Outcomes of meetings with civil protection officers and judges in Italy 

1. Davide Miozzo
Marco Altamura – Luca Ferraris – Davide
Amato
Chambery, 27.05.2015
Outcomes of meetings with civil
protection officers and judges in Italy

2. Index
Overcriminalization
• Science in complex systems
• “defensive Civil Protection”
• Science at the bar
Case Studies
• Vibo Valentia
• Aosta
Accountability of scientists
• Systemic risk
• The performance paradox
Conslucions

3. Now
20 Years
Ago
30 Years
ago
• Diffused use of
scientific means
• Monitoring
• Real time
• Prevention
• Planning
• Response
• Mass
casualties

6. Predictions &
Early Warning
Rapid contrast
Disaster
forecasting and
nowcasting
Monitoring &
active disaster
assessment

8. 0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2003
2006
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Number
of
trials
Year
Almost 50 trials
regarding the CP
System
More than 160
victims (without
L’Aquila and Emilia’s
earthquake)
More than 100
indicted
operators of CP
16 regional
administrations
involved

9. Regione Processi
Sardegna 7
Liguria 7
Toscana 6
Campania 4
Emilia Romagna 4
Veneto 4
Puglia 3
Sicilia 2
Calabria 2
Marche 2
Lazio 2
Val D'Aosta 2
Molise 1
Abruzzo 1
Piemonte 1
Basilicata 0
Umbria 0
Friuli 0
Lombardia 0
Trentino 0

11. Questions from the Italian CP
asked, through the European
Council, to National CPs:
1) Existence of Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs)
2) Are those SOPs mandatory?
3) In case of infringement of SOPs (if
they exist) do Operators have to
undergo trials?

12. 4) Are there SOPs that the operator is bound
to follow in communicating the alert to other
institutions (i.e. Regional and Municipial
entities) and to the population?
5) Are there SOPs that the operator is bound
to follow in monitoring meteorological
events? If yes, which ones?
6) Are there SOPs on the behavioural
conduct of operators during the event?

13. 7) If the abovementioned rules were infringed, has an
operator ever been prosecuted by the Judicial
Authority? If yes, which was the result of the legal
action?
No
No!
The above mentioned
rules were never infringed
The rules mentioned in
items 1-6 have been
respected so that no
operator has been
prosecuted in this respect.
There has been no such
situation.
Yes, in one case, but it was
not a court case. In 2006 a
disciplinary procedure
was introduced against a
duty officer because he
broke the above
mentioned internal rules
in relation to a
meteorological event. The
procedure was closed
down and the duty officer
was disciplined.

15. 155 Million € damage bill
4 deaths
July 3, 2006
09:00 UTC: 73mm
10:00 UTC: 115mm
11:00 UTC: 10 mm
198mm/3hrs
15 Km2

16. 200 mm20 mm

17. The Prosecutor
calls upon an
expert asking
him to answer
these questions:
1) Was the meteorological
paroxysm foreseeable?
2) Was the alert quickly
dispatched?
3) Were landslides and
flooding directly
connected with the
behavior of the accused?

18. The Expert, by use, ex
post, of a different
NWP model:
The event was not
foreseeable locally
but…
…the data in
possession of
the system
should have
induced the
CP to
(pre)alert the
entire region

19. The Hindsight bias –
procedural problems
• The “experts” of the
prosecutor
• Questions asked to the
experts
• The hindsight bias
• The Model Operator: a
superhuman figure
abstractedly configured
ed ex post
• Blame games

20. Formal charges against indicted persons
(2006)
• CP should have given the alert;
• By not doing so they were formally charged of
having caused floods (offense foreseen in the
Italian Criminal Code and punishable with 5
years in custody);
• Had he given the alert, according to the
prosecutor, the communication flow amidst CP
HQ and the population would have avoided the
deaths.

21. The decision of the court (2009):
Acquitted from charges
• If a phenomenon is not
foreseeable there cannot be
responsibility;
• Floods and landslides that have
occurred cannot be connected
with the behavior of the accused
persons.

23. • Increased number of alerts;
• Alerts of higher level;
• Adoption of precautionary
m e a s u r e s a n d m e a s u r e s
a f f e c t i n g f r e e d o m ( e . g .
evacuations or movement
limitations);
• Preventive shutdown of public,
private and industrial buildings.
Active “defensive behaviors”:

24. • Resignations from office of
highly qualified personnel;
• Fragmentation of mandates;
• Suppression of services.
Passive “defensive behaviors”:
• Fears of the officials;
• Inflexibility of the system.
No lessons learned:

25. CorrectFalseMissedNo-event

26. Precautionary Regionà 38% Correct; 61%
False; 1% Missed
Performant Regionà 87% Correct; 9% False; 4%
Missedà meaning a probability 4% higher to end up
in court!!!

27. 0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Trials
Performance
Year
Trials
False
Correct
Missed

28. Homus oeconomicus Homus Juridicus

29. Local emergency plans

31. Develop new ways of planning
Participatory approaches
• Recognize, accept and manage
risk along with the population
EU Flood Directive
• Methodologies, prevention,
preparedness and participation
Internal enquiries
• Study of what has been done and
its evaluations need to be
transparent and shared for a
systemic enhancement

32. From a model operator
to a model system
Jurists, prosecutors,
c i v i l p r o t e c t i o n
operators, legislators
(national, regional,
local), citizens and the
media should confront
each other, exchange
views, problems and
potential solutions with
a common project:
Identification of
GOOD practices
Implementation of
GOOD practices
Testing and validation
of GOOD Practices
Dissemination
Adoption of a Model
System
Final reccomendations

33. Davide Miozzo
Davide.miozzo@cimafoundation.org
Davide Amato
Marco Altamura
Luca Ferraris
CIMA FOUNDATION
Via Armando Magliotto, 2 –
17100 Savona | ITALIA
Phone: +39 019230271
Fax: +39 01923027240
Email: info@cimafoundation.org
Web: www.cimafoundation.org