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![The UK and the Troubles:
Human rights violations in
Northern Ireland between
1969 and 1998
Imagine living in a modern society in a developed state having to face daily threats to your
life and well-being. When we think of violations of human rights it is not often that our
thoughts immediately span to the depths of ‘first world’ countries – especially not within the
realm of the twentieth century. Between 1969 and 1998, Northern Ireland faced a civil war
which caused more than 3,600 deaths and 50,000 injuries1
. The so-called Troubles were
based on a centuries-old struggle over territory and identity between the Irish and the British
communities2
. With Unionist-Protestants seeking to remain a province of the United
Kingdom and Nationalist-Catholics striving for a reunification with the Irish Republic;
Northern Ireland had always faced periods of struggles and ‘uneasy coexistence’ between
the different groups3
. The outbreak of the Troubles was triggered by a civil rights march in
Londonderry in 1969, which culminated in a violent confrontation between Protestant and
Catholic groups4
. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was not able to control the fighting
and subsequently, the British army had to intervene in the three-day eruption of violence5
.
As a consequence of deathly incidents in 1972, when the British Army shot demonstrators
on Bloody Sunday and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) committed a bombing
attack on Bloody Friday, the Westminster Parliament took direct control over Northern
Ireland until 19986
. The disempowerment of the Northern Irish Stormont government thus
constituted the assumption of accountability by the British government for all legitimate and
illegitimate actions conducted by state forces.
This article argues that during the Troubles, the UK colluded in human rights violations in
different forms, such as “[…] verbal abuses and threats, torture and cruel punishment,
systematic violations of the right to fair trial and other issues of justice, and finally a
considerable number of violations of the right to life”7
. In order to understand and evaluate
the violations at hand, it is necessary to first introduce the field of human rights and to
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate derogations of human rights based on
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The arguable permission
of human rights violations in case of emergency, such as the derogation of the right to
liberty and security, the right to a fair trial and the prohibition of discrimination are imperative
factors in understanding the background and reasoning for the actions of the UK. It is as
well prevalent to note to what extent two of the most fundamental and non-restrictable
rights, the right to life and the prohibition of torture, have been violated by the executive of
By Katrin Schmitz
During the Northern Irish Troubles, the
British government violated human rights
in many different ways. In this article,
after introducing the field of human
rights, the differentiation between
legitimate and illegitimate derogations of
human rights based on Article 15 of the
European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) will be elaborated upon. On the
one hand, although Article 15 ECHR
legitimises the derogation of particular
parts of the convention in case of war or
another form of emergency, it is
questionable if these violations were
really necessary in order to protect the
state. On the other hand, the UK
repeatedly violated the fundamental and
non-restrictable right to life and the
prohibition of torture, which underlines
the serious national situation. The UK
faced immense instability and was
targeted by many terroristic attacks
perpetrated by anti-state paramilitary
groups. Thus, human rights violations
can be characterised as a consequence
of counter-insurgency strategies.
Nevertheless, in a liberal democracy,
human rights should never be
controversial; they must always need to
be protected no matter how threatened a
state is.
4 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations
1 David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland
(Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2002), p. ix-xi; Maria Power (ed.), Building Peace in Northern Ireland
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), pp.1-17.
2 Kirk Simpson, Truth Recovery in Northern Ireland, Critically Interpreting the Past (Manchester/New York:
Manchester University Press, 2009), pp. 8-30.
3 John Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror. How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (New York:
Basic Books, 1978), pp. 1-35; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Colin McInnes, ‘The British Army in Northern Ireland
1969-1972: From Policing to Counter-Terror’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 20 (1997), 1-24; Simpson, pp. 8-
30.
4 Bowyer Bell, pp. 1-35.
5 Ibid.
6 Lynn Wartchow, ‘Civil and Human Rights Violations in Northern Ireland: Effects and Shortcomings of the Good
Friday Agreement in Guaranteeing Protections’, Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, 3 (2005).
7 Ibid.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-4-2048.jpg)
![the UK during the Northern Irish Troubles. This begs the question that is indeed relevant to
today: just how far are some people willing to go in order to receive civil rights, and to what
degree will others go in order to prevent these rights being given?
Human rights violations during the Troubles
Human rights can generally be defined as the unalienable rights of every human being,
which form the moral and legal basis of humanity8
. All human beings have the right to take
advantage from the same “economic, social, cultural, civil and political freedoms”9
.
Additionally, human rights, such as the prohibition of torture and the prohibition of slavery,
must never be derogated10
. After the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948, the ECHR was drafted by the Council of Europe and signed in 1950 by the
UK and all of the other 38 member states11
. The ECHR represents the first human rights
agenda based on a regional agreement12
. Moreover, the ECHR “has the most case law,
and is the most advanced and comprehensive regional system of human rights”13
. The
Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 5
8 Klaus Schubert and Martina Klein, Human Rights [Menschenrechte] (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung, 2011) <http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/politiklexikon/17842/menschen rechte> [accessed 07
January 2016]; Human Rights Watch, Human Rights 101, (New York, 2015) <https://www.hrw.org /human-rights-
101> [accessed 17 January 2016].
9 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Act and the ECHR, (Belfast, n.d.)
<http://www.nihrc.org/about-human-rights/human-rights-law-and-standards> [accessed 15 January 2016].
10 bid.
11 Pieter van Dijk and Godefridus J. H van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 3rd edn (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp.1-36.
12 Hurst Hannum, ‘The Impact of European Human Rights Jurisprudence on the Conflict in Northern Ireland’, in
Human Rights and Conflict Resolution in Context. Colombia, Sierra Leone and Northern Ireland, ed. by Eileen F.
Babbitt and Ellen L. Lutz (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2009), pp. 230-247.
13 Kara E. Irwin, ‘Prospects for Justice: The Procedural Aspect of the Right To Life under the European Convention
on Human Rights and its Applications to Investigations of Northern Ireland’s Bloody Sunday’, Fordham
International Law Journal, 22 (1999), 1822-1859 (p. 1833).](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-5-2048.jpg)
![representing a political system which “[…] instituted a series of discriminating policies
[against Catholic citizens] in areas such as housing, employment, and voting rights”22
. The
new options of the EPA were applied particularly to Catholic citizens and therefore
continued the oppression of Catholic communities. For instance, house searches by the
RUC and the British army happened almost exclusively in Catholic neighbourhoods, which
strengthened the ethnic gap23
. According to Bowyer Bell, the British Army was not
successful in catching PIRA terrorists, but only underlined the strategies of discrimination by
collecting “hundreds of Catholics, including civil rights agitators, but no Protestant
extremists”24
. As a result, from the Catholic community’s perspective the British state forces
only represented another “tool of the oppressive Stormont regime”25
. Furthermore, the so-
called Diplock courts were established, in which no jury was needed to be declared guilty by
a judge26
. In addition, “the burden of proof was reserved in key charges relating to firearms
and explosives [and] the defendant was presumed guilty until proven innocent”27
, which
conflicts with the principle of in dubio pro reo: in the doubt for the accused. Thus, the EPA
derogated the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR), the right to respect for private and family
life (Article 8 ECHR ) and the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 ECHR).
The Troubles raised the conflict-ridden relationship to a new level. “Fuelled by religious
hatred, segregation, and heavy-handed direct British rule”28
, pro- and anti-state paramilitary
groups tried to enforce their interests by the use of force and the spread of terror29
. After the
PIRA committed a bombing in Birmingham in 1974, which caused the death of 21 people,
the British government enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)30
. The PTA applied to
the whole United Kingdom and empowered public authorities to ban military as well as
paramilitary groups31
. Moreover, the new legislation authorised state forces “to arrest, detain
and interrogate individuals for up to seven days without an appearance before a
magistrate”32
. Furthermore, it included “mandatory jail sentences for rioting or those found
guilty of causing a breach of the peace”33
. According to the European Court of Human
Rights, these security measurements are justifiable, because “although the powers of
detention and internment without trial as exercised by the British government … did violate
the convention’s guarantees of liberty and security of person, they were nonetheless
justified as ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’ in Northern Ireland”34
.
Nevertheless, it remains arguable to what extent the right to liberty and security (Article 5
ECHR) and the freedom of assembly and association (Article 11 ECHR) may be restricted.
Rolston concludes that “the Northern Ireland conflict is a prime example of a situation in
which a rule of law, albeit distorted, went hand-in-hand with a dirty war of dubious legality”35
.
Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 7
22 Ibid.
23 Kennedy-Pipe and McInnes, pp. 1-24.
24 Bowyer Bell, p. 216.
25 Kennedy-Pipe and McInnes, p.1.
26 Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘To Know Where We Are Going, We Need to Know Where We Are:
Revisiting States of Emergency’, in A Human Rights: An Agenda for the 21st Century ed. by Angela Hegarty and
Siobhan Leonard (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1999), pp. 79-116.
27 Bill Rolston, ‘An effective mask for terror: Democracy, death squads and Northern Ireland’, Crime, Law and
Social Change, 44.1 (2005), 181-203 (p. 198).
28 Wartchow.
29 Neil Jarman, ‘From the Frying Pan to the Fire? Conflict Resolution, Human Rights, and Transitional Violence in
Northern Ireland’, in Human Rights and Conflict Resolution in Context. Colombia, Sierra Leone and Northern
Ireland, ed. by Eileen F. Babbitt and Ellen L. Lutz (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2009), pp. 187-209;
Simpson, pp. 8-30.
30 Power, pp. 1-17.
31 Wartchow.
32 Ibid.
33 Kennedy-Pipe and McInnes, p. 12.
34 Hannum, p. 236.
35 2005: 198](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-7-2048.jpg)
![groups”47
. However, it is important to keep in mind that the funding by the British
government does not imply that loyalist paramilitary organisations acted as ‘state-run
counter-gangs’48
, but as autonomous movements. The sponsorship of paramilitary
organisations has also been criticised by the United Nations Special Rapporteur, Bacre
Waly Ndiaye, who received allegations concerning aiding and abetting attacks by British
intelligence officers on many cases49
. These accusations gained credibility when the British
government consistently refused any kind of investigation on the topic50
. Regardless of a
direct or indirect involvement of the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, in most
cases the emergency legislative measurements enabled them to act with impunity.
Another example of a violation of Article 2 ECHR is the event of Bloody Sunday, when
British troops tried to control a banned civil rights march in Londonderry on 30 January
1972, where 13 unarmed men were killed51
. These killings can neither be legitimised by the
exceptions given in Article 2 nor by the aspects of derogation stated in Article 15 and thus
do indeed violate the victims’ right to life52
. The incident of the Bloody Sunday killings has
been investigated by the Widgery Tribunal which acquitted the British soldiers53
. According
to the report, none of them could be blamed for the deaths because they individually
reported that the civilians were wearing objects in the form of arms54
. Thus, opening fire can
be declared as a justified reaction55
. The outcome of the Widgery Report has been fiercely
criticised as a campaign of whitewashing and covering up the British government’s failure56
.
According to Irwin, not only the killing itself violates human rights, but also the state’s overly
long hesitation to investigate these incidents57
. Scholars Bell and Irwin condemned the trial
“[…] on many grounds as a failure to find the truth”58
. It can even be argued that the long
absence of a truthful investigation of the Bloody Sunday killings has widened the gap
between Unionists and Nationalists due to the lack of a declaration of accountability by the
British government, because “governments should at all times be accountable for the loss of
life of citizens who have been killed by agents of the state”59
. In 1998 the British government
established a new inquiry chaired by Mark Saville in order to show the UK’s willingness to
find the truth of Bloody Sunday’s incidents60
. After 12 years of investigation, the Saville
Report concluded that the British soldiers’ opening fire was not a reaction towards attacks or
threatened attacks by the demonstrators, but it was based on a loss of self-control and fire
discipline61
. Consequently, in 2010 the government officially apologised to the victims’
Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 9
47 Rolston, p. 185.
48 Ibid, p. 193.
49 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in any part of the world, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and
territories, Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly
Ndiaye, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/73, E/CN.4/1996/4
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/commission/country52/4-add1.htm> [accessed 15 January 2016] (p. 118).
50 Ibid.
51 Patrick Hayes and Jim Campbell, Bloody Sunday: Trauma, Pain and Politics (London: Pluto Press, 2005).
52 Irwin, pp. 1822-1859.
53 Wartchow.
54 John Passmore Widgery, Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30 January 1972,
which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day (Widgery Report) (London:
Stationery Office, 1972) < http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/widgery.htm> [accessed 12 Jaunary 2016].
55 Wartchow.
56 Irwin, pp. 1822-1859.
57 Ibid.
58 John Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence 1967-1992 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993);
Irwin, p. 1823.
59 Irwin, p. 1823.
60 Douglas Murray, Bloody Sunday: Truth, Lies and the Saville Inquiry (London: Biteback Publishing, 2012).
61 Mark Saville, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (Saville Report) (London: Stationery Office, 2010)
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279133/0029_i.pdf> [accessed
31 March 2016].](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-9-2048.jpg)
![relatives, declaring that “[w]hat happened on Bloody Sunday was both unjustified and
unjustifiable. It was wrong”62
. Nevertheless, the British government failed to investigate an
overwhelming amount of crimes and has not yet assumed full responsibility “for the loss of
the lives of citizens killed by state agents, even those who were unarmed”63
. Thus, until the
UK does not admit to the British security forces’ human rights violations during the Troubles,
the Northern Irish society will not be able to achieve closure with its bloody history64
.
Conclusion
The Northern Irish Troubles demonstrate the extent to which the British government was
willing to go in terms of human rights violations simply to keep order and control. On the one
hand it could be emphasised that although Article 15 ECHR allows derogation of the
convention in case of war or another form of emergency, the necessity of these derogations
is highly arguable. Incidents of legitimate human rights violations such as the use of
discrimination and oppression, the disrespect of privacy and family life, and the refusal of a
fair trial show that Article 15 of the ECHR can be interpreted too broadly. It is questionable if
these violations have been really necessary in order to protect the state. Moreover, it must
not be concluded that legalising a human rights violation can be considered synonymous
with an ethical justification.
On the other hand, it is also well known that the UK violated the fundamental and non-
restrictable right to life and the prohibition of torture in many cases during the Troubles. The
ECHR strengthened their unlimited validity, even in case of war or another emergency
threatening the life of the nation. However, the British government’s disregard of the ECHR
underlines the serious situation of the UK. During the Troubles, the UK faced immense
instability and was targeted by many terroristic attacks perpetrated by anti-state paramilitary
groups. Thus, all of these human rights violations can be characterised as a consequence
of counter-insurgency strategies. Nevertheless, in a liberal democracy, above all, the most
fundamental human rights like the right to life and the prohibition of torture should never be
questionable, no matter how hard a state might be threatened. Especially in consideration
of recent threats from extremist groups attempting terrorist attacks in European cities, it is
even more important to keep in mind that violating human rights as a means to an end only
leads to the decline of the rule of law and to a restriction of our civil rights in the daily life.
10 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations
62 David Cameron, Bloody Sunday: PM David Cameron’s full statement, (London: BBC News, 2010)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10322295> [accessed 31 March 2016].
63 Wartchow.
64 Brian Gormally The legacy of the Troubles lives on. The UK must admit its failures, (London: The Guardian, 2015)
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015 /aug/03/troubles-uk-failures-good-friday-agreement-law-un>
[accessed 31 March 2016].](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-10-2048.jpg)
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Limited, 1999).
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Press, 2005).
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rights-101> [accessed 17 January 2016].
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Transitional Violence in Northern Ireland’, in Human Rights and Conflict Resolution in
Context. Colombia, Sierra Leone and Northern Ireland, ed. by Eileen F. Babbitt and Ellen L.
Lutz (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2009).
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in Northern Ireland (Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2002).
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Publishing, 2012).
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Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 11](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-11-2048.jpg)
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12 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-12-2048.jpg)
![14 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations
The key features of a liberal democracy can be described as the recognition of individual
rights and freedoms, including both electoral procedures such as political participation and
procedural democracy which focuses on democratic institutional arrangements such as the
separation of powers. Due to word limitations, four indicators of democracy will be utilised in
accordance with the indicators used by Freedom House (2015) in their assessment of
democracy. These include: economic liberalisation, the freedom of the media, judicial
independence and the absence of corruption in the electoral process.5
The following section
will examine the presence of these aspects within both Hungary and Albania as well as
offering a brief historical overview of the transition that occurred in each country
respectively.
The case of Hungary
The movement away from socialism in Hungary has been described as an ‘evolutionary
transition’6
, occurring as the result of action amongst political elites. Whilst it is important to
recognise that the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was undeniably an effort for change from
below, it can be seen that it was actually this uprising that paved the way for a top-down
reorganisation of Hungary as it forced political elites to recognise the problems that the
country was facing for fear of recurrence of the violence7
. In light of this uprising, the
Hungarian political elite adopted a far more conciliatory attitude towards social movements,
5 Sylvana Habdank-Kołaczkowska, Nations in Transit 2015: Democracy on the Defensive in Europe and Eurasia,
(Freedom House, 2015) <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_NIT2015_06.06.15_FINAL.pdf>
[accessed 10 May 2016].
6 Lewis, pp. 4.
7 Ibid, pp. 7.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-14-2048.jpg)
![steps by entering into negotiations with independent political bodies that challenged the
existing regime11
, consequently allowing the changes amongst elites to shape Hungary’s
transition away from socialism. Furthermore, the fact that the transition was evolutionary as
opposed to revolutionary meant that there was less need for rapid reform12
, to which it has
been argued, allowed for a stronger form of democracy to be consolidated. In light of this,
an assessment must be made upon the quality of democracy that can be found in Hungary
in order to see whether the nature of transition from above impacted the consolidation of
this political system. The democracy that emerged out of Hungary’s transition has been
described as one of the most stable and, until 2008, prosperous of the post-socialist
world13
. However, the initial coalition established under socialism faced a number of
accusations including intervention in the mass media and rising unemployment, issues
which Hungary are still facing today. In turn, we must question to what extent the transition
amongst political elites truly helped Hungary establish a successful democracy. The
following section has subsequently been divided into three subsections, each of which will
assess one of the key features of liberal democracy and the extent to which these can be
seen within the political system in Hungary.
Electoral process
One of the key features of a functioning democracy is the presence of free and fair elections
that in turn allow for a government free from corruption. Whilst there was initially debate
over the form and content of the constitution, Hungary still managed to establish a pluralist
system, allowing for the introduction of multi-party elections in May 199014
. Such reforms at
first seemed to be successful, with Hungary being seen by the West as the most liberal
country within the Soviet Bloc15
. Furthermore, after the collapse of the socialist regime,
Hungary saw high levels of active political participation, which is often associated with an
effective and democratic electoral process by allowing for greater representation. For
example, Pridham notes how the Hungarian Constitution of 1990 introduced a system of
participatory democracy and how at the level of civil society, Hungary had one of the most
politically active citizenships in Central and Eastern Europe16
.
However, in spite of these initial success, it can be argued that free and fair elections in
Hungary have not be sustained, seen in the fact that in recent years there has debatably
been a crisis of democracy within Hungary under the administration of Viktor Orban. After
the 2010 elections, the pluralist system vital to a democratic state were destroyed, including
the restriction to constitutional laws and the aim of removing all political alternatives17
.
Therefore, whilst primarily it seemed that Hungary would successfully employ a democratic
electoral system, current political developments have brought such claims under serious
doubt. Consequently, it can be questioned whether the top-down transition in Hungary had
a long-lasting impact on the establishment of free elections or liberal democracy Hungary.
16 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations
11 Joseph Rothschild and Nancy Wingfield, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since
World War II, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
12 James Roaf, Ruben Atoyan, Bikas Joshi and Krzysztof Krogulski, 25 Years of Transition : Post – Communist
Europe and the IMF (International Monetary Fund, 2014)
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2014/eur/eng/pdf/erei_sr_102414.pdf> [accessed 10 May 2016].
13 Jane L. Curry and Sharon L. Wolchik, Central and East European politics: From communism to democracy
(United States: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
14 Cox and Furlong.
15 East and Pontin, pp. 61.
16 Geoffrey Pridham, ‘Assessing Democratic Consolidation in Central & Eastern Europe: The European Dimension’,
Acta Politica, 41 (2006), 342–369.
17 Gábor Schein, Speaking with Double Tongues: What’s Gone Wrong in Hungary? (Open Democracy, 2012)
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/g%C3%A1bor-schein/speaking-with-double-tongues-what%E2%80%99s-
gone-wrong-in-hungary> [accessed 10 May 2016].](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-16-2048.jpg)
![Judicial independence and freedom of the press
In light of this rise in political corruption under Orban, it seems unsurprising that the
independence of the judicial system and freedom of the press have also suffered in recent
years. As with the electoral process, the Constitutional Court established in Hungary in 1990
as a result of the roundtable negotiations originally helped to maintain democratic practices
and maintained the separation of powers and rule of law typically found in liberal democratic
systems. This can be seen in the Act of on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges
which prescribed stricter requirements that had to be met in order to become a judge, in turn
helping to separate the judiciary from political activity in Hungary.
Furthermore, during the transition away from socialism, Hungary established regional courts
and a court of appeal which allowed the Supreme Court, and the judicial system overall, to
function more effectively. In turn, since its establishment Hungary’s Constitutional Court has
become one of the most powerful constitutional courts in the world, highlighting the strength
and efficiency of Hungary’s judicial system18
. However, much like the electoral system, the
democratic nature of the judicial system has seriously suffered since the election of Orban
into office; with party cronies often replacing judges and increasing reports of bribery on
behalf of political elites. In turn, this would again cast doubt on the assertion that
liberalisation amongst political elites had any enduring effect on the consolidation of
democracy in Hungary. A similar process has been seen with the freedom of the press
within Hungary. Whilst the Constitutional Court ruled in October 1994 that state interference
in the media was illegal, the freedom of the media has come under attack in recent years19
.
This can be seen most clearly after the 2010 elections, where new media laws were
introduced that explicitly restricted freedom of speech and freedom of the press20
, posing a
significant setback to democracy within Hungary.
Liberalisation of the economy
Within a liberal democratic system, the economy is generally defined by a free market
system which provides a high standard of living for the citizens of the country. After the initial
fall of the Communist Party, Hungary saw relative success in this area, with developments
towards a liberalised economy already well underway by the end of the socialist regime.
However, this economic stability was not to last and by 1992, Hungary had seen a negative
growth of 4.5% and unemployment had doubled21
. Similarly, by the end of 1995 Hungary’s
foreign debt was at approximately $33 billion, demonstrating that despite the relative
political stability in the country, this had not translated into a successful liberalised economy.
Having said this, Hungary has still witnessed sustained economic growth of about 5% since
199622
and so it would be unfair to claim that Hungary has not had any economic success
since the fall of socialism.
Still, it is important to note that economic success does not mean that the system is without
corruption. For example, currently the state remains the greatest economic force in the
marketplace with successful private companies often becoming pawns of the interests of
high-ranking politicians23
. Furthermore, Hungary has suffered as a result of the financial
crisis in 2008 (see Figure 1.1), with the recession fuelling civil unrest and a decline in living
standards. Consequently, whilst Hungary has managed to establish a liberalised market
economy, enhancing its domestic agency, it is still suffering from the corruption seen in less
democratic states.
Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 17
18 Pridham, pp. 360.
19 East and Pontin, pp. 60.
20 László Bitó, Hungary’s Struggles for Freedom and Democracy (Open Democracy, 2012)
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/l%C3%A1szl%C3%B3-bit%C3%B3/hungarys-struggles-for-freedom-and-
democracy> [accessed 10 May 2016].
21 East and Pontin, pp. 56.
22 Pridham, 2006.
23 Schein.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-17-2048.jpg)
![Figure 1.1. GDP Growth (Annual %) in Hungary
i Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local
currency24
.
The case of Albania
In contrast to the events that unfolded in Hungary, the transition that took place in Albania,
whilst not particularly violent, was clearly the result of action from below instigated by the
citizenship of the country itself25
. Unlike Hungary, the dictatorial regime in Albania was
repressive until the end of the socialist rule and so there was no toleration of any form of
elite dissent, in turn preventing the divides forming that were found amongst the Hungarian
leadership26
. Whilst the Revolution of 1956 had forced the Party in Hungary to recognise
the economic and social crisis it was facing, the Communist Party of Albania was unwilling
to acknowledge these failures despite its struggling economy and poor living standards.
Furthermore, the Albanian Constitution of 1976 prevented the government accepting any
foreign aid, also contributing to the growing civil unrest within the country at the time.
By the time of Ernst Hoxha’s death in 1985, workers were failing to show up to work,
peasants were not delivering food to the cities and there was a large scale destruction of
property across Albania27
. This civil unrest eventually culminated in the first official anti-
socialist demonstrations being held in Kavaja and Shkoder in 1990, shortly followed by the
Student’s Movement in December at the Enver Hoxha University28
. In light of these
demonstrations, the Communist Party finally agreed to minor concessions, including the
allowance of foreign investment and a free and fair election29
. However, rather than
appeasing the masses as the political elite may have hoped, this only served to deepen the
demand for change within Albania.
The end of socialism in Albania eventually came after the Communist Party was re-elected
in the free elections held in 1991. In response to these results, a series of street
demonstrations broke out followed by a nationwide strike of workers which saw four people
die in what were the most serious disturbance in Albania yet30
. Such rioting continued
18 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations
24 World Bank, Indicator Metadata (2015)
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/HU?display=graph> [accessed 10 May
2016].
25 White, pp. 52.
26 Lewis, pp. 7.
27 Sabrina Ramet, Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), pp. 423.
28 Mirela Bogdani and John Loughlin, Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey Towards (London:
I. B.Tauris & Company, 2007), pp. 21.
29 Richard J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the twentieth century–and after. (United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis,
2010), pp. 403.
30 Bogdani and Loughlin.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-18-2048.jpg)
![It is also important to consider other factors that may have impacted on the consolidation of
democracy within Central and Eastern Europe i.e. cultural legacy and the presence of
international organisations such as the European Union. For example, Pridham argued that
membership of the European Union provided long term support for the establishment of
democratic institutions and helped consolidate liberal democracy through intensification of
networking41
. As Hungary has been a member of the European Union since 2004 and
Albania is currently not a member, this may well be an influencing factor although due to
word limitations the paper has not been able to discuss this further. It is also important to
note that this article has solely focused on the idea of liberal democracy and has only made
reference to two examples, extrapolating the findings from these case studies to the wider
area of politics in post-socialist Europe. Consequently, whilst the impact of the nature of
transition may not be significant in Hungary and Albania, further research would have to be
conducted to draw firmer correlations between the two phenomenons. In spite of these
limitations however, this article has demonstrated that the overall the nature of transition
away from a socialist regime has had limited influence in shaping a country’s ability to
successfully introduce a liberal democratic system of government, as seen within Hungary
and Albania, and instead we must look to other factors such as EU membership to explain
differences in the consolidation of democracy in the post-Soviet space.
Bibliography
Bitó, László, Hungary’s Struggles for Freedom and Democracy (Open Democracy, 2012)
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/l%C3%A1szl%C3%B3-bit%C3%B3/hungarys-struggles-
for-freedom-and-democracy> [accessed 10 May 2016].
Bogdani, Mirela and John Loughlin, Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous
Journey Towards (London: I. B.Tauris & Company, 2007), pp. 21.
Bollen, Kenneth A., ‘Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National
Measures’, American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 1207-1230.
Cox, Terry, ‘1989 and the Transformations in Eastern Europe’, Europe-Asia Studies, 63
(2011), 1529–1534).
Crampton, Richard J., Eastern Europe in the twentieth century–and after (United Kingdom:
Taylor & Francis, 2010).
Curry, Jane L. and Sharon L. Wolchik, Central and East European politics: From
communism to democracy (United States: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
East, Rodger and Jolyon Pontin, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, 2nd
edn (United Kingdom: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1997).
Furlong, Andy and Terry Cox, ‘Political transition in Hungary: An overview’, The Journal of
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 10 (1994), 1-12.
Gaille, WB, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56
(1956), 167-198.
Habdank-Kołaczkowska, Sylvana, Nations in Transit 2015: Democracy on the Defensive in
Europe and Eurasia (Freedom House, 2015)
<https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_NIT2015_06.06.15_FINAL.pdf> [accessed
10 May 2016].
22 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations
41 Geoffrey Pridham, ‘EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-Communist States – Formality and
Reality’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2002), 953–973.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-22-2048.jpg)
![International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout Data for
Hungary (International IDEA, 2011) <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=100>
[accessed 10 May 2016].
Lewis, Paul, ‘Theories of Democratization and Patterns of Regime Change in Eastern
Europe’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 13 (1997), 4–26.
O’Neil, Patrick H., ‘Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from
Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary’, World Politics, 48 (1996), 579–603.
Panagiotou, Rista, ‘Albania and the EU: From Isolation to Integration’, Journal of Balkan and
Near Eastern Studies, 13(2011), 357–374.
Pridham, Geoffrey, ‘EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-Communist
States – Formality and Reality’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2002),
953–973.
— ‘Assessing Democratic Consolidation in Central & Eastern Europe: The European
Dimension’, Acta Politica, 41 (2006), 342–369.
Ramet, Sabrina, Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 423.
Roaf, James, Ruben Atoyan, Bikas Joshi and Krzysztof Krogulski, 25 Years of Transition:
Post – Communist Europe and the IMF (International Monetary Fund, 2014)
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2014/eur/eng/pdf/erei_sr_102414.pdf> [accessed
10 May 2016].
Rothschild, Joseph and Nancy Wingfield, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East
Central Europe since World War II, 2nd
edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Sakwa, Richard, Post Communism (United Kingdom: Open University Press, 1999).
Schein, Gábor, Speaking with Double Tongues: What’s Gone Wrong in Hungary? (Open
Democracy, 2012) <https://www.opendemocracy.net/g%C3%A1bor-schein/speaking-with-
double-tongues-what%E2%80%99s-gone-wrong-in-hungary> [accessed 10 May 2016].
Terry, Sarah, ‘Thinking about Post-Communist Transitions: How Different are They?’, Slavic
Review, 52 (1993), (p. 333).
White, Stephen, Communism and its Collapse (London: Taylor & Francis Group Plc, 2000).
World Bank, Indicator Metadata (2015)
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/HU?display=graph>
[accessed 10 May 2016].
Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 23](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-23-2048.jpg)
![24 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations
By Alison Onyango
In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty laid the
foundations for establishing the
European Union’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) as a successor
to the European Political Cooperation
Project. It functions by employing an
intergovernmental method. Over time,
the common element of the CFSP has
come under scrutiny, as the question of
how Member State sovereignty fits in
has been the topic of discussion
numerous times. Through an appraisal
of the CFSP in action, this article argues
that various factors have worked
together to undermine the creation of a
‘common’ foreign policy for all twenty-
eight Member States to adopt. The
factors that will be discussed include the
role of the HR/VP, relevant treaty
provisions, the Member States’
relationships with each other and other
actors, and differing views on the use of
military force.
The role that member states’
sovereignty has played in the
functioning of the common
foreign security policy.
The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was created following
the coming into force of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. It is the main instrument by which the
EU conducts its foreign policy and, since its inception, has been subject to many changes.
Initially consisting of the ‘intergovernmental’ pillar, the workings of the CFSP were based on
cooperation between member states and other actors in order for the member states to
reach a “far greater clout than they would have if each pursued its own policies”1
. This
article will examine the decision making process of the CFSP, relevant treaty provisions,
role of the HR/VP and her relationship with the member states, and how there is assurance
of member states’ sovereignty. This article will further include relevant case studies of the
CFSP in action in order to demonstrate that the member states sovereignty has been
preserved at the expense of creating a truly common foreign policy.
1 European Union, Foreign and Security Policy <http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm> [accessed 5 December
2015].
2 Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, ‘The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making’, European Foreign Affairs Review,
7 (2002), 257-282 (p.257).
A brief history of the CFSP
The CFSP was negotiated during the Intergovernmental Conference on European Political
Union, and replaced what was called the European Political Cooperation. This was an earlier
“timid and selective attempt”2
to coordinate the foreign policies of the member states through
consultation with one another. It also constituted a separate intergovernmental pillar within
the Maastricht Treaty pillar structure, which differentiated it from the community method of
the first pillar. This may have been an early indication of the member states intentions in
regards to the relationship they would have liked with each other, and the position they would
have liked to be in within the overall structure of the CFSP.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-24-2048.jpg)
![Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 25
3 Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014) p.51.
4 Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) p.488.
5 Keukeleire and Delreux, p.158.
6 Ibid, p.157.
7 Article 26(3) TEU.
Other developments have since changed the nature of the CFSP, most notably the
Amsterdam 1999 and Lisbon 2009 treaties. The former created the role of the ‘High
Representative (HR) of the CFSP’, who was to be appointed by the European Council and
assists in formulating, preparing and implementing policy decisions3
. The Lisbon Treaty
abolished the pillar system and expanded the role of the HR to make it the ‘High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the
European Commission’ (HR/VP), which means that the HR/VP now needs to co-operate
with both the Council and the Commission. Another creation of the Lisbon Treaty was the
European External Action Service (EEAS), which was formed to assist the HR/VP.
Treaty provisions and obligations
As well as considering case studies of the CFSP in operation, it is also worth considering
the clues that the relevant treaty provisions give us about the member states’ sovereignty.
Certain member states seemed determined to maintain the intergovernmental nature of the
CFSP, so this approach was continued despite the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty.
Article 24(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) specifies the following:
“The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and…shall work together to enhance
and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is
contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force
in international relations.”
Eeckhout notes that while this and the other provisions in the TEU should be enough to
create useful CFSP policies, the actual policy is often said to be “insufficient, unsatisfactory,
and ineffective” due in part to a lack of mechanisms to enforce the duties and obligations
imposed by the Treaty4
. Nonetheless, Keukeleire and Delreux indicate that Article 24(3) is
only conditionally binding, as Member States only have to adhere to this provision if the
Union does have a policy in the first place, short of which they can follow their own policies5
.
Declarations 13 and 14 of the TEU further stipulate that the CFSP ‘do[es] not affect the
responsibilities of the Member States’ and “will not affect the existing legal basis,
responsibilities, and powers of each Member State” in relation to the “formulation and
conduct of its foreign policy”. The inclusion of these two declarations, in part as a result of
pressure from the UK6
, may be taken as a clarification of the scope of the commitment that
member states must have towards the CFSP. They may also be particularly relevant for
countries that have obligations to other organisations such as NATO, which most EU
member states do. Therefore, in spite of the obligations under Article 24(3), declarations 13
and 14 retain the member states’ right to pursue their own national foreign policies and
consequently, this ensures that they maintain a large degree of sovereignty.
The decision making structure and voting
The TEU defines the structure of decision-making within the CFSP. The European Council
brings together representatives from all the member states, and defines the general
guidelines that form the basis of the decisions the Council takes on defining and
implementing the CFSP7
. The Council and the implementation of the European Council’s
decisions is the responsibility of the HR/VP. Member states and the HR/VP maintain the](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-25-2048.jpg)
![Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 27
14 Ibid.
15 Hurd, p.422.
16 Eeckhout, p.476.
17 Piana, p.211.
18 Jolyon Howorth, ‘The ‘New Faces’ of Lisbon: Assessing the Performance of Catherine Ashton and Herman van
Rompuy on the Global Stage’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 16 (2011) 303–323.
19 Ian Traynor, ‘Solid, decent – but uninspired: Catherine Ashton makes EU debut’ (The Guardian, 2010)
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/11/baroness-catherine-ashton-eu-debut> [accessed 5 December
2015].
this. The reason for their objection is often cited as a reluctance to give up what amounted
to a veto power, in place of a system where majority rules14
. Representing the UK and
speaking in support of a system of unanimity, the former Secretary of State of the UK had
said that the member states’ foreign policies were “more often than not compatible with
each other” and that “countries are not going to operate successfully a foreign policy
measure to which they are strongly opposed”15
.Eeckhout notes that “unanimity is regarded
as safeguarding national sovereignty, whereas qualified majority is advanced as
indispensable for effective decision making”16
. Eeckhout’s statement can be explained in the
following way: due to the use of unanimity and the small number of situations where QMV
may take place, in effect (although it may not be the case in practice), if all twenty-eight
member states are required to be on board, it then seems to be the case that member
states can essentially block or at least hamper the decision-reaching process. As a result,
member states are able to preserve their sovereignty as they do not have to adopt
decisions that would be against their national interests.
The changing role of the HR/VP and the crises in FYROM and
Libya
An early example of the decision making process of the CFSP in action was in regards to
the Union’s response to the crisis in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
that took place in the late 90s to early 2000s. The crisis was resolved in part due to the
signing of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and FYROM,
which included the prospect of the latter becoming a member state. This served as an
incentive for the warring parties to resolve their problems. Several factors led to the relative
success of this operation, including the role played by the former NATO Secretary General,
Javier Solana. General Solana was serving as the HR/VP at the time and the use of his
qualities as a negotiator proved invaluable17
. At the time, the country was also perceived as
being on the brink of war, which created a sense of urgency that led to greater cooperation
between the member states and Solana. The combined effort and coordination of various
elements vital to the working of the CFSP in this particular case merged together to produce
an effective solution to the end of the conflict.
Since then, the Lisbon Treaty has come into force, which altered the role of the HR/VP, as
previously mentioned. The UK’s Catherine Ashton was first to hold the newly remodelled
post. Her appointment came as a surprise, seeing as she had no foreign policy experience
and unlike Solana who came before her, was virtually unknown in Europe18
. Throughout her
time in office, Ashton faced heavy criticism from both the media and her Brussels
counterparts. One member of the European Parliament even went as far as saying that they
didn’t want her as “an ambassador for 27 foreign ministers”, asking her “what are your
criteria? What are your ambitions? That’s what we’re still waiting for”19
. Howorth offers an
evaluation of Ashton’s time in office; we can assess this through the case of the EU’s
response to the crises in North Africa in 2010-11. At the start of the crisis, state governments
and Union bodies took it upon themselves to address the problem themselves and their
responses ended up arriving before Ashton herself. Her approach was to consult all (at the
time) twenty-seven member states’ foreign ministers before issuing a statement, making
sure to tend to those member states who did not necessarily want to engage in military
action. The statement Ashton eventually released was contradictory to those issued by her](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-27-2048.jpg)
![Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 31
Bibliography
Crowe, Brian, ‘A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq?’ International Affairs (Royal
Institute of International Affairs 1944), 79 (2003), 533-546.
Eeckhout, Piet, EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)
European Union, Foreign and Security Policy <http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm>
[accessed 5 December 2015].
Gourlay, Catriona and Eric Remade, ‘The 1996 IGC: The Actors and their Interaction’ in
Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union, ed. by Kjell A. Eliassen (London: SAGE
Publications, 1998).
Howorth, Jolyon, ‘The ‘New Faces’ of Lisbon: Assessing the Performance of Catherine
Ashton and Herman van Rompuy on the Global Stage’, European Foreign Affairs Review,
16 (2011), 303–323.
Hurd, Douglas, ‘Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, International Affairs
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), 70 (1994), 421-428.
Keukeleire, Stephan and Tom Delreux,The Foreign Policy of the European Union
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Gisella, ‘The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making’, European
Foreign Affairs Review, 7 (2002), 257-282.
Musu, Costanza, ‘European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of ‘Converging
Parallels’?’ European Foreign Affairs Review, 8 (2003), 35–49.
Spyer, Jonathan, ‘Europe and Iraq: Test Case for The Common Foreign And Security
Policy’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 11 (2007), 94-106.
Smith, Michael and Rebecca Steffenson, ‘The EU and the United States’ in International
Relations and the European Union, ed. by Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011).
Traynor, Ian, ‘Solid, decent – but uninspired: Catherine Ashton makes EU debut’ (The
Guardian, 2010) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/11/baroness-catherine-
ashton-eu-debut> [accessed 5 December 2015].
Treaty on European Union 2007.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-31-2048.jpg)
![Perceptions of security and defence between different States
The way in which one perceives the necessity for a common European army depends
entirely on how the paradigms of ‘security’ and ‘defence’ are defined and what one deems
necessary in order to be ‘secure’ and ‘able to defend ourselves’. Thus, the different
approaches and semantics used by Member States, concerning ‘security’ and ‘defence’
must be understood. The CSDP is decided upon by all twenty-eight European Union
Member States that reserve the ultimate authority in anything concerning foreign or security
policy decision-making1
. This becomes a problem, considering that all Member States have,
at least to an extent, different foreign policy objectives. Driving these different policies are
underlying inherent perceptions of each country on ‘security’ and ‘defence’. As Bale pointed
out, ‘security is about perception, about the absence, or at least the minimisation, of
unacceptable risk not just to life, but to those things that are thought to make it worthwhile or
at least easier – freedom and material wellbeing’2
. Precisely this feeling of being ‘secure’
and minimising any risk to freedom and material wellbeing, is perceived very differently by
the Member States.
The UK and France, for example, favour a militarised approach to foreign policy issues
where their interests are at stake, thus perceiving ‘security’ and ‘defence’ as very closely
linked to military measures. Having close ties and national interests in former colonies, the
UK and France, together with Belgium and Portugal ‘can use the CSDP to talk about African
issues without being branded neo-colonialist’3
as well as pushing for intervention in the
region. Therefore, when military intervention is mentioned in an EU debate, they are very
quick to contribute troops and set a military strategy4
. This was highlighted by the treaty set
up in 2010 solely between the UK and France for defence and security cooperation, which
emphasises the two countries’ similar views on the matters of foreign policy5
. The
consequences were, for example, the proposal and endorsement of both France and the
UK for military intervention in Libya in 2011, which went through the decision of the United
Nations Security Council6
. In contradiction to France and the UK’s take on military actions
stands the most part of the EU. Most notably Germany have long followed a policy of
diplomacy and soft power rather than military might in trying to account for and deal with its
own past appropriately and using sanctions or persuasion as a favourite foreign policy tool7
.
In light of the military intervention in Libya in 2011, for example, Germany abstained
Resolution 1973, as it did not see it compatible with German values and interests8
thus
perceiving ‘security’ as detached from military measures and rather linked to diplomacy.
Other states like Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland derive their sense of ‘security’ from
their neutrality, which they are able to keep up under the security framework of the EU.
Smaller states can use the EU as a means for international pressure, while simultaneously
not having the capabilities to effectively shape or contribute to EU foreign policies9
. Hence,
Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 33
1 Anand Menon, ‘European defence policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival, 53 (2011) 75-90 (p.76).
2 Tim Bale, European politics: A comparative introduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p.379.
3 Ibid, p.397.
4 Menon, p.84.
5 Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence
and Security Co-operation 2010.
6 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya],
(S/RES/1973, 2011) <http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-
1973.pdf> [accessed 20 June 2016].
7 Eva Gross, ‘Germany and European security and defence cooperation: The europeanization of national crisis
management policies?’, Security Dialogue, 38 (2007), 501-520 (p.501).
8 Richard Rousseau, ‘Why Germany Abstained on UN Resolution 1973 on Libya’, Foreign Policy Journal, (2011)
<http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/06/22/why-germany-abstained-on-un-resolution-1973-on-libya/>
[accessed 4 December 2015].
9 Bale, p.397.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-33-2048.jpg)
![34 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations
while their perception of ‘security’ and ‘defence’ is also mostly a military one, they are mostly
powerless on their own. Menon argues that these differences in opinion, most profoundly
the differences of the ‘Big 3’ being the UK, France, and Germany, will prevent the CSDP
from developing any grand coherence in strategy even though particular CSDP missions
will continue10
However, such a grand strategy in European security and defence is already discernible,
making Menon’s prediction somewhat flawed. Common denominators of security threats
concerning the EU have already been put forward by the Petersberg tasks in 1992, which
account for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces
in crisis management including peace-making11
. These tasks were then enlarged under the
Lisbon treaty in 2007 to include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue
tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks,
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict
stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by
supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories12
. The question that
arises now is, whether a common European army is needed to ensure these tasks are
being fulfilled. All of these tasks are mostly concerned with peacekeeping and logistical
support; so is a common army needed for that?
10 Menon, p.76.
11 European External Action Service, About CSDP – The Petersberg Tasks (European Union, 2015)
<http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/petersberg/index_en.htm> [accessed December 3, 2015].
12 European External Action Service, About CSDP – The Treaty of Lisbon (European Union, 2015)
<http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/lisbon/index_en.htm> [accessed 3 December 2015].](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-34-2048.jpg)
![Measures already in place and its contribution to a de-facto
common army
Concerning the tasks the EU set itself out to do, the CSDP has indeed become an
increasingly useful operational entity13
. As a matter of fact, under the European Union
Military Staff (EUMS) several special groups have evolved, which actually have many
characteristics of a common European army.
For one, the existence of the Eurocorps is a multinational, highly operational and rapidly
deployable, intergovernmental army corps. It’s headquarter is in Strasbourg and is capable
of commanding an up to 65,000-strong land force. Eurocorps deployment rests on the
decision of the five Framework Nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and Spain,
with Poland to join in 201614
. They are trained to conduct wide-ranging tasks, mostly in EU
or NATO context and under a framework of the EU. The European Union Training Mission
in Mali (EUTM Mali) for example was, since its deployment in 2013, able to increase the
security situation in Mali15
. However, not every EU member state is invested in Eurocorps,
nor does everyone have a say, as that rests upon the Framework Nations16
. Their focus is
furthermore oriented to missions abroad, rather than making up an army at home. Thus, it is
lacking in legitimacy as a European army, as it is only managed by very few member states
and only addresses specific issues.
Further, there are several military units called EU Battlegroups, which also contribute to the
EU’s capability for rapid military response in cohesion with the Petersburg and Lisbon tasks.
There are 18 Battlegroups, consisting of 1,500 troops each, excluding combat support
elements. These troops are made up of contributions from the EU Member States, with the
exception for Denmark and Malta, and also including non-EU countries such as Turkey,
Norway, Macedonia, and Ukraine. To qualify as such a Battlegroup, commonly defined
standards and criteria must first be met. Having reached full operational capacity in 2007,
they have since been a stand-by force, helping to reinforce the effectiveness of Member
States’ military forces17
. Despite coming closest to a European army, these troops firstly
have never been used, are divided in 18 different Battlegroups with only two being
permanently available in rotation18
. Thus, even this project is far from the creation of a
common European army.
In addition to the EU Battlegroups and Eurocorps, there are other forces within the EU
conducting peacekeeping or military missions. These include the European Union Force
(EUFOR), the European Gendarmerie Force and the European Maritime Force, which has
thus far conducted numerable amounts of both military and civilian missions. Operation
EUPOL Afghanistan for example constitutes a police mission under the European
Gendarmerie Force since 200719
. The European Union Force Althea (EUFOR ALTHEA)
has been in place since 2004, guaranteeing stability and security in Bosnia Herzegovina20
.
The European Maritime Force Atalanta (EU NAVFOR ATALANTA) launched 2008 in
Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 35
13 Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, The foreign policy of the European Union (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008), p.148.
14 Eurocorps, Eurocorps Info (2015) <http://www.eurocorps.org> [accessed 3 December 2015].
15 BBC, Mali profile (2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881978> [accessed 4 December 2015].
16 Eurocorps.
17 European Council, The EU Battlegroups and the EU civilian and military cell (European Union Factsheet, 2005)
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups.pdf> [accessed 20 June 2016].
18 BBC, New force behind EU foreign policy (2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6441417.stm>
[accessed 11 June 2016].
19 European External Action Service, EUPOL Afghanistan (European Union, 2015) <http://www.eupol-afg.eu>
[accessed 4 December 2015].
20 European External Action Service, Political/Military Background (European Union, 2015)
<http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2821> [accessed 4 December
2015].](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-35-2048.jpg)
![36 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations
Somalia is concerned with the effect of Somali-based piracy and armed robbery at sea off
the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean21
. While these are all ambitious projects
aimed at ensuring missions and security abroad, these, too, fail to address the actual
creation of a European army that is aimed internally on a permanent basis and is made up
of the EU’s member states. However, in light of these accomplishments, the development of
the CSDP can be branded as rather impressive and are right in questioning the formal
establishment of yet another European army22
.
Especially so, as there are other frameworks in place, also guaranteeing the safety of the
EU, such as coalitions of the willing that have always come to fore in crisis situations23
,
individual missions by a Member State or most importantly NATO missions that contribute to
the vitality of the transatlantic link24
. After all, the Berlin Plus Agreement has precisely been
put into place to facilitate NATO-EU cooperation with provision of troops, assets,
capabilities, and intelligence25
. Taking this into account it should be assessed whether the
creation of an actual European army would be useful or not.
Further push towards a Common European Army: Useful for
CSDP?
In the aftermath of 9/11, criticism of the EU for its civilian power approach increased as it
was felt that international relations became increasingly dangerous and unpredictable,
calling for more military action26
. They also criticised that the US seemed to have the sole
responsibility in military interventions with a sort of powerlessness of the EU, relying on the
US to do the dirty work27
. However, while some European states are more in favour of a
militarised Europe, it became clear that as long as the citizens of Europe were not willing to
fight and die for its cause, there would be no further militarisation of the EU28
. But, it must
be asked, what would such a cause be? Most certainly a cause where Europeans would be
willing to fight and die for Europe, would be a cause of severe security threats facing the
whole of the EU internally.
However, most of the Petersburg tasks are concerned with missions abroad do not
necessarily contribute to the EU’s own security or defence, but rather contribute to security
and stability in a specific region abroad. This plays into the different perceptions of security
by member states, who find it hard to agree on points concerning the internal security of the
EU. The only point of agreement on internal security for the EU can be found under Article
42 (7) of the Treaty of Lisbon, which implies that only when an armed aggression on EU
territory has taken place, does the EU theoretically need an army for that country’s support.
With new instabilities arising in Eastern Europe and the threat of terrorism imminent, one
could make the case that a common European army, in addition to what is already in place,
would help secure the EU, if not at least to create a common European security identity.
However, the paradox seems that these threats and instabilities come from the soil of the
EU itself, therefore complicating the issue as to whether an army would even be relevant in
such internal crises.
21 European External Action Service, Missions: Eunavfor (European Union, 2015) <http://eunavfor.eu/mission>
[accessed 4 December 2015].
22 Federiga Bindi, The foreign policy of the European Union: assessing Europe’s role in the world (Washington:
Brookings Institution Press, 2012), p.80.
23 Simon Duke, The elusive quest for European security: from EDC to CFSP (London: Macmillan, 2000), p.29.
24 Bale, p.394.
25 European Union External Action Service, About CSDP: The Berlin Plus Agreement (European Union, 2015)
<http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm> [accessed 4 December 2015].
26 Christopher Hill, ‘Renationalizing or regrouping? EU foreign policy since 11 September 2001’, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 42 (2004), 143-163 (p.144).
27 Andrew Moravcsik, The Quiet Superpower (Newsweek International, 2002)
<https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/quiet.pdf> [accessed 4 December 2015].
28 Duke, p.288.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-36-2048.jpg)
![Further push towards a Common European Army: Not useful
for CSDP?
Not only is there a paradox between the likelihood of such armed aggression-taking place
on EU soil amongst EU member states, but there is also the fact that such an armed
aggression within the EU, as described in the Lisbon Treaty, has not yet taken place. Even
recent events such as the terrorist attacks on Paris in November 2015, or on Brussels in
March 2016, are highly disputed to fall under the category of the mutual defence clause as
the legal definitions surrounding the mutual defence clause account for example, not for
attacks that were perpetrated by non-state actors29
. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that a
common European army would be effective in defending the EU. Further, as the mutual
defence clause implies, EU Member States are obliged either way to stand with the EU
country under attack in solidarity and to defend it whether it be with EU military means or
individual countries’ aid. This way, military for EU security is already guaranteed without the
cost of setting up a different EU army for the case of an attack.
Lastly, disregarding the discourse of EU military capabilities and deficits, the deviation of the
EU’s security provision from its military approach should also be accounted for. The EU has
increasingly been described both as a power in as well as a power through trade30
, able to
export its norms and values as well as pushing for reform in countries hoping to be the EU’s
trading partners, which has proven itself to be a very effective tool. In addition, the EU also
uses foreign aid as an incentive for states to adapt democratic values, which pose probably
the most successful strategies of EU value export31
. Another foreign policy tool that should,
due to its effectiveness, not be ignored, is that of the promise to EU membership32
. With the
accession of much of Eastern Europe, the EU ‘has presided over the most successful
democracy-promotion programme ever implemented by an international actor’33
. Not only
were democratic values implemented and complied, they slowly created permanent
changes in the logic of behaviour of EU actors. Regarding these powerful tools and the
establishment of many army-like forces to this date, it seems unnecessary to call for an
overarching European army, if not imprudent.
Implications of a common army
Firstly, establishing a European army separate from measures that are already in place
under the CSDP framework would establish EU control over defence capability and
spending of its Member States, strongly pressuring smaller or less powerful states to the
preferences of other, bigger and more powerful states34
. This is certainly not what the
CSDP was established for and would contradict the guiding principles of EU multilateralism,
most likely evoking condemnation on part of most EU Member States. Secondly,
establishing a common European army would inevitably change the perception of the EU as
a soft power. Being perceived as a military power should arguably be avoided, as ‘the EU is
precisely respected because of its perception as a soft power’35
and its security community.
It is therefore assumed, that a further establishment of a common European army would not
Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 37
29 Sophia Müller, Deutschlands Weg in den Kampf gegen den IS – ein Pflaster aus rechtlichen Stolpersteinen,
(Verfassungs Blog, 2015). <http://www.verfassungsblog.de/deutschlands-weg-in-den-kampf-gegen-den-is-ein-
pflaster-aus-rechtlichen-stolpersteinen/#.VmY0X3ieSt9> [accessed 4 December 2015].
30 Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘The European Union as a conflicted trade power’, Journal of European
Public Policy, 13 (2006), 906-925 (p.906).
31 Ibid, p.912.
32 Moravcsik.
33 Meunier and Nicolaidis, p.913.
34 Simon Duke and Roberta Haar, ‘Still at the Crossroads: Europe, the United States, and NATO’, in Europe today: a
twenty-first century introduction, ed. by Ronald Tiersky and Erik Jones (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011).
35 Bale, p.382.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-37-2048.jpg)
![38 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations
only agonise most EU Member States but also have negative consequences for the EU’s
international reputation. After all, third parties consult the EU for help before any other
strategic partners, precisely because of their soft power approach and neutrality36
.
Therefore, the ‘strength and capacity of the EU to be an influential player will depend mainly
on its capacity to still be an example and model for the world’37
.
Conclusion
Evidently, the creation of a common European army would be imprudent of EU policy-
makers. Not only would it create discontent and doubts on the side of the Member States
that perceive security and defence as non-military means, it would also endanger the EU’s
role in the world, as it is famously a soft power, leading to much of its popularity. It is also
simply unnecessary, as there are several military mechanisms already in place, addressing
common European security and defence threats with great success. Additionally, the EU
has more leverage than simply ‘military might’ with which they can succeed in implementing
a successful CSDP, most notably power in and through trade. Therefore, as a common
European army is undesirable for the CSDP, it follows that the CSDP is also completely
possible without a common European army, precisely because of the already existing
measures dealing with security threats, and defence issues that are in form of military
groups such as Eurocorps and other political means.
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December 2015].
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rechtlichen Stolpersteinen, (Verfassungs Blog, 2015).
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Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 39](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/52240913-617c-4656-8e70-ce00f71808b1-161212093931/75/Kent-20Political-20Almanac-20Fourth-20Issue-39-2048.jpg)
![#CapCom16 : AT4 - [Décryptage] J'ai coproduit la loi numérique](https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/at4-161212105757-thumbnail.jpg?width=640&height=640&fit=bounds)
Kent%20Political%20Almanac%20Fourth%20Issue
- 1. Kent Political Almanac ‘Europein the World’ 2016 Special issue School of Politics and IR
- 2. Editor-in-Chief: Moonira Mamoon Editors: Agathe Hugel ClaudiaHill Emil Tan Eugenie Megally James Walker Mathilde Lang Philip Gonzalo Taylor About the Kent Political Almanac The Kent Political Almanac was created to provide a platform for academic debate and peer-reviewed publication opportunities for students in Politics and International Relations. This journal’s purpose is to showcase the School’s best undergraduate and postgraduate essays. The initiative came from students of the School of Politics and International Relations, which led to the journal being launched in November 2013. All articles are peer-reviewed by both students and members of the School’s academic staff. We are proud to be an entirely student-led publication, supported from our School of Politics and IR at the University of Kent. Get in touch www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec E: globaleuropecentre@kent.ac.uk F: Global Europe Centre – University of Kent T: @GlobalEuropeCen Review board: Professor Elena Korosteleva Ms Eske Van Gils Mr Igor Merheim-Eyre Dr Luca Mavelli About The Global Europe Centre The Kent Political Almanac was created to provide a platform for academic debate and peer-reviewed publication opportunities for students in Politics and International Relations. This journal’s purpose is to showcase the School’s best undergraduate essays. The initiative came from students of the School of Politics and IR, which led to the journal being launched in November 2013. All articles are peer-reviewed by both students and members of the School’s academic staff. We are proud to be an entirely student-led publication supported from our School of Politics and IR at the University of Kent. Get in touch W: www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec E: globaleuropecentre@kent.ac.uk F: Global Europe Centre – University of Kent T: @GlobalEuropeCen Blog: http://blogs.kent.ac.uk/kentpoliticalalmanac/ E: kentpoliticalalmanac@gmail.com This Special Issue is kindly supported by the Jean Monnet Chair, and the School of Politics and International Relations. 2 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations
- 3. ‘Europe in theWorld’ Special issue Welcome to this special issue The Kent Political Almanac (KPA) continues to provide an opportunity for Politics and International Relations undergraduates at the University of Kent to have their work published on a professional platform. This publication marks the fourth issue of the KPA and is the special edition of 2016. We are privileged to launch the Journal in partnership with the Global Europe Centre, University of Kent. Therefore, the essays in this publication follow a theme of ‘Europe in the World’, covering a wide range of topics from political structures, human rights and religion. We would like to thank all of the authors who contributed to this issue and those who had submitted their works to the KPA in general. We have continued to receive a very high quality of articles across the board from students, which in turn, holds promise to the future. None of this would be possible without the committed team of editors who had volunteered their time in reviewing the selected works and assisting the authors reach a high standard in their writings. We are also grateful to the members of staff from the School of Politics and International Relations, who gave their time to be part of the review process and helped advertise this opportunity to Kent students. Our special thanks go to the Global Europe Centre, and particularly to Professor Elena Korosteleva, whose pivotal support has made this special edition possible. We hope that you will enjoy reading this issue of the KPA! Moonira Mamoon Editor-In-Chief Contents The UK and the Troubles: Human rights violations in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1998 4 From Socialism to Democracy: The process of transition in Albania and Hungary 13 The role that member states’ sovereignty has played in the functioning of the common foreign security policy 24 To what extent is a common security defence policy impossible without a common European army? 32 How secularism became Europe’s religion 40 Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 3
- 4. The UK andthe Troubles: Human rights violations in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1998 Imagine living in a modern society in a developed state having to face daily threats to your life and well-being. When we think of violations of human rights it is not often that our thoughts immediately span to the depths of ‘first world’ countries – especially not within the realm of the twentieth century. Between 1969 and 1998, Northern Ireland faced a civil war which caused more than 3,600 deaths and 50,000 injuries1 . The so-called Troubles were based on a centuries-old struggle over territory and identity between the Irish and the British communities2 . With Unionist-Protestants seeking to remain a province of the United Kingdom and Nationalist-Catholics striving for a reunification with the Irish Republic; Northern Ireland had always faced periods of struggles and ‘uneasy coexistence’ between the different groups3 . The outbreak of the Troubles was triggered by a civil rights march in Londonderry in 1969, which culminated in a violent confrontation between Protestant and Catholic groups4 . The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was not able to control the fighting and subsequently, the British army had to intervene in the three-day eruption of violence5 . As a consequence of deathly incidents in 1972, when the British Army shot demonstrators on Bloody Sunday and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) committed a bombing attack on Bloody Friday, the Westminster Parliament took direct control over Northern Ireland until 19986 . The disempowerment of the Northern Irish Stormont government thus constituted the assumption of accountability by the British government for all legitimate and illegitimate actions conducted by state forces. This article argues that during the Troubles, the UK colluded in human rights violations in different forms, such as “[…] verbal abuses and threats, torture and cruel punishment, systematic violations of the right to fair trial and other issues of justice, and finally a considerable number of violations of the right to life”7 . In order to understand and evaluate the violations at hand, it is necessary to first introduce the field of human rights and to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate derogations of human rights based on Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The arguable permission of human rights violations in case of emergency, such as the derogation of the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial and the prohibition of discrimination are imperative factors in understanding the background and reasoning for the actions of the UK. It is as well prevalent to note to what extent two of the most fundamental and non-restrictable rights, the right to life and the prohibition of torture, have been violated by the executive of By Katrin Schmitz During the Northern Irish Troubles, the British government violated human rights in many different ways. In this article, after introducing the field of human rights, the differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate derogations of human rights based on Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) will be elaborated upon. On the one hand, although Article 15 ECHR legitimises the derogation of particular parts of the convention in case of war or another form of emergency, it is questionable if these violations were really necessary in order to protect the state. On the other hand, the UK repeatedly violated the fundamental and non-restrictable right to life and the prohibition of torture, which underlines the serious national situation. The UK faced immense instability and was targeted by many terroristic attacks perpetrated by anti-state paramilitary groups. Thus, human rights violations can be characterised as a consequence of counter-insurgency strategies. Nevertheless, in a liberal democracy, human rights should never be controversial; they must always need to be protected no matter how threatened a state is. 4 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations 1 David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2002), p. ix-xi; Maria Power (ed.), Building Peace in Northern Ireland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), pp.1-17. 2 Kirk Simpson, Truth Recovery in Northern Ireland, Critically Interpreting the Past (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 2009), pp. 8-30. 3 John Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror. How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (New York: Basic Books, 1978), pp. 1-35; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Colin McInnes, ‘The British Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1972: From Policing to Counter-Terror’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 20 (1997), 1-24; Simpson, pp. 8- 30. 4 Bowyer Bell, pp. 1-35. 5 Ibid. 6 Lynn Wartchow, ‘Civil and Human Rights Violations in Northern Ireland: Effects and Shortcomings of the Good Friday Agreement in Guaranteeing Protections’, Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, 3 (2005). 7 Ibid.
- 5. the UK duringthe Northern Irish Troubles. This begs the question that is indeed relevant to today: just how far are some people willing to go in order to receive civil rights, and to what degree will others go in order to prevent these rights being given? Human rights violations during the Troubles Human rights can generally be defined as the unalienable rights of every human being, which form the moral and legal basis of humanity8 . All human beings have the right to take advantage from the same “economic, social, cultural, civil and political freedoms”9 . Additionally, human rights, such as the prohibition of torture and the prohibition of slavery, must never be derogated10 . After the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the ECHR was drafted by the Council of Europe and signed in 1950 by the UK and all of the other 38 member states11 . The ECHR represents the first human rights agenda based on a regional agreement12 . Moreover, the ECHR “has the most case law, and is the most advanced and comprehensive regional system of human rights”13 . The Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 5 8 Klaus Schubert and Martina Klein, Human Rights [Menschenrechte] (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2011) <http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/politiklexikon/17842/menschen rechte> [accessed 07 January 2016]; Human Rights Watch, Human Rights 101, (New York, 2015) <https://www.hrw.org /human-rights- 101> [accessed 17 January 2016]. 9 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Act and the ECHR, (Belfast, n.d.) <http://www.nihrc.org/about-human-rights/human-rights-law-and-standards> [accessed 15 January 2016]. 10 bid. 11 Pieter van Dijk and Godefridus J. H van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp.1-36. 12 Hurst Hannum, ‘The Impact of European Human Rights Jurisprudence on the Conflict in Northern Ireland’, in Human Rights and Conflict Resolution in Context. Colombia, Sierra Leone and Northern Ireland, ed. by Eileen F. Babbitt and Ellen L. Lutz (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2009), pp. 230-247. 13 Kara E. Irwin, ‘Prospects for Justice: The Procedural Aspect of the Right To Life under the European Convention on Human Rights and its Applications to Investigations of Northern Ireland’s Bloody Sunday’, Fordham International Law Journal, 22 (1999), 1822-1859 (p. 1833).
- 6. European Commission ofHuman Rights, established in 1954, and the European Court of Human Rights, founded in 1959, implemented the ECHR and controlled its adherence until 1998, when both institutions merged into a permanent court14 . Considering the Northern Ireland Troubles, around 200 complaints were lodged to the Court between 1971 and 1975; where most applications “raised fairly narrow allegations of procedural irregularities, ill- treatment, or unlawful detention”15 . In contrast, “the global United Nations machinery now available to receive human rights complaints was not created until the mid-1970s or later”16 . Therefore, the ECHR represented the most important institution considering controversies on human rights issues17 . This is why the following analysis of human rights violations by the executive of the UK during the Troubles will be based on the ECHR. ‘Legitimate’ human rights violations The British government colluded in human rights violations in Northern Ireland in many different forms. However, these incidents cannot be judged similarly, instead they have to be analysed separately. One can draw the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate human rights violations. Based on the possible derogation in time of emergency (Article 15 ECHR), many violations become lawful due to the declaration of a state of emergency. Article 15 of the ECHR states that a government is allowed to derogate particular human rights in order to save ‘the life of the nation’. However, derogations are only allowed “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law” (Article 15 ECHR). Moreover, Article 15 underlines that even in case of war or an emergency, the right to life (Article 2 ECHR); the prohibition of torture (Article 3 ECHR); the prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 4 ECHR); and the prohibition of punishment without law (Article 7 ECHR), must not be violated, regardless of the given circumstances. According to the European Court of Human Rights, most of the British security policies during the Troubles did not violate the ECHR, because states make their own judgement on “what measures are best suited to the circumstances of a particular case”18 . Nevertheless, it is highly questionable to decide whether a human rights violation is necessary in order to protect a state. Although a human rights violation can be considered as legitimate in accordance to Article 15, one must not conclude that such an act is morally defensible. These points of criticism will be underlined in the following. During the Troubles the British government adopted two legislative acts which “greatly diminished the few procedural protections available to its citizens”19 . After the escalation of the Troubles reached its peak in 1973, first the Emergency Provisions Act (EPA) was enacted, which broadened the security forces’ rights and options within Northern Ireland20 . The EPA gave them permission “to stop and question individuals about their identity and recent movements, to search persons and residences, and to examine and seize documents – all without prior judicial notice or order”21 . Before the outbreak of the Troubles, the Northern Irish Stormont government already strengthened the societal gap by 6 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations 14 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights, 6th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 9-12. 15 Hannum, p. 235. 16 Ibid, pp. 230. 17 Ibid. 18 Hannum, p. 244. 19 Wartchow. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid.
- 7. representing a politicalsystem which “[…] instituted a series of discriminating policies [against Catholic citizens] in areas such as housing, employment, and voting rights”22 . The new options of the EPA were applied particularly to Catholic citizens and therefore continued the oppression of Catholic communities. For instance, house searches by the RUC and the British army happened almost exclusively in Catholic neighbourhoods, which strengthened the ethnic gap23 . According to Bowyer Bell, the British Army was not successful in catching PIRA terrorists, but only underlined the strategies of discrimination by collecting “hundreds of Catholics, including civil rights agitators, but no Protestant extremists”24 . As a result, from the Catholic community’s perspective the British state forces only represented another “tool of the oppressive Stormont regime”25 . Furthermore, the so- called Diplock courts were established, in which no jury was needed to be declared guilty by a judge26 . In addition, “the burden of proof was reserved in key charges relating to firearms and explosives [and] the defendant was presumed guilty until proven innocent”27 , which conflicts with the principle of in dubio pro reo: in the doubt for the accused. Thus, the EPA derogated the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR), the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR ) and the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 ECHR). The Troubles raised the conflict-ridden relationship to a new level. “Fuelled by religious hatred, segregation, and heavy-handed direct British rule”28 , pro- and anti-state paramilitary groups tried to enforce their interests by the use of force and the spread of terror29 . After the PIRA committed a bombing in Birmingham in 1974, which caused the death of 21 people, the British government enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)30 . The PTA applied to the whole United Kingdom and empowered public authorities to ban military as well as paramilitary groups31 . Moreover, the new legislation authorised state forces “to arrest, detain and interrogate individuals for up to seven days without an appearance before a magistrate”32 . Furthermore, it included “mandatory jail sentences for rioting or those found guilty of causing a breach of the peace”33 . According to the European Court of Human Rights, these security measurements are justifiable, because “although the powers of detention and internment without trial as exercised by the British government … did violate the convention’s guarantees of liberty and security of person, they were nonetheless justified as ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’ in Northern Ireland”34 . Nevertheless, it remains arguable to what extent the right to liberty and security (Article 5 ECHR) and the freedom of assembly and association (Article 11 ECHR) may be restricted. Rolston concludes that “the Northern Ireland conflict is a prime example of a situation in which a rule of law, albeit distorted, went hand-in-hand with a dirty war of dubious legality”35 . Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 7 22 Ibid. 23 Kennedy-Pipe and McInnes, pp. 1-24. 24 Bowyer Bell, p. 216. 25 Kennedy-Pipe and McInnes, p.1. 26 Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘To Know Where We Are Going, We Need to Know Where We Are: Revisiting States of Emergency’, in A Human Rights: An Agenda for the 21st Century ed. by Angela Hegarty and Siobhan Leonard (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1999), pp. 79-116. 27 Bill Rolston, ‘An effective mask for terror: Democracy, death squads and Northern Ireland’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 44.1 (2005), 181-203 (p. 198). 28 Wartchow. 29 Neil Jarman, ‘From the Frying Pan to the Fire? Conflict Resolution, Human Rights, and Transitional Violence in Northern Ireland’, in Human Rights and Conflict Resolution in Context. Colombia, Sierra Leone and Northern Ireland, ed. by Eileen F. Babbitt and Ellen L. Lutz (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2009), pp. 187-209; Simpson, pp. 8-30. 30 Power, pp. 1-17. 31 Wartchow. 32 Ibid. 33 Kennedy-Pipe and McInnes, p. 12. 34 Hannum, p. 236. 35 2005: 198
- 8. ‘Illegitimate’ human rightsviolations Besides these human rights violations which can officially be justified by the British state of emergency, the prohibition of torture (Article 3 ECHR) is excluded from the permission of derogation. It implies that there is no reason as to why one should be subject to the acts of torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment. However, in the 1970s five controversial interrogation techniques became public: sleep deprivation, food and drink deprivation, hooding, exposure to continuous and monotonous noise, and forcing the detainee into an awkward body posture36 . Initiated by the Irish government in 1971, in 1978 the European Court of Human Rights for the first time pronounced judgement on the interpretation of the prohibition of torture37 . The Court came to the conclusion that the in-depth interrogation techniques violated human rights as they can be described as inhuman and degrading treatment38 . However, the Court implied uncertainty about the terms of torture, in which it thought “should be distinguished from inhuman and degrading treatment principally by the ‘intensity of the suffering inflicted’”39 . This judgement is highly questionable since the intensity of suffering is always subjective and therefore unmeasurable. Thus, Spjut proclaims that “there is no reason why the common understanding of torture must be limited to mean extreme barbarity”40 . Nevertheless, the case put pressure on the British government. Even before the Court pronounced a judgement, the British government abandoned the five interrogation techniques in 1972 and formally declared that they would not be reintroduced41 . Consequently, such cases brought human rights violations in Northern Ireland to the public platform and helped to improve the protection of human rights standards42 . Apart from the prohibition of torture, the right to life must not be derogated even in the case of emergency (Article 15 ECHR). According to the ECHR, this right has to be protected by law and may only be derogated in the strict terms of Article 2 ECHR. During the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the British security forces violated the right to life in many cases. 359 civilians, about 10% of all deaths caused throughout the Troubles, have been killed by British agents, but only 30 of them led to trial43 . Even more alarming is the fact that “only four of these prosecutions resulted in murder convictions, and all four of the soldiers convicted were released early”44 . According to Rolston, “the state derived a complex range of police, army and intelligence units to gather intelligence, run agents and engage in direct action which included on occasion assassination of insurgents”45 . For instance, when British Special Forces killed three PIRA members in Gibraltar due to the presumption of a planned bombing, the European Court held that Article 2 ECHR was violated by the United Kingdom when excessive force was used in the killing of suspected terrorists by its Security Forces46 . Moreover, the UK supported death squads carried out by paramilitary organisations like the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). According to Rolston, “the state forces directed, supported and covered up for the activities of the loyalist 8 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations 36 Kennedy-Pipe and McInnes, pp.1-24; Michael O’Boyle, ‘Torture and Emergency Powers under the European Convention on Human Rights: Ireland v. The United Kingdom’, The American Journal of International Law, 71.4 (1977), pp. 674-706. 37 Robert J. Spjut, ‘Torture Under the European Convention on Human Rights’, The American Journal of International Law, 73.2 (1979), pp. 267-272. 38 Hannum, pp. 230-247; Spjut, pp. 267-272. 39 Spjut, p. 269. 40 Spjut, p 271. 41 Hannum, p. 236. 42 Ibid. 43 Irwin, pp. 1822-1859; Rolston, pp. 181-203. 44 Irwin, p. 1827. 45 Rolston, p. 185. 46 Irwin, pp. 1837.
- 9. groups”47 . However, itis important to keep in mind that the funding by the British government does not imply that loyalist paramilitary organisations acted as ‘state-run counter-gangs’48 , but as autonomous movements. The sponsorship of paramilitary organisations has also been criticised by the United Nations Special Rapporteur, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, who received allegations concerning aiding and abetting attacks by British intelligence officers on many cases49 . These accusations gained credibility when the British government consistently refused any kind of investigation on the topic50 . Regardless of a direct or indirect involvement of the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, in most cases the emergency legislative measurements enabled them to act with impunity. Another example of a violation of Article 2 ECHR is the event of Bloody Sunday, when British troops tried to control a banned civil rights march in Londonderry on 30 January 1972, where 13 unarmed men were killed51 . These killings can neither be legitimised by the exceptions given in Article 2 nor by the aspects of derogation stated in Article 15 and thus do indeed violate the victims’ right to life52 . The incident of the Bloody Sunday killings has been investigated by the Widgery Tribunal which acquitted the British soldiers53 . According to the report, none of them could be blamed for the deaths because they individually reported that the civilians were wearing objects in the form of arms54 . Thus, opening fire can be declared as a justified reaction55 . The outcome of the Widgery Report has been fiercely criticised as a campaign of whitewashing and covering up the British government’s failure56 . According to Irwin, not only the killing itself violates human rights, but also the state’s overly long hesitation to investigate these incidents57 . Scholars Bell and Irwin condemned the trial “[…] on many grounds as a failure to find the truth”58 . It can even be argued that the long absence of a truthful investigation of the Bloody Sunday killings has widened the gap between Unionists and Nationalists due to the lack of a declaration of accountability by the British government, because “governments should at all times be accountable for the loss of life of citizens who have been killed by agents of the state”59 . In 1998 the British government established a new inquiry chaired by Mark Saville in order to show the UK’s willingness to find the truth of Bloody Sunday’s incidents60 . After 12 years of investigation, the Saville Report concluded that the British soldiers’ opening fire was not a reaction towards attacks or threatened attacks by the demonstrators, but it was based on a loss of self-control and fire discipline61 . Consequently, in 2010 the government officially apologised to the victims’ Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 9 47 Rolston, p. 185. 48 Ibid, p. 193. 49 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of the world, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories, Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/73, E/CN.4/1996/4 <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/commission/country52/4-add1.htm> [accessed 15 January 2016] (p. 118). 50 Ibid. 51 Patrick Hayes and Jim Campbell, Bloody Sunday: Trauma, Pain and Politics (London: Pluto Press, 2005). 52 Irwin, pp. 1822-1859. 53 Wartchow. 54 John Passmore Widgery, Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30 January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day (Widgery Report) (London: Stationery Office, 1972) < http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/widgery.htm> [accessed 12 Jaunary 2016]. 55 Wartchow. 56 Irwin, pp. 1822-1859. 57 Ibid. 58 John Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence 1967-1992 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993); Irwin, p. 1823. 59 Irwin, p. 1823. 60 Douglas Murray, Bloody Sunday: Truth, Lies and the Saville Inquiry (London: Biteback Publishing, 2012). 61 Mark Saville, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (Saville Report) (London: Stationery Office, 2010) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279133/0029_i.pdf> [accessed 31 March 2016].
- 10. relatives, declaring that“[w]hat happened on Bloody Sunday was both unjustified and unjustifiable. It was wrong”62 . Nevertheless, the British government failed to investigate an overwhelming amount of crimes and has not yet assumed full responsibility “for the loss of the lives of citizens killed by state agents, even those who were unarmed”63 . Thus, until the UK does not admit to the British security forces’ human rights violations during the Troubles, the Northern Irish society will not be able to achieve closure with its bloody history64 . Conclusion The Northern Irish Troubles demonstrate the extent to which the British government was willing to go in terms of human rights violations simply to keep order and control. On the one hand it could be emphasised that although Article 15 ECHR allows derogation of the convention in case of war or another form of emergency, the necessity of these derogations is highly arguable. Incidents of legitimate human rights violations such as the use of discrimination and oppression, the disrespect of privacy and family life, and the refusal of a fair trial show that Article 15 of the ECHR can be interpreted too broadly. It is questionable if these violations have been really necessary in order to protect the state. Moreover, it must not be concluded that legalising a human rights violation can be considered synonymous with an ethical justification. On the other hand, it is also well known that the UK violated the fundamental and non- restrictable right to life and the prohibition of torture in many cases during the Troubles. The ECHR strengthened their unlimited validity, even in case of war or another emergency threatening the life of the nation. However, the British government’s disregard of the ECHR underlines the serious situation of the UK. During the Troubles, the UK faced immense instability and was targeted by many terroristic attacks perpetrated by anti-state paramilitary groups. Thus, all of these human rights violations can be characterised as a consequence of counter-insurgency strategies. Nevertheless, in a liberal democracy, above all, the most fundamental human rights like the right to life and the prohibition of torture should never be questionable, no matter how hard a state might be threatened. Especially in consideration of recent threats from extremist groups attempting terrorist attacks in European cities, it is even more important to keep in mind that violating human rights as a means to an end only leads to the decline of the rule of law and to a restriction of our civil rights in the daily life. 10 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations 62 David Cameron, Bloody Sunday: PM David Cameron’s full statement, (London: BBC News, 2010) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10322295> [accessed 31 March 2016]. 63 Wartchow. 64 Brian Gormally The legacy of the Troubles lives on. The UK must admit its failures, (London: The Guardian, 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015 /aug/03/troubles-uk-failures-good-friday-agreement-law-un> [accessed 31 March 2016].
- 11. Bibliography Bowyer Bell, John,A Time of Terror, How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (New York: Basic Books, 1978). Bowyer Bell, John, The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence 1967-1992 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). Cameron, David, Bloody Sunday: PM David Cameron’s full statement, (London: BBC News, 2010) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10322295> [accessed 31 March 2016]. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Strasbourg: European Court of Human Rights, 1950). Gormally, Brian, The legacy of the Troubles lives on. The UK must admit its failures, (London: The Guardian, 2015) < http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015 /aug/03/troubles-uk-failures-good-friday-agreement-law-un> [accessed 31 March 2016]. Gross, Oren and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘To Know Where We Are Going, We Need to Know Where We Are: Revisiting States of Emergency’, in A Human Rights: An Agenda for the 21st Century, ed. by Angela Hegarty and Siobhan Leonard (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1999). Hannum, Hurst, ‘The Impact of European Human Rights Jurisprudence on the Conflict in Northern Ireland’, in Human Rights and Conflict Resolution in Context, ed. by Eileen F. Babbitt and Ellen L. Lutz (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2009). Hayes, Patrick and Jim Campbell, Bloody Sunday: Trauma, Pain and Politics (London: Pluto Press, 2005). Human Rights Watch, Human Rights 101 (New York, 2015) <https://www.hrw.org /human- rights-101> [accessed 17 January 2016]. Irwin, Kara E., ‘Prospects for Justice: The Procedural Aspect of the Right To Life under the European Convention on Human Rights and its Applications to Investigations of Northern Ireland’s Bloody Sunday’, Fordham International Law Journal, 22 (1999). Jarman, Neil, ‘From the Frying Pan to the Fire? Conflict Resolution, Human Rights, and Transitional Violence in Northern Ireland’, in Human Rights and Conflict Resolution in Context. Colombia, Sierra Leone and Northern Ireland, ed. by Eileen F. Babbitt and Ellen L. Lutz (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2009). Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline and Colin McInnes, ‘The British Army in Northern Ireland 1969- 1972: From Policing to Counter-Terror’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 20 (1997). McKittrick, David and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2002). Murray, Douglas, Bloody Sunday: Truth, Lies and the Saville Inquiry (London: Biteback Publishing, 2012). Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Act and the ECHR, (Belfast, n.d.) <http://www.nihrc.org/about-human-rights/human-rights-law-and-standards> [accessed 15 January 2016]. O’Boyle, Michael, ‘Torture and Emergency Powers under the European Convention on Human Rights: Ireland v. The United Kingdom’, The American Journal of International Law, 71 (1977). Power, Maria, Building Peace in Northern Ireland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011). Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 11
- 12. Rainey, Bernadette, ElizabethWicks and Clare Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights, 6th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Rolston, Bill, ‘An effective mask for terror: Democracy, death squads and Northern Ireland’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 44 (2005). Saville, Mark, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (Saville Report) (London: Stationery Office, 2010) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 279133/0029_i.pdf> [accessed 31 March 2016]. Schubert, Klaus and Martina Klein, Human Rights [Menschenrechte] (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2011) <http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/politiklexikon/17842/menschen rechte> [accessed 07 January 2016]. Simpson, Kirk, Truth Recovery in Northern Ireland, Critically Interpreting the Past (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 2009). Spjut, Robert J., ‘Torture Under the European Convention on Human Rights’, The American Journal of International Law, 73 (1979). United Nations Economic and Social Council, Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of the world, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories, Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/73, E/CN.4/1996/4 <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/commission/country52/4-add1.htm> [accessed 15 January 2016]. Van Dijk, Pieter and Godefridus J. H van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998). Wartchow, Lynn, ‘Civil and Human Rights Violations in Northern Ireland: Effects and Shortcomings of the Good Friday Agreement in Guaranteeing Protections’, Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, 3 (2005). Widgery, John Passmore, Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30 January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day (Widgery Report) (London: Stationery Office, 1972) <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/widgery.htm> [accessed 12 January 2016]. 12 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations
- 13. Kent Political AlmanacIssue 4 13 By Rowan Hart The nature of transition from socialism has varied vastly in Central and Eastern Europe, arguably leading to a discrepancy in the levels of democracy between countries. Using the typologies of ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ transitions, this article will engage with this debate in reference to the cases of Hungary and Albania by offering a brief history of each country and how this has impacted on their democratisation. Whilst the definition of democracy is essentially contested, the concept of liberal democracy will be used as a benchmark in this article and will examine key areas such as electoral processes, economic progress, freedom of the media and judicial independence. In doing so, this article will conclude that the nature of transition has had little effect on the quality of democracy established in post- socialist countries. From Socialism to Democracy: The process of transition in Albania and Hungary Within the study of post-socialist politics in Central and Eastern Europe, it has been widely accepted that the movement away from socialism generally occurred, in White’s terms, as either ‘top-down’ or as ‘bottom-up’ transitions1 . In order to understand the impact such transitions had on the consolidation of democracy in the region, this article will first establish the key features of both variants of transition as well as what is meant by the term democracy itself. The article will then examine the establishment of democracy in two cases, namely Hungary and Albania, and the extent to which such democracies can be considered successful. In doing so, it will be demonstrated that whilst Hungary initially appeared to have greater political stability, in recent years its claims to a functioning democracy are not any more valid than those made by Albania. In turn, it will be argued that the presence of a top-down transition was no more significant in consolidating democracy than a bottom-up transition, and so we must look to other factors, such as European Union membership and IMF funding, to explain the course of democracy within these countries. Conceptualising Terminology: Democracy and theories of transition In order to understand and provide a conclusion as to whether the nature of transitions that took place in Central and Eastern Europe impacted on the consolidation of democracy, it is first necessary to outline the theories offered on the different modes of transition that occurred. The key to this distinction is between countries that experienced transition from above, involving major counter-elite influences, and those that experienced transition from below as the result of popular uprisings amongst citizens. Lewis argues that top-down transitions favour a more effective and less troubled consolidation of democracy in comparison to bottom-up modes of transition. Furthermore, Lewis argues that intra-elite competition and co-operation with competing counter-elites were less evident in places where the pace of democratisation was slower, further highlighting the distinction between the presence or absence of a liberalised elite2 . In light of this, greater levels of democracy in countries that experienced top-down transitions would be expected. The two case studies in relation to this debate are Hungary as an example of reform from within the political elite and Albania which experienced transition due to mounting civil unrest and protests amongst citizens. It is also important to understand what is meant by the term democracy itself in order to assess the consolidation of democracy in post-socialist Europe. Whilst the concept is essentially contested3 , with the rise of critical approaches arguing that democracy needs to be understood within a regional and political context, for the purpose of clarity the paper will focus solely on the concept of liberal democracy. Bollen further argues that liberal democracy has more salience in the contemporary world. Most hypothesis’ surrounding such issues refer to liberal democracies and thus referencing liberal democracy is more relevant and finally it allows us to bypass a lengthy and inconclusive debate so to the nature of democracy4 . 1 Stephen White, Communism and its Collapse (London: Taylor & Francis Group Plc, 2000). 2 Paul Lewis, ‘Theories of Democratization and Patterns of Regime Change in Eastern Europe’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 13 (1997), 4–26. 3 WB Gaille, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1956), 167-198. 4 Kenneth A. Bollen, ‘Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures’, American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 1207-1230.
- 14. 14 University ofKent School of Politics and International Relations The key features of a liberal democracy can be described as the recognition of individual rights and freedoms, including both electoral procedures such as political participation and procedural democracy which focuses on democratic institutional arrangements such as the separation of powers. Due to word limitations, four indicators of democracy will be utilised in accordance with the indicators used by Freedom House (2015) in their assessment of democracy. These include: economic liberalisation, the freedom of the media, judicial independence and the absence of corruption in the electoral process.5 The following section will examine the presence of these aspects within both Hungary and Albania as well as offering a brief historical overview of the transition that occurred in each country respectively. The case of Hungary The movement away from socialism in Hungary has been described as an ‘evolutionary transition’6 , occurring as the result of action amongst political elites. Whilst it is important to recognise that the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was undeniably an effort for change from below, it can be seen that it was actually this uprising that paved the way for a top-down reorganisation of Hungary as it forced political elites to recognise the problems that the country was facing for fear of recurrence of the violence7 . In light of this uprising, the Hungarian political elite adopted a far more conciliatory attitude towards social movements, 5 Sylvana Habdank-Kołaczkowska, Nations in Transit 2015: Democracy on the Defensive in Europe and Eurasia, (Freedom House, 2015) <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_NIT2015_06.06.15_FINAL.pdf> [accessed 10 May 2016]. 6 Lewis, pp. 4. 7 Ibid, pp. 7.
- 15. consequently allowing theeventual formation of divides within the Hungarian Communist Party itself. Such divides can be seen as instigating the negotiations and reforms that led to the collapse of socialism, as the emergence of broad reformists such as Pozsgay extended the ‘boundaries of permitted debate’8 , thus triggering the change towards democracy within Hungary. Furthermore, the final transition away from socialism in the 1980s was characterised by a distinct lack of nationwide strikes, the absence of anti-governmental demonstrations and no loss of life, reflecting the fact that ‘people power’9 had a minimal role in Hungary’s transition. This is reflected in a party conference that took place in May 1988, where it was agreed that political as well as economic reform was required within Hungary in light of the poor living standards and increasing housing shortages10 . Following these reforms, February of 1989 saw three months of roundtable negotiations with opposing political parties, leading the Party authorities to announce that they would introduce a new constitution in which the Communist Party would no longer have a guaranteed monopoly of power. The author argues that these negotiations were the most significant steps towards transition and effectively signalled the end of socialist rule in Hungary. In this way, unlike neighbouring countries where change was instigated by uprisings amongst citizens, Hungarian leadership took unprecedented, and somewhat experiential, Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 15 8 White, pp. 64. 9 Rodger East and Jolyon Pontin, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, 2nd edn, (United Kingdom: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1997). 10 Terry Cox and Andy Furlong, ‘Political transition in Hungary: An overview’, The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 10 (1994), 1-12 (pp. 4).
- 16. steps by enteringinto negotiations with independent political bodies that challenged the existing regime11 , consequently allowing the changes amongst elites to shape Hungary’s transition away from socialism. Furthermore, the fact that the transition was evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary meant that there was less need for rapid reform12 , to which it has been argued, allowed for a stronger form of democracy to be consolidated. In light of this, an assessment must be made upon the quality of democracy that can be found in Hungary in order to see whether the nature of transition from above impacted the consolidation of this political system. The democracy that emerged out of Hungary’s transition has been described as one of the most stable and, until 2008, prosperous of the post-socialist world13 . However, the initial coalition established under socialism faced a number of accusations including intervention in the mass media and rising unemployment, issues which Hungary are still facing today. In turn, we must question to what extent the transition amongst political elites truly helped Hungary establish a successful democracy. The following section has subsequently been divided into three subsections, each of which will assess one of the key features of liberal democracy and the extent to which these can be seen within the political system in Hungary. Electoral process One of the key features of a functioning democracy is the presence of free and fair elections that in turn allow for a government free from corruption. Whilst there was initially debate over the form and content of the constitution, Hungary still managed to establish a pluralist system, allowing for the introduction of multi-party elections in May 199014 . Such reforms at first seemed to be successful, with Hungary being seen by the West as the most liberal country within the Soviet Bloc15 . Furthermore, after the collapse of the socialist regime, Hungary saw high levels of active political participation, which is often associated with an effective and democratic electoral process by allowing for greater representation. For example, Pridham notes how the Hungarian Constitution of 1990 introduced a system of participatory democracy and how at the level of civil society, Hungary had one of the most politically active citizenships in Central and Eastern Europe16 . However, in spite of these initial success, it can be argued that free and fair elections in Hungary have not be sustained, seen in the fact that in recent years there has debatably been a crisis of democracy within Hungary under the administration of Viktor Orban. After the 2010 elections, the pluralist system vital to a democratic state were destroyed, including the restriction to constitutional laws and the aim of removing all political alternatives17 . Therefore, whilst primarily it seemed that Hungary would successfully employ a democratic electoral system, current political developments have brought such claims under serious doubt. Consequently, it can be questioned whether the top-down transition in Hungary had a long-lasting impact on the establishment of free elections or liberal democracy Hungary. 16 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations 11 Joseph Rothschild and Nancy Wingfield, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World War II, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 12 James Roaf, Ruben Atoyan, Bikas Joshi and Krzysztof Krogulski, 25 Years of Transition : Post – Communist Europe and the IMF (International Monetary Fund, 2014) <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2014/eur/eng/pdf/erei_sr_102414.pdf> [accessed 10 May 2016]. 13 Jane L. Curry and Sharon L. Wolchik, Central and East European politics: From communism to democracy (United States: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 14 Cox and Furlong. 15 East and Pontin, pp. 61. 16 Geoffrey Pridham, ‘Assessing Democratic Consolidation in Central & Eastern Europe: The European Dimension’, Acta Politica, 41 (2006), 342–369. 17 Gábor Schein, Speaking with Double Tongues: What’s Gone Wrong in Hungary? (Open Democracy, 2012) <https://www.opendemocracy.net/g%C3%A1bor-schein/speaking-with-double-tongues-what%E2%80%99s- gone-wrong-in-hungary> [accessed 10 May 2016].
- 17. Judicial independence andfreedom of the press In light of this rise in political corruption under Orban, it seems unsurprising that the independence of the judicial system and freedom of the press have also suffered in recent years. As with the electoral process, the Constitutional Court established in Hungary in 1990 as a result of the roundtable negotiations originally helped to maintain democratic practices and maintained the separation of powers and rule of law typically found in liberal democratic systems. This can be seen in the Act of on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges which prescribed stricter requirements that had to be met in order to become a judge, in turn helping to separate the judiciary from political activity in Hungary. Furthermore, during the transition away from socialism, Hungary established regional courts and a court of appeal which allowed the Supreme Court, and the judicial system overall, to function more effectively. In turn, since its establishment Hungary’s Constitutional Court has become one of the most powerful constitutional courts in the world, highlighting the strength and efficiency of Hungary’s judicial system18 . However, much like the electoral system, the democratic nature of the judicial system has seriously suffered since the election of Orban into office; with party cronies often replacing judges and increasing reports of bribery on behalf of political elites. In turn, this would again cast doubt on the assertion that liberalisation amongst political elites had any enduring effect on the consolidation of democracy in Hungary. A similar process has been seen with the freedom of the press within Hungary. Whilst the Constitutional Court ruled in October 1994 that state interference in the media was illegal, the freedom of the media has come under attack in recent years19 . This can be seen most clearly after the 2010 elections, where new media laws were introduced that explicitly restricted freedom of speech and freedom of the press20 , posing a significant setback to democracy within Hungary. Liberalisation of the economy Within a liberal democratic system, the economy is generally defined by a free market system which provides a high standard of living for the citizens of the country. After the initial fall of the Communist Party, Hungary saw relative success in this area, with developments towards a liberalised economy already well underway by the end of the socialist regime. However, this economic stability was not to last and by 1992, Hungary had seen a negative growth of 4.5% and unemployment had doubled21 . Similarly, by the end of 1995 Hungary’s foreign debt was at approximately $33 billion, demonstrating that despite the relative political stability in the country, this had not translated into a successful liberalised economy. Having said this, Hungary has still witnessed sustained economic growth of about 5% since 199622 and so it would be unfair to claim that Hungary has not had any economic success since the fall of socialism. Still, it is important to note that economic success does not mean that the system is without corruption. For example, currently the state remains the greatest economic force in the marketplace with successful private companies often becoming pawns of the interests of high-ranking politicians23 . Furthermore, Hungary has suffered as a result of the financial crisis in 2008 (see Figure 1.1), with the recession fuelling civil unrest and a decline in living standards. Consequently, whilst Hungary has managed to establish a liberalised market economy, enhancing its domestic agency, it is still suffering from the corruption seen in less democratic states. Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 17 18 Pridham, pp. 360. 19 East and Pontin, pp. 60. 20 László Bitó, Hungary’s Struggles for Freedom and Democracy (Open Democracy, 2012) <https://www.opendemocracy.net/l%C3%A1szl%C3%B3-bit%C3%B3/hungarys-struggles-for-freedom-and- democracy> [accessed 10 May 2016]. 21 East and Pontin, pp. 56. 22 Pridham, 2006. 23 Schein.
- 18. Figure 1.1. GDPGrowth (Annual %) in Hungary i Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency24 . The case of Albania In contrast to the events that unfolded in Hungary, the transition that took place in Albania, whilst not particularly violent, was clearly the result of action from below instigated by the citizenship of the country itself25 . Unlike Hungary, the dictatorial regime in Albania was repressive until the end of the socialist rule and so there was no toleration of any form of elite dissent, in turn preventing the divides forming that were found amongst the Hungarian leadership26 . Whilst the Revolution of 1956 had forced the Party in Hungary to recognise the economic and social crisis it was facing, the Communist Party of Albania was unwilling to acknowledge these failures despite its struggling economy and poor living standards. Furthermore, the Albanian Constitution of 1976 prevented the government accepting any foreign aid, also contributing to the growing civil unrest within the country at the time. By the time of Ernst Hoxha’s death in 1985, workers were failing to show up to work, peasants were not delivering food to the cities and there was a large scale destruction of property across Albania27 . This civil unrest eventually culminated in the first official anti- socialist demonstrations being held in Kavaja and Shkoder in 1990, shortly followed by the Student’s Movement in December at the Enver Hoxha University28 . In light of these demonstrations, the Communist Party finally agreed to minor concessions, including the allowance of foreign investment and a free and fair election29 . However, rather than appeasing the masses as the political elite may have hoped, this only served to deepen the demand for change within Albania. The end of socialism in Albania eventually came after the Communist Party was re-elected in the free elections held in 1991. In response to these results, a series of street demonstrations broke out followed by a nationwide strike of workers which saw four people die in what were the most serious disturbance in Albania yet30 . Such rioting continued 18 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations 24 World Bank, Indicator Metadata (2015) <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/HU?display=graph> [accessed 10 May 2016]. 25 White, pp. 52. 26 Lewis, pp. 7. 27 Sabrina Ramet, Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 423. 28 Mirela Bogdani and John Loughlin, Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey Towards (London: I. B.Tauris & Company, 2007), pp. 21. 29 Richard J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the twentieth century–and after. (United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis, 2010), pp. 403. 30 Bogdani and Loughlin.
- 19. throughout the year,ultimately forcing the government to bring forward the general elections to March 1992, which saw the Democratic Party seize a sweeping majority, thus ending the socialist rule in Albania. In turn, we can therefore see, in direct contrast to Hungary, that the transition that took place in Albania was largely the result of a populist movement from below rather than divides at the Party level. The question is whether this movement had significant impact on the quality of democracy established within Albania. Electoral process Since the collapse of socialism, Albania has struggled to establish a fully liberalised, democratic government and electoral system. Despite the introduction of pluralism, almost all elections held since 1992 have been controversial, including technical irregularities, allegations of corruption and a lack of transparency. Furthermore, due to this controversy, losing parties have often boycotted parliament, leading to political stalemates and stagnation31 . In this way, Albania is yet to hold elections in full accordance with international standards32 , casting serious doubt on the quality of the liberal democracy established in Albania. Furthermore, this corruption within the electoral system also undermines other key institutions such as the rule of law and civil society and highlights the ways in which Albania has struggled to consolidate liberal democratic rule. Whilst it would therefore appear that Hungary was more successful in establishing free and fair elections, the author would point to the resurgence of corruption Hungary has witnessed in recent years. In light of this, it Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 19 31 Rista Panagiotou, ‘Albania and the EU: From Isolation to Integration’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 13(2011), 357–374, pp. 370. 32 Curry and Wolchick.
- 20. would seem thatthe nature of transition, whilst having short-term impact on the consolidation of democracy, has not had significant long-term influence on whether a country has a democratic, pluralised electoral system as both Hungary and Albania are still suffering from the presence of corruption in this process and amongst political elites. Judicial independence and freedom of the press In association with corruption amongst political elites, Albania’s government has often come under criticism for interfering with the judiciary and corruption of the judicial system. Whilst the Albanian Constitution of 1998 theoretically guaranteed independence of the judiciary, it has not been translated into reality as underfunded courts are often subject to political pressure, resulting in it being seen as one of Albania’s most corrupt institutions.33 Furthermore, the courts do not have a track record of high level prosecutions of political elites despite corruption being rife throughout the political system34 . In this way, it is clear that Albania has failed to establish a system of checks and balances and the separation of powers that are found within a functioning liberal democracy. This corruption has almost impacted on the establishment of a free and democratic media. Whilst freedom of the press was officially declared in Albania in 1993, it is still largely associated with government control. There is also a significant level of corporate ownership of newspapers and journalists are subject to political and economic pressure35 . In this way, it is fair to argue that Albania cannot truly make claims to having freedom of speech or freedom of the press, an institution which is considered a cornerstone of any functioning liberal democracy. As seen in Figure 1.2, in comparison with other post-Socialist countries such as Poland and Estonia, the level of independence in the media and freedom of speech in both Albania and Hungary is relatively low. This would suggest that the nature of transition, whether from above or from below, has not had a significant impact on the consolidation of liberal democracy as neither country, as of 2015, can fully claim to have a democratic press. Figure 1.2. Independence of Media36 20 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations 33 Ibid, pp. 387. 34 Habdank-Kołaczkowska. 35 East and Pontin, pp. 218. 36 For full list of countries see: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_NIT2015_06.06.15_FINAL.pdf>.
- 21. Liberalisation of theeconomy In contrast to the economic system first established in Hungary, Albania struggled to implement economic reforms, resulting in it being Europe’s poorest country after the fall of socialism in 1990. This was reflected in the fall of GDP by 27% and levels of unemployment reaching 450,000 by 199337 . Even now, Albania remains one of the poorest countries in Europe, with informal and illegal activity accounting for approximately 40-50% of Albania’s economy, resulting in a form of “crony capitalism”38 . However, unlike Hungary which has seen a recent decline in its liberalised economy, Albania has begun to see some level of success in terms of economic reforms, resulting in solid growth rates and a significant reduction in poverty. For example, between 1998 and 2008 there was an annual GDP growth of 7%39 . Furthermore, in spite of its top-down transition, Hungary has seen a rise in economic corruption whilst Albania, which experienced a bottom-up transition, has witnessed the implementation of substantial economic growth in recent years (see Figure 1.3), questioning whether the nature of transition away from socialism had significant impact on liberalisation of the economy. Figure 1.3. GDP Growth (Annual %)40 Conclusion As a result of this comparison of the consolidation and level of democracy in both Albania and Hungary, it is fair to conclude that the form of transition away from socialism has had limited impact upon the consolidation of liberal democracy within individual countries. Whilst there has been some discrepancy in the quality of democracy between these two case studies, overall liberalisation at the level of political elites in Hungary was not beneficial in the process of democratisation in comparison with the populist uprising in Albania. This is reflected in the overall democracy scores assigned to each country by Freedom House in 2015, with Albania receiving a score of 4.14 whilst Hungary was given a score of 3.18. Whilst this might initially suggest the presence of stronger democracy in Hungary, it is important to note that according to Freedom House, the democracy of the electoral process, freedom of the media and independence of the judiciary have all suffered in Hungary in recent years. In comparison, Albania has not experienced the same issues, instead seeing improvement in a number of areas. This in turn, provides strong evidence that the nature of transition has not had significant impact on the long-term quality of liberal democracy in either country. Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 21 37 East and Pontin, pp. 216. 38 Panagiotou, 2011. 39 Curry and Wolchick, pp. 386. 40 World Bank.
- 22. It is alsoimportant to consider other factors that may have impacted on the consolidation of democracy within Central and Eastern Europe i.e. cultural legacy and the presence of international organisations such as the European Union. For example, Pridham argued that membership of the European Union provided long term support for the establishment of democratic institutions and helped consolidate liberal democracy through intensification of networking41 . As Hungary has been a member of the European Union since 2004 and Albania is currently not a member, this may well be an influencing factor although due to word limitations the paper has not been able to discuss this further. It is also important to note that this article has solely focused on the idea of liberal democracy and has only made reference to two examples, extrapolating the findings from these case studies to the wider area of politics in post-socialist Europe. Consequently, whilst the impact of the nature of transition may not be significant in Hungary and Albania, further research would have to be conducted to draw firmer correlations between the two phenomenons. In spite of these limitations however, this article has demonstrated that the overall the nature of transition away from a socialist regime has had limited influence in shaping a country’s ability to successfully introduce a liberal democratic system of government, as seen within Hungary and Albania, and instead we must look to other factors such as EU membership to explain differences in the consolidation of democracy in the post-Soviet space. Bibliography Bitó, László, Hungary’s Struggles for Freedom and Democracy (Open Democracy, 2012) <https://www.opendemocracy.net/l%C3%A1szl%C3%B3-bit%C3%B3/hungarys-struggles- for-freedom-and-democracy> [accessed 10 May 2016]. Bogdani, Mirela and John Loughlin, Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey Towards (London: I. B.Tauris & Company, 2007), pp. 21. Bollen, Kenneth A., ‘Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures’, American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 1207-1230. Cox, Terry, ‘1989 and the Transformations in Eastern Europe’, Europe-Asia Studies, 63 (2011), 1529–1534). Crampton, Richard J., Eastern Europe in the twentieth century–and after (United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis, 2010). Curry, Jane L. and Sharon L. Wolchik, Central and East European politics: From communism to democracy (United States: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). East, Rodger and Jolyon Pontin, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, 2nd edn (United Kingdom: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1997). Furlong, Andy and Terry Cox, ‘Political transition in Hungary: An overview’, The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 10 (1994), 1-12. Gaille, WB, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1956), 167-198. Habdank-Kołaczkowska, Sylvana, Nations in Transit 2015: Democracy on the Defensive in Europe and Eurasia (Freedom House, 2015) <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_NIT2015_06.06.15_FINAL.pdf> [accessed 10 May 2016]. 22 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations 41 Geoffrey Pridham, ‘EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-Communist States – Formality and Reality’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2002), 953–973.
- 23. International Institute forDemocracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout Data for Hungary (International IDEA, 2011) <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=100> [accessed 10 May 2016]. Lewis, Paul, ‘Theories of Democratization and Patterns of Regime Change in Eastern Europe’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 13 (1997), 4–26. O’Neil, Patrick H., ‘Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary’, World Politics, 48 (1996), 579–603. Panagiotou, Rista, ‘Albania and the EU: From Isolation to Integration’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 13(2011), 357–374. Pridham, Geoffrey, ‘EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-Communist States – Formality and Reality’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2002), 953–973. — ‘Assessing Democratic Consolidation in Central & Eastern Europe: The European Dimension’, Acta Politica, 41 (2006), 342–369. Ramet, Sabrina, Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 423. Roaf, James, Ruben Atoyan, Bikas Joshi and Krzysztof Krogulski, 25 Years of Transition: Post – Communist Europe and the IMF (International Monetary Fund, 2014) <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2014/eur/eng/pdf/erei_sr_102414.pdf> [accessed 10 May 2016]. Rothschild, Joseph and Nancy Wingfield, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World War II, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Sakwa, Richard, Post Communism (United Kingdom: Open University Press, 1999). Schein, Gábor, Speaking with Double Tongues: What’s Gone Wrong in Hungary? (Open Democracy, 2012) <https://www.opendemocracy.net/g%C3%A1bor-schein/speaking-with- double-tongues-what%E2%80%99s-gone-wrong-in-hungary> [accessed 10 May 2016]. Terry, Sarah, ‘Thinking about Post-Communist Transitions: How Different are They?’, Slavic Review, 52 (1993), (p. 333). White, Stephen, Communism and its Collapse (London: Taylor & Francis Group Plc, 2000). World Bank, Indicator Metadata (2015) <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/HU?display=graph> [accessed 10 May 2016]. Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 23
- 24. 24 University ofKent School of Politics and International Relations By Alison Onyango In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty laid the foundations for establishing the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a successor to the European Political Cooperation Project. It functions by employing an intergovernmental method. Over time, the common element of the CFSP has come under scrutiny, as the question of how Member State sovereignty fits in has been the topic of discussion numerous times. Through an appraisal of the CFSP in action, this article argues that various factors have worked together to undermine the creation of a ‘common’ foreign policy for all twenty- eight Member States to adopt. The factors that will be discussed include the role of the HR/VP, relevant treaty provisions, the Member States’ relationships with each other and other actors, and differing views on the use of military force. The role that member states’ sovereignty has played in the functioning of the common foreign security policy. The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was created following the coming into force of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. It is the main instrument by which the EU conducts its foreign policy and, since its inception, has been subject to many changes. Initially consisting of the ‘intergovernmental’ pillar, the workings of the CFSP were based on cooperation between member states and other actors in order for the member states to reach a “far greater clout than they would have if each pursued its own policies”1 . This article will examine the decision making process of the CFSP, relevant treaty provisions, role of the HR/VP and her relationship with the member states, and how there is assurance of member states’ sovereignty. This article will further include relevant case studies of the CFSP in action in order to demonstrate that the member states sovereignty has been preserved at the expense of creating a truly common foreign policy. 1 European Union, Foreign and Security Policy <http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm> [accessed 5 December 2015]. 2 Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, ‘The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 7 (2002), 257-282 (p.257). A brief history of the CFSP The CFSP was negotiated during the Intergovernmental Conference on European Political Union, and replaced what was called the European Political Cooperation. This was an earlier “timid and selective attempt”2 to coordinate the foreign policies of the member states through consultation with one another. It also constituted a separate intergovernmental pillar within the Maastricht Treaty pillar structure, which differentiated it from the community method of the first pillar. This may have been an early indication of the member states intentions in regards to the relationship they would have liked with each other, and the position they would have liked to be in within the overall structure of the CFSP.
- 25. Kent Political AlmanacIssue 4 25 3 Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) p.51. 4 Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) p.488. 5 Keukeleire and Delreux, p.158. 6 Ibid, p.157. 7 Article 26(3) TEU. Other developments have since changed the nature of the CFSP, most notably the Amsterdam 1999 and Lisbon 2009 treaties. The former created the role of the ‘High Representative (HR) of the CFSP’, who was to be appointed by the European Council and assists in formulating, preparing and implementing policy decisions3 . The Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar system and expanded the role of the HR to make it the ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission’ (HR/VP), which means that the HR/VP now needs to co-operate with both the Council and the Commission. Another creation of the Lisbon Treaty was the European External Action Service (EEAS), which was formed to assist the HR/VP. Treaty provisions and obligations As well as considering case studies of the CFSP in operation, it is also worth considering the clues that the relevant treaty provisions give us about the member states’ sovereignty. Certain member states seemed determined to maintain the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, so this approach was continued despite the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty. Article 24(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) specifies the following: “The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and…shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.” Eeckhout notes that while this and the other provisions in the TEU should be enough to create useful CFSP policies, the actual policy is often said to be “insufficient, unsatisfactory, and ineffective” due in part to a lack of mechanisms to enforce the duties and obligations imposed by the Treaty4 . Nonetheless, Keukeleire and Delreux indicate that Article 24(3) is only conditionally binding, as Member States only have to adhere to this provision if the Union does have a policy in the first place, short of which they can follow their own policies5 . Declarations 13 and 14 of the TEU further stipulate that the CFSP ‘do[es] not affect the responsibilities of the Member States’ and “will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State” in relation to the “formulation and conduct of its foreign policy”. The inclusion of these two declarations, in part as a result of pressure from the UK6 , may be taken as a clarification of the scope of the commitment that member states must have towards the CFSP. They may also be particularly relevant for countries that have obligations to other organisations such as NATO, which most EU member states do. Therefore, in spite of the obligations under Article 24(3), declarations 13 and 14 retain the member states’ right to pursue their own national foreign policies and consequently, this ensures that they maintain a large degree of sovereignty. The decision making structure and voting The TEU defines the structure of decision-making within the CFSP. The European Council brings together representatives from all the member states, and defines the general guidelines that form the basis of the decisions the Council takes on defining and implementing the CFSP7 . The Council and the implementation of the European Council’s decisions is the responsibility of the HR/VP. Member states and the HR/VP maintain the
- 26. right of initiativein that they may refer questions and submit initiatives or proposals to the Council8 . Decisions made by both the European Council (Heads of State and Government) and the Council (Ministers of Foreign Affairs) operate on a basis of unanimity (this system also underpins the decision making structure on issues of security and defence). A system of qualified majority voting (referred to as QMV hereafter) through derogation does, however, also operate in a limited number of cases that relate to decisions necessary for defining the implementing the CFSP. In addition, a decision cannot be adopted when member states constituting one-third of the member states and one-third of a Union population abstain from a vote through constructive abstention9 . Furthermore, where a member of the Council opposes a decision that’s due to be adopted and was reached by way of QMV, the vote will not take place10 and give the member state a “kind of veto right”11 . As a system of voting, unanimity could be especially useful in situations where a decision needs to made regarding a sensitive issue, but in practice this could prove “cumbersome and impractical”12 and impede the creation of a truly ‘common’ foreign and security policy. Originally, some member states such as Germany and Italy were in favour of a system of QMV instead of unanimity13 , while other countries including the UK and France objected to 26 University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations 8 Keukeleire and Delreux, p.101. 9 Eeckhout, p.172. 10 Article 31(2) TEU. 11 Eeckhout, p.488. 12 Douglas Hurd, ‘Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), 70 (1994) 421-428 (p.424). 13 Catriona Gourlay and Eric Remade, ‘The 1996 IGC: The Actors and their Interaction’ in Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union, ed. by Kjell A. Eliassen (London: SAGE Publications, 1998) pp.59-93 (p. 62).
- 27. Kent Political AlmanacIssue 4 27 14 Ibid. 15 Hurd, p.422. 16 Eeckhout, p.476. 17 Piana, p.211. 18 Jolyon Howorth, ‘The ‘New Faces’ of Lisbon: Assessing the Performance of Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy on the Global Stage’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 16 (2011) 303–323. 19 Ian Traynor, ‘Solid, decent – but uninspired: Catherine Ashton makes EU debut’ (The Guardian, 2010) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/11/baroness-catherine-ashton-eu-debut> [accessed 5 December 2015]. this. The reason for their objection is often cited as a reluctance to give up what amounted to a veto power, in place of a system where majority rules14 . Representing the UK and speaking in support of a system of unanimity, the former Secretary of State of the UK had said that the member states’ foreign policies were “more often than not compatible with each other” and that “countries are not going to operate successfully a foreign policy measure to which they are strongly opposed”15 .Eeckhout notes that “unanimity is regarded as safeguarding national sovereignty, whereas qualified majority is advanced as indispensable for effective decision making”16 . Eeckhout’s statement can be explained in the following way: due to the use of unanimity and the small number of situations where QMV may take place, in effect (although it may not be the case in practice), if all twenty-eight member states are required to be on board, it then seems to be the case that member states can essentially block or at least hamper the decision-reaching process. As a result, member states are able to preserve their sovereignty as they do not have to adopt decisions that would be against their national interests. The changing role of the HR/VP and the crises in FYROM and Libya An early example of the decision making process of the CFSP in action was in regards to the Union’s response to the crisis in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) that took place in the late 90s to early 2000s. The crisis was resolved in part due to the signing of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and FYROM, which included the prospect of the latter becoming a member state. This served as an incentive for the warring parties to resolve their problems. Several factors led to the relative success of this operation, including the role played by the former NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana. General Solana was serving as the HR/VP at the time and the use of his qualities as a negotiator proved invaluable17 . At the time, the country was also perceived as being on the brink of war, which created a sense of urgency that led to greater cooperation between the member states and Solana. The combined effort and coordination of various elements vital to the working of the CFSP in this particular case merged together to produce an effective solution to the end of the conflict. Since then, the Lisbon Treaty has come into force, which altered the role of the HR/VP, as previously mentioned. The UK’s Catherine Ashton was first to hold the newly remodelled post. Her appointment came as a surprise, seeing as she had no foreign policy experience and unlike Solana who came before her, was virtually unknown in Europe18 . Throughout her time in office, Ashton faced heavy criticism from both the media and her Brussels counterparts. One member of the European Parliament even went as far as saying that they didn’t want her as “an ambassador for 27 foreign ministers”, asking her “what are your criteria? What are your ambitions? That’s what we’re still waiting for”19 . Howorth offers an evaluation of Ashton’s time in office; we can assess this through the case of the EU’s response to the crises in North Africa in 2010-11. At the start of the crisis, state governments and Union bodies took it upon themselves to address the problem themselves and their responses ended up arriving before Ashton herself. Her approach was to consult all (at the time) twenty-seven member states’ foreign ministers before issuing a statement, making sure to tend to those member states who did not necessarily want to engage in military action. The statement Ashton eventually released was contradictory to those issued by her
- 28. 28 University ofKent School of Politics and International Relations 20 Howorth, p.320. 21 Ibid. 22 Keukeleire and Delreux, p.167. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid, p.166. 25 Ibid. 26 Howorth, p.319. peers in the member states; in addition, she was also the last to call for sanctions20 . As the HR/VP, Ashton was expected to be the face of the CFSP, but in this episode she was upstaged and in effect silent, especially in relation to much more vocal leaders such as Cameron and Sarkozy, with whom she at one point engaged in a row with over the imposition of a no-fly zone21 . When compared to Solana’s handling of the crisis in FYROM, Ashton’s approach to addressing the crisis in North Africa seems to run as smoothly. The perceptions that were held of Ashton and the relationship she had with the heads of some of the member states compromised the working of the CFSP mechanism, which resulted in an uncoordinated response that could not have been considered ‘common’ to all the parties involved. During the Libya crisis, while the member states did not quite actively compromise the workings of the CFSP, the lack of coherence between theirs and Ashton’s responses indicated their tendency to favour an approach that they felt suited them as individual member states. The pinnacle of this is France and the UK’s exercise of military force, despite other member states’ and Ashton’s apprehension. This coupled with Ashton’s in some ways dissatisfying performance, effectively worked to preserve the member states’ autonomy as they pursued their own agendas at the expense of a common policy towards the crisis in North Africa. Differing views on the use of military force There were also some discrepancies between how individual member states handled the situation. France and the UK (along with the US) adopted the UNSC Resolution 1973 which authorised the use of ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians and to establish a no-fly zone. Germany and Italy abstained from the vote and were sceptical about engaging military force22 . This revealed another weakness of the CFSP structure, whereby member states’ differing views on the use of military force-in this case reservations- ultimately undermined the development of a unified response. This disunity, along with Ashton’s handling of the situation, led to a lack of cohesion. The main motivation behind Germany’s unwillingness to use military force in Libya may be explained by their general historical reluctance in deploying military troops in missions such as this23 . Other member states have also been sceptical towards the use of military force. When France brought attention to the conflict in Mali that started in 2012 and involved the country’s President being ousted by a coup, they struggled to gain support for military intervention. It took the other member states three years to adopt the ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’24 to respond to the situation. France eventually ventured on a military operation in partnership with Mali, in order to prevent a takeover by religious extremists. France’s experience in Mali is in some way similar to that of theirs in Libya, whereby in spite of the absence of backing from most of the other member states, they proceeded to use military force anyway where it was in their own interest to do so. The question of whether to engage military force has come up time and time again and is a source of tension within the CFSP25 . While in office, Ashton said that her role was “to promote the role of the EU as a soft power in the world” and that they would not be using gunboats or bombers26 . However, certain member states, namely France and the UK did not share similar views. Smaller member states are also generally less inclined to pursue military action. This also exposes the nature of the relationship between bigger member states, like
- 29. France and theUK, and smaller ones. While all member states are meant to be equal, because of various economic, political, and social factors “some naturally contribute more than others, and take more of the burden and the risk, whether in political clout, financial resources or military capability”27 . Particularly in regards to the bigger member states and their preference for military power, this may be interpreted as them exercising their sovereignty. Their application of military force in spite of their counterparts’ doubts and their pursuit of operations outside of the CFSP of for example in working with organisations such as NATO and the UN highlight this. Similarly, the member states that chose not to participate in military action are, in their own right, exercising their autonomy. Differing views on what has been a contentious issue has led to member states showing their reservations, or in other cases, confidence in using military force and again, it came at the expense of the creation of a cohesive collective policy on an area that is vital to the CFSP. Member states and their relationships with the United States Smith and Steffenson note that the “EU-US relationship has played a key (and contradictory) role in the development of the EU’s foreign policy”28 . This relationship fits into the ‘European integration v Atlantic solidarity’ debate within EU foreign policy29 and has been an area of tension as different member states inevitably share different relationships with the US. In some cases, this has contributed to the undermining of the creation of a ‘common’ European foreign policy. During the FYROM crisis, the US had left it to the EU to manage the crisis30 , however later on there was a lack of consensus between the member states regarding the Iraq war. Whereas France and Germany very openly opposed the use Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 29 27 Brian Crowe, ‘A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq?’ International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), 79 (2003), 533-546, (p.546). 28 Michael Smith and Rebecca Steffenson, ‘The EU and the United States’ in International Relations and the European Union, ed. by Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) (p.428). 29 Keukeleire and Delreux, p.20. 30 Crowe, p.536.
- 30. 30 Kent PoliticalAlmanac Issue 4 of military force, the UK and Spain took an Atlanticist approach and ended up contributing troops to the US-led invasion of Iraq31 . The stance the UK took has been explained as an attempt to avoid creating a rift between Europe and the US32 , this therefore meant that there was a division between them and other EU member states. While collaboration with the US may not necessarily be a bad thing, as seen in Iraq, it can undermine the creation of a common European foreign policy if some countries favour that over cooperation with their fellow member states. Additionally, it has been noted that the lack of coherence between member states’ approach to their relationships with the US has also undermined the influence the EU has on the US, and working collectively can increase this33 . The difference in opinions regarding the US-led military coalition in Iraq demonstrated that due to the different relationships that are shared with the US, member states were willing to diverge from and disagree with one another. This came with the cost of having no common European standpoint on the matter, and showed member states exercising their sovereignty by choosing whether or not to align themselves with the US. Conclusion Musu describes two different trends in EU foreign policy, one being “the convergence of the Member States’ policies” and the other “the concurrent persistence of profound differences between national policies”34 . These two trends are essentially what this essay has explored and the CFSP appears to have followed the latter. Declarations 13 and 14 of the TEU, as well as the voting system employed by the CFSP are two treaty based factors that work to ensure that member states have preserved the right to conduct their own national foreign policies and do not have to adopt decisions that they disagree with, both of which in turn maintain their sovereignty. Different member states are bound to have different interests in the sphere of foreign policy, and these interests shape the way they want the Union to be portrayed and therefore the actions they take. While the crisis in FYROM was handled effectively under Solana, member states failed to create a common position towards the crises in Mali and Libya and chose to act or not to act due to differing views on the use of military force and in exercising their sovereignty. Additionally, the varying relationships shared between member states and the US contributed to disagreement on the use of force in the Iraq war. All these different factors have meant that through its years in operation, the CFSP has on the occasions discussed above has been unable to work to create one policy that would be adopted by all the member states, which secures member state sovereignty. 31 Jonathan Spyer, ‘Europe and Iraq: Test Case for The Common Foreign And Security Policy’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 11 (2007) 94-106, (p.95). 32 Crowe, p.537. 33 Ibid, p.546. 34 Costanza Musu, ‘European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of ‘Converging Parallels’?’ European Foreign Affairs Review, 8 (2003), 35-49 (p.36).
- 31. Kent Political AlmanacIssue 4 31 Bibliography Crowe, Brian, ‘A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq?’ International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), 79 (2003), 533-546. Eeckhout, Piet, EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) European Union, Foreign and Security Policy <http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm> [accessed 5 December 2015]. Gourlay, Catriona and Eric Remade, ‘The 1996 IGC: The Actors and their Interaction’ in Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union, ed. by Kjell A. Eliassen (London: SAGE Publications, 1998). Howorth, Jolyon, ‘The ‘New Faces’ of Lisbon: Assessing the Performance of Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy on the Global Stage’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 16 (2011), 303–323. Hurd, Douglas, ‘Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), 70 (1994), 421-428. Keukeleire, Stephan and Tom Delreux,The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Gisella, ‘The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 7 (2002), 257-282. Musu, Costanza, ‘European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of ‘Converging Parallels’?’ European Foreign Affairs Review, 8 (2003), 35–49. Spyer, Jonathan, ‘Europe and Iraq: Test Case for The Common Foreign And Security Policy’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 11 (2007), 94-106. Smith, Michael and Rebecca Steffenson, ‘The EU and the United States’ in International Relations and the European Union, ed. by Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Traynor, Ian, ‘Solid, decent – but uninspired: Catherine Ashton makes EU debut’ (The Guardian, 2010) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/11/baroness-catherine- ashton-eu-debut> [accessed 5 December 2015]. Treaty on European Union 2007.
- 32. 32 University ofKent School of Politics and International Relations To what extent is a common security defence policy impossible without a common European army? In recent years, especially after 9/11, voices have become loud criticising the European Union (EU) for its use of soft, rather than hard, power. It has been argued that the EU needs a proper army to respond to current crises, like the threat of terrorism, accordingly. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU has been particularly under attack as some hold the opinion that without a common European army the CSDP cannot be effective. But is this the case? Can a CSDP really not be considered effective if it doesn’t have a common European army? The question, ‘To what extent is a CSDP impossible without a common European army’ can be rebranded into ‘Is a common European army desirable for a CSDP’, as the first question implies that it is, at least to some extent, impossible. Note also, that by a common European army it is meant the complete military organisation of the EU, permanently stationed. Thus, the provisions already in place under the CSDP do not fall in this category. In order to analyse the desirability, it must be understood that every Member State defines and perceives ‘security’ and ‘defence’ differently, leading to different implications in national policies and on a EU-level debate. Bearing this in mind, it should be analysed how a common European army would, in light of these differences, be useful for a CSDP. Having agreed on common security tasks, known as the Petersberg tasks, and expanded by the Lisbon treaty, it can be assessed whether these tasks have been fulfilled. It has been identified that these tasks are actually being addressed accordingly by measures already put in place by the EU. It should also be accounted that the EU have a lot more power and leverage through means other than military considerations. Having discerned that the EU actually has several army-like military groups at its disposal and enjoys further leverage, it should be questioned whether the additional establishment of a common European army wouldn’t actually be harmful to the EU and its reputation. By Anna Valesca Antonia Lederer In analysing the desirability of a common European army from different positions taken by the EU’s Member States, and by examining the implications of the commonly agreed-upon security tasks of the CSDP, it is argued that the creation of a common European army would be imprudent of EU policy-makers. Not only would it create discontent and doubts from Member States that perceive security and defence as non-military means, it would also endanger the EU’s role in the world as it is famously a soft power. Additionally, there are already several military mechanisms in place that address common European security and defence threats with great success. It is therefore asserted that the CSDP is completely possible without a common European army, as everything crucial to security threats and defence issues has already been addressed and ensured appropriately.
- 33. Perceptions of securityand defence between different States The way in which one perceives the necessity for a common European army depends entirely on how the paradigms of ‘security’ and ‘defence’ are defined and what one deems necessary in order to be ‘secure’ and ‘able to defend ourselves’. Thus, the different approaches and semantics used by Member States, concerning ‘security’ and ‘defence’ must be understood. The CSDP is decided upon by all twenty-eight European Union Member States that reserve the ultimate authority in anything concerning foreign or security policy decision-making1 . This becomes a problem, considering that all Member States have, at least to an extent, different foreign policy objectives. Driving these different policies are underlying inherent perceptions of each country on ‘security’ and ‘defence’. As Bale pointed out, ‘security is about perception, about the absence, or at least the minimisation, of unacceptable risk not just to life, but to those things that are thought to make it worthwhile or at least easier – freedom and material wellbeing’2 . Precisely this feeling of being ‘secure’ and minimising any risk to freedom and material wellbeing, is perceived very differently by the Member States. The UK and France, for example, favour a militarised approach to foreign policy issues where their interests are at stake, thus perceiving ‘security’ and ‘defence’ as very closely linked to military measures. Having close ties and national interests in former colonies, the UK and France, together with Belgium and Portugal ‘can use the CSDP to talk about African issues without being branded neo-colonialist’3 as well as pushing for intervention in the region. Therefore, when military intervention is mentioned in an EU debate, they are very quick to contribute troops and set a military strategy4 . This was highlighted by the treaty set up in 2010 solely between the UK and France for defence and security cooperation, which emphasises the two countries’ similar views on the matters of foreign policy5 . The consequences were, for example, the proposal and endorsement of both France and the UK for military intervention in Libya in 2011, which went through the decision of the United Nations Security Council6 . In contradiction to France and the UK’s take on military actions stands the most part of the EU. Most notably Germany have long followed a policy of diplomacy and soft power rather than military might in trying to account for and deal with its own past appropriately and using sanctions or persuasion as a favourite foreign policy tool7 . In light of the military intervention in Libya in 2011, for example, Germany abstained Resolution 1973, as it did not see it compatible with German values and interests8 thus perceiving ‘security’ as detached from military measures and rather linked to diplomacy. Other states like Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland derive their sense of ‘security’ from their neutrality, which they are able to keep up under the security framework of the EU. Smaller states can use the EU as a means for international pressure, while simultaneously not having the capabilities to effectively shape or contribute to EU foreign policies9 . Hence, Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 33 1 Anand Menon, ‘European defence policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival, 53 (2011) 75-90 (p.76). 2 Tim Bale, European politics: A comparative introduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p.379. 3 Ibid, p.397. 4 Menon, p.84. 5 Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation 2010. 6 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya], (S/RES/1973, 2011) <http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR- 1973.pdf> [accessed 20 June 2016]. 7 Eva Gross, ‘Germany and European security and defence cooperation: The europeanization of national crisis management policies?’, Security Dialogue, 38 (2007), 501-520 (p.501). 8 Richard Rousseau, ‘Why Germany Abstained on UN Resolution 1973 on Libya’, Foreign Policy Journal, (2011) <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/06/22/why-germany-abstained-on-un-resolution-1973-on-libya/> [accessed 4 December 2015]. 9 Bale, p.397.
- 34. 34 University ofKent School of Politics and International Relations while their perception of ‘security’ and ‘defence’ is also mostly a military one, they are mostly powerless on their own. Menon argues that these differences in opinion, most profoundly the differences of the ‘Big 3’ being the UK, France, and Germany, will prevent the CSDP from developing any grand coherence in strategy even though particular CSDP missions will continue10 However, such a grand strategy in European security and defence is already discernible, making Menon’s prediction somewhat flawed. Common denominators of security threats concerning the EU have already been put forward by the Petersberg tasks in 1992, which account for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making11 . These tasks were then enlarged under the Lisbon treaty in 2007 to include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories12 . The question that arises now is, whether a common European army is needed to ensure these tasks are being fulfilled. All of these tasks are mostly concerned with peacekeeping and logistical support; so is a common army needed for that? 10 Menon, p.76. 11 European External Action Service, About CSDP – The Petersberg Tasks (European Union, 2015) <http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/petersberg/index_en.htm> [accessed December 3, 2015]. 12 European External Action Service, About CSDP – The Treaty of Lisbon (European Union, 2015) <http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/lisbon/index_en.htm> [accessed 3 December 2015].
- 35. Measures already inplace and its contribution to a de-facto common army Concerning the tasks the EU set itself out to do, the CSDP has indeed become an increasingly useful operational entity13 . As a matter of fact, under the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) several special groups have evolved, which actually have many characteristics of a common European army. For one, the existence of the Eurocorps is a multinational, highly operational and rapidly deployable, intergovernmental army corps. It’s headquarter is in Strasbourg and is capable of commanding an up to 65,000-strong land force. Eurocorps deployment rests on the decision of the five Framework Nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and Spain, with Poland to join in 201614 . They are trained to conduct wide-ranging tasks, mostly in EU or NATO context and under a framework of the EU. The European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) for example was, since its deployment in 2013, able to increase the security situation in Mali15 . However, not every EU member state is invested in Eurocorps, nor does everyone have a say, as that rests upon the Framework Nations16 . Their focus is furthermore oriented to missions abroad, rather than making up an army at home. Thus, it is lacking in legitimacy as a European army, as it is only managed by very few member states and only addresses specific issues. Further, there are several military units called EU Battlegroups, which also contribute to the EU’s capability for rapid military response in cohesion with the Petersburg and Lisbon tasks. There are 18 Battlegroups, consisting of 1,500 troops each, excluding combat support elements. These troops are made up of contributions from the EU Member States, with the exception for Denmark and Malta, and also including non-EU countries such as Turkey, Norway, Macedonia, and Ukraine. To qualify as such a Battlegroup, commonly defined standards and criteria must first be met. Having reached full operational capacity in 2007, they have since been a stand-by force, helping to reinforce the effectiveness of Member States’ military forces17 . Despite coming closest to a European army, these troops firstly have never been used, are divided in 18 different Battlegroups with only two being permanently available in rotation18 . Thus, even this project is far from the creation of a common European army. In addition to the EU Battlegroups and Eurocorps, there are other forces within the EU conducting peacekeeping or military missions. These include the European Union Force (EUFOR), the European Gendarmerie Force and the European Maritime Force, which has thus far conducted numerable amounts of both military and civilian missions. Operation EUPOL Afghanistan for example constitutes a police mission under the European Gendarmerie Force since 200719 . The European Union Force Althea (EUFOR ALTHEA) has been in place since 2004, guaranteeing stability and security in Bosnia Herzegovina20 . The European Maritime Force Atalanta (EU NAVFOR ATALANTA) launched 2008 in Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 35 13 Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, The foreign policy of the European Union (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.148. 14 Eurocorps, Eurocorps Info (2015) <http://www.eurocorps.org> [accessed 3 December 2015]. 15 BBC, Mali profile (2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881978> [accessed 4 December 2015]. 16 Eurocorps. 17 European Council, The EU Battlegroups and the EU civilian and military cell (European Union Factsheet, 2005) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups.pdf> [accessed 20 June 2016]. 18 BBC, New force behind EU foreign policy (2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6441417.stm> [accessed 11 June 2016]. 19 European External Action Service, EUPOL Afghanistan (European Union, 2015) <http://www.eupol-afg.eu> [accessed 4 December 2015]. 20 European External Action Service, Political/Military Background (European Union, 2015) <http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2821> [accessed 4 December 2015].
- 36. 36 University ofKent School of Politics and International Relations Somalia is concerned with the effect of Somali-based piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean21 . While these are all ambitious projects aimed at ensuring missions and security abroad, these, too, fail to address the actual creation of a European army that is aimed internally on a permanent basis and is made up of the EU’s member states. However, in light of these accomplishments, the development of the CSDP can be branded as rather impressive and are right in questioning the formal establishment of yet another European army22 . Especially so, as there are other frameworks in place, also guaranteeing the safety of the EU, such as coalitions of the willing that have always come to fore in crisis situations23 , individual missions by a Member State or most importantly NATO missions that contribute to the vitality of the transatlantic link24 . After all, the Berlin Plus Agreement has precisely been put into place to facilitate NATO-EU cooperation with provision of troops, assets, capabilities, and intelligence25 . Taking this into account it should be assessed whether the creation of an actual European army would be useful or not. Further push towards a Common European Army: Useful for CSDP? In the aftermath of 9/11, criticism of the EU for its civilian power approach increased as it was felt that international relations became increasingly dangerous and unpredictable, calling for more military action26 . They also criticised that the US seemed to have the sole responsibility in military interventions with a sort of powerlessness of the EU, relying on the US to do the dirty work27 . However, while some European states are more in favour of a militarised Europe, it became clear that as long as the citizens of Europe were not willing to fight and die for its cause, there would be no further militarisation of the EU28 . But, it must be asked, what would such a cause be? Most certainly a cause where Europeans would be willing to fight and die for Europe, would be a cause of severe security threats facing the whole of the EU internally. However, most of the Petersburg tasks are concerned with missions abroad do not necessarily contribute to the EU’s own security or defence, but rather contribute to security and stability in a specific region abroad. This plays into the different perceptions of security by member states, who find it hard to agree on points concerning the internal security of the EU. The only point of agreement on internal security for the EU can be found under Article 42 (7) of the Treaty of Lisbon, which implies that only when an armed aggression on EU territory has taken place, does the EU theoretically need an army for that country’s support. With new instabilities arising in Eastern Europe and the threat of terrorism imminent, one could make the case that a common European army, in addition to what is already in place, would help secure the EU, if not at least to create a common European security identity. However, the paradox seems that these threats and instabilities come from the soil of the EU itself, therefore complicating the issue as to whether an army would even be relevant in such internal crises. 21 European External Action Service, Missions: Eunavfor (European Union, 2015) <http://eunavfor.eu/mission> [accessed 4 December 2015]. 22 Federiga Bindi, The foreign policy of the European Union: assessing Europe’s role in the world (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), p.80. 23 Simon Duke, The elusive quest for European security: from EDC to CFSP (London: Macmillan, 2000), p.29. 24 Bale, p.394. 25 European Union External Action Service, About CSDP: The Berlin Plus Agreement (European Union, 2015) <http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm> [accessed 4 December 2015]. 26 Christopher Hill, ‘Renationalizing or regrouping? EU foreign policy since 11 September 2001’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42 (2004), 143-163 (p.144). 27 Andrew Moravcsik, The Quiet Superpower (Newsweek International, 2002) <https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/quiet.pdf> [accessed 4 December 2015]. 28 Duke, p.288.
- 37. Further push towardsa Common European Army: Not useful for CSDP? Not only is there a paradox between the likelihood of such armed aggression-taking place on EU soil amongst EU member states, but there is also the fact that such an armed aggression within the EU, as described in the Lisbon Treaty, has not yet taken place. Even recent events such as the terrorist attacks on Paris in November 2015, or on Brussels in March 2016, are highly disputed to fall under the category of the mutual defence clause as the legal definitions surrounding the mutual defence clause account for example, not for attacks that were perpetrated by non-state actors29 . Therefore, it cannot be assumed that a common European army would be effective in defending the EU. Further, as the mutual defence clause implies, EU Member States are obliged either way to stand with the EU country under attack in solidarity and to defend it whether it be with EU military means or individual countries’ aid. This way, military for EU security is already guaranteed without the cost of setting up a different EU army for the case of an attack. Lastly, disregarding the discourse of EU military capabilities and deficits, the deviation of the EU’s security provision from its military approach should also be accounted for. The EU has increasingly been described both as a power in as well as a power through trade30 , able to export its norms and values as well as pushing for reform in countries hoping to be the EU’s trading partners, which has proven itself to be a very effective tool. In addition, the EU also uses foreign aid as an incentive for states to adapt democratic values, which pose probably the most successful strategies of EU value export31 . Another foreign policy tool that should, due to its effectiveness, not be ignored, is that of the promise to EU membership32 . With the accession of much of Eastern Europe, the EU ‘has presided over the most successful democracy-promotion programme ever implemented by an international actor’33 . Not only were democratic values implemented and complied, they slowly created permanent changes in the logic of behaviour of EU actors. Regarding these powerful tools and the establishment of many army-like forces to this date, it seems unnecessary to call for an overarching European army, if not imprudent. Implications of a common army Firstly, establishing a European army separate from measures that are already in place under the CSDP framework would establish EU control over defence capability and spending of its Member States, strongly pressuring smaller or less powerful states to the preferences of other, bigger and more powerful states34 . This is certainly not what the CSDP was established for and would contradict the guiding principles of EU multilateralism, most likely evoking condemnation on part of most EU Member States. Secondly, establishing a common European army would inevitably change the perception of the EU as a soft power. Being perceived as a military power should arguably be avoided, as ‘the EU is precisely respected because of its perception as a soft power’35 and its security community. It is therefore assumed, that a further establishment of a common European army would not Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 37 29 Sophia Müller, Deutschlands Weg in den Kampf gegen den IS – ein Pflaster aus rechtlichen Stolpersteinen, (Verfassungs Blog, 2015). <http://www.verfassungsblog.de/deutschlands-weg-in-den-kampf-gegen-den-is-ein- pflaster-aus-rechtlichen-stolpersteinen/#.VmY0X3ieSt9> [accessed 4 December 2015]. 30 Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘The European Union as a conflicted trade power’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2006), 906-925 (p.906). 31 Ibid, p.912. 32 Moravcsik. 33 Meunier and Nicolaidis, p.913. 34 Simon Duke and Roberta Haar, ‘Still at the Crossroads: Europe, the United States, and NATO’, in Europe today: a twenty-first century introduction, ed. by Ronald Tiersky and Erik Jones (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011). 35 Bale, p.382.
- 38. 38 University ofKent School of Politics and International Relations only agonise most EU Member States but also have negative consequences for the EU’s international reputation. After all, third parties consult the EU for help before any other strategic partners, precisely because of their soft power approach and neutrality36 . Therefore, the ‘strength and capacity of the EU to be an influential player will depend mainly on its capacity to still be an example and model for the world’37 . Conclusion Evidently, the creation of a common European army would be imprudent of EU policy- makers. Not only would it create discontent and doubts on the side of the Member States that perceive security and defence as non-military means, it would also endanger the EU’s role in the world, as it is famously a soft power, leading to much of its popularity. It is also simply unnecessary, as there are several military mechanisms already in place, addressing common European security and defence threats with great success. Additionally, the EU has more leverage than simply ‘military might’ with which they can succeed in implementing a successful CSDP, most notably power in and through trade. Therefore, as a common European army is undesirable for the CSDP, it follows that the CSDP is also completely possible without a common European army, precisely because of the already existing measures dealing with security threats, and defence issues that are in form of military groups such as Eurocorps and other political means. Bibliography Bale, Tim, European politics: A comparative introduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). BBC, Mali profile (2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881978> [accessed 4 December 2015] — New force behind EU foreign policy (2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6441417.stm> [accessed 11 June 2016]. Bindi, Federiga, The foreign policy of the European Union: assessing Europe’s role in the world (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2012). Duke, Simon, The elusive quest for European security: from EDC to CFSP (London: Macmillan, 2000). Duke, Simon and Haar, Roberta, ‘Still at the Crossroads: Europe, the United States, and NATO’, in Europe today: a twenty-first century introduction, ed. by Ronald Tiersky and Erik Jones (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011). Eurocorps, Eurocorps Info (2015) <http://www.eurocorps.org> [accessed 3 December 2015]. European External Action Service, About CSDP: The Berlin Plus Agreement (European Union, 2015) <http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm> [accessed 4 December 2015]. — About CSDP: The Petersberg Tasks (European Union, 2015) <http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/petersberg/index_en.htm> [accessed December 3, 2015]. 36 Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, The foreign policies of European Union member states (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) p.249. 37 Bindi, p.61.
- 39. — About CSDP:The Treaty of Lisbon (European Union, 2015) <http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/lisbon/index_en.htm> [accessed 3 December 2015]. — EUPOL Afghanistan (European Union, 2015) <http://www.eupol-afg.eu> [accessed 4 December 2015]. — Missions: Eunavfor (European Union, 2015) <http://eunavfor.eu/mission> [accessed 4 December 2015]. — Political/Military Background (European Union, 2015) <http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2821> [accessed 4 December 2015]. European Council, The EU Battlegroups and the EU civilian and military cell (European Union Factsheet, 2005) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups.pdf> [accessed 20 June 2016]. Gross, Eva, ‘Germany and European security and defence cooperation: The europeanization of national crisis management policies?’, Security Dialogue, 38 (2007), 501-520. Hill, Christopher, ‘Renationalizing or regrouping? EU foreign policy since 11 September 2001’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42 (2004), 143-163. Keukeleire, Stephan and Delreux, Tom, The foreign policy of the European Union (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Manners, Ian and Whitman, Richard, The foreign policies of European Union member states (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). Menon, Anand, ‘European defence policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival, 53 (2011) 75-90. Meunier, Sophie and Nicolaidis, Kalypso, ‘The European Union as a conflicted trade power’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2006), 906-925. Moravcsik, Andrew, The Quiet Superpower (Newsweek International, 2002) <https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/quiet.pdf> [accessed 4 December 2015]. Müller, Sophia, Deutschlands Weg in den Kampf gegen den IS – ein Pflaster aus rechtlichen Stolpersteinen, (Verfassungs Blog, 2015). <http://www.verfassungsblog.de/deutschlands-weg-in-den-kampf-gegen-den-is-ein-pflaster- aus-rechtlichen-stolpersteinen/#.VmY0X3ieSt9> [accessed 4 December 2015]. Rousseau, Richard, ‘Why Germany Abstained on UN Resolution 1973 on Libya’, Foreign Policy Journal, (2011) <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/06/22/why-germany- abstained-on-un-resolution-1973-on-libya/> [accessed 4 December 2015]. Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation 2010. UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya], (S/RES/1973, 2011) <http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR- 1973.pdf> [accessed 20 June 2016]. Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 39
- 40. 40 University ofKent School of Politics and International Relations How secularism became Europe’s religion In 2002, former German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt argued that accepting Turkey into the European Union would result in “the political union degenerating into nothing more than a free-trade community”1 , inducing that Turkey’s culture made it incompatible with European Christian values. Three years later, Pope John Paul II accused the European Union of ‘militant secularism’ as propositions of references to Christianity in the draft Constitution were all rejected. The intertwining of Europe’s Christian roots with the European aspirations of privatisation of religion indeed poses a problem when it comes to identifying the nature of Europe in terms of secularity and religiosity, especially as these issues question the notion of freedom. If Europe had suffered from religious intolerance in the past, it is now time to wonder whether Europe is suffering from intolerance towards religion, and if so, why. Indeed, it may appear surprising that the process of secularisation in Europe does not solely rest on the separation of Church and State, but often goes beyond by proscribing religion from the public life for the sake of religious freedom. Therefore, one may wonder whether – and if so, to what extent- the secularisation movement that Europe is undergoing jeopardises the historical religious nature of region. In order to answer that question, I will first show that Europe is culturally religious, as religion was historically a strong cohesive factor within Europe. I will then endeavour to explain that it is this historical tie between Church and State that resulted in the secularisation process undergone by Europe, which resulted in an attempt to relegate religion to the private sphere. We will however see that secularisation does not necessarily imply lessening of the religious. Eventually, I will argue that not only does the erection of secularism as a quasi-religious doctrine in Europe show the European yearning for faith in some transcendent values based on belief. More importantly the controversies this vindictive secularism raises in politics, and notably its relation with Islam, suggest that the practice of secularism in Europe is likely to enhance its religious character by a rethinking of the place of religion in society. 1 Michael S. Teitelbaum and Philip L. Martin, ‘Is Turkey Ready for Europe?’, Foreign Affairs, 82 (2003), 97-111, p. 98. By Annabelle Godest Despite its Christian roots and cultural heritage, Europe has undergone a process of secularisation that started in the 17th century with Enlightenment, and has intensified over the past decades. This secularisation process is characterised by the relegation of religion from the public arena to the private sphere and results from the historical intertwining of church and state in Europe. Indeed, the historical instrumentalisation of religion by political leaders in order to justify the established social order gave rise to a desire to clear the public space from religion in order to establish a fairer order, which would not be based on unverifiable claims but on Man and its reason, following in the humanist tradition. Yet, in its mission to replace religion as a federative universal and self-evident principle, this fierce secularism is ironically exposing Europe’s dogmatism where in trying to protect society from the oppression of religion, Europe is increasingly oppressing religion by strictly rejecting it from the public life. During the last decade, controversies over the presence of religion in the public sphere, and in particular of Islam, have shown that the strict privatisation of religion is not a universal principle and has evidenced the need for a European adaptation.
- 41. “A religion isa unified system of beliefs and practices… which unite in one single moral community called a Church”2 . Durkheim’s description of religion illustrates the vocation of religion in Europe: to unite. Indeed, contrary to the United States that was born a modern and secular state, the historical ties and even adequacy of the Church and State in Europe imparted to religion as a mission of unifying society of creating a sense of community in order to justify war as explained by Mikkeli; “the enemy and political reasons created the incentive for a common identity in a Christian brotherhood supported by the popes”3 . It is in this mission of making community that provides a legitimisation of power to religion in having a strong political and unifying dimension in Europe. The terms “monarchy of divine right” speaks for itself. As Tocqueville explained, religion in Europe was indissoluble from politics: “Unbelievers in Europe attack Christians more as political than religious enemies; they hate the faith as the opinion of a party much more than as a mistaken belief”4 . Nowadays, still, religious affiliations in Europe have a political connotation, and this correlation can be verified as the more on the right side of the political landscape more likely to advocate religious ideas and vice-versa5 . In fact, the terms ‘right’ and ‘left’ were coined during the French Revolution, and the original ‘right’ in France was formed of politicians supporting hierarchy, tradition, and clericalism, whereas the ‘left’ fought against divine right monarchy. Such a correlation between politics and religion in Europe as a result of historical ties between Church and State left its marks on today’s European culture. Indeed, the glorification of Christianity as the common denominator of European identity, more than as a matter of private faith. This is what Hervieu-Léger refers to as “belonging without believing”6 and accounts for the celebration of ‘holy’ days such as Christmas and Easter, the widespread interdiction of opening shops on Sundays, the quasi-total absence of contracting out from paying tax churches in Lutheran countries, remaining religious character of certain events such as funerals, and perhaps even the positive outcome of the 2009 Swiss referendum against the construction of minarets7 . Whereas the absence of a national church in the United States since its foundation resulted in the expansion of a voluntarist religious market in which each religion is understood as a simple denomination, Casanova affirms that the absence of a truly competitive religious market in Western Europe can be explained by the fact that many Europeans are still implicitly members of their national churches8 . However, the federating aspect of religion has become increasingly latent and loose, and as churches are no longer seen as ‘community cults’ and churches of individual salvation. This shows the strong historical community-making aspect of religion in Europe9 that has ultimately led to the secularisation of Europe. Weber explains European powers resorted to religion as an instrument of rationalisation, which he refers to as “practical rationality” and whose aim was notably to provide irrefutable justifications to social injustice10 . For example, the belief that the suffering endured by those on the bottom rungs of society’s ladder would Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 41 2 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (London: Allen & Unwin, 1915). 3 Heikki Mikkeli, Europe as an Idea and an Identity (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), pp.21-26. 4 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy In America (London: Saunders and Otley, 1838). 5 Grace Davie, Belonging Without Believing, Just How Secular is Europe? (United States: Pew Research centre, 2005), p.19. 6 Danièle Hervieu-Léger, ‘The Role of Religion in Establishing Social Cohesion’ in Religion in the New Europe ed. by Krzysztof Michalski (Budapest: Central European Press, 2006), 45-51. 7 Jose Casanova, ‘Religion, European Secular Identities and Europe Integration’ in Religion in an Expanding Europe, ed. by Byrnes and Katsenstein (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 65-92. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid, pp.116-124. 10 Stephen Kalberg, ‘Max Weber’s Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization in History’, The American Journal of Sociology (United States: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 1145-1179.
- 42. 42 University ofKent School of Politics and International Relations have an open door to paradise, proved useful in preventing social outbreaks and national cohesion to an extent. Thus, the strong historical link between religion and injustice gave rise to a rejection of religion as a hindrance to Man’s capacity to think for himself. Kant posits that the church is a political force that constrains behaviour through the use of doctrine and that man should not assent to a set of beliefs that hinders the development of its reason, urging his readers to carry out a critical appreciation of what they are being told by authorities11 . Thus, the use of religion at political ends led to the Enlightenment movement which fought against the irrational character of a privileged society founded upon unverifiable beliefs, the main one being divine right monarchy. It is therefore the past link between State and Church that created a need to get rid of any irrational element in the public sphere embodied by positivist theories. Nowadays still, as Caplow highlights, “revolutionary movements (in Europe), whatever their form, are still directed against the church as well as against private property and hereditary privilege”12 , whereas the American Enlightenment did not carry anti-religion components13 . Nevertheless, although Casanova advocates the view that the privatisation of religion induced a decrease of individual beliefs, it seems more accurate to talk about an autonomisation of religion than about a decrease of individual beliefs. Indeed, although the 11 Immanuel Kant, Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment? Berlinische Monatsschrift (Germany: Gedike and Biester, 1784). 12 Theodore Caplow, ‘Contrasting Trends in European and American religion’, Sociological Analysis 46 (1985), 101- 108. 13 Casanova, pp. 114-123.
- 43. privatisation of religionled to the decrease of traditional religious practices such as churchgoing, one may wonder whether the loss of the social dimension of religion, and thus of its conventional character, may have deepened the authentic character of current believers. As religion is becoming an option among many and has lost its mandatory social aspect, it could be that religion is merging into a more sincere, less superficial belief14 . Tocqueville’s postulate further proclaims that the abstention of the clergy in political life increased the influence of religion, as is the case in the United States15 . For instance, Davie brought to light the increase in the number of adult baptisms and confirmations in France and Great Britain, which suggests that religion is increasingly a matter of individual human choice16 . Indeed, with the Enlightenment humanism revolution and the Declaration of Human Rights in the XVIII Century, the human reason became the new absolute, a transfer of sacrality from religion to politics occurred, and the community of citizens linked together by rights and duties replaced the community of subjects linked together by God. By conferring sacrality to the secular rational man who transcended its emotions, Durkheim argues that rationalism created a religion of which man is both believer and God17 . Indeed, as actual religion no longer appears to be a major political instrument to justify war, territorial claims or social injustice in Europe; new values were needed to unify the people. This may be illustrated by the strong religiosity that filled the vacuum left by the collapse of Communism in Poland, where federative values were essential to ensuring a sense of community18 . In the same way as religion needed a universal vocation in order to be erected as a superior, federative principle – or else it was doomed to becoming a mere matter of opinion-, the idea of human rationality was equally erected as a universal principle, and from this principle arose that of secularism as a universal value. Ever since the Enlightenment, in Europe there is the belief that secularism is the necessary implication of modernisation19 , which goes along with the European vision of the state as an “agent of a historic destiny” entrusted with the task of leading society to the realisation of its finality20 . This would explain why, according to Casanova, European countries are fiercely promoting secularism as a “freedom from belief”, whereas in the United States the state is considered as a service of public utility in promoting secularism as a “freedom to believe21 . It therefore appears that secularism is becoming a sacred principle based on a belief of what progress implies. In order to illustrate the symbolic character of European secularism, Asad explained European media have “interesting selectivity”. For example, little is reported on the cruelties perpetrated against other human beings, such as the torture and killing of political prisoners in Egypt and Israel despite the European self-proclaimed humanism and love for freedom. Yet the fatwah calling for the execution of British author, Salman Rushdie, proclaimed by Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, on the grounds that Rushdie he had written a blasphemous novel on Prophet Muhammad made world headlines. Asad that this example shows the selection bias in which Europe has an “affront to transcendent sacred principles”22 when issues of freedom of speech arise. Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 43 14 Charles Taylor, A secular age (United States: Harvard University Press, 2007), p.22-25. 15 Tocqueville. 16 Davie, p. 84. 17 Durkheim, p. 33. 18 Simona Guerra, ‘Eurosceptic Allies or Euroenthusiast Friends? The Political Discourse of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland’, in Does God Matter? Representing Religion in the European Union, ed. by Lucian Leustean (London: Routledge, 2012), 139-152. 19 Jose Casanova, ‘Religion, European Secular Identities and Europe Integration’ in Religion in an Expanding Europe, ed. by Byrnes and Katsenstein (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 65-92. 20 Caplow, pp.101-114. 21 Ibid. 22 Talal Asad, ‘Europe against Islam’, The Muslim World, 87 (1997), 183–195.
- 44. 44 University ofKent School of Politics and International Relations The construction of secularism as a universal, self-evident principle that is increasingly tainted with an anti-religious connotation is becoming a doctrine that implies arbitrary measures. As notably illustrated by the 2004 French law banning of “conspicuous religious symbols” that was seen to be aimed at the Muslim veil, an apparition of Islam in European societies seems to provoke heated secular reactions as its public dimension is questioning the universal validity of secularism as a necessary implication of modernisation, and raises the question of whether secularism is a particular perspective on community rather than a superior truth and the necessary finality to modernisation23 . It appears that increasingly, Europeans perceive Islamic practices and beliefs to be infringing upon European values, which are man and its freedom accordingly with the principles of democracy. Davie mentions the rising political debate in Europe concerning “the religious permissibility of political loyalty towards a non-Muslim government(s)”24 . Although Asad refutes the validity of these doubts as Muslims have already lived as subjects of European governments25 , it can also be said that Islam is questioning the European absolute character conferred to politics as Asad himself states that Muslims should not necessarily give in to the demands of European nationalists of absolute loyalty from their citizens, for the same reasons as bankers, trade-unionists, intellectuals, scientists, and artists who “all have personal and professional attachments that transcend the borders of the nation state”26 . 23 Jose Casanova, Religion, European Secular Identities and Europe Integration (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 65-92. 24 Davie, p.27 25 Asad, p.194. 26 Ibid.
- 45. Highlighting the dogmaticaspect of secularism and its boundaries, Islam is thus contributing to prove the need for European adaptation, and as result, to increase religion in the public sphere27 . As Casanova claims that France is eliminating religion from its public forum, one could argue the opposite: in the recent decades, religion has never been more present in the public debate than when it was vehemently fought against – such fights show that conciliation is needed28 . Indeed, the fact that the unremitting secularisation of Europe seems to be mixing up secular and total absence of religion paves the way to a re-opening of the debate on secularism. When viewing Huntington’s claim that religion is increasingly becoming “a new source of identity”29 , undeniably a society whose absolute is man and its freedom cannot strictly keep religion out of the polis. Furthermore, Asad maintains that “if we are fighting against the irrationality of a belief by another belief, secularism as a response to all ills is no different to the zealots who speak for Islam”30 . Therefore, it seems that, in the same way that the term “Judeo-Christian” was coined after World War II in order to shape a common historical culture and annihilate the perception of Jews as foreign others31 , Europe has a moral duty to change to adapt Muslims and at the same time, Muslims should change to adapt to Europe by integrating from the Sharia only what is compatible with the values of the host country as suggested by Ramadan32 . Indeed, accepting to reopen the debate about secularism, and acknowledging the fact that secularism is not incompatible with religion, as in the case of the United States demonstrates, would enable Europe to “break away from the fundamentalist vision of a single authentic modernity and help to construct multiple modernities”33 . Although the Christian roots of Europe have undeniably contributed to shaping its culture until nowadays, religion has lost it social status as the historical link between Church and State; giving rise to a need to clear the public sphere from religion in order to establish a somewhat fairer social system. Nonetheless, European secularisation did not make Europe less religious as beliefs remain, and the fact that sacrality is conferred to Man and to its choice, there is a replacement of sacrality conferred to God and religion. However, the absolute character conferred to human rationality gave rise to a fierce secularism which often takes the form of a fight against religion, suggesting that secularism has become a federative belief justifying injustice in the same way religion did in Europe. Evidencing the need for conciliation of secularism and religion parts with the teleological view of secularism as the implication of a single modernisation process that the State is to implement, this draws a questionable ideological dimension. As Asad warns, “if Europe cannot be articulated in terms of complex space and complex time that allow for multiple ways of life (and not merely multiple identities) to flourish, it may be fated to be no more than the common market of an imperial civilization, always anxious about exiles within its gates and barbarism beyond”34 . Kent Political Almanac Issue 4 45 27 Davie, pp.4-17. 28 Casanova, ‘Religion, European Secular Identities and Europe Integration’. 29 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (United Kingdom: Pocket Books, 1998). 30 Asad, p.193. 31 Asad, p.194. 32 Tariq Ramadan, What I believe (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2009). 33 Asad, p.195. 34 Talal Asad, Christianity, Islam, Modernity (United States: Stanford University Press, 2003),p.180.
- 46. 46 University ofKent School of Politics and International Relations Bibliography Asad, Talal, ‘Europe against Islam’, The Muslim World, 87 (1997), 183–195. — Christianity, Islam, Modernity (United States: Stanford University Press, 2003). — ‘French Secularism and the Islamic Veil Affair’, The Hedgehog Review (2006), 93-10. Caplow, Theodore, ‘Contrasting Trends in European and American religion’, Sociological Analysis 46 (1985), 101-108. Casanova, Jose, ‘Rethinking Secularization: a Global Comparative Perspective’, The Hedgehog Review (2006), 101-141. — ‘Religion, European Secular Identities and Europe Integration’ in Religion in an Expanding Europe, ed. by Byrnes and Katsenstein (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 65-92. Davie, Grace, Belonging Without Believing, Just How Secular is Europe? (United States: Pew Research centre, 2005). — Europe: the Exceptional Case. Parameters of Faith in the Modern World (Darton: Longman & Todd Ltd, 2002). Durkheim, Émile, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (London: Allen & Unwin, 1915). Guerra, Simona, ‘Eurosceptic Allies or Euroenthusiast Friends? The Political Discourse of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland’, in Does God Matter? Representing Religion in the European Union, ed. by Lucian Leustean (London: Routledge, 2012), 139-152. Hervieu-Léger, Danièle, ‘The Role of Religion in Establishing Social Cohesion’ in Religion in the New Europe ed. by Krzysztof Michalski (Budapest: Central European Press, 2006), 45- 51. Huntington, Samuel, The clash of civilizations (United Kingdom: Pocket Books, 1998). Kalberg, Stephen, ‘Max Weber’s Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization in History’, The American Journal of Sociology (United States: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 1145-1179. Kant, Immanuel, Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment? Berlinische Monatsschrift (Germany: Gedike and Biester, 1784). Mikkeli, Heikki, Europe as an Idea and an Identity (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998). Ramadan, Tariq, What I believe (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2009). Taylor, Charles, A secular age (United States: Harvard University Press, 2007). Teitelbaum, Michael S. and Martin, Philip L., ‘Is Turkey Ready for Europe?’, Foreign Affairs, 82 (2003), 97-111. Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democracy In America (London: Saunders and Otley, 1838)
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- 48. 48 University ofKent School of Politics and International Relations Global Europe Centre Get in touch E: globaleuropecentre@kent.ac.uk F: Global Europe Centre – University of Kent T: @GlobalEuropeCen www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec About The Kent Political Almanac The Kent Political Almanac was created to provide a platform for academic debate and peer-reviewed publication opportuni-ties for students in Politics and International Relations. This journal’s purpose is to showcase the School’s best undergraduate and postgraduate essays. The initiative came from students of the School of Politics and International Relations, which led to the journal being launched in November 2013. All articles are peer-reviewed by both students and members of the School’s academic staff. We are proud to be an entirely student-led publication, supported from our School of Politics and IR at the University of Kent.