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Moshe Zioni ( @dalmoz_ )
Security Research Manager, VERINT
On the Hunt for
Advanced Attacks?
C&C Channels are a
Good Place to Start
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
• Why focus on C&C?
• C&C - Landscape
• Trends in C&C implementations
• Traditional Approaches
• Our approach
• Limitations
• Proof-of-Concept results
• Takeaways
• Q&A
On The Agenda
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
• Moshe Zioni ( @dalmoz_ )
• Leading a terrific group of talented researches at
• Researching and developing cutting-edge, next generation
detection engines for malicious activity on very big enterprises and
ISPs.
• Credit & Kudos goes to the Research team, especially to Eddie,
Maria, Meir, Oren and Vadim, and to the Analysis team.
WHOAMI – credits & kudos
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
• Always present (almost)
• Network interception is practical, contrast to other detection
methods/layers
• While malware tends to be polymorphic, communication protocol
does not
• An old problem –
• Current schemes of detection are not so promising on detecting the ‘new’.
• Traditional tactics rely heavily on somewhat naïve comparison.
Why focus on C&C channels?
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
C&C landscape
DNS
9%
HTTP
62%
ICMP
5%
NATIVE
14%
P2P
10%
Distribution of Protocols
DNS HTTP ICMP NATIVE P2P
Name Method
Dridex P2P, HTTP
Nano Locker ICMP
Poisn Ivy HTTP
FLAME HTTP
CITADEL HTTP
Bergard HTTP
Vawtrack URLZONE HTTP
BlackMoon HTTP
Wekby DNS
ZeUS (GOZ) HTTP (P2P)
DORKBOT HTTP
SIMDA NATIVE + HTTP
REGIN NATIVE (TCP + UDP ) +ICMP + HTTP
SOUNDFIX-11 HTTP
JAKUcalc HTTP /NATIVE TCP / DNS
TrickBot HTTP
GOZNYM P2P
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Trends in C&C implementations
Rapid, fast to respond, evolution
Encryption of transmissions and payload
Encapsulation of transmissions
Steganography of messages
P2P – Forget about SPOF
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Traditional Approaches
• Blacklists/ known patterns
• Constantly needs upkeep and maintenance
• Low False Positive
• Forever rely Intelligence and Analysis
• Not suitable at all to find
‘unknown’ schemes
• High False Negative
• Markov models
• ARMA
• Baseline comparison
• Assuming normal traffic differ, in statistic
modelling, of malicious traffic, might reveal
novel schemes
• This assumption is failing many times
in current trends.
• High False Positive Rate
Signature based detection Anomaly based detection
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Our approach
Choosing an alternate path
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
What Do We Need?
We need something robust, that can “think” of many possibilities.
Rely on what we do know and induce further.
Fast (polynomial) results.
MACHINE LEARNING - For The Win!
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Enter Machine Learning
Machine Learning is the science of
providing a computer with the ability to
“learn” by example and teach itself to
find patterns.
There are many methods of ML –
each one has its pros and cons.
The model ‘learns’ from
known, classified data, and
extrapolate to achieve even
nontrivial results. (for a human)
Evolved from Pattern
Recognition and
Artificial Intelligence
studies.
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Supervised Learning
Rely on labelled training data.
Collection is key for optimized model and for reducing error levels
Data sample set should be comprised of encompassing, diverse and relevant data.
We used Decision Tree-Random Forest based Supervised learning
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Feature
Extraction
SUIT TIE CHARM SMILE BAD-TEETH CAT CLASS
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Feature
Extraction
SUIT TIE CHARM SMILE BAD-TEETH CAT CLASS
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Feature
Extraction
SUIT TIE CHARM SMILE BAD-TEETH CAT CLASS
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Feature
Extraction
SUIT TIE CHARM SMILE BAD-TEETH CAT CLASS
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Session
• Time differences
• # of bytes
• How many requests got an answer?
• How much time it took to get an answer?
TCP
• 5-Tuple information
• Protocol
• IP Payload
• Handshake data
• Flags
• Flow count
Feature selection in TCP/HTTP
Protocol specific - HTTP:
• What is the length of the host name?
• Body length
• # of unique URI calls within the session
• # of “user agent” strings used & values
• How many file types were downloaded?
• What is the average status code?
• What is the avg. length of the URI?
• Number of parameters
SSL/TLS
• Certificate metadata
• Negotiatied cipher-suite
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Appropriate data collection and feature engineering is crucial for a
proper, effective, model
Machine learning results are hard to interpret – most of the times
the question of ‘How did the machine decided that is malicious
traffic?!’ - Is not straight-forwardly answered.
Do not succumb to overfitting. (e.g. params/samples >> 1)
But, first
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
In-the-Wild POC
Sample Results
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
POST /some/uri.php HTTP/1.1
layer=cXJjb3JtYUJxamNwaW5jcWdwcSxhbW8=&dimm=Pl
dRR1A8YG12bGd2XW9ja25ncD4tV1FHUDwIPkxDT0c8IG9ja25ncGB
teiA+LUxDT0c8CD5RV0BIPHFyY28iYG12bGd2ImtsImNhdmttbD4tU
VdASDwIPlFATUZbPAhWamtxIm9ncXFjZWcidWNxInFnbHYiZHBtbyJj
ImFtb3JwbW9rcWdmIm9jYWprbGcsCD4tU UBNRls8&err=1
(Source: Akamai)
Spamtorte – old version comm.
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Old version body contents:
layer=cXJjb3JtYUJxamNwaW5jcWdwcSxhbW8=&dimm=Pl
dRR1A8YG12bGd2XW9ja25ncD4tV1FHUDwIPkxDT0c8IG9ja25ncGBteiA+LUxDT0c
8CD5RV0BIPHFyY28iYG12bGd2ImtsImNhdmttbD4tUVdASDwIPlFATUZbPAhWamtxIm9ncXFjZWcidWNxInFnbHYiZHBtbyJjI
mFtb3JwbW9rcWdmIm9jYWprbGcsCD4tU UBNRls8&err=1
(Source: Akamai)
New version POST Request body contents: (keeping the first letter and randomizing, 2-5 chars each)
ljj=Y24sZXBnZ2xnNTs1OyxjZUJlb2NrbixhbW8hY2hY24sZXdjcGZCbmdjdGt2dixhb
W8hY24sZXdY2tuLGFtbyFjbixld2tjcGZCam12b2NrbixkcCFjbixld2tjcGZCbmNybXF2
ZyxsZ3YhY24sZXdrYG10a2FqQmVvY2tuLGFtbw3%3D&dhgxbg=PldRR1A8Zm1sY2
5mcW1sNDQ6Pi1XUUdrcWo9Ij5gcDwiPmBwPCJwZ3JueyJvZyJrZCJ7bXcidW13bm
YibmtpZyJ2bSJxZ2cib3sicmptdm1xLCJRZ2cie21&ejv=o
Spamtorte - version comparison
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Spamtorte – Malware Upgrades
Filename MD5 Size
OLD (32bit version) 1faf27f6b8e8a9cadb611f668a01cf73 47,509
OLD (64bit version) cb0477445fef9c5f1a5b6689bbfb941e 52,515
NEW (32bit version) c547177e6f8b2cb8be26185073d64edc 87,875
NEW (64bit version) d04c492a5b78516a7a36cc2e1e8bf521 95,063
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Spamtorte -
what made
the machine
spot it??
Relevant samples
were from several
sources, found to
be “similar” to:
CryptoWall
TeslaCrypt
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
SpamTorte v2: http://cyber.verint.com/spamtorte-version-2/
Getting a hold of the details:
Extra! http://cyber.verint.com/nymaim-malware-variant/
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Key takeaways
Traditional schemes are not relevant for the goal of APT detection
Machine Learning is key for uncovering unknown malicious traffic
Collection is gold and should be considered the most crucial part
of the operation, if not – may lead to very error-prone models
C&C comms. are becoming rapidly encrypted (exp. Features)
LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START
Thank You
Visit us at booth #G160!

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InfoSecurity Europe 2017 - On The Hunt for Advanced Attacks? C&C Channels are a Good Place to Start

  • 1. Moshe Zioni ( @dalmoz_ ) Security Research Manager, VERINT On the Hunt for Advanced Attacks? C&C Channels are a Good Place to Start
  • 2. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START • Why focus on C&C? • C&C - Landscape • Trends in C&C implementations • Traditional Approaches • Our approach • Limitations • Proof-of-Concept results • Takeaways • Q&A On The Agenda
  • 3. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START • Moshe Zioni ( @dalmoz_ ) • Leading a terrific group of talented researches at • Researching and developing cutting-edge, next generation detection engines for malicious activity on very big enterprises and ISPs. • Credit & Kudos goes to the Research team, especially to Eddie, Maria, Meir, Oren and Vadim, and to the Analysis team. WHOAMI – credits & kudos
  • 4. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START • Always present (almost) • Network interception is practical, contrast to other detection methods/layers • While malware tends to be polymorphic, communication protocol does not • An old problem – • Current schemes of detection are not so promising on detecting the ‘new’. • Traditional tactics rely heavily on somewhat naïve comparison. Why focus on C&C channels?
  • 5. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START C&C landscape DNS 9% HTTP 62% ICMP 5% NATIVE 14% P2P 10% Distribution of Protocols DNS HTTP ICMP NATIVE P2P Name Method Dridex P2P, HTTP Nano Locker ICMP Poisn Ivy HTTP FLAME HTTP CITADEL HTTP Bergard HTTP Vawtrack URLZONE HTTP BlackMoon HTTP Wekby DNS ZeUS (GOZ) HTTP (P2P) DORKBOT HTTP SIMDA NATIVE + HTTP REGIN NATIVE (TCP + UDP ) +ICMP + HTTP SOUNDFIX-11 HTTP JAKUcalc HTTP /NATIVE TCP / DNS TrickBot HTTP GOZNYM P2P
  • 6. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Trends in C&C implementations Rapid, fast to respond, evolution Encryption of transmissions and payload Encapsulation of transmissions Steganography of messages P2P – Forget about SPOF
  • 7. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Traditional Approaches • Blacklists/ known patterns • Constantly needs upkeep and maintenance • Low False Positive • Forever rely Intelligence and Analysis • Not suitable at all to find ‘unknown’ schemes • High False Negative • Markov models • ARMA • Baseline comparison • Assuming normal traffic differ, in statistic modelling, of malicious traffic, might reveal novel schemes • This assumption is failing many times in current trends. • High False Positive Rate Signature based detection Anomaly based detection
  • 8. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Our approach Choosing an alternate path
  • 9. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START What Do We Need? We need something robust, that can “think” of many possibilities. Rely on what we do know and induce further. Fast (polynomial) results. MACHINE LEARNING - For The Win!
  • 10. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Enter Machine Learning Machine Learning is the science of providing a computer with the ability to “learn” by example and teach itself to find patterns. There are many methods of ML – each one has its pros and cons. The model ‘learns’ from known, classified data, and extrapolate to achieve even nontrivial results. (for a human) Evolved from Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence studies.
  • 11. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Supervised Learning Rely on labelled training data. Collection is key for optimized model and for reducing error levels Data sample set should be comprised of encompassing, diverse and relevant data. We used Decision Tree-Random Forest based Supervised learning
  • 12. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Feature Extraction SUIT TIE CHARM SMILE BAD-TEETH CAT CLASS
  • 13. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Feature Extraction SUIT TIE CHARM SMILE BAD-TEETH CAT CLASS
  • 14. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Feature Extraction SUIT TIE CHARM SMILE BAD-TEETH CAT CLASS
  • 15. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Feature Extraction SUIT TIE CHARM SMILE BAD-TEETH CAT CLASS
  • 16. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Session • Time differences • # of bytes • How many requests got an answer? • How much time it took to get an answer? TCP • 5-Tuple information • Protocol • IP Payload • Handshake data • Flags • Flow count Feature selection in TCP/HTTP Protocol specific - HTTP: • What is the length of the host name? • Body length • # of unique URI calls within the session • # of “user agent” strings used & values • How many file types were downloaded? • What is the average status code? • What is the avg. length of the URI? • Number of parameters SSL/TLS • Certificate metadata • Negotiatied cipher-suite
  • 17. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Appropriate data collection and feature engineering is crucial for a proper, effective, model Machine learning results are hard to interpret – most of the times the question of ‘How did the machine decided that is malicious traffic?!’ - Is not straight-forwardly answered. Do not succumb to overfitting. (e.g. params/samples >> 1) But, first
  • 18. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START In-the-Wild POC Sample Results
  • 19. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START POST /some/uri.php HTTP/1.1 layer=cXJjb3JtYUJxamNwaW5jcWdwcSxhbW8=&dimm=Pl dRR1A8YG12bGd2XW9ja25ncD4tV1FHUDwIPkxDT0c8IG9ja25ncGB teiA+LUxDT0c8CD5RV0BIPHFyY28iYG12bGd2ImtsImNhdmttbD4tU VdASDwIPlFATUZbPAhWamtxIm9ncXFjZWcidWNxInFnbHYiZHBtbyJj ImFtb3JwbW9rcWdmIm9jYWprbGcsCD4tU UBNRls8&err=1 (Source: Akamai) Spamtorte – old version comm.
  • 20. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Old version body contents: layer=cXJjb3JtYUJxamNwaW5jcWdwcSxhbW8=&dimm=Pl dRR1A8YG12bGd2XW9ja25ncD4tV1FHUDwIPkxDT0c8IG9ja25ncGBteiA+LUxDT0c 8CD5RV0BIPHFyY28iYG12bGd2ImtsImNhdmttbD4tUVdASDwIPlFATUZbPAhWamtxIm9ncXFjZWcidWNxInFnbHYiZHBtbyJjI mFtb3JwbW9rcWdmIm9jYWprbGcsCD4tU UBNRls8&err=1 (Source: Akamai) New version POST Request body contents: (keeping the first letter and randomizing, 2-5 chars each) ljj=Y24sZXBnZ2xnNTs1OyxjZUJlb2NrbixhbW8hY2hY24sZXdjcGZCbmdjdGt2dixhb W8hY24sZXdY2tuLGFtbyFjbixld2tjcGZCam12b2NrbixkcCFjbixld2tjcGZCbmNybXF2 ZyxsZ3YhY24sZXdrYG10a2FqQmVvY2tuLGFtbw3%3D&dhgxbg=PldRR1A8Zm1sY2 5mcW1sNDQ6Pi1XUUdrcWo9Ij5gcDwiPmBwPCJwZ3JueyJvZyJrZCJ7bXcidW13bm YibmtpZyJ2bSJxZ2cib3sicmptdm1xLCJRZ2cie21&ejv=o Spamtorte - version comparison
  • 21. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Spamtorte – Malware Upgrades Filename MD5 Size OLD (32bit version) 1faf27f6b8e8a9cadb611f668a01cf73 47,509 OLD (64bit version) cb0477445fef9c5f1a5b6689bbfb941e 52,515 NEW (32bit version) c547177e6f8b2cb8be26185073d64edc 87,875 NEW (64bit version) d04c492a5b78516a7a36cc2e1e8bf521 95,063
  • 22. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Spamtorte - what made the machine spot it?? Relevant samples were from several sources, found to be “similar” to: CryptoWall TeslaCrypt
  • 23. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START SpamTorte v2: http://cyber.verint.com/spamtorte-version-2/ Getting a hold of the details: Extra! http://cyber.verint.com/nymaim-malware-variant/
  • 24. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Key takeaways Traditional schemes are not relevant for the goal of APT detection Machine Learning is key for uncovering unknown malicious traffic Collection is gold and should be considered the most crucial part of the operation, if not – may lead to very error-prone models C&C comms. are becoming rapidly encrypted (exp. Features)
  • 25. LOOKING FOR APTS? C&C IS A GOOD PLACE TO START Thank You Visit us at booth #G160!

Editor's Notes

  1. HTTP/S definitions UDP/TCP ICMP Social networks? Dridex is p2p or http?
  2. tegonagraphy? Social networks?
  3. Autoregressive moving average
  4. TRAINING DATA Easy example - Small set – cannot really extrapolate from a small bunch Collection is key! Bias is dangerous – diversity, robust, clean
  5. TRAINING DATA Easy example - Small set – cannot really extrapolate from a small bunch Collection is key! Bias is dangerous – diversity, robust, clean
  6. TRAINING DATA Easy example - Small set – cannot really extrapolate from a small bunch Collection is key! Bias is dangerous – diversity, robust, clean
  7. TRAINING DATA Easy example - Small set – cannot really extrapolate from a small bunch Collection is key! Bias is dangerous – diversity, robust, clean
  8. Per domain features – sessions instead of http specific features Another option is to add certificate to the circle together with other ssl/tls features
  9. The payload itself (body) is different – Json -
  10. Samples from samples – add some pcaps or at least names of families of which we derived this conclusion Similarity breakdown (Columns malware_prediction), [count of alert] 1000052 -  [~300] - CryptoWall 1000053 – [~ 100 ]-  TeslaCrypt