HONORS THESIS BRANCH

Cornell College International Relations Department
MYSTICAL MONARCHISM IN THE 21ST
CENTURY:
LÈSE-MAJESTÉ AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
Submitted in Fulfillment of requirements for Departmental Honors in the Department of
International Relations
Kahn Thomas Kenneth Branch

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The kindness and support I have received throughout this research experience is
immeasurable. The support from friends, colleagues and family is unlike what I have ever
experienced before. I thank each and every person who gave of themselves, in the hopes of
helping me complete this honors thesis. This research is a result of the kindness and care that
each and every person along the way gave me.
I am most thankful for the patience of my professors, friends and family throughout this
endeavor. From offering editorial insight to emotional support all while I engaged in this work, I
thank each and every person for the patience they afforded me throughout this work.
Without the kindness shown in the many different ways by everyone apart of this work,
my research would not have been possible.

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Table of Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................................3
The Rise of the Thai Lèse-Majesté Law.......................................................................................................4
The Lèse-Majesté Law Today ....................................................................................................................11
Recent International Community Responses ..............................................................................................14
I. The United States of America.........................................................................................................15
II. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland..........................................................20
III. United Nations Part I: Jurisdiction..............................................................................................27
A. Universal Declaration on Human Rights ....................................................................................28
B. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights .................................................................29
IV. United Nations Part II: Response................................................................................................30
A. United Nations General Assembly..............................................................................................31
B. Security Council of the United Nations ......................................................................................33
C. United Nations Human Rights Council ......................................................................................35
D. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.................................39
Understanding the International Community Responses............................................................................41
Mystical Monarchism and International Understanding.............................................................................45
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................49
Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................................50

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Introduction
In October 2014, eighty-two year old Sulak Sivaraksa was accused of insulting Thai
royalty. Naresuan the Great, ruler of the Kingdom of Ayutthaya who died in 1605, was the topic
of a lecture by Sivaraksa at Chulalongkorn University. Although Naresuan the Great is not a
member of the current royal family, two Thai military officials accused Sivaraksa of violating
the state’s lèse-majesté law. Facing fifteen years in prison, Sivaraksa waited as many others did
for his fate to be determined.1
Thailand’s lèse-majesté law, found in the nineteen constitutions and penal code for the
Kingdom of Thailand, punishes anyone who speaks in a defamatory way about the Monarch of
Thailand and the monarch’s immediate family. The response from the international community
has differed in recent years regarding the enforcement of the lèse-majesté law. This lack of
meaningful response from the international community will be examined through evaluating the
history of the Thai lèse-majesté law and surveying responses to the law from a sample of
international actors. Finally, the rationale for responses from the selected international actors will
be evaluated to draw a conclusion about international response to the Thai lèse-majesté law.
The Realm of Analysis
To address the international community’s response to the Thai lèse-majesté law, the
parameters for examining the international community response must be addressed. A majority
of the current scholars examining Thailand’s lèse-majesté law have focused their analysis on
parliamentary governments after the 1932 Palace Coup. A prominent example of this
1
Amy Sawitta Lefevre, “Thai scholar faces royal insult charge over medieval king”, Reuters, Oct 20, 2014,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-lesemajeste-idUKKCN0I90OS20141020, (accessed Jan 14, 2016).

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government change focused analysis include David Streckfuss, PhD. in his 2010 book Truth on
Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason and Lèse-majesté. This is representative of the current
literature regarding Thailand’s lèse-majesté law.
Unlike the analysis engaged in by Streckfuss or scholars like him, there will be no in
depth analysis of the motives behind the actions engaged in by the Thai Parliaments that have
existed post—1932. Streckfuss has aptly assessed the significance of these laws in the context of
political change as orchestrated by groups of politicians and military officials.2
Rather than add
to an already existing body of scholarship focused on Thai politics and not international
relations, the focus of this analysis will be on international actors’ response toward the Thai
government and the Thai lèse-majesté law
All of Thai law has a distinct historical context and nature rooted in religious influence.
The unique nature of Thai lèse-majesté law must be distinguished from other legal practices
Thailand has engaged in to ensure the security of the institution of monarchy. This will be the
focus of the next section, as the religious and historic influences in Thai law is evaluated through
historic and current examples.
The Rise of the Thai Lèse-Majesté Law
Today, the lèse-majesté law3
for the Kingdom of Thailand is codified in the Thai Penal
Code. “Whoever defames, insults or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir-Apparent or the
2
See David Streckfuss. Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason and Lèse-majesté. London:
Routledge, 2011. Streckfuss has suggested that there has been a spike in lèse-majesté cases brought before Thai
courts. Although the way that these cases are initiated will be addressed, the change over time in how many cases
are heard dealing with the lèse-majesté will not be addressed.
3
There is nothing to suggest these laws are called lèse-majesté by practitioners in the Thai legal system.
When this law is referenced for indictments in Thailand, the specific section of the Penal Code is sited. The
shorthand lèse-majesté will be used in this paper as is done in conversation throughout the Kingdom of Thailand to
refer to Article 112 of the Thai Penal Code.

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Regent, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to fifteen years.”4
The language in Article
112 is similar to the language used in a previous law embodying the lèse-majesté principle. To
properly assess the international community’s response to the lèse-majesté law, the historical
roots and political philosophy of the law must be analyzed, to give context to what international
actors may (or may not) be responding to.
One of the first Western-style penal code promulgated in the state now known as
Thailand offers insight into the influence behind the creation of the current lèse-majesté law.
This first penal code, written for Siam (a former name for the Kingdom of Thailand) in 1908
during the reign of King Chulalongkorn, Rama V included language for the administration of
punishment for defamation of the king’s majesty.5
Dr. Tokichi Masao, legal assistant to King
Chulalongkorn, notes in his article for the Yale Law Journal the work that was done by
government ministers to create the Siamese Penal Code, and the different areas of influence from
which they drew from. When the 1908 Penal Code was promulgated, an ancient legal code was
referenced in the preamble6
:
In the ancient times the monarchs of the Siamese nation governed their people
with laws which were originally derived from the Dharma-sutra of Manu, which
was then the prevailing law among the inhabitants of India and the neighboring
countries.7
The Dharma-sutra of Manu, an ancient legal text, is representative of the legal history of
Southeast Asia dating back to the time of Vedic India.8
The history and traditions emanating
4
Thai Criminal Code: Chapter 1, Book II, Article 112, Royal Thai Government Gazette.
5
Tokichi Masao, “New Penal Code of Siam”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Dec. 1908): 99.
6
1908 Siamese Penal Code (Draft Version), Royal Thai Government Gazette (A.P. Mission Press).
7
8
Ibid., 92.

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from Hindu and Vedic Indian9
culture have influenced the means by which the Siamese/Thai
Kingdom has evolved to the modern day. It is the influence of these religious and historical
traditions present in both 1908 and modern Thailand that made for the law that exists at both of
these points in history.
Of the influences that come from Vedic India, the time at which the Dharma-sutra of
Manu is believed to have originated, the ideas of kingship within the Thai/Siamese region of
Southeast Asia are essential. Because lèse-majesté is a law for protecting the institution of the
monarchy, understanding the role that the Thai monarchy has in Thai culture (independent of the
lèse-majesté law) will demonstrate the importance of the law’s protecting power for the
monarch. With understanding of the institution’s significance comes understanding of the
protections given to the institution.
Around the time of the Dharma-sutra’s creation, the ideology associated with the king
was that of divine and cosmic origin. It was believed that the king of Southeast Asian kingdoms
such as Ayutthaya, a predecessor state to the Kingdom of Thailand, embodied two gods: Shiva
and Vishnu. Although Thailand is a Buddhist nation, the role of Vedic Brahmanism in the Thai
Royal Court is enforced by the Brahmin priest who set the manner and means for royal
ceremony.10
Brahmanism was essential to the divine origin and nature of a Southeast Asian
monarch.
In the days of old, Brahmin priests sat atop the Hindu caste system, engaging in
important rituals and serving as religious leaders vital to state planning. Today, Brahmin serve
the King of Thailand in the inner sanctums of the palace, managing and administering over the
9
Scholarship has suggested this time falls somewhere between 1700 and 500 BCE.
10
Wendell Blanchard, Thailand: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Inc., 1958), 13.

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ancient traditions and rituals passed down from Vedic India.11
Brahmanism includes the sets of
practices and beliefs that were manifested in India around the time that the Vedas were compiled.
The role of these religious practices have incorporated themselves not only into the actions and
functions of the state but also into the conduct of Thai citizens.
From the Brahmin came the organization of the state functions and practices that are now
integral to the life of the Thai citizen. In Thailand, the line between Buddhism and Brahmanism
derived practices is blurred, or even nonexistent, to the average individual. Instead, traditions
from both are practiced, incorporated into daily life for all members of Thai society, including
the head of state.12
With that premise, the universe and the Thai state can be seen as two sides of
the same mirror: order and stability in Thailand on one side of the mirror is a reflection of order
and stability in the universe.13
Balance in one is dependent on balance in the other.
In the center of the Buddhist cosmological order is Mount Meru, the abode of the gods
who create order and reign over all of existence. It is the fount of order and the source of stability
for the universe, this repository for the divine. In that same way, the center of the Kingdom of
Thailand is the monarch, in his abode the Grand Palace. Instead of on a mountain, like the
mythical Mount Meru, it is along the Chao Phraya River by Wat Phra Kaeo (the Temple of the
Emerald Buddha), where the source of stability for the state resides. Like the celestial Mount
Meru, there are gods who reside in the center of this terrestrial realm: in the center of the state
resides the gods Shiva and Vishnu in the personhood of the reigning monarch.14
The role of the
monarch is literally the same in the Thai state: he is the center of the state in the same way that at
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid., 92.
14
Ibid.

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the center of the universe are the gods and goddesses, the divine royalty.15
With this ideology
present in Southeast Asia, the identity of the king became synonymous with the centrality of the
monarch’s place in the center of the universe. This was accompanied with the ideas of kingship
which were pervasive in the state.
One of the many titles associated with the god Shiva, one is Lord of the Universe.
Analogous to that, one of the titles of the monarch is Lord of the Land.16
The idea of multiple
titles associated with the monarch is not uncommon for Thai or European monarchs. For
example, the Queen of the United Kingdom also holds the title Lord of the Isle of Man and
Defender of the Faith. What is atypical and central in the case of the Thai monarch is the
association with the institution of monarchy and certain attributes of kingship. With Vedic
influence in Thailand came that ideology surrounding the personhood of the monarch: four
attributes associated with a ruler who is entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining order.17
To keep the state in good health, the monarch must reign with four temporal and spiritual
characteristics. The Thai king has four attributes: first, the king is father of the people (pho
khun), second he is the wheel-rolling king-emperor (chakraphat), third, as explained previously
he is divine and temporal (deva raja) and finally he is a splendid and majestic being of great
power (chao phaen din).18
Collectively, with the four attributes of the monarch, stemming from
Vedic influence, incorporating Buddhist principles, the monarch may reign with cosmic order.
The four attributes of the monarch, though working together, manifest themselves in
different ways for the numerous roles the monarch may have to address. As father of the people,
15
Ibid., 93.
16
Library of Congress, Thailand: A Country Study (Washington, 1989), 13.
17
Ibid.
18
David Wilson, Politics in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 87.

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he is seen as the leader through war and the counselor and judge during the peace—a wise judge
ensuring peace and order amongst those living together, securing harmony.19
The wheel-rolling
king is the Theravada Buddhist concept of the righteous monarch, abiding by laws both natural
and codified in Buddhist holy texts. He “makes pain to study the law…to uphold the righteous
and truthful”.20
These concepts work in tandem with the other aspects of monarchy: the deva raja
and the majestic being that is lord of the land, chao phaen din. Through these four aspects of
kingship, he is able to facilitate the functions of state to maintain order with the cosmos.
These ancient beliefs and traditions remained through the Kingdom of Ayutthaya to
Siam, during the reigns of the Chakri Dynasty. This includes the fifth reign, when the 1908 Penal
Code included language prohibiting defamation to the king’s majesty. The preamble to the 1908
Penal Code’s inclusion of the Dharma-sutra of Manu is a manifestation of the thousands of years
of influence in Southeast Asian monarchs. With this history and culture surrounding the
monarch, the needs of maintaining the monarch and protecting it from attack are essential.
Without this law, the god reigning on earth in the Grand Palace like the gods of Mount Meru
would be subject to injury from his subjects, who should be living under this natural order.
The influence of Vedic India were not manifested exclusively in the lèse-majesté law
found in the 1908 Penal Code or in the current Article 112 lèse-majesté law. The reference to the
Dharma-sutra of Manu in the preamble of the 1908 Penal Code is representative of King
Chulalongkorn, Rama V tying his conduct at that time to the law making practices of ancient
Thai monarchs. The Thai state is one of Buddhist ecclesiastical polity, where the teachings and
19
Ibid., 88.
20
Prince Dhani Niwat, “The Old Siamese Conception of the Monarchy”, Journal of Siamese Society, Vol.
36, Part II, 94.

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practices emanating from Buddhism and Vedic India are essential to conduct by and regarding
state institutions. In that way, the 1908 promulgation of the Penal Code mirrors the conduct of
ancient kings, influenced by the Dharma-sutra of Manu.
The function of the state is to preserve and strengthen the moral order, and the duty of the
king as head of state is to enforce and strengthen moral order.21
For centuries, kings looked to
ancient holy texts to govern, connecting their actions to those expressed in the Dharma-sutra of
Manu. Exactly the same thing was done by King Chulalongkorn, Rama V in the 1908 Penal
Code. This was done for other ancient holy texts like the Aggannasutra, the Cakkavattisutra, and
the Singkalasutra, connecting the conduct of the monarch to universal law. The most important
and best representation of Buddhist cosmology in Thai political discourse is the Traiphumikatha,
or Three Worlds according to King Ruang written by King Luthai of Sukothai in 1345 and
revised in 1783 under the reign of King Phra Phutthayotfa Chulalok, Rama I.22
Thai kings relied
on these texts to govern their conduct, ensuring the institution of the monarchy continued in the
role of deva raja.
The influence of ancient holy texts solidified the sacred, divine atmosphere surrounding
the monarch that exists in the modern day. The coronation ceremony is an excellent example of
this sacred, divine nature in state ceremony. When King Bhumibol Adulyadej, Rama IX was
crowned, he took the Crown of Victory and placed it upon his head. As the royal nine-tiered
umbrella hung above him, representing his cosmic accord with the multileveled heaven, no one
could crown him because of his royal personage. For this reason he, like Thai kings have done
21
Imtiyaz Yusuf and Canan Atilgan, ed., Religion and Democracy in Thailand (Bangkok: Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, 2008), 16-17.
22
Ibid.

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for centuries, crowned himself.23
Recurring state ceremonies are subject to the rules set by the
ancient customs and traditions from Vedic India, in the hopes of maintaining cosmic order. Even
upon the death of the monarch these ancient traditions remain active: the monarch’s person is
covered with a shroud, as was done for Lord Shiva in Vedic tradition.24
The lèse-majesté law is
therefore a device created alongside the other trappings of the monarchy.
Thus, Thailand's monarchy and lèse-majesté law have been inexorably linked with its
political and religious conduct throughout Thai history. From the past kingdom of Ayutthaya to
the present day, monarchs of Thailand have had a sacred atmosphere around themselves which
has influenced the way the monarchy has been treated. The historical roots and political
philosophy of the institution of monarchy gives context to the laws. Like the Dharma-sutra of
Manu quoted in the preamble of the 1908 Penal Code by King Chulalongkorn, Rama V, the
institution of the monarch is tied to ancient history and practices. These ancient practices, like
the coronation and reference to ancient holy texts when promulgating law, continue preserve the
Thai monarchy in all its sacred and divine splendor. The past and modern lèse-majesté laws are
necessary to preserving that idea of Thai kingship.
The Lèse-Majesté Law Today
Since the promulgation of the lèse-majesté law in the 1908 Penal Code for Siam, the
application of the lèse-majesté law has seen change in two ways: breadth and depth. Breadth
refers to the extent to which the law applies: how the law applies to the monarch, and the consort
or during a regency. The most important question to consider in regards to breadth is whether or
not deceased members of the royal family are included in the law, or the law is only for kings
23
Wendell Blanchard, Thailand: It’s People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Inc., 1958), 92.
24
Ibid.

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apart the Chakri Dynasty (the Kings of Thailand since King Phutthayotfa Chulalok, Rama I). The
next question to address is the depth in media that the law governs: if the lèse-majesté apply to
spoken words or written words. The final question of depth brings attention to the modern day: if
this law has been expanded to include illegal conduct engaged in over the internet.
In the same reign that the 1908 Penal Code—with the codified lèse-majesté law—was
promulgated, regulation of the media began in the Kingdom of Siam (Thailand). The reign of
King Chulalongkorn, Rama V, saw the first means for regulation of the media, as the monarch
himself began to impose press control. This was done in a sporadic manner; the control
happening alongside the king’s interest in media and occasional articles in newspapers.25
In
1919, during the reign of King Vajiravudh, Rama VI the Newspaper Act was promulgated,
allowing for the regulation of the press by the crown and crown ministers.26
With the creation of
the Siamese (and future Thai) Parliament after the Constitution of 1932, laws were passed
through the Parliament in 1938, allowing for the regulation and closure of newspapers by the
Press Office and Ministry of the Interior.
One of the most significant points in regards to press regulation in Siam/Thailand
occurred after the death of His Majesty King Ananda Mahidol, Rama VIII (brother of the
reigning king). Press regulation after the death of King Ananda Mahidol, Rama VIII is an
example of expanded regulation on speech regarding the monarch applied to a king who was not
on the throne. Because King Ananda Mahidol, Rama VIII had at that point died, his brother King
Bhumibol Adulyadej, Rama IX (although, at the time uncrowned) ascended to the Octagonal
Throne. Although there was nothing to suggest that individuals were imprisoned or prosecuted
25
Ibid., 224.
26
Ibid.

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for violating lèse-majesté by discussing the possible ways King Ananda Mahidol, Rama VIII had
died, Pridi Banomyong, Prime Minister and for a time Regent of Thailand forced newspapers to
handle the topic with great care, requiring that newspaper firms to “tread lightly”.27
The topic of
King Ananda, Rama VIII’s death remains a taboo subject to this day, protected by lèse-majesté.
Since the regulation of national press after the death of King Ananda Mahidol in 1945, a
new age of technological regulation has affected prohibition of lèse-majesté. The 2007 Computer
Crimes Act expanded Article 11228
of the Thai Penal Code to include digital forms of
defamation, like writings online and posted on social media. This also included SMS text
messages, as was the case with Amphon Tangnoppakul, known in the media as “Uncle SMS”. In
2011, Tangnoppakul was found guilty of making defamatory statements towards Her Majesty
Queen Sirikit. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.29
A grandfather in his early sixties at the
time of his arrest, he died in prison months into his sentence.30
In 2015 the Thai government amended the Computer Crimes Act, including language that
would make webmasters and those participating in internet forums subject to criminal charges if
Article 112 is violated through words used online. These changes came in the wake of the
sentencing for Chiranuch Premchaiporn, a news website manager who failed to remove
comments that violated Article 112 of the Thai Penal Code.31
With the 2015 changes to the
27
Ibid., 224-225.
28
See footnote 5.
29
Tangnoppakul was sentenced under Article 112 of the Thai Penal Code (fifteen years) and an additional
five years as a result of the Computer Crimes Act.
30
Damir Sagolj, “Thai royal insult prisoner ‘Uncle SMS’ dies in jail”, Reuters, May 8, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-lesemajeste-idUSBRE84709M20120508 (accessed Jan 14, 2016).
31
Saksith Saiyasombut, “Thai webmaster Chiranuch found guilty, but avoids jail term”, Asian
Correspondent, May 30, 2012, https://asiancorrespondent.com/2012/05/live-blog-chiranuch-verdict-2/ (accessed Jan
14, 2016).

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“Digital Economy”, web managers and service providers are just as criminally responsible as
those who have written felonious statements that violate the lèse-majesté prohibition.32
In the previous cases, lèse-majesté charges weren’t initiated by government prosecutors.
Each of these lèse-majesté cases, from Tangnoppakul to Sivaraksa were instead initiated by
government workers or members of the military who saw or heard the defamatory statements.
Charges arising under Article 112 do not have to be initiated by prosecutors. From the charge
being initiated, the accused is then brought to court, tried and sentenced under the law for an
amount of time prescribed under that law or other relating laws. This, along with the manner in
which the regulation has spread to internet and digital media, is the state of Thailand’s lèse-
majesté law.
Recent International Community Responses
Over a millennia of traditions and beliefs has resulted in the current lèse-majesté law
found in Article 112 of the Thai Penal Code. This law and that centuries-old history is what the
international community is responding to. Manifested within Southeast Asia, from Vedic India
and present in the states that had existed there (from Ayutthaya to Thailand), the lèse-majesté
laws are a culmination of these historical, religious and cultural factors. International community
responses is set against the backdrop of over a millennia of history, tradition and beliefs. Recent
response from the international community is therefore best demonstrated through a sample of
unique international actors with unique histories.
32
Saksith Saiyasombut, “Thailand’s new cyber laws – Part 2: Changes to the Computer Crime Act”, Asian
Correspondent, Feb 17, 2015, https://asiancorrespondent.com/2015/02/thailands-new-cyber-laws-part-2-changes-to-
the-computer-crime-act/ (accessed Jan 14, 2016).

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I. The United States of America
The United States of America has maintained diplomatic ties with the Kingdom of
Thailand since the connection between the Kingdom of Siam and the United Statas was
established through King Nangklao, Rama III and President Andrew Jackson.33
Through political
reorganization and numerous international conflicts, the Kingdom of Thailand has remained the
United States’ closest ally in Southeast Asia. The Kingdom of Thailand’s adherence to tradition,
and the expansion of regulation in regards to free speech, have not hindered the relationship
between the two states.
The United States response to Thailand’s lèse-majesté law has been, for lack of a better
word, cryptic. While visiting the Kingdom of Thailand, American citizens have been prosecuted
in Thailand for protected speech engaged in while on American soil. American citizens of Thai
descent have been treated as if they were citizens of the Kingdom of Thailand, subject to Royal
Thai law and sentenced as a result of that presumption. This is all while leading diplomats in the
United States Department of State and the United States Congress have said little on these arrests
and sentencings in recent years. While there are other situations for which this has happened, one
of the best examples of this occurred during a visit to Thailand by an American citizen in 2011.
A Thai-born United States citizen was sentenced to thirty months in prison in 2011 for
posting a translation of a forbidden book online. Fifty-five year old tourist Joe Gordon (whose
Thai name is Lerpong Wichaikhammat) stated when taken away for imprisonment, “[i]n
Thailand they put people in jail without proof…I was born in Thailand, but this does not mean I
33
See Siamese–American Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1833).

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am Thai. I am proud to be an American citizen”.34
The United States responded in that instance
through Elizabeth Pratt, Consul General at the US Embassy in Bangkok. She stated that the
sentence was severe as, “he has been sentenced for his right to freedom of expression”.35
“We
support freedom of expression both here in Thailand and around the world. We fully consider
Joe Gordon to be a US citizen” concluded both her remarks and any further action from the
United States government on that case.36
More recently, the United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand has come
under scrutiny for statements that were considered a violation of the lèse-majesté law. In
December 2015 the Royal Thai Government announced it would begin an investigation into the
conduct of Ambassador Glyn Davies. A few weeks before, on November 25, Ambassador
Davies spoke at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand. In his statement he addressed
concerns about the lèse-majesté law stating these were, “long prison sentences handed to some of
those found guilty of criticizing [the] king”.37
Protected by diplomatic immunity, the ambassador
stated, “[w]e believe no one should be jailed for peacefully expressing their views”.38
Though the claim was filed by a Thai citizen not affiliated with the government, the
response from the Thai government was a harsh critique of the ambassador’s statement.
Government spokesman Sansern Kaewkamnerd said United States Ambassador Davies’s
34
Simon Roughneen and Mark Magnier, “Thailand sentences American to prison for insulting king”, Los
Angeles Times, Dec 9, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/09/world/la-fg-thailand-american-20111209
(accessed Jan. 21, 2016).
35
Ibid.
36
Pravit Rojanaphruk, “US citizen Gordon jailed for lese majesty”, The Nation, Dec 9, 2011,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/US-citizen-Gordon-jailed-for-lese-majeste-30171546.html (accessed Jan.
21, 2016).
37
Joshua Kurlantzick, “U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Investigated for Lèse Majesté”, The Diplomat, Dec
19, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/u-s-ambassador-to-thailand-investigated-for-lese-majeste/ (accessed Jan
23, 2016).
38
Thomas Fuller, “Thai Police Investigate U.S. Ambassador on Suspicion of Insulting King”, The New
York Times, Dec 9, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/world/asia/thailand-lese-majeste.html (accessed Jan
23, 2016).

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statement showed “personal bias” which could damage “the longstanding relationship” between
Thailand and the United States.39
In the wake of this indictment by a Thai citizen and probe by
the Thai government, a spokeswoman for the American Embassy said staff members would seek
guidance from Washington before responding to further interactions between embassy
employees and Article 112 claims.40
These examples are only a few of what have become recurring situations in the Kingdom
of Thailand for United States citizens. Americans, with or without Thai blood, have been brought
before Thai courts for conduct they may have engaged in while in the United States several years
before arriving in Thailand, ending in them being sentenced to several years in prison. The
response from the Department of State has, however amounted to nothing more than rebukes
while “[continuing] to have full support for the Thai monarchy”, as Consul General Elizabeth
Pratt noted after the arrest of Joe Gordon.41
The greatest call to action given to United States citizens in recent years is the clear
message to be careful when traveling to Thailand. Through the United States Department of
State, warnings have been made to citizens of the United States seeking to travel to the Kingdom
of Thailand. On the State Department website, the United States government describes the
Kingdom of Thailand as a monarchy-run state, noting that lèse-majesté is part of the institution.42
On that same page there is an explanation of the consequences for lèse-majesté violation in
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
There have been numerous situations where United States citizens did not serve the full time for their
sentences. The Crown issues pardons to Americans sentenced under Article 112. In the case of Joe Gordon, for
example, his lawyers expressed to numerous news sources that they would be seeking a pardon from the Crown.
Being that the prerogative of mercy is seen in constitutional monarchies as a reserve power of the Crown, these
aren’t subject to government counsel.
42
Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Thailand- Embassy Messages”, United States Department of State, Last
updated Dec 1, 2015, https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/country/thailand.html (accessed Jan 25, 2016).

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Thailand, and some of the ways that the law has been applied (authorities actively search for and
investigate Internet postings, including blog entries…for lèse-majesté content”43
). From the
United States Department of State, that seems to be the greatest action taken towards Thailand
both in recent years and throughout American-Thai history.
Each year, the United States Department of State documents the status of human rights
around the globe. In the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the Department of State
details the situation for specific states, examining democratic practices and offering the
American perspective on foreign states. The most recent reports explain the situation for the
Kingdom of Thailand in 2013 and 2014. In the Secretary of State’s preface to the 2014 Report,
the Kingdom of Thailand is highlighted because of the dissolution of the Thai Parliament and the
establishment of the National Council for Peace and Order.44
However, along that critique, there
is no direct reference to the lèse-majesté law. The only reference to law in that portion is the
Constitution of 2007 being suspended. It should be noted that even with the suspension of the
2007 Thai Constitution, Article 112 of the Penal Code remains unchanged. In both the 201345
and the 201446
reports there are clear references to Article 112 of the Thai Penal Code and the
expansion of that law to include former monarchs and members of the Privy Council. This is
highlighted amongst the human rights violations in the Kingdom of Thailand.
43
Ibid.
44
John Kerry, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014: Secretary’s Preface”, United States
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper (accessed Jan 25,
2016).
45
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013:
Thailand”, United States Department of State,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2013humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper (accessed Jan 26, 2016).
46
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014:
Thailand”, United States Department of State,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2014&dlid=236480#wrapper (accessed Jan
26, 2016).

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This approach of the United States generally fits this pattern of conduct in both Joe
Gordon and Ambassador Davies’s cases. In recent years, especially during the Obama
Administration, there has not been direct action taken in response to Article 112 from the
Department of State through the United States Embassy. With the Executive Branch having
engaged in little action, the United States Congress is the only other active branch of the Federal
Government able to respond. In Congress, the question of Thailand’s lèse-majesté has been one
similar to that of the United States Department of State: the question is not addressed via formal
congressional action.
Though the role of the United States Congress in making foreign policy is limited47
, the
discussions and resolutions in Congress are important to note. However, from the United States
Congress, there are few statements made about the Kingdom of Thailand.
In August of 2015, Texas Republican Ted Poe criticized Thailand’s lèse-majesté law on
the floor of the United States House of Representatives. In his one minute speech, Representative
Poe noted, “[f]reedom of speech is our first amendment for a reason…it's the building block of
all other rights and to promote change for the good of the people”.48
He went on to critique the
current Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha for ignoring that idea expressed in the American
Constitution.49
Most recently, California Republican Dana Rohrabacher introduced H. Res. 574
to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. H. Res. 574 calls for a return to democratic government
47
Toni Johnson, “Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, Jan 24, 2013,
http://www.cfr.org/united-states/congress-us-foreign-policy/p29871#p4 (accessed Mar 30, 2016).
48
THOMAS, “Thailand’s Freedom of the Press -- (Extensions of Remarks - April 13, 2015)”, Library of
Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r114:3:./temp/~r114a2ccBy:: (accessed Jan 25, 2016).
49
Section 45 of the Thai Constitution of 2007 did provide for the free expression, with the caveat that this
right was subject to the government need to ensure peace and other state interests. It is, however, not a right in the
same way as free speech is a right in the United States of America.

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for the Kingdom of Thailand.50
In the resolution, Representative Rohrabacher praised the
reigning king’s leadership through the transitions in government.51
The last action engaged in for
the resolution was its referral to committee.
From the political sphere in the United States of America, the response to Thailand’s
lèse-majesté law is one of dissatisfaction, accompanied by inaction. There are no sanctions or
scathing speeches made about Thailand’s maintenance of the law both before and after the May
2014 change in government. The United States’ conduct in regards to the law can be looked at as
a mild response to implementation and adherence to Article 112.
The United States’ response demonstrates not only the response from an international
actor, but everything that comes with the history associated with that actor. In the United States
of America the right to free speech is so important that it is, as Representative Ted Poe (R-
Texas) noted before, the First Amendment. Both states, having had a connection since the early
nineteenth century, now have their relations altered because of words uttered by the Ambassador
of one about the concern for foreign citizens.
II. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Of the relationships with European governments, the relationship between the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of Thailand may be the oldest.
The diplomatic connection now five centuries old, the Kingdom of Thailand and the United
Kingdom have a similar history of monarchy that has evolved into constitutional practice. This
50
It is suggested that the high number of lèse-majesté cases currently before Thai courts is a result of the
dissolution of Parliament and the Constitution of 2006. However, as already noted the lèse-majesté law has been in
Thai written law as far back as the 1908 Penal Code. Individuals had been imprisoned before the May 2014
dissolution of Parliament and appointment of General Prayuth Chan-ocha as Prime Minister.
51
THOMAS, “H.RES.574 -- Calling for a restoration of civil government in Thailand established by fair,
free, democratic, and open elections and expressing solidarity with the people of Thailand in their desire...”, Library
of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c114:H.RES.574: (accessed Jan 25, 2016).

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means, as spoken and emphasized at a celebration of 500 years of British-Thai relations, that
both states are constitutional monarchies loved by their people.52
The United Kingdom and Thailand are unique in that their political atmospheres are
driven by state religions. Anglican Christianity in the United Kingdom and Theravada Buddhism
in Thailand have been essential to the practices and traditions associated with these monarchies.
The practices, principles and beliefs of state religion have manifested themselves in United
Kingdom laws like Theravada Buddhism has manifested itself in Thai law. This unique
similarity that the two states share provides insight unmatched by any other European great
power.
In recent years, citizens of the United Kingdom with and without Thai blood have
violated Article 112 of the Thai Penal Code. This has required response from the Government of
the United Kingdom. Whereas five hundred years of international relations has existed between
the Kingdom of Thailand and the United Kingdom, the UK government has had responses
similar to the United States.
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) came under fire at all levels of the
organization because of lèse-majesté violations. In December 2007, BBC Asia-Pacific reporter
Jonathan Head was charged with committing lèse-majesté because of a seminar he had
moderated at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand. During the seminar, entitled “Coup,
Capital and Crown”53
, Head went on to make the following volatile comments:
52
British Embassy-Bangkok, “Forward into the 5th Century of Thailand-UK Relations”, Government of
the United Kingdom, March 10, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/forward-into-the-5th-
century-of-thailand-uk-relations (accessed Jan 28, 2016).
53
Michael Casey, “BBC Reporter Jonathan Head Could Face 15 Years in Thai Jail”, The Huffington Post,
Jan 26, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/26/bbc-reporter-jonathan-hea_n_153563.html (accessed Feb
3, 2016).

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As a journalist, it's very frustrating not being able to discuss the monarchy, but we
must respect the law and be restrained in what we say…His Majesty The King is
now eighty, he will not be around forever…[d]emocracy, the military and the
monarchy are deeply linked.54
As a result, Jonathan Head faced up to fifteen years in prison under Article 112.
Although the charges against Jonathan Head were dropped, the scrutiny experienced by
writers and experts in Thai studies of all ethnic backgrounds has increased drastically. This
scrutiny made itself present once again in a far more critical way with the imprisonment of a
professor from a top Thai university. Chulalongkorn University Associate Professor of Politics
Giles Ji Ungpakorn fled to the United Kingdom (he has dual citizenship in Thailand and the
United Kingdom) after facing lèse-majesté charges for a book he had written that was being
placed in Chulalongkorn University bookstore, A Coup for the Rich. The bookstore staffer
reported eight paragraphs from the first chapter as being a violation of Article 112. Professor
Ungpakorn fled for London within a week of the charge being announced in 2009.55
To this day,
Professor Ungpakorn remains in the United Kingdom, and there is a strong possibility he will
remain there to avoid imprisonment in Thailand.
This is not the only time that individuals who are citizens of the Kingdom of Thailand
have fled to the United Kingdom in the wake of lèse-majesté charges. In 2014 this happened
again, with the arrival of Chatwadee Amornchat to London. In July of that year, Chatwadee
Amornchat had charges processed against her for violating the Computer Crimes Act,
54
Ian MacKinnon, “Thailand: BBC rejects claims reporter insulted country's king”, The Guardian, June 2,
2008, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2008/jun/02/bbc.television1 (accessed Feb 3, 2016).
55
Duncan Campbell, “British professor flees Thailand after charge of insulting king”, The Guardian, Feb 8,
2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/09/professor-thailand-charged-king (accessed Feb 6, 2016).

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committing lèse-majesté via the internet.56
The Royal Thai Government requested that
Chatwadee Amornchat be extradited back to Bangkok, upon her arriving in London. The British
government refused the deportation of Amornchat, the final word on the matter being expressed
in a tweet.57
British Ambassador to Thailand Mark Kent tweeted, “[i]n brief, extradition treaties
cover only offences in both states. UK position clear.”58
Lèse-majesté doesn’t currently exist in
the United Kingdom, and is therefore not included in extradition treaties.
Like the United States of America, the British government’s travel warnings to British
citizens traveling to the Kingdom of Thailand is to be careful.59
Through the Office of the
Foreign Secretary (the Foreign Office), there are clear recommendations and warnings given for
individuals traveling to the Kingdom of Thailand:
It’s a criminal offence to make critical or defamatory comments in any format,
including online, about the King or other members of the Royal family in
Thailand. This is known as Lèse Majesté and is punishable by a prison sentence
of 3 to 15 years, or longer. Foreign nationals have been convicted of Lèse
Majesté.60
The language used by the Foreign Office is very similar to that of the United States Department
of State. There is an important difference, however. The language used by the Foreign Office
56
Kesinee Taengkhiao, “Attorney General set to process lese majesty charges against 'Rose'”, The Nation,
Jul 22, 2014, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Attorney-General-set-to-process-lese-majeste-charg-
30239117.html (accessed Feb 6, 2016).
57
“Thailand Demands Lese Majesté Suspect Extradited, UK Says No”, Khaosod English, Jun 19, 2014,
http://www.khaosodenglish.com/detail.php?newsid=1403182038&section=11 (accessed Feb 7, 2016).
58
Mark Kent, Twitter post, Jun 13, 2014, 8:24 AM,
https://twitter.com/KentBKK/status/477471522836070400 (accessed Feb 7, 2016).
59
There is nothing to suggest that individuals from the United Kingdom were being punished for writings
engaged in while outside of Thailand. It would appear that this phenomenon is exclusive to individuals traveling
from the United States, such as the aforementioned case of Joe Gordon.
60
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Foreign Travel Advice: Thailand”, Government of the United
Kingdom, https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/thailand/local-laws-and-customs (accessed Feb 9, 2016).

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does not presuppose that the lèse-majesté law is an integral part of the monarchy, as the United
States Department of State does. There is no language explaining the role of the monarchy in
Thai society
The United Kingdom government, like the United States of America, creates a Human
Rights report to analyze the conduct engaged in by states around the world. Like the United
States of America, the most recent reports were those completed in 201361
and 201462
. Again,
like the United States of America, the reports both focused on the reorganization of the state with
the creation of the National Council for Peace and Order. The phrase “lèse-majesté” was
mentioned only twice throughout the 2013 report, noting with strong wording that the use of the
law “serves only to undermine the institution it purports to protect”63
This is language stronger
than what appears in the United States’ report. The United Kingdom 2014 report includes a case
study for the Kingdom of Thailand, detailing at length the reorganization of government under
the National Council for Peace and Order. The case study uses strong language to critique the
dissolution of the Constitution of 2007 and, more importantly, directly critique the use of the
lèse-majesté law:
Within the first two months of the coup, the military authorities summoned and
arbitrarily detained around 700 individuals (former government ministers,
journalists, political activists), banned gatherings of more than five people, and
61
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Human Rights and Democracy Report 2013”, Government of the
United Kingdom, updated Jun 24, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-
democracy-report-2013/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2013 (accessed Feb 13, 2013).
62
United Kingdom, Mar 12, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-
2014/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2014 (accessed Feb 13, 2013).
63
United Kingdom, updated Jun 24, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-
democracy-report-2013/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2013 (accessed Feb 13, 2015).

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announced their intention to pursue aggressively cases of alleged criticism of the
monarchy (lèse-majesté). The limitations on freedom of speech and the zealous,
often retrospective use of lèse-majesté laws, are of particular concern, resulting in
the censoring (and self-censoring) of the media, NGOs, academic institutions, and
political opposition. Many from within these groups assert that the situation
regarding freedom of expression and assembly is worse than during previous
periods of military rule in Thailand. Restrictions on these fundamental human
rights compromise the integrity of the national reform process being pursued by
coup leader Prime Minister Prayuth’s military dominated government.64
This is the strongest language used in regards to the lèse-majesté law examined thus far.
In the Houses of Parliament, the question of Thailand’s lèse-majesté prohibition has been
raised on several occasions. These occasions have been, from what has been found in Hansard
(the record for debate in the United Kingdom Parliament), questions posed in writing to junior
ministers working in the Foreign Office. Of the most recent examples found, the questions were
posed in the House of Commons. At the time, the responding minister was Jeremy Browne,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, who noted that the United Kingdom government seeks for
the Kingdom of Thailand to review the lèse-majesté law.65
With the change in government, this
same sentiment was expressed by the Foreign Secretary Jeremy Browne, noting how members of
64
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Case Study: Military Coup in Thailand”, Government of the United
Kingdom, Mar 12, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/military-coup-in-thailand (accessed Feb 13,
2015).
65
Jeremy Browne, Written question response to Kerry McCarthy, Hansard: Government of the United
Kingdom, May 21, 2012,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm120521/text/120521w0003.htm#1205213600041
3 (accessed Feb 14, 2016).

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the diplomatic corps in Bangkok attended the trial of Somyot Prueksakasemsuk and reported that
to the Foreign Office.66
The response from the United Kingdom is stronger than that of the United States of
America. The subtle critiques of changing governments has been replaced with harsh statements
regarding the institution of monarchy by the United Kingdom. The language used is critical at all
levels: from the reports compiled by bureaucrats on King Charles Street in London to Her
Majesty’s Ambassador on Wireless Road in Bangkok. However, this heightened scrutiny by the
British government still lacks active and concrete state conduct. The greatest physical response
on the part of the United Kingdom was the denial of extradition requests for individuals who
have found solace in the United Kingdom, a phenomenon not found in the United States case.
For these reasons, the response from the United Kingdom on these laws can be considered
greater than that of the United States of America.
Two examples have been given of state actors responding to the lèse-majesté law
embodied in Article 112 of the Thai Penal Code. The two examples, leading world powers rich
with traditions of individual rights and democratic government centuries old, have set the stage
for individual state response. With these two examples, the next step of analysis is examining the
response from international governmental bodies. The United Nations serves as the best example
and representative of an international governmental body.
66
Hugo Swire, Written question response to Kerry McCarthy, Hansard: Government of the United
Kingdom, Jan 28, 2013,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130128/text/130128w0002.htm#1301284700019
3 (accessed Feb 14, 2016).

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III. United Nations Part I: Jurisdiction
After the Second World War, representatives from fifty states met in San Francisco to
craft the United Nations Charter. The Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 by the
representatives of the fifty countries, legally establishing the United Nation.67
The Kingdom
of Thailand became party to the United Nations Charter on December 16, 1946.68
Over the
nearly seventy years that the Kingdom of Thailand has been a member of the United Nations,
Thailand has played an active role in the organization, from serving as a non-permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council to serving as President of the United Nations
General Assembly.69
Since the United Nations is comprised of numerous organs and committees, it has the
ability to evaluate the lèse-majesté law in Thailand through numerous channels and means
for interpreting international law. Actions or statements from and by the United Nations
General Assembly, the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Human
Rights Council are of the greatest importance in evaluating response to Article 112. Along
with these organs and committees, responses from the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (a human rights expert directed offices) will be assessed
with regards to Article 112 and Thailand’s lèse-majesté prohibition.
Analysis of the relationship between these organizations requires understanding the
international law that governs the conduct of the state and organizational actors. To do that,
67
Secretariat of the United Nations, “History of the United Nations”, United Nations,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/index.html (accessed Feb 15, 2016).
68
Secretariat of the United Nations, “Member States of the United Nations”, United Nations,
http://www.un.org/en/members/ (accessed Feb 15, 2016).
69
Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, “Mission History”, United Nations,
https://www.un.int/thailand/about (accessed Feb 15, 2016).

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each governing and related treaty that the Kingdom of Thailand should be analyzed, so the
jurisdiction of United Nations organs and committees is clear.
A. Universal Declaration on Human Rights
As previously addressed, the Kingdom of Thailand is party to the United Nations Charter,
the founding document for the United Nations. This document finalized the organs of the United
Nations, from the General Assembly to the Security Council and International Courts of Justice.
With the framework set for each UN organ, the different entities of international government
addressed the question of international human rights.
By 1948, the United Nations General Assembly voted on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR, or the Universal Declaration) via General Assembly Resolution 217.
This universal declaration, demonstrating for the first time that fundamental rights should be
universally protected, became international law on December 10, 1948.70
The Kingdom of
Thailand (at the time using the ancient name of Siam) voted in favor of General Assembly
Resolution 217.71
Article XIX is the most relevant portion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Article XIX of the Universal Declaration establishes the universal right of self-expression, and
the ability for individuals to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers”72
. This section of the Universal Declaration sets the international
standard for this right, afforded to all citizens apart of the global community. This idea is further
70
Secretariat of the United Nations, “(Introduction) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, United
Nations, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html (accessed Mar 2, 2016).
71
UN Bibliographic Information System, Voting Record: Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1H58353KD0778.7509&profile=voting&uri=full=3100023~!9
09326~!0&ri=4&aspect=power&menu=search&source=~!horizon (accessed Mar 2, 2016).
72
Article XIX, United Nations Declaration on Human Rights.

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protected through an international covenant, which identified other types of rights for
individuals.
B. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
After the ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the drafting
of a new international treaty to affirm rights of individuals began. This new treaty would define
the rights of individuals engaged in the political processes of the states in which they are citizens.
By December 1966, the rights to free speech and free assembly were protected by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as it was made part of the fabric of
international law. Like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Kingdom of Thailand
became party to the treaty, but not until October 29, 1996.73
For this international agreement, the relevant parts that should be analyzed in the context
of the Thai lèse-majesté law are numerous.74
The applicable section of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for paper states,
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion75
…
[e]veryone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. Everyone
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
73
United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed Mar
2, 2016).
74
The argument can be made that the portions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
dealing with the manner for which individuals are tried in court should be applied to Article 112. That analysis
would include, for example Part III Articles IX and XIV which address the rights of the tried. This analysis has been
and will continue to be narrowly tailored so as to address exclusively the existence of the law and international
response.
75
Part III, Article XVIII, Section 1.

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either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media
of his choice.76
In regards to political participation and freedom to express ideas, this part of the ICCPR is the
pertinent section for evaluation of Article 112 response.77
These two international agreements, with their relevant portions highlighted, give context
to the relationship between the United Nations and the Kingdom of Thailand, so as to analyze the
conduct and response of United Nations organs and committees.78
What these two international
agreements do not note, however, is the way that the Kingdom of Thailand has maintained
compliance with international law. Although the Kingdom of Thailand is party to the ICCPR the
state is not party to the Optional Protocol which creates a process for enforcement.79
For this
reason, each relevant UN Organ will be examined to understand the response to Article 112.
IV. United Nations Part II: Response
The parts of the United Nations that will be examined are as stated in United Nations Part
I: the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Security Council and the United
Nations Human Rights Council. Included in these organs and committees that will be examined
is the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. This will be the
process of analysis, looking at specific entities individually and the applicable international law
they use (if they act on Thailand’s Article 112).
76
Part III, Article XIX, Sections 1 and 2.
77
Other analysis of Article 112 include evaluations of due process concerns involving claims under that
section of the Thai Penal Code. This paper will not address these due process concerns.
78
Although there is Thai activity with RUDs (reservations, understandings, derogations) the language in
each of them makes clear that Article XVIII has been left untouched in each derogation notice. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
79
Office of the High Commissioner, “Status of Ratification”, United Nations, http://indicators.ohchr.org/
(accessed Mar 30, 2016).

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For each of the UN organs and committees, the action engaged in as a response will be
analyzed separate from the other UN organs and committees, unlike the manner for which
response from the United States or the United Kingdom. For the United States and the United
Kingdom, state institutions were analyzed as a part of the whole. In the case of the United
Nations, each organ and committee is made up of different states with different policy initiatives
and outcomes possible, which do not necessarily reflect the entire United Nations but instead
specific offices and organs. It is that distinct difference which makes analyzing the United
Nations response one individual entity at a time the best approach.
A. United Nations General Assembly
The General Assembly, comprised of every United Nations member-state, is the main
deliberative body for the governments of the world. It appoints member-states to the United
Nations Security Council and individuals to the Secretary-Generalship, along with other United
Nations positions and offices.80
Within the international deliberative assembly, every state has ability to engage in debate
and bring topics to the floor. Reports from other United Nations entities are discussed81
,
including measures and reports conducted by the other United Nations organizations listed for
examination in this paper.82
There are numerous documents and statements that address Thailand in the records of the
United Nations General Assembly, the most recent and most being those related to Thailand’s
promise to adhere to internationally—set standards for human rights. One such example is a
80
United Nations General Assembly, “Functions and powers of the General Assembly”, United Nations,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml (accessed Mar 3, 2016).
81
Ibid.
82
The United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Human Rights Council, and the reports
compiled by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

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statement made by the Thai Foreign Minister General Tanasak Patimapragorn in September 2014
noting that Thailand, “remain[s] fully committed to democracy and human rights”.83
In that
statement he also reaffirmed this as being the reason for Thailand’s candidacy for a United
Nations Committee, which had been officially presented to the United Nations General
Assembly in July of that same year. In the candidacy letter, Ambassador Norachit Sinhaseni
affirms Thailand’s goal to adhere to international human rights law.84
That committee was the
UN Human Rights Council, which will be discussed later.
Nothing from the available records suggests that successful action has been engaged in
by the United Nations General Assembly on this topic.85
In the official minutes of the United
Nations General Assembly meetings, there isn’t a single resolution passed by that body regarding
Thailand’s lèse-majesté prohibition found in Article 112.86
The lack of resolutions from the United Nations General Assembly would suggest that
there is no action that has been taken by that deliberative assembly. This does not, however,
confirm that there hasn’t been debate or discussion in the United Nations General Assembly.
Although speeches in the United States Congress and messages from ministers in the United
Kingdom Parliament have been included, they should not be afforded the same weight as
speeches in the United Nations General Assembly. The role of debate in state level deliberative
83
Statement by His Excellency General Tanasak Patimapragorn Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Kingdom of Thailand, 69th
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, United Nations, Sept
27, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/TH_en.pdf (accessed Mar 6, 2016).
84
Letter dated 22 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly, Jul 22, 2014,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/175 (accessed Mar 6, 2016).
85
This conclusion is based off of a search using the terms Thailand, coup, and lèse-majesté. Possible
relating United Nations resolutions (such as those dealing with Cambodian-Thai border disputes) were also
examined.
86
Through an examination of resolutions found in the online archives of the United Nations General
Assembly, there was nothing regarding lèse-majesté present.

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assemblies is far greater than at the international level. In the United States of America, the
potential influence that individual speeches by legislators is different from statements made by
diplomats in international deliberative assembly. The reason for that is simple: at the state level
deliberative assemblies are swayed by majority decision at a greater rate than at the international
level. Political parties with manifestos and programs for legislation dictate legislature conduct.
For this reason, the most pertinent statements are those made by representatives of the Royal
Thai Government before the General Assembly, because they represent the state’s interaction
with the United Nations.
The United Nations General Assembly has failed to act on the topic of Thailand’s Article
112 and lèse-majesté. But for statements dealing with Thailand’s recent candidacy for a United
Nations Human Rights Council and the Security Council, there is nothing to suggest that this
issue has seized the General Assembly. That being the situation, the next organ of the United
Nations to examine is the Security Council.
B. Security Council of the United Nations
The fifteen member United Nations Security Council is charged with the responsibility of
maintaining international peace and global security. Comprised of the five permanent members
(each with a veto power) and ten rotating seats, the United Nations Security Council is one of the
primary enforcement organs of the United Nations. In recent years, the United Nations is known
to have issued sanctions against states which have violated the norms of international law and
global security. Sanctions have been issued against states such as the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for violations of international law.
Like the United Nations General Assembly, the Kingdom of Thailand became subject to
the jurisdiction of the United Nations Security Council upon becoming party to the United

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Nations Charter. For that same reason, the Kingdom of Thailand is subject to the scrutiny of the
United Nations Security Council; the Security Council can issue sanctions against Thailand for
not following international law.
The case for the United Nations Security Council is the same as for the General
Assembly. Through a review of resolutions, there is nothing to suggest that the issue of
Thailand’s lèse-majesté or Article 112 has been addressed by the body. No resolutions dealing
with that topic were found. The only resolutions found in the Security Council online archives
relating to the Kingdom of Thailand were those relating to Thai-Cambodian border disputes.
None of these included language referring to Thailand’s lèse-majesté law or Article 112 of the
Penal Code.
Like the situation for the United Nations General Assembly, there were statements made
for Thailand’s candidacy to the United Nations Security Council in 2013. These statements, like
those submitted to the United Nations General Assembly (as previously mentioned), note
Thailand’s adherence to international law and commitment to human rights.87
Language
proposing new international law dealing with the protection of women combatants suggested by
a member of the Royal Family was also included in the candidacy letter.88
Thailand is not a
current member of the United Nations Security Council.89
87
Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “Thailand lobbies for position on UN Security Council”, The Nation, Sept 25,
2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Thailand-lobbies-for-position-on-UN-Security-Counc-
30215627.html (accessed Mar 6, 2016).
88
Department of International Organizations, “Thailand Candidature for UNSC”, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, Feb 21, 2015,
http://www.thaiembassy.org/unmissionnewyork/en/relation/53893-Thailand-Candidature-for-UNSC.html (accessed
Mar 6, 2016).
89
United Nations Security Council, “Current Members: Permanent and Non-Permanent Members”, United
Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ (accessed Mar 7, 2016).

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C. United Nations Human Rights Council
The United Nations Human Rights Council is the successor to the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights. Created through the United Nations General Assembly in 1946,
the Commission on Human Rights was created to supervise states, addressing issues of human
rights across the globe.90
In 2006, during the tenure of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the
Human Rights Commission was succeeded by the United Nations Human Rights Council
(UNHCR) via General Assembly Resolution 60/251, approved on March 15, 2016.91
Reducing
the number of member-states that could be part of the committee, the UNHRC utilizes some of
the same procedures in addressing issues as the Human Rights Commission. However, one
change in procedure was created via General Assembly Resolution 60/251: the Universal
Periodic Review.
The Universal Periodic Review is, according to the United Nations, the only standard for
measuring states adherence to human rights and international law.92
Using the cooperation of
United Nations member-states to complete the evaluations the United Nations Human Rights
Council has, according to the Office of the High Commissioner, reviewed all 193 member states
since October 2011.93
This will be the standard used in this paper to determine the international
community’s opinion on Thailand’s adherence to international human rights law.
Before addressing the UNHRC evaluation of the Kingdom of Thailand adhering to
international law, the relationship between the Council should be addressed. Specifically, the fact
90
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, “About the Commission on Human Rights”, United
Nations, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CHR/Pages/CommissionOnHumanRights.aspx (accessed Mar 7,
2016).
91
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, “United Nations Human Rights Council”, United
Nations, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx (accessed Mar 7, 2016).
92
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Universal Periodic Review, United Nations,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRmain.aspx (accessed Mar 7, 2016).
93
Ibid.

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that the Kingdom of Thailand had sought to be a more active member of the United Nations
Human Rights Council.94
In statements addressed to the United Nations General Assembly
(where the votes for membership to the UNHRC occurs), the Kingdom of Thailand noted its
adherence to international law. One such example is the statement by Foreign Minister General
Tanasak Patimapragorn in September 2014.95
The statement of candidacy for the United Nations
Security Council and the United Nations Human Rights Council share the sentiments expressed
by the Thai Prime Minister a year later. In his address before the United Nations General
Assembly, Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-o-cha lauds the work of the Kingdom of
Thailand between 2010-2013 as a member and chair of the United Nations Human Rights
Council.96
The Kingdom of Thailand was not re-elected to the United Nations Human Rights
Council during that election cycle.97
Being party to the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and being a United Nations member-state, the Kingdom of Thailand was reviewed by the Human
Rights Council. The Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review was issued
on December 8, 2011. In the report, numerous states voiced their concerns with the presence of
Thailand’s lèse-majesté law, including statements from other constitutional monarchies such as
Norway and Japan. Although the caveat was given that the requests in the report attributed to
states were not a reflection of the will of the working group (point 90), a large majority of
94
See subsection “United Nations General Assembly”
95
Statement by His Excellency General Tanasak Patimapragorn Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Kingdom of Thailand, 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Sept 27, 2014,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/TH_en.pdf (accessed Mar 6, 2016).
96
Statement by His Excellency General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand,
70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Sept 29, 2015,
http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_TH_en.pdf (accessed Mar 8, 2016).
97
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, “Current Members of the HRC”, United Nations,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/CurrentMembers.aspx (accessed Mar 8, 2016).

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committee member-states sought action by the Thai government to revise the lèse-majesté
language in the Penal Code.98
The language used by member-states of the United Nations Human Rights Council was
direct and clear. France called the use of lèse-majesté “excessive” and “limiting to free speech”.
Slovenia called for the repeal of the lèse-majesté law and related Computer Crimes Act. Both
Spain and Canada called for the creation of a timetable to review the Computer Crimes Act,
Article 112 of the Penal Code, and lift the ban on free expression throughout the state.
The United Kingdom and United States of America were also involved in this evaluation
by the UNHRC. In the Universal Periodic Review, the United Kingdom recommended that a UN
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression be permitted to review the lèse-majesté law.99
This is a clear shift from the language used by the United Kingdom in direct interaction with the
Kingdom of Thailand, as analyzed in the Recent International Community Response header.
Unlike the United Kingdom, the United States of America did not mention in the Universal
Periodic Review any suggestions for reviewing the lèse-majesté law. All of these
recommendations were presented to the Kingdom of Thailand government in the Universal
Periodic Review.
With the information provided to the Kingdom of Thailand, and according to the protocol
for the Universal Periodic Review, Thailand issued a response to the report compiled by the
Human Rights Council. In this response to the Universal Periodic Review, the Kingdom of
Thailand defended the implementation of the lèse-majesté law, noting that amendment of the
98
United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review
(Thailand)”, United Nations General Assembly, Dec 8, 2011, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/172/64/PDF/G1117264.pdf?OpenElement (accessed Mar 9, 2016).
99
Ibid.

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Thai Penal code would have required “extensive and comprehensive analysis by all possible
stakeholders”. Further, the Thai government called the lèse-majesté law “an instrument of
national unity” that is highly sensitive. Finally, Thailand note that the media enjoys free
expression because the state is in compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.100
Thailand notes the existence of lèse-majesté is indispensable for the state, and
as it is needed to protect the monarch, Thailand cannot accept the request to augment or repeal
the law.
The conversation about Thailand’s lèse-majesté law and Article 112 of the Penal Code
has been one involving severe critiques from the International Community in the UN Human
Rights Council. The international community, while Thailand was a member of the Human
Rights Council, admonished Thailand’s maintenance of Article 112 and disregard for
international law. However, the Kingdom of Thailand has adhered to that policy. Article 112
remained unchanged as Thailand submitted candidacy to both the Human Rights Council and
Security Council of the United Nations after the Universal Periodic Review was issued.
The Universal Periodic Review, with severe language used by observing states, suggests
that the Kingdom of Thailand is out of compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. This lack of compliance, having been addressed in committee, is now subject to
the review of the chief human rights officer in the United Nations: the High Commissioner.
100
United Nations Human Rights Council, “Addendum: Report of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review (Thailand)”, United Nations General Assembly, Mar 6, 2012, A/HRC/19/8/Add.1 (accessed Mar
11, 2016).

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D. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, serve as the global representatives for international human rights law around the
globe. The High Commissioner is the head of that office, and the chief officer for human rights
at the United Nations. Created by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1993, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights now leads the human rights related work
done by the United Nations. The current High Commissioner, Prince Zeid bin Ra'ad of Jordan,
provides administrative guidance and assistance to the other human rights bodies (such as the
aforementioned UN Human Rights Council).101
The High Commissioner for Human Rights can, in their own right, issue statements in
regards to the conduct engaged in by countries. The High Commissioner engages in projects
relying on the Universal Periodic Review, or on ground inspectors and experts out in the field.102
Analysis of the statements made by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights has shown that a majority of statements about Thailand are not related to lèse-majesté.
Through a regional office located in Bangkok, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights did issue a statement after the arrest of two journalists, Alan Morison and Chutima
Sidasathian.103
These two journalists were indicted on charges of defamation104
issued by the
Royal Thai Navy, matching the pattern of lèse-majesté charges filed against individuals. In the
101
Office of the High Commissioner, “About Us”, United Nations Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhoWeAre.aspx (accessed Mar 11, 2016).
102
Such as in a state under suspicion of violating international human rights law.
103
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Regional Office for South-East Asia, “Press
Release: United Nations Human Rights Office urges Thailand to drop charges against Phuketwan journalists”,
United Nations, Jul 14, 2015, http://bangkok.ohchr.org/files/ROB%20Press%20Statement%20140715.pdf (accessed
Mar 12, 2016).
104
Language throughout United Nations documents have used the terms ‘defamation’ and ‘lèse-majesté’
interchangeably.

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same statement, the Office of the High Commissioner called for Thailand to stop indicting
journalists under the defamation law.105
Eventually, the charges against Morison and Sidasathian
were dropped.
Those two aforementioned press releases were the most recent statements issued by the
Office of the High Commissioner in the last six years about Thailand’s lèse-majesté law. The
High Commissioner, being an expert and lead human rights officer in the United Nations has
focused on, for lack of better wording, focused on more pressing Thai human rights issues.
A majority of the statements issued by the Office of the High Commissioner regarding
the Kingdom of Thailand address other human rights issues, such as extrajudicial executions and
forced disappearances caused by the South Thai insurgency. With conflict on Thailand’s border
with Cambodia, and in Southern Thailand with Muslim insurgencies, the Office of the High
Commissioner has spent more energy on the issues arising from those situations. Discussion has
occurred on the question of Thailand’s lèse-majesté law; however, that discussion has been
overshadowed by violence on the Thai borders.
In United Nations, it is clear that the levels of response through state collaboration at
differing levels varies. In the United Nations, through statements made and issued via
international governance, the response to Thailand’s lèse-majesté law in Article 112 can be
looked at as, at some points both greater and less than the United States and United Kingdom.
The lowest level of response, where there is no conduct engaged in by the international
deliberative body, is the United Nations Security Council. With no resolutions regarding
Thailand’s Article 112, this is lowest on the level of response from within the United Nation.
105

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Above the United Nations Security Council response to Article 112 is the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, issuing statements opposing the use of Article
112 against journalists. Because the United Nations General Assembly has voted against re-
electing the Kingdom of Thailand to the United Nations Human Rights Council, and did not
approve Thailand to sit on the United Nations Security Council, this is action. However, the link
between Thailand’s maintenance of Article 112 and the failure to secure either election is one
that cannot be readily established through accessible information. Nevertheless, this can be
considered as conduct towards the Kingdom of Thailand at a time where Article 112 was subject
to scrutiny.
For the sake of this paper, the response from the United Nations that will represent the
most extreme response from the entire organization will be that expressed in the Universal
Periodic Review issued by the United Nations Human Rights Council. This critique from the
committee member-states, using the instrument for evaluating state adherence to international
law (the Universal Periodic Review), is the most active response from any organ, committee or
office of the United Nations examined in this paper. No other United Nations entity has had as
severe a response as the UNHRC.
Understanding the International Community Responses
This exercise in understanding the response from the international community, through
analyzing statements from international actors, naturally orders the severity in reaction by the
international actors. In the responses from the United States of America, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and organs of the United Nations there is a clear hierarchy in
response severity.

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At the extreme bottom of the hierarchy of response, is that of the United Nations Security
Council. For the Security Council, there is nothing to suggest that the question of Thailand’s
lèse-majesté law found in Article 112 had been addressed. As previously addressed, the United
Nations Security Council has issued no resolutions addressing the maintenance of Article 112.
For this reason, the United Nations Security Council serves as the most extreme example of non-
response.
Above the United Nations Security Council on the hierarchy is the action of the United
States of America in response to Article 112. The lack of response from the United States
Secretary of State, especially in the wake of an ambassador being investigated for lèse-majesté is
a clear example of inaction. Although the United States has issued reports of the conduct on the
part of the Royal Thai Government, noting that free speech is a fundamental right, that language
was not rooted in international law.106
With American citizens and representatives of American
government being threatened with decades in prison, the United States government does nothing
more than issue reports and warn citizens.107
The response from the United States of America
begins the upward slope towards more severe response.
The next step in response is that of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights. In many respects, the conduct is similar to that of the United States of
America: issuing statements. The difference in the conduct is the direct language used by the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner in press releases dealing with individuals
indicted for lèse-majesté charges. The Kingdom of Thailand is admonished for its lack of
106
See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2013 and 2014: Thailand”, United States Department of State (footnotes 41 and 42).
107
Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Thailand- Embassy Messages”, United States Department of State, Last
updated Dec 1, 2015, https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/country/thailand.html (accessed Mar 15, 2016).

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conformity to international law, being reminded that “Thailand has the obligation to uphold the
right to freedom of expression”.108
The response from the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights is a step above the United States of America.
Because of the way in which United Nations committees operate, the General Assembly
is in some way connected with the work of the High Commissioner and the United Nations
Human Rights Council. The United Nations General Assembly votes on High Commissioner
candidates and on members of the UN Human Rights Council. However, the action of the United
Nations General Assembly is the same as the Security Council: there are no resolutions
addressing Thailand’s lèse-majesté law in Article 112 of the Penal Code. For this reason, the
United Nations General Assembly has had a covert, indirect role in responding to Article 112 of
the Thai Penal code by selecting individuals to fill these roles. Nevertheless, there has been no
overt, direct response in the form of resolutions. In this way, the United Nations General
Assembly conduct is above that of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights.
The next step in the hierarchy of response to Article 112 is the reaction of the United
Kingdom to the law. Statements from the United Kingdom Foreign Minister via state issued
reports109
and through debates in Parliament110
were severe in the critique of Thailand’s claim
that lèse-majesté is essential to state security and protecting the institution of the monarchy. This
108
United Nations, Jul 14, 2015, http://bangkok.ohchr.org/files/ROB%20Press%20Statement%20140715.pdf (accessed
Mar 15, 2016).
109
See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Case Study: Military Coup in Thailand”, Government of the
United Kingdom, Mar 12, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/military-coup-in-thailand (accessed
Mar 17, 2016).
110
See written questions to Kerry McCarthy, footnotes 61 and 62.

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extremely critical language, however does not demonstrate the highest level of state conduct for
the simple reason that there was no conduct different from the United States of America:
warnings for travelers and human rights reports. There is one difference, however, in refusing to
extradite an individual who had traveled to London to avoid appearing in court under Article
112.111
Collectively, states who are members of the UN Council on Human Rights demonstrate
the apex, the most severe critique of Article 112. In the evaluation of Thailand’s adherence to
international law, a group of states not only expressed their concerns and disagreement with
Article 112, the disagreement manifested itself in the Universal Periodic Review. Numerous
states propounded Thailand to amend the Penal Code to conform to international human rights
law.112
The Kingdom of Thailand was forced to react to this situation by refusing to consider
changes to the Penal Code.113
Having sequenced the conduct of a sample of state actors, the next step is to address why
these responses have occurred. Why have these state actors responded in the ways that they have
to what the United Nations Human Rights Council considers to be a violation of international
law? Before that question can be answered, the question must be asked if states and international
organizations understand the nature of Thailand’s lèse-majesté law. Can it be said that other
states understand the purpose, history and nature for which Thailand’s Article 112 of the Penal
Code arises and is implemented?
111
See footnotes 50-54.
112
See Human Rights Council, “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review
(Thailand)”, United Nations General Assembly, Dec 8, 2011, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/172/64/PDF/G1117264.pdf?OpenElement (accessed Mar 17, 2016).
113
Human Rights Council, “Addendum: Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review
(Thailand)”, United Nations General Assembly, Mar 6, 2012, A/HRC/19/8/Add.1 (accessed Mar 11, 2016).

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Mystical Monarchism and International Understanding
The Kingdom of Thailand presents the international community with an unusual
situation. An ancient institution enshrined in laws founded in ancient religious practice is subject
to scrutiny from the modern world: derived of the Dharma-sutra of Manu, the lèse-majesté law is
a manifestation of those ancient practices.114
No other states have a similar history and practice
that can be traced back to Vedic India. Through the language used by diplomats, especially the
language used in the Universal Periodic Review, it is clear that the role of lèse-majesté in
Thailand is not understood. This sample of responses from the international community
demonstrates a lack of understanding of lèse-majesté in Thailand.
International community critique is an evaluation of the form for which the principles of
democracy and constitutional monarchy have manifested themselves in Thailand. Even the ideas
of kingship or constitutional monarchy which may exist in other states such as in the United
Kingdom cannot be compared to the unique institution of monarchy which has come to exist in
Thailand. There is nothing to suggest the influence of early Theravada Buddhist texts in Thai
polity is understood by diplomats. The ease for which states seek to remove the lèse-majesté law
without considering the rationale behind its implementation speaks to that ignorance.
This lack of understanding of the political philosophy behind the lèse-majesté prohibition
has been compounded by a lack of international understanding of Thailand’s political history. As
previously addressed, Thailand has been a constitutional monarchy since 1932. However, lèse-
majesté has existed long before the establishment of the first constitution for the Kingdom of
114

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Siam. There is nothing to suggest that accommodation has been given to the tradition associated
with the head of state that lèse-majesté provides.
If considered through a sympathetic lens, the lèse-majesté law found in Article 112 of the
Thai Penal Code embodies a common concept that is a part of internal state security. Dispelling
the mystical façade afforded to Article 112, and the ideas of kingship that distinguish lèse-
majesté as unique, presents a commonality found in state internal affairs, creating internal
stability and protection by prohibiting chaos. This idea is at the root of Article 112, and that is a
commonality found in all state legal codes. The best example of this is offered in the United
States legal code.
In the United States of America, it is illegal to engage in both sedition and seditious
conspiracy. Title 18 of the United States Code define both terms, and what constitutes illegal
conduct:
Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such
government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or
publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching
the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any
government in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; or
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or
assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or
destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons,
knowing the purposes thereof—Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not

Branch-47
more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the
United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next
following his conviction.115
Sedition in the United States limits speech regarding the state and governmental order.
This law, in its most basic analysis, is a safeguard against internally organized
insurrection and governmental disorder. In Title 18 the common goal of internal stability and
protection is expressed in a way similar to Article 112 and the prohibition of language damaging
to the monarchy: protection from destructive speech, harmful to the established order in the state.
After removing the mystical and religiously influenced façade of kingship, the legal principle of
state security in Article 112 is the same as that of Title 18 United States Code.
The unique history, and political philosophy of the Kingdom of Thailand has manifested
itself in a host of state practices and customs that are unfamiliar to democracies and republican
governments in the West. Religion and religious practice play a central role in Thai government.
The relationship between the people and the King is representative of that history of religious
practice and the state. There is no doubt that this is a major factor in the responses found in the
sample.
There is evidence that suggests there are other reasons for the lack of response from
international actors other than the United Nations Human Rights Council. From the United States
of America to the United Nations Security Council, discussions have been happening about the
Kingdom of Thailand. The United Nations Human Rights Council sees Article 112 of the Thai
115
18 U.S. Code § 2385

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Penal Code as a violation of international law, however, more imminent human rights concern
seize the United Nations.
As stated before, there appears to be an order of response to international issues,
depending on how pressing certain issues which may be brought before (for example) the Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The most pressing are those of possible killings
and border disputes, and for that reason it is far easier to find United Nations resolutions (and in
individual state legislatures, resolutions) dealing with these issues instead of Article 112 of the
Thai Penal Code. Other human rights concerns that exist in the Kingdom of Thailand may be the
reason for the lack of response to Article 112 of the Thai Penal Code. Forced disappearances,
Muslim insurgency in the southern parts of the country and the tense situation along the Thai-
Cambodian border have been issues which have seized the United Nations Security Council and
Human Rights Council.
Though there are other issues that seize world and state deliberative assemblies, the lack
of understanding cannot be discounted as a reason for the international community’s inaction.
Throughout the language used by international actors, both at the individual state level and via
international government, there exists a sense of blame placed on constitutional change. The
current regime being in power has resulted in the charge of lèse-majesté.116
Whatever the case
may be for that, lèse-majesté has been part of the Thai Penal Code since the first penal code,
drafted by King Chulalongkorn, Rama V.117
This mystical monarchism practiced by Thailand,
and the methods for which it is protected by legislation may be a reason why there is such a
minor response from the international community.
116
See “Realm of Analysis”, see also footnote 2.
117
1908 Siamese Penal Code (Draft Version), Royal Thai Government Gazette (A.P. Mission Press).

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What is the future for Thailand’s lèse-majesté law found in Article 112? So many factors
contribute to answering this question. The international community is a fluid body of participants
constantly responding to change. The history and traditions of the state, and the role that these
have in diplomacy, remain an ever-changing component in global affairs. Institutional change at
the state and international level, and the interactions between other international actors and
Thailand are important factors. Finally, the monarchy, as an individual and as an institution, is a
central factor in answering this question.
Conclusion
Thailand’s lèse-majesté law found in Article 112 of the Thai Penal Code is a
manifestation of centuries of ideas associated with kingship in Southeast Asia. With the creation
of written penal codes and the establishment of the constitutional monarchy, Thailand has
brought the monarchy into the modern era. In the modern era, the need for protecting the
established order has required the inclusion of lèse-majesté into the current legal code. However,
as aspects of the ancient monarchist traditions remain, the response from the international
community reflects the lack of understanding of that history. Along with other pressing human
rights issues in Thailand, this mysticism is why the international community’s response to lèse-
majesté has manifested itself the way it has as Article 112 continues to be implemented. Like
Sulak Sivaraksa, again under suspicion of violating Article 112 after the October 2014 charges
were dropped118
, the Kingdom of Thailand shows that la plus ça change, plus c'est la même
chose.
118
“Nine people accused of lèse-majesté over academic discussion”, Prachatai, Mar 10, 2016,
http://www.prachatai.org/english/node/5923 (accessed Mar 29, 2016).

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