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Living With Passwords: Personal Password Management
The document discusses the challenges of password management, highlighting the common practice of password reuse and the risks associated with it. It presents various alternatives for managing passwords, such as non-electronic methods, password managers, and two-factor authentication options. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of using strong, unique passwords for different sites while also addressing the security implications of each method.
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Living With Passwords: Personal Password Management
- 1. Confraria InfoSec Living With Passwords: Personal Password Management 23/02/2011
- 2. Summary Summary: • Mo;va;on • Today’s scenario • Alterna;ves -‐ Non-‐electronic -‐ Limited -‐ Password Managers • Two-‐Factor Authen;ca;on -‐ SoHware Tokens -‐ Hardware Tokens • Trends SAPO Websecurity Team 2
- 3. Motivation > Lotsof accounts compromised SAPO Websecurity Team 3
- 4. Motivation > PeopleReuse Passwords • Password Sharing: 73% of users share passwords that are used for online banking with at least one non-‐financial website. • Username / Password Sharing: 42% of users share both their username and password with at least one non-‐financial website Study on 4M PCs in Reusing Login Creden.als, Security Advisor, February 2010, Trusteer Inc. SAPO Websecurity Team 4
- 5. Today Typical choice of passwords on the Web: • Weak password and reused in different sites • Strong password but reused in different sites • Weak password but different from other sites • Strong password for criFcal sites, Weak password for other sites • Strong or weak password and basic derivaFons on other sites SAPO Websecurity Team 5
- 6. Today Can we memorize hundreds of strong passwords? SAPO Websecurity Team Confraria InfoSec 6
- 7. Today No way! SAPO Websecurity Team Confraria InfoSec 7
- 8. Today So what can we do? SAPO Websecurity Team Confraria InfoSec 8
- 9. Alternatives to memorizingmultiple passwords? • Non-‐electronic -‐ Post-‐it -‐ Password Cards • Limited adopFon -‐ OpenID / OAuth (Facebook, TwiQer, Google, SAPO) -‐ Smart card • Password Managers: -‐ Local (examples): ‣ PGP File on Disk ‣ Mac Keychain ‣ Password Safe -‐ Stateless (examples): ‣ SuperGenPass -‐ Remote (examples): ‣ LastPass ‣ 1Password + Dropbox SAPO Websecurity Team 9
- 10. Alternatives > Post-it Post-‐it User can write passwords on a piece of paper, prefixed and sufixed with random chars, and keep it in his/her wallet Pros: • More secure than memorizing weak passwords 12345 6 Cons: • Not prac;cal at all • Difficult to check and type passwords when there’re people around “Simply, people can no longer remember passwords good enough to reliably defend against dictionary attacks, and are much more secure if they choose a password too complicated to remember and then write it down. We're all good at securing small pieces of paper. I recommend that people write their passwords down on a small piece of paper, and keep it with their other valuable small pieces of paper: in their wallet.” in Schneier on Security, Bruce Schneier, Jun 2005 SAPO Websecurity Team 10
- 11. Alternatives > PasswordCards Password Cards User keeps the password card in his/her wallet and all he/she does it remember a combina;on of a symbol and a color per site... and direc;on and length! Pros: • More secure than post-‐it if stolen Cons: • Not prac;cal • Might be difficult to use because of password policies • User s;ll needs to memorize some informa;on for each site SAPO Websecurity Team 11
- 12. Alternatives > OpenID OpenID Open standard that describes how users can be authen;cated in a decentralized manner, allowing users to consolidate their digital iden;;es Pros: • Users don’t need to remember mul;ple passwords • Sites don’t know users’ passwords • Users can change provider and s;ll maintain digital iden;ty • Allows mul;ple authen;ca;on mechanisms Cons: • Limited to the subset of sites that support OpenID • If the provider is down you can’t authen;cate* SAPO Websecurity Team 12
- 13. Alternatives > OAuthbased OAuth based Use popular sites (Facebook, TwiQer, SAPO) as authen;cators to other sites, just like OpenID. Similar Pros&Cons of OpenID SAPO Websecurity Team 13
- 14. Alternatives > SmartCards Smart Cards Some sites allow you to use SSL Client cer;ficates as a mean of authen;ca;on. Cer;ficates can be stored in a Smart Card. Pros: • Good security offered • Even beQer when used as 3-‐factor authen;ca;on Cons: • Not very prac;cal • Only a very limited number of sites support SSL Client cer;ficates • May provide a false sense of security SAPO Websecurity Team 14
- 15. Alternatives > PasswordManagers Password Managers Use a password manager to manage all your passwords instead of trying to memorize them all Types (we will provide examples of each): • Local • Stateless • Remote Pros: • easy to use • prac;cal • enable you to use strong and different passwords across sites Cons: • If a hacker breaks your password manager, ALL your passwords are compromised! SAPO Websecurity Team 15
- 16. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Local > PGP File PGP Encrypted File on Disk Not really a password manager, but the user can keep all his/hers passwords in one file that is encrypted with PGP. Pros: • It seems preQy secure Cons: • Not for everyone • Hard to maintain • If you need a password and you don’t have your computer with you.. SAPO Websecurity Team 16
- 17. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Local > MacOSX Keychain MacOSX Keychain OS-‐wise password manager. Can sync keychain’s data with other computers. Pros: • Integrated with the opera;ng system, thus easy and prac;cal to use • Secure • You can unlock your keychain with a smart card Cons: • If you need a password and you don’t have your computer with you.. • Only MacOSX is supported SAPO Websecurity Team 17
- 18. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Local > Password Safe Password Safe Similar to PGP Encrypted File in terms of func;onality but has a GUI. Pros: • Secure • GUI to manage passwords Cons: • If you need a password and you don’t have your computer with you.. • Only MS-‐Windows is supported SAPO Websecurity Team 18
- 19. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Stateless > SuperGenPass SuperGenPass SuperGenPass is a simple bookmarklet that computes your site’s password. No one knows your passwords. Site’s password =10x MD5(yourMasterSecret:domainURL). Pros: • Simple Idea, simple to use • Very Prac;cal, easy to use when you don’t have access to your computer Cons: • Prone to XSS aQacks! SAPO Websecurity Team 19
- 20. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote Remote Password Managers SAPO Websecurity Team 20
- 21. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass LastPass Features: • Server is not aware of your encryp;on key • Data is stored on server in encrypted form and encrypted/decrypted locally (using JS or browser extension) • Device synchroniza;on • Mul;plahorm support • Import and export func;onality • Mul;-‐factor authen;ca;on (OTPs, Yubikey, Grid, among others) • Phishing mi;ga;on SAPO Websecurity Team 21
- 22. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass > Usage Login SAPO Websecurity Team 22
- 23. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass > Usage Saving a site SAPO Websecurity Team 23
- 24. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass > Usage Saving a site SAPO Websecurity Team 24
- 25. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass > Usage Site login SAPO Websecurity Team 25
- 26. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass Looking deeper: • The login process; • Adding a site; • Risks related to implementaFon; • Major threats; • Advantages. SAPO Websecurity Team 26
- 27. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass > Details Looking deeper -‐ The login process SAPO Websecurity Team 27
- 28. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass > Details Looking deeper -‐ The login process Parameter Value Opera[on username hypnotoad@sapo.pt user 0f4ca0edff9ac0436c9c161565c7bff0654aa67 hash e412578e5294a245d971d91cb SHA256(master_key + password) encrypted_username, Le74Bkbjqv8Hfj5HPayoqCD402FtjIBn7XhSN B64(AES256_ECB(master_key, PKCS7(user))) miTNzk= requesthash dafb156eb7e0c3aa23a47c90a70350b54ce64 lostpwotphash 9c9a9e6ee6670f64110dc783778 SHA256(user + recovery_key) e548f6d1a533d298102519aed86ef186b3d3b u 9f4b0d3c7c1c20cc8072771ce3d SHA256(user) • user = “hypnotoad@sapo.pt” • password = “pwd123456” • master_key = SHA256(user + password) • rand_n = RAND(128b) • recovery_key = SHA256(user + rand_n) • encrypted_master_key = AES256_ECB(recovery_key, master_key) SAPO Websecurity Team 28
- 29. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass > Details Looking deeper -‐ Adding a site SAPO Websecurity Team 29
- 30. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass > Details Looking deeper -‐ Adding a site Parameter Value Opera[on url 68747470733a2f2f747769747465722e636f6d2f HEX(“hfps://twifer.com/”) name iiFFsmFqWzhZEzz4WdqFsQ== B64(AES256_ECB(master_key, PKCS7 (“twifer.com”))) username VXu4hWF75MFuA1XiaAUp/g== B64(AES256_ECB(master_key, PKCS7 (“someaccount”))) 8ISq2uZ6HHHkgaPNPzTDDs2sqi+erKc65snJce/ B64(AES256_ECB(master_key, PKCS7 password 0V2s= (“NS3ptHQcvwEkCX6NK9uJeKOstLWbN4Mf”))) Le74Bkbjqv8Hfj5HPayoqCD402FtjIBn7XhSNmiT requesthash Nzk= B64(AES256_ECB(master_key, PKCS7(user))) • user = “hypnotoad@sapo.pt” • password = “pwd123456” • master_key = SHA256(user + password) SAPO Websecurity Team 30
- 31. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass > Details Looking deeper -‐ Risks related to implementa[on • The URL is stored in plaintext; • Form field names are stored in plaintext; • AES is being used in ECB mode. The same input always generates the same output... • Key derivaFon should be improved (e.g. using PBKDF2) “That means that it only takes three days to break a seven-letter mixed-case password -- ouch. It takes a little more time if there are numbers and special characters in the password or the password is longer and much less time if the password is all one case, subject to a dictionary attack, or is partially known.” • Beware of the “create an OTP for recovery opFon”; • Third-‐party security assessment sFll pending. SAPO Websecurity Team 31
- 32. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass > Details Looking deeper -‐ Major threats • Master password thea; • Trojan installed in host may compromise all passwords at once. SAPO Websecurity Team 32
- 33. Alternatives > PasswordManagers > Remote > LastPass Pros: Prac[cal • One password to remember; • Integrated with the browser; • Synchronizes credenFals across devices. Open • Client-‐side source code is available. Secure • Very effecFve in Gawker-‐style aeacks (password containment); • Can be paired with addiFonal authenFcaFon factors; • Passwords are stored in encrypted form, both locally and remotely. SAPO Websecurity Team 33
- 34. Two-Factor Authentication Two-‐Factor Authen[ca[on SAPO Websecurity Team Confraria InfoSec 34
- 35. Two-Factor Auth >Examples Some Examples • Smart cards • SoHware OTP Tokens: -‐ Google Authen;cator -‐ Verisign VIP • Hardware OTP Tokens: -‐ Yubikey -‐ CryptoCard -‐ RSA SecureID Pros: • More secure than single-‐ factor:) Cons: • Not very prac;cal • May provide a false sense of security • Typically a closed market (vendors rip you off!) SAPO Websecurity Team 35
- 36. Two-Factor Auth >Google Authenticator Google Authen[cator Supports HOTP (event-‐based) and TOTP (;me-‐based) codes. Key provisioning via scanning a QR code. Pros: • Free! :) • No need to carry extra devices • You can use it in your own systems (using a PAM Module or integra;ng it with RADIUS) Cons: • Concerns related to security of the device • Your baQery may die when you most need an OTP • You lose some ;me to generate an OTP SAPO Websecurity Team 36
- 37. Two-Factor Auth >Yubikey > What is it? What is it? • The Yubikey is a small USB token which acts as a regular keyboard. It can generate StaFc Passwords and One Time Passwords. SAPO Websecurity Team 37
- 38. Two-Factor Auth >Yubikey > How does it work? Sta[c Passwords • The Yubikey can be provisioned with a staFc password with up to 64 chars. This password can be used with applicaFons/services that do not support OTPs. You should use an addiFonal password! One Time Passwords • Two different One Time Password standards are supported: event-‐based HOTP and Yubikey-‐style OTPs. • HOTP is a beeer known standard, but it is more limited due to usability concerns (smaller OTP, sync issues, etc.). • The Yubikey OTP standard leverages the fact that the Yubikey inputs the OTPs for you. Two slots • Short-‐press for slot 1; Long-‐press for slot 2 (3 secs); Drivers • Any OS with USB-‐keyboard support. It even works during boot (useful for, e.g., whole-‐disk encrypFon soluFons such as PGP-‐WDE and TrueCrypt). SAPO Websecurity Team 38
- 39. Two-Factor Auth >Yubikey > Where does it work? Yubico OpenID (hfp://openid.yubico.com) SAPO Websecurity Team 39
- 40. Two-Factor Auth >Yubikey > Where does it work? Lastpass (hfp://www.lastpass.com) SAPO Websecurity Team 40
- 41. Two-Factor Auth >Yubikey > Where does it work? Laptop (hfp://127.0.0.1) One Time Password Sta;c Password SAPO Websecurity Team 41
- 42. Two-Factor Auth >Yubikey > Details Inner workings SAPO Websecurity Team 42
- 43. Two-Factor Auth >Yubikey > Security Threats Protocol afacks • Generated OTPs consist of unique 128 bit blocks encrypted with a shared AES key between Token and Server. Protocol security depends on the security strength of the AES algorithm. SAPO Websecurity Team 43
- 44. Two-Factor Auth >Yubikey > Security Threats Server afacks • An authenFcaFon server stores symmetric keys for all Token and is a single point of failure. This can be miFgated with tamper-‐proof HSMs and user passwords; • A DoS aeack on the server will result in users not being able to log in. SAPO Websecurity Team 44
- 45. Two-Factor Auth >Yubikey > Security Threats User afacks • Social engineering; • Phishing; • “Borrowing” the Token. SAPO Websecurity Team 45
- 46. Two-Factor Auth >Yubikey > Security Threats Host afacks • Soaware key extracFon (very hard to exploit); • Man-‐in-‐the-‐browser. SAPO Websecurity Team 46
- 47. Two-Factor Auth >Yubikey > Security Threats Hardware afacks • Hardware key extracFon and Token duplicaFon. SAPO Websecurity Team 47
- 48. Two-Factor Auth >Yubikey > Advantages Prac[cal • No drivers necessary • Types the key for you Open • Open standard and infrastructure • Soaware released under permissive license • Extensible (PIN opFon) • No license required per token Affordable • Around 10€ if purchased in larger quanFFes Secure • Provides an addiFonal authenFcaFon factor • OTP generaFon requires manual intervenFon SAPO Websecurity Team 48
- 49. Future Trends SAPO Websecurity Team Confraria InfoSec 49
- 50. Trends Two-‐factor Authen[ca[on is geong Popular: SAPO Websecurity Team 50
- 51. Trends NFC starts to be a hype: In “How Apple and Google will kill the password”, Computerworld, Jan 2011: SAPO Websecurity Team 51
- 52. The End Ques[ons? Nuno Loureiro <nuno@co.sapo.pt> João Poupino <joao.poupino@co.sapo.pt> SAPO Websecurity Team Confraria InfoSec 52
Editor's Notes
- #2 \n
- #3 - All examples in PHP and MySQL\n
- #4 - Passwords can be compromised\n- If compromised passwords are hashed, bad passwords can be broken\n
- #5 - Passwords can be compromised\n- If compromised passwords are hashed, bad passwords can be broken\n
- #6 - Passwords can be compromised\n- If compromised passwords are hashed, bad passwords can be broken\n
- #7 - Passwords can be compromised\n- If compromised passwords are hashed, bad passwords can be broken\n
- #8 - Passwords can be compromised\n- If compromised passwords are hashed, bad passwords can be broken\n
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- #29 - Passwords are remotely stored\n- Web-based\n- Multi-platform\n- Sync between devices\n\n\n
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- #43 hash parameter ~ HMAC\n
- #44 hash parameter ~ HMAC\n
- #45 hash parameter ~ HMAC\n
- #46 hash parameter ~ HMAC\n
- #47 hash parameter ~ HMAC\n
- #48 hash parameter ~ HMAC\n
- #49 hash parameter ~ HMAC\n
- #50 hash parameter ~ HMAC\n
- #51 hash parameter ~ HMAC\n
- #52 hash parameter ~ HMAC\n
- #53 hash parameter ~ HMAC\n
- #54 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #55 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #56 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #57 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #58 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #59 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #60 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
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- #64 - Waterproof\n- \n
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- #74 Anti-phishing\nAnti-gawker\n\n
- #75 - PAM\n- SSH\n
- #76 - The ModHex encoding is used instead of standard hex or base64 encoding to make the device independent of language settings in the operating system.\n- sessionCtr : It is incremented every time the device is powered on and an OTP is used\n- timestamp : Is set to a random value every time the device is connected.\n- sessionUse: counts the number of authentication tokens generated during the particular session.\n- random: LFSR register seeded by the touch button sensor USB activity\n- crc: data corruption (not integrity!)\n- \n
- #77 - Token duplication/steal issues may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- If the authentication token is stolen or lost, one must assume it is compromised already\n\n
- #78 - Token duplication/steal issues may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- If the authentication token is stolen or lost, one must assume it is compromised already\n\n
- #79 - Token duplication/steal issues may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- If the authentication token is stolen or lost, one must assume it is compromised already\n\n
- #80 - Token duplication/steal issues may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- If the authentication token is stolen or lost, one must assume it is compromised already\n\n
- #81 - Token duplication/steal issues may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- If the authentication token is stolen or lost, one must assume it is compromised already\n\n
- #82 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #83 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #84 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #85 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #86 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #87 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #88 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #89 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
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- #91 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #92 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
- #93 - Token duplication may be hindered by counter desynchronization and the usage of a simple PIN\n- \n
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