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AGENDA
  Whoami   blah
  Paterva blah blah



Always wanted to do a talk on fun stuff

1.     It’s a security con ?
          blah
2.     UAVs, laser guided munitions
          The fun stuff
3.     EXCLUSIVE – hold the press !!
          (South African) Facebook zero day !
INTELLIGENCE / INFO GATHERING
  Why   do you ‘hack’?
      Information
      Control…leads to information
  Controls  are getting harder to break
  In proper assessment, 80-90% of time is spent on
   intelligence gathering.
  Intelligence gathering is also
      A port scan
      A Nessus scan…
      ..because we learn more about our target
YOU ARE PART OF THE STACK!
    Threats are moving up the stack
    Network -> OS -> Application - - -> Person




                 Understand the graph – volume and frequency
PEOPLE, SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND MALWARE
    Everyone is talking malware….

  Malware -> attacking the workstation
  Server in a server room vs. workstation with a person behind it
  For conventional malware traditional network mapping is
   worthless

    Focus in the past: find the server and perimeter (infrastructure
     foot print)

  Thinking needs to be updated
  Now – person / company profiling -> the new foot print
HACKERS VS. CRIMINALS
  Commercializing   vulnerabilities
MAKING ZA STRONGER
 Don’t hack ... but if you really have to:
   Have good/right intentions -> !criminal
            Never ever use what you found
            Don’t give SAP a reason to go look for you...
     Mail your findings so that they can learn/fix
            ..not from your work - duh...
            Development is NOT easy, and they are not idiots!
            Treat with respect – ‘jy is volgende vettie!’
     Don’t disrupt / destroy / delete anything
            (even if they gave you bad service)
     ‘Insider knowledge’ does not count...
            You are just an ass
     Don’t share outside of SA
            Sanitize and share the knowledge/tech – locally
     Don’t be a doos at international cons....


 Slammer ‘secured’ more networks in a day than all the security consultants in a year
 Change only happens at the point of extinction
 Strongest piece of metal is at the breaking point
 A chain is as strong as it’s weakest member
UAVS
  UAV  == Unmanned aerial vehicle
  Think back to your model airplane
       Let’s put a camera in there !
       Let’s put a BB gun in there !
       Let’s put a Hellfire missile in there !!
  Different sizes
  Fixed wing / rotary

  Electrical / Fuel powered

  Used to be for recon, now also armed
UAVS
UAVS
  Different   altitudes
       60k feet / 18km++ (Zephyr)
       100 feet (hand launched)
       747 flies at around 32-40k feet
  Speed     (max)
       747 flies at around 900 km/h
       Predator MQ1 – 217 km/h
       Avenger, Global Hawk 750 km/h
       Prop vs. jet


  Flying   time
       Up to 82 hours ... Typical 30h ish
UAVS
  Initial
         idea 1980s, serious thought in 1990s
  Driving force behind it  CIA
       CIA pilots
  Most known / successful = General Atomic
  Predator - Series A
       1995
       RQ / MQ
  Reaper      - Series B
       MQ9
       2002
  Avenger     - Series C
       Announced 2009
UAVS - PREDATOR
UAVS - REAPER
UAVS - AVENGER
UAVS – AVENGER SPECS
  Jet  engine
  Speed – 740 km/h

  Fly time – 20h

  Altitude – 60k feet / 18km

  Stealth - internal weapons bay, shape, materials,
   exhaust
  RADAR / Optics / Targeting

  Payload – 1.3 tons of Hellfire / Paveway II/ JDAM
UAVS – COMMAND & CONTROL
  Line of sight – C band (4 – 8 GHz)
  Satellite – Ku band (11 – 15 GHz)
       Can be routed over commercial sats. NBC - 1983
  3    crew members
       Pilot
             Flying - looking through a straw
       2 x sensor guys
           Difference in two scans :
           Tire tracks, movement
CAPTURING UAVS
  If
    communications dies it flies home
  Self destruct ?
FOOTAGE
MATCHING WAR PORN TO GOOGLE EARTH
EARTH
UAVS – PROBLEMS
  Not   a lot – it seems to kind of work well..

  Ku   band sucks in heavy weather
      Pray for rain
  Lag   of up to two seconds
      Like playing CS/CoD over a link made of wet towels and
       barbed wire
      No dog fights!
  Thus– send in the UAVs once air dominance has
  been established
SO, WE’RE PRETTY MUCH ...
LET’S JUST HIDE
  Optics,      infra red, RADAR
       Conceal, underground
       Rapid change in environment?
       The Chinese vs. American spy sat story
       Uhmm...next...
  Weapons
       Bombs, missiles
            LASER guided

        So...it becomes a game of defending against laser guided
         munitions
HOW LASER GUIDED MUNITIONS WORK
  Understand       a little about light
       Light storage system == FAIL
  Terminology
       Seeker = the bomb/missile
       Designator = guy / plane with the laser
  ‘Painting’    the target
       Invisible laser == you won’t see it..
  Bomb      vs. missile
       28km,60km (spice) radius
PAINTING THE TARGET
LASER ON!
ENCODING
  But - there could be multiple targets and multiple
   munitions
  Seeker needs to know where it should go

  Thus – must be able to distinguish designators

  This is done by pulsing the laser
       Fast
             Very fast
                  You won’t see it’s pulsing ... either.

  Encoding
       PIM – Pulse Interval Module
       PRF – Pulse Repetition Frequency
PIM
PRF / PIM
  Missiles   are pre-programmed, or programmed on
   the fly.
  PRF code is 3 digits.
      Does this make sense?
      Everyone should now be thinking...brute force
      But just hang on..
  Testing   it:
BTW - HOW DOES IT GET TO THE
MUNITIONS?

  Open   protocol – on the ‘net
      MIL-STD-3014 - MiDEF == PDF for munitions
      In flight coding was introduced in 2008
DUDE, ERRR...NO.. VERY UN-COOL, DON’T
PRESS THAT ...
AND THE OTHER SIDE OF THE EQUATION
DETECTION

  See the light!
  We can detect the designator’s laser light
      We know we are being targeted (like in the
       movies)...and run
  We   can decode the PIM/PRF
      We might know if we are a priority target – nice...
      Page 45 -6b: “Lower code numbers and faster
       pulse rates are appropriate for the most important
       targets and the most difficult operating conditions.”
DETECTION




   Laser warning sensor configured as a multi-sensor arrangement and interfaced
with a suitable smoke/aerosol screening system can be used effectively on platforms
  like main battle tanks, AFV, etc., to provide platform protection from laser-guided
       munitions. The development of this sensor is a totally indigenous effort,
                          both in design and implementation.
DETECTION

  Can   we determine the direction of the designator?
      Know where the special ops guy is sitting / plane
      Source or reflected light?
  We   might look at the divergence ??
      Shape of the reflected light
      Know how far away the special ops guy is / plane
REPLAY
  Sniff
       the light!
  Replay attack should work well...
       You don’t even have to know what the designator says
          Does it makes sense to have a 256 number code?
          Why are PRF codes 393,424,515 and so on more popular?

          Americans are always thinking big (1000 missiles at a time)

       Bomb does not speak .. One way comms
  So   now it’s becoming interesting..
“WTF – DID IT JUST TURN THIS WAY?!”

   .. replay the laser pulses ...
  ..and point it somewhere else...like..

  ...at the designator (see previous slides)
         Will this work when the designator is a plane? NOT
  “Page  46, Chapter 5 – Safety: c. Inversion. Caution
   must be used when the laser-target line is over +30
   degrees of the attack heading to ensure the LST or
   LGB does not detect and guide on the laser
   designator instead of the target‘s reflected laser
   energy.”
  Oops..
JDAMS

  Guidance    retrofitted to dumb bombs
      GPS
      TV (with RF link)
      Inertial navigation system


  Range  up to 60km from drop, up to 12 control
   surfaces
  Cheap – 21k USD compared to missiles at around
   75k USD
WHY DO YOU HAVE THESE SLIDES AT THE
CON ACTUALLY? AG, NO MAN REALLY...


  Ona more serious note...
  Same principles in attack (thinking) applies
       It’s really just 1s and 0s
  Don’t  think it’s too complex!
  If you ask the right questions, you can Google the
   answers
       (Patents, specs, etc.)
  Significantly    complex tech is indistinguishable from
   magic.
  Development of UAVs in non US countries is a big
   headache for the US...
QUESTIONS?
FACEBOOK 0 DAY, BOUGHT TO YOU BY...
...VODACOM
WE USE THE MAGIC EMAIL ADDRESS...
..AND AWAY IT GOES!

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Make Tea Not War

  • 1.
  • 2. AGENDA   Whoami blah   Paterva blah blah Always wanted to do a talk on fun stuff 1.  It’s a security con ?   blah 2.  UAVs, laser guided munitions   The fun stuff 3.  EXCLUSIVE – hold the press !!   (South African) Facebook zero day !
  • 3. INTELLIGENCE / INFO GATHERING   Why do you ‘hack’?   Information   Control…leads to information   Controls are getting harder to break   In proper assessment, 80-90% of time is spent on intelligence gathering.   Intelligence gathering is also   A port scan   A Nessus scan…   ..because we learn more about our target
  • 4. YOU ARE PART OF THE STACK!   Threats are moving up the stack   Network -> OS -> Application - - -> Person Understand the graph – volume and frequency
  • 5. PEOPLE, SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND MALWARE   Everyone is talking malware….   Malware -> attacking the workstation   Server in a server room vs. workstation with a person behind it   For conventional malware traditional network mapping is worthless   Focus in the past: find the server and perimeter (infrastructure foot print)   Thinking needs to be updated   Now – person / company profiling -> the new foot print
  • 6. HACKERS VS. CRIMINALS   Commercializing vulnerabilities
  • 7. MAKING ZA STRONGER Don’t hack ... but if you really have to:   Have good/right intentions -> !criminal   Never ever use what you found   Don’t give SAP a reason to go look for you...   Mail your findings so that they can learn/fix   ..not from your work - duh...   Development is NOT easy, and they are not idiots!   Treat with respect – ‘jy is volgende vettie!’   Don’t disrupt / destroy / delete anything   (even if they gave you bad service)   ‘Insider knowledge’ does not count...   You are just an ass   Don’t share outside of SA   Sanitize and share the knowledge/tech – locally   Don’t be a doos at international cons.... Slammer ‘secured’ more networks in a day than all the security consultants in a year Change only happens at the point of extinction Strongest piece of metal is at the breaking point A chain is as strong as it’s weakest member
  • 8. UAVS   UAV == Unmanned aerial vehicle   Think back to your model airplane   Let’s put a camera in there !   Let’s put a BB gun in there !   Let’s put a Hellfire missile in there !!   Different sizes   Fixed wing / rotary   Electrical / Fuel powered   Used to be for recon, now also armed
  • 10. UAVS   Different altitudes   60k feet / 18km++ (Zephyr)   100 feet (hand launched)   747 flies at around 32-40k feet   Speed (max)   747 flies at around 900 km/h   Predator MQ1 – 217 km/h   Avenger, Global Hawk 750 km/h   Prop vs. jet   Flying time   Up to 82 hours ... Typical 30h ish
  • 11. UAVS   Initial idea 1980s, serious thought in 1990s   Driving force behind it  CIA   CIA pilots   Most known / successful = General Atomic   Predator - Series A   1995   RQ / MQ   Reaper - Series B   MQ9   2002   Avenger - Series C   Announced 2009
  • 15. UAVS – AVENGER SPECS   Jet engine   Speed – 740 km/h   Fly time – 20h   Altitude – 60k feet / 18km   Stealth - internal weapons bay, shape, materials, exhaust   RADAR / Optics / Targeting   Payload – 1.3 tons of Hellfire / Paveway II/ JDAM
  • 16. UAVS – COMMAND & CONTROL   Line of sight – C band (4 – 8 GHz)   Satellite – Ku band (11 – 15 GHz)   Can be routed over commercial sats. NBC - 1983   3 crew members   Pilot   Flying - looking through a straw   2 x sensor guys   Difference in two scans :   Tire tracks, movement
  • 17. CAPTURING UAVS   If communications dies it flies home   Self destruct ?
  • 19. MATCHING WAR PORN TO GOOGLE EARTH EARTH
  • 20. UAVS – PROBLEMS   Not a lot – it seems to kind of work well..   Ku band sucks in heavy weather   Pray for rain   Lag of up to two seconds   Like playing CS/CoD over a link made of wet towels and barbed wire   No dog fights!   Thus– send in the UAVs once air dominance has been established
  • 21. SO, WE’RE PRETTY MUCH ...
  • 22. LET’S JUST HIDE   Optics, infra red, RADAR   Conceal, underground   Rapid change in environment?   The Chinese vs. American spy sat story   Uhmm...next...   Weapons   Bombs, missiles   LASER guided So...it becomes a game of defending against laser guided munitions
  • 23. HOW LASER GUIDED MUNITIONS WORK   Understand a little about light   Light storage system == FAIL   Terminology   Seeker = the bomb/missile   Designator = guy / plane with the laser   ‘Painting’ the target   Invisible laser == you won’t see it..   Bomb vs. missile   28km,60km (spice) radius
  • 26. ENCODING   But - there could be multiple targets and multiple munitions   Seeker needs to know where it should go   Thus – must be able to distinguish designators   This is done by pulsing the laser   Fast   Very fast   You won’t see it’s pulsing ... either.   Encoding   PIM – Pulse Interval Module   PRF – Pulse Repetition Frequency
  • 27. PIM
  • 28. PRF / PIM   Missiles are pre-programmed, or programmed on the fly.   PRF code is 3 digits.   Does this make sense?   Everyone should now be thinking...brute force   But just hang on..   Testing it:
  • 29. BTW - HOW DOES IT GET TO THE MUNITIONS?   Open protocol – on the ‘net   MIL-STD-3014 - MiDEF == PDF for munitions   In flight coding was introduced in 2008
  • 30. DUDE, ERRR...NO.. VERY UN-COOL, DON’T PRESS THAT ...
  • 31. AND THE OTHER SIDE OF THE EQUATION
  • 32. DETECTION   See the light!   We can detect the designator’s laser light   We know we are being targeted (like in the movies)...and run   We can decode the PIM/PRF   We might know if we are a priority target – nice...   Page 45 -6b: “Lower code numbers and faster pulse rates are appropriate for the most important targets and the most difficult operating conditions.”
  • 33. DETECTION Laser warning sensor configured as a multi-sensor arrangement and interfaced with a suitable smoke/aerosol screening system can be used effectively on platforms like main battle tanks, AFV, etc., to provide platform protection from laser-guided munitions. The development of this sensor is a totally indigenous effort, both in design and implementation.
  • 34. DETECTION   Can we determine the direction of the designator?   Know where the special ops guy is sitting / plane   Source or reflected light?   We might look at the divergence ??   Shape of the reflected light   Know how far away the special ops guy is / plane
  • 35. REPLAY   Sniff the light!   Replay attack should work well...   You don’t even have to know what the designator says   Does it makes sense to have a 256 number code?   Why are PRF codes 393,424,515 and so on more popular?   Americans are always thinking big (1000 missiles at a time)   Bomb does not speak .. One way comms   So now it’s becoming interesting..
  • 36. “WTF – DID IT JUST TURN THIS WAY?!”   .. replay the laser pulses ...   ..and point it somewhere else...like..   ...at the designator (see previous slides)   Will this work when the designator is a plane? NOT   “Page 46, Chapter 5 – Safety: c. Inversion. Caution must be used when the laser-target line is over +30 degrees of the attack heading to ensure the LST or LGB does not detect and guide on the laser designator instead of the target‘s reflected laser energy.”   Oops..
  • 37. JDAMS   Guidance retrofitted to dumb bombs   GPS   TV (with RF link)   Inertial navigation system   Range up to 60km from drop, up to 12 control surfaces   Cheap – 21k USD compared to missiles at around 75k USD
  • 38. WHY DO YOU HAVE THESE SLIDES AT THE CON ACTUALLY? AG, NO MAN REALLY...   Ona more serious note...   Same principles in attack (thinking) applies   It’s really just 1s and 0s   Don’t think it’s too complex!   If you ask the right questions, you can Google the answers   (Patents, specs, etc.)   Significantly complex tech is indistinguishable from magic.   Development of UAVs in non US countries is a big headache for the US...
  • 40. FACEBOOK 0 DAY, BOUGHT TO YOU BY...
  • 42. WE USE THE MAGIC EMAIL ADDRESS...
  • 43. ..AND AWAY IT GOES!