hand, the critics of the contracting practices that are leading to a
hollow state of government, have roots in traditional public administration fields and counter that contracting tends to
sacrifice key public interest values (e.g., equality of treatment) and reduces service delivery capacity (Gooden, 2008).
Regardless of the scholarly debate, the fact is that contracting is and will continue to be a reality that is facing public
managers. In many cases, public managers, such as at this present time, do not always have a choice about contracting and
may be required by elected officials to do so. It is safe to say that public managers charged with contracting services
operate in politically charged environments, challenged by multiple constituencies (citizens, elected officials, interest
groups, etc.) and must juggle value conflicts. For both critics and supporters, it has to be acknowledged that the notion of
so called “one-size-fits-all (Singh, 2003)” judgments about contracting are unrealistic because as many volumes of case
studies will attest to, contracting can improve service delivery or it can be a complete disaster, depending on the
underlying market conditions and management structures in place (Singh, 2003).
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
16
The practice of contracting is not new globally and has been both a challenge and an opportunity for public
administrators, since it became more widespread for the last 30 years or so in this country, due to increasing distrust and
dissatisfaction with government (Kennedy, 2006). Scholars have also noted how the definition of the hollow state has
expanded beyond contraction of public services to private organizations as the dominant trend because the delivery of
public services involves so many different parties and overlapping functions. To some degree, it could be said that
“privatization is passé” because “the historic institutional environment of public administration is liquefying”, due to
forces, such as globalization and devolution, which are causing government to wither and be displaced by governance or a
blend of laws, policies, organizations, institutions, cooperative arrangements, and formal agreements that controls citizens
and the delivery of public benefits (Henry, 2002). There is now a clear distinction that can be made between government
is institutional; governance is institutional and networked, which has led to a new term for the current state of affairs, the
inter-sectoral administration as described in this review. In essence, we are still learning of what are the best methods of
incorporating the inter-sectoral administration into the fold traditional government in an effective manner.
Bibliography
Allen, P. (2007). The New Public Contracting: Regulation, responsiveness, relationality. Journal of Social Policy , 36, 513-
516.
Anechiarico, F. (2007). The New Public Management at Middle Age: Critiques of the Performance Movement. Public
Administration Review , 67 (4), 783-787.
Brown, T. L., Potoski, M., & Slyke, D. M. (2006). Managing Public Service Contracts: Aligning Values, Institutions, and
Markets. Public Administration Review , 66 (3), 323-332.
Bryer, T. A. (2008). Warning: The Hollow State Could Be Deadly. Public Administration Review , 68 (3), 587-591.
Burman, A. (2009/2010). Inherently Government Functions: Has the Debate Changed? Public Manager , 38 (4), 28-31.
Neil Joshi
PAA 601 Final Paper
The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services
17
DeLysa, B. (2009). Markets No More: Toward a Care-Centered Public Administration. Administrative Theory & Praxis , 31
(3), 396-403.
Gooden, V. (2008). Getting Strategic Results through Performance-Based Acquistion. Public Manager , 37 (2), 48-53.
Henry, N. (2002). Is privatization passe? The case for competition and the emergence of intersectoral administration.
Public Administration Review , 62 (3), 374-379.
Kennedy, S. S. (2006). Holding "Governance" Accountable: Third-Party Government in a Limited State. The Independent
Review , 11 (1), 67-78.
Krane, D. (2007). The Unavoidable Politics of Disaster Recovery. Public Manager , 36 (3), 31-37.
Milward, B., & Provan, K. G. (2000). Governing the Hollow State. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory .
Milward, H. P. (2000). Governing the Hollow State. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory , 359-379.
Shetterly, D. R. (2002). You Don't Always Get What You Pay for: The Economics of Privatization. Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management , 21 (1), 161.
Singh, A. (2003). Questioning the New Public Management. Public Administration Review , 63 (1), 116-120.
Terry, L. D. (2005). The Thinning of Administrative Institutions In the Hollow State. Administration & Society , 37 (4), 426-
445.
Zacchea, N. M. (2003). Developing A Strategy For Auditing Outsourced Public Sector Contracts. The Journal of
Government Financial Management , 52 (4).
Zullo, R. (2009). Does Fiscal Stress Induce Privatization? Governance , 22 (3), 459-481.

More Related Content

What's hot

10 kelly mulgan muers creating public value
10 kelly mulgan muers creating public value10 kelly mulgan muers creating public value
10 kelly mulgan muers creating public valueJordi Puig
 
The Costs of Political In‡fluence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing Countries
The Costs of Political In‡fluence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing CountriesThe Costs of Political In‡fluence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing Countries
The Costs of Political In‡fluence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing CountriesStockholm Institute of Transition Economics
 
Combating corruption and fraud for sustainable developmen beyond audit proced...
Combating corruption and fraud for sustainable developmen beyond audit proced...Combating corruption and fraud for sustainable developmen beyond audit proced...
Combating corruption and fraud for sustainable developmen beyond audit proced...Alexander Decker
 
Adversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public services
Adversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public servicesAdversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public services
Adversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public servicesShantanu Basu
 
Banking finance-and-income-inequality
Banking finance-and-income-inequalityBanking finance-and-income-inequality
Banking finance-and-income-inequalityIFLab
 
Booklet highlighting the key messages from the OECD publication "Lobbyists, G...
Booklet highlighting the key messages from the OECD publication "Lobbyists, G...Booklet highlighting the key messages from the OECD publication "Lobbyists, G...
Booklet highlighting the key messages from the OECD publication "Lobbyists, G...OECD Governance
 
Aid Effectiveness in Times of Political Change: Lessons from the Post-Communi...
Aid Effectiveness in Times of Political Change: Lessons from the Post-Communi...Aid Effectiveness in Times of Political Change: Lessons from the Post-Communi...
Aid Effectiveness in Times of Political Change: Lessons from the Post-Communi...Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
 
Corruption, Judicial Accountability and Inequality: Unfair Procedures May Ben...
Corruption, Judicial Accountability and Inequality: Unfair Procedures May Ben...Corruption, Judicial Accountability and Inequality: Unfair Procedures May Ben...
Corruption, Judicial Accountability and Inequality: Unfair Procedures May Ben...Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
 
Social_TheoryApplication_HongKong
Social_TheoryApplication_HongKongSocial_TheoryApplication_HongKong
Social_TheoryApplication_HongKongKurt Callaway
 
Intermunicipal cooperation municipal amalgamation and the price of credit
Intermunicipal cooperation municipal amalgamation and the price of creditIntermunicipal cooperation municipal amalgamation and the price of credit
Intermunicipal cooperation municipal amalgamation and the price of creditBernard Ommeren,van
 

What's hot (20)

Herding in Aid Allocation
Herding in Aid AllocationHerding in Aid Allocation
Herding in Aid Allocation
 
10 kelly mulgan muers creating public value
10 kelly mulgan muers creating public value10 kelly mulgan muers creating public value
10 kelly mulgan muers creating public value
 
Efficient Fiscal Spending by Supranational Unions
Efficient Fiscal Spending by Supranational UnionsEfficient Fiscal Spending by Supranational Unions
Efficient Fiscal Spending by Supranational Unions
 
Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption Evidence from China
Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption Evidence from ChinaLeniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption Evidence from China
Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption Evidence from China
 
Political Man on Horseback: Military Coups and Development
Political Man on Horseback: Military Coups and DevelopmentPolitical Man on Horseback: Military Coups and Development
Political Man on Horseback: Military Coups and Development
 
The Costs of Political In‡fluence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing Countries
The Costs of Political In‡fluence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing CountriesThe Costs of Political In‡fluence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing Countries
The Costs of Political In‡fluence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing Countries
 
Effective service delivery
Effective service deliveryEffective service delivery
Effective service delivery
 
Combating corruption and fraud for sustainable developmen beyond audit proced...
Combating corruption and fraud for sustainable developmen beyond audit proced...Combating corruption and fraud for sustainable developmen beyond audit proced...
Combating corruption and fraud for sustainable developmen beyond audit proced...
 
Adversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public services
Adversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public servicesAdversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public services
Adversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public services
 
Banking finance-and-income-inequality
Banking finance-and-income-inequalityBanking finance-and-income-inequality
Banking finance-and-income-inequality
 
Booklet highlighting the key messages from the OECD publication "Lobbyists, G...
Booklet highlighting the key messages from the OECD publication "Lobbyists, G...Booklet highlighting the key messages from the OECD publication "Lobbyists, G...
Booklet highlighting the key messages from the OECD publication "Lobbyists, G...
 
Aid Effectiveness in Times of Political Change: Lessons from the Post-Communi...
Aid Effectiveness in Times of Political Change: Lessons from the Post-Communi...Aid Effectiveness in Times of Political Change: Lessons from the Post-Communi...
Aid Effectiveness in Times of Political Change: Lessons from the Post-Communi...
 
On the Timing of Turkey’s Authoritarian Turn
On the Timing of Turkey’s Authoritarian TurnOn the Timing of Turkey’s Authoritarian Turn
On the Timing of Turkey’s Authoritarian Turn
 
Corruption, Judicial Accountability and Inequality: Unfair Procedures May Ben...
Corruption, Judicial Accountability and Inequality: Unfair Procedures May Ben...Corruption, Judicial Accountability and Inequality: Unfair Procedures May Ben...
Corruption, Judicial Accountability and Inequality: Unfair Procedures May Ben...
 
Political Man on Horseback Coups and Development
Political Man on Horseback Coups and DevelopmentPolitical Man on Horseback Coups and Development
Political Man on Horseback Coups and Development
 
Poverty, Exclusion, and Dissent - Support for Regimes in Developing Countries
Poverty, Exclusion, and Dissent - Support for Regimes in Developing CountriesPoverty, Exclusion, and Dissent - Support for Regimes in Developing Countries
Poverty, Exclusion, and Dissent - Support for Regimes in Developing Countries
 
Ade neuro psy
Ade neuro psyAde neuro psy
Ade neuro psy
 
Political Influence in Transition Economies: Firm Level Evidence
Political Influence in Transition Economies: Firm Level EvidencePolitical Influence in Transition Economies: Firm Level Evidence
Political Influence in Transition Economies: Firm Level Evidence
 
Social_TheoryApplication_HongKong
Social_TheoryApplication_HongKongSocial_TheoryApplication_HongKong
Social_TheoryApplication_HongKong
 
Intermunicipal cooperation municipal amalgamation and the price of credit
Intermunicipal cooperation municipal amalgamation and the price of creditIntermunicipal cooperation municipal amalgamation and the price of credit
Intermunicipal cooperation municipal amalgamation and the price of credit
 

Viewers also liked

Ryland resume January 2016
Ryland resume January 2016Ryland resume January 2016
Ryland resume January 2016Ryland Slingsby
 
Evaluating Sustainable Development in US Cities and States_finalpaper_
Evaluating Sustainable Development in US Cities and States_finalpaper_Evaluating Sustainable Development in US Cities and States_finalpaper_
Evaluating Sustainable Development in US Cities and States_finalpaper_Neil Joshi
 
Professional Profile Gilda Antonio 18 March 2016
Professional Profile Gilda Antonio  18 March 2016Professional Profile Gilda Antonio  18 March 2016
Professional Profile Gilda Antonio 18 March 2016Gilda Antonio
 
2015_Sept_30_NepalEQ-CaseStudy_Final-2col
2015_Sept_30_NepalEQ-CaseStudy_Final-2col2015_Sept_30_NepalEQ-CaseStudy_Final-2col
2015_Sept_30_NepalEQ-CaseStudy_Final-2colRobin Crozier
 
DHS National Summit Full CHAIR Geoff Shively
DHS National Summit Full CHAIR Geoff ShivelyDHS National Summit Full CHAIR Geoff Shively
DHS National Summit Full CHAIR Geoff ShivelyCurious Geoff (Shively)
 
First annual economic inclusion update 031716 final (2)
First annual economic inclusion update 031716 final (2)First annual economic inclusion update 031716 final (2)
First annual economic inclusion update 031716 final (2)Harry Black
 
Monografia - Direito (PENAL) Econômico
Monografia - Direito (PENAL) EconômicoMonografia - Direito (PENAL) Econômico
Monografia - Direito (PENAL) EconômicoMoacir Pinto
 
Org Structure - 10-15-14
Org Structure - 10-15-14Org Structure - 10-15-14
Org Structure - 10-15-14Jim Heinen
 
Ultimate Guide To Being A Team Leader
Ultimate Guide To Being A Team LeaderUltimate Guide To Being A Team Leader
Ultimate Guide To Being A Team Leadersur96
 
History and physical examination in pediatrics; illustrated book of pediatrics
History and physical examination in pediatrics; illustrated book of pediatricsHistory and physical examination in pediatrics; illustrated book of pediatrics
History and physical examination in pediatrics; illustrated book of pediatricsMays Yousuf
 

Viewers also liked (12)

Ryland resume January 2016
Ryland resume January 2016Ryland resume January 2016
Ryland resume January 2016
 
Evaluating Sustainable Development in US Cities and States_finalpaper_
Evaluating Sustainable Development in US Cities and States_finalpaper_Evaluating Sustainable Development in US Cities and States_finalpaper_
Evaluating Sustainable Development in US Cities and States_finalpaper_
 
Professional Profile Gilda Antonio 18 March 2016
Professional Profile Gilda Antonio  18 March 2016Professional Profile Gilda Antonio  18 March 2016
Professional Profile Gilda Antonio 18 March 2016
 
2015_Sept_30_NepalEQ-CaseStudy_Final-2col
2015_Sept_30_NepalEQ-CaseStudy_Final-2col2015_Sept_30_NepalEQ-CaseStudy_Final-2col
2015_Sept_30_NepalEQ-CaseStudy_Final-2col
 
DHS National Summit Full CHAIR Geoff Shively
DHS National Summit Full CHAIR Geoff ShivelyDHS National Summit Full CHAIR Geoff Shively
DHS National Summit Full CHAIR Geoff Shively
 
First annual economic inclusion update 031716 final (2)
First annual economic inclusion update 031716 final (2)First annual economic inclusion update 031716 final (2)
First annual economic inclusion update 031716 final (2)
 
Monografia - Direito (PENAL) Econômico
Monografia - Direito (PENAL) EconômicoMonografia - Direito (PENAL) Econômico
Monografia - Direito (PENAL) Econômico
 
RTA
RTARTA
RTA
 
Org Structure - 10-15-14
Org Structure - 10-15-14Org Structure - 10-15-14
Org Structure - 10-15-14
 
Sherlock holmes
Sherlock holmesSherlock holmes
Sherlock holmes
 
Ultimate Guide To Being A Team Leader
Ultimate Guide To Being A Team LeaderUltimate Guide To Being A Team Leader
Ultimate Guide To Being A Team Leader
 
History and physical examination in pediatrics; illustrated book of pediatrics
History and physical examination in pediatrics; illustrated book of pediatricsHistory and physical examination in pediatrics; illustrated book of pediatrics
History and physical examination in pediatrics; illustrated book of pediatrics
 

Similar to neiljoshi_privatization of governmental services_finalpaper_

Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...
Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...
Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...Daniel P. Vitaletti
 
Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...
Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...
Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...Daniel P. Vitaletti
 
E-Government and Social Media as openess and anti-corruption tools
E-Government and Social Media as openess and anti-corruption toolsE-Government and Social Media as openess and anti-corruption tools
E-Government and Social Media as openess and anti-corruption toolsDr Lendy Spires
 
Adversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public services
Adversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public servicesAdversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public services
Adversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public servicesShantanu Basu
 
Causes of Corruption in the Public Sector.pdf
Causes of Corruption in the Public Sector.pdfCauses of Corruption in the Public Sector.pdf
Causes of Corruption in the Public Sector.pdfWajidKhanMP
 
Citizen Satisfaction with Police: A Pillar of Law Enforcement Governance
Citizen Satisfaction with Police: A Pillar of Law Enforcement GovernanceCitizen Satisfaction with Police: A Pillar of Law Enforcement Governance
Citizen Satisfaction with Police: A Pillar of Law Enforcement Governanceinventionjournals
 
Critical evaluation of the potential of stakeholder theory to contribute to u...
Critical evaluation of the potential of stakeholder theory to contribute to u...Critical evaluation of the potential of stakeholder theory to contribute to u...
Critical evaluation of the potential of stakeholder theory to contribute to u...Kennedy Mbwette
 
10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY March 2000Peters, Pierre MUTU
10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY  March 2000Peters, Pierre  MUTU10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY  March 2000Peters, Pierre  MUTU
10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY March 2000Peters, Pierre MUTUSantosConleyha
 
10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY March 2000Peters, Pierre MUTU
10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY  March 2000Peters, Pierre  MUTU10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY  March 2000Peters, Pierre  MUTU
10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY March 2000Peters, Pierre MUTUBenitoSumpter862
 
Neal D. Buckwalter is assistant profes-sor in the School o.docx
Neal D. Buckwalter is assistant profes-sor in the School o.docxNeal D. Buckwalter is assistant profes-sor in the School o.docx
Neal D. Buckwalter is assistant profes-sor in the School o.docxhallettfaustina
 
The Role of Government in Tourism: Linking Competitiveness, Freedom, and Deve...
The Role of Government in Tourism: Linking Competitiveness, Freedom, and Deve...The Role of Government in Tourism: Linking Competitiveness, Freedom, and Deve...
The Role of Government in Tourism: Linking Competitiveness, Freedom, and Deve...David Vicent
 
Citizen and Administration - Plutus IAS.pdf
Citizen and Administration - Plutus IAS.pdfCitizen and Administration - Plutus IAS.pdf
Citizen and Administration - Plutus IAS.pdfPlutus IAS
 
Traditional Public Administration
Traditional Public AdministrationTraditional Public Administration
Traditional Public AdministrationBrenda Higgins
 
Justin B. Bullock is assistant professor in the Bush Schoo.docx
Justin B. Bullock is assistant professor in the Bush Schoo.docxJustin B. Bullock is assistant professor in the Bush Schoo.docx
Justin B. Bullock is assistant professor in the Bush Schoo.docxtawnyataylor528
 
Corporate Governance in Local Governments of the Public Sector for Sustainabl...
Corporate Governance in Local Governments of the Public Sector for Sustainabl...Corporate Governance in Local Governments of the Public Sector for Sustainabl...
Corporate Governance in Local Governments of the Public Sector for Sustainabl...ijtsrd
 
Video 1 Linkhttpswaldenu.kanopy.comvideogroup-therapy-live-
Video 1 Linkhttpswaldenu.kanopy.comvideogroup-therapy-live-Video 1 Linkhttpswaldenu.kanopy.comvideogroup-therapy-live-
Video 1 Linkhttpswaldenu.kanopy.comvideogroup-therapy-live-VannaJoy20
 
The Global Public Management Revolution
The Global Public Management RevolutionThe Global Public Management Revolution
The Global Public Management RevolutionMackendy Pierre-Louis
 
An evaluation of_governance_indicators
An evaluation of_governance_indicatorsAn evaluation of_governance_indicators
An evaluation of_governance_indicatorsMalik Khalid Mehmood
 
A Critical Review Of Literature On Influence Of Good Governance On Service Qu...
A Critical Review Of Literature On Influence Of Good Governance On Service Qu...A Critical Review Of Literature On Influence Of Good Governance On Service Qu...
A Critical Review Of Literature On Influence Of Good Governance On Service Qu...Stacy Taylor
 

Similar to neiljoshi_privatization of governmental services_finalpaper_ (20)

Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...
Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...
Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...
 
Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...
Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...
Recession, Renewal, Revolution Nonprofit and Voluntary Action in an Age of Tu...
 
E-Government and Social Media as openess and anti-corruption tools
E-Government and Social Media as openess and anti-corruption toolsE-Government and Social Media as openess and anti-corruption tools
E-Government and Social Media as openess and anti-corruption tools
 
Adversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public services
Adversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public servicesAdversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public services
Adversarial and cooperative models in contracting for public services
 
Causes of Corruption in the Public Sector.pdf
Causes of Corruption in the Public Sector.pdfCauses of Corruption in the Public Sector.pdf
Causes of Corruption in the Public Sector.pdf
 
Citizen Satisfaction with Police: A Pillar of Law Enforcement Governance
Citizen Satisfaction with Police: A Pillar of Law Enforcement GovernanceCitizen Satisfaction with Police: A Pillar of Law Enforcement Governance
Citizen Satisfaction with Police: A Pillar of Law Enforcement Governance
 
Critical evaluation of the potential of stakeholder theory to contribute to u...
Critical evaluation of the potential of stakeholder theory to contribute to u...Critical evaluation of the potential of stakeholder theory to contribute to u...
Critical evaluation of the potential of stakeholder theory to contribute to u...
 
10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY March 2000Peters, Pierre MUTU
10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY  March 2000Peters, Pierre  MUTU10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY  March 2000Peters, Pierre  MUTU
10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY March 2000Peters, Pierre MUTU
 
10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY March 2000Peters, Pierre MUTU
10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY  March 2000Peters, Pierre  MUTU10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY  March 2000Peters, Pierre  MUTU
10ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY March 2000Peters, Pierre MUTU
 
Neal D. Buckwalter is assistant profes-sor in the School o.docx
Neal D. Buckwalter is assistant profes-sor in the School o.docxNeal D. Buckwalter is assistant profes-sor in the School o.docx
Neal D. Buckwalter is assistant profes-sor in the School o.docx
 
The Role of Government in Tourism: Linking Competitiveness, Freedom, and Deve...
The Role of Government in Tourism: Linking Competitiveness, Freedom, and Deve...The Role of Government in Tourism: Linking Competitiveness, Freedom, and Deve...
The Role of Government in Tourism: Linking Competitiveness, Freedom, and Deve...
 
Citizen and Administration - Plutus IAS.pdf
Citizen and Administration - Plutus IAS.pdfCitizen and Administration - Plutus IAS.pdf
Citizen and Administration - Plutus IAS.pdf
 
Traditional Public Administration
Traditional Public AdministrationTraditional Public Administration
Traditional Public Administration
 
Effect of Govt Funding
Effect of Govt FundingEffect of Govt Funding
Effect of Govt Funding
 
Justin B. Bullock is assistant professor in the Bush Schoo.docx
Justin B. Bullock is assistant professor in the Bush Schoo.docxJustin B. Bullock is assistant professor in the Bush Schoo.docx
Justin B. Bullock is assistant professor in the Bush Schoo.docx
 
Corporate Governance in Local Governments of the Public Sector for Sustainabl...
Corporate Governance in Local Governments of the Public Sector for Sustainabl...Corporate Governance in Local Governments of the Public Sector for Sustainabl...
Corporate Governance in Local Governments of the Public Sector for Sustainabl...
 
Video 1 Linkhttpswaldenu.kanopy.comvideogroup-therapy-live-
Video 1 Linkhttpswaldenu.kanopy.comvideogroup-therapy-live-Video 1 Linkhttpswaldenu.kanopy.comvideogroup-therapy-live-
Video 1 Linkhttpswaldenu.kanopy.comvideogroup-therapy-live-
 
The Global Public Management Revolution
The Global Public Management RevolutionThe Global Public Management Revolution
The Global Public Management Revolution
 
An evaluation of_governance_indicators
An evaluation of_governance_indicatorsAn evaluation of_governance_indicators
An evaluation of_governance_indicators
 
A Critical Review Of Literature On Influence Of Good Governance On Service Qu...
A Critical Review Of Literature On Influence Of Good Governance On Service Qu...A Critical Review Of Literature On Influence Of Good Governance On Service Qu...
A Critical Review Of Literature On Influence Of Good Governance On Service Qu...
 

neiljoshi_privatization of governmental services_finalpaper_

  • 1. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 1 I.) Introduction: The phenomena of what is called the “Hollow State” where government increasingly contracts various services such as prisons, health services, water delivery, waste removal, defense, among many other services that we take for granted as part of our modern society is not a new trend, but rather has a long history globally, in general, as many countries today employ some form of contracting (Milward H. P., 2000). At the heart of it, economically speaking, a public service is meant to satisfy an essential societal need (Shetterly, 2002). Members of society, individually or collectively, usually cannot deliver these services. The contracting out of public services is one form of privatization where the production or the provision of public services is commissioned to the market (Milward H. P., 2000). The result of this process is that the role of the state changes from public provider to buyer of public services (Milward H. P., 2000). The belief behind contracting out public services is that the introduction of market elements in the production of public services increases effectiveness and efficiency. In reality directing the contractor to supply services according to the agency’s policies and preferences in the deliverance of various services is both a difficult and costly challenge. More importantly, government faces the dilemma in safeguarding public interests, in terms of value conflicts, especially the balance between effectiveness and efficiency (Milward H. P., 2000). In the U.S., after decades of state and local government experiments with contracting out, the benefits of private delivery of public services have proven to be elusive (Milward H. P., 2000). The practice of contracting out services has more often resulted in the opposite of intended results in terms of higher costs, poor quality of service, increased opportunities for corruption and diminished government flexibility, control and accountability (Milward H. P., 2000). Practices related to contracting out public services are rooted in a distrust of government and an often-reflexive preference for markets or civil society (Terry, 2005). This literature review highlights some of the works published by scholars across a spectrum of disciplines: economics, political science, public administration, law, among others sought to understand its nature, characteristics, and administrative requirements as well as its implications for democratic governance. The growing disenchantment with the performance of the public sector has set the stage for market reforms and that privatization is an idea drawn out of “ideological moorings” and not so much out of historical experience as this literature
  • 2. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 2 review will discuss (Singh, 2003). The astonishing part about this worldwide movement away from government provision to government procurement of these services is that there is little evidence that governments or academics know much about how to govern or manage networks. (Milward & Provan, 2000) II.) Key Points: Subtheme 1: The Characteristics of the Hollow State: The term “hollow state” is used to describe the nature of the devolution of power and decentralization of services” from central governments to sub-national governments, in addition to third parties such as nonprofit agencies and private firms to deliver public services. Government has several choices, it can produce public services internally, purchase public services from external sources, or use some combination of the two (Gooden, 2008). This system raises important questions about democratic accountability and the legitimacy of government. Alexander Hamilton warned of the danger that the “hollow state” can bring about, long before the terminology was coined by writing that the American public's confidence in government is "proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration (Terry, 2005)" which deserves serious consideration by current public administrators because it potentially threatens the long-term stability of the U.S. constitutional democracy (Terry, 2005). These Market libertarians or whatever terminology wants to use for them stood in sharp contrast to the Keynesian welfare state created during the previous historical era (In the US, this was the New Deal era which expanded the size of government) (Terry, 2005). Proponents of market liberalism blamed the policies of the state for slow economic growth, inflationary wage pressures, and a multitude of other economic and social ills (Terry, 2005). The only remedy in their opinion was to dismantle the traditional administrative management practices of the Keynesian welfare state and replacing them with management technologies under the label of the NPM (Terry, 2005). These trends in the development of the hollow state have led to a new term being devised the inter-sectoral administration (Henry, 2002). This is defined as the management and coordination of the relations among government agencies and organizations in the private and nonprofit sectors for the purpose of achieving specific policy goals (Henry, 2002).
  • 3. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 3 Contracting should be viewed as an economic exchange that requires for government institutions to align public values, institutions, and service-market conditions. Public managers operate in an environment of changing social and political values such as effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, responsiveness, equality of treatment, and service quality (Zacchea, 2003). Critics of the reasoning justifying the hollow state phenomena believe that public management approaches employed by government have undervalued the intangibles in public policy such as identity, pluralism, and multiculturalism necessary for a democratic society (Zacchea, 2003). These scholars conclude now the argument put forward by proponents of contracting services that the state needs to shed its extra baggage is now firmly entrenched in public opinion, without specifying the complexity involved in such a task (Singh, 2003). Instead the concept of continuous reform has been emphasized because "changing an institutional structure as large as a public bureaucracy is a difficult chore; even changing one organization within it has been enough to defeat some experienced and skilled practitioners (Singh, 2003)." Managers experience these values as pressures from internal or external stakeholders that they must balance or optimize as they deliver services. There are always some conditions that lie beyond a manager’s control. For instance, managers typically have little influence over the laws and rules governing service delivery, such as those that allow the use of some management practices or service delivery approaches but prohibit others. (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006) Still, all things being equal, services with inherently lower transaction costs are more favorable contracting targets, freeing resources to lower costs or to purchase more service quality (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). On the other hand, services with higher transaction costs pose greater contracting problems, consuming more resources and inhibiting a manager’s ability to optimize competing values (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). There has been extensive debate about what is NPM and the origins of the ideology of this movement among scholars but there is general consensus on the theoretical foundation of NPM. Scholars agree that public-choice theory, transaction-cost economics and principal-agent theory are important influences that have contributed to the hollow state phenomena (Kennedy, 2006). But, what supporters of contracting out fail to understand is that by eliminating rules and regulations disregards the important role that rules and regulations play in strengthening the capacity and integrity of administrative institutions (Kennedy, 2006).
  • 4. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 4 Subtheme 2: Factors That Lead to Privatization: A very relevant question for public administrators during these difficult financial times, where governments at all levels have been forced to increasingly study whether to contract out services or in certain cases even share services amongst each other to save costs, improve the quality of service, and improve efficiency. This article describes the results of a ten year comprehensive study conducted from 1992 to 2002 using a variety of data sources (Zullo, 2009). This research distinguishes between both private and inter municipal contracting. There is a distinction between the motives for private contracting and inter-municipal contracting because “Private contracting…is partially driven by an ideological preference for reducing the size of government, an objective that inter-municipal contracting clearly fails to satisfy. Inter-municipal contracting is used to achieve economies of scale, to take advantage of overlapping geographic jurisdictions, and to outsource when there are legal restrictions on the delegation of governmental powers (Zullo, 2009).” In other words, one form of contracting, private contracting, is influenced more by ideological means and the other form, inter municipal contracting is driven primarily by economic factors. The study concludes, despite the assumption that financial stress could lead to contracting or sharing of services, there is no evidence that fiscal stress induces privatization. It notes that those governments with high debt levels tend to reduce publicly delivered services. The county governments surveyed were about as likely to partner with neighboring municipalities as they are with private firms if they took such cost saving measures (Zullo, 2009). The strongest and most reliable predictor of both private and inter municipal contracting was the creation of new public services, not political influence or economic reasons. On the other hand, the public administration model states in contrast to the public choice theory that local government officials are pragmatists who supply communities with cost-effective, quality services (Zullo, 2009). This is not to say that this theory disregards the presence of interest group pressure, but this theory emphasizes accountability to the public as an important motivator of the decisions taken by rational public administrators (Zullo, 2009). This ideology believes that private contracting is conditional on labor and management relations. For example, when labor relations are contentious and where the possibility of collaboration is low (Zullo, 2009). The public administration model makes a careful distinction between private and public goods, and appreciates a role for government in providing the latter. This theory views governmental agencies as organizations balancing competing demands from both within and outside of the
  • 5. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 5 agency, which is indeed very true in reality (Zullo, 2009). Therefore, with the proper talent, resources, and oversight mechanisms ensuring accountability in place, public agencies can effectively deliver public goods. The conclusion from this theory is that while fiscal stress sets in motion financial and operational reform, private contracting is not the default option for public organizations nor it is a panacea for the shortcomings in the provision of public services from such organizations, private contracting is merely just one strategy for service reorganization, that can be taken in lieu of improving the existing public service workforce. It notes that governance, rather government, is a more appropriate description of the reality of contemporary state structures, where an ever-increasing percentage of the state's work is outsourced to for-profit, nonprofit, and faith-based organizations (Kennedy, 2006). Subtheme 3: Criticism of the Hollow State Phenomena: The hollow state can be traced back to the gradual expansion of government since the New Deal. The increasing development of the hollow state has spurred rethinking the relationship between government power and fundamental rights (Kennedy, 2006). This is because the hollow state has provoked scholars to create a new definition of government because the boundaries between public and private sector are making are being blurred by for-profit and nonprofit organizations that are being gradually incorporated into the fold of traditional government. A major dilemma is how this system is affecting the constitutional system that forms the basis for American government and “depends on the distinction between public and private to serve as a fundamental safeguard of private rights. (Kennedy, 2006)” Critics, such as the authors cited in this literature review, state that because delivering public services has become increasing complex, outsourcing brings with it inherent risks which include: The loss of expertise after an outsourcing decision has been made because the government may no longer employ personnel with service delivery expertise (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). This in turn results in an increased dependence on service providers and possibly a reduction in control over the delivery of a service if there are not the proper administrative procedures in place to ensure the job is done. There is the potential for escalating costs which results from poor service delivery expertise from a contractor who may incrementally raise the costs of providing a service as they see fit (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). In many cases, it
  • 6. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 6 has been reported that contracting services has in general increased the risk of service delivery failures be it due to deficiencies in the contracting process, or shortcomings by the service contractor, outsourcing brings with it a potential for the non-delivery of critical services (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). The obvious concern that remains for public administrators is whether outsourcing can deliver services in the quality, quantity and timeliness required and at a reasonable cost (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). The fundamental question that must be carefully deliberated is therefore whether outsourcing, or continuing to provide a service in-house, provides the level of service desired (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). It is believed by many that thin regulative systems are believed to undermine the integrity of administrative institutions and weaken their capacity to serve the common good (Terry, 2005). The effects of the hollow state are apparent in how the federal workforce was reduced from approximately 2.3 million employees in fiscal 1990 to fewer than 1.9 million in 1999 (Terry, 2005). Federal agencies were compelled to drastically reduced or froze their hiring efforts for extended periods of time in line with the doctrine of NPM. One approach of NPM is the concept of liberation management. This is based on the premise that public managers are competent and highly skilled individuals familiar with good management practices. Proponents of this philosophy believe that the bureaucratic system with its burdensome rules, controls, and procedures, is largely responsible for poor government performance (Terry, 2005). In other words, bureaucracy has constrained the decision making processes, discretion, and actions of public managers by limiting their freedom to improve government performance, so public managers must be “freed” from these bonds and “senseless red tape” to achieve better performance (Terry, 2005). This principle provided a justification in the cutbacks in the 1990’s under the Clinton Administration. However, these actions “reduced the influx of new people with new skills, new knowledge, new energy and ideas (Terry, 2005)" Some agencies reported that downsizing in general led to such adverse effects as loss of institutional memory and an increase in work backlogs hindering their ability to achieve organizational mission (Terry, 2005). This is not to say that the concept of utilizing performance measurement in government should be abandoned but the literature studied indicates that in too many cases has selected the wrong targets or ignored non-quantifiable criteria
  • 7. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 7 that is essential to the operations of many agencies. A well known example is the unintended effects caused by the No Child Left Behind Act (Anechiarico, 2007). This legislation has been criticized in many academic circles because it places undue pressure on educators to “teaching to the test. (Singh, 2003)" It has been argued that this has created a system whose output is children who are attaining acceptable scores on the test, with innovation and variation of material suffering not to mention the professional discretion of teachers and school administrators (Anechiarico, 2007). Various experts assert that the result of ignoring non-standard performance criteria in effect creates the erroneous belief that there are “one-size solutions” to improve administrative efficiency and services. Many experts in general chafe about the rigidity of the Government Results and Performance Act (GPRA) of 1993 or the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) that puts in their view unduly powerful emphasis on performance based standards (Anechiarico, 2007). Elliot Sclar in his book about the economics of privatization argues that the decision to contract is complicated by the nature of public services, which is also often overlooked by proponents of contracting services (Shetterly, 2002). His analysis notes that the key to successful contracting is the ability for the service to be adequately specified. He states that specifying work for residential refuse collection is much different than specifying work for a mental health contract in which the production process is complex and uncertain, and effect on patients difficult to measure (Shetterly, 2002). Therefore, the type of service contracted influences the contract relationship and the ease with which it can be monitored (Shetterly, 2002). Sclar notes two of the elements that constitute the cost for contracted services. He cites the comparative cost of service provision which compares the costs for the public and private sectors to do a particular task (Shetterly, 2002). There is also the transaction cost which is the cost incurred by a public organization to select and monitor a contractor. Therefore, administrators can derive the true cost of a contract operation as being the production cost (normally the annual payment made to the contractor) plus the internal costs incurred by having a contract operation to provide a fair cost comparison (Shetterly, 2002). However, in many cases the transaction cost is rarely considered, which may lead to incorrect analysis regarding contracting a public service. The relevance of the standard economic model of competition to public contracting was also examined. The standard economic model, advocated by market libertarians
  • 8. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 8 assumes there will be “robust” competition for the services in question, but this is rarely the case in reality (Shetterly, 2002). Sclar notes that most contracting actions involve no or minimal competition and in certain cases the public sector is the market. This is because the “effective markets” envisioned by proponents of free market principles by its very nature requires large numbers of participants who are well informed about the quality, price, and availability of the goods being exchanged. Such proponents fail to understand that many services tend toward monopoly provision, such as those performed by government, because only the organization producing the service can afford the large investments in assets that are specific to delivering that service (Zacchea, 2003). Sclar also studied the two types of contracts that are most commonly used. One type is a complete contract characterized as such because "...generally the contract terms effectively capture all present and future rights and obligations between the parties. (Shetterly, 2002)" These complete contracts are in low frequency of contracting transactions ( such as a one-time or infrequent need), where there is little uncertainty about the work to be undertaken (the process is known and understood), and a there is a specific output desired within a specified timeframe (repairing potholes or repaving streets) (Shetterly, 2002).The other type is the incomplete contract, which does not capture all of the present and future rights and responsibilities of both parties. This is the most common type of contract used (Shetterly, 2002). This type of contract is referred to as incomplete because the parties cannot predict and understand the effect of future situations. Incomplete contracting can pose problems related to information asymmetry, which leads to two particular problems in the principal-agent relationship governing a contract, moral hazard and adverse selection (Shetterly, 2002). The first, adverse selection involves selection of agents in a manner adverse to the principal, for example if the government lacks certain information related to the contractor selection decision). The other is moral hazard where the agent acts in ways inconsistent with the goals of the principal (Shetterly, 2002). Both are caused by the principal's inability to obtain or understand information relevant to selection of an agent and the agent's behavior in carrying out the terms of the contract and could lead for example to “opportunistic behavior” on the part of the agent. Because of the fact that opportunities for complete contracts are rare, and incomplete contracts are costly for government to award and monitor, Sclar suggests relational contracting as an alternative (Shetterly, 2002). Relational contracting replaces the
  • 9. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 9 formal legalistic governance structure associated with incomplete contracting with a bilateral governance structure based on trust and cooperation between organizations, replacing an adversarial relationship with one of cooperation and mutual benefit (Shetterly, 2002). Subtheme 4: The Pervasiveness of the Hollow State in Society: The presence of contracted services in government is pervasive throughout American society, we can see examples of it in our day to day lives. For example we see the presence of the hollow state in the government ability to coordinate an appropriate response to disasters. The rise of “third party” government has been generally impeded the effectiveness of government responses. For example in the case of the response before and after hurricane Katrina, much has been made of the politics behind the decision making process behind government actions related to the construction of storm defense systems and the government response to the disaster (misplaced attention, cronyism, partisanship, patronage, class based indifference to the poor, special interest groups, etc. (Krane, 2007)) However, the point that is often overlooked the government response was how third party government played a role in the inadequate coordinated government response to this disaster. Katrina is yet another example of government that was complicated by inter- sectorial politics (Krane, 2007). In this case, there was a raging debate over insurance coverage to victims. The states of Louisiana and Mississippi were engaged in an argument with insurance companies over the settlement of damage claims suffered by each state's residents (and the various jurisdictions within those states) in the form of lawsuits contesting the insurance company actions related to the cause of damage, amount of compensation, and degree of negligence by the property owner (Krane, 2007). Because of the layered nature of insurance coverage, this compensation is only a portion of the total claims, and the remaining claims are in dispute as to the insurers that have responsibility for the payments (Krane, 2007). The Hollow State can also produce deadly results. For example, there is literature that chronicles the rise of military contractors such as Blackwater, which can be considered the most powerful private army in the world (Bryer, 2008). As described earlier, private military contractors like Blackwater pose a serious dilemma regarding constitutional
  • 10. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 10 rights of an individual. Under current law both U.S. and Iraqi, security contractors are immune from lawsuits. The Blackwater incident in 2007 has led many to question the logic of the immunity clause (Bryer, 2008). On February 27, 2007, a sniper employed by a security contractor opened fire and killed innocent Iraqi civilians (Bryer, 2008). The U.S. Department of State had later cleared the sniper and the company of any legal wrongdoing, offering that the action taken was within the scope of work of the contractor in its efforts to protect U.S. diplomats, which led to notoriety for Blackwater (Bryer, 2008). The case of the Fallujah attack by the U.S. military raid is an example of how the lack of coordination between military and private security can lead to devastating consequences (Bryer, 2008). In the Fallujah case, military strategists had no interest in deploying troops in the city itself in order to avoid unnecessary hostilities with city residents but the attack on civilian contractors employed by Blackwater forced a change in strategy (Bryer, 2008). Therefore scholars have suggested placing more oversight controls on privatized military firms, such as Blackwater in the form of “highly specified and transparent contracts that are focused on clearly defined results and permissible actions (Bryer, 2008).” Subtheme 5: Methods to Improve the Effectiveness of Contracting: Once governments select a contractor, the most important task then involves monitoring and evaluating the performance of vendors working under contract. This is because while there is truth that the practice contracting out services under the NPM theory brings flexibility, “it is erroneous to think that without building institutions of public accountability this would bring any substantial difference (Singh, 2003).” Well-monitored vendors are more likely to perform according to contract specifications, thereby improving returns from contracting if there is the legal basis to do so. A common recommended for managers is to perform tactical and strategic planning and management in terms of how something will get done how it will be achieved (Gooden, 2008). It is widely recognized that but without foresight government falls behind in several areas such as technology, economy, and demography needed for operations. They
  • 11. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 11 concluded that several tools and such as geographic information systems, public involvement approaches, and forecasting methods could be used to better understand the future (Gooden, 2008). It has also been stated that because of the fact that management decisions and actions affect many parties it is suggested that these players should be included in the planning, management, and decision-making processes (Allen, 2007). When diverse parties are included in the planning and decision making process, they are more likely to share in the accountability and responsibility for the outcome (Gooden, 2008). Some managers cite eight effective practices that have technical and relationship aspects that successful managers use in the contracting process, which are (Gooden, 2008): 1. They emphasize pre-bid planning activities and multiple needs assessment methods to accurately reflect service needs for the area and to more equitably distribute services for various populations. 2. They monitor waiting lists and utilization of services regularly to determine who uses and needs services. 3. They rely on a large number of participants to review proposals. 4. They use a standard tool to rate them to ensure fairness and competitiveness in the proposal evaluation step. 5. They conduct debriefings as training and mediation sessions and encourage bidders to become more capable to participate in future bidding. 6. They negotiate rates on the basis of pricing ranges, not line-item details. 7. They assist providers with program and budget support. 8. They rely on experience and technical competence to succeed.
  • 12. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 12 One crucial example of various methods that have been suggested to improve the practices governing contracting out public services is how the Obama administration done it’s part to recognize the detrimental changes that the increasing contraction can bring about to government. His administration has attempted to produce a new "single consistent definition" of inherently governmental functions that can be applied throughout the government (Burman, 2009/2010). In a presidential memorandum dated March 4, 2009, he stated that: "Government outsourcing for services raises special concerns." He goes on to say, "The line between inherently governmental activities that should not be outsourced and commercial activities that may be subject to private sector competition has been blurred and inadequately defined. As a result, contractors may be performing inherently governmental functions. (Burman, 2009/2010)" Obama personally warned in his memo of the dangers associated with “over-reliance on contractors” which can weaken the “in-house capacity that is essential to effective government performance." Obama’s actions are significant because it regards the issue of extensively contracting public services as a real threat to government stability and authority (Burman, 2009/2010). The central issue put forward by the administration’s actions is that the issue is not so much about which laws or policies determine the federal government’s responsibilities but how a “capable and robust” federal workforce can effectively oversee contractor activities and facilitate communication (Burman, 2009/2010). The purpose is to give flexibility to agencies regarding outsourcing services by providing guidelines that will allow them to choose which are to be contracted. This means that each agency is to determine what their core competencies are, regardless of whether the activity is widely found in the private sector (Burman, 2009/2010). For example, if meteorologists are critical to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's mission, then it be wise to keep such staff and their operations within the agency. Functions that are not critical to the agency operations and mission can be outsourced or shared among agencies (Burman, 2009/2010). The guidelines put forward offer three categories of functions: Those that are inherently governmental (e.g. determined by law or regulation or by OMB guidance), critical, but not inherently governmental (determined by agency officials), essential, but not inherently governmental (determined by agency officials using a cost- comparison approach to seek the "most cost-effective source of support for the organization") (Burman, 2009/2010).
  • 13. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 13 Another suggestion put forward for scholarly review is by Burnier DeLysa who advocates a care-based approach to public management, which has feminist roots from the frontier settlements in the old West. She believes that a care- based model is relevant now because of the "real world" collapse of the housing and financial markets that triggered the current recession in lieu of the businesslike approach to government, which includes contracting (DeLysa, 2009). She noted that for many public administrators, especially those working at the street and agency levels, care-centered administration is already at the core of what they do (DeLysa, 2009). She believes that public administration should return more towards it’s roots in providing quality public service that improves people's lives and stresses caring for others, not efficiency, at the center of administration. This sort of view was embraced during the Progressive and New Deal eras, in part due to the advocacy of Frances Perkins, the labor secretary to FDR. In stark contrast to contemporary rhetoric about privatization and market-based government, Perkins believed that "government in a democracy is a service agency for these essential activities of human cooperation (Burman, 2009/2010)." A care-centered public administration as envisioned by some would adopt a relational leadership approach that attempts to establish caring relationships both inside and outside of the organization through collaboration, caring, courage, intuition, and organizational vision (DeLysa, 2009). A care based approach believes that diverse administrators from varied backgrounds should use care to find meaning and motivation in their work experiences and to communicate those experiences to others (DeLysa, 2009). More importantly, it is important to note that this discourse need not be viewed as inconsistent with public-sector requirements for performance measurement. It can be argued despite the role of care and relationship oriented activities in public administration, care work and emotional labor often go unrecognized. The collective care in the form of government programs and policies was allowed to erode or disappear altogether, forcing individuals to bear an ever higher load of individual care costs (DeLysa, 2009). For those with economic resources, the costs could be managed and quality care provided for themselves and their families (DeLysa, 2009). For everyone else, it could not. It is argued by care-based government advocates that with the private sector in disarray because of the financial crisis, many people who never thought they would need government care programs have turned to them and found them wanting (DeLysa, 2009).
  • 14. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 14 The point behind these types of approaches is the emphasis to build more networks among contractors, suppliers, within a government organization, across other departments, and external connections to the community to create an atmosphere of greater accountability, trust, and cooperative work. In addition, there should be a rational approach to decide which sources are critical to an organization and which activities have the best chances of improving effectiveness if they were outsourced. III.) Implications for Public Administrators: The phenomenon of the “hollow state” has significant implications for public administrators in several ways. For example, the practice of contracting out has caused numerous complications in constitutional accountability such as the fact there is a lack of comprehensible rules defining the actions and responsibilities of the state (Kennedy, 2006). The example of the Fourteenth Amendment is cited because this amendment had prohibited states from denying the privileges of citizenship to persons otherwise entitled to them (Kennedy, 2006). In the subsequent years this amendment was ratified, the courts have interpreted the content of this amendment in various different ways over time depending on the situation. For example, the Supreme Court declared a distinction between “between state action or “public conduct” under the procedure of due process, and “private conduct”, which falls outside of the jurisdiction of the amendment, “no matter how unfair that conduct may be (Kennedy, 2006)." This distinction between public and private is rather vague so that the Supreme Court has been pushed to develop rules that allow certain private acts to be attributed to government, but these rules have proven tricky to implement. For example, there have been cases where a government funded program that is conducted by private actor, but the courts has generally found such action to be deemed as state action (Kennedy, 2006). In other cases, contracting can provide the means for evasion of the limits imposed by the Bill of Rights by the government because due process scrutiny is delegated along with the authority to take actions on behalf of the government to private partners (Kennedy, 2006). With contracting government services there are very serious constitutional and legal issues involved. There are some characteristics of the relationship between government and private entities that help determine whether an action can fairly be attributed to the state such as the existence, nature, and extent of government funding; the nature and extent of government control of the activity in question; the extent to which government has
  • 15. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 15 authorized a contractor to exercise government powers in which it is up to the legal community to determine who is liable (Kennedy, 2006). The bottom line should be when government acts, it should be accountable no matter how government chooses to perform a specific action should not alter that requirement and with contracting government services there are very serious constitutional and legal issues involved that public administrators must deal with. Public Administrators are faced with value conflict challenges (ex: cost-efficiency v. responsiveness) and concerns brought forward by different constituencies before they can contract public services to other organizations. IV.) Conclusion: While there is extensive literature that questions the assumptions made by proponents of free market principles and New Public Management techniques that are intended to make government more responsive, effective, and business like there is a continual debate on what direction governments at all levels should take to provide public services. The contracting proponents typically have roots in economics and cite contracting as a way to reduce service costs through competitiveness and economies of scale. On the other hand, the critics of the contracting practices that are leading to a hollow state of government, have roots in traditional public administration fields and counter that contracting tends to sacrifice key public interest values (e.g., equality of treatment) and reduces service delivery capacity (Gooden, 2008). Regardless of the scholarly debate, the fact is that contracting is and will continue to be a reality that is facing public managers. In many cases, public managers, such as at this present time, do not always have a choice about contracting and may be required by elected officials to do so. It is safe to say that public managers charged with contracting services operate in politically charged environments, challenged by multiple constituencies (citizens, elected officials, interest groups, etc.) and must juggle value conflicts. For both critics and supporters, it has to be acknowledged that the notion of so called “one-size-fits-all (Singh, 2003)” judgments about contracting are unrealistic because as many volumes of case studies will attest to, contracting can improve service delivery or it can be a complete disaster, depending on the underlying market conditions and management structures in place (Singh, 2003).
  • 16. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 16 The practice of contracting is not new globally and has been both a challenge and an opportunity for public administrators, since it became more widespread for the last 30 years or so in this country, due to increasing distrust and dissatisfaction with government (Kennedy, 2006). Scholars have also noted how the definition of the hollow state has expanded beyond contraction of public services to private organizations as the dominant trend because the delivery of public services involves so many different parties and overlapping functions. To some degree, it could be said that “privatization is passé” because “the historic institutional environment of public administration is liquefying”, due to forces, such as globalization and devolution, which are causing government to wither and be displaced by governance or a blend of laws, policies, organizations, institutions, cooperative arrangements, and formal agreements that controls citizens and the delivery of public benefits (Henry, 2002). There is now a clear distinction that can be made between government is institutional; governance is institutional and networked, which has led to a new term for the current state of affairs, the inter-sectoral administration as described in this review. In essence, we are still learning of what are the best methods of incorporating the inter-sectoral administration into the fold traditional government in an effective manner. Bibliography Allen, P. (2007). The New Public Contracting: Regulation, responsiveness, relationality. Journal of Social Policy , 36, 513- 516. Anechiarico, F. (2007). The New Public Management at Middle Age: Critiques of the Performance Movement. Public Administration Review , 67 (4), 783-787. Brown, T. L., Potoski, M., & Slyke, D. M. (2006). Managing Public Service Contracts: Aligning Values, Institutions, and Markets. Public Administration Review , 66 (3), 323-332. Bryer, T. A. (2008). Warning: The Hollow State Could Be Deadly. Public Administration Review , 68 (3), 587-591. Burman, A. (2009/2010). Inherently Government Functions: Has the Debate Changed? Public Manager , 38 (4), 28-31.
  • 17. Neil Joshi PAA 601 Final Paper The Hollow State: The Consequences of the Privatization of Governmental Services 17 DeLysa, B. (2009). Markets No More: Toward a Care-Centered Public Administration. Administrative Theory & Praxis , 31 (3), 396-403. Gooden, V. (2008). Getting Strategic Results through Performance-Based Acquistion. Public Manager , 37 (2), 48-53. Henry, N. (2002). Is privatization passe? The case for competition and the emergence of intersectoral administration. Public Administration Review , 62 (3), 374-379. Kennedy, S. S. (2006). Holding "Governance" Accountable: Third-Party Government in a Limited State. The Independent Review , 11 (1), 67-78. Krane, D. (2007). The Unavoidable Politics of Disaster Recovery. Public Manager , 36 (3), 31-37. Milward, B., & Provan, K. G. (2000). Governing the Hollow State. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory . Milward, H. P. (2000). Governing the Hollow State. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory , 359-379. Shetterly, D. R. (2002). You Don't Always Get What You Pay for: The Economics of Privatization. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management , 21 (1), 161. Singh, A. (2003). Questioning the New Public Management. Public Administration Review , 63 (1), 116-120. Terry, L. D. (2005). The Thinning of Administrative Institutions In the Hollow State. Administration & Society , 37 (4), 426- 445. Zacchea, N. M. (2003). Developing A Strategy For Auditing Outsourced Public Sector Contracts. The Journal of Government Financial Management , 52 (4). Zullo, R. (2009). Does Fiscal Stress Induce Privatization? Governance , 22 (3), 459-481.