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Joe Basirico
Security Innovation
SVP Engineering
jbasirico@securityinnovation.com
About Security Innovation
• Authority in Software Security
• 15+ years research on software vulnerabilities
• Security testing methodology adopted by SAP,
Symantec, Microsoft and McAfee
• Authors of 18 books
• Helping organizations minimize risk
• Assessment: Show me the gaps
• Education: Guide me to the right decisions
• Standards: Set goals and make it easy and natural
• Tech-enabled services for both breadth and depth
Attackers Have Superpowers
4
Attackers View Software Differently
• Never OK with ignorance
• Identify things that are out of place quickly
• Have mental
• Horsepower: Ability to focus on difficult problems
• Agility: To quickly context switch
• Bandwidth: To hold many concepts in the mind
5
Phineas Fisher recently hacked into Cayman National Bank and Trust.
They wrote a large manifesto and guide, I’ll be lifting snippets out as
quotes throughout.
Manifesto and guide translated here: https://pastebin.com/8rXhtqgr
What are the Super Powers?
• Complete Knowledge of the System
• Good Imagination
• Creativity
• Observant
• Good Memory
• Evil Streak
6
They Build a
Complete Knowledge of the System
• What happens when I click the "login" button?
• Let’s talk technology
• Headers?
• Parameters?
• HTML Source?
• Where to ask more…
• Google
• Github
• StackOverflow
So I studied and practiced (see section 11), until I felt I was
ready to pay a visit to Hacking Team almost a year later. The
practice paid off, and this time I was able to make a
complete commitment from the company [7]. Before I
realized that I could enter with shellshock, I was willing to
spend happy whole months of life studying exploit
development and writing a reliable exploit for one of the
memory corruption vulnerabilities I had encountered.
They have a Good Imagination
How do people commonly use this technology stack?
• What are the common patterns people follow with this technology?
• And then what are some common mistakes made when developing
this type of thing?
• What could be running the back end?
• What assumptions were made?
• What mistakes might you make if implementing the same features?
They are Creative
9
https://absurd.design
Once they have a goal
they’re persistent
Never stop if they hit a
roadblock
They were using a remote citrix app …
to access the SWIFT network, where
each payment message … had to go
through three employees: one to
"create" the message, one to "verify"
it, and another to "authorize it."
Since I already had all their credentials
thanks to the keylogger, I could easily
perform all three steps myself.
They are Observant
• What is out of place?
• What has changed?
• Load times
• Technology
• URLs and Parameters
• Content Types
• Headers
• Typos
Have a Good Memory & Take Great
Notes
They Remember Everything,
or have tools and automation
to make up the difference
• Error Messages
• Encodings
• Page layouts
• Load times
• Extra Information
They Harness Their Evil Streak
• Steal credit card numbers
• Become an admin
• Siphon off cash
• Learn private information
• Send spam
• Gain persistence on the network
OK, we’ve found some issues, what
can we do with them?
Polling Question
What are those Super Powers again?
• complete knowledge, creativity, access to a super computer,
fedora, evil streak
• complete knowledge, good imagination, creativity,
observant, good memory, evil streak
• complete knowledge, observant, creativity, great developer,
good memory, evil streak
• creativity, good imagination, observant, good memory, great
time management, evil streak
All My Demos with CMD+CTRL
• CyberRange for AppSec awareness and education
• 7 Web Apps & an Android App
• Exploits detected automatically
• Designed for beginners, but scales to experts
Design Goals
• Engage users of all skill levels
• Lots of vulnerabilities that can be understood quickly
• No special tools needed
• Built-in hints
• Immediate feedback
• Easter eggs
• Realism
• Full Featured Sites with Real vulnerabilities
Methodology & Primary Test Cases
Explore &
Gather
What does this
do?
What do you
want to attack
first?
Anything out of
the ordinary?
Information
Disclosure
Passive
Active
Parameter
Tampering
Try flipping
some switches!
URLs
Forms
Cross Site
Scripting
Notice
anything
reflected back?
SQL
Injection
Let's get the
data!
Adjust Your Eyes
Keep your eye on the URL
Always view the source
Passive Recon
Anything the attacker can gain
without providing input
We already found the hidden
credentials and secret
message, what else can we
find?
Active Recon
Start rattling door handles
Control Characters are a
good place to start
What’s running? How do
we “feel” about it?
' < ; -- #
OSINT: OpSec is Hard
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) –
Gathering data about people or systems that
is publicly available
• Remember Fjord Engineering?
• Who is that Arnold Character?
https://osintframework.com
Polling Question
Passive and Active Recon are types of what attack?
• Information disclosure
• Social Engineering
• Parameter tampering
• Cross Site Scripting
• Server Side Request Forgery
• SQL injection
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
Mixing Code and Data using control characters
in the webpage
• Try this anywhere you control a value on the page
• HTML
• JavaScript
• Headers
• How is your input being encoded?
• Test Cases
• Change your input
• Try <marquee>
• Try <script>alert('XSS')</script>
SQL Injection
Mixing Code and Data using control characters
in Database Queries
• Try this on any input you think may use the database
• Textboxes, URL Parameters, dropdowns, hidden fields
• Start small, build more complex SQL Queries to manipulate the
database
• Test Cases
• Does ' Produce an error message?
• Think about how to manipulate the SQL command
SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE Username = 'joe' AND Password = '
I didn't get anywhere with Hacking Team, but I
was lucky with Gamma Group, and I was able to
hack their customer support portal with basic
sql injection and file upload vulnerabilities.
Post Exploitation
We have a toe hold in the application,
where does that lead us?
Thinking Differently
You don’t have to run faster than the bear
You just have to run faster than the guy next to you
-Jim Butcher
“I did not set out to hack a
specific bank, what I wanted
was to hack any bank, which
ends up being a much simpler
task.”
What can you do?
• Create a Culture of Security
• Define Standards and Policies
• Require Systems Updates and Patching
• Test and Define Authentication, Identity and Access Control
• Centralized, tuned Logs and Auditing
The best way to learn to hack is by hacking. Put
together a laboratory with virtual machines
and start testing things, taking a break to
investigate anything you don't understand.
Questions?
Joe Basirico
Security Innovation
SVP Engineering
jbasirico@securityinnovation.com

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How an Attacker "Audits" Your Software Systems

  • 1.
  • 2. Joe Basirico Security Innovation SVP Engineering jbasirico@securityinnovation.com
  • 3. About Security Innovation • Authority in Software Security • 15+ years research on software vulnerabilities • Security testing methodology adopted by SAP, Symantec, Microsoft and McAfee • Authors of 18 books • Helping organizations minimize risk • Assessment: Show me the gaps • Education: Guide me to the right decisions • Standards: Set goals and make it easy and natural • Tech-enabled services for both breadth and depth
  • 5. Attackers View Software Differently • Never OK with ignorance • Identify things that are out of place quickly • Have mental • Horsepower: Ability to focus on difficult problems • Agility: To quickly context switch • Bandwidth: To hold many concepts in the mind 5 Phineas Fisher recently hacked into Cayman National Bank and Trust. They wrote a large manifesto and guide, I’ll be lifting snippets out as quotes throughout. Manifesto and guide translated here: https://pastebin.com/8rXhtqgr
  • 6. What are the Super Powers? • Complete Knowledge of the System • Good Imagination • Creativity • Observant • Good Memory • Evil Streak 6
  • 7. They Build a Complete Knowledge of the System • What happens when I click the "login" button? • Let’s talk technology • Headers? • Parameters? • HTML Source? • Where to ask more… • Google • Github • StackOverflow So I studied and practiced (see section 11), until I felt I was ready to pay a visit to Hacking Team almost a year later. The practice paid off, and this time I was able to make a complete commitment from the company [7]. Before I realized that I could enter with shellshock, I was willing to spend happy whole months of life studying exploit development and writing a reliable exploit for one of the memory corruption vulnerabilities I had encountered.
  • 8. They have a Good Imagination How do people commonly use this technology stack? • What are the common patterns people follow with this technology? • And then what are some common mistakes made when developing this type of thing? • What could be running the back end? • What assumptions were made? • What mistakes might you make if implementing the same features?
  • 9. They are Creative 9 https://absurd.design Once they have a goal they’re persistent Never stop if they hit a roadblock They were using a remote citrix app … to access the SWIFT network, where each payment message … had to go through three employees: one to "create" the message, one to "verify" it, and another to "authorize it." Since I already had all their credentials thanks to the keylogger, I could easily perform all three steps myself.
  • 10.
  • 11. They are Observant • What is out of place? • What has changed? • Load times • Technology • URLs and Parameters • Content Types • Headers • Typos
  • 12. Have a Good Memory & Take Great Notes They Remember Everything, or have tools and automation to make up the difference • Error Messages • Encodings • Page layouts • Load times • Extra Information
  • 13. They Harness Their Evil Streak • Steal credit card numbers • Become an admin • Siphon off cash • Learn private information • Send spam • Gain persistence on the network OK, we’ve found some issues, what can we do with them?
  • 14. Polling Question What are those Super Powers again? • complete knowledge, creativity, access to a super computer, fedora, evil streak • complete knowledge, good imagination, creativity, observant, good memory, evil streak • complete knowledge, observant, creativity, great developer, good memory, evil streak • creativity, good imagination, observant, good memory, great time management, evil streak
  • 15. All My Demos with CMD+CTRL • CyberRange for AppSec awareness and education • 7 Web Apps & an Android App • Exploits detected automatically • Designed for beginners, but scales to experts
  • 16. Design Goals • Engage users of all skill levels • Lots of vulnerabilities that can be understood quickly • No special tools needed • Built-in hints • Immediate feedback • Easter eggs • Realism • Full Featured Sites with Real vulnerabilities
  • 17. Methodology & Primary Test Cases Explore & Gather What does this do? What do you want to attack first? Anything out of the ordinary? Information Disclosure Passive Active Parameter Tampering Try flipping some switches! URLs Forms Cross Site Scripting Notice anything reflected back? SQL Injection Let's get the data!
  • 18. Adjust Your Eyes Keep your eye on the URL Always view the source
  • 19. Passive Recon Anything the attacker can gain without providing input We already found the hidden credentials and secret message, what else can we find?
  • 20. Active Recon Start rattling door handles Control Characters are a good place to start What’s running? How do we “feel” about it? ' < ; -- #
  • 21. OSINT: OpSec is Hard Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) – Gathering data about people or systems that is publicly available • Remember Fjord Engineering? • Who is that Arnold Character? https://osintframework.com
  • 22. Polling Question Passive and Active Recon are types of what attack? • Information disclosure • Social Engineering • Parameter tampering • Cross Site Scripting • Server Side Request Forgery • SQL injection
  • 23. Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Mixing Code and Data using control characters in the webpage • Try this anywhere you control a value on the page • HTML • JavaScript • Headers • How is your input being encoded? • Test Cases • Change your input • Try <marquee> • Try <script>alert('XSS')</script>
  • 24. SQL Injection Mixing Code and Data using control characters in Database Queries • Try this on any input you think may use the database • Textboxes, URL Parameters, dropdowns, hidden fields • Start small, build more complex SQL Queries to manipulate the database • Test Cases • Does ' Produce an error message? • Think about how to manipulate the SQL command SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE Username = 'joe' AND Password = ' I didn't get anywhere with Hacking Team, but I was lucky with Gamma Group, and I was able to hack their customer support portal with basic sql injection and file upload vulnerabilities.
  • 25. Post Exploitation We have a toe hold in the application, where does that lead us?
  • 27. You don’t have to run faster than the bear You just have to run faster than the guy next to you -Jim Butcher “I did not set out to hack a specific bank, what I wanted was to hack any bank, which ends up being a much simpler task.”
  • 28. What can you do? • Create a Culture of Security • Define Standards and Policies • Require Systems Updates and Patching • Test and Define Authentication, Identity and Access Control • Centralized, tuned Logs and Auditing The best way to learn to hack is by hacking. Put together a laboratory with virtual machines and start testing things, taking a break to investigate anything you don't understand.
  • 30. Joe Basirico Security Innovation SVP Engineering jbasirico@securityinnovation.com

Editor's Notes

  1. Security innovation is a company dedicated to helping our customers with hard application and data security problems. We’ve spent years researching security vulnerabilities, why they occur, what they look like in production code and how to find and fix them. We have experience working with some of the largest companies in a variety of industries - from software companies such as Microsoft to e-commerce companies such as amazon, financial companies and many more. We offer solutions for all phases of the SDLC including instructor led training, computer based eLearning courses, on-site consulting and security assessments as well as technology to help secure sensitive data over the network or at rest. Over the years we’ve analyzed more than 10,000 vulnerabilities both in the course of research studies and through the assessments of software for our customers We got our start as a security testing company, grew to a products and services company that focused on breaking systems (code review, pen test, etc) and then helping fix the problems through secure design and implementation. We acquired NTRU in 2009 to expand our data protection services focused on data in transit as well as data at rest with best in class, high performance cryptography.
  2. Brandon Evans Example of LetSee attack and exploitation
  3. Samy Garage Door Openers story or Samy worm story
  4. Nobody has ever solved all the challenges in a single sitting
  5. Helpful error messages, stack traces, hints in the FAQ and about pages…leaked information basically wherever we could
  6. Headers Demo Shodan Demo Demo: Shodan.io  Octoprint: 173.48.229.165:8081/ https://www.shodan.io/host/77.40.158.113 product:CouchDB product:CouchDB version:1.6.1 https://www.shodan.io/search?query=RDP https://www.shodan.io/search?query=RDP+country%3A%22RU%22 https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47416
  7. Sabu Story https://pastebin.com/iVujX4TR Worked so hard to keep his ID safe, DOXd by his own “team”
  8. XSS Alert box Beef
  9. SQLi Error messages Auth Bypass DB Queries
  10. Post-Exploitation Data Exfiltration SQLi DB Queries Denial of Service
  11. Attackers think differently than we do. We have to understand what makes them tick to be successful. What are their goals, techniques, and tools? How do we look to not just the auditors and compliance folks, but to the creative and potentially malicious attackers
  12. Being 100% secure isn’t possible You don’t need to be vulnerability free, that’s not possible you need to commit and be more secure than the next person
  13. Open Discussion What can you do? Standards and Policies Systems Updates and Patching Identity and Access Control System Logs and Tracking Authentication