The creditor should return the garnished funds to the client and is in violation of the automatic stay by not doing so. Once a bankruptcy petition is filed, the automatic stay goes into effect and prevents creditors from garnishing wages, even if earned before the filing. Both case law discussed and bankruptcy code require creditors to affirmatively stop garnishment and return any funds obtained after a bankruptcy petition is filed and notice is provided. The client can file a motion for turnover or sanctions to recover the garnished wages and attorney's fees from the creditor who failed to return the funds after the bankruptcy filing.
San Diego attorney Scott McMillan sued Darren Chaker to remove public records about McMillan's being named in a child molestation investigation. The report is contained as an exhibit in San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2017-00036344-CU-NP-CTL and can also be seen on this profile.
Nonetheless, Scott McMillan San Diego attorney suffered a miserable loss in San Diego federal court, then appealed the loss to the Ninth Circuit. San Diego attorney Scott McMillan also filed an identical lawsuit in San Diego Superior Court, Case No. 37-2017-00036344-CU-NP-CTL. As expected, the Ninth Circuit found the lawsuit against Darren Chaker was meritless.
Now, San Diego attorney Scott McMillan is facing two anti-SLAPP motions in San Diego Superior Court and of course the inevitable embarrassment of losing his case, which is almost as bad as Scott McMillan having been sued twice recently for fraud and legal malpractice.
Judge Mosman avoided directly ruling on the application of SB 814 to the defense costs being sought by Schnitzer, instead holding that Schnitzer was judicially estopped from arguing that its defense counsel was "independent counsel" subject to SB 814.
San Diego attorney Scott McMillan sued Darren Chaker to remove public records about McMillan's being named in a child molestation investigation. The report is contained as an exhibit in San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2017-00036344-CU-NP-CTL and can also be seen on this profile.
Nonetheless, Scott McMillan San Diego attorney suffered a miserable loss in San Diego federal court, then appealed the loss to the Ninth Circuit. San Diego attorney Scott McMillan also filed an identical lawsuit in San Diego Superior Court, Case No. 37-2017-00036344-CU-NP-CTL. As expected, the Ninth Circuit found the lawsuit against Darren Chaker was meritless.
Now, San Diego attorney Scott McMillan is facing two anti-SLAPP motions in San Diego Superior Court and of course the inevitable embarrassment of losing his case, which is almost as bad as Scott McMillan having been sued twice recently for fraud and legal malpractice.
Judge Mosman avoided directly ruling on the application of SB 814 to the defense costs being sought by Schnitzer, instead holding that Schnitzer was judicially estopped from arguing that its defense counsel was "independent counsel" subject to SB 814.
BIA Remands of Immigration Judge Michael Baird from 01/01/2014 to 05/26/2016Bryan Johnson
EOIR FOIA ID # 2016-23184. Also, see acknowledgment letter at following link: http://www.slideshare.net/abogadobryan/eoir-acknowledgment-letter-for-201623284
Sample collection of meet and confer letters for discovery in californiaLegalDocsPro
This sample collection of meet and confer letters for discovery in California contains over 10 sample meet and confer letters and responses to meet and confer letters including a (1) meet and confer letter for further discovery responses to interrogatories, requests for admission and requests for production of documents, (2) response to meet and confer letter for motion to compel further responses to interrogatories, (3) response to meet and confer letter for motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents, (4) meet and confer letter for protective order for interrogatories, (5) meet and confer letter for protective order for requests for admission, (6) meet and confer letter for protective order for requests for production of documents, (7) Response to meet and confer letter for for protective order for interrogatories, (8) response to meet and confer letter for protective order for requests for admission, (9) response to meet and confer letter for protective order for requests for production of documents, (10) meet and confer letter for protective order for deposition, (11) meet and confer letter for motion to quash subpoena duces tecum, (12) meet and confer letter for motion to compel attendance at deposition, and (13) meet and confer letter for motion to compel testimony at deposition. The sample on which this preview is based is 42 pages and includes the meet and confer letters mentioned above. The author is a freelance paralegal that has worked in California and Federal litigation since 1995 and has created over 300 sample legal documents for sale.
BIA Remands of Immigration Judge Michael Baird from 01/01/2014 to 05/26/2016Bryan Johnson
EOIR FOIA ID # 2016-23184. Also, see acknowledgment letter at following link: http://www.slideshare.net/abogadobryan/eoir-acknowledgment-letter-for-201623284
Sample collection of meet and confer letters for discovery in californiaLegalDocsPro
This sample collection of meet and confer letters for discovery in California contains over 10 sample meet and confer letters and responses to meet and confer letters including a (1) meet and confer letter for further discovery responses to interrogatories, requests for admission and requests for production of documents, (2) response to meet and confer letter for motion to compel further responses to interrogatories, (3) response to meet and confer letter for motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents, (4) meet and confer letter for protective order for interrogatories, (5) meet and confer letter for protective order for requests for admission, (6) meet and confer letter for protective order for requests for production of documents, (7) Response to meet and confer letter for for protective order for interrogatories, (8) response to meet and confer letter for protective order for requests for admission, (9) response to meet and confer letter for protective order for requests for production of documents, (10) meet and confer letter for protective order for deposition, (11) meet and confer letter for motion to quash subpoena duces tecum, (12) meet and confer letter for motion to compel attendance at deposition, and (13) meet and confer letter for motion to compel testimony at deposition. The sample on which this preview is based is 42 pages and includes the meet and confer letters mentioned above. The author is a freelance paralegal that has worked in California and Federal litigation since 1995 and has created over 300 sample legal documents for sale.
Bankruptcy basics: What every lawyer should knowMichael Sheridan
Michael Sheridan is a chapter 7 and chapter 13 Minnesota Bankruptcy Attorney. Michael outlines the basics of bankruptcy at a Continuing Legal Education seminar.
Embedded video of the presentation can be found at: https://wmitchell.adobeconnect.com/_a1011281558/p4rm0zjl0uw/?launcher=false&fcsContent=true&pbMode=normal
Bankruptcy basics: What every lawyer should knowMichael Sheridan
Michael is a chapter 7 and chapter 13 MN Bankruptcy lawyer. Michael outlines the bankruptcy basics the lawyers and other professionals at a Continuing Legal Education seminar. Embedded video of the presentation can be found at: https://wmitchell.adobeconnect.com/_a1011281558/p4rm0zjl0uw/?launcher=false&fcsContent=true&pbMode=normal
Inherited IRA Not Exempt from Bankruptcy Estate, Supreme Court RulesCBIZ, Inc.
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that funds from an inherited IRA are not "retirement funds" exempt from the debtor's bankruptcy estate (B.C. Clark v. W.J. Rameker, SCt, 2014-1 USTC ¶50,317). Funds held in inherited IRAs are not objectively set aside for the purpose of retirement, the Court found.
The annual Legal Seminar For Credit Professionals, presented by Kegler Brown in conjunction with NACM – Great Lakes Region and American Subcontractors Association, was combined with an international business and construction legal program. Topics included selling internationally, post-judgment collection, bankruptcy, bids and pay-if-paid clauses.
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MEMO:
To:
From: Rebecca Holmes
Client:
Re: Garnishment of paycheck after Automatic Stay.
Date: 6/23/2015
FACTS: Client filed bankruptcy on 5/20/15. On 5/22/15, client was garnished for pay period
5/3/15-5/16/15.
QUESTION PRESENTED: Does a creditor have to give a garnished amount of a paycheck
back post-bankruptcy petition in accordance with the Automatic Stay provisions of 11 USC §
362 if the wages are earned prior to bankruptcy petition?
RULE: Garnishment cannot continue after filing the bankruptcy for a pre-petition judgment.
The creditor has the affirmative duty to stop garnishment after notice of filing.
SHORT ANSWER: Yes, the creditor should give the money back. The debtor may file a
Motion for Turnover or ask the creditor to release all funds garnished after the bankruptcy filing
date, as those funds were taken in violation of the automatic stay.
DISCUSSION:
In Re Scroggin, 364 B.R. 772, 780-81 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007), the creditor was garnishing
the debtor’s wages prior to the debtor filing for bankruptcy on October 12, 2004. The debtor sent
notice to the creditor on October 13, 2004. The creditor failed to notify the employer, the debtor,
2. 2
or the debtor’s attorney of the Release of Garnishment, and continued to garnish wages on
October 15 and October 30, 2004.The court held that once notified of a Debtor’s bankruptcy, the
creditor has to take affirmative action to stop the garnishment and that post-petition garnishment
of wages here was a violation of the automatic stay. at 780-81.
Similarly, in In re Russell, a debtor filed for bankruptcy 5/6/2010 after a garnishment
order was in effect. 441 BR 859 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, 2010), The creditor was notified the same
day, but failed to stop the garnishment for the May 14, 2010 and May 28, 2010 wages. The
creditor was held to have violated the automatic stay because “by May 14, 2010 [when the
creditor was notified that a garnishment had taken place], an affirmative duty arose on the part of
the Creditor’s counsel to take action to release the wage garnishment.” Id. at 862. The funds
from both garnishments in this case were voluntarily released by the creditor. Id. at 863 Here, the
court ordered reasonable attorney’s fees for the creditor, but denied granting punitive damages.
Id at 863.
The difference between Russell and Scroggin is when the affirmative duty of the creditor
arose to take action to stop the garnishment. In Russell, the creditor’s duty to stop garnishment
arose after the initial notice of bankruptcy and the subsequent notice that a garnishment had been
taken. In Scroggin, the creditor had a duty to stop the garnishment upon notice of bankruptcy.
In both cases, the affirmative duty was on the creditor to return funds garnished after the
date of filing bankruptcy and the automatic stay was in effect. 11 USC § 362(a); In re Pulliam,
262 B.R. 539, 542 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2001). While neither case specifies the importance of when
wages are earned, the emphasis is on the date of the garnishment. If the garnishment takes place
after the automatic stay is in effect, it is in violation of the stay. Accordingly, the garnished
wages, reasonable attorney’s fees, and, in limited circumstances, punitive damages can be
3. 3
awarded to the debtor when a creditor takes garnishment after the automatic stay is in effect.
Russell 441 BR at 862; (the debtor may recover damages after the first violation of the automatic
stay occurred); Id. at 863 (citing In Re Pawlowicz, 337 B.R. 640, 645 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005)
(“egregious misconduct on the creditor’s part… in arrogant defiance of federal law” may entitle
the debtor to punitive damages under Section 362(k)).
The actual violation of the stay is key to the recovery of damages, including garnished
wages. In re Henson, 477 B.R. 786 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012). Henson involved an automatic,
recurring postponement of a foreclosure sale after a debtor filed for bankruptcy under Colorado
state law. The court found no violation of the automatic stay because neither the lender nor
foreclosure trustee took an action to violate the stay; such as move forward with foreclosure.
Thus, there was no violation of 11 USC § 362 (a)(1) or (6). Id. In addition, the court In re Panos,
found that there was no violation of the automatic stay where the creditor was simply awaiting
judgment in order to start garnishment after the date of the bankruptcy petition was filed. 11
USC § 362(a); No. 13-21338-GMH, unreported 2013 WL 1498889, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
Apr. 10, 2013); (slip copy).
Unlike Henson and Panos, our client experienced actual automatic stay violations when
garnishment continued after filing for bankruptcy and notice was given to the garnishing
creditors.
Finally, In re Trujillo is most like our client’s situation. 485 B.R. 238 (Bankr. D. Colo.
2012). Here, the debtor failed to give actual notice to the court or creditor from the filings of
wage exemptions, even though they gave actual notice to the employer of the bankruptcy filing.
The employer continued to garnish wages post-petition for prep-petitioned-earned wages. Id. at
4. 4
243. (“This paycheck covered the last pre-petition pay period…”). The debtor’s counsel had to
repeatedly request the funds be returned before filing a motion to sanction the creditor. Id. 243.
The court awarded attorney’s fees here to the debtor even though the proper standing to assert a
violation of the turnover statute has traditionally belonged to the bankruptcy trustee. Id. at 234-
244 (“property of the estate” includes Garnished funds: “…§541 encompasses all of [Debtor’s]
wages, even if a portion of them may be subject to a pre-petition garnishment lien, because [the
Debtor] still held an interest in the garnished portion on the date of the petition.”) With each
garnished paycheck, “a judgment debtor has an opportunity to object.” Id at 244. With a right to
object comes an interest in the funds on petition date. Id. at 244.
The court awarded the attorney’s fees based on the violation of the automatic stay
because the creditor retained the funds. Id. at 245. (§362(a) Automatic Stay protects the debtor
from the enforcement of lien or garnishment rights against exempt property. The lienholder may
protect their interest (during this period when the funds are property of the estate, exempt, or
discharged) by seeking adequate protection or by seeking relief form the automatic stay under
§362(d), or they may apply for emergency hearing.) The court reasoned that the Bankruptcy code
places the burden on the lien creditor “to seek protection if its interests are threatened”, and not
on the debtor. Id. at 245. “By asserting its client’s lien rights in refusing to turn over the Funds,
the [Creditor] has upset this delicate balance. Its proper remedy was to seek protection from the
bankruptcy court. Instead it continued to exercise control over the Funds in violation of the
automatic stay.” Id at 246.
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Thus, a court may entertain a motion for sanction against a creditor who held garnished
funds post-petition if the debtor brings such a motion. However, the court is only likely to grant
attorney’s fees in such a case once the funds are returned.
CONCLUSION:
In these cases, the filing and automatic stay went into effect just days before the
garnishment took place. As long as the notice of filing was provided to creditors, the debtor has a
right to recovery of the garnished funds and reasonable attorney’s fees.