Intermediate Report on Ukraine's 2019 Presidential Election Monitoring

Intermediate Report on Monitoring Ukraine's 2019 Presidential Election
The "Uspishna Varta" human rights platform, February 2019
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Table of contents
SUMMARY..................................................................................................................................................................... 3
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF ELECTIONS...................................................................................................... 5
MANAGEMENT OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS............................................................................................... 7
CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION.......................................................................................................... 7
DISTRICT ELECTION COMMISSIONS........................................................................................................ 8
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS.................................................................................................................................... 8
REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES......................................................................................................................... 9
CONDITIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGNING.............................10
ENSURING SECURITY, LAW, AND ORDER DURING AN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN............................12
ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN FINANCING................................................................................................................15
MASS MEDIA..............................................................................................................................................................15
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS...........................................................................................16
RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................................................................................17
ABOUT THE “USPISHNA VARTA” HUMAN RIGHTS PLATFORM............................................................19

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SUMMARY
The next presidential election in Ukraine is scheduled for March 31st, 2019. The electoral campaign was
launched on December 31st 2019, in accordance with the legislation.
On January 18th 2019 the “Uspishna Varta” human rights platform received permission from the CEC to
have its official election observers. Observation is carried out through the work of more than 50 long-term
and short-term observers in constituencies; interviews with representatives of candidate headquarters,
election commissions, the media community, and the public sector; the collection of information from public
sources of information.
This report was formed on the basis of observation during the period from December 31st 2018 to February
28th 2019 with the aim of informing the Ukrainian and international community about the electoral process
in Ukraine and violations that may affect the free will of citizens and the results of elections.
***
The legal framework as a whole is sufficient for holding democratic elections. At the same time, further
efforts are needed to ensure the stability of the electoral legislation and its unification (adoption of the
Electoral Code). After the start of the 2019 presidential campaign, draft laws affecting the course of
elections were considered in parliament. Thus, on February 7th, along with slogans of anti-Russian
rhetoric, a law was passed restricting the ability of international organizations to observe elections
(banning citizens of the Russian Federation from being observers at elections in Ukraine). Also, during the
campaign a draft law on toughening criminal liability for violations related to elections was included on
the agenda of the parliament.
As of February 28th the electoral process has been managed within the timeframe and scope of the
powers stipulated by electoral legislation. By February 18th the Central Election Commission (CEC) formed
199 district election commissions (DECs). 44 candidates filed submissions to 7,355 DEC members. The
specified amount is sufficient to form commissions without sending a request for the appointment of
members to the CEC. According to Ukrainian journalists, DEC members from a number of candidates in
the previous elections worked for other candidates. Experts admit that such “overflowing” is due to the
fact that a number of candidates are technical. And the members of the DEC appointed by their
submission will work in the interests of other candidates who are leaders of the race. Also, the first facts of
pressure being put on the work of the DECs by right-wing organizations (DEC number 24 in the Dnepr)
were recorded.
Voter registration is passive, constantly functioning, and takes place on the basis of a centralized State
Voter Register (SVR). The preliminary list of voters in the presidential election included 35,602,855 citizens
(as of December 31st, 2018). A positive point is the fact that the CEC has simplified the procedure for the
temporary change of voting places for internally displaced persons from the Donetsk and Lugansk
regions. At the same time, almost 1 million citizens will be deprived of the right to vote in the presidential
elections of 2019 due to the lack of a registered residence. The electoral rights of about 3 million
Ukrainian citizens residing in the Russian Federation in connection with the CEC’s decision to close polling
stations in this state are also limited.
The candidate registration process was held in accordance with legal requirements. Within the statutory
period, the commission received 89 applications for registration as a candidate for the presidency, and
from this figure 44 candidates were registered. The CEC’s refusal to register the candidate from the
Communist Party, Petro Simonenko, was challenged in a court of law. The court of first instance and the

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Supreme Court dismissed the claims. Experts note that a number of registered candidates do not have an
electoral support rating and are “technical” in nature for larger participants in the election race. In
addition, a twin candidate was registered against one of the opposition leaders (a candidate with a similar
last name and initials).
During the first two months of the electoral campaign, violations carried out by candidates of the
procedure for conducting electoral campaigning, such as disseminating campaign products without
statutory basic data, hidden campaigning, and placing campaign products in government premises and
communal institutions (mainly campaigning for the current President), were recorded. The frequent cases
of campaign materials, billboards, and campaign tents being damaged (recorded in different regions and
in relation to different candidates) act as obstacles impeding the campaigning of candidates. Also,
attempts made by right-wing organizations to disrupt the activities of candidates (February 9th in Kiev
during the rally of the candidate Yuliya Tymoshenko) were recorded. In the course of the campaign
candidates also reported cases of physical violence against their HQs (A. Gritsenko, A. Vilkul, O.
Bogomolets).
The current President Petro Poroshenko's use of his official powers and administrative resources
for his electoral campaign as a candidate for the presidency can significantly affect the results of the
expression of will of citizens. After the start of the electoral campaign and before his official registration as
a candidate, President Poroshenko made a number of trips to the regions of Ukraine for the presentation
of the received Tomos of Autocephaly (the so-called Tomos-tour), which can be regarded as electoral
trips for the purpose of election campaigning.
The problem of bribing voters, including through legal payments of social assistance and the
monetization of social benefits (subsidies), is also relevant within the framework of the current electoral
campaign. Journalists published data about a multi-stage scheme for buying off voters through a so-
called "grid" by the headquarters of the current president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko. People who have
expressed support for the current president Poroshenko were further offered the opportunity to receive
additional social benefits from the state.
Participants in the electoral process also reported about being pressured and harassed by law
enforcement bodies. Such cases were recorded in relation to candidates who have an opposition
position vis-a-vis Petro Poroshenko (E. Murayev, Y. Tymoshenko). In general, as part of the electoral
campaign, there is a trend where a part of law enforcement bodies (the Security Service of Ukraine and
the Prosecutor-General's Office of Ukraine) carry out actions and make statements that are in the interests
of the current president, Petro Poroshenko. At the same time, the Ministry of Internal Affairs takes
positions that may indicate support for the interests of another race leader - the candidate Yuliya
Tymoshenko. This trend was most clearly demonstrated on February 21st-22nd, during the mutual
denunciation of the schemes using so-called “electoral pyramids” that are allegedly used by these
candidates.
In addition, the cases of social network users who allegedly wanted to influence the election process “on
the instructions of Russia” being detained become more frequent in connection with the start of the
electoral campaign in Ukraine.
The activities of the media during the electoral campaign are governed by the Election Law, which
stipulates that both public and private media outlets must provide balanced coverage of candidates. On
the eve of the electoral campaign the state policy of Ukraine was aimed at creating additional restrictions
for the work of independent media and journalists under the guise of combating separatism and the need
to protect the information space from Russian aggression.

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During the 2019 electoral campaign the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting has
retained its practice of appointing inspections of opposition television channels (“Nash”, 112 Ukraine). In
addition, a number of candidates reported the presence of their names in “black lists” of people who are
not invited to certain TV channels and are not published in the media. The campaign is also characterized
by the broadcasting of defamatory information (“black PR”) against opponents on TV channels owned by
candidates or persons close to them (for example, the “Zashkvareni” cartoon series on “Pryamoy” TV
channel close to President Poroshenko). A special feature of the 2019 campaign is the active use of
advertising on the social networks YouTube and Facebook by candidates.
It will be possible to check whether or not this is paid from their election funds after the publication of
financial reports on the use by candidates of election funds. They must be submitted to the CEC and the
National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and then published no later than 5 days before the
voting day (March 25th). According to experts, there is a common practice where candidates pay for a
number of activities outside the framework of their electoral fund. We are talking about paying for the
work of agitators, the so-called "jeansa" programs on television and radio, "black PR" technologies against
competitors, etc.
As of February 22nd the CEC also accredited 36 observers from foreign countries and 312 observers from
international organizations. At the legislative level, the parliament has prohibited citizens of the Russian
Federation and persons proposed by the Russian side from being an election observer (the law was
adopted on February 7th). In addition, 139 Ukrainian public organizations received the right to observe
the electoral process. Human rights activists are concerned about the provision of observer status to
right-wing paramilitarist groups (“National Druzhina”, “State Initiative of Yarosh”). The participation of
these groups, which have previously repeatedly participated in acts of aggression against dissidents in
Ukraine, can lead to the intimidation of candidates and voters, as well as to forced behaviour at polling
stations on election day.
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF ELECTIONS
The President of Ukraine is elected by popular vote for a term of 5 years. If none of the candidates
receive more than 50% of the votes in the first round, then three weeks after the voting day a second
round of elections is held in which two candidates who received the most votes in the first round
participate.
The main normative-legal framework for the Ukrainian presidential election consists of the
Constitution of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine "On the Ukrainian presidential election"1
(hereinafter - the
"Law on Elections"), the Law of Ukraine "On the Central Election Commission"2
, and the Law of Ukraine
"On the state register of voters"3
. The basic legislation is supplemented by some provisions of the Code of
Administrative Procedure, the Code of Administrative Offences, and the Criminal Code, as well as
regulations adopted by the Central Election Commission.
Comprehensive electoral reform, which would unify the electoral legislation for all types of elections,
has not been implemented as of February 2019. The regulatory framework for holding elections in
Ukraine after 2014 remains fragmented, and also contains gaps and inaccuracies. It lacks legal certainty
regarding the registration of candidates, the rules for campaigning and campaign financing, the
resolution of electoral disputes, and the regulation of media activities.
1 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/474-14
2 https://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932-15/print1443087113377542
3 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/698-16

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On November 7th 2017 people's deputies voted at the first reading for the draft Election Code4
, which
united 5 electoral laws: on the election of the President, on the election of people's deputies, on local
elections, on the Central Election Commission, and on the State Voter Register. As of December 2018 the
Election Code5
was still pending in the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Policy and Justice.
Since the presidential election in 2014 the government has taken initiatives to tighten criminal liability
for violations of electoral legislation. On October 14th 2014 (before the parliamentary elections)
amendments to the Criminal Code were adopted that increased responsibility for election-related
violations6
.
On April 13th 2018 a governmental draft law was introduced in parliament to strengthen responsibility
for violations of electoral legislation7
. The draft law was included in the parliament’s agenda for
February 26, but was never put to the vote. On the whole, welcoming the intention to increase the
transparency of the electoral process, “Uspishna Varta” is forced to state that there is a risk of a number of
norms of the draft law being used as a tool against the political opposition in the upcoming 2019
parliamentary election8
.
After the start of the 2019 presidential campaign, along with slogans of anti-Russian rhetoric, a
number of decisions were taken that restrict the right to vote for Ukrainian citizens and the ability
of international organizations to observe the elections.
Thus, by resolution No. 274, the CEC of Ukraine decided to transfer polling stations from the Russian
Federation to the embassies of Ukraine in Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Finland. By this decision, the
commission effectively removed 3 million Ukrainians from the 2019 electoral process who (according to
the official statements of representatives of the Ukrainian government) are in the Russian Federation.
On February 7th the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, by 232 votes, voted for draft law No. 9524, which
prohibited citizens of the Russian Federation and persons proposed by the Russian side to be an observer
at the presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in Ukraine. The explanatory note to the law states
that it was developed “with the aim of minimizing the risks and threats of interference of the Russian
Federation in the holding of elections in Ukraine”9
. On the eve of the adoption of this law (February 4th),
the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko said that he would give an order to the State Border Service of
Ukraine to not allow observers from the Russian Federation to be involved in the 2019 presidential
election. The law was signed by the president on February 26th.
4 Initially, two drafts of the Electoral Code were submitted to the Verkhovna Rada for consideration. Draft law No. 3112 was
registered by the deputy Valery Pisarenko in September 2015 and draft law No. 3112-1, submitted by a group of deputies - in
particular, Aleksandr Chernenko and Leonid Emets. Each draft proposed three options for electoral systems: a proportional system, a
system of a single intransitive vote during district council elections, and a majority electoral system. In this case, the first draft does
not stipulate open lists. Alternative draft No. 3112-1 of the Electoral Code at the end of the vote scored the most votes.
5 The Election Code received a record number of amendments - 4200.
6 According to the amendments, for depriving citizens of the right to participate in voting or hindering the work of election
commissions, criminal liability is stipulated up to imprisonment for a term of 3 years. For fraud with the State Register of Voters - a
prison term of 2 to 4 years; for the production, use, and even storage of fake ballots - from 3 to 7 years.
7 Draft law No. 8270 “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts Regarding Strengthening Responsibility for Violating Electoral
Laws”, subject of legislative initiative - Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=63864
8 https://uspishna-varta.com/ru/novyny/sazhat-za-grechku-chto-dumayut-yuristy-ob-uzhestochenii-otvetstvennosti-za-narushenie-
izbiratelnogo-prava
9 https://uspishna-varta.com/ru/novyny/verkhovnaya-rada-zapretila-rossiyskikh-nablyudateley-na-vyborakh-prezidenta

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MANAGEMENT OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
The electoral process is managed at three levels, including the Central Election Commission (CEC), district
election commissions (DECs), and precinct election commissions (PECs). Despite the fact that the territory
of Ukraine is divided into 225 electoral districts, only 199 DECs were formed in connection with the 2019
presidential election in Ukraine.
On February 12th the CEC approved the list of territorial electoral districts in which they will not hold
presidential elections in Ukraine. This is the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and 14
districts in the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions. The CEC noted that the relevant decision was
made on the basis of a decree of President Poroshenko from February 7th 2019, by which he approved
the boundaries and the list of districts, cities, towns, and villages, and parts of their territories in separate
districts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions.
Precinct election commissions must be formed, according to the election schedule, no later than 18 days
before voting day (before March 12th, inclusive).
CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION
The Central Election Commission (CEC) is a permanent body responsible for ensuring the implementation
and protection of citizens' electoral rights, as well as the uniform application of the electoral law. The CEC
regulates all technical aspects of the elections, determines single-mandate electoral districts, appoints
district electoral commissions, controls the functioning of the State Voter Register, and allocates a budget
for holding elections. In addition, the CEC’s tasks include registering authorised representatives of parties,
candidates, and civil observer organizations; accrediting international observers; and controlling the
financing of electoral campaigns.
On March 23rd 2014, on the eve of the early presidential election, the CEC law was amended to allow
members of the commission appointed on June 1st 2007 to continue to fulfil their functions after the
expiration of their 7-year term of office. This was done in order to avoid a situation where the mandate of
a CEC member would become invalid in the middle of the electoral process.
After international organizations made numerous recommendations, in early February 2018, President
Poroshenko submitted to the Verkhovna Rada a renewed submission on the appointment of CEC
members. On September 20th 2018 the parliament voted for 14 new members of the CEC. Two members
of the commission retained their positions until April 2021. One vacant seat remains on the quota of the
"Opposition Bloc," which at the time of voting refused to submit its candidacy. According to experts, 9 out
of the 16 appointed new members of the commission can be considered as being loyal to the
administration of the current president Poroshenko.
In September 2018 it was specifically for these appointments that the parliament decided to expand the
membership of the CEC to 17 people. Also, the law changed the number of commission members to be
considered a quorum (11 people)10
.
On October 5th 2018 the new members of the CEC took an oath in parliament, and after this they held
their first meeting, during which they elected the head of the commission, two deputies, and a secretary.
The members of the Commission decided to hold the first meeting in a closed format and did not allow
journalists to attend the meeting. According to the current legislation of Ukraine, the Commission’s
10 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2550-19#n2

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activities are carried out openly and publicly, i.e., absolutely all CEC meetings should be open to the media
and members of the public.
As of February 22nd the CEC was governed by the electoral process within the time limits and in the
scope of the powers stipulated by electoral legislation.
DISTRICT ELECTION COMMISSIONS
DECs and PECs are temporary bodies whose members are nominated. The CEC appoints the DEC, and the
DEC appoints the PEC. The composition of the DEC should include at least 12 members.
By February 18th - the deadline set by law - the CEC formed 199 DECs. 44 candidates filed submissions to
7355 DEC members11
. The specified amount is sufficient to form commissions without sending a request
for the appointment of members to the CEC. The chairperson, vice-chairperson, and secretaries of the
DEC (managers) were appointed in proportion to the number of candidates nominated using the formula
defined by the CEC. This made it possible to ensure an even distribution of the mentioned posts among
the candidates. According to data released by the CEC, about 65.7% of such nominated persons had
previous experience in the election commission (in the previous presidential election it was 71%).
According to Ukrainian journalists, DEC members from a number of candidates worked for other
candidates in the previous elections. Thus, several members of the DEC who in 2014 worked for the
candidate Yuliya Tymoshenko, in the elections of 2019 were submitted by the little-known candidates
Nikolay Gaber and Andrey Novak - 7 and 5 people respectively. 4 out of 8 new members of the DEC from
the candidate Roman Nasirov worked at the DEC as representatives of Petro Poroshenko in 2014. 8
members of the DEC from the “UDAR” party (the “Bloc of Petro Poroshenko” was created on its
foundations in 2014) represent the interests of the candidate Yuliya Litvinenko in the 2019 elections.
Experts admit that this “overflowing” of DEC members is due to the fact that a number of candidates are
technical in nature. And the members of the DEC appointed by their submission will work in the interests
of other candidates who are leaders of the electoral race.
The first facts of pressure being put on the work of the DEC by right-wing organizations were
recorded. Thus, on February 21st, in Dnepr, district election commission No. 24 was unable to start its
work after being blocked by representatives of the “C14” group. A significant part of the DEC members
refused to or simply did not attend the meeting. Representatives of “C14” did not allow the DEC Chairman
to perform any actions with respect to the commission. “C14” reported that the pretensions against the
head of the DEC were caused by his supposedly pro-Russian and “separatist” position12
.
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
Voter registration is passive, constantly functions, and takes place on the basis of a centralized State Voter
Register (SVR). The CEC monitors the SVR, which is updated monthly. Since 2013 voters can verify their
personal data online, which increases transparency13
.
The preliminary list of voters in the presidential elections included 35,602,855 citizens. This is the data of
the State Voter Register from December 31st 201814
.
11 In the early presidential elections of 2014 the candidates submitted 4,164 candidates for the DEC
12 https://uspishna-varta.com/ru/novyny/aktivisty-s14-napali-na-predsedatelya-izbiratelnoy-komissii-i-sorvali-rabotu-oik
13 https://www.drv.gov.ua/ords/portal/!cm_core.cm_index?start
14 https://www.drv.gov.ua/ords/portal/!cm_core.cm_index?option=ext_num_voters&pdt=1

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According to the SVR's data, almost 1 million citizens will not be able to vote in the elections due to the
lack of a registered place of residence. In 2003, Parliament passed a law that effectively canceled
registration. But in fact, they simply started to call it "registration of the place of residence." According to
the Office of Administrative Reform Services, 2 million people use the service of registration and re-
registration of a place of residence every year. At the same time, at least 30% of citizens cannot register at
their place of residence due to various reasons.
To ensure the constitutional right of citizens to elect and be elected, legislative mechanisms must be
provided so that citizens who do not have official registration of their place of residence have the possibility
to vote.
Citizens' electoral rights were also limited by the decision of the CEC to transfer 5 electoral precincts
from the territory of the Russian Federation to the embassies of Ukraine in Georgia, Kazakhstan,
and Finland15
. As the Foreign Minister Pavel Klimkin stated in April 2018, there are about 3 million
Ukrainians living in Russia. Accordingly, the electoral rights of these citizens will be significantly limited
during the 2019 presidential campaign16
.
To ensure the voting rights of Ukrainian citizens in the Russian Federation, polling stations should be open
on the territory of this country.
A positive point is the fact that the CEC has simplified the procedure for temporarily changing voting
places for internally displaced persons from the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. According to the CEC
resolution, citizens whose electoral address is located on the temporarily occupied territories of the
Donetsk and Lugansk regions don't have to attach documents confirming the need for a temporary
change in the place of their voting to their application. The implemented procedure can be used only for
the period of the presidential elections in Ukraine, parliamentary elections in Ukraine, and the All-
Ukrainian referendum17
.
REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES
A citizen of Ukraine who has reached the age of 35 by election day, has the right to vote, has lived in
Ukraine for the last 10 years before the election day, and speaks the state language can be elected as the
President of Ukraine. Candidates may be nominated by political parties or run for self-nomination.
To register, each candidate must submit an exhaustive list of documents, together with a document
confirming the payment of a cash deposit in the amount of 2.5 million hryvnia to the special CEC bank
account. The deposit will be refunded only to those candidates who were denied registration, as well as to
the two candidates who progressed to the second round.
On February 8th the CEC completed the registration of candidates for the presidency of Ukraine. The
CEC's process of registering candidates was in accordance with legal requirements. Within the statutory
period, the commission received 89 applications for registration as a candidate for the presidency, and
from them 44 candidates were registered. Candidates who were denied registration made significant
mistakes in their submitted documents or did not deposit money.
The CEC’s refusal to register the candidate from the Communist Party Petro Simonenko was challenged in a
court of law. On February 2nd the CEC refused to register him as a candidate for the presidency due to
15 CEC Resolution No. 274 from December 31, 2018 http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/acts/ShowCard?id=44232&what=0
16 https://uspishna-varta.com/ru/novyny/3-milliona-ukraintsev-v-rossii-ne-smogut-prinyat-uchastiya-v-vyborakh
17http://mtot.gov.ua/tsvk-sproshheno-protseduru-zminy-mistsya-golosuvannya-dlya-vpo-donetskoyi-ta-luganskoyi-oblastej/

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the fact that he was nominated by a party whose charter, name, and symbols do not meet the
requirements of the law "On the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian
regimes in Ukraine and the prohibition of the promotion of their symbols". The Supreme Court decided to
agree with the decision of the court of first instance, which refused to satisfy the claims of the Communist
Party of Ukraine leader.
In the current election a record number of candidates for the presidency of Ukraine were registered (44)18
.
Thus, this election is the most competitive one in the entire history of independent Ukraine. At the same
time, a number of candidates who are little-known nationwide and have no electoral rating or party
structure were registered as candidates for participation in the election. Such candidates, as a rule,
perform the role of "technical" candidates for the larger leaders of the presidential race. The number of
representatives in district and precinct election commissions is distributed proportionally among all
candidates (including senior positions). Presumably representatives from a number of candidates in the
commissions will work in the interests of other candidates. Thus, according to experts, the current
president Petro Poroshenko and the leader of the “Batkivshchyna” party, Yuliya Tymoshenko, registered
their technical candidates.
Also the CEC registered a so-called "duplicate candidate" - a deputy from the "People's Front" party Yury
Tymoshenko. The initials of Yury Vladimirovich Tymoshenko (Tymoshenko Y.V.) in a shortened form
completely coincide with the initials of the “Batkivshchyna” party leader Yuliya Tymoshenko, which leads
in sociological polls. Thus, two names of Tymoshenko will be located next to each other on the ballot,
which can mislead voters.
The technical candidate and duplicate candidate technologies have been used in Ukrainian electoral
campaigns for a long time. In order to solve this problem at the legislative level it is necessary to provide for
a certain qualification, excluding such unfair competition of candidates in the future. As such a qualification,
for example, a requirement may be introduced regarding whether a candidate has a minimum threshold for
electoral support at the time of the announcement of elections, or the provision of a certain number of
signatures from citizens in support of a candidate.
CONDITIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGNING
According to electoral law, a candidate can start an electoral campaign the day after their registration. The
electoral campaign ends at 00:00 on the last Friday before the voting day (in the case of this election -
March 29th).
In January, during the process of registering candidates, numerous instances of campaign products of
already registered presidential candidates being distributed without statutory background data
(circulation, client, and organization that carried out printing) were recorded. The distribution of such
products (billboards, flyers) was recorded by the following candidates: A. Sadovoy, A. Shevchenko, Yu.
Boyko, S. Kaplin, E. Murayev, Yu. Tymoshenko, A. Gritsenko, V. Skotsik, O. Bogomolets, and so on.
There were also recorded cases of hidden campaigning (meetings of deputies from parties whose
candidates are running, with employees of public institutions, holding charity events, etc.). There have
been cases of campaign products being placed in the premises of government and municipal
institutions (Vinnytsia, Rovno, Zaporozhye, etc.). According to the law on the presidential election, it is
prohibited to use the premises of state and local government bodies for electoral campaigning (part 20 of
18 In the presidential election of 1999 - 13 candidates, in the presidential election of 2004 - 24 candidates, in the election of 2014 -
21

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article 64) and the placement of campaign materials and political advertising inside of them (part 21 of
article 64).
During the entire campaign cases of damage being caused to the campaign materials , billboards,
and campaign tents of presidential candidates are being recorded19
. In a number of regions
representatives of the right-wing radical groups “C14” and “National Corpus” reported through their
public pages about causing damage to the billboards of opposition candidates (A. Vilkul, E. Murayev).
There were also reported cases of an attack on the campaign tents of the candidates Anatoly Gritsenko
(Nikolaev, February 8th), Yuliya Tymoshenko (Lugansk region, February 16th), and the “People's Front”
party (Kiev, January 23th). On February 22nd in Vinnytsia unknown persons smashed the windows of the
front door of a public reception party of the “Bloc of Petro Poroshenko”20
.
Candidates are generally free to meet with voters in various regions. At the same time, attempts to
disrupt the activities of candidates by right-wing organizations have been recorded. Thus, on
February 9th in Kiev law enforcement officers detained “C14” members during a rally of the candidate
Yuliya Tymoshenko. They seized gas cartridges, knives, and posters. A “support group” from the other
“C14” members that arrived at the scene attacked the Podolsky district police department. As a result of
the conflict, three policemen were injured. All detained “C14” representatives were later released.
During the electoral campaign a number of significant violations of the order and conditions of
campaigning were recorded, which could significantly affect the results of citizens' will. One of
them is the current president Petro Poroshenko's use of his official powers and administrative
resources to carry out an electoral campaign as a candidate for the presidency.
After the start of the election campaign and before the official registration as a candidate, President
Poroshenko made a number of trips to the regions of Ukraine for the presentation of Tomos about
obtaining autocephaly (the so-called Tomos-tour), which can be regarded as electoral trips for the
purpose of election campaigning.
With such trips, starting from January 10th, Poroshenko visited the Rovno21
, Vinnytsia22
, Lutsk23
,
Zhytomyr24
, Cherkassy25
, and Kiev26
regions. During these visits the president took part in the presentation
of Tomos with the hierarchs of the newly-established church and held meetings with voters with the
participation of representatives of local authorities and officials. Independent observers recorded signs of
the centralized transportation of people to the meeting with the president. In addition, after the start of
the electoral campaign, President Poroshenko made a working trip to the Odessa region, where he took
part in the opening of a new road27
.
19 https://uspishna-varta.com/ru/novyny/v-ukraine-okhotyatsya-za-reklamoy-oppozitsionnykh-politsil
20 https://uspishna-varta.com/ru/novyny/v-ukraine-uchastilis-sluchai-povrezhdeniya-predvybornoy-agitatsii
21 https://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/bez-nezalezhnoyi-cerkvi-nemozhliva-nezalezhna-derzhava-prezi-52426
22 https://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/prezident-na-podyachnomu-molebni-za-otrimannya-tomosu-pro-av-52458
23 https://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/htos-shukaye-v-tomosi-vidsutnist-avtokefaliyi-i-te-sho-mitro-52474
24 https://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/uhvalennya-zakonu-pro-vporyadkuvannya-mehanizmu-perehodu-par-52558
25 https://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/prezident-na-podyachnomu-molebni-na-cherkashini-yednist-cerk-52594
26 https://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/tomos-ta-yedina-cerkva-ye-duhovnim-fundamentom-derzhavotvore-52514
27 https://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/nasha-doroga-ye-simvolom-nashih-zmin-prezident-vzyav-uchast-53058

12
In February, as a registered candidate, President Poroshenko made working trips to Kharkov28
, Ivano-
Frankovsk29
, and Lvov30
, where he also presented Tomos.
One of the candidates (Yuliya Tymoshenko) in court demanded to declare as illegal the actions of the
candidate for the post of President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko aimed at carrying out electoral
campaigning and using other means besides the resources of his election fund to finance his electoral
campaigning. On February 20th the panel of judges of the Sixth Appeal Administrative Court rejected the
lawsuit.
The problem of bribing voters, including through legal payments of social assistance and the
monetization of social benefits (subsidies), is also relevant within the framework of the current
electoral campaign.
Journalists published information about a multi-stage scheme for buying off voters through a so-
called "grid" by the headquarters of the current president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko. Thus, in a
number of regions of Ukraine (Kiev, Odessa, Chernigov, Khmelnitsky, Sumy, Odessa, Lugansk, etc.) the
holding of a so-called "Sociological survey" regarding people's willingness to vote for the current
president Poroshenko was recorded in January. Formally, it was conducted not by the headquarters of the
candidate or his party, but by the public organization “Institute for the Development and Promotion of
Democracy” (established in December 2018). As journalists found out, employees of budgetary
institutions were actively involved in the carrying out of such a survey on a paid basis. According to
electoral law (part 6, article 64), the conclusion of paid contracts for electoral campaigning with voters at
the expense of the election fund is prohibited. In this case, under the guise of sociological research,
hidden campaign activities are actually carried out outside the framework of the expenses of the electoral
fund.
People who have expressed support for the current president Poroshenko were further offered the
opportunity to receive additional social benefits from the state. The money for social assistance programs,
which are approved by local and regional councils, is given to those who are on the white list of potential
Poroshenko supporters. In the Nikolaev region 70 million hryvnia was allocated from the local budget for
these programs, 90 million hryvnia in the Odessa region, and 140 million hryvnia in the Dnepropetrovsk
region. The Kharkov regional program initially allocated 18 million for 2019, then by the decision of the
session of the regional council (December 6th 2018) the amount was increased to 50 million.
In addition, in the Odessa region, the activity of the “Mobile Polyclinic”, which provides free medical
examinations and consultations to patients under the auspices of President Poroshenko, was
documented. In the villages of the Lvov region residents were invited to discuss the development plan for
villages at the initiative of the President. Such activities bear signs of indirect campaigning for Petro
Poroshenko as a potential presidential candidate.
ENSURING SECURITY, LAW, AND ORDER DURING AN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN
According to the Ministry of the Interior, since the beginning of the electoral process and as of February
22nd, 1,741 allegations and reports of violations related to the electoral process were registered. For the
most part, these facts were related to illegal campaigning (1102), the buying-off of voters (130), damage
to property (130), and hooliganism (27). The police initiated 77 criminal proceedings, 39 of which relate to
28 https://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/na-sogodnishnij-den-dlya-nas-nemaye-nichogo-vazhlivishogo-ni-53106
29 https://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/nasha-cerkva-jde-z-viroyu-i-lyubovyu-prezident-pid-chas-pody-53190
30 https://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/ya-dyakuyu-za-nashu-yednist-prezident-na-lvivshini-zavitav-d-53398

13
violations of electoral legislation, and 38 - to facts related to the electoral campaign. In addition, law
enforcement officers made 401 administrative protocols on violations in the electoral sphere31
.
During the campaign instances of physical violence against HQs and representatives of candidates
was reported.
 On January 14th unidentified persons opened fire at a car of the HQ of the candidate Anatoly
Gritsenko in Kiev. The police launched criminal proceedings on the fact of hooliganism with the
use of weapons.
 On February 1st in Berdyansk (Zaporozhye region) local “activists” from the right-wing “National
Corpus” group disrupted the candidate Aleksandr Vilkul’s speech by dousing him with zelenka
and not giving him the chance to speak at the local cultural center. The attacker was detained but
later released by the court under a personal obligation. The candidate also reported about a
similar attack on him in the city of Mangush (Donetsk region). Vilkul said that the attacks on him
were organized by the Security Service of Ukraine32
.
 On February 11th the candidate Olga Bogomolets said that unknown persons attacked the
apartment of the head of her election headquarters in Odessa.
Participants in the electoral process also reported that they were being pressured and harassed by law
enforcement bodies. Such cases were recorded against candidates holding an opposition position in
relation to Petro Poroshenko.
 On January 15th the deputy Nadezhda Savchenko, who had previously been arrested on suspicion
of treason, said that the SBU was preventing her from registering as a presidential candidate in
Ukraine. She noted that law enforcement officers do not allow her to be a notary in the pre-trial
detention center, which makes it impossible for her to draw up documents for registration.
 On February 13th one of the candidates (Evgeny Murayev) was summoned for questioning by the
Prosecutor General's Office in a case of tax evasion under Part 3 of Article 212 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine. The lawyers of the candidate claim that the case bears signs of political
persecution.
 On February 15th the Prosecutor General of Ukraine Yury Lutsenko stated that he sent a
statement to the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office about a possible crime
committed by the candidate Yuliya Tymoshenko (illegal enrichment and declaration of inaccurate
information by a candidate)33
.
As a part of the electoral campaign, there is a trend where a part of the law enforcement bodies (the
Security Service of Ukraine and the Prosecutor-General's Office of Ukraine) carry out actions and
make statements in the interests of the current president, Petro Poroshenko. At the same time, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs (police) takes positions that may indicate its support for the interests of
another leader in the race - the candidate Yuliya Tymoshenko.
This trend was most clearly manifested on February 21st-22nd, during the mutual denunciation of the
schemes using so-called “election pyramids” that are allegedly used by these candidates. Thus, on
31http://mvs.gov.ua/ua/news/18532_Popri_ataki_i_diskreditaciyu_policiya_bude_prodovzhuvati_borotisya_z_porushennyam_peredvib
orchogo_zakonodavstva___Arsen_Avakov.htm
32 https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=605941319876515
33 https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=245618

14
February 21st the Security Service of Ukraine carried out more than 50 searches in various regions in
connection with the creation of so-called “election pyramids”, stating that the persons were suspected of
being a member of the party of Yuliya Tymoshenko “Batkivshchyna”. Also, the SBU stressed that some of
the organizers of this “pyramid” are deeply integrated in Russian politics and have been organizing
electoral campaigns in the Russian Federation for a long time. It is important to emphasize that on the eve
of these searches several journalistic investigations were simultaneously launched concerning the
President Petro Poroshenko's plans to bribe voters and influence the work of district election
commissions.
On February 22nd representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (police) detained several
representatives of the so-called "grid" of the current president Poroshenko in the Sumy region. In
response, the prosecutor's office of the Sumy region reported suspicion to the police chief of the Sumy
region, accusing him of knowingly illegal behaviour.
On the same day, the candidate Yuliya Tymoshenko at a press briefing highly appreciated the work of the
leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in ensuring law and order during elections. The Interior
Minister Arsen Avakov, in an interview with one of the Ukrainian publications, reported about the
involvement of the deputy head of the “Bloc of Petro Poroshenko” faction in parliament, Sergey
Berezenko, in violations of electoral legislation.
Thus, the leadership of the law enforcement and security bodies of Ukraine was involved in the
electoral process on the side of various presidential candidates.
In addition, cases of social network users who allegedly wanted to influence the electoral process
being searched and detained have become more frequent in connection with the start of the
electoral campaign in Ukraine. In most cases, the Security Service of Ukraine does not disclose the
identities of the detainees.
Thus, on January 22nd the SBU declared that the identity of a Russian journalist in Sumy who allegedly
administered and posted content on anti-Ukrainian online communities “at the order of the special
services of the Russian Federation” had been established34
. On January 24th the SBU announced the
detention of a resident of Kiev with similar wording. The operatives claim that the man by his actions
helped the Russian special services to interfere in the electoral processes in Ukraine through social
networks.
On February 15th the SBU said they had blocked an attempt by the Russian Federation to interfere in the
electoral process in Ukraine. Supposedly, curators from the Russian Federation attracted residents of the
Dnepropetrovsk region for the distribution on social networks of provocative materials that affect the
electoral mood of the population35
. On February 25th the SBU announced the detention of another
resident of Dneper, who, according to the SBU, “conducted electronic correspondence with a resident of
Russia who was trying to obtain information about the communications network ensuring the holding of
presidential elections in Ukraine”36
.
34 https://uspishna-varta.com/ru/novyny/sbu-soobshchila-o-razoblachenii-ocherednogo-administratora-sotssetey
35 https://www.facebook.com/UspishnaVarta/photos/a.293109324488562/571394733326685/?type=3&theater
36 https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/news/1/category/21/view/5775#.6DxSOp4v.dpbs

15
ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN FINANCING
According to the law, an electoral campaign can be financed from the candidate’s private funds, from
donations from individuals, as well as from the funds of the party that nominated the candidate. There are
no restrictions on the amount of funds that a party can spend on financing a candidate’s campaign.
Individuals can donate up to 400 minimum wages (approximately 490,000 hryvnia). Donations from
foreigners, legal entities, and from anonymous sources are prohibited.
The electoral law requires the presidential candidate to open two special bank accounts for cash inflows
and expenses. There are no restrictions on campaign costs.
The electoral law contains the requirement that all expenses must be made exclusively by bank transfer
from an account for expenses.
According to the legislation, interim financial reports on the use of candidates' electoral funds must be
filed with the CEC and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and published no later than 5
days before voting day (March 25th). The final total reports of candidates must be published no later than
the 30th day after the election (April 30th).
According to experts, there is a common practice where candidates pay for a number of activities outside
the framework of their electoral fund. We are talking about paying for the work of agitators, the so-called
"jeansa" programs on television and radio, "black PR" technologies against competitors, etc.
MASS MEDIA
The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and prohibits censorship, while the regulatory framework
for the media provides for general media freedom.
On the eve of the election campaign the state policy of Ukraine was aimed at a significant restriction
of freedom of speech and opinion37
. Publicly declaring adherence to the norms of international law and
European standards, the state policy of Ukraine in 2018 de facto aimed to create additional restrictions for
the work of independent media and journalists under the guise of fighting separatism and the need to
protect the information space from Russian aggression.
In parliament, deputies from the government coalition submitted for consideration a number of draft laws
that aim to provide the possibility of extrajudicially blocking online resources and creating additional
reasons for fines and denying licenses to television channels. The parliament’s vote in favour of imposing
targeted sanctions against two TV channels that broadcast alternative government opinions and positions
was unprecedented.
The National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting, at the expense of its functions of licensing
and imposing fines, remained a tool for putting pressure on independent media in order to gain loyal
editorial policies towards President Poroshenko.
In addition, Ukrainian and international human rights defenders recorded numerous instances of security
agencies interfering in the work of journalists and the activities of public organizations in order to censor
materials and voiced opinions. Since 2014 representatives of the SBU have been overly broadly
interpreting the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to terrorism, as well as the provisions on treason
and encroachment on the territorial integrity of the state in cases against Ukrainian media workers,
37 For more details, see “Political and civil rights in Ukraine. Monitoring compliance in 2018” https://uspishna-
varta.com/ru/monitoring/politicheskiye-i-grazhdanskiye-prava-v-ukraine-monitoring-soblyudeniya-2018

16
journalists, bloggers, and ordinary users of social networks. In 2018 law enforcement bodies initiated new
prosecutions against journalists (the arrest of Kirill Vyshinsky, the editor-in-chief of RIA “Novosti Ukraine”).
An equally significant problem in the observance of the right to freedom of speech and opinion in
Ukraine is violence against journalists and media editorial boards. According to statistics, 96% of crimes
against journalists in Ukraine go unpunished.
The activities of the media during the electoral campaign are governed by the Election Law, which
stipulates that both public and private media must provide balanced coverage of candidates. In addition,
the law stipulates that state-owned media should provide free airtime and print space for all participants
in the pre-election race. On February 21st the CEC, according to the law, approved the results of the draw
regarding the order in which candidates for the presidency of Ukraine were given airtime on Public
Television.
Paid pre-election campaigns are allowed in state and private media without restrictions, however, news
agencies must provide the participants of the pre-election race with equal conditions and publish their
quotations.
During the 2019 electoral campaign the following trends were recorded:
- the appointment by the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting of inspections of the
opposition TV channel “Nash” (owned by the presidential candidate Evgeny Murayev) and the TV channel
“112 Ukraine”;
- the existence of “black lists” of candidates and experts who are not invited to certain TV channels and
are not published in the media;
- broadcasting defamatory information (“black PR”) against opponents on TV channels owned by
candidates or persons close to them (for example, the “Zashkvareni” cartoon series on the “Pryamoy” TV
channel close to President Poroshenko);
- distribution of candidate-discrediting messages through custom-ordered publications in regional print
media. For example, during February an article was posted in a number of printed regional publications
against the candidate Vladimir Zelensky38
.
- the active use of texts, videos, and images that discredit presidential candidates on the social networks
YouTube and Facebook.
- propaganda YouTube videos in support of candidates, the advertising for which is paid outside the
candidates' official election fund.
In addition, as of February 26th, the parliament has not adopted a decree on a moratorium on media
audits during elections by supervising bodies.
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS
The Election Law provides for the observation of the electoral process by international and national
observers, including local public organizations. The law establishes that in order to obtain the right to
observe elections, the charters of local public organizations should define election observation as one of
the activities of such an organization, thus restricting the possibility of observation.
As of February 22nd the CEC also accredited 36 observers from foreign countries and 312 observers from
international organizations.
38 https://uspishna-varta.com/ru/election/nablyudateli-fiksiruyut-ispolzovaniye-tekhnologiy-chernogo-piara-na-vyborakh-2019

17
On February 7th the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine voted in favour of draft law No. 9524, which prohibited
citizens of the Russian Federation and persons proposed by the Russian side to be an observer at the
presidential, parliamentary and local elections in Ukraine. The explanatory note to the law states that it
was developed “with the aim of minimizing the risks and threats of interference of the Russian Federation
in the holding of elections in Ukraine”39
.
139 Ukrainian public organizations registered for accreditation as observers40
. Human rights activists are
concerned about granting observer status to right-wing radical paramilitarist groups (“National Druzhina”,
“State Initiative of Yarosh”).
The participation of these groups, which had previously repeatedly participated in acts of aggression
against dissidents in Ukraine, can lead to the intimidation of candidates and voters, as well as to forced
behaviour at polling stations on election day. Representatives of right-wing radical groups have already
stated that they intend to "strictly pursue those who organize massive buying of votes".
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are proposed for consideration by the authorities, candidates for the
position of President of Ukraine, and the civil society of Ukraine in order to increase the transparency of
the electoral process and create conditions for holding fair and democratic elections.
1. The Parliament of Ukraine must refuse to amend electoral legislation and other laws regulating
the conduct of elections after an electoral campaign has started.
2. The methodology for appointing DEC members should be carefully reviewed in order to ensure a
higher level of professionalism and stability concerning the work of these commissions. The
practice where members of DECs informally represent the interests of other candidates (not those
from who they were submitted) is unacceptable.
3. To ensure the constitutional right of citizens to elect and be elected, legislative mechanisms must
be provided in order to give citizens who do not have official registration of their place of
residence the chance to vote.
4. To ensure the right to vote of Ukrainian citizens in the Russian Federation, polling stations should
be open on the territory of this country.
5. In order to eliminate the “technical candidate” and “duplicate candidate” technology at the
legislative level, it is necessary to provide a certain qualification that excludes such unfair
competition of candidates in the future. As such a qualification, for example, a requirement may
be introduced regarding whether a candidate has a minimum threshold for electoral support at
the time of the announcement of elections, or the provision of a certain number of signatures
from citizens in support of a candidate.
6. At the level of the CEC, give an assessment of, and make an appropriate decision regarding, the
use by the current President of Poroshenko of his official powers and administrative resources to
conduct an electoral campaign as a candidate for the presidency.
7. Candidates for the Presidency of Ukraine should be guided by the principles of fair competition
and abandon the practice of bribing voters and building so-called "electoral pyramids".
39 https://uspishna-varta.com/ru/novyny/verkhovnaya-rada-zapretila-rossiyskikh-nablyudateley-na-vyborakh-prezidenta
40 http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2019/WP001

18
8. Prohibit the security authorities from interfering in any way in the electoral process for the
purpose of supporting or discrediting certain candidates. Security and law enforcement bodies
must remain politically unbiased and objectively carry out their policing and security functions
within the framework of the electoral process, as is provided for in the current legislation.
9. The unlawful interference of right-wing paramilitary groups in the work of district commissions
and the electoral campaign of candidates should be immediately stopped by law enforcement
bodies and qualified in accordance with criminal and administrative law.
10. Ensure objectivity in decisions made by the National Council for Television and Radio
Broadcasting regarding inspections and fines for broadcasters; maintain a balance and hold
violators accountable, including the media outlets close to President Poroshenko and the current
government.

19
ABOUT THE “USPISHNA VARTA” HUMAN RIGHTS PLATFORM
The All-Ukrainian Association “Uspishna Varta” is a human rights platform that unites lawyers, public
figures, and volunteers to protect the political and civil rights and freedoms of citizens of Ukraine, as well
as to provide support for people and organizations who are persecuted for their political beliefs.
Our main function is to monitor violations of the rights and freedoms of citizens in Ukraine and to make
them public for a prompt response and the protection of affected people and organizations. We collect
evidence of violations for the further transfer of these facts to the responsible authorities of Ukraine, and
if a reaction does not follow, then to the world community and international organizations.
In its activities, the “Uspishna Varta” human rights platform is guided solely by the principles of non-
violence and respect for the law and international standards in the field of human rights. Law, people's
lives, and peace in the state are fundamental to us.
We urge all those who are not indifferent to join our Platform for the joint realization of our mission: to
change the public climate of Ukraine, demonstrating and supporting the existence of an alternative view
on the order of things and affirming the value of human life and respect for civil and political rights in the
state.
The “Uspishna Varta” human rights platform was created at the initiative and with the support of the
Ukrainian public figure and philanthropist Aleksandr Klimenko.
On January 18th the All-Ukrainian Public Association “Uspishna Varta” received permission from the CEC
to have its official election observers. The number of long-term and short-term observers from “Uspishna
Varta” during the campaign is more than 50 people.
More information about our initiative can be found on our website. https://uspishna-varta.com/
e-mail: uspishnavarta@gmail.com
Telephone: 0 800 20 40 04

20
© 2019 Public organization “All-Ukrainian Association 'Uspishna Varta'”
All rights reserved.
1a Sportivna Square, Gulliver Business Center, Office 2A, 31st floor
Kiev, Ukraine, 01023
0 800 20 40 04, uspishna-varta.com

Intermediate Report on Ukraine's 2019 Presidential Election Monitoring

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Intermediate Report on Ukraine's 2019 Presidential Election Monitoring