Mac dermid, inc., plaintiff–appellant, v. jackie deiter, defendant–

1. MacDERMID, INC., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Jackie DEITER,
Defendant–Appellee.
(Second Circuit Court of Appeals 2012)
This appeal calls on us to decide whether a court in Connecticut
may properly exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a defendant
who, while domiciled and working in Canada, is alleged to have
accessed a computer server located in Connecticut to
misappropriate confidential information belonging to her
employer. The United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut (Eginton, J.) dismissed the complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction, reasoning that the defendant had not used
a computer in Connecticut and consequently was not amenable
to long-arm jurisdiction. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52–59b(a);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). We hold that, consistent with due
process, the Connecticut statute authorizes jurisdiction, and we
reverse.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff–Appellant MacDermid, Inc. is a specialty chemical
company with its principal place of business in Waterbury,
Connecticut. Defendant–Appellee Jackie Deiter lives near
Toronto in Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada, and she was employed in
Canada by MacDermid's Canadian subsidiary, MacDermid
Chemicals, Inc., as an account manager from May 2008 until
her termination in April 2011.
The facts that were adduced on Deiter's Rule 12(b)(2) motion
and are not disputed show that MacDermid stores proprietary
and confidential electronic data on computer servers that it
maintains in Waterbury and that employees of MacDermid
Chemicals can access that information only by accessing the
Waterbury servers. The record reflects that employees of
MacDermid and its subsidiaries are, as a condition of
employment, made aware of the housing of the companies' email
system and their confidential and proprietary information in
Waterbury. The record further reflects that Deiter agreed in

2. writing to safeguard and to properly use MacDermid's
confidential information and that she was not authorized to
transfer such information to a personal email account.
For reasons not relevant here, MacDermid Chemicals decided to
terminate Deiter effective April 7, 2011. Deiter became aware
of her impending termination and, just prior to it, forwarded
from her MacDermid email account to her personal email
account allegedly confidential and proprietary MacDermid data
files. Deiter had to access MacDermid's Waterbury computer
servers both to obtain and to email the files.
MacDermid then sued Deiter in United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut, alleging unauthorized access and
misuse of a computer system and misappropriation of trade
secrets in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 53a–251 and 35–51 et
seq. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and the
Connecticut long-arm statute. Deiter moved pursuant to Rule
12(b)(2) to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction. The district court concluded that the long-arm
statute did not reach Deiter's conduct and dismissed the
complaint. MacDermid appealed.
DISCUSSION
In order for the district court to have jurisdiction over Deiter, it
must be proper under both the Connecticut long-arm statute and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Chloe, 616 F.3d at 163–65.
I.
Connecticut's long-arm statute provides that:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident
individual․ who in person or through an agent: (1) Transacts
any business within the state; (2) commits a tortious act within
the state․ ; (3) commits a tortious act outside the state causing
injury to person or property within the state․ if such person or
agent (A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in

3. the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to
have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue
from interstate or international commerce; ․ or (5) uses a
computer, as defined in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of
section 53–451, or a computer network, as defined in
subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of said section, located within
the state.
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52–59b(a). The statute incorporates the
following definitions:
(1) “Computer” means an electronic, magnetic or optical device
or group of devices that, pursuant to a computer program,
human instruction or permanent instructions contained in the
device or group of devices, can automatically perform computer
operations with or on computer data and can communicate the
results to another computer or to a person. “Computer” includes
any connected or directly related device, equipment or facility
that enables the computer to store, retrieve or communicate
computer programs, computer data or the results of computer
operations to or from a person, another computer or another
device․
(3) “Computer network” means a set of related, remotely
connected devices and any communications facilities including
more than one computer with the capability to transmit data
among them through the communications facilities.
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53–451(a).
In concluding that Connecticut's long-arm statute did not apply,
the court reasoned that Deiter had not used a Connecticut
computer or computer network but had simply sent email “from
one computer in Canada to another computer in Canada”; that
is, from her MacDermid computer at her home to her personal
computer at her home.
While it is true that Deiter physically interacted only with
computers in Canada, we do not believe that this fact defeats
long-arm jurisdiction. The record before the district court
indicated that, “[i]n order to use [her] MacDermid e-mail
account and to obtain said confidential data files, Ms. Deiter

4. accessed computer servers located in MacDermid's offices in
Waterbury, Connecticut.” A computer server meets the
Connecticut long-arm statute's definition of computer because it
is
an electronic device that, pursuant to human instruction, can
automatically perform computer operations with computer data
and can communicate the results to another computer or to a
person [or is a] connected or directly related device that enables
the computer to store, retrieve or communicate computer data to
or from a person, another computer or another device.
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53–451(a)(1).
Because we are constrained to accept as true MacDermid's
uncontroverted assertions that Deiter used the Connecticut
servers and because the servers are computers under the long-
arm statute, we conclude that Deiter used a computer in
Connecticut and that the Connecticut district court had long-arm
jurisdiction under § 52–59b(a)(5).
It is not material that Deiter was outside of Connecticut when
she accessed the Waterbury servers. The statute requires only
that the computer or network, not the user, be located in
Connecticut. See § 52–59b(a)(5). The statute reaches persons
outside the state who remotely access computers within the
state, and we read § 52–59b(a)(5) to apply to torts committed by
persons not in Connecticut based on conduct not covered by §§
52–59b(a)(1), (2), or (3). . . .
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand for further proceedings.
BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
Page 3 of 3
International Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
STONE, C.J., Opinion of the Court
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the
Court.

5. The questions for decision are (1) whether, within the
limitations of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, appellant, a Delaware corporation, has, by its
activities in the State of Washington, rendered itself amenable
to proceedings in the courts of that state to recover unpaid
contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund
exacted by state statutes, Washington Unemployment
Compensation Act, Washington Revised Statutes, § 9998-103a
through § 9998-123a, 1941 Supp., and (2) whether the state can
exact those contributions consistently with the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The statutes in question set up a comprehensive scheme of
unemployment compensation, the costs of which are defrayed
by contributions required to be made by employers to a state
unemployment compensation fund. The contributions are a
specified percentage of the wages payable annually by each
employer for his employees' services in the state. The
assessment and collection of the contributions and the fund are
administered by appellees. Section 14(c) of the Act
(Wash.Rev.Stat., 1941 Supp., § 9998-114c) authorizes appellee
Commissioner to issue an order and notice of assessment of
delinquent contributions upon prescribed personal service of the
notice upon the employer if found within the state, or, if not so
found, by mailing the notice to the employer by registered mail
at his last known address. That section also authorizes the
Commissioner to collect the assessment by distraint if it is not
paid within ten days after service of the notice.
In this case, notice of assessment for the years in question was
personally served upon a sales solicitor employed by appellant
in the State of Washington, and a copy of the notice was mailed
by registered mail to appellant at its address in St. Louis,
Missouri. Appellant appeared specially before the office of
unemployment, and moved to set aside the order and notice of
assessment on the ground that the service upon appellant's
salesman was not proper service upon appellant; that appellant
was not a corporation of the State of Washington, and was not

6. doing business within the state; that it had no agent within the
state upon whom service could be made; and that appellant is
not an employer, and does not furnish employment within the
meaning of the statute.
Appellant in each of these courts assailed the statute as applied,
as a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and as imposing a constitutionally prohibited
burden on interstate commerce. The cause comes here on appeal
under § 237(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 344(a),
appellant assigning as error that the challenged statutes, as
applied, infringe the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the commerce clause.
The facts, as found by the appeal tribunal and accepted by the
state Superior Court and Supreme Court, are not in dispute.
Appellant is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place
of business in St. Louis, Missouri, and is engaged in the
manufacture and sale of shoes and other footwear. It maintains
places of business in several states other than Washington, at
which its manufacturing is carried on and from which its
merchandise is distributed interstate through several sales units
or branches located outside the State of Washington.
Appellant has no office in Washington, and makes no contracts
either for sale or purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no
stock of merchandise in that state, and makes there no deliveries
of goods in intrastate commerce. During the years from 1937 to
1940, now in question, appellant employed eleven to thirteen
salesmen under direct supervision and control of sales managers
located in St. Louis. These salesmen resided in Washington;
their principal activities were confined to that state, and they
were compensated by commissions based upon the amount of
their sales. The commissions for each year totaled more than
$31,000. Appellant supplies its salesmen with a line of samples,
each consisting of one shoe of a pair, which they display to
prospective purchasers. On occasion, they rent permanent
sample rooms, for exhibiting samples, in business buildings, or
rent rooms in hotels or business buildings temporarily for that

7. purpose. The cost of such rentals is reimbursed by appellant.
The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their
samples and soliciting orders from prospective buyers, at prices
and on terms fixed by appellant. The salesmen transmit the
orders to appellant's office in St. Louis for acceptance or
rejection, and, when accepted, the merchandise for filling the
orders is shipped f.o.b. from points outside Washington to the
purchasers within the state. All the merchandise shipped into
Washington is invoiced at the place of shipment, from which
collections are made. No salesman has authority to enter into
contracts or to make collections.
The Supreme Court of Washington was of opinion that the
regular and systematic solicitation of orders in the state by
appellant's salesmen, resulting in a continuous flow of
appellant's product into the state, was sufficient to constitute
doing business in the state so as to make appellant amenable to
suit in its courts. But it was also of opinion that there were
sufficient additional activities shown to bring the case within
the rule, frequently stated, that solicitation within a state by the
agents of a foreign corporation plus some additional activities
there are sufficient to render the corporation amenable to suit
brought in the courts of the state to enforce an obligation
arising out of its activities there. International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky,234 U.S. 579, 587; People's Tobacco Co. v. American
Tobacco Co.,246 U.S. 79, 87; Frene v. Louisville Cement Co.,
77 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 134 F.2d 511, 516. The court found such
additional activities in the salesmen's display of samples
sometimes in permanent display rooms, and the salesmen's
residence within the state, continued over a period of years, all
resulting in a substantial volume of merchandise regularly
shipped by appellant to purchasers within the state.
Appellant also insists that its activities within the state were not
sufficient to manifest its "presence" there, and that, in its
absence, the state courts were without jurisdiction, that,
consequently, it was a denial of due process for the state to
subject appellant to suit. It refers to those cases in which it was

8. said that the mere solicitation of orders for the purchase of
goods within a state, to be accepted without the state and filled
by shipment of the purchased goods interstate, does not render
the corporation seller amenable to suit within the state. See
Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.,205 U.S. 530, 533;
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 586-587;
Philadelphia& Reading R. Co. v. McKibbin,243 U.S. 264, 268;
People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., supra, 87. And
appellant further argues that, since it was not present within the
state, it is a denial of due process to subject it to taxation or
other money exaction. It thus denies the power of the state to
lay the tax or to subject appellant to a suit for its collection.
Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in
personam is grounded on their de facto power over the
defendant's person. Hence, his presence within the territorial
jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a
judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff,95 U.S. 714,
733. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to
personal service of summons or other form of notice, due
process requires only that, in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." Milliken v.
Meyer,311 U.S. 457, 463. See Holmes, J., in McDonald v.
Mabee,243 U.S. 90, 91. Compare Hoopeston Canning Co. v.
Cullen,318 U.S. 313, 316, 319. See Blackmer v. United
States,284 U.S. 421; Hess v. Pawloski,274 U.S. 352; Young v.
Masci,289 U.S. 253. ,
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction
intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact, Klein v.
Board of Supervisors,282 U.S. 19, 24, it is clear that, unlike an
individual, its "presence" without, as well as within, the state of
its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its
behalf by those who are authorized to act for it. To say that the
corporation is so far "present" there as to satisfy due process

9. requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of
suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question
to be decided. For the terms "present" or "presence" are used
merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent
within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process. L. Hand, J., in Hutchinson
v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141. Those demands may be
met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the
forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal
system of government, to require the corporation to defend the
particular suit which is brought there. An "estimate of the
inconveniences" which would result to the corporation from a
trial away from its "home" or principal place of business is
relevant in this connection. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,
supra, 141.
"Presence" in the state in this sense has never been doubted
when the activities of the corporation there have not only been
continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities
sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to
an agent to accept service of process has been given. St. Clair v.
Cox,106 U.S. 350, 355; Connecticut Mutual Co. v. Spratley,172
U.S. 602, 610-611; Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v.
Meyer,197 U.S. 407, 414-415; Commercial Mutual Co. v.
Davis,213 U.S. 245, 255-256; International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, supra; cf. St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Alexander,227
U.S. 218. Conversely, it has been generally recognized that the
casual presence of the corporate agent, or even his conduct of
single or isolated items of activities in a state in the
corporation's behalf, are not enough to subject it to suit on
causes of action unconnected with the activities there. St. Clair
v. Cox, supra, 359, 360; Old Wayne Life Assn. v.
McDonough,204 U.S. 8, 21; Frene v. Louisville Cement Co.,
supra, 515, and cases cited. To require the corporation in such
circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or other
jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has
been thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the

10. corporation to comport with due process.
While it has been held, in cases on which appellant relies, that
continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not enough to
support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits
unrelated to that activity, Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough,
supra; Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., supra; Simon v.
Southern R. Co.,236 U.S. 115; People's Tobacco Co. v.
American Tobacco Co., supra; cf. Davis v. Farmers Co-
operative Co.,262 U.S. 312, 317, there have been instances in
which the continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities. See Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v.
Reynolds,255 U.S. 565; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220
N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915; cf. St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Alexander,
supra.
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a
corporation to suit and those which do not cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has
sometimes been suggested, whether the activity, which the
corporation has seen fit to procure through its agents in another
state, is a little more or a little less. St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v.
Alexander, supra, 228; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,
supra, 587. Whether due process is satisfied must depend,
rather, upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does
not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in
personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. Cf. Pennoyer
v. Neff, supra; Minnesota Commercial Assn. v. Benn,261 U.S.
140.
But, to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that

11. privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those
obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to
respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue. Compare International Harvester Co.
v. Kentucky, supra, with Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.,
supra, and People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.,
supra.
Applying these standards, the activities carried on in behalf of
appellant in the State of Washington were neither irregular nor
casual. They were systematic and continuous throughout the
years in question. They resulted in a large volume of interstate
business, in the course of which appellant received the benefits
and protection of the laws of the state, including the right to
resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The
obligation which is here sued upon arose out of those very
activities. It is evident that these operations establish sufficient
contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable
and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and
substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations
which appellant has incurred there. Hence, we cannot say that
the maintenance of the present suit in the State of Washington
involves an unreasonable or undue procedure.
Appellant having rendered itself amenable to suit upon
obligations arising out of the activities of its salesmen in
Washington, the state may maintain the present suit in personam
to collect the tax laid upon the exercise of the privilege of
employing appellant's salesmen within the state. For
Washington has made one of those activities which, taken
together, establish appellant's "presence" there for purposes of
suit the taxable event by which the state brings appellant within
the reach of its taxing power. The state thus has constitutional
power to lay the tax and to subject appellant to a suit to recover
it. The activities which establish its "presence" subject it alike
to taxation by the state and to suit to recover the tax. Equitable
Life Society v. Pennsylvania,238 U.S. 143, 146.

12. Affirmed.
Page 3 of 3
HERTZ CORP. V. FRIEND
559 U. S. 77 (2010)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 08-1107
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal diversity jurisdiction statute provides that “a
corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by
which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its
principal place of business.” 28 U. S. C. §1332(c)(1) (emphasis
added). We seek here to resolve different interpretations that
the Circuits have given this phrase. In doing so, we place
primary weight upon the need for judicial administration of a
jurisdictional statute to remain as simple as possible. And we
conclude that the phrase “principal place of business” refers to
the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct,
control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities. Lower
federal courts have often metaphorically called that place the
corporation’s “nerve center.” See, e.g.,Wisconsin Knife Works
v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F. 2d 1280, 1282 (CA7 1986).
We believe that the “nerve center” will typically be found at a
corporation’s headquarters.
In September 2007, respondents Melinda Friend and John
Nhieu, two California citizens, sued petitioner, the Hertz
Corporation, in a California state court. They sought damages
for what they claimed were violations of California’s wage and
hour laws. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a. And they requested relief
on behalf of a potential class composed of California citizens
who had allegedly suffered similar harms.
Hertz filed a notice seeking removal to a federal court. 28 U.
S. C. §§1332(d)(2), 1441(a). Hertz claimed that the plaintiffs
and the defendant were citizens of different States.

13. §§1332(a)(1), (c)(1). Hence, the federal court possessed
diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. Friend and Nhieu,
however, claimed that the Hertz Corporation was a California
citizen, like themselves, and that, hence, diversity jurisdiction
was lacking.
To support its position, Hertz submitted a declaration by an
employee relations manager that sought to show that Hertz’s
“principal place of business” was in New Jersey, not in
California. The declaration stated, among other things, that
Hertz operated facilities in 44 States; and that California—
which had about 12% of the Nation’s population, Pet. for Cert.
8—accounted for 273 of Hertz’s 1,606 car rental locations;
about 2,300 of its 11,230 full-time employees; about $811
million of its $4.371 billion in annual revenue; and about 3.8
million of its approximately 21 million annual transactions, i.e.,
rentals. The declaration also stated that the “leadership of Hertz
and its domestic subsidiaries” is located at Hertz’s “corporate
headquarters” in Park Ridge, New Jersey; that its “core
executive and administrative functions . . . are carried out”
there and “to a lesser extent” in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and
that its “major administrative operations . . . are found” at those
two locations. App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a–30a.
The District Court of the Northern District of California
accepted Hertz’s statement of the facts as undisputed. But it
concluded that, given those facts, Hertz was a citizen of
California. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied Ninth
Circuit precedent, which instructs courts to identify a
corporation’s “principal place of business” by first determining
the amount of a corporation’s business activity State by State. If
the amount of activity is “significantly larger” or “substantially
predominates” in one State, then that State is the corporation’s
“principal place of business.” If there is no such State, then the
“principal place of business” is the corporation’s “‘nerve
center,’ ” i.e., the place where “‘the majority of its executive
and administrative functions are performed.’ ”
Applying this test, the District Court found that the “plurality

14. of each of the relevant business activities” was in California,
and that “the differential between the amounts of those
activities” in California and the amount in “the next closest
state” was “significant.” Order 4. Hence, Hertz’s “principal
place of business” was California, and diversity jurisdiction was
thus lacking. The District Court consequently remanded the case
to the state courts.
Hertz appealed the District Court’s remand order. 28 U. S. C.
§1453(c). The Ninth Circuit affirmed in a brief memorandum
opinion. 297 Fed. Appx. 690 (2008). Hertz filed a petition for
certiorari. And, in light of differences among the Circuits in the
application of the test for corporate citizenship, we granted the
writ.
A “nerve center” approach, which ordinarily equates that
“center” with a corporation’s headquarters, is simple to apply
comparatively speaking. The metaphor of a corporate “brain,”
while not precise, suggests a single location. By contrast, a
corporation’s general business activities more often lack a
single principal place where they take place. That is to say, the
corporation may have several plants, many sales locations, and
employees located in many different places. If so, it will not be
as easy to determine which of these different business locales is
the “principal” or most important “place.”
The burden of persuasion for establishing diversity
jurisdiction, of course, remains on the party asserting it. When
challenged on allegations of jurisdictional facts, the parties
must support their allegations by competent proof. And when
faced with such a challenge, we reject suggestions such as, for
example, the one made by petitioner that the mere filing of a
form like the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Form 10–
K listing a corporation’s “principal executive offices” would,
without more, be sufficient proof to establish a corporation’s
“nerve center.” Such possibilities would readily permit
jurisdictional manipulation, thereby subverting a major reason
for the insertion of the “principal place of business” language in
the diversity statute. Indeed, if the record reveals attempts at

15. manipulation—for example, that the alleged “nerve center” is
nothing more than a mail drop box, a bare office with a
computer, or the location of an annual executive retreat—the
courts should instead take as the “nerve center” the place of
actual direction, control, and coordination, in the absence of
such manipulation.
Petitioner’s unchallenged declaration suggests that Hertz’s
center of direction, control, and coordination, its “nerve
center,” and its corporate headquarters are one and the same,
and they are located in New Jersey, not in California. Because
respondents should have a fair op- opportunity to litigate their
case in light of our holding, however, we vacate the Ninth
Circuit’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Page 1 of 3
Instructor: Virgil Alexander
HOW TO PREPARE A CASE BRIEF
A case brief is a summary of a case. It briefly describes:
1. The parties (Plaintiff and Defendant) in the case = the
persons or companies involved.
2. The facts of the case = What happened in the case? What is
the parties’ dispute? What are their arguments in support of
their positions?
3. The court in which the case is being prosecuted (e.g., the
United States Supreme Court, the Delaware Supreme Court).
4. What did this court decide = Who won/lost? Why (i.e. what
was the courts stated reason for its decision?)
5. The lower court proceedings, if applicable = What did the
lower court decide (i.e. who won/lost and why)? The lower
court is the court from which the decision was appealed.

16. For example: The Assigned Case is Jennifer Smith v. John
Smith (US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (2016)
Assume that you have read the court’s opinion in the case
Jennifer Smith v. John Smith (US Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit (2016) wherein Jennifer Smith, an 18 year old, has
sued her father seeking full payment of her college tuition.
Defendant John Smith refuses to pay the tuition because he
prefers that plaintiff attend Temple University, his alma mater,
instead of the University of Delaware.
The case was filed (initiated) in the federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania where a trial was held. The
trial court ruled in favor of defendant John Smith reasoning that
since Plaintiff at 18 years old is an adult, Defendant is under no
legal obligation to support her in any way. Plaintiff appealed
the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. The opinion in the Court of Appeals is your reading
assignment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court
decision agreeing fully with its reasoning.
The following is an example of a case brief summarizing the
opinion of the Court of Appeals:
In this case Plaintiff Jennifer Smith sued her father, Defendant
John Smith, in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff in her suit sought an order
compelling Defendant to pay her full tuition and other necessary
expenses relating to Plaintiff’s attendance at the University of
Delaware where she will enter her freshman year in the fall
semester of 2017. Plaintiff is 18 years old. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant has a legal obligation to pay for her college
education but that Defendant has steadfastly refused to pay or to
sign the necessary papers to guarantee her loan because
Defendant insists that Plaintiff attend Temple University,
Defendant’s alma mater. Defendant argues that he owes no
legal duty to pay Plaintiff’s college expenses because Plaintiff
at 18 years old is an adult who is personally responsible for
such expenses.
The United States District Court ruled in favor of Defendant

17. holding that a parent has no legal obligation to pay any
expenses of any kind of a child who has reached the age of
majority (i.e. 18 years of age). Plaintiff appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of
Appeals agreed with the District Court noting that while
parenthood might carry certain ethical and moral obligations, all
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS are severed once the child reaches the
age of 18.
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