This document argues that NATO overstepped its mandate by intervening in Libya under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. While the Qaddafi regime was authoritarian, NATO left Libya in a weak and unstable state after the intervention. The use of NATO as an operational arm of R2P is dangerous and beyond NATO's purpose as a collective security organization for its member nations. NATO risks becoming a tool for liberal internationalism through unwarranted humanitarian interventions if it is not reigned in from overextending its role based on principles that did not exist when NATO was founded.

1. NATO's Greatest Mistake was Libya: the Alliance Should Have Nothing to do with R2P
As a collective securityorganisationfor its membersNATO overreacheditspurview and the spirit
of its treaty mandate by interveninginLibya. The Responsibilityto Protect (R2P) principle adopted
by the UNin 2005 should not partner or utilize withNATO's operational capability to be able to
intervene instates outside ofthe North Atlantic Treaty. NATO should stay clear of becomingan
operational arm for liberal internationalismandre-considerits humanitarian role.
NATOwas createdas a collective securityorganisation.Assoonasit actedunderthe authorityof
UNSCR 1973 and OperationUnifiedProtector(OUP) inLibyaitunequivocallyexceededitspurposeas
an organisation.The interventioninLibyatookona strong formof missioncreepwithNATO
graduallyincreasingitsrole fromsurveillance toassistingthe armsembargotofull operational
control underthe remitof UNSCR 1973.
There islittle doubtthatthe regime of Colonel MuammarQaddafi wasanauthoritarianand
unworthyone.There isalsolittle doubtthatLibyaendedupwithanalmostHobbesianstate of
nature existingwithinitsborderswhichcreatedanevenmore dangerouscocktail of extremismand
violence forthe Libyanpeople.
Thoughthe regime of Qaddafi wasgone,a weak,dividedandfracturedcountrywasleft.NATObears
strongresponsibilityforthe situationithelpedbringaboutinLibya.The strategicshortsightedness
whichwasevidentinIraqand Afghanistanpost-militaryoperationswasalsoapparentafterOUPwas
concluded.
The use of NATOas an operational armof the R2P principle isbothdangerousandbeyondthe
purviewof whatNATOshouldreallybe.Asacollective securityorganisation NATOshouldonlyact
withrespecttoits membernations'interestsandterritorial integritysuchasitsrole inAfghanistan
as a resultof the Al-Qaedaattackson9/11. R2P allowsthe distortingof the purpose of NATOwhich
resultsinthe organisationbasingitsactionona principle thatdidn'texistincustomaryor
international law atthe time NATOwasfounded.
If not enoughcare istakenor protocolsestablishedthenNATOcouldbuildonitsmistake inLibya
and become anoperational tool foreveryhumanitarianinterventioninthe 21st century.Thismakes
NATOequivalenttoa crusadingmilitarybodyforliberal internationalismandthe fighttomake ‘evil'
nations‘good'.Thisiscontrary to the intentionof whatNATOwascreatedfor andif not checked, it
couldresultinfurthermilitaryentanglements.If the UKand US had decidedtointervenemilitarilyin
Syriathenit ishard not to see howmissioncreepwouldhave suckedNATOintoassuminganother
operational commandbeyonditsborders.
The promulgationof R2P andhumanitarianinterventionismhascreatedarole whichNATOcould
easilyfill butwhichfundamentallytransgressesitspurpose.The NorthAtlantictreatycouldif reada
certainway,especiallythe preambleandArticle 1,provide NATOthe operational mandate towork
alongside R2Pas the principle hasbeentakenonandapprovedbythe UN.
It isquestionablethoughwhetherthe publicsof NATOnationsfullyunderstandhow andinwhat
waytheirtaxesand national armedforcesare beingusedby liberal internationalistgovernments.
Sendingmenandwomentowar throughwhathas grownto be a quite unaccountable NATO

2. involvementprocesssuchasin Libyaisboth disconcertingandtroubling.NATOdoesof course have
a role to playin operationsoutside the bordersof itsmembernationssuchasinOperationDesert
Storm where itutiliseditscommandandlogistical abilitiestoassistthe coalitionof the willing.
In sum.The principle of R2Phas the scope to significantlyalterthe purpose andscope of whatis
permissible forNATOtoundertake.NATOtransformingintoacrusadingarmof liberal
internationalismisnotwhatthe publicsof itsmembernationsunderstandittobe and itis
inherentlyundemocraticanddangerousforthe militaryAlliancetobeginchangingitsmission
purpose withoutnational level approval.Asaresult:
1. NATOshoulddisavowR2Pas an operational mandate forittoact ina humanitariancrisis.
2. NATOshouldconsiderdemocraticprocessesandmethodsif itwantsthe Alliancetobe
involvedinhumanitarianinterventionoutside itsborders.
3. NATOshouldstronglyconsiderthe creationof ahumanitarianinterventionchecklistwith
the necessityof all conditionsbeingmetbefore aninterventioncanbe sanctioned.Thiswill
helppreventpostconflictbreakdown,asinLibya.
ConnorSmartstudied internationalrelationsatthe University of Plymouth.Hehashis own current
affairsblog and is planning to workin London with a Internationaleducation charity.
This article has beensubmittedfor category B "NATO'sBiggest Mistake and Lesson Learned" of
the competition"ShapingOur NATO: YoungVoiceson the NATO Summit".Commentsare most
appreciated. You can also read the other articles inthis category. Learn more about
this competitionand how you can submit your own text or videoin the categoriesC and D.
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