Atul Honours Thesis

R2P and Libya: Reconciling the Ethical, Legal, and Practical Challenges to
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect
By
Atul Menon
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of Honors in
International Studies, Department of International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Fall 2014.
December 12, 2014
Thesis Adviser:
Dr. Onur Bakiner

1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................................................2
Abstract.........................................................................................................................................................3
Introduction...................................................................................................................................................4
1) The Theoretical Approach: Realist Constructivism..............................................................................5
a) Situating Power within Realist Constructivism ................................................................................6
b) Situating Ethics within Realist Constructivism.................................................................................8
Methodology: Approaching the Study of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in Libya ....................................11
2) Providing Context: The ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ NATO, and Resolution 1973............................13
a) The Responsibility to Protect..........................................................................................................13
b) The UNSC’s Mandate, the intervention in Libya, and the Dominant Narrative.............................16
3) Evaluating the Implementation and Legitimacy of the R2P in Libya.................................................20
a) Invoking the R2P in Libya..............................................................................................................20
b) The Ethical and Legal Legitimacy of the NATO-led Coalition......................................................24
i) NATO’s Ethical Legitimacy and Failure to Encourage Peace Negotiations..............................24
ii) Regime Change and the Ground Component..............................................................................25
c) Factors Inhibiting the NATO’s Practical legitimacy: Logistical and Operational Shortcomings...28
i) NATO’s Operational, Logistical, and Financial Shortcomings..................................................28
ii) Importance of Adequate Cultural Knowledge and Operational Effectiveness ...........................30
d) The Consequences of OUP .............................................................................................................31
i) Collateral Damage......................................................................................................................31
ii) Spillover in Mali .........................................................................................................................33
iii) Post-interventionist Libya: A Human Security Failure of Local and Regional Proportions......34
4) The International Stability and Conflict Monitoring Body (ISCMB).................................................36
a) Legal Chamber: A Responsibility to Abide....................................................................................37
b) Military-Tactical Chamber: Responsibility to Plan ........................................................................38
c) Financial Chamber: Responsibility to Contribute...........................................................................39
d) Diplomatic and Regional Chamber: Responsibility for Peace and Negotiations............................40
e) Post-intervention Chamber: Responsibility to Rebuild...................................................................41
5) Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................................42
Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................................44

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Acknowledgements
This thesis could not have been completed without the assistance and constant support of
my professors, friends, family and loved ones. My utmost gratitude goes out to Professor Onur
Bakiner for his challenging critiques, thought provoking questions, guidance, and his patience. I
would also like to thank Tina for her comments, advice, and presence during the many hours
spent together, writing our theses. In addition, I would like to express the deepest love and
appreciation for my mother, Jaya, my father, Venu, my sister and her husband, Roopika and
Vinay; all of whom have shown the greatest belief in me over the course of my degree and
thesis. Special thanks to my partner, Gwen for her cheer, grammatical reviews, and for helping
me through the many stressful days that accompany the life of an undergraduate student. Lastly,
I am very thankful to all the professors and staff at the Department of International Studies for
their encouragements and for giving me the confidence to enroll in the thesis program.

3
Abstract
Although the International Commission on Interventions and State Sovereignty’s 2001
report on the Responsibility to Protect marked a seminal moment in the progress of norms
endorsing humanitarian interventions, this thesis will demonstrate that there is a disconnect
between the doctrine’s normative progress and its practical implementation. By assessing the
legitimacy of NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, this thesis seeks to reconcile the ethical, legal
and practical challenges that face the policy implementation of the R2P. Evaluating NATO’s
operation and the failed results of its Libyan intervention, it is argued that NATO’s conduct and
erroneous application of the R2P has resulted in the doctrine’s significant delegitimization. This
in turn, has endangered the future invocation of the doctrine. Consequently, recognizing that the
R2P still offers a beneficial framework through which to rescue and protect populations facing
tyrannical regimes and supreme humanitarian emergencies, this thesis will proceed to propose an
institutional framework to aid the practical policy implementation of the R2P, through the
suggested International Stability and Conflict Monitoring Body (ISCMB). The aim of this thesis
is to reanimate discussions on the R2P and thereby aid its realization.

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Introduction
Within the fora of global affairs and international security, questions regarding the
theory, legitimacy, and utility of humanitarian interventions tend to pervade the literature. This
literature has become more prominent in the period after the fall of the Soviet Union and the
Cold War’s end. This phenomenon has resulted from multifarious factors including, but not
limited to, the advent of globalization and technological advancements, the rise of a unipolar
international system dominated by the United States of America (US), the observed proliferation
of human security-centric norms, the emergence of various cases requiring humanitarian
interventionist responses, and so on. In addition, many distinguished scholars, policy makers,
and diplomats regarded the 2001 publication of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty’s (ICISS) report on the Responsibility to Protect1
(R2P), as ‘marking the
dawn of a new era’2
in the normative expansion of the act humanitarian intervention. Despite this
proclamation, the application of the doctrine in the 2011 North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led
(NATO) intervention in Libya has been derided as a “model of failure”3
and as result, aspersions
have been cast over the doctrine’s future and legitimacy.
In order to ascertain the normative and practical potential of the R2P, it is of the utmost
importance to study the NATO-led intervention in Libya, as it represented the “first full-blown
test”4
for the doctrine, which has been in a process of deliberative refinement ever since its
inception. As such, this thesis seeks to uncover the various dimensions of the 2011 NATO-led
intervention in Libya, as well as the role played by the R2P over the course of the Libyan saga.
The arguments provided in this thesis will encompass the following:
Research Question: In the case of employing the Responsibility to Protect in Libya, to what
extent was the NATO-led coalition legitimate in applying the doctrine and how can we attempt to
reconcile the problems that accompany the practical implementation of the R2P?
1
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (International Development Research Centre:
Ottawa, 2001). Print.
2
Homans, Charles. "Responsibility to Protect: A Short History." Foreign Policy. The FP Group, 11 Oct. 2011. Web.
02 Jan. 2014.
<http%3A%2F%2Fwww.foreignpolicy.com%2Farticles%2F2011%2F10%2F11%2Fresponsibility_to_protect_a_sh
ort_history>.
3
Kuperman, Alan J. "A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign." International
Security 1st ser. 38 (2013): 105-36. Print.
4
“Responsibility to Protect: The Lessons of Libya.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 19 May 2011.
Web. 03 Feb. 2014. <http%3A%2F%2Fwww.economist.com%2Fnode%2F18709571>.

5
Thus, this thesis will investigate the legitimacy and practical dimensions of NATO’s act
of intervention in Libya. In doing so, it is primarily argued that the coalition’s legitimacy and
conduct, viewed through the framework of the R2P, were for the most part, a failure.
Furthermore, the failed nature of the Libyan intervention gravely jeopardizes the invocation of
the doctrine in potential future scenarios that may require interventionist responses. The failed
nature of the intervention in Libya and its detrimental effect on the legitimacy of the R2P, is
evaluated based on four main indicators, namely: a) the limited manner and extent to which the
R2P was rhetorically invoked and mobilized; b) the ethical and legal legitimacy of the NATO-
led coalition’s actions; c) the factors that weakened the coalition’s practical legitimacy; and d)
the intervention’s practical, doctrinal, and regional consequences. After evaluating the failures
that arose in Libya, this thesis will proceed to reinvigorate discussions on the R2P by presenting
an institutional proposal designed to reconcile the tensions between the normative progress
achieved by the R2P, and the difficulties that emerge during its practical policy implementation.
In aiming to institute the “Professionalization of R2P” through the proposed International
Stability and Conflict Monitoring Body (ISCMB), the ultimate objective is to try and aid the
realization of a norm of humanitarian intervention that is directed at the prevention of atrocities
and which is consistently invoked, legally permitted, properly implemented, and effective.
1) The Theoretical Approach: Realist Constructivism
In approaching the topic at hand, this thesis will utilize and build upon Samuel J.
Barkin’s ideas on Realist Constructivism. This section argues that the realist constructivist
approach is the most appropriate lens through which to observe, explain, and predict the goings-
on within the field of International Relations. In particular, this section will focus on two central
points in relation to realist constructivism, namely: a) The conceptualization, manifestation, and
practice of power in the international system; and b) The infusion of ethics and its role in the
aforementioned paradigm, where morality is derived from the ‘logic of liberalism, one of
humanitarian intervention’s’ main ‘ethical sources.’5
Ultimately, it is also argued that using the
5
Farer, Tom J. "Humanitarian Intervention before and after 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy." Humanitarian
Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. By J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2003. 56. Print.

6
realist constructivist lens serves as a useful tool for policy makers attempting to predict
behavioral trends related to humanitarian interventions.
a) Situating Power within Realist Constructivism
When locating the role of power within the literature on international relations, realist
constructivism borrows quite heavily upon realism’s tenets on power, albeit, with a few key
changes. To start with, what is power? Power, as conceptualized by Wright, is the mechanism of
practicing influence over ‘major groups in the world so as to advance the purposes of some
against the opposition of others.’6
Furthermore, realist constructivism, like realism, continues to
hold that “power is the ultima ratio of international politics.”7
Realist constructivism therefore
places importance on how different actors within the international system exercise their power
and influence in order to attain certain desired outcomes. However, this is where the paradigm
starts branching away from realism.
Unlike most realist literature, which tends to focus on the exercise of power narrowly,
mostly by States as “actors trying to maximize their utility at the expense of others,”8
realist
constructivism contends that the manifestation of power can be broader and more dynamic. This
broadening has emerged as a result of the advent of globalization and technological
advancement, the proliferation of new human security-centric norms, and the end of the Cold
War—all of which have been able to empower a greater array of global non-state actors. These
non-state actors include the global media, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), along with “people and
domestic institutions,” which matter “because they can determine how much power States will
have, and how that power will be used.”9
Additionally, non-state actors have played a key role in
mobilizing civil society voices, in order to have a bottom-up impact on State foreign policies
formulated by bureaucratic elites. Furthermore, as with the expansion of the practice and
influence of power, there has also been a broadening in the motivations that push those who
wield and practice power. This observation can be better explained through the importance of
norms, as theorized by constructivists.
6
Wright, Quincy. The Study of International Relations. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955. Print.
7
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. "Bridging the Gap: Toward A Realist-Constructivist Dialogue." International Studies
Review 6.2 (2004): 337-52. Print.
8
Krieg, Andreas. "National Interests and Altruism in Humanitarian Intervention." Motivations for Humanitarian
Intervention: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations. Dordrecht: Springer, 2013. 37-58. Print.
9
Barkin, J. Samuel. "Realist Constructivism." International Studies Review 5.3 (2003): 325-42. Print.

7
Constructivists “focus on the impact of norms and rules on State behavior.”10
Norms in
turn, are defined as ‘collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given
identity.’11
Norms are known to be able to “regulate and constrain the behavior of actors,” such
that a level of shared understandings can be achieved, which allow for the (re)constitution of
“identities and interests of the actors themselves.”12
With the rising influence of international organizations and a shifting away from the
State-centric security rhetoric that characterized the Cold-War, Deng’s “conceptualization of
‘sovereignty as responsibility’”13
serves to illustrate the manner in which new norms of human
security, human rights, and the conditional nature of state sovereignty are proliferating. Thus,
power is operating in order to encourage the proliferation and internalization of new norms,
values, and beliefs. The changing origins and practices of power are strongly emphasized in
Nicholas Wheeler’s Saving Strangers, in which Wheeler uses the example of President Clinton’s
‘apology for the international community's failure act in Rwanda,’14
to illuminate the manner in
which States are exposed “to the glare of world public opinion,”15
when they fail to act in
accordance with the newly burgeoning norms of human security.
One common realist criticism is the argument that moral considerations are a cover for
self-interest and that even those politicians who hold moral positions genuinely, will simply give
in to self-interest in demanding situations. The framework of realist constructivism counters this
by arguing that the proliferation of the newly emerging norms of human rights, human security,
and humanitarian intervention – are still a work in progress. The propagation of these new
values, beliefs, and ideas began shortly after the establishment of the post-1945 world order and
continued with renewed vigor after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the relatively short
timeframe between 1991 and 2014, the discourse on humanitarian intervention and its practice
has experienced rapid growth and progress. Even the ‘UN’s adoption of R2P as part of its
10
Ibid
11
Katzenstein, Peter J. "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security." The Culture of National
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia UP, 1996. 5. Print.
12
Glanville, Luke. "Norms, Interests and Humanitarian Intervention." Global Change, Peace & Security 18.3
(2006): 153-71. Print.
13
Weiss, Thomas G. "New Thinking: The Responsibility to Protect." Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action.
Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 2007. 98. Print.
14
Wheeler, Nicholas J. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford UP,
2000. 241. Print.
15
Ibid

8
unanimous approval of the 2005 World Summit outcome document, and the concept’s
subsequent endorsement by the UNSC,’16
are relatively recent manifestations of a newly
emerging norm. With global governance mechanisms and multilateral acts of intervention having
taken place with regards to the establishment of the International Criminal Court, along with
interventions in Kosovo (1999), Iraq (1991) and Libya (to name a few), realist constructivism
argues that the norms endorsing humanitarian interventions will only continue to proliferate in
their intensity and influence.
b) Situating Ethics within Realist Constructivism
The paradigm of realist constructivism internalizes ethical considerations from both
realist and constructivist thought. With regards to interventions, here, these ethical considerations
are rooted in the understandings of a liberal international order17
. While realism is generally
denigrated for allegedly being “completely hostile to the ethical and political notions of
humanitarian intervention,”18
key realist scholars such as Hans Morgenthau have maintained that
ethics do have a role to play in realism, since ‘all political acts have ethical significance.’19
Morgenthau argues that this can be facilitated through the use of “moral and political
pragmatism,” in order to visualize a world in which interventions could occur while having a
16
Morris, Justin. "Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum." International Affairs 89.5
(2013): 1265-283. Print.
17
Fernando Tesón provides a suitable description for “morally justified” cases of humanitarian intervention that rest
upon the tenets of “liberal political philosophy.” Tesón explains that according to the logic of the liberal
international order, “a major purpose of States and governments is to protect and secure human rights” which are
“rights that all persons have by virtue of personhood alone.” Furthermore, leaders in power “who seriously violate
these rights” and undermine the “reason that justifies their political power,” cannot be protected by international
law. In other words, “Sovereignty serves valuable human ends, and those who grossly assault them should not be
allowed to shield themselves behind the sovereignty principle.” Thus, abuse of power through “tyranny and
anarchy” leads to the “moral collapse of society.” In such situations, where populations are being oppressed on a
horrendous scale by political leaders, it is justifiable to initiate a “proportionate international use or threat of military
force, undertaken in principle by a liberal government or alliance, aimed at ending tyranny or anarchy, welcomed by
the victims, and consistent with the doctrine of double effect .” However, I would only add that interventions can
and should be undertaken by any alliance or State willing to act on the behalf of the international community and in
the name of human security-centric values, who intend to prevent or attend to supreme humanitarian emergencies. In
addition, global governance bodies are designed to uphold and protect these very same values of human rights. For
more information, see Fernando R. Tesón, “The liberal case for humanitarian intervention,” in J.L Holzgrefe and
Robert O. Keohane eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge UP,
Cambridge, 2003), pp 93-129, and authors cited therein.
18
Fiott, Daniel. "Realist Thought and Humanitarian Intervention." The International History Review 35.4 (2013):
766-82. Print.
19
Morgenthau, Hans J. Scientific Man versus Power Politics. Chicago Etc.: U of Chicago, 1965. 177-78. Print.

9
minimal detrimental effect on the “necessities of the balance of power.”20
The understanding that
even realist tenets include ethical evaluations, allows us to better construct a realist
constructivism without encountering the pitfall assumption ‘that morality must be banished from
the realm of international affairs.’21
Furthermore, this empowers realist constructivism to
envision prescriptive policies that are both pragmatic in accounting for the realities of the
international system, as well as ethically driven to ensure a legitimate standing.
There exists already a powerful infusion of ethical considerations within the
constructivist discourse. Ethical considerations allow for prescriptive and permissive norms of
humanitarian intervention to proliferate, not only from State policies, but from other domestic
and international non-state origins: concerned citizen groups, the global media, IGOs, NGOs,
civil society organizations (CSOs) etc. Globalization and technological advancements have
facilitated the rise of a global public sphere and the embodiment of a “common humanity,” 22
through which such non-state groups can openly and articulately voice their opinions. The
proliferation of prescriptive norms, aided by the efforts of such sources, has the power to
“(re)constitute state interests so that norm compliant behavior is seen as being in the State’s
interest.” 23
Castells postulates that globalization along with the “decreased ability of nationally based
political systems to manage the world’s problems on a global scale,” have given rise to a “global
civil society.” 24
This has also shifted ‘the space of debates on public affairs’ from the ‘national to
the global.’25
The R2P should also fall under a globalized public sphere of debate. Even the
recent establishment of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC) is
momentous given that a global civil society of various NGOs, CSOs, and activists played a key
role in its institutionalization. Marchetti highlights that CSOs and transnational networks are
20
Molloy, Sean. "Truth, Power, Theory: Hans Morgenthau's Formulation of Realism." Diplomacy & Statecraft 15.1
(2004): 1-34. Print.
21
Hendrickson, David C. "In Defense of Realism: A Commentary on Just and Unjust Wars." Ethics and
International Affairs 11.1 (1997): 19-53. Print.
22
Tesón, Fernando R. "The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention." Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical,
Legal, and Political Dilemmas. By J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. 93-
129. Print.
23
Glanville, Luke. "Norms, Interests and Humanitarian Intervention." Global Change, Peace & Security 18.3
(2006): 153-71. Print.
24
Castells, M. “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance.”
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616.1 (2008): 78-93. Print.
25
Ibid

10
‘characterised by their advocacy in promoting normative change in politics,” where the
establishment of the ICC (1995) and the “approval of the Rome Statute” (1998) are exemplars of
their “success in influencing policy on global issues.”26
Similarly, with the ICC being able to
“prosecute individuals, from common soldiers to heads of state, for genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity,”27
Glasius lionizes global civil society actors for infusing a “dimension
of morality and idealism”28
to the ICC. While many may question the ICC’s effectiveness today,
it must be stressed that the role played by civil society actors was itself an impressive feat,
especially considering that powerful States such as the U.S. and India were opposed to its
establishment. Despite the ICC’s shortcomings, such normative changes are indicative of a still
emerging trend, where global civil society will be increasingly looked upon to pressure States
into complying with human security-centric norms.
The above two sections have therefore argued that a realist constructivist approach can
account for both the role of power and ethics within the international system. With classical
realist theories being far too narrow and constructivist theories not sufficiently accounting for the
role played by those wielding power, realist constructivism demonstrates how a norm of
humanitarian intervention can exist within the confines of the international system. Here, the key
point to adhere to is that power can be both rooted in and exercised through a broader and more
dynamic manner. Though it manifests in an asymmetrical manner, in the twenty-first century,
power can be concentrated in and exercised from both States and non-state groups, where
traditionally power was observed to emanate solely from the top echelons of State bureaucratic
policy circles. Nowadays, both domestic and global civil society groups have been empowered
by globalization and technological advancements to play a greater role in foreign policy
formulations and international relations. Moreover, with numerous non-state groups and civil
society actors being motivated by human security-centric considerations, policies framed by
bureaucratic elites can be influenced by the pressures exerted through bottom-up mechanisms.
Moving forward, as the forces generating these norms continue to strengthen over time,
26
Marchetti, Raffaele. The Role of Civil Society in Global Governance: Report on the Joint Seminar Organised by
the EUISS, the European Commission / DG Research, and UNU-CRIS. Brussels and Rome: European Union
Institute for Security Studies, 2010. 15. Print.
27
Glasius, Marlies. "Global Civil Society Influence on the Statue for an International Criminal Court." Global Civil
Society Yearbook 2002. By Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor, and Helmut Anheier. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. 137-68.
Print.
28
Ibid

11
discussions on the subject of humanitarian interventions will become more salient. Additionally,
realist constructivism, in accounting for power and ethics in such a manner, can justify an
international system in which humanitarian interventions and the ISCMB, both have a role and
position.
Methodology: Approaching the Study of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in Libya
The first phase of the research pertains to the history, legality, and ethics of humanitarian
intervention. Once a fuller understanding of the subject is attained, this phase also includes the
evaluation and comparison of academic works and policy briefs related to the R2P, its history,
and its application in regards to the NATO-led intervention in Libya. The academic literature is
obtained through the use of key search phrases such as “humanitarian intervention,” along with
“ethics,” “R2P and Libya,” “security,” “liberalism,” “criticism” on the databases of prominent
journals such as International Studies Review, Ethics and International Affairs, International
Security, Diplomacy & Statecraft, and International Affairs. The journals represent a wide range
of interdisciplinary social scientific sub-fields ranging from political philosophy, to political
science, history, and international relations. The academic literature is complemented by an
analysis of primary and secondary research, which include books, organizational reports (by
NATO, Human Rights Watch29
, Amnesty International, ICISS, UNSC, think tanks), global news
media reports (such as The Guardian, New York Times, Reuters, BBC etc.), speeches, and
analytical pieces by major international affairs publications such as Foreign Policy, Foreign
Affairs, and the Belfer Center.
The second stage of the research focuses on uncovering existing gaps in the current
literature pertaining to the subject of humanitarian intervention. The secondary source literature
was compiled and compared in terms of how well it applied to the intervention in Libya. Much
of the literature that suggested possible solutions to challenges that arise in interventions, could
not be directly applied to rectify the errors of the Libyan intervention because of their narrow
scope. While the literature did attempt to provide solutions to the challenges that arise in
implementing interventionist operations, the proposed solutions were often narrow in their focus.
In other words the offered solutions tended to address micro-level challenges to implementation.
29
From this point on, Human Rights Watch will be referred to as HRW.

12
For example, proposed solutions ranged from how to choose or encourage interventionist
participation, to focussing on the economic origins of conflicts, to paying attention to post-
conflict statebuilding etc. The literature was feeble in connecting the different solutions and
bringing them together to envision a fuller picture (macro-level) of the problems that arise in the
totality of the R2P’s practical policy implementation and how its complex components would
function together. Based on this recognition, a proposal was devised which sought to attend to
the practical challenges of implementing the R2P. This thesis, presented in the form of an
extended literature review, will seek to contribute to the literature by addressing these gaps
through the formulation of the International Stability and Conflict Monitoring Body (ISCMB).
While the first portion of the thesis will seek to discuss the legitimacy and practical utility of the
R2P in Libya, in the latter portions of this thesis, an attempt will be made to produce a macro-
level institutional solution aimed at the “Professionalization of R2P,” by addressing the diverse
challenges that arose in the Libyan intervention. It must be noted that a lack of field experience
and the usage of potentially biased western dominated literature on the subject might weaken the
validity of this paper’s findings. However, an attempt has been made at mitigating these biases
through the heavy use of more primary source documents in the analyses.
Here, legitimacy is defined through three merging perspectives. In the first sense “the
contemporary legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is based on UN Security Council
authorization of the use of force,”30
international law, and the extent to which a legal mandate is
followed. The second lens adopts Pattison’s conceptualization in which he states that “an
intervener's effectiveness is the primary (and a necessary) determinant of its legitimacy.”31
For
the purpose of this thesis, effectiveness is measured based on two central sub-criteria, namely: a)
the extent to which an intervener is “likely to promote or harm the enjoyment of basic human
rights” among members of a political community in which an intervention takes place; and b) a
‘global external effectiveness’ which is the extent to which an “intervener is likely to promote or
harm the enjoyment of basic human rights in the world at large.”32
Thirdly, the term “legitimacy”
also encompasses the ethics of jus in bello (justice in war) and jus ad bellum (justice of war)
30
Kahler, M. "Legitimacy, Humanitarian Intervention, and International Institutions." Politics, Philosophy &
Economics 10.1 (2011): 20-45. Print.
31
Pattison, James. "Legitimacy and Humanitarian Intervention: Who Should Intervene?" The International Journal
of Human Rights 12.3 (2008): 395-413. Print.
32
Ibid

13
structures of just war theory (JWT), as conceptualized by Michael Walzer. Thus, this thesis
adopts an understanding of legitimacy that covers intermixing legal, practical, and ethical
dimensions, which taken together have a powerful role in influencing the course and validity of
any intervention under the R2P.
2) Providing Context: The ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ NATO, and Resolution
1973
a) The Responsibility to Protect
The build-up and spread of human security-centric discourse at the end of the Cold-War
contributed to the release of the ICISS’s report on the Responsibility to Protect in 2001. At the
UN General Assembly (UNGA) meetings of 1999 and 2000, ‘Secretary-General Kofi Annan
made compelling pleas to the international community to try to find consensus on how to
approach’33
the issues surrounding the need for humanitarian interventions. Annan had
emphasized that the international community needed to reach a solution on how to respond to
“gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common
humanity.”34
In response, the Canadian government, “together with a group of major
foundations,”35
aided the formulation of the R2P doctrine.
The doctrine has sought to reconceptualise the notion of state sovereignty, such that the
concept of sovereignty was viewed as “a responsibility, the responsibility to uphold one’s
citizens’ basic human rights,”36
where if a State was “unwilling or unable”37
to grant this
protection, the sovereignty of the State in question would be temporarily suspended, thereby
33
34
Ibid
35
Ibid
36
Pattison, James. "Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: The Moral Importance of an Intervener’s
Legal Status." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2007th ser. 10.3 (2007): 301-19.
Print.
37

14
moving to an “international responsibility to respond.”38
Within the first decade of the twenty-
first century, the doctrine had experienced some bitter-sweet moments. At the 2005 World
Summit, while States generally agreed that there was “a universal responsibility to protect
populations”39
against “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,”40
the version of the doctrine agreed to was criticized as being ‘watered down’41
in form. There
were certain essential differences between the original document produced by the ICISS and the
World Summit Outcome that was agreed to by the international community.
Heinze highlights how the original document stated that the responsibility to protect
‘transferred from individual States to the international community in cases where a State was
“unable or unwilling” to protect its citizens,’ whereas the World Summit Outcome defined a
“clearly higher threshold for action” in changing the wording to ‘cases where the State in
question is “manifestly failing”’ to protect its citizens42
. Similarly, whereas the ICISS has
defined the just cause threshold for military intervention as cases of “serious and irreparable
harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur,”43
the World Summit Outcome
changed this wording to reflect “the more limited circumstances of genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleaning, and crimes against humanity.”44
Next, though the ICISS clearly designated that the
international community has a “responsibility”45
to take affirmative action when States fail to
carry out their outlined responsibilities, the World Summit Outcome ‘tempers’ this language to
reflect that ‘the international community need only be prepared to take action on a case-by-case
38
Pattison, James. "Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: The Moral Importance of an Intervener’s
Legal Status." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2007th ser. 10.3 (2007): 301-19.
Print.
39
Pattison, James. "Legitimacy and Humanitarian Intervention: Who Should Intervene?" The International Journal
of Human Rights 12.3 (2008): 395-413. Print.
40
UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 October
2005, A/RES/60/1, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/44168a910.html [accessed 7 October 2014]
41
Bellamy, Alex J. "Realizing the Responsibility to Protect." International Studies Perspectives 10.2 (2009): 111-
28. Print.
42
Heinze, Eric A. "Humanitarian Intervention, the Responsibility to Protect, and Confused Legitimacy." Human
Rights and Human Welfare 11 (2011): 17-32. Print.
43
This threshold includes the “large loss of life” or “large-scale ethnic cleansing.” For more, see refer to:
Ottawa, 2001).
44
45

15
basis.’46
Lastly, the World Summit Outcome affirms “the authority of the Security Council to
mandate coercive action to maintain and restore international peace and security,”47
which stands
in contrast to the ICISS’s own position, which permits interventions in extreme cases without the
approval of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Though this thesis supports the wording presented
within the ICISS’s original publication, the arguments presented will revolve around the
framework adopted in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, since it has been affirmed by the
international community and is thus the version that is currently (supposedly) being exercised.
According to the UNSG’s 2009 report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, the
implementation of the R2P is encapsulated within a three-pillared strategy. Pillar I of the report,
outlines the “protection responsibilities of the State,” where every State within the international
community has a responsibility to protect its “populations, whether nationals or not, from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their
incitement.”48
Pillar II is designed to express “the commitment of the international community to
assist States in meeting,” their Pillar I obligations, and advises cooperation with “Member States,
regional and sub-regional arrangements, civil society and the private sector.”49
Subsequently,
Pillar III, the hard military pillar, conveys “the responsibility of Member States to respond
collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to”50
uphold its
Pillar I and II commitments. Pillar III allows for the summoning and use of the coercive Chapter
VII (“use of armed force”51
) and VIII (“regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action”52
) provisions of the UN Charter.
Still, despite the strong changes made to the original doctrine’s phrasing, numerous
initiatives were taken by UN Secretary General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon in attempting to further
establish international normative consensus on the doctrine, which included reports that
46
47
UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 October
2005, A/RES/60/1, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/44168a910.html [accessed 7 October 2014]
48
UN General Assembly, Implementing the responsibility to protect : report of the Secretary-General, 12 January
2009, A/63/677, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4989924d2.html [accessed 8 October 2014]
49
Ibid
50
Ibid
51
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available at:
http://www.unwebsite.com/charter [accessed 9 July 2014]
52
Ibid

16
discussed ‘early warning assessments, the need for global-regional collaboration to help
implement the doctrine, the need for timely and decisive response, and the necessity of focussing
on conflict prevention.’53
Furthermore, in the Secretary-General’s 2010 report, the Office of the
“Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect” was established and charged with “the
development and refinement of the Responsibility to Protect concept,” along with “fostering
political dialogue”54
among Member States and other stakeholders, to ultimately progress on the
path towards the successful implementation of the doctrine.
b) The UNSC’s Mandate, the intervention in Libya, and the Dominant Narrative
The emergence of turmoil under the Libyan dictatorship of Muammar Gaddafi provided
the first full-fledged test for the implementation of the R2P. The Libyan uprising, which began
in February 2011, started as an off-shoot from similar people’s revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt.
Driven by the cries “Ashsha‘b yurıd isqat. an-nizam”55
(the people want to bring down the
regime), as the civilian unrest in the region increased, it was soon termed as the “Arab Spring,” 56
and referred to the uprising flamed by the people’s discontentment with the ruling dictatorship
and the bureaucratic elite. In Libya, the revolution against the dictatorship of Gaddafi began
during the middle of February, with ‘protests breaking out in Libya’s second largest city,
Benghazi.’57
Within a few short days the protests had swiftly spread to the other Libyan cities of
Tripoli, Al Bayda, Misurata and even smaller regional towns. As the instability intensified, the
levels of violence continued to expand and escalate, with anti-Gaddafi rebels on one side and the
pro-Gaddafi loyalists and mercenaries, on the other.
Gaddafi’s responses were televised across the world by various news media
organizations, who reported that Gaddafi had launched “assaults on peacefully demonstrating
53
United Nations. "Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 05
Mar. 2014. <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml>.
54
United Nations. "Office of The Special Adviser on The Prevention of Genocide." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web.
05 Apr. 2014. <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/>.
55
Hehir, Aidan, and Robert W. Murray. Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian
Intervention. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 4. Print.
56
57
CNN Library. "Libya Civil War Fast Facts." CNN. Cable News Network, Updated on 25 Mar. 2014. Web. 27
Mar. 2014. <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/20/world/libya-civil-war-fast-facts/>.

17
citizens.”58
On February 22nd
, Gaddafi called on his supporters to “come out of” their homes and
“attack [the opposition] in their dens,” in addition to having referred to the protestors as
‘cockroaches and rats’59
who deserved to die. In spite of a roadmap sponsored by the African
Union (AU), that called on the regime to implement ‘an effective cease-fire and initiate, in a
peaceful and democratic manner, political reforms that meet the aspirations of the Libyan
people,”60
Gaddafi issued televised statements in which he elucidated his refusal to “leave this
land” and instead preferred to “die as a martyr at the end.”61
At the time, journalistic reports were
even cautioning the type of language being used by Gaddafi, as being “language chillingly
reminiscent of the broadcasts of Radio Mille Collines,” which was famously known to have
“spurred on the perpetrators of Rwanda's genocide in 1994.”62
This sort of aggressive rhetoric
continued to increase in lethality and urgency, as Gaddafi threatened to “cleanse Libya house by
house.”63
The perception of Gaddafi’s rhetoric created a sense of urgency, which was further
galvanized by his stationing of “a large concentration of armored vehicles” towards Benghazi,
which was “the headquarters of the revolution and home to 750,000 people”.64
In the midst of
military build-up and aggression, key defections were taking place within the Libyan
bureaucracy, with many Libyan State service officials unhesitatingly calling for the ‘overthrow
of the tyrant’65
Gaddafi. By now, there was a sufficient basis for the UN to invoke the doctrine
58
Gaub, Florence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation Unified Protector.
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013. vii. Print.
59
"Responsibility to Protect: The Lessons of Libya." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 19 Mar. 2011.
Web. 16 Feb. 2014.
60
African Union. The African Union Ad Hoc High‐Level Committee On Libya Convenes Its Second Meeting In
Addis Ababa. 2011. Print.
61
Black, Ian. "Gaddafi Urges Violent Showdown and Tells Libya 'I'll Die a Martyr'" The Guardian. Guardian News
and Media, 23 Feb. 2011. Web. 02 Mar. 2014.
< http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/22/muammar-gaddafi-urges-violent-showdown>.
62
Web. 16 Feb. 2014.
63
Daalder, Ivo H., and James G. Stavridis. "NATO's Victory in Libya." Foreign Affairs. Council on Foreign
Relations, Mar.-Apr. 2012. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137073/ivo-h-daalder-and-
james-g-stavridis/natos-victory-in-libya>.
64
Fogh Rasmussen, Anders. "NATO After Libya: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times." Foreign Affairs. Council
on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1 July 2011. Web. 11 Feb. 2014. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67915/anders-
fogh-rasmussen/nato-after-libya>.
65
"TIMELINE-Libya's Uprising against Muammar Gaddafi." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 28 Mar. 2011. Web. 08
Feb. 2014.

18
by first “urging the regime to meet its ‘responsibility to protect’ its people.”66
This failed as the
regime’s rhetoric continued to display a flagrant refusal to heed the warnings of the UNSC.
Finally, on February 26th
, the UNSC “unanimously” passed Resolution 1970 (UNSCR)
authorizing the “implementation of an arms embargo on Libya,” along with ‘travel bans,
sanctions, and financial asset freezes’67
placed on Gaddafi and key members within his circle.
Then on March 17th
, after weeks of tense fighting, failed sanctions, embargoes, and
Gaddafi’s adamant refusal to obey the directives suggested by the UNSC, the Council decided to
authorize “the use of force”68
under chapter VII of the Charter. UNSCR 1973 permitted certain
legitimate actors “to take all necessary measures” to ‘protect civilians and civilian populated
areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.’69
Furthermore, such an intervention
was to be conducted “while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of
Libyan territory.”70
In addition, Resolution 1973 also mandated the establishment of a no-fly
zone and an arms embargo.71
On March 19th
, a coalition led by the US, consisting of France and Great Britain (UK),
began launching “air and missile strikes against Libyan forces”72
on their way to vital rebel
strongholds. Subsequently, by March 22nd
, the responsibility to carry out the provisions of the
mandate was passed onto NATO to implement.73
On March 24th
, NATO announced that it would
take over all aspects of the Libyan intervention, which later led to the start of NATO’s
66
Web. 16 Feb. 2014.
67
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1970 (2011), 26 February 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011), available
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d6ce9742.html [accessed 8 October 2014]
68
Sands, Philippe. "UN's Libya Resolution 1973 Is Better Late than Never." The Guardian. Guardian News and
Media, 19 Mar. 2011. Web. 24 Feb. 2014.
69
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya],
17 March 2011, S/RES/1973(2011), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d885fc42.html [accessed 8
Ocober 2014]
70
Ibid
71
Ibid
72
73
Poort, David, and Ismaeel Naar. "Timeline: Three Years after Libya's Uprising." Aljazeera. Aljazeera, 19 May
2014. Web. 19 June 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2014/02/timeline-three-years-after-libya-
uprising-201421691755192622.html>.

19
“Operation Unified Protector,” (OUP) on the 31st
of March, and in doing so, also signalled “for
the first time in its history,” NATO’s declaration of war against an “Arab country.”74
The campaign, which spanned from 23rd
March 2011 to 31st
October 2011, lasted 222
days.75
Mission figures released by NATO report that the campaign was waged with ‘8000
troops, 260 air assets, 21 naval assets, 26500 sorties, and 9500 strike sorties,’ along with
engaging ‘5900 military targets, including over 400 artillery or rocket launchers and over 600
tanks or armored vehicles.’76
Moreover, OUP came with a hefty price tag amounting to “$1.1
billion for the US and several billion dollars overall.”77
OUP was carried out by 28 NATO-
member States, of which “14 committed military assets, but only 8 were prepared to fly ground
attack sorties.”78,79
Besides NATO member countries, four non-NATO States contributed to OUP
as well.80
In the months immediately after the end of OUP, the general sentiment being expressed
by the leaders of the operation was one of success. With NATO “financially drained by the debt
crisis,” OUP was described as “a much-needed success for an alliance fatigued”81
by its
engagement in Afghanistan over the past decade. Towards the end of the operation, General
Jodice (Air Component Commander for OUP) congratulated the coalition for displaying
“professionalism and tremendous effort” in producing an “air campaign that saved thousands of
Libyan lives.”82
Additionally, OUP was also considered as a diplomatic success, with NATO
praised for working in conjunction with The Arab League, in what amounted to “the first-ever
74
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013. Print.
75
NATO. "Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO, 2
Nov. 2011. Web. 28 Mar. 2014. <http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107-
factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf>.
76
Ibid
77
78
Davis, Dr. Ivan. How Good Is NATO after Libya? Rep. no. Briefing Paper No. 20. Gairloch: NATO Watch, 2011.
Print. Ser. 2011.
79
The 8 countries that carried out ground attack sorties were: France, UK, US, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Italy
and Canada.
80
The non-NATO members were Jordan, Qatar, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
81
Brzezinski, Ian. "Lesson From Libya: NATO Alliance Remains Relevant." National Defense. National Defense
Industrial Association, Nov. 2011. Web. 02 Apr. 2014.
<http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nationaldefensemagazine.org%2Farchive%2F2011%2FNovember%2FPages%2FLessonFr
omLibyaNATOAllianceRemainsRelevant.aspx>.
82
Phinney, Todd R. "Reflections on Operation Unified Protector." JFQ 73 2014th ser. 2 (2014): 86-92. Print.

20
NATO-Arab combat partnership.”83
Phinney praises ‘Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE’ for playing a
vital role in contributing “personnel and aircraft.”84
What is more, many had deemed the
intervention as a success for the R2P. Former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, who
played an important role in the construction of the R2P, had opined that “the stars were well and
truly aligned in the Libya case,” even adding that “all the criteria were satisfied.”85
However, contrary to the narrative pursued by the West, in the months following the end
of OUP, Libya continued to unravel with increased instability and violence. The next section of
this thesis will discuss the legitimacy of NATO’s intervention, along with the various challenges
it faced. In doing so, this thesis will use the lessons of Libya to try and reconcile the clear gap
between the normative and discursive progress that the R2P has achieved, and the challenges that
face its policy implementation.
3) Evaluating the Implementation and Legitimacy of the R2P in Libya
To examine the legitimacy and challenges encountered in employing the R2P in Libya,
the following section will cover four investigative segments: a) The extent to which the R2P in
was rhetorically invoked and mobilized in Libya; b) The shortcomings of the ethical and legal
legitimacy of the NATO-led coalition’s actions; c) The factors that inhibited the coalition’s
practical legitimacy; and d) The intervention’s destructive consequences for Libya, the R2P, and
the larger region.
a) Invoking the R2P in Libya
For an intervention to be accepted as functioning under the R2P, an expectation exists
that nations should be able to explicitly justify ‘their policy positions and the apparent relevance
of the R2P to these”86
policies. Embarking on an interventionist operation without explicitly
invoking the doctrine could hamper the doctrine’s normative expansion. With the doctrine
having been formulated to better organize and validate the occurrence of humanitarian
interventions, a failure to cite the doctrine also has the potential to weaken the legitimacy of any
83
Ibid
84
Ibid
85
"Responsibility to Protect: The Lessons of Libya." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 19 May 2011.
Web. 03 Feb. 2014. <http%3A%2F%2Fwww.economist.com%2Fnode%2F18709571>.
86
(2013): 1265-283. Print. Ibid

21
undertaken intervention. In addition, Morris opines that even if the doctrine were invoked in the
UNSC to justify the need for an intervention, an intervener’s callous and erroneous
implementation of the doctrine could be “seized upon by those sceptical towards R2P in order to
delegitimize the concept.”87
Thus, before evaluating the legitimacy of the OUP, the following
section focusses on understanding the extent to which the R2P was invoked with regards to
UNSCR 1973. This is done in order to ascertain the normative status of the R2P, to aid the
further evaluation of the intervention’s legitimacy, and to aid the design of the ISCMB.
During deliberations in the UNSC, though UNSCR 1973 was passed by the Council, it
was met with significant resistance. The resolution’s success was exceptional in that the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation “were willing to acquiesce in the passage”
of Resolution 1973 “by abstention,”88
instead of expressing their discontentment by resorting to a
veto of the draft. While this was the case with Libya, it is worth noting that Russia and China
were swayed into abstaining, through pressure exerted by regional bodies including the “League
of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference,”89
all of whom had growing economic ties (leverage) with the two nations. An awareness of such
circumstances and factors are required for those looking to formulate policies that aim at
encouraging the passage and implementation of resolutions relating to the R2P.
Morris observes that the doctrine, as it links to Libya, was invoked in a limited manner,
where “only France and Colombia referred to the concept”90
during the deliberation period, and
even then, only in reference to Libya’s Pillar I responsibilities. There was almost no mention of
the Pillar II and III responsibilities that fell upon the international community, when the primary
State in question is unable to fulfil its Pillar I responsibilities. In fact, Morris adds that in
discussions occurring in the UNSC between February 2011 and May 2013, clear references to
the R2P were made only by “six council members,” where Libya’s Pillar I responsibilities were
explicitly referred to by ‘the US, France (twice), Columbia (twice), and Germany’ and where the
Pillar III responsibilities of the international community were explicitly referred to by ‘France
87
Ibid
88
Hehir, Aidan, and Robert W. Murray. Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian
Intervention. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 110. Print.
89
Ibid., 152.
90
(2013): 1265-283. Print.

22
(twice), Lebanon, and Rwanda.’91
For Morris, this observation potentially suggests two things: a)
that “States did not cite R2P in the debates over Libya simply because it did not figure
significantly in their thinking,” or more plausibly, b) that States were unwilling to “cite the
concept, especially in pillar three guise, given the controversy which still surrounds it.”92
In
either case, the evidence implies that those celebrating the normative expansion of the R2P, may
have done so prematurely. The unwillingness or inability to adequately discuss the hard Pillar III
aspects of the R2P was also evidenced by the extent to which the doctrine was weakened in the
World Summit Outcome meeting, where nations were mostly willing to deliberate only the Pillar
I aspects of the doctrine.
Beside the difficulties faced during the actual drafting and ratification of UNSCR 1973,
many scholars also question the intent and motivation of those key powers pushing for the
intervention. Here, the US that played a central role in calling for international action. However,
even the American government’s invocation of the doctrine was quite vague and limited.
President Obama, instead of talking about the R2P, based the need to intervene on a
“responsibility to act.”93
President Obama’s justification was therefore clearly conditioned upon
the presence of American geopolitical “interests and values.”94
Additionally, the refusal to
invoke the doctrine in name is surprising, given that Obama’s former US Permanent
Representative to the UN, Susan Rice, while giving a speech in New York in 2009, had
described the principle as ‘bold and important’ and that the US “welcomed it.”95
Mohamed
therefore argues that America’s actions were “guided primarily by U.S. interests and only
secondarily by a sense of responsibility regardless of interest.”96
Still, Mohamed follows this
same line of argument in suggesting that perhaps there was a ‘deep sense of moral duty at the
91
Ibid
92
Ibid
93
Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya. National Defense University,
Washington D.C. 28 Mar. 2011. The White House. Web. 28 Sept. 2014. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>.
94
Ibid
95
Rice, Susan E. Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative, on the UN Security
Council and the Responsibility to Protect, at the International Peace Institute Vienna Seminar. U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, New York. 15 June 2009. United States Mission to the United Nations. Web. 2 Oct. 2014.
<http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/125977.htm>.
96
Mohamed, Saira. "Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect." Stanford Journal of International Law 48.2
(2012): 319-39. Print.

23
heart of the (U.S.) decision to intervene,’ and that it was ‘political expediency’ that motivated the
talking points’ subordination of the R2P to other interests.’97
Despite the American unwillingness to definitively refer to the doctrine, the ICISS clearly
acknowledges that “the absence of any narrow self-interest at all may be ideal, but it is not likely
always to be a reality,” and that the costs and risks of investing in interventions may make it
“politically imperative for intervening States to be able to claim some degree of self-interest in
the intervention, however altruistic its primary motive might be.”98
Tesón also promotes the idea
that the doctrine “requires humanitarian intention to be one reason for intervening, but not
necessarily the only one.”99
Similarly, Pattison stresses the importance of ‘intention,’ which is
“the contemplated act, what the agent wills to do”; so, regardless of the presence of self-
interested (primary) motives, if the “kind of military intervention we are discussing is a good
action performed out of a bad or non-altruistic motive,”100
it can still be legitimate since it has
the potential to save lives and end suffering. In linking this reasoning to Obama’s public rhetoric,
it is found that Obama wanted to prevent a “massacre that would have reverberated across the
region and stained the conscience of the world.”101
Thus, having ascertained that the US did
purportedly want to save lives and that the limited invocation of the R2P, while weak, was
seemingly sufficient to authorize UNSCR 1973, the next sections will judge the overall
legitimacy of the intervention conducted under the R2P.
97
Ibid
98
99
Tesón, Fernando R. "Humanitarian Intervention: Loose Ends." Journal of Military Ethics 10.3 (2011): 192-212.
Print.
100
Pattison, James. “Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: The Moral Importance of an Intervener’s
Legal Status.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2007th
ser. 10.3 (2007): 301-19.
Print.
101
Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya. National Defense University,
Washington D.C. 28 Mar. 2011. The White House. Web. 28 Sept. 2014. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>.

24
b) The Ethical and Legal Legitimacy of the NATO-led Coalition
i) NATO’s Ethical Legitimacy and Failure to Encourage Peace Negotiations
While discussing the legitimate use of force in interventions, the ICISS’s doctrine advises
the ‘full exploration of all peaceful means of resolving a conflict.’102
With the formulation of the
R2P having “drawn from traditional just war theory,’103
the NATO-led coalition’s approach and
faulty application of the R2P seemingly weakens the overall legitimacy of the intervention.
According to Kuperman, NATO should have carried out its mandate and enforced “the no-fly
zone, bombed forces that were threatening civilians, and attempted to forge a cease-fire.”104
Instead, short of peace through outright military victory, NATO seems to have thwarted most, if
not all other political avenues through which to bring the conflict to a peaceful close. De Waal
stresses that the AU roadmap did include provisions for a “cease-fire and negotiations,” but the
rebel “TNC (Transitional National Council) leadership rejected the plan”105
outright. Kuperman
also lambasts NATO for aiding “the rebels who rejected this peaceful path and who instead
sought to overthrow Qaddafi.”106
The TNC were also “flushed with military support from
NATO,” which ostensibly led to the ‘hardening of the rebel’s intransigence and delays in”107
achieving a political resolution. Beyond rejecting the AU’s roadmap to peace, which Gaddafi
himself “accepted,”108
when Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez struggled to ‘broker a truce
between the rebels and Muammar Gaddafi,’109
the rebels responded by vowing “never to
102
Ottawa, 2001). 1. print
103
Nye, Joseph S. "The Intervention Dilemma." Aljazeera. Aljazeera, 15 June 2012. Web. 24 Nov. 2014.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/06/201261292523651706.html>.
104
Ibid
105
De Waal, Alex. "‘My Fears, Alas, Were Not Unfounded’: Africa’s Responses to the Libya Conflict." Libya: The
Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention. By Aidan Hehir and Robert W. Murray. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 68. Print.
106
107
Steele, Jonathan. "Why No Mention of a Ceasefire for Libya, Obama?" The Guardian. Guardian News and
Media, 28 May 2011. Web. 02 Apr. 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/27/ceasefire-
libya-obama-nato-mistake>.
108
Fadel, Leila. "Libyan Rebels Reject African Union Cease-fire Proposal." Washington Post. The Washington Post,
11 Apr. 2011. Web. 21 Nov. 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gaddafi-accepts-road-map-for-peace-
proposed-by-african-leaders/2011/04/10/AFbrtuJD_story.html>.
109
Chulov, Martin. "Libyan Rebels Reject Hugo Chávez Mediation Offer." Theguardian.com. Guardian News and
Media, 03 Mar. 2011. Web. 24 Mar. 2014. < http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/03/libyan-rebels-reject-
hugo-chavez>.

25
negotiate with him.”110
Ultimately, had NATO been serious about achieving peace and
protecting civilians, it would have “conditioned its aid to the rebels on their sincerely exploring
the regime’s offers.”111
NATO’s support for the rebels, in spite of their refusal to engage in
political negotiations, not only opens them to the criticism of prolonging the violence and
primarily aiming for regime change, but it also creates a dent in their ethical legitimacy and
thereby also threatens the R2P, by contributing to its delegitimization.
ii) Regime Change and the Ground Component
Next, the onset of regime change in Libya was viewed unfavorably by many States112
as a
Western neo-colonialist project. In referring to the doctrine, Kuperman starts off by establishing
that “the situation in Libya did not seem serious enough to provide just cause113
for regime
change- or, more precisely, forcible regime change by an external party in support of a rebel
movement.”114
Walzer would seemingly support this position, as he states that any proposed
intervention must be “as much like non-intervention as possible,” where the goal is either ‘to
balance or to rescue’115
an imminently threatened population. Relatedly, Pattison opines that
“making regime change the primary objective would be morally problematic,” not only because
it would fail to meet many qualities required for the ethical legitimacy of an intervention, but
also because “it would most likely lead to a large number of innocent casualties,”116
thereby
purposefully undermining the ethical legitimacy and effectiveness of the intervention.
110
Ibid
111
112
Such as India, Brazil, Russia, China and later, South Africa. For more information, refer to: Charbonneau, Louis.
"U.N. Chief Defends NATO from Critics of Libya War." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 14 Dec. 2011. Web. 8 Oct.
2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/14/us-libya-nato-un-idUSTRE7BD20C20111214>.
113
Just cause is one of the six decision making criteria considered by the R2P. The rest of the six include right
authority, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects. When considering that Gaddafi
was willing to negotiate with the rebels and that the rebels refused to even come to the table, it is difficult to justify
NATO’s stance of failing to encourage the TNC into a negotiated peace settlement, and instead providing support
for a rebel movement intent on continuing the violence. For more information on the six criteria, refer to the ICISS’s
doctrine.
114
115
Walzer, Michael. "Humanitarian Intervention." Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations. 4th ed. New York: Basic, 1977. 101-08. Print.
116
Pattison, James. "The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya." Ethics & International Affairs 25.03
(2011): 271-77. Print.

26
While McMahon and others may argue that “regime change should sometimes be part of
the process of protecting populations,”117
Gaub reminds us that the legal mandate’s ‘military
rules of engagement very clearly excluded regime change as a mission objective.’118
He adds that
OUP was planned to be conducted “purely from the air and sea to protect civilians,” but that ‘the
difference between regime change and civilian protection became more unclear the longer the
operation lasted.’119
Pattison supports this argument by claiming that the “primary objective” of
NATO’s OUP may have “become regime change rather than the protection of civilians,”120
given
observations such as NATO’s attack on “Libyan forces that were retreating and therefore not a
threat to civilians, who were far away.”121
Similarly, aggressive aerial strikes were conducted in
areas (e.g. Sirte) that represented “no threat to civilians,”122
and which constituted actions that
were described by Libyan government officials as “a far cry from the United Nations
mandate.”123
Thus, NATO’s aggressive conduct and failure to abide by its mandate in this
manner erodes both its ethical and legal legitimacy. This in turn also provides fodder for those
looking to criticize the legitimacy and purpose of the R2P itself.
By partaking in other activities that constituted breaches of the coalition’s legal mandate,
NATO has once again polluted its legal legitimacy. UNSCR 1973’s provisions were very
particular regarding the exclusion of a “foreign occupation force of any form on any part of
Libyan territory.”124
Though UNSG, Ban Ki-moon, in 2011, ‘rejected claims that NATO had
117
McMahon, Robert. "The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on
Foreign Relations, 12 June 2013. Web. 08 Nov. 2014. <http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-intervention/dilemma-
humanitarian-intervention/p16524>.
118
119
Ibid
120
Pattison, James. "The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya." Ethics & International Affairs 25.03
(2011): 271-77. Print.
121
Fahim, Kareem, and David D. Kirkpatrick. "Rebels Retake Libyan City As Airstrikes Clear a Way." The New
York Times. The New York Times, 26 Mar. 2011. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.
< http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/world/africa/27libya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>.
122
Swami, Praveen, Rosa Prince, and Toby Harnden. "Coalition Forces Strike Sirte; Leader’s Home Town." The
Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 28 Mar. 2011. Web. 20 Mar. 2014.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8410250/Libya-coalition-attacks-Sirte-for-
first-time.html>.
123
124
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya],
17 March 2011, S/RES/1973(2011), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d885fc42.html [accessed 8
Ocober 2014]

27
exceeded its mandate in Libya,’125
Gaub reasons that there was in fact a ‘crucial ground
component that can be attributed to any claimed success achieved by NATO.’126
Even though
UNSCR 1973 forbade coalition boots on the ground in Libya, and though the UNSC demanded
“transparency and accountability”127
from NATO, OUP members such as Qatar and the UAE did
not “notify the UN in time or adequately”128
of its actions on the ground. These actions
constituted the ground based stationing and transfer of “weapons to the rebels, military
technology, and military personnel.”129
In fact, it was only in October 2011 that Qatari Major-
General, Hamad bin Ali al-Atiya, admitted to stationing ‘hundreds of Qataris in every region of
Libya’ to ‘support the Libyan rebels who overthrew’130
Gaddafi. When questioned about similar
allegations, the UAE replied that “NATO would be in a better position to answer those
questions,”131
thus implying NATO’s implicit consent regarding the legal breach. Moreover,
reports that NATO members such as the UK, in announcing the terrestrial deployment of
‘military experts to advise the rebels in eastern Libya’132
and the US, in ‘approving covert aid to
the rebels,’133
clearly display a further blatant violation and disrespect for both the R2P and the
parameters set by the mandate.
125
Shabi, Rachel. "Nato Accused of War Crimes in Libya." The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media,
27 Oct. 2014. Web. 08 Dec. 2014. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/nato-accused-of-war-crimes-
in-libya-6291566.html>.
126
127
Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011)
Concerning Libya. Rep. United Nations Security Council, 20 Mar. 2012. Web. 19 Feb. 2014.
<www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/163>.
128
Ibid
129
130
Black, Ian. "Qatar Admits Sending Hundreds of Troops to Support Libya Rebels." The Guardian. Guardian News
and Media Limited, 26 Oct. 20111. Web. 13 Oct. 2014.
<http%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fworld%2F2011%2Foct%2F26%2Fqatar-troops-libya-rebels-
support>.
131
Borger, Julian, and Martin Chulov. "Al-Jazeera Footage Captures 'western Troops on the Ground' in Libya." The
Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 31 May 2011. Web. 28 Mar. 2014.
< http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/30/western-troops-on-ground-libya>.
132
Wintour, Patrick, and Richard Norton-Taylor. "Libyan Opposition Leaders to Get Advice from UK Military."
The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 05 Mar. 2011. Web. 28 Mar. 2014. <
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/04/libyan-opposition-leaders-advice>.
133
Hosenball, Mark. "Exclusive: Obama Authorizes Secret Help for Libya Rebels." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 01
Mar. 30. Web. 28 Mar. 2014. < http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/30/us-libya-usa-order-
idUSTRE72T6H220110330>.

28
c) Factors Inhibiting the NATO’s Practical legitimacy: Logistical and Operational
Shortcomings
The following section will evaluate NATO’s financial, logistical and operational
shortcomings in Libya, and their consequences for the intervention. Studying this practical aspect
of the intervention is vital as it strongly relates to NATO’s effectiveness and thus, its practical
legitimacy. With the intervention being carried out under the framework of the R2P, albeit in a
limited manner as observed in section 3(a), an effective NATO also serves to bolster the
normative growth and legitimacy of the R2P. Conversely, NATO’s failure to legitimately,
efficiently, and effectively establish a stable human rights system through its conduct, can
detrimentally affect the validity, purpose, and future of the doctrine.
i) NATO’s Operational, Logistical, and Financial Shortcomings
With the US purportedly “leading from behind,” NATO’s OUP was praised for being
‘driven by Britain, France,” 134
and other EU nations. However, this was not an accurate
depiction. Ideally, with the coalition relying heavily on the resources of closely stationed EU
member States, NATO’s independence from US resources was important to increasing their
operational effectiveness. Nevertheless, NATO major-general Marcel Druart, during an address
to the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defense, stated that “Nato relied
heavily on US military expertise on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities.”135
This point was reiterated by NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
when he stated that OUP had “demonstrated significant shortfalls in a range of European
capabilities – from smart munitions, to air-to-air refuelling,”136
and ISR.
During the course of the intervention, on many occasions, NATO ran out of strategic
resources. Davis cites US conservatives, who “censured NATO” (especially the EU-NATO) for
134
Erlanger, Steven. "Libya’s Dark Lesson for NATO." Editorial. The New York Times. The New York Times
Company, 3 Sept. 2011. Web. 17 Mar. 2014. < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/sunday-review/what-libyas-
lessons-mean-for-nato.html?pagewanted=all>.
135
Neilsen, Nikolaj. "Nato Commander: EU Could Not Do Libya without US." EUobserver /. EUobserver, 20 Mar.
2012. Web. 7 Sept. 2014. <http://euobserver.com/defence/115650>.
136
Fogh Rasmussen, Anders. "Speech to the Chairpersons of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the European Union
Member’s States Parliaments." Folketing, Copenhagen. 15 Mar. 2012. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Web. 16
June 2014. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_85119.htm>.

29
conducting operations “too slowly and with inadequate resources.”137
Similarly, Erlanger
expounds the scope of NATO’s shortcomings by stating that the alliance faced problems of
“running out of ammunitions and targets, with inadequate means to achieve stated political
goals.”138
Erlanger adds that even from the “eight of the 28 allies engaged in combat…most ran
out of ammunition, having to buy, at cost, ammunition stockpiled by the United States.”139
Phinney supplements this critique and adds that not only was there “an immediate lack of skilled
staffing across each of the CFAC divisions” (Command Force Air Command), the US’s decision
to “take a secondary role in OUP exposed NATO’s ISR shortcomings.”140
Stavridis and Daalder
emphasize how the U.S. had contributed “75 percent of the refueling planes used throughout the
mission,” without which ‘strike aircraft could not have responded quickly to hostile forces
threatening to attack civilians.’141
Consequently, the weaknesses within the NATO’s ISR
division hampered its targeting purposes, where it became “impossible to distinguish”142
the
regime’s forces from civilians and rebel forces.
In terms of finance, numerous politicians, military advisers, and policy makers within the
US bureaucracy have blamed NATO’s operational weaknesses on the NATO-EU member’s
unwillingness to increase their defense spending. Rasmussen asks, with “European NATO allies
drastically reducing their defense spending,” would NATO ‘still be able to afford responding to
such complex emergencies?’143
Rasmussen observes that European defense spending had fallen
by ‘almost 20 percent since the end of the Cold War,’ even though figures show that the EU-
NATO member’s “combined GDP grew by 55 percent.”144
Moreover, while EU-NATO
137
Davis, Dr. Ivan. How Good Is NATO after Libya? Rep. no. Briefing Paper No. 20. Gairloch: NATO Watch, 2011.
Print. Ser. 2011.
138
Erlanger, Steven. "Libya’s Dark Lesson for NATO." Editorial. The New York Times. The New York Times
Company, 3 Sept. 2011. Web. 17 Mar. 2014. < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/sunday-review/what-libyas-
lessons-mean-for-nato.html?pagewanted=all>.
139
Ibid
140
141
142
143
Fogh Rasmussen, Anders. "NATO After Libya: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times." Foreign Affairs.
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1 July 2011. Web. 11 Feb. 2014.
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67915/anders-fogh-rasmussen/nato-after-libya>.
144
Ibid

30
members are expected to spend “2 percent”145
of their GDPs on national defense, on average,
“Europe now spends just 1.6 percent of their GDPs on their militaries, and many spend less than
one percent.”146
For the US, which spends “4 percent of its GDP” on its military, this was a
rather disappointing trend, especially considering that Washington spends “nearly three times as
much on defense as the other 27 NATO allies combined.”147
This trend is significant for the R2P,
given that a well-resourced intervener also has a stronger propensity to carry-out its mandate
efficiently, thereby saving lives. Therefore, a well-funded NATO could have prevented the
observed shortfalls in its ISR capabilities (which are supposed to have increased civilian
casualties), while simultaneously strengthening its practical legitimacy, which in turn could have
fortified the R2P’s perception as well.
ii) Importance of Adequate Cultural Knowledge and Operational Effectiveness
Next, with regards to NATO’s operational effectiveness in Libya, NATO Commander of
OUP, Lt. General Bouchard, proudly claims the Arab countries “helped” the alliance
“understand the culture” in Libya so as to allow NATO to ‘continue their mission and interpret
what they saw on the ground.’148
Furthermore, Bouchard believes that this aspect of the
operation helped make the mission “a success.”149
However, in claiming that NATO had “no
cultural advisers on the staff of OUP,” Gaub criticizes NATO for paying “rather limited attention
to Libya’s cultural terrain.”150
Subsequently, the improvised use of advice “that OUP relied on
turned out to be a failure,” with NATO personnel admitting that they lacked the capacity to
‘predict several of the turns the operation took.’151
These turns include “Qaddafi’s holding on to
power, the comparable weakness but surprising resilience and adaptability of the armed forces,
145
Freyer-Briggs, Zachary. "US Pushes NATO Allies To Boost Defense Spending." Defense News. Gannett
Government Media Corporation, 3 May 2014. Web. 02 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140503/DEFREG01/305030021/US-Pushes-NATO-Allies-Boost-Defense-
Spending>.
146
147
Ibid
148
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Newsroom. Press Briefing on Libya. NATO: Speeches and Transcripts.
NATO, 24 Oct. 2011. Web. 8 Sept. 2014. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_79851.htm>.
149
Ibid
150
151
Ibid

31
and apparent passivity shown by the population of Tripoli, whose uprising was expected.”152
Gaub vehemently argues that success in Libya could have come earlier (with fewer civilian
casualties), had there been a better understanding of the local culture, which would have aided
the coalition in ‘anticipating rebel and civilian population behavior, be it in Tripoli or Misrata, on
the basis of sound judgment rather than speculation.”153
With practical legitimacy judged by the manner in which an intervener is able to
efficiently establish a stable human rights system, NATO’s discussed operational, logistical, and
financial shortcomings seriously compromises its effectiveness (and thus, its legitimacy). Once
again, it is stressed that NATO’s faulty conduct in Libya also becomes representative of the
R2P’s status and role in the international system. The following section will evaluate the
practical legitimacy of NATO’s OUP by looking at the intervention’s consequences and its
effects on the doctrine’s legitimate standing.
d) The Consequences of OUP
i) Collateral Damage
According to Walzer, during times of war, “non-combatants cannot be attacked at any
time.”154
However, they are often “endangered” during conflicts “because of their proximity to a
battle that is being fought against someone else.”155
While collateral damage may be a part and
parcel of war, Walzer contends that “some degree of care must be taken not to harm civilians”
and that “we recognize their rights as best as we can within the context of war.”156
Stavridis and
Daalder congratulate NATO for conducting ‘air campaigns of unparalleled precision, which
greatly minimized collateral damage.’157
Similarly, O’Donnell and Vaïsse argue that NATO was
152
Ibid
153
Ibid
154
Walzer, Michael. "Noncombatant Immunity and Military Necessity." Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument
with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic, 1977. 151-52. Print.
155
Ibid
156
Ibid
157
Relations, Mar.-Apr. 2012. Web. 03 Mar. 2014.

32
able to “keep the level of collateral damage remarkably low” as a result of “the extensive and
skilled use of precision guided munitions.”158
In contrast to NATO’s narrative, Cock affirms the indisputability of the fact “that
airstrikes on a number of legitimate military targets might have caused some collateral
damage.”159
Phinney adds that during the preliminary stages of its aerial campaign, ‘NATO
severely lacked ISR capabilities,’160
which greatly increased the probability of collateral damage.
Furthermore, a 2012 report published by Amnesty International argues that though NATO did
make “significant efforts to minimize the risk of causing civilian casualties” in a variety of ways,
‘dozens of civilians have been killed (and injured) in NATO airstrikes on private homes in
residential and rural areas, with no evidence of military objectives at the strike locations at the
time of the strikes.’161
It also holds NATO guilty for violations of “International Humanitarian
Law” (IHL) and for failing to ‘investigate, acknowledge and mend’ the injustice perceived by
innocent civilian victims of NATO’s actions.162
These claims were also substantiated by the
ICIL163
, which “confirmed civilian casualties and found targets that showed no evidence of
military utility.”164
Though the ICIL concluded that “NATO did not deliberately target civilians in Libya,”165
NATO’s abject refusal to “address these incidents appropriately including by establishing contact
and providing information to the victims and their relatives about any investigation which might
have been initiated”166
—severely damaged its purpose and moral standing in Libya. A 2012
report published by HRW determined that though “civilian deaths in Libya from NATO strikes
were low,” NATO air strikes killed “at least 72 civilians, one-third of them children under age
158
O'Donnell, Clara M., and Justin Vaïsse. "Is Libya NATO's Final Bow?" The Brookings Institution. The
Brookings Institution, 2 Dec. 2011. Web. 12 Aug. 2014. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/12/02-
libya-odonnell-vaisse>.
159
Cock, Chris De. "Operation Unified Protector and the Protection of Civilians in Libya." Yearbook of
International Humanitarian Law 2011th ser. 14 (2011): 213-35. Print.
160
161
Amnesty International. Libya: The Forgotten Victims of NATO Strikes. London: Amnesty International
Publications, 2012. Print.
162
Ibid
163
ICIL is an abbreviation for Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (mandated by the UN
Human Rights Council)
164
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya , 2 March
2012, A/HRC/19/68 , available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ffd19532.html [accessed 12 August 2014]
165
Ibid
166
Amnesty International. Libya: The Forgotten Victims of NATO Strikes. London: Amnesty International
Publications, 2012. Print.

33
8.”167
Again, like Amnesty International, HRW’s report accused NATO of failing to
“acknowledge these casualties or to examine how and why they occurred.”168
The report’s
author, Fred Abrahams, condemned NATO for refusing to “acknowledge the deaths” and for
‘offering no compensation for the families.’169
Bassiouni argues that NATO was “not
forthcoming with information when it came to strikes that led to civilian casualties or the
destruction of civilian infrastructure” and that it had to rely on ‘news outlets to account for and
report on its own violations of IHL because it did not have the mandate or the disposition to do
so.’170
NATO’s refusal to concede its mistakes and face the legal accusations levelled against it,
further erodes its legal, ethical and practical legitimacy, which consequently delegitimizes the
R2P and endangers its future. Also, as claimed by realist constructivism, NATO’s actions have
been challenged by the rise of global non-state actors, who place pressure on interveners to
justify their actions.
ii) Spillover in Mali
NATO’s intervention in Libya also led to a regional spillover in Mali, which garnered
severe condemnation from the international community. Since NATO’s mandate in Libya
forbade the presence of ground forces, the mandate made possible a situation where ‘hundreds of
Malian combatants who had fought to defend Gaddafi, fled back home’ to form ‘the most
powerful Tuareg-led (minority) rebel group the region,’171
known as the Azawad National
Liberation Movement (MNLA). The rebellion was facilitated by the smuggling of “large
quantities of weapons and ammunition”172
out of Libya by retreating members of the Libyan
army, mercenaries and other groups in the region. This Tuareg rebellion, which imposed heavy
losses on the Malian security forces, resulted in Malian President, Amadou Toumani Toure,
167
Abrahams, Fred. Unacknowledged Deaths: Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air Campaign in Libya. Rep. United
States of America: HRW, 2012. Print.
168
Ibid
169
BBC. "Nato Hits Back at Libya's Civilian Deaths Report." BBC News. BBC, 14 May 2012. Web. 12 Aug. 2014.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18062012>.
170
Bassiouni, M. Cherif. "The NATO Campaign." Libya, from Repression to Revolution: A Record of Armed
Conflict and International Law Violations, 2011-2013. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013. 270. Print.
171
Fessy, Thomas. "Gaddafi's Influence in Mali's Coup." BBC News. BBC, 22 Mar. 2012. Web. 16 Feb. 2014.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17481114>.
172
George, Princy M. "The Libyan Crisis and the Western Sahel: Emerging Security Issues." Institute for Defense
Studies and Analyses. IDSA, 14 Aug. 2012. Web. 01 Apr. 2014.
< http://www.idsa.in/backgrounder/TheLibyanCrisisandWestAfricanSahel_140812.html>.

34
being “deposed”173
as a consequence of internal military pressures and the actions of radical
groups. The instability in Mali was then compounded by the rise of radical Islamist forces,
dominated by “Ansar Dine”174
and other elements affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM).
Kuperman notes that before the instability in Mali brought about by OUP, Mali was
hailed by “many diplomats and scholars as the region’s exceptional example of peace and
democracy.”175
Douthat acknowledges the practical problems for the future of R2P posed by the
spillover, in stating that these events “should complicate the Libya hawks’ easy moralism.”176
Furthermore, Douthat concludes that ‘interventionists who want to claim credit for saving lives
in Benghazi’ are obligated to ‘recognize how the adverse effects of their choices lead to deaths in
Timbuktu.’177
With terrorists having come in to fill the power vacuum created by the Tuareg
movement, Kaplan lamentably notes that the human rights situation in Mali has only deteriorated
with increased violence and the ‘flourishing of criminal enterprises.’178
The expansion of
regional instability and the increase in human insecurity resulting from OUP illustrates the duty
that the UNSC and chosen interveners have, in remedying the negative effects of their actions.
Additionally, by inducing a regional human rights crisis, NATO’s practical legitimacy has
observably taken a beating.
iii) Post-interventionist Libya: A Human Security Failure of Local and Regional
Proportions
The state of post-interventionist Libya is a harrowing sight. The intervention, along with
NATO’s disengagement had “left a vacuum in the wake of Gaddafi’s death,” leading to the
173
Lye, Ian, and Monika Roszkowska. Insurgency, Instability, Intervention: A Snapshot of Mali and the Sahel
Region Threat Landscape. N.p.: Thomson Reuters Acceleus, 2013. Print.
174
Douthat, Ross. "Libya’s Unintended Consequences." The New York Times. The New York Times, 07 July 2012.
Web. 13 Mar. 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/opinion/sunday/libyas-unintended-
consequences.html?_r=0>.
175
176
Douthat, Ross. "Libya’s Unintended Consequences." The New York Times. The New York Times, 07 July 2012.
Web. 13 Mar. 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/opinion/sunday/libyas-unintended-
consequences.html?_r=0>.
177
Ibid
178
Kaplan, Seth. "Libya Spillover: Mapping Northern Africa’s Growing Chaos." Fragile States. Seth Kaplan, 2013.
Web. 10 Oct. 2014. <http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fragilestates.org%2F2014%2F07%2F14%2Flibya-spillover-mapping-
northern-africas-growing-chaos%2F>.

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