This document summarizes a court ruling on whether terrorism is justified in war. The court rules in favor of neither petitioner because they failed to present enforceable legal arguments and instead posed moral arguments. The court finds that there are no existing laws or agreements between countries that prohibit the use of terrorism. As such, the court determines that terrorism has not been agreed upon and there is no definitive legal answer under a framework of global justice.

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GOV S335M
August 16, 2015
Moral vs. Legal
The question presented before this court is whether terrorism is justified in the context of
war, the petitioners in this case are David Rodin and Saul Smilansky.i
Both petitioners have
submitted briefs and after close and careful analysis of the briefs I rule in favor of neither
petitioner because both fail to present enforceable legal arguments and instead pose moral
arguments. This court does holds that terrorism is justified in the context of war. My ruling is
broader use of terrorism from what petitioner Smilansky is requesting in the sense that I do not
impose any limitation under which situations warrant the use.
The value of this case is Global Justice. The definition employed is a modified version of
that of David Hume’s, defined as, “Justice established itself by a kind of convention or
agreement; that is, by a sense of interest, suppos’d to be common to all, and where every single
act is perform’d in expectation that others are to perform the like” (Global Justice Reader 577).
“Agreement” is the key word in this case because justice, in short, is created when two or more
parties agree to follow a set rule. When the parties obey the agreement the actions are said to be
just and when they are not obeying the agreement they are said to be acting unjustly. I
extrapolate Hume’s definition and conclude that Global Justice is the same kind of justice but on
a global scale where the agents in global justice are sovereign countries.
The criterion used to evaluate this case is Enforceability.ii
What I have to judge in each of
the petitioner’s argument is whether their theories correspond with the global justice as I have
defined. Thus, I have to determine if there is a law/ agreement that currently exists which binds
countries together which forbids the use of terrorism.
The petitioner David Rodin has presented before this court the idea that “war on terror,
should not if it is to be legitimate, use terrorist tactics itself” (Global Justice Reader 566). If the

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terrorist attacks the United States, the United States is not allowed to counter the terrorism with
terrorism. What bars the USA from using terrorism is the rights of the individuals, “the problem
is not to describe how immunity is gained, but how it is lost. We are all immune to start with; our
rights not to be attacked is a feature of normal human relationships” (Global Justice Reader 556).
The crux of Mr. Roding relies on the fact that our rights are “lost” and “feature of the
normal human relationship” (Global Justice Reader 556). First, the use of lost is an implication
that the rights are innate to the individual. Here the individual does not need to gain the right
because the individual was born with the right. Second, Roding is describing a moral argument
by stating right is “a normal human relationship.”iii
I find that Mr. Rodin’s overall argument is not enforceable because it is not a legal
claim. Rodin does not evoke a legal doctrine to support his assertion, he does not point to a
global governing document to justify his stance. As I have mentioned, this case requires that the
petitioners point specifically to a legal doctrine, which outlines the global rights of humans or the
terms for the use of terrorism. Remember, Global justice is the legal and enforceable agreements
among countries. Where there is no such agreement then the question does not have a definitive
answer.
Consider, country A and B have willingly agreed to obey certain laws that I will call 1,2
and 3. This means that A and B and CAN enforce laws 1, 2, an 3 among each other and this
would be considered legal and just. However, let us say that an issue such as terrorism arises, call
it 4. This 4 agreement is not encompassed in 1,2, or 3. Therefore until A and B agree on how to
handle 4 it is not unjust or illegitimate for A or B to address 4 as they please. I emphasize that
the two parties must willingly adopt the agreement and be willing to abide by the agreement as
mentioned in my definition of justice. Continuing with my analogy, If both A and B agree to 4

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but B does not fully support 4 then there is a breach. The problem is exasperated when B is the
controlling and dominant power. Thus, B is really the deciding party as to who gets to enforce 4.
The situation that Rodin has provided for this court is that of number four in my analogy where
there is no law that prohibits one country from stopping another from using terrorism as a form
of a military tactic.iv
Yet, there are two pieces of legislation that appear to be relevant in the course of this
case: United Nations Resolution 1624 and the Rome Statute of 1998.
Part of the Resolution 1642 of 2005 reads the following: “Stresses that States must…
comply with all of their obligations under international law, in particular international human
rights law, refugee law, and humanitarian law [when addressing terrorism]” (United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1642). It is here that I finally find a piece of legislation to hang my
hat in this court case. I can stop here and base my ruling on this piece of legislation that gives the
United Nations a just reason to stop the use of terrorism and observe the rights of the innocent
but recall my clarification on powerful countries enforcing the law.
The entity that enforces violations to this is the International Criminal Court established
by the Rome Statute of 1998. The international law states, “To become party to a treaty, a State
must express, through a concrete act, its willingness to undertake the legal rights and obligations
contained in the treaty – it must ‘consent to be bound’ by the treaty. This is usually accomplished
through signature and ratification of the treaty, or if it’s already in force, by accession to it”
(Global Issues and the United Nations).
There are three countries, which have yet to ratify, and bind themselves to the
International Court’s decision’s and overall to International law: The United States of America,
The Peoples Republic of China, and Russia. These three countries are the most powerful and

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arguably the enforcers of the international law. Without these three countries obeying and
enforcing the international it seems that the international law is but empty words on paper. Thus,
I find that even Rodin and Resolution 1642 is not enforceable. I find Rodin’s view
unenforceable because he does not justify his stance using a legal doctrine and I find that the UN
Resolution 1642 also not enforceable because the superpowers of the world refuse to obey and
continue to violate it.
The petitioner Saul Smilansky has presented before this court the argument that terrorism
can be justified under what he calls the “Antioppression Exception” (Global Justice Reader 570).
This is a theory claims that the use of terrorism can be justified used by oppressed countries if
they meet one of the following criteria: genocide, drawing public attention to poverty, and
overthrowing a dictatorial regime (Global justice Reader 574).v
It appears that Petitioner
Smilansky is trying to reconcile the moral wrongness of terrorism with the legal or lack of legal
stance on terrorism. The problem that I run into with Mr. Smilansky is that his position is
confusing in such a way that the reader cannot clearly understand what the intention of the work
is. In the end I find that Smilansky’s argument is null and void because of major contradiction’s
that he presents in his petition.
Smilansky produces an alternative to the use of terrorism, the Antioppression Exception.
Let us say I accept this position. Smilansky also posits the Principle of Noncombatant Immunity
or PNI, which states that “It is never permissible to aim to kill noncombatants; PNI forbids
terrorist as well as counterterrorist activities aimed at killing noncombatants” (Global Justice
Reader 569). There is a clear and indisputable contradiction between the Antioppression
Exception and the PNI. One the main position that Smilansky takes states that it is permissible to

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use terrorism under some circumstances. Yet, the PNI which he also upholds goes against his
main position and topic of his paper.
The petitioner destroys his own argument when he makes the following statement: “One
would have thought that there would be some significant positive correlation between the
practice of terrorism and moral justification. But not only is there no direct positive correlation,
the two go in opposite directions” (Global Justice Reader 575). To put in simpler terms, when the
use of terrorism increase the moral justification decreases. The aim of Smilansky was to find a
justification for the use of terrorism; this statement clearly defeats his main goal! Smilansky has
negated the three situations that he has presented to the Antioppresion Exception and self-defeats
his entire paper thus making his argument mute. I hold that I cannot uphold Smilansky’s position
for these reasons.
I want to close this case by considering one of the last statements that one of my
colleagues would like me to consider: The use of torture in the context of terrorism as defined
by David Sussman. Sussman makes the argument that there is a “Confident consensus that
torture is uniquely ‘barbaric’ and ‘inhuman’: the most profound violation possible of the dignity
of the human being” (Global Justice Reader 189). What I have shown in the course of this case is
that there is no legal and enforceable law that prohibits the countries from using terrorism and
torture is but a subset of terrorism. Therefore, Sussman’s argument is unable to hold legally
either. What we are left with is the default position that terrorism is something that has not been
agreed upon according the world countries. Justice only exists among a mutually agreeing parties
and since there is no mutual agreement on the use of terrorism then I must hold that countries
still have the ultimate decision as to whether they will wish to employ it or not.

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Works Cited
Brooks, Thom. The Global Justice Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2008. Print.
Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com. Web. 16 Aug. 2015.
“Global Issues and the United Nations.” UN News Center. UN. Web. 16 Aug. 2015.
“United Nations Security Council Resolution 1642.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department
of State, 14, Sept. 2005. Web. 16 Aug. 2015.

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End Notes
i Terrorism
: “Terrorism is the deliberate, negligent, or reckless use of force against noncombatants, by state
or non state actors for ideological ends and in the absence of a substantively just legal process”
(Global Justice Reader 555).
ii
Enforceability
: to make (a law, rule, etc.) active or effective : to make sure that people do what is required by (a
law, rule, etc.)
: to make (something) happen : to force or cause (something)
iii
Moral
1.
of, relating to, or concerned with the principles or rules
of right conduct or the distinction between right and wrong; ethical:
moral attitudes.
2.
expressing or conveying truths or counsel as to right conduct, as a speaker or a literary work.
3.
founded on the fundamental principles of right conduct rather than on legalities, enactment, or
custom:
moral obligations.
5.
conforming to the rules of right conduct (opposed to immoral ):
a moral man.
7.
of, relating to, or acting on the mind, feelings, will, or character:
moral support.
iv Terrorism is a “broadly military and political practice, which is frequently utilized by states,
including the United States and her allies (Global Justice Reader 565).
v
“Situations where there is clear danger to a group’s very existence or the mass extermination of
noncombatants” (Global Justice Reader 574).
“Limited terrorist actions aimed at galvanizing public attention to the plight of poor people in the
Third World” (Global Justice Reader 574).

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“Limited and narrowly focused terrorism aimed at toppling dictatorial regimes and establishing
democracy” (Global Justice Reader 574).