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How to pentest
Let’s make things easy: webapp test
Disclaimer
Never ever try to do a pentest based on this slideshow
Many things are not included because
I don’t know everything
90 minutes is not enough to explain this
How to hack - Hackers 1995 1:23:52
The source for this
http://www.pentest-standard.org
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Guide_v4_Table_of_Contents
Structure of this presentation
Project management part
● 99% of the people think this is boring
● The more projects you do, the more you value a good project management
The hack part
● Bad news, only the second part will deal with this
● Business logic goodies
Is this legal?
Check that you own the system (warning, trolling potential ahead)
If not, check that the client who pays you owns the system
Check that the project already started - Once I did not check this :)
If possible, know ahead what is test env and what is production env
If possible, test the test environment
Basic tests should be done on prod as well
Check the IP range at least twice
Pre-engagement
Estimate time
Define scope
Define scope exactly - very very important
Avoid scope creep
Use a questionnaire (pentest-standard.org)
Pro-tip: provide your static external IP address to the client before any test starts
The Most Accurate Hacking Scene Ever
Typical web questionnaire
● How many web applications are being assessed?
● How many login systems are being assessed?
● How many static pages are being assessed? (approximate)
● How many dynamic pages are being assessed? (approximate)
● Will the source code be made readily available?
● Will there be any kind of documentation?
○ If yes, what kind of documentation?
● Will static analysis be performed on this application?
● Does the client want fuzzing performed against this application?
● Does the client want role-based testing performed against this application?
● Does the client want credentialed scans of web applications performed?
Define goal of the test!
Pentesters usually want to be domain admin!
Not every client wants this
Define limits
E.g. I promise not to use local root exploits to gain root privileges on prod
I promise not to use any memory corruption exploits
I promise not to dump the whole database
I promise not to lockout all the users from the prod
Communications - PGP / Signal instead of plain text email
Communications - just don’t use public IRC
Numb3rs' description of IRC
Blind test / double blind test
Blind test
Pentesters have same starting point as any hacker, no info, no credz
Double blind
Will the security monitoring group/ IT group know about the test?
If not, what happens when they detect an incident?
Gather intelligence
Most overlooked part of the test
People look at this as boring - I want XSS and SQLi and RCE!
Hot topic - find resources which are live for 1-2 minutes
Professionals know proper intelligence gathering is key to success
Can find new entries to the company network even the admins don’t know about
There are thousands of non-technical ways for intelligence gathering
Use your creativity
Check http://www.pentest-standard.org/index.php/Intelligence_Gathering
Gather intelligence - technical stuff
● Passive Reconnaissance
○ WHOIS Lookups
○ BGP looking glasses
○ Google Dork
● Active Footprinting
○ Port Scanning - Zsombor NMAP
○ Banner Grabbing
○ SNMP Sweeps
○ Zone Transfers
○ SMTP Bounce Back
○ DNS Discovery
○ Forward/Reverse DNS - SHARED HOSTING FTW!!!!!
○ DNS Bruteforce
○ Web Application Discovery
○ Virtual Host Detection & Enumeration
If this is an internal test system
Ask to turn off IPS/WAF
If behind cloud WAF, you might be able to completely bypass it
Ask to turn off Captcha
Discuss with the system admin/system
owner/whatever
Whitebox/grey box /black box???
Vulnerability assessment / ethical hacking / both
● https://silentsignal.hu/docs/S2_Fogalomtar_v1.pdf
Ask for users, probably users from different roles
Ask for 2 users on the same level
2 admin + 2 user == 4 user to test with
Threat agent/capability analysis
Internal External
Employees Business
Partners
Management (executive, middle) Competitors
Administrators (network, system, server) Contractors
Developers Suppliers
Engineers Nation
States
Technicians
Organized Crime
Contractors (with their external users) Hacktivists
General user community Script Kiddies (recreational
Understand the application
First, always click through the app
Map all the functionalities
Read the man/doc if any
● Check for credentials in the doc, it happens
What to test
A good test needs
An experienced, motivated tester with dedicated time
Good tools (e.g. automated scanner, …)
The tester should know how to use the tools, and when not to use it
The tester should know how to create new tool if needed
Automated scanners
Automated scanners are good at many things
● Find SQLi, test many many parameters, create a good baseline test
Automated scanners are bad at
● Find/exploit business logic flaws
● Exploiting found vulns
● Chaining vulns
● Find vulns in the not first step of a workflow (multi-page forms)
Chuck S05E05 29:41
Business logic tests
Rewrite the price for the item to be purchased
● A.k.a how college students were able to buy flat-screen TV when it was new
to the market
Navigate to last form page to bypass security checks
Rewrite the account ID to see someone else’s account
● Error, account #x belongs to client #z
○ Rewrite both #x and #z
Use the same coupon multiple times in the same session
Business logic tests
Bypass Captcha-s via OCR
Bypass password resets, bypass 2FA
Transfer -10000 USD to “friend”
Access “company news” before release - predictable sequential news ID
● Use for trading before market know this
Jeremiah Grossman; Arian Evans;Trey Ford
Get Rich or Die Trying - Making Money on the Web the black hat way - 2009
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIMF8bp5-qg
MR Robot S01E03 - 35:03

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Hogy néz ki egy pentest meló a gyakorlatban?

  • 1. How to pentest Let’s make things easy: webapp test
  • 2. Disclaimer Never ever try to do a pentest based on this slideshow Many things are not included because I don’t know everything 90 minutes is not enough to explain this
  • 3. How to hack - Hackers 1995 1:23:52
  • 4. The source for this http://www.pentest-standard.org https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Guide_v4_Table_of_Contents
  • 5.
  • 6. Structure of this presentation Project management part ● 99% of the people think this is boring ● The more projects you do, the more you value a good project management The hack part ● Bad news, only the second part will deal with this ● Business logic goodies
  • 7. Is this legal? Check that you own the system (warning, trolling potential ahead) If not, check that the client who pays you owns the system Check that the project already started - Once I did not check this :) If possible, know ahead what is test env and what is production env If possible, test the test environment Basic tests should be done on prod as well Check the IP range at least twice
  • 8. Pre-engagement Estimate time Define scope Define scope exactly - very very important Avoid scope creep Use a questionnaire (pentest-standard.org) Pro-tip: provide your static external IP address to the client before any test starts
  • 9. The Most Accurate Hacking Scene Ever
  • 10. Typical web questionnaire ● How many web applications are being assessed? ● How many login systems are being assessed? ● How many static pages are being assessed? (approximate) ● How many dynamic pages are being assessed? (approximate) ● Will the source code be made readily available? ● Will there be any kind of documentation? ○ If yes, what kind of documentation? ● Will static analysis be performed on this application? ● Does the client want fuzzing performed against this application? ● Does the client want role-based testing performed against this application? ● Does the client want credentialed scans of web applications performed?
  • 11. Define goal of the test! Pentesters usually want to be domain admin! Not every client wants this Define limits E.g. I promise not to use local root exploits to gain root privileges on prod I promise not to use any memory corruption exploits I promise not to dump the whole database I promise not to lockout all the users from the prod Communications - PGP / Signal instead of plain text email
  • 12. Communications - just don’t use public IRC Numb3rs' description of IRC
  • 13. Blind test / double blind test Blind test Pentesters have same starting point as any hacker, no info, no credz Double blind Will the security monitoring group/ IT group know about the test? If not, what happens when they detect an incident?
  • 14. Gather intelligence Most overlooked part of the test People look at this as boring - I want XSS and SQLi and RCE! Hot topic - find resources which are live for 1-2 minutes Professionals know proper intelligence gathering is key to success Can find new entries to the company network even the admins don’t know about There are thousands of non-technical ways for intelligence gathering Use your creativity Check http://www.pentest-standard.org/index.php/Intelligence_Gathering
  • 15. Gather intelligence - technical stuff ● Passive Reconnaissance ○ WHOIS Lookups ○ BGP looking glasses ○ Google Dork ● Active Footprinting ○ Port Scanning - Zsombor NMAP ○ Banner Grabbing ○ SNMP Sweeps ○ Zone Transfers ○ SMTP Bounce Back ○ DNS Discovery ○ Forward/Reverse DNS - SHARED HOSTING FTW!!!!! ○ DNS Bruteforce ○ Web Application Discovery ○ Virtual Host Detection & Enumeration
  • 16. If this is an internal test system Ask to turn off IPS/WAF If behind cloud WAF, you might be able to completely bypass it Ask to turn off Captcha
  • 17. Discuss with the system admin/system owner/whatever Whitebox/grey box /black box??? Vulnerability assessment / ethical hacking / both ● https://silentsignal.hu/docs/S2_Fogalomtar_v1.pdf Ask for users, probably users from different roles Ask for 2 users on the same level 2 admin + 2 user == 4 user to test with
  • 18. Threat agent/capability analysis Internal External Employees Business Partners Management (executive, middle) Competitors Administrators (network, system, server) Contractors Developers Suppliers Engineers Nation States Technicians Organized Crime Contractors (with their external users) Hacktivists General user community Script Kiddies (recreational
  • 19. Understand the application First, always click through the app Map all the functionalities Read the man/doc if any ● Check for credentials in the doc, it happens
  • 21. A good test needs An experienced, motivated tester with dedicated time Good tools (e.g. automated scanner, …) The tester should know how to use the tools, and when not to use it The tester should know how to create new tool if needed
  • 22. Automated scanners Automated scanners are good at many things ● Find SQLi, test many many parameters, create a good baseline test Automated scanners are bad at ● Find/exploit business logic flaws ● Exploiting found vulns ● Chaining vulns ● Find vulns in the not first step of a workflow (multi-page forms)
  • 24. Business logic tests Rewrite the price for the item to be purchased ● A.k.a how college students were able to buy flat-screen TV when it was new to the market Navigate to last form page to bypass security checks Rewrite the account ID to see someone else’s account ● Error, account #x belongs to client #z ○ Rewrite both #x and #z Use the same coupon multiple times in the same session
  • 25. Business logic tests Bypass Captcha-s via OCR Bypass password resets, bypass 2FA Transfer -10000 USD to “friend” Access “company news” before release - predictable sequential news ID ● Use for trading before market know this Jeremiah Grossman; Arian Evans;Trey Ford Get Rich or Die Trying - Making Money on the Web the black hat way - 2009 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIMF8bp5-qg
  • 26. MR Robot S01E03 - 35:03