A master thesis project designed, executed and presented by Ir. Dimitrios Kordas for the degree of MSc in Construction Management and Engineering at the University of Twente, the Netherlands.
Study details:
√ questionnaire-based survey study
√ 27 individual on-site risks assessed
√ 5 cost elemental categories
√ product-based cost model
√ Tools: MC method, AHP, Sensitivity diagrams
√ Sample: 22 building projects from the Greek Construction Industry
Under the supervision of:
Prof. Joop Halman (chairman)
Assoc. Prof. Saad Al-Jibouri (direct supervisor)
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RISK SHARING IN TRADITIONAL CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS FOR BUILDING PROJECTS
1. “RISK SHARING IN TRADITIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS FOR
BUILDING PROJECTS.”
A CONTRACTOR’S PERSPECTIVE
IN THE GREEK CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY.
ENSCHEDE, 29-04-2015
Dimitrios Kordas (M-CME/s1231901)
MSc: Construction Management and Engineering
3. 29-04-2015 3
■ Failure on: “Triple Constraints” (Cost-Time- Scope) target?
■ Cost overruns in traditional construction contract?
▪ Delay risks: 50% projects suffered by time overruns in UAE’s CI (Faridi 2006)
▪ 61% of Australian contractors claim bearing misallocated cost risks (Atkin 2006)
AlSalman & Sillars (2013)
1. INTRODUCTION
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“A practical case in traditional building procurement in the Greek CI”
Step 1: Client submits a Request for Proposals invitation
Step 2: Contractors: “Closed books” bid-competition
Step 3: Client and awarded contractor: “Open books” Post-bid
3.1 Compensation mechanism agreement
3.2 Risk sharing agreement
For the contractor:
Price (Contract value) = Fixed amount (Base estimate) + Profit
For the client:
Price = Contract value ± 30-35%×Contract value
“Maximum cost risk allowance”
1. INTRODUCTION
Pipattanapiwong (2004)
■ No risks → Fixed amount paid.
■ On-site risks → always →
sharing agreement → if unfair
risk allocation by client →
contractors: reserve amounts
(contingencies) or arbitration
path.
High contingencies pre-bid
↔ More/Less risks shared
Revise profits & estimates? ⇒
Project cost performance
Cotnigencies
Contingencies ↔
Incentive profits Contingency reduction →
Project delivery efficiency
6. 2. RESEARCH DESIGN
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“Problem scope”
√ Type of projects: Buildings
√ Phase: Execution (Construction)
√ Post-bid period
√ Cost-side
Chang & Ive (2002)
PMI (2013)
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“Cost estimating”
■ Cost estimates: (1) Design estimates, (2) Bid estimates, (3) Control estimates
2. RESEARCH DESIGN
“Building a cost model”
Product-based Vs. Process-based
COST PLAN
PROJECT: (Type), (Location) Note: This cost plan is based upon the attached outline
DATE OF COST PLAN: X/X/2015 specification, and both documents should be read together.
ASSUMED DATE OF TENDER: X/X/2015
TOTAL INTERNAL FLOOR AREA: 2,390 m²
Cost
Unit Quantity Unit Cost (₤) Subtotal (₤) Total (₤) Elemental cost (₤) / m²
1. WORK BELOW LOWEST FLOOR FINISH
Ground floor area 390 m² 321.00 125,19 52.38
2. STRUCTURAL FRAME
2,390 m² 125,6 52.55
3. UPPER FLOORS
225 mm Hollow pot 386 m² 60.00 23,16
150 mm in-situ RC 1,585 m² 41.00 64,985
88,145 36.88
4. STAIRCASES
RC Staircases 25 m 1225.00 30,625
1 No 25 m rise
1 No secondary
21.5 m rise 21.5 m 900.00 19,350
49,975 49,975 20.91
“Cost elements”
▪ Land preparation
▪ Foundations
▪ Substructure
▪ Superstructure
▪ Finishes
RICS (2014)
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Ferry et al. (1999)
2. RESEARCH DESIGN
“Components in a project cost estimate”
1. Identification
2. Assessment = Analysis + Evaluation
3. Monitoring
4. Control
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2. RESEARCH DESIGN
“Research goal”
“Assessing the effect of risk sharing decisions taken (in post-bid) by contractors and
examine projects’ performance in terms of project delivery efficiency and cost performance.”
“Research question”
“How do risk-sharing decisions of contractors’ in the post-bid context affect building
projects cost performance when these projects are traditionally procured?”
√ Revise the minimum
required change in
profit
√ Revise risk sharing
and base estimate
amounts
√ Reduce contingency
below the 10% of
base estimate
“Research objectives”
√ Cost risk transfer
√ Probability to meet the base estimate
√ Contingencies
√ Incentive profits
√ Any relation: Incentive profits ↔ Contingencies
√ Improvements on Project performance?
√ Reduce project delivery inefficiency?
pre-ΔΜ
pοst-ΔΜ
“Proposal”
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Joustra (2010)
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Definitions
“Uncertainty”
√ The variability and ambiguity of future
outcomes.
√ No probability distributions can be assigned
Vs. Risky situations
“Risk”
√ Expected value = Probability × Impact
√ The “fallacy” of expected value:
Risk events Magnitude Probability Impact Expected
Value
Earth. 1 3 Richter 5% € 10000 € 500
Earth. 2 6 Richter 0.02% € 1500000 € 300
RiskCompound command (@RISK)
“Contingency”
√ A budget reserve above the estimate to
reduce the risk of overruns at a desired
confidence level.
√ Included in bid price → Total commitment
on tender
√ Arbitrary amount, usually set as the 10% of
base estimate.
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW
“Systematic review”
No specific RM
framework applied.
27 on-site risks were
collected: tailored list
4 cost risk drivers
√ Quantity
√ Unit Cost
√ Schedule
√ Global
Risk importance criteria
√ Propensity
√ Perception
√ Performance
Quantitative risk assessment
√ MC simulation
√ PDFs, CDFs
√ Sensitivity diagrams
AHP
Risk misallocation
literature consensus.
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No previous study in risk sharing in D-B-B contracts
Risk sharing mainly as an optimization parameter of contracts.
“Risk transfer degree” and “Project delivery efficiency” not examined.
P (price of contract) = F (fixed amount) + b×(E – C)
Incentive profit
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
“Motivation”
Degree of risk transfer →
Project delivery inefficiency →
Witt & Liias (2011)
Efficient delivery of project ⇒ ΔP=ΔM=ΔC=0
P (price) = C (cost) + M (margin)
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4. MODEL DESIGN
“Stochastic process: 5 questions” (Diekmann 1983)
(1) Data available for each risk (Xi)? → Probability (RiskCompound) Range of Impact = Individual
risk effect level
(2) Correlated Xi s → No correlations assumed among the 27 individual risks
(3) Data required for Yj? → Yj = Ej + n×CRi
(4) Additive or Multiplicative combination of Xi → Additive:
(5) How many cost elements (Yj)? → 5 cost elements
Project final cost = Iterations number: 10000
Confidence level = 50% + Average risk effect level
Input distributions:
Base estimates Risk Probability Risk Impact
(Risk Triang) (Risk Discrete) (Risk Trigen)
Land
preparation
Foundations
Substructure
Superstructure
Finishes
Fixed: Risk Discrete Variable: P=100%
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4.4 Cost risk analysis model
for contingency estimation
Model adopted from Hobbs (2010)
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19
6. DATA ANALYSIS
Kurtosis for standard normal distribution N (0, 1) → k=3
or k=0 → “excess kurtosis”
▪ k>0 → peaked distribution → heavy (excess) in tails (leptokurtic)
▪ k=0 → normal distribution (mesokurtic)
▪ k<0 → flat distribution → light tails (platykurtic)
▪ Standard normal distribution N(μ=0, var.=1)
▪ The skewness for any normal distribution and
“symmetrically” distributed data
g1=0
Kurtosis - Shape parameter
Skewness - Location parameter
Normal distribution → 95.5% of the “Project Final Cost” ⇒
Data normality and data symmetry
“Starting point”
Portfolio level
Project Case 10
Project Case 14
Portfolio level
Chapter 7
Chapter 6
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► On portfolio level (average values)
(1) Skewness: Land preparation (g1=-0.046), Foundations (g1=-0.047), Finishes (g1=-0.008)
negatively skewed
Substructure (g1=+0.020) and Superstructure (g1=+0.278) positively skewed
Superstructure (comparing to project-level) ⇒ +41.8%
Land preparation (comparing to project-level) ⇒ + 70.7%
If -0.5< g1 <+0.5 ⇒ Symmetrical distribution (Bulmer 1979)
Av. Skewness values
Y1 → g1 = -0.046
Y2 → g1 = -0.047
Y3 → g1 = +0.020
Y4 → g1 = +0.279
Y5 → g1 = -0.008
(2) Mean: Superstructure → highest average cost of € 98402.19
Finishes → largest range equal to € 149808
Land preparation → lowest average cost € 47402.77
Land preparation → smallest range equal to € 28489.27
(3) Coefficient of Variation (CV): substructure → highest CV=27.61%,
superstructure → lowest CV=11.55%
(4) Kurtosis: All cost elements were found with positive approx. k≈3.0
Av. Kurtosis values
Y1 → k = +2.81
Y2 → k = +2.79
Y3 → k = +2.70
Y4 → k = +3.33
Y5 → k = +2.75
6. DATA ANALYSIS
“Summary of statistics” Portfolio
21. 21
► On project level [pre-ΔΜ: Ε = € 263000, post-ΔΜ: E’= € 258857]
(1) Skewness: Substructure, Superstructure, Finishes → positively skewed
Land preparation, Foundations → negatively skewed
Superstructure → largest g1=0.4782, Land preparation → lowest g1=-0.1571
(2) Mean: Substructure → highest average cost with mean = € 100955.90 (=38.4% of E)
→ largest range (max – min) equal to € 178332.90
Land preparation → lowest average cost with mean = € 26725.95
→ smallest range (max – mix) equal to € 19979.64
(3) Coefficient of Variation (CV): Finishes → highest CV of 30.34%
Substructure → CV=26.73%
Land preparation → lowest CV=10.88%
(4) Kurtosis: Superstructure → highest k=3.1, Substructure → lowest k=2.675
6. DATA ANALYSIS
Project Case 10
“Data normality and symmetry tests”
Skewness & kurtosis significance tests → SPSS analysis input: {min, 5% Perc., 10% Perc., 15% Perc., . .
. . , 90% Perc., 95% Perc., and Max}
Skewness → Not significant at 95% c.l. → Symmetry in cost data Ok!
Kurtosis → Significant at 95% c.l. → All cost distributions leptokurtic (k>0)
Data
normality
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6. DATA ANALYSIS
“Normality tests”
All cost elements → Follow normal distribution pattern
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W)
Project
Case 10
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“Correlation effect”
■ Impact of correlations among cost elements and individual risks often ignored (Flanagan et al. 1987; Jaafari
1988; Ranasinghe 1994)
■ Treatment of correlations necessary → realistic quantification of uncertainty (Ranasinghe & Russell 1992)
■ Correlation effect, if neglected may lead to:
▪ Underestimation of the total cost’s variance (Touran & Wiser 1992)
▪ Stronger effect of “including correlations” than the choice of distributions (Wall 1997)
▪ Ignoring a whole cost element (Yang 2005)
■ Spearman and Pearson coefficients in SPSS → Input for @RISK correlation matrix
▪@RISK adjusted the matrix so to be positively defined → -0.036% reduction in columns, +0.016%
increase in rows
Land
preparation
Foundations Substructure Superstructure Finishes
Land
preparation
1 0.9993 0.9993 0.9763 0.9923
Foundations 1 0.9943 0.9803 0.9943
Substructure 1 0.9913 0.9993
Superstructure 1 0.9903
Finishes 1
Adjusted self-consisted correlation matrix
6. DATA ANALYSIS
Project Case 14
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All cost elements strongly and
positively correlated → Sign for a
serious correlation effect.
No negative correlations
Rho = 1 ⇒ √ Monotonicity
√ Linearity
6. DATA ANALYSIS
“Correlation effect”
Project Case 14
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“Simulation results”
Probability meeting the estimate
+7 % Increase
Range of data captured in 90%
+94.67% more cost data captured
6. DATA ANALYSIS
Project Case 14
■ @ the desired confidence level 71.57%
+3.39% higher estimate when including correlations
■ Two S-curves cross @ 50% c.l.
▪ Below 50% c.l. → tendency for underestimation (with)
▪ Above 50% c.l. → tendency for overestimation (with)
Mean overestimated by +0.1% Variance increased by +3.4%
SD increased by + 1.7% SE increased by +55.1 units → more outliers . . .
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■ Tails exist (Recall: g1>0).
■ Heavier or Thinner? Why?
■ Heavier left tail
■ More skewed to left
■ g1 reduced from 0.1417 to
0.1379
Q-Q plots for normal distributions
Q-Q plots for natural logarithm
Why to transform?
To keep untouched the outliers and
reveal their true effect (Chou et al. 2009)
6. DATA ANALYSIS
Project Case 14
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“Risk assessment of cost elements”
■ Substructure → largest SDx = € 15018.91 ⇒ max. effect in project final cost
■ Land preparation → smallest SDx = 1536.28 ⇒ min. effect in project final cost
6. DATA ANALYSIS
“Importance of individual risks”
Simulation (quantitative approach) and AHP
(qualitative approach): 1. Schedule
2. Quantity
3. Unit Cost
4. Global
Project Case 14
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“Probability meeting base estimate”
pre-ΔΜ (%) post-ΔΜ (%) Change (%)
Land preparation 22.70 28.45 +25.33
Foundations 53.90 51.25 -4.91
Substructure 14.55 14.33 -1.51
Superstructure 27.18 26.83 -1.28
Finishes 20.95 22.50 +7.39
Project final cost 6.51 6.47 -0.61
pre-ΔΜ (%) post-ΔΜ (%) Change (%)
Land preparation 1575.82 1425.90 -9.51
Foundations 2845.70 2755.70 -3.16
Substructure 30630.40 29256.70 -4.48
Superstructure 7049.20 6801.55 -3.51
Finishes 7123.90 6996.35 -1.79
Project final cost 35790.00 34779.55 -2.82
% Project Final Cost: decreased by – 0.61%
Total contingency: reduced by – 2.82%
Contingency % Estimate: (pre-ΔΜ) 19.55% (post-ΔΜ) 19,49%
“Expected contingencies”
Recall:
Pre-ΔΜ: Ε = € 183000
Post-ΔΜ: Ε = € 178423
⇒ Revised estimate: reduced by -0.02%
7. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Project Case 14
% Cost category: increased by +5%
29. All cost elements, apart from “superstructure” become more
efficient ⇒ Move towards “red line” ⇒ keep in budget
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7. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Project Case 14
“Project delivery (in)efficiency”
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“Risk transfer degree” “Project delivery inefficiency”
Transfer € 401.40
less to client and
again win the bid.
Contractor delivers by
+2.70% more efficient
the project.
7. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Project Case 14
On project level:
CPI +0.02%
improvement
CPI = BCWP / ACWP
= E / C
“Construction Performance Index ”
Portfolio level
On portfolio-level:
√ 14/22 (64% of sample)
scored improved CPI
√ Average improvement = +2%
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“Research Questions → Research Replies”
R.Q. 1a/2a “How much cost risks transferred from contractor to client?”
On average 35.65% less cost risks transferred from contractors to clients
R.Q. 1b/2b “How much likely to meet the estimate the actual cost?”
On average an increase of +5% probability to meet the base estimate.
R.Q. 3 “Consequences of profit decision on profits and contingencies ?”
On average contigencies reduced by -4.32%.
Reduction of contigencies in each phase:
On average profits increased by +6.17%.
Change in profits in each phase:
7. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Project Case 14
Incentive profit (€) Contingencies (€)
pre-ΔΜ post-ΔΜ % change pre-ΔΜ post-ΔΜ % change
Land
preparation
-341.79 -432.69 -26.60 1575.80 1425.90 -9.51
Foundations -422.42 -780.64 -84.80 2845.70 2755.70 -3.16
Substructure -7723.19 -5226.76 +32.32 30630.40 29526.70 -3.60
Superstructure -785.84 -350.57 +55.39 7049.20 6801.55 -3.51
Finishes -738.54 -335.78 +54.53 7123.90 6996.35 -1.79
Mean +6.17% -4.32%
Changes in profit and contingency elements
Any “generilisable”
conclusions?
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7. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Portfolio levelHypothesis:
“ High changes in incentive profits are associated with low changes in contingencies.”
Hypothesis valid!
Not causation can
be deducted.
Contractor can
predict how a
contingency
decision will
affect incentive
profit.
A grouping of
projects. Outliers
(Pr. 21) why?
Different pattern
with 400 projects?
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8. CONCLUSIONS: A SUMMARY
Portfolio level
√ 18/22 (81.8% sample) projects
overestimated initial base estimates.
√ 18/22 (81.8% sample) projects overestimated
initial contingencies.
√ CPI: +2%
√ Incentive profits: +1.91% portfolio’s av. value
Project Case level
√ -35.65% reduction of cost risks ⇒ +5%
increase in the probability meeting the
base estimate
√ Finishes: highest opportunity for cost risks
reduction by -167.35%
Land preparation: highest opportunity to
meet the base estimate by +25.33%
√ CPI: +0.02%
√ -4.32% contingencies ⇒ +6.17% incentive
profits
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9. LIMITATIONS & FURTHER WORK
“Limitations”
■ Sample → 35 questionnaires sent, 22 valid received: small sample
■ Industry
▪ Structure: fragmented with many SMEs
▪ Contractors: based too much on cost control accounting tools, not on RM systems
▪ Nature: legal framework very rigid and in favor of clients
▪ Decreasing profitability path
■ AHP scale → Linear scale selected
■ No validation and verification of cost risk analysis model
“Further work”
■ Pseudo-code integration into @RISK for optimal
contingency setting.
■ Client recommendation with a bidding proposal.
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“Client recommendation”
(Touran 2003)
Poisson distribution for cost risks
Contingency calculation for desired p(%)
Bid also for:
√ T
√ max. α
√ max. χ → public (database)
→ private (consultant)
√ agree post-bid on p
Calculate Cch
Compare contingencies
within the legal range
8. LIMITATIONS & FURTHER WORK
“Pseudo construction”