Market Timing and Capital Structure Evidence from Hong Kong Listed Companies
1.
Market Timing and Capital Structure:
Evidence from Hong Kong Listed Companies
Submitted by Feifei Wang to the University of Exeter
as a dissertation towards the degree of Master of Science (MSc)
in Financial Analysis and Fund Management
August 2016
Supervisor: Dr Pedro Angel Garcia Ares
I certify that all material in this dissertation which is not my own work has been identified and
that no material is included for which a degree has previously been conferred upon me
Signature…………………………………………………………....
2. 2
Abstract
Capital structure is always a keyword associated with modern corporate finance. Market
timing theory is a popular strand among theories about capital structure. This dissertation
uses IPO data from 227 Hong Kong listed companies from 2005 to 2015. I hope to provide
a refreshing view, as little prior research focuses on the Hong Kong market, and the
majority of past literature apply data available no later than 2003. The main methodology
is linear regression and I apply three different models to test the existence of short-term
and long-term effects of market timing respectively. The results confirm that 1) market
timing actions exist in both in debt financing and equity financing decisions of Hong Kong
listed companies 2) short-term effects of market timing on capital structure exist and 3)
persistent effects of market timing behaviour on capital structure that can last for 10 years
exist. This dissertation provides evidence to support the market timing theory in Hong
Kong listed companies. The result is consistent with the majority of studies based in
developed economies.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................. 5
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 6
1.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................................... 6
1.2 OBJECTIVE STATEMENT ........................................................................................................ 8
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THIS DISSERTATION ...................................................................................... 8
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 9
2.1 TRADE-OFF THEORY .............................................................................................................. 9
2.1.1 Static trade-off theory ................................................................................................... 9
2.1.2 Dynamic trade-off theory ............................................................................................ 10
2.2 PECKING ORDER THEORY .................................................................................................... 11
2.3 THEORY BASED ON AGENCY COSTS ..................................................................................... 11
2.3.1 Managerial entrenchment theory ............................................................................... 12
2.4 MARKET TIMING THEORY ..................................................................................................... 13
2.4.1 Windows of opportunity hypothesis ............................................................................ 13
2.4.2 Perceived mispricing .................................................................................................. 14
2.4.3 Adverse selection ....................................................................................................... 15
3. METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................... 18
3.1 VARIABLE DEFINITION ......................................................................................................... 18
3.1.1 Market timing indicator ............................................................................................... 18
3.1.2 Capital structure and determinants ............................................................................ 20
3.2 HYPOTHESIS AND MODELS .................................................................................................. 23
3.2.1 Hypothesis 1 Existence of Market timing ................................................................... 24
3.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Short-term effect .................................................................................. 25
3.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Persistent effect ................................................................................... 26
4. DATA ...................................................................................................................................... 28
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS .................................................................................................... 30
5.1 EXISTENCE OF MARKET TIMING BEHAVIOUR .......................................................................... 30
5.2 SHORT-TERM EFFECTS OF MARKET TIMING BEHAVIOUR ........................................................ 34
5.3 PERSISTENT EFFECT OF MARKET TIMING BEHAVIOUR ............................................................ 36
6. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 39
6.1 LIMITATIONS ....................................................................................................................... 39
6.2 SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................... 40
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................. 41
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 43
4. 4
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Various Equity Choices under “Windows of Opportunity” ……………..………..14
Table 2 Summary of Capital Structure Theories…………………………………………...17
Table 3 Summary of Different Choices on Market-timing Indicators……………..………19
Table 4 Summary of Variable Definitions ………………………………………………..23
Table 5 Summarised Statistics of Capital Structure and Financing Decisions.………...30
Table 6 Pearson Correlation between Variables…………………………………………...32
Table 7 Coefficients of Model 1a ...………………………………………………………….33
Table 8 Coefficients of Model 1b&1c ...……………………………………………………..33
Table 9 Coefficients of Model 2a …………………………………………………………....34
Table 10 Coefficients of Model 2b…………………………………………………………...35
Table 11 Coefficients of Model 3a…………………………………………………………...36
Table 12 Summary of Subsamples Coefficients …………………………………………..37
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Acknowledgements
I would like to express sincere appreciation to my supervisor Dr Pedro Angel Garcia Ares
for his constant guidance and support. He always encouraged me to explore the field I
was interested in and provided thorough advice on my work. His suggestions helped me
understand how to conduct and organise a professional dissertation and help me get to
where I am today.
I would like to convey my heartfelt thanks to Dr Angela Christidis, who is the module
coordinator for finance dissertation, for her help to me and her efforts to this dissertation.
I would also like to present my honest gratitude to Eugene for all the inspirations from
those interesting discussions with you. I don’t know where I’d be without you.
Last, but definitely not the least, I would like to thank my parents and my whole family, for
accompanying me through tough days with your encouragement and belief in me. I will
always remember your eternal love, in those times when I need them the most.
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1. Introduction
Capital structure must not be a strange word to most of people as it is vital to corporate
finance. After Modigliani and Miller published their study about capital structure in 1958,
it has become a popular topic and many researchers have made their contribution to the
field. In general, capital structure is a mix of sources for firms to raise capital, and normally
it is comprised of debt and equity. Firms make so much effort to allocate debt and equity
in an appropriate way in order to maximise firm value and shareholder interest.
There are mainly two traditional theories about capital structure: One is trade-off theory,
and the other is pecking order theory. These two theories form the fundamentals for other
theories. However, traditional trade-off theory assumes the existence of an optimal capital
structure, and pecking order theory requires an absolute order of financing. Thus, both of
them do not seem to fit the flexible financial environment that exists nowadays. This is
what makes the appearance of the “market timing” concept so important. It was first
introduced in Baker & Wurgler (2002), where they describe the theory as “capital structure
is the cumulative outcome of attempts to time the equity market”. Market timing theory
absorbs concepts from previous theories and develops upon them, but it does not
necessarily need any assumptions, unlike trade-off theory or pecking order theory. It
adapts to the new pattern of corporate finance where firms pay more attention to market
situations than previous years when they are making financial decisions, which makes
the new theory valuable and worth studying.
1.1 Problem Definition
Whether market timing behaviour exists;; whether it will bring significant influence to
capital structure;; does the effect exist in the short or long run time horizons, and does it
only apply to developed markets? Many questions remain unanswered.
The first controversial issue is whether the market timing behaviour examined in the study
of Baker & Wurgler (2002) really exists. In their paper, market timing is a behaviour in
which firms adopt different actions according to market situations when making financing
decisions. To be more specific, firms issue equity when they think the market is booming,
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and thus their stocks tend to be overvalued. In contrast, firms will repurchase those stocks
when the market is relatively depressed. Hence, in Model 1 of this dissertation, equity
financing and debt financing are applied as two dependent variables, the market to book
value is the independent variable, and this paper aims to test the relationship between
them. If the market timing theory holds, there should be an inverse relationship between
market to book value and debt, while a positive relationship between that and equity
issued. Results from Model 1 confirm both debt timing and equity timing of Hong Kong
listed companies.
Aside from the question on the theory’s existence, another problem is the geographical
application of this theory. Since the study of Baker & Wurgler (2002), their empirical study
has attracted much attention as plenty of scholars have devoted themselves into the
investigation of the new theory. Abundant studies have proven the existence and effects
of market timing behaviour in different markets, the majority of which use information from
American listed companies and their IPOs. Xu (2009) made investigations of Canadian
companies and proves the influence of historical IPOs on capital structure. Sautner and
Spranger (2009) present the result of European listed companies and support this theory,
while Hermanns (2006) supported this theory by result of an empirical study in Germany.
However, the relationship seems to apply only for firms in developed markets. Zhou (2011)
made a thorough study in China, but failed to prove the effects both in the short, and long,
runs. Whether market timing theory only applies to developed markets has become
another source of intrigue to researchers.
Finally, many researchers are also concerned about whether the effect of market timing
behaviour lasts in the short run or long run. Baker & Wurgler (2002) shows a significant
short-term influence and a persistent effect that can last for about 10 years. Therefore,
this dissertation designs Model 2 and Model 3 to test the short-term and persistent effects
respectively. Model 2 uses data of both current period and the last period to assess the
consequence of periodical change. Model 3 introduces the variable of the external finance
weighted-average market-to-book ratio that was created by Baker & Wurgler (2002) to
represent the accumulated historical market timing behaviour to evaluate their effect in
the long run.
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1.2 Objective Statement
Briefly speaking, this dissertation aims to answer 3 questions that correspond to those in
the Problem Statement above: 1) Whether market timing behaviour exists in Hong Kong
listed companies;; 2) Whether the short-term effect of market timing behaviour to capital
structure exists in Hong Kong listed companies;; and 3) Whether a persistent effect exists
in Hong Kong listed companies.
As mentioned before, researchers have found evidence in different developed markets,
but few scholars have conducted research in the Hong Kong area. Yiu (2016) reported in
the South China Morning Post that Hong Kong has surpassed New York to become the
top IPO market in the world. Equity market timing is a vital element in IPO issue, thus it
is worth studying the Hong Kong market. Hong Kong is a developed market in Asia, but
its special relationship with mainland China makes the market unique. Many studies failed
to find evidence on effects of market timing in China market as it is an emerging market.
Whether the close relationship between the Hong Kong market and China market affects
the result is one of the questions that need clarification. In addition, the majority of
literature referred in this dissertation apply data available no later than 2003. This paper
uses data ranging from 2005 to 2015, which is quite an updated period. Thus, one of my
objectives is to test whether the theory still stands in the new era of corporate finance.
1.3 Structure of this Dissertation
There are 5 parts to this dissertation: 1) Introduction, providing background information,
giving the problem definition and expressing the objectives of this dissertation 2)
Literature Review, providing summary of related literature, classified theories into various
categories and explaining relationships between different theories 3) Methodology,
demonstrating statistical methods, hypotheses and models. Additionally, it also contains
a data description and variable definition 4) Result and Analysis, illustrating detailed
results with various tables, and presenting thorough analyses of results 5) Conclusion,
outlining limitations and summarising this dissertation. The remaining parts are the
Abstract at the beginning, APA style references and an Appendix at the end.
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2. Literature review
I introduce various theories about capital structure in this part to compare reasons behind
different choices for different companies. The objective of this paper is to study the
relationship between capital structure and market timing strategies, and therefore the
market timing theory is emphasised here. The publication of Modigliani and Miller in 1958
can be considered as the beginning of studies on capital structure. According to the
Modigliani-Miller theorem (MM, 1958), under the premise of efficient markets (that the
market is free of arbitrage) and excluding tax issues, bankruptcy cost and asymmetric
information, firm value is not related with the amount of leverage, or how the company
raises capital. After that, the amount of studies and literatures increases rapidly and
several strands of theories are formed.
2.1 Trade-off theory
The most important assumption of the Modigliani-Miller theorem is there is no tax.
However, for modern corporations, this assumption cannot stand and debt seems more
like an efficient way of raising capital, because the interest on debt may be tax deductible.
Trade-off theory developed on the base of the Modigliani-Miller theorem in 1958 and its
core argument is that capital structure has influence on firm value, and an optimal capital
structure exists. Theories can be classified into two categories: “Static” and “Dynamic”.
2.1.1 Static trade-off theory
Static trade-off theory can be viewed as an improved version of the MM model. In sum,
the static trade-off theory takes the effects of both taxation and bankruptcy costs into
account, and confirms the presence of the optimal capital structure.
Firstly, tax issues have been taken into consideration. In 1963, Modigliani and Miller
introduced corporate income tax into the original MM model. According to Miller (1977),
both change in individual income tax and change in corporate income tax have influence
on the optimal capital structure. To be more specific, facing higher corporate income tax
rates, firms will prefer acquiring capital from debt rather than issuing equities, due to the
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tax shield. Under higher individual income tax rates, and when the tax rate of dividend
income is lower than that of interests of issuing debt, firms will choose to raise capital by
issuing shares. Secondly, the bankruptcy cost is incorporated into the MM model.
Modigliani and Miller (1963) drew a conclusion, that there is a growth in firm value as a
result of increased debt-to-asset ratios, and therefore the optimal capital structure should
be 100% liabilities. However, in the event of heavy debt, the possibility of a firm’s
bankruptcy will increase significantly. Once bankruptcy happens, various expenses will
follow. Hence, firm should realise that though debt brings a firm benefit from tax
deductions, it also delivers risks of collapse. Figure 1 in appendices provides the
illustration of the static trade-off theory.
2.1.2 Dynamic trade-off theory
Dynamic trade-off theory holds the assumption of semi-strong market efficiency, and that
managers make financing decision for the maximisation of firm value. Compared to the
static theory, the dynamic version further illustrates the relationship between capital
structure and different costs during a firm’s process of adjustment.
Stiglitz (1973) was the pioneer of the dynamic trade-off theory. He built the fundamentals
of this theory based on the tax shield benefit and bankruptcy cost. Myers (1984) proposed
the idea in static trade-off theory that a firm will set a goal of optimizing capital structure,
and thought the dynamic trade-off theory is about how firms adapt their capital structure
towards the targeted one step by step after events. Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989)
introduced the concept of adjustment cost into the theory. If adjustment cost is
acknowledged, there will always be differences between the actual capital structure and
the optimal one that a firm wants to reach, and the speed of adaptation is determined by
the cost of alteration. The presence of adjustment cost constraining a company’s capital
structure fluctuates within a certain range, and only when the gap between actual capital
structure and the target one is relatively large, will the firm make adjustments to their
capital structure.
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2.2 Pecking order theory
Compared to trade-off theory, the pecking order theory does not necessarily require the
existence of an optimal capital structure and it believes financial leverage is an
accumulated result of historical capital raising activities.
The pecking order theory was first proposed by Myers (1984). The theory illustrates the
priority of methods in raising funds under the effects of adverse selection due to
information asymmetry. Given several ways a firm can choose to finance its activities,
firms tend to pick internal financing as their first choice, followed by debt financing, and
equity financing will be the last resort. Myers (1984) stated that if the firm accumulates
enough retained earnings, they would not have to bear the risk of issuing common stock,
which is a relatively riskier way for raising funds. Therefore, firms tend have requirements
on their payout ratio to make sure certain degrees of investment can be satisfied simply
by internal financing. According to the latest research on this theory, pecking order theory
cannot generally apply to all enterprises. Different orders are described in financing of
firms in emerging markets and developed market. Firms in developed countries like
American corporations tend to perfectly follow “pecking order theory”. They initially rely
on internal funds, then seek external financing sources like debt issues or equity financing.
But in the case of Chinese firms, the proportion of external financing is bigger than internal
financing, and equity financing is the most preferred method (Zhou, 2011). Table 1 in
appendices proves the pecking order theory by providing evidence from several
developed countries.
2.3 Theory based on agency costs
Agency cost comes down to the separation of ownership and management. When firms
hire managers to run the organisation on their behalf, a gap emerges because these two
groups have conflicts of interests and managers own the comparative advantage of
information.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasises the existence and importance of agency costs
in their paper, and classify the models based on agency costs into two categories. The
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first conflict exists between managers and equity holders. In order to test the action of
managers, they divided equity into two parts --- inside and outside, based on whether the
equity is held and used by the managers. Inside equity is the part that is accessible for
managers and vice versa. It turns out that managers tend to use resources and
information held for their own benefit, which is normally against the interests of equity
holders. In a word, agency cost arises due to the conflicts between a manager’s behaviour
and an equity owner’s benefit. The second conflict arises from the conflict between firm’s
equity holders and its debt holders. Provided that equity holders make a high-risk
investment, which may provide them with high yield of return on the condition that it is
successful. However, under the circumstance of failure, debt owners suffer from loss of
interest or even principal. Thus, equity holders have the motivation to choose investments
with extra risk, which can be a hazard to debt holders due to the higher default possibility.
The idea that equity owners use risky investment to transfer risk and liability to debt
owners is called the “asset substitution effect” or “risk-shifting hypothesis”. Figure 2 in
appendices explains firm’s process of reaching the optimal capital structure.
2.3.1 Managerial entrenchment theory
Managerial entrenchment theory emphasises that managers value their own position or
ventures more than the optimum capital structure and interests of shareholders. Novaes
and Zingales (1995) believe that managers and shareholders hold different views towards
debt. Stakeholders of firms tend to consider debt as a tool of efficiency maximisation.
Nonetheless, managers, who are actually making the business decisions, regard debt as
a defensive mechanism. Zwiebel (1996) started by simply discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of managers’ accessibility to funds. He also states that when firms are
highly valued, managers tend to avoid debt and do not rebalance the capital structure
with debt for personal interest. Managers generally face two major threats: bankruptcies
and takeovers. Debts may lead to bankruptcy;; and thus, managers avoid accumulating
debt for their own benefit. In order to strengthen individual entrenchment, managers will
make different decisions on capital structure.
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2.4 Market timing theory
Stein (1996) was the first one to propose the idea of a “market timing hypothesis”. The
hypothesis states that the stock market is irrational, and that price cannot precisely reflect
the intrinsic value of stocks. When a firm’s stock price is overestimated, rational managers
are supposed to issue more shares to take full advantage of investor overenthusiasm. On
the contrary, when a firm’s stock price is underestimated, a strategy of share repurchasing
should be adopted by the managers.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) also raised a new theory about capital structure, called the
market timing theory. They describe the relationship between the capital structure and
market timing as “capital structure is the cumulative outcome of attempts to time the equity
market”. Their concept can be viewed as a breakthrough in this field because it does not
necessarily require the hypothesis of rational investors and perfect arbitrage as does the
traditional theory of capital structure.
2.4.1 Windows of opportunity hypothesis
To further discuss market-timing theory, it should start with the “windows of opportunity”
hypothesis since Baker and Wurgler’s concept is based on the empirical studies of this
hypothesis. Windows of opportunity describes the existence of a best period of time to
capitalise on events. In particular, the issue of the initial public offering (IPO) is a case of
windows of opportunity. For some stocks with high potential such as Apple Inc., the
window of opportunity is small during the IPO times because the stock price will increase
rapidly later. A window of opportunity is also associated with market mispricing, which
can be rectified by traders after they realise it. In short, the window of opportunity
hypothesis indicates that the time of IPO issue is vital for the future development of a firm,
and how well managers can seise the short period of opportunity decide the amount of
value the managers can create for shareholders.
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Table 1 Various Equity Choices under “Windows of Opportunity”
Table 1 is referred from the article “The long-‐run performance of initial public offerings” of
Ritter (1991), the research found that the under-pricing of IPOs is normal, but it exists
only in the short term. In the long term, these IPOs underperform. People tend to become
over-confident about the future returns of these new stocks and firms fully utilise the
“window of opportunity”. In practice, firms choose to go public whenever they think firm’s
stocks are overpriced. The action that the firm try to obtain benefits from the mispricing
can be considered as an attempt in equity market timing. In particular, he illustrated the
situation by listing various financing orders a firm tends to choose under different
circumstances.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) considered two types of equity market timing: One is perceived
mispricing, and the other one is adverse selection.
2.4.2 Perceived mispricing
The premise of this section is that managers or investors are irrational. From the
perspective of investors, their enthusiasm will drive the stock price higher and
consequently lead to overvalued stocks. Similarly, investors’ depressed emotions may be
the impetus for declining stock prices and results in undervalued stocks. From the
perspective of managers, they tend to issue equity if they consider that the cost is
relatively low and repurchase shares if they believe that the cost is relatively high (Chazi,
2004). In sum, the irrational behaviours of both investors and managers lead to time-
varying mispricing. Jenter (2005) supported this point of view and stated that managers
make equity decisions based solely on their perceived mispricing, instead of a real need
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for capital. Under this situation, if a firm does not achieve its optimal capital structure, and
managers do not adjust them later, the temporary change in stock price will have a
persistent influence on capital structure.
2.4.3 Adverse selection
Adverse selection is essentially caused by asymmetric information. The problem of
information asymmetry is common in the business world, and it was first studied by
George Akerlof, who was the winner of 2001 Economic Nobel Prize. According to Akerlof
(1970), due to the presence of asymmetric information, buyer and seller tend to hold
different perceived value of the same good, and the difference results in the
undervaluation of goods with premium quality. Finally, inferior goods are left and traded
on the market instead of those with high quality.
Ross (1977), Brealey, Leland and Pyle (1977) stated that if managers make decisions on
capital structure based on inside information, the choice will signal information to
outsiders in the market, and this theory is called Signaling. Myers and Majluf (1984) wrote
that managers of the firm are supposed to know more about their investment than
investors, which can cause mispricing in the market. To be more specific, since outside
investors do not have access to inside information, they will evaluate a firm in a relatively
objective way with a mean-reverting value. However, managers acquire more information.
When they face favourable news, managers will avoid issuing equity because they know
shares are underestimated. Contrastingly, when they receive bad news, they will issue
equity because stocks are overvalued at this time compared to the estimation of outsiders.
Once they make the issue choices, the action will signal information to outsiders, and thus
the price of stock will drop significantly after issue.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) drew several conclusions in their paper: 1) Equity market timing
indeed affects capital structure as leverage has significant negative correlation with
weighted average historical market value. In their empirical study, they broke the change
in leverage into three parts, which are change in net equity issue (e/A), newly retained
earnings (∆RE/A) and the net debt issue as the residual change in assets (∆A/A-∆E/A-
∆RE/A). The results show that the effect of M/B value to leverage mainly comes from new
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equity issue, and higher M/B value leads to higher amounts of issued equity. 2) The effect
of market timing actions to leverage is persistent as the weighted average market value
have more than ten years of influence on capital structure. Though Baker and Wurgler
(2002) proposed two types of market timing, they did not distinguish them from each other
in their results.
After Baker and Wurgler, scholars have done further investigations in this field and have
found more evidence to prove the theory. Hovakimian et al., (2004) discovered in their
paper that the market to book ratio and stock returns have significant influence on the
timing of equity issues. The timing of issuing stocks depends on market conditions, and
they found firms tend to issue new shares after a notable increase in stock price. Similarly,
Asquith and Mullins (1986) found that a certain price pattern is associated with equity
market timing. The price of stocks is generally high and overvalued before the issues of
IPO. However, the issue of stock, or to be more accurate, the announcement of issue, is
often followed by decline in share prices. Another survey made by Graham and Harvey
(2002) further confirm the existence of equity market timing by managers. They surveyed
about 4440 companies and received responses in the form of 392 finished surveys, and
found that the action of equity market timing is common in modern corporations. In
addition, firms are reluctant to resort to equity issuing because they do not want to dilute
their earning per share (EPS) and they, following trade-off theory, want to set a target
debt ratio and try to achieve a target capital structure in operations.
Furthermore, on the question of whether equity market timing will bring capital structure
a continuous influence, Baker and Wurgler (2002) reported their result as a persistent
one, which can last about ten years. Huang and Ritter (2009) prove the long lasting
influence of market timing in their empirical study. They found that companies choose the
method of raising funds by selecting the one with lower cost and follow the pecking order
theory about the priority of internal or external financing. However, Alti (2006) stated in
his paper that equity market timing indeed performs as a critical determinant for firm
financing in the short term, but it become less important as time goes by, as he found the
effect of market timing to be diminishing in the long term and eventually vanish. In
accordance with Alti (2006), and Flannery and Rangan (2006), they claimed that the effect
17. 17
of market-timing is temporary because a firm’s debt-equity ratio adapts to changes rapidly,
and corresponding adjustments will make it always be consistent with their target ratio.
Table 2 Summary of Capital Structure Theories
Table 2 provides a summary of theories about capital structure. An obvious trend can be
observed that new theories do not assume the presence of an optimal capital structure,
but these theories all take asymmetric information into consideration. Market timing theory
absorbs knowledge from previous theories, and it is developed based on the windows of
opportunity hypothesis. Thus, market timing theory is a quite comprehensive and updated
one, and is relevant to this era.
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3. Methodology
The methodology is divided into two sections. The first one is variable definition, which
introduces and defines variables that will be used in the linear regression. The second
part includes hypotheses and corresponding regression models. In particular, it provides
explanations on choosing variables in each model and the reasons behind these choices.
3.1 Variable Definition
Following the method of Baker and Wurgler (2002), this paper focus on the relationship
between market timing and capital structure, other variables will be held as control
variables. Variables can be classified into two categories: 1) Market timing indicators and
2) Determinants of capital structure.
3.1.1 Market timing indicator
In this paper, the Market to book value (M/B) t is chosen as the indicator of market timing
following the empirical study of Baker and Wurgler (2002). Previous literature has used
this ratio as the variable to represent market timing. For example, Rajan and Zingales
(1995) used the market-to-book ratio, and as expected, the ratio has a negative
correlation with leverage. In addition, Baker and Wurgler (2002) divided the leverage into
three parts, and found that the market-to-book value has significant positive correlation
with the equity issues. Market-to-book ratio here is defined as the result of total asset
minus book equity and plus market capitalisation divided by total assets.
However, whether the Market-to-book ratio can be considered as a precise proxy for
market timing behaviour is still controversial. Hovakimian (2006) studied firms in America
and cannot find a direct and significant influence of market-to-book ratio on the capital
structure. Instead, he found an inverse relationship as a result of the larger growth
potentials, which means firms possess more opportunity to expand by issuing more equity.
Thus, some scholars replace market-to-book ratio with other variables as indicators of
market timing behaviour. For instance, by dividing months into hot months and cold
months, Alti (2006) built the dummy variable of “HOT”, if firm issue IPO in hot months, the
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value is 1 otherwise it will be 0. Chazi and Tripathy (2007) use insider trading as an
alternative method.
Table 3 Summary of Different Choices on Market-timing Indicators
In the article “A Test of the Market Timing Theory in China---econometric evidence from
the Chinese listed companies” of Liu and Li (2005), theories are divided into three
categories. Table 3 chooses and organises only theories that concern the
appropriateness of using M/B as an indicator of market timing. Table 3 also summarised
different indicators for market timing and listed the main conclusion of these empirical
studies.
When testing the persistent effect of the market-to-book ratio on capital structure, Baker
and Wurgler (2002) introduced a modified variable (M/Befwa) into their model.
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The variable shown in the figure is the external finance weighted-average market-to-book
ratio. The variable is initially introduced in the paper “Market timing and capital structure”
by Baker and Wurgler (2002), and they described it as it “summarizes the relevant
historical variation in market valuations”. Their results show that if firm raise capital from
external financing when their stocks are overvalued, the external finance weighted-
average M/B ratio will subsequently provide high value even if they eventually choose
debt or equity issuing. This number directly reflects external financing actions of a firm,
and thus firms who use external capital more frequently will observe higher values. They
believe the new measurement is better than simply adding a lagged M/B ratio because it
points out which of those lags are most relevant in a precise way.
They do not allow negative value of this variable as they have to make sure they are
averaged results. The minimum of this value is zero and it represents that no information
of market change is reflected by the variable in that year. Most importantly, all of these
restrictions are applied to avoid the weighted number increasing with the increase in
external capital in each period, as the number is supposed to show the effect of historical
market valuation and should not be correspond with time.
3.1.2 Capital structure and determinants
Leverage itself will be presented by the ratio of debt and assets, and both book and
market leverage will be tested. Three other relevant variables first applied by Rajan and
Zingales (1995), which is also referred to Baker & Wurgler (2002), are profitability
(EBITDA/At), firm size Log (St) and assets tangibility (PPE/At).
Leverage
Leverage is the most straight-forward and precise indicator for a firm’s capital structure.
This paper uses the ratio of debt to total assets (D/At) to represent leverage. Both book
21. 21
leverage and market leverage are taken into consideration in this model. Book leverage
(D/At) is calculated as book debt (D) divided by total assets (A) and market leverage (D/At)
m is calculated as book debt divided by the result of total assets minus book equity (Eb)
and plus the market capitalisation (Em).
Profitability
According to pecking order theory, profitability has a negative relationship with leverage
because high earnings allow firms to acquire capital internally. Hence, firms do not
necessarily need to raise capital from external sources. Baker and Wurgler (2002) proved
that profitability’s effect on leverage is mainly from retained earnings, and the net effect
of higher profitability is leverage reduction. However, as stated in trade-off theory, firms
with stronger profitability also bear heavier tax burdens as a result of higher profit.
Therefore, they will have stronger motivation to issue debt, which provides firms the
opportunity to benefit from tax shields. Additionally, higher profitability indicates less
possibility of bankruptcy, which means that firms with higher profitability generally have
lower bankruptcy costs. Thus, firms tend to choose relatively high levels of debt as the
method of financing. Under the pecking order theory, higher profitability means firms own
more internal capital, and thus will use less leverage.
Profitability (EBITDA/At) is calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortisation divided by total assets, and expressed in terms of percentage.
Size
A firm’s size is also associated with the degree of leverage. Traditional trade-off theory
believes larger firms will be more likely to choose debt financing, because risk can be
diversified by wider range of operation activities, unless the firm is facing a financial crisis.
However, Rajan and Zingales (1995) anticipated that larger firms have less problems with
asymmetric information, and hence tend to select equity financing when compared to
smaller firms. Beck et al. (2008) also proves the importance of firm size in financing
decisions of companies. Their study found a negative correlation between firm size and
usage of external financing. In another words, they confirm that larger firms tend to use
external capital more frequently than smaller ones.
22. 22
Firm size log(St) is defined as the log of net sale/revenues.
Tangibility
Generally, if a firm holds large quantity of tangible assets, they will be more willing to use
debt because fixed assets are normally considered as collateral of debt. Thus, higher
tangibility indicates higher capacity of using debt, and the majority of studies discover a
positive relationship between the amount of fixed assets and the level of leverage. The
result is also in line with both trade-off theory and pecking order theory.
Tangibility (PPE/At) here is defined as net property, plant and equipment divided by total
assets in percentage terms. In some literature, tangibility is also known as the ratio of
fixed assets to total assets.
Growth
The growth opportunity of a firm is measured as Tobin’s q. This measurement is proposed
by Tobin (1969) to assess the growth opportunity of a firm. Generally, the Tobin’s q has
a negative relationship with the degree of leverage. A firm with the larger growth
opportunity tends to rapidly expand their business and the process is accompanied with
huge expenditure. Thus, companies are reluctant to use debt in order to avoid heavy debt
burdens or even financial collapse. In research by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), the
importance of growth opportunity as well as the inverse relationship between Tobin’s q
and leverage was proven. On the basis of traditional trade-off theory, the negative
relationship is reasonable as it stated that firms with higher growth rates may suffer from
higher bankruptcy costs when using debt. However, the inverse relationship seems to
have some conflict with pecking order theory, which claims the growth opportunities
should be supported by debt financing instead of equity. In short, there is a negative
relationship between growth opportunities and leverage under trade-off theory, while it is
positive under pecking order theory.
Tobin’s q (or the q ratio) is defined as total market value of firm divided by total assets.
23. 23
However, there is similarity in calculations of Tobin’s q and Market-to-book value. They
have a Pearson correlation of 1, which means they have multi-collinearity in the initial
analysis. Hence, this variable is abandoned from the linear regression.
Table 4 Summary of Variable Definitions
Table 4 gives a summary of variable definitions. All of them originally follow the research
of Fama and French (2000). Many studies like research of Yu (2008) have also cited
these variable definitions.
3.2 Hypothesis and Models
This paper aims to answer three questions: 1) Whether market timing exists in Hong Kong
listed companies;; 2) Whether market timing will have short-term influence on capital
structures;; and 3) Whether market timing will have long-lasting (more than 10 years)
influence on capital structure.
Based on the result of the market timing theory test in Baker and Wurgler (2002), three
hypothesis corresponding to the three questions are stated in this part.
24. 24
3.2.1 Hypothesis 1 Existence of Market timing
Hypothesis 1: Market timing exists both in debt and equity financing of Hong Kong listed
companies
Research by Hovakimian te al (2001) found that firms face obstacles in achieving their
optimal capital structure. In order to reach the target debt ratio, a firm has to choose
whether to repurchase equities or retire debts, a process which is highly related to market
timing. Furthermore, according to Hovakimian (2004), equity market timing depends on
the market situations. Under the circumstance of good market performance, the market
to book value will be higher, and firms tend to issue equity to raise capital;; under a more
bearish market, which is reflected in lower market to book value, firms tend to repurchase
shares.
Model 1 Existence of equity market timing in Hong Kong listed company
Model 1 aims to test the relationship between market-to-book value with two different
ways of external financing, while simultaneously controlling for the last three variables.
Yt= (EQUI/At, DEBT/At, DEBT/At,m)
Yt here is the dependent variable, which represents three indicators: 1) Amount of net
equity financing divided by total assets (EQUI/A) t;; 2) Book leverage (DEBT/A) t;; 3) Market
leverage (DEBT/A) t,m. These three variables are used to test whether market timing exist
in debt financing or equity financing. Both book and market leverage are used in order to
conduct a more comprehensive investigation.
(M/B) t is the market to book value, which is the indicator of market timing behaviour. If
the market timing theory holds, this ratio will exhibit a positive relationship with equity
financing and a negative one with leverage, because higher market to book ratio indicates
25. 25
the market is in a state of flourishing, and a firm’s stock is more likely to be overvalued,
leading the firm to choose issue equity.
There are three control variables here: (EBITDA/A) t, log (S) t and (PPE/A) t. These three
determinants of capital structure are used in Model 1 in order to test how they will affect
financing behaviour.
(EBITDA/A) t is the Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation divided by
total assets and expressed in percentage form.
log (S) t is the log of net sale of firm.
(PPE/A) t is Net property, plant & equipment divided by total assets and expressed in
percentage form.
3.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Short-term effect
Hypothesis 2: Market timing behaviour has short-term effects on the capital structure of
Hong Kong listed companies
Plenty of literature have proven the short-term effect of both equity and debt market timing.
However, Liu and Li (2005) held a negative result in China. They found that though equity
market-timing behaviour exists in the Chinese market, they do not have significant
influence on firms’ capital structures. This paper still assumes there is a short-term effect
in Hong Kong listed companies, because the research of Liu and Li (2005) indicates the
market-timing theory is not a suitable application for emerging market, while Hong Kong
is a developed area.
Model 2: Short-run effect of equity market timing on capital structure
Model 2 aims to test the short-term effects of market-timing. Hence the data from the last
period is also used in order to test the relationship between the change of leverage and
market-timing behaviour.
26. 26
(D/A)t-(D/A)t-1 is the dependent variable in this model, which represents the change
between leverage in this period and that of the last one. Both book and market leverage
are tested in the linear regression.
(D/A)t-1 is a lagged leverage variable and is restricted between 0 and 1. In Baker and
Wurgler (2002), the lagged average has a negative sign, but they did not report it in their
results. They use this variable in their model because they are restricted to a certain range,
which means they can only go in one direction, and thus it can be used as a control
variable.
Other variables are same as that in the last model, except that data from previous periods
is used here.
3.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Persistent effect
Hypothesis 3: Market timing behaviour has persistent effect on capital structure of Hong
Kong listed companies
As mentioned in the literature review part, the “external finance weighted-average"
market-to-book ratio is used as a proxy of accumulated historical market valuation. Some
researches confirm the long-lasting effect, such as Huang and Ritter (2009), but Alti
(2006), Flannery and Rangan (2006) doubt the presence of persistent effects of market
timing as they only proved the temporary influence and failed to find the long-term one.
Followed the study of Baker and Wurgler (2002, this dissertation hypothesises that the
persistent effect exists.
Model 3: Persistent effect of equity market timing on capital structure
Model 3 mainly focuses on the effect of the accumulative change since the IPO, and is
designed to compare the effect between the external finance weighted-average market-
to-book value (M/B)efwa and the lagged market to book value (M/B)t-1.
27. 27
(M/B)efwa is the external finance weighted-average market-to-book value, which
represents the accumulated historical effect of equity market timing behaviour. However,
the market to book value is also applied in this model to distinguish the accumulative
effect and the periodical influence from the last period.
The dependent variable simply adopt leverage but not the change of leverage like in the
Model 2 because (M/B)efwa is already contains historical information. Thus, the persistent
effect since the IPO time to each period can be directly observed by using periodical
leverage.
Other variables are the same as that in the last model.
28. 28
4. Data
This paper use both the Bloomberg database and the Thomson One DataStream
database. The Bloomberg database is used to generate the list of companies which
issued IPOs from 2005 to 2015 in the Hong Kong stock market, together with the
International Securities Identification Numbers (ISIN) of those IPOs. Subsequently, by
using their ISIN code, specific data for variables like Market to book ratio is acquired from
the DataStream database. Data is processed by IBM SPSS 23.0. The main statistical
method is linear regression and t-test of sample.
There are two types of samples: 1) IPO subsample, and 2) Calendar year sample.
According to different offer times of different IPOs, data is classified into several
subsamples as IPO, IPO+1, IPO+3, IPO+5, IPO+7 and IPO+9. For instance, if firm A
issued an IPO in 2000, data for this firm in 2001 will be included into the subsample of
IPO+1. Equivalently, if firm B issue IPO in 2005, data for this firm in 2006 will be included
into the subsample of IPO+1. Thus, one subsample (like IPO+1) can contain data of
different companies in different years. Eventually, data of 227 Hong Kong listed
companies within the eleven-year period (including the pre-IPO year) is required and used
for analysis in this paper. In IPO subsamples, the subject of observation is the individual
firms. Classifying data into samples according to time makes it easier to understand how
a firm’s leverage or financing structure changes since the issue of its IPO. Detailed
changes in each year can be required from running regressions in each subsample.
Compared to IPO subsamples, calendar year samples are more integral. The duration of
observation in this dissertation is 11 years (includes the pre-IPO year), and calendar year
subsamples just break this time period into 4 parts. For example, in the first subsample
of 2005-2007, data of IPOs issued in 2005, 2006 or 2007 will be included. Also, the IPO+1
and IPO+2 subsamples data of a firm that issues its IPO in 2005 will be included as well
because for this company, IPO+1 means the year of 2006 and IPO+2 means that of 2007.
Calendar year samples focus more on the market trend as it assesses all firms in a certain
time period together, and it allows an individual firm to be observed multiple times.
29. 29
Similar to the majority of empirical studies, in order to winsorise our sample, this paper
excludes companies that: 1) Are in financial industry, due to the characteristic of financial
corporations (Liu and Li, 2005);; 2) Do not provide consolidated financial statements;; 3)
Has leverage higher than 1 or lower than 0 (Yu, 2008);; and 4) Has market to book value
over 10 (Baker and Wurgler 2002) By applying these conditions, the outliers can be avoid
and stationarity can be improved, especially when the observing time horizon includes
the period of 2008-09 financial crisis.
30. 30
5. Results and Analysis
5.1 Existence of market timing behaviour
Table 5 Summarised Statistics of Capital Structure and Financing Decisions
Table 5 summarises the statistical results of the analysis looking at the change in both
book and market leverage and the components of capital structure.
Panel A organizes data by IPO subsamples, and 6 different sub-samples of IPO are
selected. As stated in the section on data, the IPO subsamples are designed to observe
trends of individual firms. A decline of book leverage can be observed after the IPO issue.
The trend lasts for 1 year and the book leverage recovers little by little in the next 9 years.
The process is slow and time-consuming as it takes 9 years for the mean value of book
leverage to recover to the initial level. It is worth noting that there is a change in the
method of financing after the issue of IPO. In the IPO+1 sample, the portion of debt
finance has a notable increase while the portion of equity financing has an inverse change.
In other words, after the issue of IPO, firms tend to change their way of raising capital
from equity to debt.
Panel B sorts data by calendar year. In this sections, samples are analysed in a cross-
sectional manner as all firms during that period of time are observed together, and the
31. 31
same firm may be observed multiple times, and thus calendar year samples more
accurately reflect the general market situation. The overall trend is the increase of market
leverage and decrease in equity issue. The increase in market leverage indicates that the
market value of firms is becoming lower, thus firm will not issue equity, but will raise capital
from debt instead. According to the market timing theory, firms issue equity when the
market value is high (or stocks are overvalued), and thus the amount of equity issues
should decrease when market value becomes lower. The result in Table 5 is consistent
with market timing theory.
Market-timing behaviour not only refers to equity market timing in stock market, it also
includes market timing of debt (Hovakimian, 2004). The Pearson linear correlations
between the two dependent variables and the four independent variables are checked
before running the linear regression. Results are shown in the table below.
Table 6 Pearson Correlation between Variables
Results from Table 6 show the M/B value has a positive correlation with net equity issue
and a negative correlation with debt financing. It also shows results of three different
regressions, where the dependent variables are net equity issue, book leverage and
market leverage respectively.
32. 32
Generally, the M/B ratio reflects the current market situation. Higher M/B ratio indicates a
bull market, which also means firm’s share price has higher possibility to be
overestimated, and thus firms will issue IPOs at this time to take advantage of the
mispricing. Contrastingly, when the M/B value is lower, firms will switch to debt financing
to avoid underestimation of their stock prices. The result shows when the M/B ratio
changes in the same direction with equity issue and changes in an opposite direction with
leverage, which meets the expectations of market timing theory.
Profitability here has a positive correlation with equity financing and a negative one with
leverage. This result demonstrates that when Hong Kong listed companies possess
stronger profitability, they are more likely to raise funds internally from the retained
earnings, and thus the amount of debt will decrease. Equity issuing provides firms extra
funds, thus leading to higher profitability. Marsh (1982) explains that profitability can be
viewed as an indicator of the timing effect, as firms with higher earnings tend to be those
that are enjoying significant increases in stock price.
Firm’s size, which is represented by the log value of net sales, show a positive relationship
with debt. The result means larger Hong Kong listed companies are more willing to use
debt. Larger firms are usually more diversified. Research from Wan (1998) pointed out
that Hong Kong firms that are more diversified do not necessarily have higher profitability.
Instead, higher levels of diversification only have positive effects on the stability of
profitability. Hence, larger firms with a wider range of operations are more willing to use
debt because they have stable earnings, and thus bear less risk.
Finally, tangibility has a positive relationship with debt use, and the value of positive
correlation is higher than that between firm size and debt. The result shows a more direct
and positive relationship and is consistent with both trade-off and pecking order theory,
as well as the majority of empirical studies on this subject. It proves the importance of
tangible assets as collateral in borrowing debt.
However, the Pearson correlation just provides a general glance of variables. Precise
analysis of relations between variables need to be confirmed by the coefficients of linear
33. 33
regression. Applying the Model 1 introduced in the methodology, coefficients among
variables are acquired and shown in the table below.
Table 7 Coefficients of Model 1a
Model 1a is designed to study the relationship between net equity issue and equity market
timing and the results are shown in Table 7. Though the R-square of this model is 0.083,
the t-test of all independent variables are highly significant. The result shows the market
to book value has a significant effect in issuing equity and further confirms: 1) The positive
relationship between equity issue and equity market timing;; 2) the positive relationship
between equity issue and profitability;; 3) the negative relationship between equity issue
and firm size;; and 4) the negative relationship between equity issue and tangibility.
Table 8 Coefficients of Model 1b &1c
34. 34
Table 8 summarises results of book leverage and market leverage by applying Model 1.
It explains that market timing behaviour is an important issue to be considered when
making debt financing decisions. In contrast to the result in Model 1a, it further proves: 1)
The negative relationship between debt financing and firm’s market value;; 2) the negative
relationship between debt financing and tangibility;; 3) the positive relationship between
debt financing and firm size;; and 4) the positive relationship between debt financing and
tangibility.
Based on all results from linear regressions, hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. I can
conclude that market timing behaviour exists both in equity and debt financing decisions
of Hong Kong listed companies. Firms choose equity issue when the market value is high
and select debt financing otherwise.
5.2 Short-term effects of market timing behaviour
Model 2 described in the methodology is used to test for short-term effects. Compared to
Model 1, the dependent variable adopts the difference of leverage of current period and
that of the last period in order to test the effect of a temporary change of leverage.
Coefficients of variables are acquired and shown in the table below.
Table 9 Coefficients of Model 2a
According to Table 9, all variables are significant at 1% level of significance.
35. 35
Profitability has a relative strong linear relationship with the change in capital structure,
and the effect is negative. As stated before, the result meets the expectation of pecking
order theory, and indicates that the Hong Kong market is like other developed markets
that follow the financing order under pecking order theory. Higher ability to generate
earnings provides firms with sufficient internal funds.
The next one is tangibility. In the short-run, tangibility plays an important role in a firm’s
capital structure. The beta shows that when there is a 1 percent increase in tangibility
(PPE/A t), there will be a 0.12 percent increase in the book leverage.
Compared to profitability and tangibility, market timing seems less important from the
perspective of effect on capital structure. It proves that though a manager’s timing
behaviour indeed has short-run influence on capital structure, how much it changes still
largely depends on the firm’s willingness and ability to raise debt.
The lagged term, DEBTt-1 has the strongest correlation with the change in leverage.
Similar to the result in Baker & Wurgler (2002), the relationship is strongly negative, but
they did not report the statistical result of this variable in their paper. The lagged variable
is included because the amount of leverage in the last period will definitely has a
significant influence on the result of changes in leverage, and therefore it needs to be
controlled in order to avoid adverse effects on other variables.
Table 10 Coefficients of Model 2b
36. 36
One interesting thing is that the result of market leverage always has higher degree of
significance than that of book leverage in each single regression thus far. Overall, the
sign of results of market leverage are the same as those in the previous model. However,
they are more significant and the model has higher R-squared. One possible explanation
is that book leverage reflects more about the operation of a company and will be modified
before publishing, but market leverage contains more information about the market, and
thus will be more sensitive and will express the change more accurately. Adrian et al
(2015) stated in their staff report of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York that “market
leverage is nearly entirely reflective of movements in book-to- market ratios”. Therefore,
market leverage tends to have more significant results.
Model 2 is designed to test the short-term effect of market timing behaviour on capital
structure. According to the results of the t-test, hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. In short
time horizons, market timing has significant influence on financing actions and has direct
effects on changes of leverage. However, the primary reason behind the change is firms’
desire and ability.
5.3 Persistent effect of market timing behaviour
Model 3 introduces a new variable created by Baker & Wurgler (2002). First of all, data
of all time periods is analysed in a cross-sectional manner in the regression, and the result
is shown in the table below.
Table 11 Coefficients of Model 3a
37. 37
From Table 11 shows that during the ten-year period, both (M/B)efwa and (M/B)t-1 are
significant, but the periodical market timing seems much more closely related to leverage
than the accumulated historical behaviour. In this model, the result indicates that instead
of past timing actions, the periodical adjustment of a firm’s leverage has greater influence
on its capital structure. This outcome is more likely to follow the trade-off theory that
managers rectify and rebalance for the target capital structure based on the current
market situation. However, Baker & Wurgler (2002) emphasizes that market timing is the
result of accumulated actions of timing, and the impact of (M/B)efwa is obviously more
significant and accurate than the variable of (M/B)t-1. This model only examines from a
single point of time, and cannot show the continuous change from year to year. Hence,
in order to further compare influence of these two variables, detailed statistical analysis
in each subsample is necessary.
Instead of using cross-sectional data, time-series regressions of each subsample are
presented in the table below.
Table 12 Summary of coefficients in subsamples1
Results of four subsamples, including IPO+1, IPO+3, IPO+5 and IPO+10, are shown in
Table 12. Coefficients of all firms from 2005 to 2015 have already been illustrated in Table
11, but are shown here to facilitate comparison.
1
Subsample of IPO+10 here combines the data of IPO+9 and IPO+10 because initially there are only 26 companies in the
IPO+10, which is less than 30, and the small sample size may cause bias in the result. Thus data from the end of IPO+9 is added.
38. 38
As can be seen, the (M/B)efwa variable becomes more significant as time passes, and
turns into the most significant one in the IPO+10 sample. Compared to the result of all
firms in the 10 years, this result shows the gradual progress and proves the continuous
effect of historical market timing attempts.
The interesting thing is that after the introduction of (M/B)efwa , (M/B)t-1 becomes less
significant when data is observed by independent IPO subsamples. (M/B)t-1 only passes
the significance test in the IPO+1 sample. At the end of year 10, the coefficient of (M/B)t-
1 becomes positive, which is the same in the study of Baker & Wurgler (2002). Hence, the
result explains why when the data is observed in a continuous process, the external
finance weighted-average market-to-book value performs better than normal lagged
market-to-book value.
Like all the results before, the presence strong tangibility is always a stable support for a
firm to debt. The positive correlation has been proven in all models. Similarly, the
coefficient for profitability is always inverse to that of tangibility, and profitability is always
negatively correlated with leverage. Nevertheless, the importance of firm size in the
financing structure is diminishing as time passes. In the IPO+10 sample, firm size is not
a significant variable, which indicates that the scale of firms does not matter that much in
the long run. Like the principle of diminishing rate of return, initially, larger scale can
diversify a firm’s risk and stabilize their profitability. However, in the long run, when their
competitors reach a similar level of scale and the market is quite stable, the advantages
that large size once brought will vanish.
To summarize, if data is being studied in a cross-sectional manner, market-to-book value
is significant and indicates that periodical adjustments of managers affect capital structure.
However, if the data is analysed across time, in the long-term, the external finance
weighted-average market-to-book value is more powerful, because the effect is
cumulative, and becomes more significant with time. No matter which method is used in
which model, the external finance weighted-average market-to-book value is always
significant. Thus, hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected, and a conclusion can be drawn that
market timing does have a persistent effect on capital structure that may last for about
ten years.
39. 39
6. Conclusion
6.1 Limitations
In sum, this dissertation has significant results and answers the three questions listed in
the section outlining our objectives. However, many limitations still exist and may have
an adverse influence on the accuracy of the research.
First of all, the data is ranges from 2005-2015. Due to the financial crisis of 2008-09, many
listed companies have abnormal values of book leverage and especially market leverage,
and even lack of data. In order to avoid the bias of extreme values, conditions have been
applied when selecting the companies. For instance, like stated in the methodology,
companies with market to book value exceeding 10, and with book leverage below 0 or
over 1 are all removed from the sample. Those restrictions aid to remove the influence of
the crisis to a relatively large extent, but it leads to the shrinkage in sample size as well.
Data of many companies have been deleted because either one of the or both of the
variables cannot meet these requirements. The IPO sample in 2008 only contains 6 listed
companies and their IPOs. In the analysis of Model 3, the subsample IPO+10 is actually
a combined one of subsample IPO+9 and IPO+10, because IPO+10 only includes 26
listed companies, which is below the minimum sample size of 30, and cannot be tested
as a normal distribution.
Secondly, similar to research done by Baker & Wurgler (2002), this dissertation did not
manage to distinguish between the effects of market timing from perceived mispricing or
adverse selection. More data and models are required to do precise tests for these two
types of market timing. It can be conducted by following the example of Chazi (2004),
where he quantifies the perceived mispricing and adverse selection by using net insider
trading and checks the relationship between net insider trading and leverage. Additionally,
he adds different dummy variables for the two types of market timing.
40. 40
6.2 Summary
This dissertation aims to study the relationship between market timing and capital
structure in Hong Kong. This dissertation proves the existence and long-lasting effects of
market timing behaviour on changes in capital structure in Hong Kong listed companies
from 2005 to 2015. The main contribution is providing evidence from an area that few
people have studied before, which is Hong Kong, and the use of a new time period. The
result is consistent with the majority of literature based on developed markets.
It turns out that market timing behaviour universally exists in Hong Kong listed companies,
from both the equity and debt financing perspectives. Firms tend to issue IPOs when their
market value is high, and choose debt otherwise. In the short run, capital structure can
be affected by market timing behaviour, but it will be influenced by the firm’s tangibility
and profitability to a greater degree. In the long run, market timing actions have persistent
effects. At each time period, firms rebalancing to the movement of equity markets is vital.
The accumulated timing behaviour has a greater importance as time passes. This result
can be considered as evidence of the application of market timing in Hong Kong.
41. 41
Appendices
Figure 1 Static Trade-off Theory
The graph above is referred from Robichek & Myers (1966). The graph shows the dual
characteristics of debt. On the one hand, debt increases the firm value and lets the firm
benefit from tax shields. On the other hand, debt potentially inflicts upon firm’s higher
bankruptcy costs and agency costs.
Figure 2 Trade-off Model Based on Agency Cost
42. 42
The graph above is referred from Myers & Majluf (1984). It explains that in the process of
reaching the optimal capital structure, a firm always faces the problem of agency cost no
matter whether the firm chooses debt financing or equity financing.
Table 1 Sources of Net Capitals in Developed Countries
The table above uses data from Corbett & Jenkinson (1996). It proves the pecking order
theory by providing evidence from several developed countries. The data shows that
these countries consider internal finance as their absolute first choice.
43. 43
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