2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Libya's federal electoral system (under Gaddafi)
FDA auditors gave Libya an overall electoral score of 0%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Lebanon republic electoral system.
FDA auditors gave Lebanon an overall electoral score of 35%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Bahrain's monarchical electoral system
FDA auditors gave Bahrain an overall electoral score of 0%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Afghan's Islamic Republic electoral system
FDA auditors gave Afghanistan an overall electoral score of 23.75%. (50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum grade.)
The 2012 FDA electoral fairness audit of Alberta's legislative level of government uses new matrices in the audit process as outlined to the Research Methodology section of the report. These matrices are more comprehensive of electoral systems than previous FDA audits, and therefore, the use of the new matrices may result in higher electoral fairness scores.
FDA auditors measured Alberta with a 54% overall electoral fairness score. (0% is the lowest score attainable; 50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum and reasonably attainable score.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Iraq's federal electoral system
FDA auditors gave Iraq an overall electoral score of 35.25%. (50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Canadian federal electoral system.
FDA auditors gave Canada an overall electoral score of 25.75%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the France's republic electoral system
FDA auditors gave France an overall electoral score of 91.75%. (50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the highest grade attainable.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Bolivia's presidential and parliamentary electoral system
FDA auditors gave Bolivia an overall electoral score of 78.75%. (50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is maximum grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Lebanon republic electoral system.
FDA auditors gave Lebanon an overall electoral score of 35%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Bahrain's monarchical electoral system
FDA auditors gave Bahrain an overall electoral score of 0%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Afghan's Islamic Republic electoral system
FDA auditors gave Afghanistan an overall electoral score of 23.75%. (50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum grade.)
The 2012 FDA electoral fairness audit of Alberta's legislative level of government uses new matrices in the audit process as outlined to the Research Methodology section of the report. These matrices are more comprehensive of electoral systems than previous FDA audits, and therefore, the use of the new matrices may result in higher electoral fairness scores.
FDA auditors measured Alberta with a 54% overall electoral fairness score. (0% is the lowest score attainable; 50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum and reasonably attainable score.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Iraq's federal electoral system
FDA auditors gave Iraq an overall electoral score of 35.25%. (50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Canadian federal electoral system.
FDA auditors gave Canada an overall electoral score of 25.75%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the France's republic electoral system
FDA auditors gave France an overall electoral score of 91.75%. (50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the highest grade attainable.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Bolivia's presidential and parliamentary electoral system
FDA auditors gave Bolivia an overall electoral score of 78.75%. (50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is maximum grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Sweden's republic electoral system
FDA auditors gave Sweden an overall electoral score of 34.5%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Global Electoral Fairness Report on the United States Federal Electoral System.
FDA auditors gave the US an overall grade of 30%. (50% minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Congolese presidential and parliamentary electoral system.
FDA auditors gave the DRC an overall electoral score of 3.75%. (0% is the lowest score attainable; 50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum score attainable.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Syria federal electoral system.
FDA auditors gave Russia an overall electoral score of 35%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
U.S. Electoral Fairness Report revised as of April 11, 2013
Executive Summary
The American federal electoral system borders a failed state as determined by the overall unsatisfactory audit score of 54.5 percent (out of 100 percent). The FDA auditors measured
1) two failing scores for legislation pertaining to electoral finance (48.25 percent) and media election content (42.5 percent);
2) one unsatisfactory score for legislation pertaining to candidates and parties
(57 percent);
3) one satisfactory score for legislation pertaining to voters (70.25 percent).
The FDA auditors factored in 52 independent variables and used matrices and financial spreadsheets in its calculations and determinations. Based on its measurements, the FDA believes that the American federal election outcomes may not reflect the voice of Americans from electoral districts. The significant legislated unfair competition between American candidates and parties coupled with electoral finance legislation favoring wealthy money interests and media legislation favoring large corporate media and imbalanced election coverage creates a system tilted heavily to special and minority interests, rather than the American people. The FDA believes that reforms are necessary in electoral finance and election coverage in order to help realign the American federal electoral process with Americans as a whole. The FDA recommends, for examples, expenditure limits on congressional candidates and privately funded presidential candidates, caps on independent third-party expenditure, caps on media ownership concentration, and a voluntary media code of conduct during the 60 day campaign period which supports impartial and balanced campaign coverage of all registered candidates and parties.
The FDA recommends that the public get involved with the government legislative process and implementation if they want to protect and advance their democratic voice, and create a society of their choosing.
“If liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in government to the utmost.”
- Aristotle
2011 FDA Global Electoral Fairness Audit of Spain's federal electoral system
FDA auditors gave Spain an overall electoral fairness score of 42.25%. (50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the New Zealand's parliamentary electoral system
FDA auditors gave New Zealand an overall electoral score of 54.75%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Saudi Arabia's monarchical electoral system
FDA auditors gave Saudi Arabia an overall electoral score of 0%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
The FDA power point presentation from the April 17th, 2012 FDA Public Forum on Alberta Democracy Reform. The forum took place in Calgary, Alberta.
The audio of the power point can listened to on the FDA itunes page:
http://itunes.apple.com/ca/podcast/fda-world-democracy-discussion/id4521492
The 2012 FDA electoral fairness audit of Alberta's legislative level of government uses new matrices in the audit process as outlined to the Research Methodology section of the report. These matrices are more comprehensive of electoral systems than previous FDA audits, and therefore, the use of the new matrices may result in higher electoral fairness scores.
FDA auditors measured Alberta with a 54% overall electoral fairness score. (0% is the lowest score attainable; 50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum and reasonably attainable score.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Iran's republic electoral system
FDA auditors gave Iran an overall electoral score of 0%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
Executive Summary
The FDA audit entailed a comprehensive audit of the electoral finance legislation of Canada's 10 provinces. The audit is restricted to capturing systematic corruption. The FDA measured exceptional legislation in Québec and Manitoba, very good in Nova Scotia, acceptable in New Brunswick, unacceptable (passing) in Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador, and unacceptable (failing) in Alberta, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. The FDA believes that the legislation from Alberta, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan is systematically corrupt by favouring minority/special interests over the interests of the people. The FDA identified major deficiencies in many areas of these provinces' legislation including the addition of corporations and trade unions in electoral contributions, high caps on contributions, no expenditure limits, public subsidies which favor large, established parties, no regulation of third party expenditure, and/or low fines on corporations and trade unions for electoral wrongdoing. In contrast, FDA auditors measured zero deficiency in Québec's legislation. This measurement means that Québec's legislation is working completely in the interests of the people of Québec. The FDA recommends that the rest of Canada's provinces model their legislation after Québec's.
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Cameroon's republic presidential electoral system
FDA auditors gave Cameroon an overall electoral score of 2.5%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Azerbaijan's republic electoral system
FDA auditors gave Azerbaijan an overall electoral score of 25%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Syria republic electoral system.
FDA auditors gave Syria an overall electoral score of 0%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
Asian Election Stakeholder Forum III (AESF III)
August 22 – 26, 2016
Bali, Indonesia
"Transparency & integrity for Quality Elections"
General Election Commission Republic of Indonesia
and
General Election Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
Asian Election Stakeholder Forum III (AESF III)
August 22 – 26, 2016
Bali, Indonesia
"Transparency & integrity for Quality Elections"
General Election Commission Republic of Indonesia
and
General Election Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
Asian Election Stakeholder Forum III (AESF III)
August 22 – 26, 2016
Bali, Indonesia
"Transparency & integrity for Quality Elections"
General Election Commission Republic of Indonesia
and
General Election Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Jordan's parliamentary electoral system.
FDA auditors gave Jordan an overall electoral score of 0%. (0% is the lowest score attainable; 50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum score attainable.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Egypt's Islamic Republic electoral system (under Hosni Mubarak).
FDA auditors gave Egypt an overall electoral score of 23.75%. (50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Sweden's republic electoral system
FDA auditors gave Sweden an overall electoral score of 34.5%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Global Electoral Fairness Report on the United States Federal Electoral System.
FDA auditors gave the US an overall grade of 30%. (50% minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Congolese presidential and parliamentary electoral system.
FDA auditors gave the DRC an overall electoral score of 3.75%. (0% is the lowest score attainable; 50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum score attainable.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Syria federal electoral system.
FDA auditors gave Russia an overall electoral score of 35%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
U.S. Electoral Fairness Report revised as of April 11, 2013
Executive Summary
The American federal electoral system borders a failed state as determined by the overall unsatisfactory audit score of 54.5 percent (out of 100 percent). The FDA auditors measured
1) two failing scores for legislation pertaining to electoral finance (48.25 percent) and media election content (42.5 percent);
2) one unsatisfactory score for legislation pertaining to candidates and parties
(57 percent);
3) one satisfactory score for legislation pertaining to voters (70.25 percent).
The FDA auditors factored in 52 independent variables and used matrices and financial spreadsheets in its calculations and determinations. Based on its measurements, the FDA believes that the American federal election outcomes may not reflect the voice of Americans from electoral districts. The significant legislated unfair competition between American candidates and parties coupled with electoral finance legislation favoring wealthy money interests and media legislation favoring large corporate media and imbalanced election coverage creates a system tilted heavily to special and minority interests, rather than the American people. The FDA believes that reforms are necessary in electoral finance and election coverage in order to help realign the American federal electoral process with Americans as a whole. The FDA recommends, for examples, expenditure limits on congressional candidates and privately funded presidential candidates, caps on independent third-party expenditure, caps on media ownership concentration, and a voluntary media code of conduct during the 60 day campaign period which supports impartial and balanced campaign coverage of all registered candidates and parties.
The FDA recommends that the public get involved with the government legislative process and implementation if they want to protect and advance their democratic voice, and create a society of their choosing.
“If liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in government to the utmost.”
- Aristotle
2011 FDA Global Electoral Fairness Audit of Spain's federal electoral system
FDA auditors gave Spain an overall electoral fairness score of 42.25%. (50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the New Zealand's parliamentary electoral system
FDA auditors gave New Zealand an overall electoral score of 54.75%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Saudi Arabia's monarchical electoral system
FDA auditors gave Saudi Arabia an overall electoral score of 0%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
The FDA power point presentation from the April 17th, 2012 FDA Public Forum on Alberta Democracy Reform. The forum took place in Calgary, Alberta.
The audio of the power point can listened to on the FDA itunes page:
http://itunes.apple.com/ca/podcast/fda-world-democracy-discussion/id4521492
The 2012 FDA electoral fairness audit of Alberta's legislative level of government uses new matrices in the audit process as outlined to the Research Methodology section of the report. These matrices are more comprehensive of electoral systems than previous FDA audits, and therefore, the use of the new matrices may result in higher electoral fairness scores.
FDA auditors measured Alberta with a 54% overall electoral fairness score. (0% is the lowest score attainable; 50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum and reasonably attainable score.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Iran's republic electoral system
FDA auditors gave Iran an overall electoral score of 0%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
Executive Summary
The FDA audit entailed a comprehensive audit of the electoral finance legislation of Canada's 10 provinces. The audit is restricted to capturing systematic corruption. The FDA measured exceptional legislation in Québec and Manitoba, very good in Nova Scotia, acceptable in New Brunswick, unacceptable (passing) in Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador, and unacceptable (failing) in Alberta, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. The FDA believes that the legislation from Alberta, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan is systematically corrupt by favouring minority/special interests over the interests of the people. The FDA identified major deficiencies in many areas of these provinces' legislation including the addition of corporations and trade unions in electoral contributions, high caps on contributions, no expenditure limits, public subsidies which favor large, established parties, no regulation of third party expenditure, and/or low fines on corporations and trade unions for electoral wrongdoing. In contrast, FDA auditors measured zero deficiency in Québec's legislation. This measurement means that Québec's legislation is working completely in the interests of the people of Québec. The FDA recommends that the rest of Canada's provinces model their legislation after Québec's.
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Cameroon's republic presidential electoral system
FDA auditors gave Cameroon an overall electoral score of 2.5%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Azerbaijan's republic electoral system
FDA auditors gave Azerbaijan an overall electoral score of 25%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of the Syria republic electoral system.
FDA auditors gave Syria an overall electoral score of 0%. (50% is the minimum passing grade.)
Asian Election Stakeholder Forum III (AESF III)
August 22 – 26, 2016
Bali, Indonesia
"Transparency & integrity for Quality Elections"
General Election Commission Republic of Indonesia
and
General Election Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
Asian Election Stakeholder Forum III (AESF III)
August 22 – 26, 2016
Bali, Indonesia
"Transparency & integrity for Quality Elections"
General Election Commission Republic of Indonesia
and
General Election Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
Asian Election Stakeholder Forum III (AESF III)
August 22 – 26, 2016
Bali, Indonesia
"Transparency & integrity for Quality Elections"
General Election Commission Republic of Indonesia
and
General Election Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Jordan's parliamentary electoral system.
FDA auditors gave Jordan an overall electoral score of 0%. (0% is the lowest score attainable; 50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum score attainable.)
2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Egypt's Islamic Republic electoral system (under Hosni Mubarak).
FDA auditors gave Egypt an overall electoral score of 23.75%. (50% is the minimum passing grade; 100% is the maximum grade.)
Revised as of April 15, 2013 (Revision #1)
Executive Summary
The Venezuelan federal electoral system is very satisfactory as determined by the overall audit score of 78.83 percent (out of 100 percent). The FDA auditors measured
1) one unsatisfactory passing score for legislation pertaining to electoral finance (52.5 percent);
2) one very satisfactory score for legislation pertaining to candidates and parties (77.9%);
3) two exceptional scores for legislation pertaining to media election coverage
(100 percent) and voters (84.9 percent).
The FDA audit focused on 52 variables, and it utilized matrices, financial analysis, and scoring scales. The most notable areas of the system are Venezuela’s commitment to complete and balanced election coverage, thereby supporting a fair playing field for candidates and parties, and a commitment to people’s right to vote and the act of voting through various innovative and progressive measures. However, electoral finances of candidates and parties are only transparent to the state, and there are no direct caps on campaign contributions and no direct limits on expenditures. The lack of public financial transparency creates the potential for pro-government parties to pursue corrupt financial practices and leave anti-government parties subject to unjust assessments of their finances including targeting their contributors. The lack of caps and limits on electoral finances may create an unfair playing field in the realms of billboards, flyers, posters, and campaign events, because these media are not covered by the complete and balanced coverage requirement. The FDA has no evidence of electoral financial wrongdoing, as does no one else, because only the Venezuelan State through the National Electoral Council is privy to party finances. The FDA recommends reforms that will bring about public electoral finance transparency, caps on campaign contributions and limits on campaign expenditures. If implemented these reforms would make the Venezuelan electoral system a model for the rest of the world. As it stands, these limitations have the potential to allow for corrupt financial practices and create unfair playing fields for candidates and parties.
Overall the FDA recommends that the public get continuously and actively involved with the government legislative process and implementation if they want to protect and advance their democratic voice, and create a society of their choosing.
On May 30, 2013, the FDA will host a webinar on the 2013 Canada Electoral Fairness Report. To register for the webinar, go to this url:
https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/5418267208238649088
Executive Summary of the 2013 Canada Electoral Report
The Foundation for Democratic Advancement (FDA) concludes that the Canadian federal electoral system is mediocre as determined by the overall unsatisfactory passing audit score of 64.49 percent (out of 100 percent). FDA auditors measured
1) Failing score for legislation pertaining to media election coverage (47.35 percent).
2) Unsatisfactory score for legislation pertaining to candidates and parties
(58.93 percent).
3) Satisfactory score for legislation pertaining to voters (73.52 percent).
4) Very satisfactory score for legislation pertaining to electoral finance
(78.15 percent).
In its analysis, the FDA factored in 32 independent variables, matrix examination, and financial analysis to inform calculations and conclusions. Based on its measurements, the FDA believes that Canadian federal election outcomes are not truly reflective of the voice of Canadians from electoral constituencies. Although there is sound legislation relating to voters and electoral finance, various provisions concerning candidates, parties, and media function to favour certain large and established parties over new and small parties and even other large and established parties. The FDA identified several elements in the Canadian electoral system that, when combined, undermine significantly electoral competition and thereby election outcomes. The FDA believes that the degree of electoral competition is an indication of the health of a democracy, and competition whether in the marketplace or elections produces the better societal outcome. Therefore, the FDA recommends a number of reforms to the Canadian electoral system that would eliminate biased electoral legislation and uncompetitive electoral processes.
“If liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in government to the utmost.”
- Aristotle
About the Foundation for Democratic Advancement
The Foundation for Democratic Advancement (FDA) is an international independent, non-partisan democracy organization. The FDA’s mission is
to measure, study, and communicate the impact of government processes on a free and democratic society.
Overall, the FDA works
1. to ensure that people become more knowledgeable about the outcomes of government processes and can then make decisions that are more informed;
2. to get people involved in monitoring government processes at all levels of government and in providing sound, practical, and effective suggestions. (For more information on the FDA visit: www.democracychange.org)
FDA Media Study revised as of April 21, 2013. Revision number 1.
The FDA media study focuses on the last two weeks of the 2012 Alberta provincial election regarding the newspaper, radio, and television media sectors. The FDA collected data from two major media corporations in each sector and presents the relevant findings in the following report. It found that the PC Party and Wildrose Alliance Party had 65.2% of total media exposure and the seven other registered parties had 34.8% of total media exposure. Five of these seven parties had 4.1% of the total exposure. These results are similar to the actual election results in terms of percentage of coverage and percentage of popular vote received, and identical in terms of media and election result rankings of parties. The Alberta Legislature does not regulate provincial media in terms of election coverage. Therefore, the FDA recommends reform in media practices that should include some form of regulation such as a code of media conduct during elections and/or required election coverage for parties based on, for instance, the number of candidates each party endorses in an election. The high degree of media concentration in the Alberta press and television sectors may be a contributing factor to the inequitable coverage of the various parties.
OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS OF NIGERIA'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; 2011 - 2015 Yagana Bintube (MNIM)
A STUDY ON THE OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS OF NIGERIA'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; 2011 - 2015 BEING A RESEARCH PROJECT IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF A MASTER IN SCIENCE DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF ABUJA, NIGERIA.
THE WORK DISSECTS THE OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS OF THE 7TH SESSION AND EVALUATES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OVERSIGHT TOOL IN DELIVERY GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC DEMOCRATIC DISPENSATION. IT LOOKS FURTHER TO HIGHLIGHT THE CHALLENGES, PROFFER DEEP ROOTED RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROJECT THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE OVERSIGHT TOOL IN ACHIEVING DEMOCRATIC SUCCESS, RESPONSIBLE, RESPONSIVE, TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA.
Parliamentary Oversight of Sustainable Development Goals and the Application ...Dr. Fotios Fitsilis
Presentation at the 14th Wroxton Workshop of Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians, 27-28 July 2019. Based on a joint working paper with Franklin De Vrieze.
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention (IJHSSI) is an international journal intended for professionals and researchers in all fields of Humanities and Social Science. IJHSSI publishes research articles and reviews within the whole field Humanities and Social Science, new teaching methods, assessment, validation and the impact of new technologies and it will continue to provide information on the latest trends and developments in this ever-expanding subject. The publications of papers are selected through double peer reviewed to ensure originality, relevance, and readability. The articles published in our journal can be accessed online.
Executive Summary
The Foundation for Democratic Advancement (FDA) asserts that municipalities like any other government department and agency, corporation, and non-profit/charity organization are expected to operate efficiently and effectively in order to provide adequate services at reasonable cost. In this report, the FDA is not promoting and will never promote the idea that municipalities have the right to impose their own levies in order to create more revenue. The reader knows that extra revenue and abundance of cash and resources may lead to complacency, inefficiency, waste, and corruption. However, the FDA supports and advocates that municipalities have the right, when needed and warranted, to supplement their revenue in order to provide services and develop and maintain safe and reliable communities.
In its research, the Foundation for Democratic Advancement uncovers the bias of section 648 of the Alberta Municipal Government Act (MGA, 2000) and the section’s inconsistent application throughout Alberta. As it stands, section 648 only allows Alberta municipalities to charge hard infrastructure levies (such as charges for sewer or water infrastructure) on new off-site developments as opposed to municipalities having the discretionary capacity to charge for both hard and soft levies which includes police and fire services, parks, and community infrastructure. Currently, several Alberta cities (most notably the City of Calgary) bypass this restriction on levies by signing private negotiated agreements (standard development agreements) with development community stakeholders. These agreements allow the City of Calgary, for instance, to charge also for soft infrastructure levies because the development industry agreed to them, and therefore it cannot sue on grounds of violation of the MGA. All other Alberta municipalities are restricted to charging only hard infrastructure levies unless they too can negotiate private agreements with developers and/or developer associations. Moreover, the Government of Alberta ignores the bypass of section 648 by Alberta municipalities.
In the FDA’s view, section 648 is a process shortcoming by allowing developers to either avoid soft infrastructure levies or negotiate low levies from a strong negotiating position. In either scenario, Alberta municipal taxpayers likely pay more for the capital costs of new off-site developments, while developers, which are the principle profit beneficiaries of new developments, pay less. This issue resolves around who pays for soft infrastructure which is critical to new off-site infrastructure and the ability of municipalities to maintain safe and viable communities (MGA, Part 1, Section 3).
An off-site levy is one financing source to both pay for growth-related infrastructure and pass on infrastructure costs to those individuals and organizations who are the primary beneficiaries of the growth, and thereby ensure “growth pays for growth”....
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Building off Veterans Ombudsman reports and other reports which support systematic change to the federal government process involving injured and/or disabled veterans, the Foundation for Democratic Advancement (FDA) examines closely the federal government veteran processes. Through that examination, the FDA uncovers serve deficiencies which compromise the federal government’s service to injured and/or disabled veterans and ultimately its obligation to Canadians in the Canadian Forces and Royal Mounted Police who put their lives at risk to protect this country. In particular, the FDA documents a system of patronage appointments, mismanagement of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board (VRAB), and a veterans review and appeal process defined significantly by unreasonable interpretation and application of relevant Acts of Parliament. Using its expertise in democracy and government, the FDA believes that these deficiencies stem from a failure of Canadian democracy and shortcomings in the Canadian federal electoral system. The FDA uncovers evidence that elected officials including the Prime Minister are putting their self-interests above the interests of injured and/or disabled veterans and Canadians as a whole. The Brian Bradley case study, an ongoing egregious seventeen-year legal struggle in which Brian battles for just care for his spinal cord injury, shows that the deficiencies with the VRAB and failings of the federal government have gone on far too long. The FDA recommends a number of reforms, including the elimination of the VRAB and delegation of its responsibilities and duties to the Federal Court, implementation of a non-partisan federal government appointment system, and correction of biases and unfairness in the federal electoral system to help ensure that representatives who represent the broad public good are elected.
"If liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in government to the utmost."
- Aristotle
For more information on veteran Brian Bradley and the Veterans Review and Appeal Board (VRAB) please go to the FDA url:
http://democracychange.org/2013/10/fdas-brian-bradley-case-study-and-process-review-of-the-veterans-review-and-appeal-board/
Executive Summary
This FDA electoral finance study focuses on the 2010 Calgary Mayoral Election. The main purpose of the research is to tabulate the amount of contributions for all candidates. As the research progressed, further inquiry was made into the reporting system used by the City of Calgary, within provincial legislation. (2013 election finance data not publicly disclosed until after Election Day on October 21, 2013; only voluntary and incomplete financial data is available now.)
Our results indicate that the top three candidates accounted for two-thirds of total campaign financing or 67 percent. The FDA also observed a wide variation between candidates with respect to the proportion of financing originating from different types of contributors. This includes distinctions based on contribution amount (under $100 versus over $100), and contribution source (individuals versus business versus unions). For example, 95.9 percent of gross contributions to all mayoral candidates were over $100, while 4.1 percent of gross contributions to all mayoral candidates were under $100. Also, 51.1 percent of total contributions to mayoral candidates were from corporations.
The FDA concludes that electoral finance process in the 2010 City of Calgary mayoral election had a number of shortcomings, which in turn likely impacted the electoral fairness of the election, and the correlation between the voice of Calgarians and the election results.
The FDA acknowledges that the root issue stems from Alberta’s Local Authorities Election Act, which the Alberta Provincial Government has jurisdiction over. However, the FDA believes that the City of Calgary still has the ability to improve the electoral finance process. For example, for modest costs, the City Calgary can upgrade and standardize the way campaign finances are reported to the City by candidates, and subsequently reported by the City to the general public.
Key Findings from Report
• The FDA auditors identified that three mayoral candidates had 67% of the electoral finances of all mayoral candidates (ten mayoral candidates in total).
• The FDA auditors identified that contributions by corporations accounted for 51.1% of the total contributions to mayoral candidates, without considering any individuals who may have contributed for corporations.
• The FDA auditors identified 99 incidents of individuals and corporations contributing to more than one candidate and totaling $595,333. (Note, we are not making an ethical judgment, and there are no municipal laws against contributing to more than one candidate. Our goals are to gauge the frequency and financial scope of this phenomenon.)
• The FDA auditors identified that 95.9% of gross contributions to all mayoral candidates were over $100, while 4.1% of gross contributions to all mayoral candidates were under $100.
Executive Summary
The Foundation for Democratic Advancement (FDA) measured severe deficiencies in the Alberta municipal processes with regard to the Bingham Crossing development application. The FDA measured both individual and cumulative impacts of the Alberta municipal processes on the democratic welfare of Rocky View County residents and users of the area. Although the individual effects were in some cases insignificant, the accumulation of these impacts raises questions about the consistency of the Alberta municipal processes with a free and democratic society. The FDA determined that overall; the municipal processes give a greater voice to special interests over the voice of the citizenry. In addition, the FDA identified municipal processes that unreasonably limit the democratic rights of citizens and do not include adequate offsetting mechanisms; and are therefore in conflict with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The FDA concludes that the Bingham Crossing development application requires an inspection by the Alberta Municipal Affairs Minister and a provincial government-initiated referendum to determine whether this controversial development application should pass or fail. The purposes of the referendum are to compensate for the deficiencies in the Alberta municipal processes and accurately measure the voice of the Rocky View electorate concerning the Bingham Crossing development. In addition, the FDA recommends amendments of the Alberta Municipal Government Act and Local Authorities Election Act. The measurements and findings of this report have implications for all Albertan municipalities. Finally, the report’s overall purpose is to ensure that Albertans become more knowledgeable about the outcomes of Alberta government processes, and can then make decisions that are more informed.
This report is in no way an evaluation of the merits and deficiencies of the proposed Bingham Crossing development.
The FDA recommends that the public get involved with the government legislative process and implementation if they want to protect and advance their democratic voice, and create a society of their choosing.
“If liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in government to the utmost.”
- Aristotle
2012 FDA media study of the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election. This 76-page study covers the U.S. national press, radio, and television sectors (including online content), and utilizes 7,924 data points. A full report can be purchased at www.democracychange.org
The FDA audit entails a comprehensive audit of the electoral finance legislation of Canada's 10 provinces. The audit is restricted to capturing systematic corruption. The FDA measured exceptional legislation in Québec and Manitoba, very good in Nova Scotia, acceptable in New Brunswick, unacceptable (passing) in Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador, and unacceptable (failing) in Alberta, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. The FDA believes that the legislation from Alberta, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan is systematically corrupt by favouring minority/special interests over the interests of the people. The FDA identified major deficiencies in many areas of these provinces' legislation including the addition of corporations and trade unions in electoral contributions, high caps on contributions, no expenditure limits, public subsidies which favor large, established parties, no regulation of third party expenditure, and/or low fines on corporations and trade unions for electoral wrongdoing. In contrast, FDA auditors measured zero deficiency in Québec's legislation. This measurement means that Québec's legislation is working completely in the interests of the people of Québec. The FDA recommends that the rest of Canada's provinces model their legislation after Québec's.
More from Foundation for Democratic Advancement (6)
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‘वोटर्स विल मस्ट प्रीवेल’ (मतदाताओं को जीतना होगा) अभियान द्वारा जारी हेल्पलाइन नंबर, 4 जून को सुबह 7 बजे से दोपहर 12 बजे तक मतगणना प्रक्रिया में कहीं भी किसी भी तरह के उल्लंघन की रिपोर्ट करने के लिए खुला रहेगा।
In a May 9, 2024 paper, Juri Opitz from the University of Zurich, along with Shira Wein and Nathan Schneider form Georgetown University, discussed the importance of linguistic expertise in natural language processing (NLP) in an era dominated by large language models (LLMs).
The authors explained that while machine translation (MT) previously relied heavily on linguists, the landscape has shifted. “Linguistics is no longer front and center in the way we build NLP systems,” they said. With the emergence of LLMs, which can generate fluent text without the need for specialized modules to handle grammar or semantic coherence, the need for linguistic expertise in NLP is being questioned.
हम आग्रह करते हैं कि जो भी सत्ता में आए, वह संविधान का पालन करे, उसकी रक्षा करे और उसे बनाए रखे।" प्रस्ताव में कुल तीन प्रमुख हस्तक्षेप और उनके तंत्र भी प्रस्तुत किए गए। पहला हस्तक्षेप स्वतंत्र मीडिया को प्रोत्साहित करके, वास्तविकता पर आधारित काउंटर नैरेटिव का निर्माण करके और सत्तारूढ़ सरकार द्वारा नियोजित मनोवैज्ञानिक हेरफेर की रणनीति का मुकाबला करके लोगों द्वारा निर्धारित कथा को बनाए रखना और उस पर कार्यकरना था।
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role of women and girls in various terror groupssadiakorobi2
Women have three distinct types of involvement: direct involvement in terrorist acts; enabling of others to commit such acts; and facilitating the disengagement of others from violent or extremist groups.
Libya--2011 FDA Global Electoral Fairness Audit Report
1. 2011 FDA Global Electoral Fairness
Audit of Libya's Republic Electoral
System (under Gaddafi)
Executive Summary: Libya received a failing overall score of 0 percent for electoral
fairness. The score means that the constitutional and legislative basis for Libya's political
system is completely unfair. With the Supreme Command Council in complete control of the
country, the elected Basic People's Congress is irrelevant. There is no overall element of
democracy in Libya's political system.
Electoral Fairness Audit Completed July 18, 2011.
Updated October 3, 2011
2. About the Foundation for Democratic Advancement:
The Foundation for Democratic Advancement ("FDA")'s mission is to advance fair and
transparent democratic processes wherever elections occur. The FDA believes that fairer
electoral systems and a more informed public will help ensure the election of candidates who
truly represent the will of the people. The FDA fulfills its mission by performing detailed
electoral audits on political candidates and parties to inform the public, objectively and
impartially, about their electoral choices. Also, the FDA audits electoral legislation in terms of
fairness and equity, and conducts ground level assessments of democratic processes. (For more
information on the FDA visit: www.democracychange.com)
Purpose of Electoral Fairness Audit:
The purpose of the FDA’s electoral fairness audit (the “Audit”) is to determine a grade and
ranking for electoral fairness in Libya at the republic level of government. This Audit is part of
the FDA’s global audit of electoral fairness involving all countries which hold political elections.
The FDA's goal is to give the citizens of Libya an informed, objective perspective of the fairness
of the Libyan republic electoral system.
The views in this electoral fairness audit are the views of the FDA only. The FDA’s members and
volunteers are in no way affiliated with the Libyan government or any of the Libyan opposition
elements. The Audit is an independent assessment based on objectivity, transparency and non-
partisanship. The FDA assumes no responsibility or liability for any errors in the calculation of
its audit results or inaccuracies in its research of relevant Libyan legislation.
Methodology of the Electoral Fairness Audit:
The FDA uses the methodology of more reasonableness which was created by FDA founder and
executive director, Stephen Garvey. The methodology focuses on facts themselves for fairness
and unfairness, and their comparative numerical value. To determine the correct numerical value
for facts, FDA auditors are guided by matrices which show the numerical value of established
facts, and FDA scoring scales for fairness and unfairness.
The FDA focuses on four key areas of electoral fairness:
1) Laws and regulations on the political content of media including newspapers, broadcasters and
online media before, during, and after elections;
2) Laws and regulations on the candidates’ and parties’ influence before, during and after
elections, such as national televised debates, restrictions on candidate nominations, party
registration requirements, etc.;
3) Laws and regulations on electoral finance, such as party and campaign donation limits, third
party spending limits etc.; and
Foundation for Democratic Advancement | 2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Libya
3. 4) Laws and regulations on voter say before, during, and after an election. The FDA auditors
determine the fairness of Libyan laws and regulations for voter say in the media, at the polling
booth, through electoral finance and constitutional laws etc.
The FDA audits these four areas of electoral fairness because, in our opinion, they are often
ignored or overlooked by the international community in determining electoral fairness.
Moreover, these four areas cover broad aspects of the electoral process in which fairness could
be compromised significantly. The FDA acknowledges that electoral laws and regulations may
not necessarily correspond to the implementation of those laws and regulations or the public’s
response to them. The implementation and response could be positive or negative, in terms of
electoral fairness. Nevertheless, laws and regulations provide the foundation for democracy,
framework for the electoral system, and an indication of electoral fairness. Also, a country's
constitutional and electoral laws are part of the reality of its democracy. A further study which
tracks the actions of mainstream media and the enforcement or non-enforcement of electoral
laws and regulation, for example, would provide a more reliable overall determination of
electoral fairness.
The FDA researched current Libyan legislation, in relation to the four areas of electoral fairness
being audited. Following which, the FDA audited the research results via the FDA electoral audit
team and established FDA matrices and scoring scales. The scores and the reasons for them are
recorded.
Weighting and Scoring:
Overall, the FDA scoring is guided by an inherent valuation of the concepts of soundness and
relevancy. Each area of electoral fairness has a score range between 0 and 10, and each area is
counted equally. The FDA auditors allow for overlap of electoral fairness areas, due to the
interconnectedness of the areas. For example, electoral finance will be factored into the score for
voter say and candidate and party influence if it is relevant to these areas. The total averaged
score will provide an indication of the electoral fairness in Libya.
The FDA electoral audit team deliberated on the research on each area of electoral fairness, and
then attempted to reach consensus on the scores. When no consensus could be reached, the
individual scores of the team were averaged. The final score for each area must be supported by
more sound reasons and correspond to the established FDA matrices and scoring scale.
FDA Researchers:
Mr. Stephen Garvey, FDA founder and executive director, bachelor degree in Political Science
(University of British Columbia) and Masters degree in Environment and Development
(University of Cambridge).
Foundation for Democratic Advancement | 2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Libya
5. Table of Contents:
Chapter 1: Political Content of Media 7
Executive Summary 7
Research Excerpts 7
Score 8
Rational 8
Chapter 2 Equality of Political Candidate and Party Influence 9
Executive Summary 9
Research Excerpts 9
Score 11
Rational 11
Chapter 3: Equality of Electoral Finance 12
Executive Summary 12
Research Excerpts 12
Score 13
Rational 13
Chapter 4: Equality of Voter Say 14
Executive Summary 14
Research Excerpts 14
Score 16
Rational 16
Chapter 5: Overall Audit Results 18
Chapter 6: Analysis 19
6. Chapter 7: Conclusion 20
Chapter 8: Recommendations 21
References: 22
Appendix: FDA Global Audit Results 23
7. Chapter One: Political Content of Media
Chapter one will focus on the research and audit results of Libyan laws and regulations with
respect to the political content of media, including newspapers, broadcasters and on-line media,
before, during and after elections.
Executive Summary:
Libya received a score of 0 percent for equality of political content. Libya's media and
broadcasters are controlled by the state, and they must conform to the ideology and goals of the
state. Although Libya allows two Arabic satellite channels, political content is censored,
including on the internet. The Libyan state imposes severe penalties including the death penalty
for individuals who act contrary to the state.
Research Excerpts:
The following excerpts were identified by the FDA researchers as relevant. The FDA researchers
made some excerpts bold to emphasize high relevance:
Article 13 [Expression]
Freedom of Opinion is guaranteed within the limits of public interest and the
principles of the Revolution.
The government runs and strictly controls all media in Libya. Law on Publications No. 76 of
1972, modified by Law 120 of 1972 and Law 75 of 1973, governs the press and restricts
publishing rights to two public entities: Al Dar al-Jamahiriya and the General Corporation of
Press, Professional Unions, and Syndicates.
The government owns all print and broadcast media outlets. There is a state-run daily newspaper
and several smaller newspapers published by the local Revolutionary Committees. Opinions
contrary to those of the government are not allowed. No privately owned radio or television
stations are permitted.
The official news agency is the Jamahiriya News Agency (JANA).
Foreign newspapers and magazines are limited in availability and frequently censored, and their
distribution is at times prohibited
The two exceptions to the state’s control of the media are satellite television (especially Arabic
news channels like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyya) and the Internet. In January 2011 the Libyan
government blocked access to at least seven independent and opposition Libyan websites based
abroad, including Libya Al Youm, Al Manara, and Libya Al Mostakbal.
[Arab foreign news channels allowed and no control of the Internet.]
Foundation for Democratic Advancement | 2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Libya Page | 7
8. Electoral Fairness Audit Results for Media and Broadcasters:
Score:
The FDA electoral fairness audit team reached consensus on a score of 0/10
Rational for Score:
The Libyan state has complete control over media and broadcast networks. The state does not
allow privately owned radio and television.
Political content must conform to the ideology and goals of the state.
The internet is filtered based on political content.
The two Arabic news channels (al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyya) permitted by the state via satellite
television may be subject to censorship. These news channels are pro-Arab.
The 0% score reflects the complete control the Libyan state has over Libyan media and
broadcasters. Political content which is counter to the ideology and goals of the Libyan state are
not permitted.
Foundation for Democratic Advancement | 2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Libya Page | 8
9. Chapter Two: Candidates’ and Parties’ Influence
Chapter two will focus on the research and audit results of Libyan laws and regulations with
respect to the fairness of candidates and parties’ influence before, during and after elections.
Executive Summary:
Libya received a failing score of 0 percent for equality of candidate and party influence. Libyan
political parties are illegal, and political content must conform to the ideology and goals of the
state. Also, the elected Basic People's Congress is fully controlled by the Supreme Command
Council. There is complete overall unfairness for Libyan political candidates and parties who are
against the state.
Research Excerpts:
The following excerpts were identified by the FDA researchers as relevant. The FDA researchers
made some excerpts bold to emphasize high relevance:
Article 13 [Expression]
Freedom of Opinion is guaranteed within the limits of public interest and the
principles of the Revolution.
Article 18 [Revolutionary Command Council]
The Revolutionary Command Council constitutes the supreme authority in the Libyan
Arab Republic. It will exercise the powers attached to national sovereignty,
promulgate laws and decrees, decide in the name of the people the general policy of
the State, and make all decisions it deems necessary for the protection of the
Revolution and the regime.
Article 19 [President, Council of Ministers]
(1) The Revolutionary Command Council appoints the President and the Council of
Ministers. It may appoint deputies for the Prime Minister and Ministers without
portfolio. It may discharge the Premier and Ministers and accept their resignation. But
the resignation of the Premier carries with it the resignation of all Ministers.
(2) The Council of Ministers insures the execution of the general policy of the State in
accordance with the decisions of the Revolutionary Command Council.
(3) The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible before the Revolutionary
Command Council. Each Minister is responsible for his department before the Prime
Minister.
Foundation for Democratic Advancement | 2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Libya Page | 9
10. Article 20 [Promulgation]
The Council of Ministers shall study and prepare all projects of law within the
framework of the general policy outlined by the Revolutionary Command Council. It
will then forward the proposed texts to the Revolutionary Command Council for
consideration and promulgation.
[Revolutionary Command Council has supreme, unelected power.]
The Arab Socialist Union acts as the only political party, mobilizing citizens for political
involvement.
National elections in Libya are held indirectly through a hierarchy of committees. In
theory, every three years all citizens 18 years and older must participate in the elections of
the leaders of local Basic People’s Congresses. Members of the Basic People’s Congresses
choose their Basic Local Committees, who in turn, participate in the elections of the
General People’s Congress. The General People’s Congress then chooses the General
People’s Committee.
The 1994 Purge Law was established to fight financial corruption, black marketeering, drug
trafficking, and atheism.
Political parties are illegal. Law 71 of 1972 bans any group activity based on political
ideology contrary to the principles of the 1969 al-Fateh revolution.
Law 19 of 2003 and Law 71 of 1972 regulate the formation and activity of associations in Libya.
Associations engaging in political activity are illegal and political activity is defined as any
activity based on a political ideology contrary to the principles of the 1969 al-Fateh Revolution.
Violators of the law can be put to death. The Libyan authorities have imprisoned hundreds of
people for violating this law, and some have been sentenced to death. The law is typically used to
disband Islamist political organizations, as in 2002 when 86 professionals and students were
sentenced to jail for their membership in the Libyan Islamic Group. Article 206 of the penal code
also imposes the death penalty on those who call “for the establishment of any grouping,
organization or association proscribed by law,” and for those who belong to or support such an
organization.
(3) People's Congresses:
1. The Libyan People is divided into basic People's Congresses.
2. All citizens register themselves as members of the Basic People's Congress* in their area.
3. Every basic People's Congress chooses among its members a committee to lead the Congress.
(4) The masses of the People's Congresses choose People's Committees to administer all the
services. These Committees are responsible to the People's Congresses.
Foundation for Democratic Advancement | 2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Libya Page | 10
11. Electoral Fairness Audit Results for Equality of Candidates and Parties:
Score:
The FDA electoral fairness audit team reached consensus on a score of 0/10.
Rational for Score:
Political parties are illegal.
Political candidates for the Basic People’s Congress must form to the goals of the 1969
revolution.
The Revolutionary Command Council has supreme control politically over Libya.
Civil sector organizations which are counter to the 1969 revolution are not permitted.
The 0% score reflects the complete dominance of the state over political parties and candidates.
Political parties have no influence on elections, because political parties are illegal, and political
candidates must conform to the principles of the 1969 revolution, and therefore their influence is
directed by the state. Candidates who act contrary to the 1969 revolution are not permitted.
Severe penalties including the death sentence are imposed on citizens who act contrary to the
goals of the 1969 revolution.
Foundation for Democratic Advancement | 2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Libya Page | 11
12. Chapter Three: Electoral Finance
Chapter three will focus on the research and audit results of Libyan laws and regulations with
respect to the fairness of Libyan laws and regulations with respect to electoral finance.
Executive Summary:
Libya received a score of 0 percent for equality of electoral finance. The score means that
Libya's electoral finance laws are completely unfair. The FDA could not find Libyan electoral
finance legislation. However, because the Supreme Command Council has complete control over
the country, political content must conform to the ideology and goals of the state, political parties
are illegal, and severe punishments are imposed for acting contrary to the state, the FDA auditors
conclude that even if Libyan electoral finance laws exist, they would have no impact on Libya's
complete electoral unfairness.
Research Excerpts:
The following excerpts were identified by the FDA researchers as relevant. The FDA researchers
made some excerpts bold to emphasize high relevance:
Questionable election participation in 2004:
Election result 2004
Aug 23, 2007
The last elections of the people's congress took place in two stages: the first stage was on
July 18, 2004 and the second on August 7, 2004. The Libyans elected 864 persons out of
11,000 candidates who would assume the tasks of congresses and people's committees’
secretaries in 32 governorates that include 452 people's congresses.
The secretaries enjoy executive, legislative and financial powers in their districts. These
elections were called "reconstruction elections."
Baghdadi Mahmudi was appointed General Secretary of the General People's Committee
on March 5th 2006 in succession to Shukri Ghanem. (Source: MENA Election Guide)
The Arab Socialist Union acts as the only political party, mobilizing citizens for political
involvement.
National elections in Libya are held indirectly through a hierarchy of committees. In
theory, every three years all citizens 18 years and older must participate in the elections of
the leaders of local Basic People’s Congresses. Members of the Basic People’s Congresses
choose their Basic Local Committees, who in turn, participate in the elections of the
General People’s Congress. The General People’s Congress then chooses the General
People’s Committee.
(3) People's Congresses:
Foundation for Democratic Advancement | 2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Libya Page | 12
13. 1. The Libyan People is divided into basic People's Congresses.
2. All citizens register themselves as members of the Basic People's Congress* in their area.
3. Every basic People's Congress chooses among its members a committee to lead the Congress.
4. The masses of the People's Congresses choose People's Committees to administer all the
services. These Committees are responsible to the People's Congresses.
Article 18 [Revolutionary Command Council]
The Revolutionary Command Council constitutes the supreme authority in the Libyan
Arab Republic. It will exercise the powers attached to national sovereignty,
promulgate laws and decrees, decide in the name of the people the general policy of
the State, and make all decisions it deems necessary for the protection of the
Revolution and the regime.
Article 19 [President, Council of Ministers]
(1) The Revolutionary Command Council appoints the President and the Council of
Ministers. It may appoint deputies for the Prime Minister and Ministers without
portfolio. It may discharge the Premier and Ministers and accept their resignation. But
the resignation of the Premier carries with it the resignation of all Ministers.
(2) The Council of Ministers insures the execution of the general policy of the State in
accordance with the decisions of the Revolutionary Command Council.
(3) The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible before the Revolutionary
Command Council. Each Minister is responsible for his department before the Prime
Minister.
Article 20 [Promulgation]
The Council of Ministers shall study and prepare all projects of law within the
framework of the general policy outlined by the Revolutionary Command Council. It
will then forward the proposed texts to the Revolutionary Command Council for
consideration and promulgation.
Electoral Fairness Audit Results for Libyan Election Finance:
Score:
The FDA electoral fairness audit team reached consensus on a score of 0/10.
Rational for Score:
The FDA could find no Libyan laws or regulations on electoral finance.
The 0% score is based on the state’s complete control over the election of members to the Basic
People Congress. Candidates must conform to the goals of the 1969 revolution, and the media
and broadcasters are partial, completely, to the state. The elections in Libya are not free or fair.
Even if there were electoral finance laws, for example, limiting citizen donations to candidates,
the finance laws would be canceled out by the state control over elections.
Foundation for Democratic Advancement | 2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Libya Page | 13
14. Chapter Four: Voter Say
Chapter four will focus on the research and audit results of Libyan laws and regulations with
respect to the fairness of voter say laws and regulations before, during and after an election.
Executive Summary:
Libya received a score of 0 percent for equality of voter say. The scores means that there is
complete unfairness for equality of voter say. Libya voter's say is restricted in numerous ways:
political content must conform to the ideology and goals of the state, political parties are illegal,
groups and organizations contrary to the goals of the state are disallowed, and the elected Basic
People's Congress is fully controlled by the Supreme Command Council. Libyan voters who are
opposed to the state have no say in the public domain (without facing severe punishment) or at
the voting booth, while Libyan voters who support the state have say in the public domain
(without consequences) and at the voting booth. There is no element fairness in voter say.
Research Excerpts:
The following excerpts were identified by the FDA researchers as relevant. The FDA researchers
made some excerpts bold to emphasize high relevance:
Libyan Constitution:
In the name of the Libyan people who believe that peace cannot be achieved without justice, who
are conscious of the importance of strengthening the ties which unite them with all the people of
the world who are struggling against imperialism; who understand fully that the alliance of
reaction and imperialism is responsible for their underdevelopment despite the abundance of
their natural resources, and for the corruption which spread through the governmental apparatus;
who are conscious of their responsibility in the establishment of a national, democratic,
progressive, and unitary government.
[Formation of political system counter to imperialism]
Objectives of freedom, socialism, and unity.
The present Constitutional Proclamation is made to provide a basis for the
organization of the state during the phase of completion of the national and
democratic revolution, until a permanent constitution is prepared, defining the
objectives of the Revolution and outlining the future course.
[Why hasn’t a new Constitution been made?]
Article 6 [Socialism]
The aim of the state is the realization of socialism through the application of social
justice which forbids any form of exploitation. The state endeavors, through the
edification of a socialist community, to achieve self-sufficiency in production and
equity in distribution. Its aim is to eliminate peacefully the disparities between social
Foundation for Democratic Advancement | 2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Libya Page | 14
15. classes and to attain a society of prosperity. Its inspiration is its Arabic and Islamic
heritage, humanitarian values and the specific conditions of the Libyan society.
Article 13 [Expression]
Freedom of Opinion is guaranteed within the limits of public interest and the
principles of the Revolution.
There is no functioning civil society in the sense of independent organizations with views
differing from the leaderships’. Although Libya has many organizations and associations,
including three dealing with human rights, all have ties to the government.
The Libyan Arab Committee for Human Rights, the Libyan Bar Association and the Qadhafi
Foundation for Development address human rights issues strictly within the limits of what the
government deems acceptable debate. They criticize the government at times. This is the case
especially with the Qadhafi Foundation, which enjoys a high degree of protection. It was
founded in 1998 by Seif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, Qadhafi’s son. Originally named the Qadhafi
International Foundation for Charity Associations, it has since been renamed the Qadhafi
Foundation for Development. It has been moderately vocal in criticizing human rights violations
such as torture and political imprisonments
The 1994 Purge Law was established to fight financial corruption, black marketeering, drug
trafficking, and atheism.
Only the elections for the Basic People’s Congresses are based on universal suffrage. The
government is structured in a pyramid of committees and congresses, with each layer
involved in the selection of the layer above. At the apex are the Revolutionary Command
Council and the General People’s Committee.
The elected members (secretaries) of the various congresses and committees select the
members of the General People’s Congress.
Law 19 of 2003 and Law 71 of 1972 regulate the formation and activity of associations in Libya.
Associations engaging in political activity are illegal and political activity is defined as any
activity based on a political ideology contrary to the principles of the 1969 al-Fateh Revolution.
Violators of the law can be put to death. The Libyan authorities have imprisoned hundreds of
people for violating this law, and some have been sentenced to death. The law is typically used to
disband Islamist political organizations, as in 2002 when 86 professionals and students were
sentenced to jail for their membership in the Libyan Islamic Group. Article 206 of the penal code
also imposes the death penalty on those who call “for the establishment of any grouping,
organization or association proscribed by law,” and for those who belong to or support such an
organization.
According to the Law on Enhancing Freedom, “Citizens are free to establish and join trade
unions, professional and social federations and leagues and charitable associations in order to
protect their interests or achieve the legitimate objectives for which those institutions have been
established.” In reality, workers can only join the National Trade Unions’ Federation, which was
created in 1972 and is administered by the People’s Committees.
Foundation for Democratic Advancement | 2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Libya Page | 15
16. According to the law, applications for the formation of an organization or association must be
signed by a minimum of fifty founders. If the organization plans to work country-wide, its
application goes to the secretariat of the General People’s Congress. If the proposed work is
limited to a governorate, the application goes to the People’s Congress of that governorate. If the
work is international, it goes to the whole General People’s Congress. There is no right to appeal
a decision denying a group’s application.
Public assembly is permitted only with the government's approval and in support of the
government's positions.
The law provides for freedom of religion, and the government generally respects this right,
although it represses Islamist groups, which it views as a threat to the regime.
The Charter only guarantees freedom of expression within the system of People’s Congresses
and “within the limits of public interest and the principles of the revolution.” Law 20 also
qualifies the right to free expression. According to article 8, “Every citizen has the right to
express and publicly proclaim his opinions and ideas to the people’s congresses and the
information media of the Jamahiriya. No citizen shall be answerable for his exercise of this right
unless he exploits it with a view to detracting from the people’s authority or for personal ends.”
The article continues: “It is prohibited to advocate ideas or opinions clandestinely or to attempt
to disseminate or impose them on others through enticement, force, intimidation, or fraud.”
Law 20 of 1991 on the Promotion of Freedom establishes the death penalty for anyone
whose continued existence would lead to the disintegration of Libyan society.
Under the Revolutionary leader is a complex system which supposedly represents pure, direct
democracy based on the Green Book, the People’s Declaration of 1977, and subsequently
enacted and ever-changing fundamental laws. It is based on a hierarchy of People’s Committees
and People’s Congresses that extend from the local to the central level.
The Amazigh (Berbers), Libya's main cultural and linguistic minority, face discrimination and
harassment by security officials. Libyan authorities do not allow schools to teach, or media to
use, the Amazigh language. Libyan law also bans use of non-Arab Amazigh names on all official
documentation.
Electoral Fairness Audit Results for Equality of Voter Say:
Score:
The FDA electoral fairness audit team reached consensus on a score of 0/10.
Rational for Score:
The state controls the political content of the media and broadcasters, and citizens.
Libyan political content must conform to the goals of the 1969 revolution.
Foundation for Democratic Advancement | 2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Libya Page | 16
17. The Libyan Supreme Command Council has complete control politically over Libya.
The state enforces its political content laws through censorship and severe penalties including the
death sentence.
Political candidates for the Basic Peoples Congress must accept the goals of the 1969 revolution.
The 0% score is based on the complete control of the Libyan state on the voters’ Libya. Libyan
voters who espouse the state ideology and goals will have say, while those voters who do not will
be silenced or converted through the state’s societal control. There is no voter equality in Libya.
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18. Chapter Five: Audit Results
Chapter five will set out the FDA’s scores for each of the areas of the Libyan electoral system as
set out above.
1. Research and audit results for Libyan laws and regulations on the political content of media
including newspapers, broadcasters, online media, before, during, and after elections.
0/10
2. Research and audit results for Libyan Laws and regulations on the equality of candidates and
parties influence before, during and after elections.
0/10
3. Research and audit results for Libyan laws and regulations on electoral finance.
0/10
4. Research and audit results for laws and regulations on the equality of voter say before, during,
and after an election.
0/10
Total score: 0/40
0 percent
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19. Chapter Six: Analysis
Chapter six will provide a brief analysis of the FDA’s findings.
The Libyan overall electoral fairness score of 0 percent means that there is complete electoral
unfairness in Libya, and any elements of electoral fairness are trumped by overall electoral
unfairness.
The FDA’s 0 percent score for Libya is the same as the FDA score for both Egypt (under
Mubarak) and Syria (current conditions under Assad).
Libya’s electoral and constitutional laws and regulations, which are the foundation for any
democracy, are completely undemocratic.
Strict adherence to the principles as set out by the 1969 Libyan revolution mean that there can be
minimal development toward a system that allows for the fair and democratic election of
candidates who truly represent the people. The only political choice currently available is that of
unquestioning loyalty to the status quo.
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20. Chapter Seven: Conclusion
Chapter seven will provide a summary of the FDA’s findings.
With an overall score of 0 percent Libya needs significant improvement in all four areas of
electoral fairness.
Libya is devoid of a foundation for democracy based on the concepts of political equality,
electoral fairness, and liberty. The country is devoid of freedom for opposing views which would
foster and influence the course of the country’s decisions.
The Libyan political system, through the government’s complete control of all facets of political
discourse, is set up to keep the current regime in power for as long as the people accept the
system as it currently stands, with minimal opportunity for oppositional views to grow.
Elected members of the Basic People’s Congress can have no view beyond that of the goals of
the 1969 Libyan revolution, and this Congress holds insignificant or no actual power.
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21. Chapter Eight: Recommendations
Chapter eight will set out the FDA’s recommendations on how Libya can improve its electoral
fairness score and thereby its electoral fairness.
Libyans need to decide what type of political system they wish to exist in. The current political
system under Gaddafi is an authoritarian system (bordering on totalitarian). Under the system, no
opposition to the state is permitted. Libyan people have no political freedom. However, the
system helps to shield or protect the Libyan people from foreign intervention.
An alternative system would be a pure democratic system based on liberty, political equality, and
electoral fairness. In this system, the Libyan people would have political freedom, and elected
officials who truly represent the will of the people. Moreover, the strength of the society would
rest with the people themselves, and thereby provide the most effective defense against foreign
interference and intervention.
Ultimately, the Libyan people must decide themselves what their future will be. The FDA
believes that an authoritarian system is unjustifiable as a means to protect a country from foreign
intervention, because a pure democratic system can more effectively protect the country.
Therefore, the FDA believes that there is no just cause for an authoritarian system in Libya.
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22. References:
The following information was consulted and utilized in this audit report:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Libya
Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People on March 2, 1977
Libya Constitution 1969
MENA Election Guide: Libya
Prohibition of Party Politics Act Number 71 of 1972
World Report 2011: Libya (Human Rights Watch)
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23. Appendix
FDA Global Audit Results as of September 9, 2011:
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