SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 38
Download to read offline
“RISK SHARING IN TRADITIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS FOR
BUILDING PROJECTS.”
A CONTRACTOR’S PERSPECTIVE
IN THE GREEK CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY.
ENSCHEDE, 29-04-2015
Dimitrios Kordas (M-CME/s1231901)
MSc: Construction Management and Engineering
1. INTRODUCTION
29-04-2015 2
29-04-2015 3
■ Failure on: “Triple Constraints” (Cost-Time- Scope) target?
■ Cost overruns in traditional construction contract?
▪ Delay risks: 50% projects suffered by time overruns in UAE’s CI (Faridi 2006)
▪ 61% of Australian contractors claim bearing misallocated cost risks (Atkin 2006)
AlSalman & Sillars (2013)
1. INTRODUCTION
“Traditional procurement”
29-04-2015 4
Ferry et al. (1999)
1. INTRODUCTION
“Project estimate”
29-04-2015 5
“A practical case in traditional building procurement in the Greek CI”
Step 1: Client submits a Request for Proposals invitation
Step 2: Contractors: “Closed books” bid-competition
Step 3: Client and awarded contractor: “Open books” Post-bid
3.1 Compensation mechanism agreement
3.2 Risk sharing agreement
For the contractor:
Price (Contract value) = Fixed amount (Base estimate) + Profit
For the client:
Price = Contract value ± 30-35%×Contract value
“Maximum cost risk allowance”
1. INTRODUCTION
Pipattanapiwong (2004)
■ No risks → Fixed amount paid.
■ On-site risks → always →
sharing agreement → if unfair
risk allocation by client →
contractors: reserve amounts
(contingencies) or arbitration
path.
High contingencies pre-bid
↔ More/Less risks shared
Revise profits & estimates? ⇒
Project cost performance
Cotnigencies
Contingencies ↔
Incentive profits Contingency reduction →
Project delivery efficiency
2. RESEARCH DESIGN
29-04-2015 6
“Problem scope”
√ Type of projects: Buildings
√ Phase: Execution (Construction)
√ Post-bid period
√ Cost-side
Chang & Ive (2002)
PMI (2013)
29-04-2015 7
“Cost estimating”
■ Cost estimates: (1) Design estimates, (2) Bid estimates, (3) Control estimates
2. RESEARCH DESIGN
“Building a cost model”
Product-based Vs. Process-based
COST PLAN
PROJECT: (Type), (Location) Note: This cost plan is based upon the attached outline
DATE OF COST PLAN: X/X/2015 specification, and both documents should be read together.
ASSUMED DATE OF TENDER: X/X/2015
TOTAL INTERNAL FLOOR AREA: 2,390 m²
Cost
Unit Quantity Unit Cost (₤) Subtotal (₤) Total (₤) Elemental cost (₤) / m²
1. WORK BELOW LOWEST FLOOR FINISH
Ground floor area 390 m² 321.00 125,19 52.38
2. STRUCTURAL FRAME
2,390 m² 125,6 52.55
3. UPPER FLOORS
225 mm Hollow pot 386 m² 60.00 23,16
150 mm in-situ RC 1,585 m² 41.00 64,985
88,145 36.88
4. STAIRCASES
RC Staircases 25 m 1225.00 30,625
1 No 25 m rise
1 No secondary
21.5 m rise 21.5 m 900.00 19,350
49,975 49,975 20.91
“Cost elements”
▪ Land preparation
▪ Foundations
▪ Substructure
▪ Superstructure
▪ Finishes
RICS (2014)
29-04-2015 8
Ferry et al. (1999)
2. RESEARCH DESIGN
“Components in a project cost estimate”
1. Identification
2. Assessment = Analysis + Evaluation
3. Monitoring
4. Control
29-04-2015 9
2. RESEARCH DESIGN
“Research goal”
“Assessing the effect of risk sharing decisions taken (in post-bid) by contractors and
examine projects’ performance in terms of project delivery efficiency and cost performance.”
“Research question”
“How do risk-sharing decisions of contractors’ in the post-bid context affect building
projects cost performance when these projects are traditionally procured?”
√ Revise the minimum
required change in
profit
√ Revise risk sharing
and base estimate
amounts
√ Reduce contingency
below the 10% of
base estimate
“Research objectives”
√ Cost risk transfer
√ Probability to meet the base estimate
√ Contingencies
√ Incentive profits
√ Any relation: Incentive profits ↔ Contingencies
√ Improvements on Project performance?
√ Reduce project delivery inefficiency?
pre-ΔΜ
pοst-ΔΜ
“Proposal”
29-04-2015 10
Joustra (2010)
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Definitions
“Uncertainty”
√ The variability and ambiguity of future
outcomes.
√ No probability distributions can be assigned
Vs. Risky situations
“Risk”
√ Expected value = Probability × Impact
√ The “fallacy” of expected value:
Risk events Magnitude Probability Impact Expected
Value
Earth. 1 3 Richter 5% € 10000 € 500
Earth. 2 6 Richter 0.02% € 1500000 € 300
RiskCompound command (@RISK)
“Contingency”
√ A budget reserve above the estimate to
reduce the risk of overruns at a desired
confidence level.
√ Included in bid price → Total commitment
on tender
√ Arbitrary amount, usually set as the 10% of
base estimate.
29-04-2015 11
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
“Systematic review”
No specific RM
framework applied.
27 on-site risks were
collected: tailored list
4 cost risk drivers
√ Quantity
√ Unit Cost
√ Schedule
√ Global
Risk importance criteria
√ Propensity
√ Perception
√ Performance
Quantitative risk assessment
√ MC simulation
√ PDFs, CDFs
√ Sensitivity diagrams
AHP
Risk misallocation
literature consensus.
12
No previous study in risk sharing in D-B-B contracts
Risk sharing mainly as an optimization parameter of contracts.
“Risk transfer degree” and “Project delivery efficiency” not examined.
P (price of contract) = F (fixed amount) + b×(E – C)
Incentive profit
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
“Motivation”
Degree of risk transfer →
Project delivery inefficiency →
Witt & Liias (2011)
Efficient delivery of project ⇒ ΔP=ΔM=ΔC=0
P (price) = C (cost) + M (margin)
29-04-2015 13
4. MODEL DESIGN
“Stochastic process: 5 questions” (Diekmann 1983)
(1) Data available for each risk (Xi)? → Probability (RiskCompound) Range of Impact = Individual
risk effect level
(2) Correlated Xi s → No correlations assumed among the 27 individual risks
(3) Data required for Yj? → Yj = Ej + n×CRi
(4) Additive or Multiplicative combination of Xi → Additive:
(5) How many cost elements (Yj)? → 5 cost elements
Project final cost = Iterations number: 10000
Confidence level = 50% + Average risk effect level
Input distributions:
Base estimates Risk Probability Risk Impact
(Risk Triang) (Risk Discrete) (Risk Trigen)
Land
preparation
Foundations
Substructure
Superstructure
Finishes
Fixed: Risk Discrete Variable: P=100%
29-04-2015 14
4.4 Cost risk analysis model
for contingency estimation
Model adopted from Hobbs (2010)
29-04-2015 15
Construction phase Risk factors Drivers Type Risk Probability Input Distr. Risk impact (% on E change) Input Distr. Overall risk effect Amount of individual line cost impacted by risk (€) Estimated effect of individual risk on line item or Cost Risks (€) Percentage impacted Total Cost
Occuring Not occuring Discrete / 1 (F / V) Low Most likely High Trigen RiskCompound Risk Prob/ty × Cost line = Amount Impacted Overall effect × Amount impacted = Cost effect (€) E + Cost Risks
% (€)
Land preparation R1 Quantity F 30% 70% 0 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,008739 0,3 × 18300 5490 0,008738705 × 5490 47,97549008 0,002622 0,2621611
E (€) 18300 R2 Quantity F 30% 70% 0 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,008739 0,3 × 18300 5490 0,008738705 × 5490 47,97549008 0,002622 0,2621611
(-5%,+5%) 18300 R3 Quantity V 100% 0% 1 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,028488 1 × 18300 18300 0,02848774 × 18300 521,3256419 0,028488 2,848774
R4 Quantity V 100% 0% 1 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,028488 1 × 18300 18300 0,02848774 × 18300 521,3256419 0,028488 2,848774
R5 Unit cost F 30% 70% 0 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,001092 0,3 × 18300 5490 0,001092299 × 5490 5,996721855 0,000328 0,032769
0,075545 7,55% 1144,598986 6,2546393 19444,60
Foundations R6 Unit cost V 100% 0% 1 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,002814 1 × 54900 54900 0,002813841 × 54900 154,4798472 0,002814 0,2813841
E (€) 54900 R7 Global V 100% 0% 1 -5% 1% 5% 0,001407 0,001407 1 × 54900 54900 0,00140692 × 54900 77,23992359 0,001407 0,140692
(-2%,+2%) 54900 R8 Global V 100% 0% 1 -5% 1% 5% 0,001407 0,001407 1 × 54900 54900 0,00140692 × 54900 77,23992359 0,001407 0,140692
R9 Global F 10% 90% 0 -5% 1% 5% 0,001407 0,000182 0,1 × 54900 5490 0,000182032 × 5490 0,999353697 1,82E-05 0,0018203
R10 Quantity F 10% 90% 0 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,002913 0,1 × 54900 5490 0,00291261 × 5490 15,99023084 0,000291 0,0291261
R11 Quantity V 100% 0% 1 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,028488 1 × 54900 54900 0,02848774 × 54900 1563,976926 0,028488 2,848774
R12 Quantity F 30% 70% 0 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,008739 0,3 × 54900 16470 0,008738705 × 16470 143,9264702 0,002622 0,2621611
0,045949 4,59% 2033,852675 3,7046497 56933,85
Substructure R13 Unit cost V 100% 0% 1 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,002814 1 × 54900 54900 0,002813841 × 54900 154,4798472 0,002814 0,2813841
E (€) 54900 R14 Unit cost F 40% 60% 0 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,001456 0,4 × 54900 21960 0,001456253 × 21960 31,97931831 0,000583 0,0582501
(-7%,+7%) 54900 R15 Unit cost F 40% 60% 0 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,001456 0,4 × 54900 21960 0,001456253 × 21960 31,97931831 0,000583 0,0582501
R16 Schedule F 60% 40% 1 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,112997 0,6 × 54900 32940 0,112996663 × 32940 3722,110068 0,067798 6,7797998
R17 Schedule V 100% 0% 1 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,186049 1 × 54900 54900 0,18604904 × 54900 10214,0923 0,186049 18,604904
R18 Quantity V 100% 0% 1 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,028488 1 × 54900 54900 0,02848774 × 54900 1563,976926 0,028488 2,848774
0,33326 33,32% 15718,61777 28,63 70618,62
Superstructure R19 Schedule F 50% 50% 0 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,094126 0,5 × 45750 22875 0,09412622 × 22875 2153,137282 0,047063 4,706311
E (€) 45750 R20 Schedule F 30% 70% 0 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,056481 0,3 × 45750 13725 0,05648138 × 13725 775,2069424 0,016944 1,6944414
(-7%,+7%) 45750 R21 Schedule F 30% 70% 0 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,056481 0,3 × 45750 13725 0,05648138 × 13725 775,2069424 0,016944 1,6944414
R22 Global V 100% 0% 1 -5% 1% 5% 0,001407 0,001407 1 × 45750 45750 0,00140692 × 45750 64,36660299 0,001407 0,140692
R23 Global V 100% 0% 1 -5% 1% 5% 0,001407 0,001407 1 × 45750 45750 0,00140692 × 45750 64,36660299 0,001407 0,140692
0,209903 20,99% 3832,284373 8,3765779 49582,28
Finishes R24 Schedule V 100% 0% 1 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,186049 1 × 9150 9150 0,18604904 × 9150 1702,348716 0,186049 18,604904
E (€) 9150 R25 Schedule V 100% 0% 1 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,186049 1 × 9150 9150 0,18604904 × 9150 1702,348716 0,186049 18,604904
(-5%,+5%) 9150 R26 Unit cost V 100% 0% 1 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,002814 1 × 9150 9150 0,002813841 × 9150 25,7466412 0,002814 0,2813841
R27 Unit cost V 100% 0% 1 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,002814 1 × 9150 9150 0,002813841 × 9150 25,7466412 0,002814 0,2813841
0,377726 37,72% 3456,190715 37,772576 12606,19
Overall 20,83% Contribution of cost risk drivers
Driver Cost Risk (€) Total (€) Contribution
Q 4426,47 26185,54 0,17
Project final cost 209185,5 UC 430,41 26185,54 0,02
S 21044,45 26185,54 0,80
G 284,21 26185,54 0,01
Overall risk level = Average (Risk effects)
Confidence level= 50% + Overall risk level
Error range limits Input Distr. Triang
Error range limits Input Distr. Triang
Error range limits
Error range limits
Error range limits
Input Distr. Triang
Input Distr. Triang
Input Distr. Triang
Sum of output cells
@RISK cost risk analysis model (adopted from Hobbs 2010)
4. MODEL DESIGN
5. SURVEY DESIGN
29-04-2015 16
“(Questionnaire) Survey in construction Project Risk Management (PRM)”
24 survey studies were reviewed
√ Extensive use of the 5-Likert scale √ Relative Importance Index
The study collects data with a questionnaire
√Section A: Organization profile
√Section B: Project specific characteristics
√Section C: Direct rating of risks and of cost risk drivers
√Section D: Contact details
“Survey evaluation – Section A”
■ 36 self-administrated questionnaires ■ Validity test → Content Validity Panel 5 Raters
√ 22 valid received → Item-CVI = 0.80>0.78
■ Response rate: 62.3% → ■ Reliability
much higher than the 30% expected ▪ Instrumental: Contingency = 0.546 (satisfactory)
(Uher & Toakley 1999; Zou et al. 2006) ▪ Response: ICC=0.758, a=0.439 (single: weak)
a=0.758 (total: satisfactory)
29-04-2015 17
5. SURVEY DESIGN
“Sample description”
29-04-2015 18
5. SURVEY DESIGN
29-04-2015
19
6. DATA ANALYSIS
Kurtosis for standard normal distribution N (0, 1) → k=3
or k=0 → “excess kurtosis”
▪ k>0 → peaked distribution → heavy (excess) in tails (leptokurtic)
▪ k=0 → normal distribution (mesokurtic)
▪ k<0 → flat distribution → light tails (platykurtic)
▪ Standard normal distribution N(μ=0, var.=1)
▪ The skewness for any normal distribution and
“symmetrically” distributed data
g1=0
Kurtosis - Shape parameter
Skewness - Location parameter
Normal distribution → 95.5% of the “Project Final Cost” ⇒
Data normality and data symmetry
“Starting point”
Portfolio level
Project Case 10
Project Case 14
Portfolio level
Chapter 7
Chapter 6
2029-04-2015
► On portfolio level (average values)
(1) Skewness: Land preparation (g1=-0.046), Foundations (g1=-0.047), Finishes (g1=-0.008)
negatively skewed
Substructure (g1=+0.020) and Superstructure (g1=+0.278) positively skewed
Superstructure (comparing to project-level) ⇒ +41.8%
Land preparation (comparing to project-level) ⇒ + 70.7%
If -0.5< g1 <+0.5 ⇒ Symmetrical distribution (Bulmer 1979)
Av. Skewness values
Y1 → g1 = -0.046
Y2 → g1 = -0.047
Y3 → g1 = +0.020
Y4 → g1 = +0.279
Y5 → g1 = -0.008
(2) Mean: Superstructure → highest average cost of € 98402.19
Finishes → largest range equal to € 149808
Land preparation → lowest average cost € 47402.77
Land preparation → smallest range equal to € 28489.27
(3) Coefficient of Variation (CV): substructure → highest CV=27.61%,
superstructure → lowest CV=11.55%
(4) Kurtosis: All cost elements were found with positive approx. k≈3.0
Av. Kurtosis values
Y1 → k = +2.81
Y2 → k = +2.79
Y3 → k = +2.70
Y4 → k = +3.33
Y5 → k = +2.75
6. DATA ANALYSIS
“Summary of statistics” Portfolio
21
► On project level [pre-ΔΜ: Ε = € 263000, post-ΔΜ: E’= € 258857]
(1) Skewness: Substructure, Superstructure, Finishes → positively skewed
Land preparation, Foundations → negatively skewed
Superstructure → largest g1=0.4782, Land preparation → lowest g1=-0.1571
(2) Mean: Substructure → highest average cost with mean = € 100955.90 (=38.4% of E)
→ largest range (max – min) equal to € 178332.90
Land preparation → lowest average cost with mean = € 26725.95
→ smallest range (max – mix) equal to € 19979.64
(3) Coefficient of Variation (CV): Finishes → highest CV of 30.34%
Substructure → CV=26.73%
Land preparation → lowest CV=10.88%
(4) Kurtosis: Superstructure → highest k=3.1, Substructure → lowest k=2.675
6. DATA ANALYSIS
Project Case 10
“Data normality and symmetry tests”
Skewness & kurtosis significance tests → SPSS analysis input: {min, 5% Perc., 10% Perc., 15% Perc., . .
. . , 90% Perc., 95% Perc., and Max}
Skewness → Not significant at 95% c.l. → Symmetry in cost data Ok!
Kurtosis → Significant at 95% c.l. → All cost distributions leptokurtic (k>0)
Data
normality
29-04-2015 22
6. DATA ANALYSIS
“Normality tests”
All cost elements → Follow normal distribution pattern
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W)
Project
Case 10
29-04-2015 23
“Correlation effect”
■ Impact of correlations among cost elements and individual risks often ignored (Flanagan et al. 1987; Jaafari
1988; Ranasinghe 1994)
■ Treatment of correlations necessary → realistic quantification of uncertainty (Ranasinghe & Russell 1992)
■ Correlation effect, if neglected may lead to:
▪ Underestimation of the total cost’s variance (Touran & Wiser 1992)
▪ Stronger effect of “including correlations” than the choice of distributions (Wall 1997)
▪ Ignoring a whole cost element (Yang 2005)
■ Spearman and Pearson coefficients in SPSS → Input for @RISK correlation matrix
▪@RISK adjusted the matrix so to be positively defined → -0.036% reduction in columns, +0.016%
increase in rows
Land
preparation
Foundations Substructure Superstructure Finishes
Land
preparation
1 0.9993 0.9993 0.9763 0.9923
Foundations 1 0.9943 0.9803 0.9943
Substructure 1 0.9913 0.9993
Superstructure 1 0.9903
Finishes 1
Adjusted self-consisted correlation matrix
6. DATA ANALYSIS
Project Case 14
2429-04-2015
All cost elements strongly and
positively correlated → Sign for a
serious correlation effect.
No negative correlations
Rho = 1 ⇒ √ Monotonicity
√ Linearity
6. DATA ANALYSIS
“Correlation effect”
Project Case 14
25
“Simulation results”
Probability meeting the estimate
+7 % Increase
Range of data captured in 90%
+94.67% more cost data captured
6. DATA ANALYSIS
Project Case 14
■ @ the desired confidence level 71.57%
+3.39% higher estimate when including correlations
■ Two S-curves cross @ 50% c.l.
▪ Below 50% c.l. → tendency for underestimation (with)
▪ Above 50% c.l. → tendency for overestimation (with)
Mean overestimated by +0.1% Variance increased by +3.4%
SD increased by + 1.7% SE increased by +55.1 units → more outliers . . .
29-04-2015 26
■ Tails exist (Recall: g1>0).
■ Heavier or Thinner? Why?
■ Heavier left tail
■ More skewed to left
■ g1 reduced from 0.1417 to
0.1379
Q-Q plots for normal distributions
Q-Q plots for natural logarithm
Why to transform?
To keep untouched the outliers and
reveal their true effect (Chou et al. 2009)
6. DATA ANALYSIS
Project Case 14
29-04-2015 27
“Risk assessment of cost elements”
■ Substructure → largest SDx = € 15018.91 ⇒ max. effect in project final cost
■ Land preparation → smallest SDx = 1536.28 ⇒ min. effect in project final cost
6. DATA ANALYSIS
“Importance of individual risks”
Simulation (quantitative approach) and AHP
(qualitative approach): 1. Schedule
2. Quantity
3. Unit Cost
4. Global
Project Case 14
29-04-2015 28
“Probability meeting base estimate”
pre-ΔΜ (%) post-ΔΜ (%) Change (%)
Land preparation 22.70 28.45 +25.33
Foundations 53.90 51.25 -4.91
Substructure 14.55 14.33 -1.51
Superstructure 27.18 26.83 -1.28
Finishes 20.95 22.50 +7.39
Project final cost 6.51 6.47 -0.61
pre-ΔΜ (%) post-ΔΜ (%) Change (%)
Land preparation 1575.82 1425.90 -9.51
Foundations 2845.70 2755.70 -3.16
Substructure 30630.40 29256.70 -4.48
Superstructure 7049.20 6801.55 -3.51
Finishes 7123.90 6996.35 -1.79
Project final cost 35790.00 34779.55 -2.82
% Project Final Cost: decreased by – 0.61%
Total contingency: reduced by – 2.82%
Contingency % Estimate: (pre-ΔΜ) 19.55% (post-ΔΜ) 19,49%
“Expected contingencies”
Recall:
Pre-ΔΜ: Ε = € 183000
Post-ΔΜ: Ε = € 178423
⇒ Revised estimate: reduced by -0.02%
7. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Project Case 14
% Cost category: increased by +5%
All cost elements, apart from “superstructure” become more
efficient ⇒ Move towards “red line” ⇒ keep in budget
29-04-2015 29
7. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Project Case 14
“Project delivery (in)efficiency”
29-04-2015 30
“Risk transfer degree” “Project delivery inefficiency”
Transfer € 401.40
less to client and
again win the bid.
Contractor delivers by
+2.70% more efficient
the project.
7. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Project Case 14
On project level:
CPI +0.02%
improvement
CPI = BCWP / ACWP
= E / C
“Construction Performance Index ”
Portfolio level
On portfolio-level:
√ 14/22 (64% of sample)
scored improved CPI
√ Average improvement = +2%
31
pre-ΔΜ post-ΔΜ Change (€)
Project ID b×(E-C) b’×(E’-C’) Δ (incentive profit)
1 -3365.27 -5193.15 -1827.88
2 -12214.64 -12253.64 -38.65
3 1087.46 63.97 -1023.49
4 -4029.31 -948.66 3080.65
5 915.71 -140.47 775.24
6 -645.09 -121.43 523.66
7 -3816.10 -1007.83 2808.27
8 -11605.68 -1601.58 10004.10
9 -9366.39 -2283.52 7082.86
10 -14524.03 -3433.48 11090.55
11 -46245.14 -22675.80 23569.30
12 -1243.19 -329.20 913.99
13 -13776.86 -4482.99 9293.87
14 -7419.13 -1960.13 5458.99
15 -4165.99 -1228.13 2937.85
16 -41619.68 -18365.10 23524.58
17 -2165.82 -611.63 1554.20
18 -493.53 -28.43 465.11
19 -23918.83 -14719.64 9199.18
20 -5535.54 -4135.05 1400.49
21 -121662.33 -96137.58 25524.76
22 -14251.51 -2736.29 11515.22
Mean= € 6707.42
Recall:
b=risk sharing ratio (0-100%)
E, E’=initial, revised estimate
C, C’=initial cost, revised cost
On portfolio level:
Additional incentive
profit of € 6707.42 ⇒
1.91% of av. value of
portfolio (349994.32 )
“Incentive profit element – Project Final Cost”
7. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Portfolio level
32
pre-ΔΜ post-ΔΜ Change Improvement
Project ID Contigency (€) Contigency (€) Δ (Contingency) % Change
1 39503.40 34779.20 -4724.20 -11.96
2 37358.42 37290.02 -68.40 -0.18
3 3134.93 5439.93 2305.00 73.53
4 15057.82 13607.94 -1449.88 -9.63
5 4601.73 5122.38 520.65 11.31
6 3548.68 2748.53 -800.15 -22.55
7 28139.81 33820.82 5681.01 20.19
8 71270.91 66799.45 -4471.46 -6.27
9 35746.23 35136.95 -609.28 -1.70
10 67153.60 5682.00 -61471.60 -91.54
11 103241.20 99320.90 -3920.30 -3.80
12 4884.30 10872.79 5988.49 122.61
13 51335.30 41406.40 -9928.90 -19.34
14 35790.00 34779.50 -1010.50 -2.82
15 18391.41 13193.68 -5197.73 -28.26
16 126819.76 62490.22 -64329.54 -50.73
17 9047.79 8057.59 -990.20 -10.94
18 9855.67 9097.49 -758.18 -7.69
19 66914.56 59576.69 -7337.87 -10.97
20 7410.36 6908.80 -501.56 -6.77
21 228178.03 211300.50 -16877.53 -7.40
22 145178.44 121776.82 -23401.62 -16.12
Mean= -3.68%
On portfolio level:
Average reduction of
contingencies
achieved by -3.68%
⇒ Still competitive
⇒ More incentive
profits by clients
⇒ More efficient
delivery
7. RESEARCH FINDINGS
“Contingencies – Project Final Cost”
Portfolio level
29-04-2015 33
“Research Questions → Research Replies”
R.Q. 1a/2a “How much cost risks transferred from contractor to client?”
On average 35.65% less cost risks transferred from contractors to clients
R.Q. 1b/2b “How much likely to meet the estimate the actual cost?”
On average an increase of +5% probability to meet the base estimate.
R.Q. 3 “Consequences of profit decision on profits and contingencies ?”
On average contigencies reduced by -4.32%.
Reduction of contigencies in each phase:
On average profits increased by +6.17%.
Change in profits in each phase:
7. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Project Case 14
Incentive profit (€) Contingencies (€)
pre-ΔΜ post-ΔΜ % change pre-ΔΜ post-ΔΜ % change
Land
preparation
-341.79 -432.69 -26.60 1575.80 1425.90 -9.51
Foundations -422.42 -780.64 -84.80 2845.70 2755.70 -3.16
Substructure -7723.19 -5226.76 +32.32 30630.40 29526.70 -3.60
Superstructure -785.84 -350.57 +55.39 7049.20 6801.55 -3.51
Finishes -738.54 -335.78 +54.53 7123.90 6996.35 -1.79
Mean +6.17% -4.32%
Changes in profit and contingency elements
Any “generilisable”
conclusions?
29-04-2015 34
7. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Portfolio levelHypothesis:
“ High changes in incentive profits are associated with low changes in contingencies.”
Hypothesis valid!
Not causation can
be deducted.
Contractor can
predict how a
contingency
decision will
affect incentive
profit.
A grouping of
projects. Outliers
(Pr. 21) why?
Different pattern
with 400 projects?
29-04-2015 35
8. CONCLUSIONS: A SUMMARY
Portfolio level
√ 18/22 (81.8% sample) projects
overestimated initial base estimates.
√ 18/22 (81.8% sample) projects overestimated
initial contingencies.
√ CPI: +2%
√ Incentive profits: +1.91% portfolio’s av. value
Project Case level
√ -35.65% reduction of cost risks ⇒ +5%
increase in the probability meeting the
base estimate
√ Finishes: highest opportunity for cost risks
reduction by -167.35%
Land preparation: highest opportunity to
meet the base estimate by +25.33%
√ CPI: +0.02%
√ -4.32% contingencies ⇒ +6.17% incentive
profits
29-04-2015 36
9. LIMITATIONS & FURTHER WORK
“Limitations”
■ Sample → 35 questionnaires sent, 22 valid received: small sample
■ Industry
▪ Structure: fragmented with many SMEs
▪ Contractors: based too much on cost control accounting tools, not on RM systems
▪ Nature: legal framework very rigid and in favor of clients
▪ Decreasing profitability path
■ AHP scale → Linear scale selected
■ No validation and verification of cost risk analysis model
“Further work”
■ Pseudo-code integration into @RISK for optimal
contingency setting.
■ Client recommendation with a bidding proposal.
29-04-2015 37
“Client recommendation”
(Touran 2003)
Poisson distribution for cost risks
Contingency calculation for desired p(%)
Bid also for:
√ T
√ max. α
√ max. χ → public (database)
→ private (consultant)
√ agree post-bid on p
Calculate Cch
Compare contingencies
within the legal range
8. LIMITATIONS & FURTHER WORK
“Pseudo construction”
29-04-2015 38
MSc. Construction Management & Engineering
Ir. Dimitrios Kordas
Tel.: +31 649 177 841
E-mail: dimitriskordas@gmail.com

More Related Content

Viewers also liked

2011 Aon Industry Risk Report - Construction
2011 Aon Industry Risk Report  - Construction2011 Aon Industry Risk Report  - Construction
2011 Aon Industry Risk Report - ConstructionMark Leon
 
Payment in construction contracts: how to get paid
Payment in construction contracts: how to get paidPayment in construction contracts: how to get paid
Payment in construction contracts: how to get paidBarry Hembling
 
Construction contracts - Getting Paid Pt. One
Construction contracts - Getting Paid Pt. OneConstruction contracts - Getting Paid Pt. One
Construction contracts - Getting Paid Pt. OneJanet Kim
 
What You Need to Know for Construction Contracts
What You Need to Know for Construction ContractsWhat You Need to Know for Construction Contracts
What You Need to Know for Construction ContractsByrne and O'Neill
 
Issues Involving Construction Contracts
Issues Involving Construction Contracts Issues Involving Construction Contracts
Issues Involving Construction Contracts Byrne and O'Neill
 
Presentation corporate eng_kaz2015
Presentation corporate eng_kaz2015Presentation corporate eng_kaz2015
Presentation corporate eng_kaz2015Marlies Overbeek
 
WHEN GOOD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS GO BAD
WHEN GOOD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS GO BAD WHEN GOOD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS GO BAD
WHEN GOOD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS GO BAD Werksmans Attorneys
 
Affordable Construction Method
Affordable Construction MethodAffordable Construction Method
Affordable Construction MethodGanesh Kamat
 
Traditional construction
Traditional constructionTraditional construction
Traditional constructionDr K M SONI
 
Contractual Risk Transfer in Construction Contracts
Contractual Risk Transfer in Construction ContractsContractual Risk Transfer in Construction Contracts
Contractual Risk Transfer in Construction ContractsGary L. Henry
 
Top Tips for a Successful 2016 in Construction Contract Management
Top Tips for a Successful 2016 in Construction Contract ManagementTop Tips for a Successful 2016 in Construction Contract Management
Top Tips for a Successful 2016 in Construction Contract ManagementEque2 Ltd
 

Viewers also liked (15)

2011 Aon Industry Risk Report - Construction
2011 Aon Industry Risk Report  - Construction2011 Aon Industry Risk Report  - Construction
2011 Aon Industry Risk Report - Construction
 
Payment in construction contracts: how to get paid
Payment in construction contracts: how to get paidPayment in construction contracts: how to get paid
Payment in construction contracts: how to get paid
 
Construction contracts - Getting Paid Pt. One
Construction contracts - Getting Paid Pt. OneConstruction contracts - Getting Paid Pt. One
Construction contracts - Getting Paid Pt. One
 
What You Need to Know for Construction Contracts
What You Need to Know for Construction ContractsWhat You Need to Know for Construction Contracts
What You Need to Know for Construction Contracts
 
Issues Involving Construction Contracts
Issues Involving Construction Contracts Issues Involving Construction Contracts
Issues Involving Construction Contracts
 
Presentation corporate eng_kaz2015
Presentation corporate eng_kaz2015Presentation corporate eng_kaz2015
Presentation corporate eng_kaz2015
 
WHEN GOOD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS GO BAD
WHEN GOOD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS GO BAD WHEN GOOD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS GO BAD
WHEN GOOD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS GO BAD
 
Affordable Construction Method
Affordable Construction MethodAffordable Construction Method
Affordable Construction Method
 
Traditional construction
Traditional constructionTraditional construction
Traditional construction
 
Contractual Risk Transfer in Construction Contracts
Contractual Risk Transfer in Construction ContractsContractual Risk Transfer in Construction Contracts
Contractual Risk Transfer in Construction Contracts
 
Inovasi Bangunan - Taipei 101
Inovasi Bangunan - Taipei 101Inovasi Bangunan - Taipei 101
Inovasi Bangunan - Taipei 101
 
Top Tips for a Successful 2016 in Construction Contract Management
Top Tips for a Successful 2016 in Construction Contract ManagementTop Tips for a Successful 2016 in Construction Contract Management
Top Tips for a Successful 2016 in Construction Contract Management
 
Scribe
ScribeScribe
Scribe
 
Taipei 101
Taipei 101  Taipei 101
Taipei 101
 
Taipei 101
Taipei 101Taipei 101
Taipei 101
 

Similar to RISK SHARING IN TRADITIONAL CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS FOR BUILDING PROJECTS

Integrated planning of cash-flows and projects in a discrete-time model
Integrated planning of cash-flows and projects in a discrete-time modelIntegrated planning of cash-flows and projects in a discrete-time model
Integrated planning of cash-flows and projects in a discrete-time modelFrancisco Lemos
 
Tracker Lifetime Cost: MTBF, Lifetime and Other Events
Tracker Lifetime Cost: MTBF, Lifetime and Other EventsTracker Lifetime Cost: MTBF, Lifetime and Other Events
Tracker Lifetime Cost: MTBF, Lifetime and Other EventsArray Technologies, Inc.
 
Michel Sacotte - Schneider Electric
Michel Sacotte - Schneider ElectricMichel Sacotte - Schneider Electric
Michel Sacotte - Schneider Electriccwiemeexpo
 
Javier Garcia - Verdugo Sanchez - Six Sigma Training - W1 Z Transformation
Javier Garcia - Verdugo Sanchez - Six Sigma Training - W1 Z TransformationJavier Garcia - Verdugo Sanchez - Six Sigma Training - W1 Z Transformation
Javier Garcia - Verdugo Sanchez - Six Sigma Training - W1 Z TransformationJ. García - Verdugo
 
Scheduling by Primavera - Training
Scheduling by Primavera - TrainingScheduling by Primavera - Training
Scheduling by Primavera - TrainingMohammed Feroze
 
IRJET- Diesel Particulate Filter by using Copper Oxide as a Filter Medium
IRJET- Diesel Particulate Filter by using Copper Oxide as a Filter MediumIRJET- Diesel Particulate Filter by using Copper Oxide as a Filter Medium
IRJET- Diesel Particulate Filter by using Copper Oxide as a Filter MediumIRJET Journal
 
Schedule of Works Cost Summary Report
Schedule of Works Cost Summary ReportSchedule of Works Cost Summary Report
Schedule of Works Cost Summary ReportNatalie Reid
 
Practically Delivering Energy-Reducing Technology To Optimise Efficiency On T...
Practically Delivering Energy-ReducingTechnology To Optimise Efficiency On T...Practically Delivering Energy-ReducingTechnology To Optimise Efficiency On T...
Practically Delivering Energy-Reducing Technology To Optimise Efficiency On T...Andy_Watson_Sim
 
Gowipes18 new trends in modern shopfloor
Gowipes18   new trends in modern shopfloorGowipes18   new trends in modern shopfloor
Gowipes18 new trends in modern shopfloorGuido Conio
 
Z Ships Presentation Oct 2015
Z Ships Presentation Oct 2015Z Ships Presentation Oct 2015
Z Ships Presentation Oct 2015Laurent H Selles
 
Schedule of Works Bill
Schedule of Works BillSchedule of Works Bill
Schedule of Works BillNatalie Reid
 
IRJET - Airfoil Iterative Design for Maximum Aerodynamic Performance at Low R...
IRJET - Airfoil Iterative Design for Maximum Aerodynamic Performance at Low R...IRJET - Airfoil Iterative Design for Maximum Aerodynamic Performance at Low R...
IRJET - Airfoil Iterative Design for Maximum Aerodynamic Performance at Low R...IRJET Journal
 
Design Optimization and CFD Analysis of Car using Active Mounting to Reduce D...
Design Optimization and CFD Analysis of Car using Active Mounting to Reduce D...Design Optimization and CFD Analysis of Car using Active Mounting to Reduce D...
Design Optimization and CFD Analysis of Car using Active Mounting to Reduce D...IRJET Journal
 
Analyst presentation 9M 2020
 Analyst presentation 9M 2020 Analyst presentation 9M 2020
Analyst presentation 9M 2020Hera Group
 
The economics of reducing the cost of energy by 13% revenues
The economics of reducing the cost of energy by 13% revenuesThe economics of reducing the cost of energy by 13% revenues
The economics of reducing the cost of energy by 13% revenuesSentient Science
 

Similar to RISK SHARING IN TRADITIONAL CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS FOR BUILDING PROJECTS (20)

Integrated planning of cash-flows and projects in a discrete-time model
Integrated planning of cash-flows and projects in a discrete-time modelIntegrated planning of cash-flows and projects in a discrete-time model
Integrated planning of cash-flows and projects in a discrete-time model
 
004 benchmarking and productivity
004 benchmarking and productivity004 benchmarking and productivity
004 benchmarking and productivity
 
Session B2 - Project Cost Control
Session B2 - Project Cost ControlSession B2 - Project Cost Control
Session B2 - Project Cost Control
 
Tracker Lifetime Cost: MTBF, Lifetime and Other Events
Tracker Lifetime Cost: MTBF, Lifetime and Other EventsTracker Lifetime Cost: MTBF, Lifetime and Other Events
Tracker Lifetime Cost: MTBF, Lifetime and Other Events
 
Michel Sacotte - Schneider Electric
Michel Sacotte - Schneider ElectricMichel Sacotte - Schneider Electric
Michel Sacotte - Schneider Electric
 
total report
total reporttotal report
total report
 
Javier Garcia - Verdugo Sanchez - Six Sigma Training - W1 Z Transformation
Javier Garcia - Verdugo Sanchez - Six Sigma Training - W1 Z TransformationJavier Garcia - Verdugo Sanchez - Six Sigma Training - W1 Z Transformation
Javier Garcia - Verdugo Sanchez - Six Sigma Training - W1 Z Transformation
 
Scheduling by Primavera - Training
Scheduling by Primavera - TrainingScheduling by Primavera - Training
Scheduling by Primavera - Training
 
IRJET- Diesel Particulate Filter by using Copper Oxide as a Filter Medium
IRJET- Diesel Particulate Filter by using Copper Oxide as a Filter MediumIRJET- Diesel Particulate Filter by using Copper Oxide as a Filter Medium
IRJET- Diesel Particulate Filter by using Copper Oxide as a Filter Medium
 
Schedule of Works Cost Summary Report
Schedule of Works Cost Summary ReportSchedule of Works Cost Summary Report
Schedule of Works Cost Summary Report
 
Practically Delivering Energy-Reducing Technology To Optimise Efficiency On T...
Practically Delivering Energy-ReducingTechnology To Optimise Efficiency On T...Practically Delivering Energy-ReducingTechnology To Optimise Efficiency On T...
Practically Delivering Energy-Reducing Technology To Optimise Efficiency On T...
 
Gowipes18 new trends in modern shopfloor
Gowipes18   new trends in modern shopfloorGowipes18   new trends in modern shopfloor
Gowipes18 new trends in modern shopfloor
 
mesh 3aref malo 222
mesh 3aref malo 222mesh 3aref malo 222
mesh 3aref malo 222
 
Z Ships Presentation Oct 2015
Z Ships Presentation Oct 2015Z Ships Presentation Oct 2015
Z Ships Presentation Oct 2015
 
Schedule of Works Bill
Schedule of Works BillSchedule of Works Bill
Schedule of Works Bill
 
IRJET - Airfoil Iterative Design for Maximum Aerodynamic Performance at Low R...
IRJET - Airfoil Iterative Design for Maximum Aerodynamic Performance at Low R...IRJET - Airfoil Iterative Design for Maximum Aerodynamic Performance at Low R...
IRJET - Airfoil Iterative Design for Maximum Aerodynamic Performance at Low R...
 
Design Optimization and CFD Analysis of Car using Active Mounting to Reduce D...
Design Optimization and CFD Analysis of Car using Active Mounting to Reduce D...Design Optimization and CFD Analysis of Car using Active Mounting to Reduce D...
Design Optimization and CFD Analysis of Car using Active Mounting to Reduce D...
 
Analyst presentation 9M 2020
 Analyst presentation 9M 2020 Analyst presentation 9M 2020
Analyst presentation 9M 2020
 
The economics of reducing the cost of energy by 13% revenues
The economics of reducing the cost of energy by 13% revenuesThe economics of reducing the cost of energy by 13% revenues
The economics of reducing the cost of energy by 13% revenues
 
Transformers
TransformersTransformers
Transformers
 

More from Dimitrios Kordas

Esssay. Relational vs Transactional psychological contracts
Esssay. Relational vs Transactional psychological contractsEsssay. Relational vs Transactional psychological contracts
Esssay. Relational vs Transactional psychological contractsDimitrios Kordas
 
Operations management certificate
Operations management certificate   Operations management certificate
Operations management certificate Dimitrios Kordas
 
HRM in Automotive Industry - Capita selecta
HRM in Automotive Industry - Capita selectaHRM in Automotive Industry - Capita selecta
HRM in Automotive Industry - Capita selectaDimitrios Kordas
 
SoA. "Property and Liability: An Introduction to Law and Economics"
SoA. "Property and Liability: An Introduction to Law and Economics"SoA. "Property and Liability: An Introduction to Law and Economics"
SoA. "Property and Liability: An Introduction to Law and Economics"Dimitrios Kordas
 
TALENT MANAGEMENT: A Conceptual Framework For The Construction Industry
TALENT MANAGEMENT: A Conceptual Framework For The Construction IndustryTALENT MANAGEMENT: A Conceptual Framework For The Construction Industry
TALENT MANAGEMENT: A Conceptual Framework For The Construction IndustryDimitrios Kordas
 
(Essay) HRO & Lean 6 Sigma
(Essay) HRO & Lean 6 Sigma(Essay) HRO & Lean 6 Sigma
(Essay) HRO & Lean 6 SigmaDimitrios Kordas
 
M.Eng Thesis (Kordas & Thanopoulos, 2011)
M.Eng Thesis (Kordas & Thanopoulos, 2011)M.Eng Thesis (Kordas & Thanopoulos, 2011)
M.Eng Thesis (Kordas & Thanopoulos, 2011)Dimitrios Kordas
 
e-Recruitment & Selection
e-Recruitment & Selection e-Recruitment & Selection
e-Recruitment & Selection Dimitrios Kordas
 
CHANGES IN LABOR MARKETS AND EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS
CHANGES IN LABOR MARKETS AND EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICSCHANGES IN LABOR MARKETS AND EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS
CHANGES IN LABOR MARKETS AND EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICSDimitrios Kordas
 
International summer school (July 2012, Enschede)
International summer school (July 2012, Enschede)International summer school (July 2012, Enschede)
International summer school (July 2012, Enschede)Dimitrios Kordas
 

More from Dimitrios Kordas (13)

Esssay. Relational vs Transactional psychological contracts
Esssay. Relational vs Transactional psychological contractsEsssay. Relational vs Transactional psychological contracts
Esssay. Relational vs Transactional psychological contracts
 
Operations management certificate
Operations management certificate   Operations management certificate
Operations management certificate
 
Six sigma certification
Six sigma certificationSix sigma certification
Six sigma certification
 
HRM in Automotive Industry - Capita selecta
HRM in Automotive Industry - Capita selectaHRM in Automotive Industry - Capita selecta
HRM in Automotive Industry - Capita selecta
 
SoA. "Property and Liability: An Introduction to Law and Economics"
SoA. "Property and Liability: An Introduction to Law and Economics"SoA. "Property and Liability: An Introduction to Law and Economics"
SoA. "Property and Liability: An Introduction to Law and Economics"
 
TALENT MANAGEMENT: A Conceptual Framework For The Construction Industry
TALENT MANAGEMENT: A Conceptual Framework For The Construction IndustryTALENT MANAGEMENT: A Conceptual Framework For The Construction Industry
TALENT MANAGEMENT: A Conceptual Framework For The Construction Industry
 
(Essay) HRO & Lean 6 Sigma
(Essay) HRO & Lean 6 Sigma(Essay) HRO & Lean 6 Sigma
(Essay) HRO & Lean 6 Sigma
 
HRO & LEAN 6-SIGMA
HRO & LEAN 6-SIGMAHRO & LEAN 6-SIGMA
HRO & LEAN 6-SIGMA
 
TALENT MANAGEMENT
TALENT MANAGEMENTTALENT MANAGEMENT
TALENT MANAGEMENT
 
M.Eng Thesis (Kordas & Thanopoulos, 2011)
M.Eng Thesis (Kordas & Thanopoulos, 2011)M.Eng Thesis (Kordas & Thanopoulos, 2011)
M.Eng Thesis (Kordas & Thanopoulos, 2011)
 
e-Recruitment & Selection
e-Recruitment & Selection e-Recruitment & Selection
e-Recruitment & Selection
 
CHANGES IN LABOR MARKETS AND EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS
CHANGES IN LABOR MARKETS AND EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICSCHANGES IN LABOR MARKETS AND EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS
CHANGES IN LABOR MARKETS AND EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS
 
International summer school (July 2012, Enschede)
International summer school (July 2012, Enschede)International summer school (July 2012, Enschede)
International summer school (July 2012, Enschede)
 

Recently uploaded

call girls in Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
call girls in  Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️call girls in  Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
call girls in Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️9953056974 Low Rate Call Girls In Saket, Delhi NCR
 
Instant Issue Debit Cards - High School Spirit
Instant Issue Debit Cards - High School SpiritInstant Issue Debit Cards - High School Spirit
Instant Issue Debit Cards - High School Spiritegoetzinger
 
Log your LOA pain with Pension Lab's brilliant campaign
Log your LOA pain with Pension Lab's brilliant campaignLog your LOA pain with Pension Lab's brilliant campaign
Log your LOA pain with Pension Lab's brilliant campaignHenry Tapper
 
Andheri Call Girls In 9825968104 Mumbai Hot Models
Andheri Call Girls In 9825968104 Mumbai Hot ModelsAndheri Call Girls In 9825968104 Mumbai Hot Models
Andheri Call Girls In 9825968104 Mumbai Hot Modelshematsharma006
 
Independent Lucknow Call Girls 8923113531WhatsApp Lucknow Call Girls make you...
Independent Lucknow Call Girls 8923113531WhatsApp Lucknow Call Girls make you...Independent Lucknow Call Girls 8923113531WhatsApp Lucknow Call Girls make you...
Independent Lucknow Call Girls 8923113531WhatsApp Lucknow Call Girls make you...makika9823
 
Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111
Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111
Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111Sapana Sha
 
20240417-Calibre-April-2024-Investor-Presentation.pdf
20240417-Calibre-April-2024-Investor-Presentation.pdf20240417-Calibre-April-2024-Investor-Presentation.pdf
20240417-Calibre-April-2024-Investor-Presentation.pdfAdnet Communications
 
Quarter 4- Module 3 Principles of Marketing
Quarter 4- Module 3 Principles of MarketingQuarter 4- Module 3 Principles of Marketing
Quarter 4- Module 3 Principles of MarketingMaristelaRamos12
 
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779Delhi Call girls
 
VIP Call Girls in Saharanpur Aarohi 8250192130 Independent Escort Service Sah...
VIP Call Girls in Saharanpur Aarohi 8250192130 Independent Escort Service Sah...VIP Call Girls in Saharanpur Aarohi 8250192130 Independent Escort Service Sah...
VIP Call Girls in Saharanpur Aarohi 8250192130 Independent Escort Service Sah...Suhani Kapoor
 
VIP Call Girls Service Dilsukhnagar Hyderabad Call +91-8250192130
VIP Call Girls Service Dilsukhnagar Hyderabad Call +91-8250192130VIP Call Girls Service Dilsukhnagar Hyderabad Call +91-8250192130
VIP Call Girls Service Dilsukhnagar Hyderabad Call +91-8250192130Suhani Kapoor
 
VVIP Pune Call Girls Katraj (7001035870) Pune Escorts Nearby with Complete Sa...
VVIP Pune Call Girls Katraj (7001035870) Pune Escorts Nearby with Complete Sa...VVIP Pune Call Girls Katraj (7001035870) Pune Escorts Nearby with Complete Sa...
VVIP Pune Call Girls Katraj (7001035870) Pune Escorts Nearby with Complete Sa...Call Girls in Nagpur High Profile
 
Vip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service Aizawl
Vip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service AizawlVip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service Aizawl
Vip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service Aizawlmakika9823
 
High Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
High Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur EscortsHigh Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
High Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escortsranjana rawat
 
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service NashikHigh Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service NashikCall Girls in Nagpur High Profile
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdfGale Pooley
 
Monthly Market Risk Update: April 2024 [SlideShare]
Monthly Market Risk Update: April 2024 [SlideShare]Monthly Market Risk Update: April 2024 [SlideShare]
Monthly Market Risk Update: April 2024 [SlideShare]Commonwealth
 
VIP Kolkata Call Girl Serampore 👉 8250192130 Available With Room
VIP Kolkata Call Girl Serampore 👉 8250192130  Available With RoomVIP Kolkata Call Girl Serampore 👉 8250192130  Available With Room
VIP Kolkata Call Girl Serampore 👉 8250192130 Available With Roomdivyansh0kumar0
 
(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...
(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...
(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...ranjana rawat
 

Recently uploaded (20)

call girls in Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
call girls in  Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️call girls in  Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
call girls in Nand Nagri (DELHI) 🔝 >༒9953330565🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
 
Instant Issue Debit Cards - High School Spirit
Instant Issue Debit Cards - High School SpiritInstant Issue Debit Cards - High School Spirit
Instant Issue Debit Cards - High School Spirit
 
Log your LOA pain with Pension Lab's brilliant campaign
Log your LOA pain with Pension Lab's brilliant campaignLog your LOA pain with Pension Lab's brilliant campaign
Log your LOA pain with Pension Lab's brilliant campaign
 
Andheri Call Girls In 9825968104 Mumbai Hot Models
Andheri Call Girls In 9825968104 Mumbai Hot ModelsAndheri Call Girls In 9825968104 Mumbai Hot Models
Andheri Call Girls In 9825968104 Mumbai Hot Models
 
Independent Lucknow Call Girls 8923113531WhatsApp Lucknow Call Girls make you...
Independent Lucknow Call Girls 8923113531WhatsApp Lucknow Call Girls make you...Independent Lucknow Call Girls 8923113531WhatsApp Lucknow Call Girls make you...
Independent Lucknow Call Girls 8923113531WhatsApp Lucknow Call Girls make you...
 
Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111
Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111
Call Girls In Yusuf Sarai Women Seeking Men 9654467111
 
20240417-Calibre-April-2024-Investor-Presentation.pdf
20240417-Calibre-April-2024-Investor-Presentation.pdf20240417-Calibre-April-2024-Investor-Presentation.pdf
20240417-Calibre-April-2024-Investor-Presentation.pdf
 
Quarter 4- Module 3 Principles of Marketing
Quarter 4- Module 3 Principles of MarketingQuarter 4- Module 3 Principles of Marketing
Quarter 4- Module 3 Principles of Marketing
 
Veritas Interim Report 1 January–31 March 2024
Veritas Interim Report 1 January–31 March 2024Veritas Interim Report 1 January–31 March 2024
Veritas Interim Report 1 January–31 March 2024
 
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
 
VIP Call Girls in Saharanpur Aarohi 8250192130 Independent Escort Service Sah...
VIP Call Girls in Saharanpur Aarohi 8250192130 Independent Escort Service Sah...VIP Call Girls in Saharanpur Aarohi 8250192130 Independent Escort Service Sah...
VIP Call Girls in Saharanpur Aarohi 8250192130 Independent Escort Service Sah...
 
VIP Call Girls Service Dilsukhnagar Hyderabad Call +91-8250192130
VIP Call Girls Service Dilsukhnagar Hyderabad Call +91-8250192130VIP Call Girls Service Dilsukhnagar Hyderabad Call +91-8250192130
VIP Call Girls Service Dilsukhnagar Hyderabad Call +91-8250192130
 
VVIP Pune Call Girls Katraj (7001035870) Pune Escorts Nearby with Complete Sa...
VVIP Pune Call Girls Katraj (7001035870) Pune Escorts Nearby with Complete Sa...VVIP Pune Call Girls Katraj (7001035870) Pune Escorts Nearby with Complete Sa...
VVIP Pune Call Girls Katraj (7001035870) Pune Escorts Nearby with Complete Sa...
 
Vip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service Aizawl
Vip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service AizawlVip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service Aizawl
Vip B Aizawl Call Girls #9907093804 Contact Number Escorts Service Aizawl
 
High Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
High Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur EscortsHigh Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
High Class Call Girls Nagpur Grishma Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
 
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service NashikHigh Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
 
Monthly Market Risk Update: April 2024 [SlideShare]
Monthly Market Risk Update: April 2024 [SlideShare]Monthly Market Risk Update: April 2024 [SlideShare]
Monthly Market Risk Update: April 2024 [SlideShare]
 
VIP Kolkata Call Girl Serampore 👉 8250192130 Available With Room
VIP Kolkata Call Girl Serampore 👉 8250192130  Available With RoomVIP Kolkata Call Girl Serampore 👉 8250192130  Available With Room
VIP Kolkata Call Girl Serampore 👉 8250192130 Available With Room
 
(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...
(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...
(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...
 

RISK SHARING IN TRADITIONAL CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS FOR BUILDING PROJECTS

  • 1. “RISK SHARING IN TRADITIONAL CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS FOR BUILDING PROJECTS.” A CONTRACTOR’S PERSPECTIVE IN THE GREEK CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY. ENSCHEDE, 29-04-2015 Dimitrios Kordas (M-CME/s1231901) MSc: Construction Management and Engineering
  • 3. 29-04-2015 3 ■ Failure on: “Triple Constraints” (Cost-Time- Scope) target? ■ Cost overruns in traditional construction contract? ▪ Delay risks: 50% projects suffered by time overruns in UAE’s CI (Faridi 2006) ▪ 61% of Australian contractors claim bearing misallocated cost risks (Atkin 2006) AlSalman & Sillars (2013) 1. INTRODUCTION
  • 4. “Traditional procurement” 29-04-2015 4 Ferry et al. (1999) 1. INTRODUCTION “Project estimate”
  • 5. 29-04-2015 5 “A practical case in traditional building procurement in the Greek CI” Step 1: Client submits a Request for Proposals invitation Step 2: Contractors: “Closed books” bid-competition Step 3: Client and awarded contractor: “Open books” Post-bid 3.1 Compensation mechanism agreement 3.2 Risk sharing agreement For the contractor: Price (Contract value) = Fixed amount (Base estimate) + Profit For the client: Price = Contract value ± 30-35%×Contract value “Maximum cost risk allowance” 1. INTRODUCTION Pipattanapiwong (2004) ■ No risks → Fixed amount paid. ■ On-site risks → always → sharing agreement → if unfair risk allocation by client → contractors: reserve amounts (contingencies) or arbitration path. High contingencies pre-bid ↔ More/Less risks shared Revise profits & estimates? ⇒ Project cost performance Cotnigencies Contingencies ↔ Incentive profits Contingency reduction → Project delivery efficiency
  • 6. 2. RESEARCH DESIGN 29-04-2015 6 “Problem scope” √ Type of projects: Buildings √ Phase: Execution (Construction) √ Post-bid period √ Cost-side Chang & Ive (2002) PMI (2013)
  • 7. 29-04-2015 7 “Cost estimating” ■ Cost estimates: (1) Design estimates, (2) Bid estimates, (3) Control estimates 2. RESEARCH DESIGN “Building a cost model” Product-based Vs. Process-based COST PLAN PROJECT: (Type), (Location) Note: This cost plan is based upon the attached outline DATE OF COST PLAN: X/X/2015 specification, and both documents should be read together. ASSUMED DATE OF TENDER: X/X/2015 TOTAL INTERNAL FLOOR AREA: 2,390 m² Cost Unit Quantity Unit Cost (₤) Subtotal (₤) Total (₤) Elemental cost (₤) / m² 1. WORK BELOW LOWEST FLOOR FINISH Ground floor area 390 m² 321.00 125,19 52.38 2. STRUCTURAL FRAME 2,390 m² 125,6 52.55 3. UPPER FLOORS 225 mm Hollow pot 386 m² 60.00 23,16 150 mm in-situ RC 1,585 m² 41.00 64,985 88,145 36.88 4. STAIRCASES RC Staircases 25 m 1225.00 30,625 1 No 25 m rise 1 No secondary 21.5 m rise 21.5 m 900.00 19,350 49,975 49,975 20.91 “Cost elements” ▪ Land preparation ▪ Foundations ▪ Substructure ▪ Superstructure ▪ Finishes RICS (2014)
  • 8. 29-04-2015 8 Ferry et al. (1999) 2. RESEARCH DESIGN “Components in a project cost estimate” 1. Identification 2. Assessment = Analysis + Evaluation 3. Monitoring 4. Control
  • 9. 29-04-2015 9 2. RESEARCH DESIGN “Research goal” “Assessing the effect of risk sharing decisions taken (in post-bid) by contractors and examine projects’ performance in terms of project delivery efficiency and cost performance.” “Research question” “How do risk-sharing decisions of contractors’ in the post-bid context affect building projects cost performance when these projects are traditionally procured?” √ Revise the minimum required change in profit √ Revise risk sharing and base estimate amounts √ Reduce contingency below the 10% of base estimate “Research objectives” √ Cost risk transfer √ Probability to meet the base estimate √ Contingencies √ Incentive profits √ Any relation: Incentive profits ↔ Contingencies √ Improvements on Project performance? √ Reduce project delivery inefficiency? pre-ΔΜ pοst-ΔΜ “Proposal”
  • 10. 29-04-2015 10 Joustra (2010) 3. LITERATURE REVIEW Definitions “Uncertainty” √ The variability and ambiguity of future outcomes. √ No probability distributions can be assigned Vs. Risky situations “Risk” √ Expected value = Probability × Impact √ The “fallacy” of expected value: Risk events Magnitude Probability Impact Expected Value Earth. 1 3 Richter 5% € 10000 € 500 Earth. 2 6 Richter 0.02% € 1500000 € 300 RiskCompound command (@RISK) “Contingency” √ A budget reserve above the estimate to reduce the risk of overruns at a desired confidence level. √ Included in bid price → Total commitment on tender √ Arbitrary amount, usually set as the 10% of base estimate.
  • 11. 29-04-2015 11 3. LITERATURE REVIEW “Systematic review” No specific RM framework applied. 27 on-site risks were collected: tailored list 4 cost risk drivers √ Quantity √ Unit Cost √ Schedule √ Global Risk importance criteria √ Propensity √ Perception √ Performance Quantitative risk assessment √ MC simulation √ PDFs, CDFs √ Sensitivity diagrams AHP Risk misallocation literature consensus.
  • 12. 12 No previous study in risk sharing in D-B-B contracts Risk sharing mainly as an optimization parameter of contracts. “Risk transfer degree” and “Project delivery efficiency” not examined. P (price of contract) = F (fixed amount) + b×(E – C) Incentive profit 3. LITERATURE REVIEW “Motivation” Degree of risk transfer → Project delivery inefficiency → Witt & Liias (2011) Efficient delivery of project ⇒ ΔP=ΔM=ΔC=0 P (price) = C (cost) + M (margin)
  • 13. 29-04-2015 13 4. MODEL DESIGN “Stochastic process: 5 questions” (Diekmann 1983) (1) Data available for each risk (Xi)? → Probability (RiskCompound) Range of Impact = Individual risk effect level (2) Correlated Xi s → No correlations assumed among the 27 individual risks (3) Data required for Yj? → Yj = Ej + n×CRi (4) Additive or Multiplicative combination of Xi → Additive: (5) How many cost elements (Yj)? → 5 cost elements Project final cost = Iterations number: 10000 Confidence level = 50% + Average risk effect level Input distributions: Base estimates Risk Probability Risk Impact (Risk Triang) (Risk Discrete) (Risk Trigen) Land preparation Foundations Substructure Superstructure Finishes Fixed: Risk Discrete Variable: P=100%
  • 14. 29-04-2015 14 4.4 Cost risk analysis model for contingency estimation Model adopted from Hobbs (2010)
  • 15. 29-04-2015 15 Construction phase Risk factors Drivers Type Risk Probability Input Distr. Risk impact (% on E change) Input Distr. Overall risk effect Amount of individual line cost impacted by risk (€) Estimated effect of individual risk on line item or Cost Risks (€) Percentage impacted Total Cost Occuring Not occuring Discrete / 1 (F / V) Low Most likely High Trigen RiskCompound Risk Prob/ty × Cost line = Amount Impacted Overall effect × Amount impacted = Cost effect (€) E + Cost Risks % (€) Land preparation R1 Quantity F 30% 70% 0 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,008739 0,3 × 18300 5490 0,008738705 × 5490 47,97549008 0,002622 0,2621611 E (€) 18300 R2 Quantity F 30% 70% 0 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,008739 0,3 × 18300 5490 0,008738705 × 5490 47,97549008 0,002622 0,2621611 (-5%,+5%) 18300 R3 Quantity V 100% 0% 1 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,028488 1 × 18300 18300 0,02848774 × 18300 521,3256419 0,028488 2,848774 R4 Quantity V 100% 0% 1 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,028488 1 × 18300 18300 0,02848774 × 18300 521,3256419 0,028488 2,848774 R5 Unit cost F 30% 70% 0 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,001092 0,3 × 18300 5490 0,001092299 × 5490 5,996721855 0,000328 0,032769 0,075545 7,55% 1144,598986 6,2546393 19444,60 Foundations R6 Unit cost V 100% 0% 1 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,002814 1 × 54900 54900 0,002813841 × 54900 154,4798472 0,002814 0,2813841 E (€) 54900 R7 Global V 100% 0% 1 -5% 1% 5% 0,001407 0,001407 1 × 54900 54900 0,00140692 × 54900 77,23992359 0,001407 0,140692 (-2%,+2%) 54900 R8 Global V 100% 0% 1 -5% 1% 5% 0,001407 0,001407 1 × 54900 54900 0,00140692 × 54900 77,23992359 0,001407 0,140692 R9 Global F 10% 90% 0 -5% 1% 5% 0,001407 0,000182 0,1 × 54900 5490 0,000182032 × 5490 0,999353697 1,82E-05 0,0018203 R10 Quantity F 10% 90% 0 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,002913 0,1 × 54900 5490 0,00291261 × 5490 15,99023084 0,000291 0,0291261 R11 Quantity V 100% 0% 1 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,028488 1 × 54900 54900 0,02848774 × 54900 1563,976926 0,028488 2,848774 R12 Quantity F 30% 70% 0 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,008739 0,3 × 54900 16470 0,008738705 × 16470 143,9264702 0,002622 0,2621611 0,045949 4,59% 2033,852675 3,7046497 56933,85 Substructure R13 Unit cost V 100% 0% 1 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,002814 1 × 54900 54900 0,002813841 × 54900 154,4798472 0,002814 0,2813841 E (€) 54900 R14 Unit cost F 40% 60% 0 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,001456 0,4 × 54900 21960 0,001456253 × 21960 31,97931831 0,000583 0,0582501 (-7%,+7%) 54900 R15 Unit cost F 40% 60% 0 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,001456 0,4 × 54900 21960 0,001456253 × 21960 31,97931831 0,000583 0,0582501 R16 Schedule F 60% 40% 1 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,112997 0,6 × 54900 32940 0,112996663 × 32940 3722,110068 0,067798 6,7797998 R17 Schedule V 100% 0% 1 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,186049 1 × 54900 54900 0,18604904 × 54900 10214,0923 0,186049 18,604904 R18 Quantity V 100% 0% 1 -5% 5% 10% 0,028488 0,028488 1 × 54900 54900 0,02848774 × 54900 1563,976926 0,028488 2,848774 0,33326 33,32% 15718,61777 28,63 70618,62 Superstructure R19 Schedule F 50% 50% 0 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,094126 0,5 × 45750 22875 0,09412622 × 22875 2153,137282 0,047063 4,706311 E (€) 45750 R20 Schedule F 30% 70% 0 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,056481 0,3 × 45750 13725 0,05648138 × 13725 775,2069424 0,016944 1,6944414 (-7%,+7%) 45750 R21 Schedule F 30% 70% 0 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,056481 0,3 × 45750 13725 0,05648138 × 13725 775,2069424 0,016944 1,6944414 R22 Global V 100% 0% 1 -5% 1% 5% 0,001407 0,001407 1 × 45750 45750 0,00140692 × 45750 64,36660299 0,001407 0,140692 R23 Global V 100% 0% 1 -5% 1% 5% 0,001407 0,001407 1 × 45750 45750 0,00140692 × 45750 64,36660299 0,001407 0,140692 0,209903 20,99% 3832,284373 8,3765779 49582,28 Finishes R24 Schedule V 100% 0% 1 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,186049 1 × 9150 9150 0,18604904 × 9150 1702,348716 0,186049 18,604904 E (€) 9150 R25 Schedule V 100% 0% 1 -10% 10% 50% 0,186049 0,186049 1 × 9150 9150 0,18604904 × 9150 1702,348716 0,186049 18,604904 (-5%,+5%) 9150 R26 Unit cost V 100% 0% 1 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,002814 1 × 9150 9150 0,002813841 × 9150 25,7466412 0,002814 0,2813841 R27 Unit cost V 100% 0% 1 -10% 2% 10% 0,002814 0,002814 1 × 9150 9150 0,002813841 × 9150 25,7466412 0,002814 0,2813841 0,377726 37,72% 3456,190715 37,772576 12606,19 Overall 20,83% Contribution of cost risk drivers Driver Cost Risk (€) Total (€) Contribution Q 4426,47 26185,54 0,17 Project final cost 209185,5 UC 430,41 26185,54 0,02 S 21044,45 26185,54 0,80 G 284,21 26185,54 0,01 Overall risk level = Average (Risk effects) Confidence level= 50% + Overall risk level Error range limits Input Distr. Triang Error range limits Input Distr. Triang Error range limits Error range limits Error range limits Input Distr. Triang Input Distr. Triang Input Distr. Triang Sum of output cells @RISK cost risk analysis model (adopted from Hobbs 2010) 4. MODEL DESIGN
  • 16. 5. SURVEY DESIGN 29-04-2015 16 “(Questionnaire) Survey in construction Project Risk Management (PRM)” 24 survey studies were reviewed √ Extensive use of the 5-Likert scale √ Relative Importance Index The study collects data with a questionnaire √Section A: Organization profile √Section B: Project specific characteristics √Section C: Direct rating of risks and of cost risk drivers √Section D: Contact details “Survey evaluation – Section A” ■ 36 self-administrated questionnaires ■ Validity test → Content Validity Panel 5 Raters √ 22 valid received → Item-CVI = 0.80>0.78 ■ Response rate: 62.3% → ■ Reliability much higher than the 30% expected ▪ Instrumental: Contingency = 0.546 (satisfactory) (Uher & Toakley 1999; Zou et al. 2006) ▪ Response: ICC=0.758, a=0.439 (single: weak) a=0.758 (total: satisfactory)
  • 17. 29-04-2015 17 5. SURVEY DESIGN “Sample description”
  • 19. 29-04-2015 19 6. DATA ANALYSIS Kurtosis for standard normal distribution N (0, 1) → k=3 or k=0 → “excess kurtosis” ▪ k>0 → peaked distribution → heavy (excess) in tails (leptokurtic) ▪ k=0 → normal distribution (mesokurtic) ▪ k<0 → flat distribution → light tails (platykurtic) ▪ Standard normal distribution N(μ=0, var.=1) ▪ The skewness for any normal distribution and “symmetrically” distributed data g1=0 Kurtosis - Shape parameter Skewness - Location parameter Normal distribution → 95.5% of the “Project Final Cost” ⇒ Data normality and data symmetry “Starting point” Portfolio level Project Case 10 Project Case 14 Portfolio level Chapter 7 Chapter 6
  • 20. 2029-04-2015 ► On portfolio level (average values) (1) Skewness: Land preparation (g1=-0.046), Foundations (g1=-0.047), Finishes (g1=-0.008) negatively skewed Substructure (g1=+0.020) and Superstructure (g1=+0.278) positively skewed Superstructure (comparing to project-level) ⇒ +41.8% Land preparation (comparing to project-level) ⇒ + 70.7% If -0.5< g1 <+0.5 ⇒ Symmetrical distribution (Bulmer 1979) Av. Skewness values Y1 → g1 = -0.046 Y2 → g1 = -0.047 Y3 → g1 = +0.020 Y4 → g1 = +0.279 Y5 → g1 = -0.008 (2) Mean: Superstructure → highest average cost of € 98402.19 Finishes → largest range equal to € 149808 Land preparation → lowest average cost € 47402.77 Land preparation → smallest range equal to € 28489.27 (3) Coefficient of Variation (CV): substructure → highest CV=27.61%, superstructure → lowest CV=11.55% (4) Kurtosis: All cost elements were found with positive approx. k≈3.0 Av. Kurtosis values Y1 → k = +2.81 Y2 → k = +2.79 Y3 → k = +2.70 Y4 → k = +3.33 Y5 → k = +2.75 6. DATA ANALYSIS “Summary of statistics” Portfolio
  • 21. 21 ► On project level [pre-ΔΜ: Ε = € 263000, post-ΔΜ: E’= € 258857] (1) Skewness: Substructure, Superstructure, Finishes → positively skewed Land preparation, Foundations → negatively skewed Superstructure → largest g1=0.4782, Land preparation → lowest g1=-0.1571 (2) Mean: Substructure → highest average cost with mean = € 100955.90 (=38.4% of E) → largest range (max – min) equal to € 178332.90 Land preparation → lowest average cost with mean = € 26725.95 → smallest range (max – mix) equal to € 19979.64 (3) Coefficient of Variation (CV): Finishes → highest CV of 30.34% Substructure → CV=26.73% Land preparation → lowest CV=10.88% (4) Kurtosis: Superstructure → highest k=3.1, Substructure → lowest k=2.675 6. DATA ANALYSIS Project Case 10 “Data normality and symmetry tests” Skewness & kurtosis significance tests → SPSS analysis input: {min, 5% Perc., 10% Perc., 15% Perc., . . . . , 90% Perc., 95% Perc., and Max} Skewness → Not significant at 95% c.l. → Symmetry in cost data Ok! Kurtosis → Significant at 95% c.l. → All cost distributions leptokurtic (k>0) Data normality
  • 22. 29-04-2015 22 6. DATA ANALYSIS “Normality tests” All cost elements → Follow normal distribution pattern Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) Project Case 10
  • 23. 29-04-2015 23 “Correlation effect” ■ Impact of correlations among cost elements and individual risks often ignored (Flanagan et al. 1987; Jaafari 1988; Ranasinghe 1994) ■ Treatment of correlations necessary → realistic quantification of uncertainty (Ranasinghe & Russell 1992) ■ Correlation effect, if neglected may lead to: ▪ Underestimation of the total cost’s variance (Touran & Wiser 1992) ▪ Stronger effect of “including correlations” than the choice of distributions (Wall 1997) ▪ Ignoring a whole cost element (Yang 2005) ■ Spearman and Pearson coefficients in SPSS → Input for @RISK correlation matrix ▪@RISK adjusted the matrix so to be positively defined → -0.036% reduction in columns, +0.016% increase in rows Land preparation Foundations Substructure Superstructure Finishes Land preparation 1 0.9993 0.9993 0.9763 0.9923 Foundations 1 0.9943 0.9803 0.9943 Substructure 1 0.9913 0.9993 Superstructure 1 0.9903 Finishes 1 Adjusted self-consisted correlation matrix 6. DATA ANALYSIS Project Case 14
  • 24. 2429-04-2015 All cost elements strongly and positively correlated → Sign for a serious correlation effect. No negative correlations Rho = 1 ⇒ √ Monotonicity √ Linearity 6. DATA ANALYSIS “Correlation effect” Project Case 14
  • 25. 25 “Simulation results” Probability meeting the estimate +7 % Increase Range of data captured in 90% +94.67% more cost data captured 6. DATA ANALYSIS Project Case 14 ■ @ the desired confidence level 71.57% +3.39% higher estimate when including correlations ■ Two S-curves cross @ 50% c.l. ▪ Below 50% c.l. → tendency for underestimation (with) ▪ Above 50% c.l. → tendency for overestimation (with) Mean overestimated by +0.1% Variance increased by +3.4% SD increased by + 1.7% SE increased by +55.1 units → more outliers . . .
  • 26. 29-04-2015 26 ■ Tails exist (Recall: g1>0). ■ Heavier or Thinner? Why? ■ Heavier left tail ■ More skewed to left ■ g1 reduced from 0.1417 to 0.1379 Q-Q plots for normal distributions Q-Q plots for natural logarithm Why to transform? To keep untouched the outliers and reveal their true effect (Chou et al. 2009) 6. DATA ANALYSIS Project Case 14
  • 27. 29-04-2015 27 “Risk assessment of cost elements” ■ Substructure → largest SDx = € 15018.91 ⇒ max. effect in project final cost ■ Land preparation → smallest SDx = 1536.28 ⇒ min. effect in project final cost 6. DATA ANALYSIS “Importance of individual risks” Simulation (quantitative approach) and AHP (qualitative approach): 1. Schedule 2. Quantity 3. Unit Cost 4. Global Project Case 14
  • 28. 29-04-2015 28 “Probability meeting base estimate” pre-ΔΜ (%) post-ΔΜ (%) Change (%) Land preparation 22.70 28.45 +25.33 Foundations 53.90 51.25 -4.91 Substructure 14.55 14.33 -1.51 Superstructure 27.18 26.83 -1.28 Finishes 20.95 22.50 +7.39 Project final cost 6.51 6.47 -0.61 pre-ΔΜ (%) post-ΔΜ (%) Change (%) Land preparation 1575.82 1425.90 -9.51 Foundations 2845.70 2755.70 -3.16 Substructure 30630.40 29256.70 -4.48 Superstructure 7049.20 6801.55 -3.51 Finishes 7123.90 6996.35 -1.79 Project final cost 35790.00 34779.55 -2.82 % Project Final Cost: decreased by – 0.61% Total contingency: reduced by – 2.82% Contingency % Estimate: (pre-ΔΜ) 19.55% (post-ΔΜ) 19,49% “Expected contingencies” Recall: Pre-ΔΜ: Ε = € 183000 Post-ΔΜ: Ε = € 178423 ⇒ Revised estimate: reduced by -0.02% 7. RESEARCH FINDINGS Project Case 14 % Cost category: increased by +5%
  • 29. All cost elements, apart from “superstructure” become more efficient ⇒ Move towards “red line” ⇒ keep in budget 29-04-2015 29 7. RESEARCH FINDINGS Project Case 14 “Project delivery (in)efficiency”
  • 30. 29-04-2015 30 “Risk transfer degree” “Project delivery inefficiency” Transfer € 401.40 less to client and again win the bid. Contractor delivers by +2.70% more efficient the project. 7. RESEARCH FINDINGS Project Case 14 On project level: CPI +0.02% improvement CPI = BCWP / ACWP = E / C “Construction Performance Index ” Portfolio level On portfolio-level: √ 14/22 (64% of sample) scored improved CPI √ Average improvement = +2%
  • 31. 31 pre-ΔΜ post-ΔΜ Change (€) Project ID b×(E-C) b’×(E’-C’) Δ (incentive profit) 1 -3365.27 -5193.15 -1827.88 2 -12214.64 -12253.64 -38.65 3 1087.46 63.97 -1023.49 4 -4029.31 -948.66 3080.65 5 915.71 -140.47 775.24 6 -645.09 -121.43 523.66 7 -3816.10 -1007.83 2808.27 8 -11605.68 -1601.58 10004.10 9 -9366.39 -2283.52 7082.86 10 -14524.03 -3433.48 11090.55 11 -46245.14 -22675.80 23569.30 12 -1243.19 -329.20 913.99 13 -13776.86 -4482.99 9293.87 14 -7419.13 -1960.13 5458.99 15 -4165.99 -1228.13 2937.85 16 -41619.68 -18365.10 23524.58 17 -2165.82 -611.63 1554.20 18 -493.53 -28.43 465.11 19 -23918.83 -14719.64 9199.18 20 -5535.54 -4135.05 1400.49 21 -121662.33 -96137.58 25524.76 22 -14251.51 -2736.29 11515.22 Mean= € 6707.42 Recall: b=risk sharing ratio (0-100%) E, E’=initial, revised estimate C, C’=initial cost, revised cost On portfolio level: Additional incentive profit of € 6707.42 ⇒ 1.91% of av. value of portfolio (349994.32 ) “Incentive profit element – Project Final Cost” 7. RESEARCH FINDINGS Portfolio level
  • 32. 32 pre-ΔΜ post-ΔΜ Change Improvement Project ID Contigency (€) Contigency (€) Δ (Contingency) % Change 1 39503.40 34779.20 -4724.20 -11.96 2 37358.42 37290.02 -68.40 -0.18 3 3134.93 5439.93 2305.00 73.53 4 15057.82 13607.94 -1449.88 -9.63 5 4601.73 5122.38 520.65 11.31 6 3548.68 2748.53 -800.15 -22.55 7 28139.81 33820.82 5681.01 20.19 8 71270.91 66799.45 -4471.46 -6.27 9 35746.23 35136.95 -609.28 -1.70 10 67153.60 5682.00 -61471.60 -91.54 11 103241.20 99320.90 -3920.30 -3.80 12 4884.30 10872.79 5988.49 122.61 13 51335.30 41406.40 -9928.90 -19.34 14 35790.00 34779.50 -1010.50 -2.82 15 18391.41 13193.68 -5197.73 -28.26 16 126819.76 62490.22 -64329.54 -50.73 17 9047.79 8057.59 -990.20 -10.94 18 9855.67 9097.49 -758.18 -7.69 19 66914.56 59576.69 -7337.87 -10.97 20 7410.36 6908.80 -501.56 -6.77 21 228178.03 211300.50 -16877.53 -7.40 22 145178.44 121776.82 -23401.62 -16.12 Mean= -3.68% On portfolio level: Average reduction of contingencies achieved by -3.68% ⇒ Still competitive ⇒ More incentive profits by clients ⇒ More efficient delivery 7. RESEARCH FINDINGS “Contingencies – Project Final Cost” Portfolio level
  • 33. 29-04-2015 33 “Research Questions → Research Replies” R.Q. 1a/2a “How much cost risks transferred from contractor to client?” On average 35.65% less cost risks transferred from contractors to clients R.Q. 1b/2b “How much likely to meet the estimate the actual cost?” On average an increase of +5% probability to meet the base estimate. R.Q. 3 “Consequences of profit decision on profits and contingencies ?” On average contigencies reduced by -4.32%. Reduction of contigencies in each phase: On average profits increased by +6.17%. Change in profits in each phase: 7. RESEARCH FINDINGS Project Case 14 Incentive profit (€) Contingencies (€) pre-ΔΜ post-ΔΜ % change pre-ΔΜ post-ΔΜ % change Land preparation -341.79 -432.69 -26.60 1575.80 1425.90 -9.51 Foundations -422.42 -780.64 -84.80 2845.70 2755.70 -3.16 Substructure -7723.19 -5226.76 +32.32 30630.40 29526.70 -3.60 Superstructure -785.84 -350.57 +55.39 7049.20 6801.55 -3.51 Finishes -738.54 -335.78 +54.53 7123.90 6996.35 -1.79 Mean +6.17% -4.32% Changes in profit and contingency elements Any “generilisable” conclusions?
  • 34. 29-04-2015 34 7. RESEARCH FINDINGS Portfolio levelHypothesis: “ High changes in incentive profits are associated with low changes in contingencies.” Hypothesis valid! Not causation can be deducted. Contractor can predict how a contingency decision will affect incentive profit. A grouping of projects. Outliers (Pr. 21) why? Different pattern with 400 projects?
  • 35. 29-04-2015 35 8. CONCLUSIONS: A SUMMARY Portfolio level √ 18/22 (81.8% sample) projects overestimated initial base estimates. √ 18/22 (81.8% sample) projects overestimated initial contingencies. √ CPI: +2% √ Incentive profits: +1.91% portfolio’s av. value Project Case level √ -35.65% reduction of cost risks ⇒ +5% increase in the probability meeting the base estimate √ Finishes: highest opportunity for cost risks reduction by -167.35% Land preparation: highest opportunity to meet the base estimate by +25.33% √ CPI: +0.02% √ -4.32% contingencies ⇒ +6.17% incentive profits
  • 36. 29-04-2015 36 9. LIMITATIONS & FURTHER WORK “Limitations” ■ Sample → 35 questionnaires sent, 22 valid received: small sample ■ Industry ▪ Structure: fragmented with many SMEs ▪ Contractors: based too much on cost control accounting tools, not on RM systems ▪ Nature: legal framework very rigid and in favor of clients ▪ Decreasing profitability path ■ AHP scale → Linear scale selected ■ No validation and verification of cost risk analysis model “Further work” ■ Pseudo-code integration into @RISK for optimal contingency setting. ■ Client recommendation with a bidding proposal.
  • 37. 29-04-2015 37 “Client recommendation” (Touran 2003) Poisson distribution for cost risks Contingency calculation for desired p(%) Bid also for: √ T √ max. α √ max. χ → public (database) → private (consultant) √ agree post-bid on p Calculate Cch Compare contingencies within the legal range 8. LIMITATIONS & FURTHER WORK “Pseudo construction”
  • 38. 29-04-2015 38 MSc. Construction Management & Engineering Ir. Dimitrios Kordas Tel.: +31 649 177 841 E-mail: dimitriskordas@gmail.com