Heidegger_Basic_Problems_ch_1_ppt.pptx

§ 6. Outline of the course:
Part One consists of four chapters:
(Chapter 1) Kant's thesis: Being is not a real predicate.
(Chapter 2) The thesis of medieval ontology which goes back to
Aristotle: To the being of a being there belong whatness (essentia) and
existence (existentia, extantness).
(Chapter 3) The thesis of modern ontology: The basic ways of being
are the being of nature (res extensa) and the being of mind (res cogitans).
(Chapter 4) The thesis of logic: Every being, regardless of its
particular way of being, can be addressed and talked about by
means of the “is.” The being of the copula.

Part Two: (originally intended to consist of four chapters each corresponding respectively to
the four parts of Part One, but only the first was written as part of the original lecture course)
(Chapter 1) The problem of the ontological difference (the distinction
between being and beings).

The Basic Problems of Phenomenology
by Martin Heidegger
Chapter One
Kant’s Thesis: Being Is Not a Real Predicate
§§ 7-9 pp. 27-76

§ 7. The content of the Kantian thesis
Kant’s thesis that being is not a real predicate is discussed in the essay “The
Sole Possible Argument for a Demonstration of God's Existence” and at B620 ff.
in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Some Notes on Terminology:
Kant uses the term “Dasein” for existence of things (natural things in the broadest
sense) as does Husserl.
Instead, Heidegger will use the terms “Vorhanden” and “Vorhandensein”
which are translated in by Hofstadter in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology
as “extant” and “to be extant” respectively.
Heidegger will reserve the term “Dasein” to designate the particular being
which each of us is (that being for whom its being is an issue), and “existence” for the
mode of being of Dasein.
We will have to verify the appropriateness of this terminology. If the
terminology is adequate, it follows that not everything that is not an extant
entity is a non-being, i.e. that extantness is not the only way of being.
Kant uses the Scholastic concept of reality where “reality” does not mean
extant nor actuality, but instead refers to the possible determinations (features)
of a thing (we will come back to this term later).

Some Ontological Distinctions in Heidegger’s
Terminology:
Kind of investigation:
Ontic concerning
beings
Kind of
investigation:
Ontological
concerning
ways of being
Who is
investigated
A “who,” i.e. a
being with
the character of
Dasein
(i.e. a being that
exists)
(Factical) possible
ways to be
(e.g. being a student,
being gay, etc.) and
the structure thereof
Existentials and
structures
of possible ways of
being (e.g. being-with,
facticity)
What is
investigated
A “what,” i.e. a
being of
an other kind (an
extant thing or
something handy)
(Factual) properties
(e.g., being orange,
being a prime number) and
the structures thereof
Categories and
structures
of factual
properties
(quality, quantity,
scientific laws, etc.)

Kant’s thesis is presented in the context of the proof that God is (that a certain
being is extant – that being which most perfectly is – that the being which is the ground of all beings
is).
For the Scholastics and Kant (i.e., for traditional metaphysics), the science of being
seemed (unsurprisingly), therefore, to concern God, i.e. that the problem of being
seemed closely connected to defining and proving the extantness of the
particular being, God.
The ontological proof (as Kant was the first to called it – for Kant counts as metaphysics or
ontology the attempt to prove, dogmatically that something is purely from concepts) tries to
prove that God is from the concept of God.
The ontological proof goes back, at least, to Anslem’s Proslogium and was
challenged by Aquinas, but Kant’s refutation is more radical.

The Ontological Proof
The concept of God is that of the most perfect being, where this means God
possesses every possible positive characteristic in an infinitely perfect way (and so
excludes every defect). Existence is a positive characteristic. Therefore, existence
belongs to the perfection of this most perfect being. God could not be what he is
unless he exists.
We can put the argument simply in premises and conclusion form as follows:
Major premise: (1) God, by his concept, is the most perfect being.
Minor premise: (2) Existence belongs to the concept of the most perfect being.
Conclusion: Therefore, (3) God exists.

Aquinas denies the major premise, asking
(A) Is God known to the human mind in himself like the first
principles of demonstration (i.e. like the laws of non-contradiction and identity)?
(B) Is this a case where the subject cannot be thought without that
which appears in the predicate (Kant calls this “analytic cognition”)?
(1) If both (A) and (B) were answered affirmatively, that would require
that God’s whole essence be known to us.
(2) But, God’s essence (whatness, i.e. what God is, i.e. the concept of God) is not
known to us.
Therefore, (3) The answer to both (A) and (B) is negative.
Instead of attempting to prove God’s existence from the concept of God,
God’s existence must be proved, Aquinas claims, from God’s creation (i.e.
from experience).

Kant, instead, accepts the major premise [which Aquinas rejected] and [in a way
accepts] the conclusion, but denies the minor premise.
Kant claims that existence does not belong to the determinateness of
any concept at all. This claim is the thesis that existence is not a real
predicate.

In the essay “The Sole Possible Argument for a Demonstration of God's
Existence,” Kant explicates the notion of existence in three theses:
1st thesis: “Existence is not a [real] predicate or determination of any
thing at all.” (or “Being is manifestly not a real predicate, that is, a concept of something
that could be added to the concept of a thing.”).
This gives a negative characterization of existence.
2nd thesis: “Existence is the absolute position of a thing and thereby
differs from any sort of predicate, which as such, is posited at each
time merely relative to another thing.” (or Being “is merely the position of a
thing or of certain determinations in themselves.”)
This gives a positive definition of existence.
3rd thesis is presented in the form of a question: “Can I really say that
there is more in existence than in mere possibility?” This question
asks about Christian Wolff’s claim that the existence of a thing
accompanies its possibility.

Note that Kant does not differentiate being in general from existence
[extantness], while Kant does distinguish between something existing and
something being real.
Insofar as a predicate is what is asserted in a judgment it seems as though we
do assert extantness of things (res), we say “God exists.” “This table exists.” etc.
For Kant, the understanding acts by combining [synthesizing] something with
something – this amounts to a formal definition of assertion abstracted from
what (materially) is combined with something else – the “I combine,” i.e.
synthesis, in judgment.
This formal characterization is insufficient to resolve whether existence is a
real predicate, since existence has a specific content. A real predicate is a
determination, i.e., a predicate which, when added, enlarges the subject
from beyond what is already contained in the subject (a determination that is not
already contained in the concept of the subject), and so requires a synthetic judgment.

Kant uses the term “reality” [Realität] to mean the determination of a thing (res)
in terms of its possibilities. Realities are the what-contents of possible
things in general regardless of their actuality. Kant uses the term
“objective reality” to mean existence. This terminology is precise, although we
have yet to find out whether it is adequate.
Kant derives this terminology from Baumgarten: “that which is posited as
being A or posited as being not-A is determined.” Determination is the
determination of a res. Determinations may be affirmative or negative. So,
reality means the real determination of a thing (res), i.e., affirmatively posited
predicates, and their opposites which are their negations, for example, a table
may have the determination green and so fall under the predicate “green” or
not have the determination green and so fall under the predicate “not-green”.

Formally, judgments combine subject and predicate with respect to a
possible unity. The categories are the different possible forms of unity of
combination in judgments (categories are not forms molding pre-given material). The
table of judgments gives all possible form of union from which the
categories, the ideas of unity, can be read off.
[Note: infinite judgments only differ from affirmative judgments with respect to transcendental
logic. See below!]

TABLE OF JUDGMENTS
I
Quantity of Judgments
Universal – “All Fs are Gs”
Particular – “Some Fs are Gs”
Singular – “This F is G” or “The F is G.”
II III
Quality Relation
Affirmative – “Fs are Gs” Categorical – “Fs are Gs”
Negative – “No Fs are Gs” Hypothetical – “If P then Q”
Infinite – “Fs are non-Gs.” Disjunctive – “Fs are either Gs or Hs or …”
IV Modality
Problematic – “Possibly, Fs are Gs.”
Assertoric – “Actually, Fs are Gs.”
Apodeictic – “Necessarily, Fs are Gs.”

TABLE OF CATEGORIES
I
Of Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality
II III
Of Quality Of Relation
Reality Of Inherence and Subsistence
Negation (substantia et accidens – substances and
accidents)
Limitation Of Causality and Dependence
(cause and effect)
Of Community
(reciprocity between agent and patient)
IV
Of Modality
Possibility -- Impossibility
Existence -- Non-existence
Necessity -- Contingency

Reality belongs to each of these forms of unity. Reality belongs among the
categories of quality (a quality is the character of judgmental positing which indicates
whether a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject).
Reality is the form of unity of affirmative positing judgment, while
actuality, i.e. existence, belongs to the categories of modality (modality
expresses the attitude of the cognizing subject to what is judged). Actuality contrasts
with possibility or necessity, not with negation as with reality, and
corresponds to assertoric judgment (whether positive or negative). Reality, then, is
the what-content of things (res) including God as the most real of beings –
not the most actual, but having the greatest possible real contents, lacking
no positive real determination.

“Reality” for Kant, therefore, is not the same as objective reality, which is
actuality, i.e. the reality exhibited in an experienced entity. Kant
distinguishes objective reality, i.e. actuality, from possibility, which only
considers the real content of a thing. Descartes also thinks that nothing
negative is a res and so has no real content or quidditas, i.e. whatness, but
unlike Kant, for Descartes “realitas objectiva” is the same as possibility.
Descartes uses “realitas actualis” for what Kant calls objective reality or
actuality. This reflects a reversal in the use of the term “objective” which for
Descartes and Scholasticism meant something subjective in the modern
sense, i.e. the object insofar as it is the object of an act of thinking, (the object of
a mental act, or representation, as contrasted with what the Scholastics called formal reality), and
comes with Kant to mean something objective in the modern sense.

“Existence is not a reality” means existence is not a determination of
the concept of a thing with respect to its real content. An actual x does
not differ in its real content [its what-content, i.e. what it is] from a possible x. The
what-content of a possible x coincides with the what-content of the actual
x. Thinking “that x exists” adds nothing to the thing (res). Otherwise the
actual x would include more than in its concept and we could not ever say
that exactly the same object of my concept exists.
“Thus when I think a thing, through whichever and however many predicates I like (even in its
thoroughgoing determination), not the least bit gets added to the thing when I posit in addition that
this thing is. For otherwise what would exist would not be the same as what I had thought in my
concept, but more than that, and I could not say that the very object of my concept exists.”
Critique of Pure Reason A6oo/B628

In common linguistic usage, however, the word “exists” does occur as a
grammatical predicate, and in the broadest sense the word “is” is involved
in every predication as the copula, for example “Body is extended.” The
copulative sense of “is” links a subject concept to a predicate, and is
distinct from the existential sense of ‘is,” as in, for example “God is.”
[As Bertrand Russell pointed out we must distinguish the “is” of predication from the “is” of
existence. Russell said that is was a crime that the English language used the same word to
express these two very differtent concepts.]

How can being be determined positively, if being is not a real predicate?
How does existence differ from being in general?
Being in general is position in general, according to Kant. Position is
inherently simple [position, to posit – to place]. The mere position or realities of a
thing constitute the thing’s concept as its possibility in accord with the law of
non-contradiction, but this positing is only relative, i.e., predication is always
relative to another thing [mere position as in ‘A is B’ is combining B with A in a judgment
that obeys the law of non-contradiction].

In attributing existence, we do not refer (merely relatively) to another thing or to
some other feature of a thing, but we posit (position, i.e. to take a position –
affirmative, negative, or neutral – with respect to some object) the thing in and for
itself without relation, i.e. we posit the thing’s position absolutely [The whole
of ‘A is B’ is posited in itself]. So, existence is absolute position and differs from mere
[or relative] position (being something). Neither absolute nor mere (relative) position
is a real predicate.
[So, for example the term ‘brown’ expresses a reality, i.e. mere position, and combining the concept
‘table’ with ‘brown,’ using the ‘is’ of predication, constructs a judgment ‘The table is brown.’ This
posits ‘brown’ relative to ‘table’ within the judgment. Absolute position, instead posits the whole of
the judgment ‘The table is brown.’
“When, on the other hand, I say “Something exists,” in this positing I am not making a relational
reference to any other thing or to some other characteristic of a thing, to some other real being;
instead, I am here positing the thing in and for itself, free of relation; I am positing here without
relation, non-relatively, i.e. absolutely. In the proposition “A exists,” “A is extant,” an absolute positing
is involved.” pp. 39-40]

For Kant, actuality is a combining of the thing, with respect to its
concept, with perception. The “is” of predication is not itself an additional
predicate, but posits the predicate as relative to the subject – it asserts
nothing with respect to existence. This “is” can even express relations
forming impossible combinations, for example, “The circle is square.” But,
taking the subject x with all its predicates and saying it (for example, God) is,
does not posit a new predicate added to the concept of the subject; instead it
posits absolute position, i.e., it places x in absolute position.
The actual existent entity corresponding to a concept is added synthetically
to the concept , so that the judgment “A exists” involves a different synthesis
than in predications, as in the judgment “A is B.” In existential assertion the
entire conceptual content is posited in relation to the object of the concept
– this object is posited absolutely – posited outside the concept.

What is posited?
A possible thing (the possible thing’s what-content).
How is it posited?
The absolute position of the thing is posited over and above its mere
possibility.
In absolute position, a relation is posited between the object itself and
its concept.
Existence is thought, for Kant, in the [grammatical] subject, and not in the
predicate, saying “Existence belongs to x.” Existence is thought of the thing,
rather than as predicate of the thing, despite common usage. The concept of
a thing contrast sharply with the object (Gegenstand), the thing itself. “God
exists,” then, means “Something existing is God.”

Hence, the ontological proof of God’s existence fails, since existence
cannot belong to the concept of a thing; hence, the pure conceptual content
of a thing can never assure its existence, unless one presup-poses [vor-
aussetzen – set out before one – to take a postion with respect to] the thing’s actuality,
which would be tautologous.
Thus, Kant refutes the minor premise. This is far more devistating than
Aquinas’s refutation which only appeals to the limits of our understanding.

Our interest is in Kant’s conceptions of being, that being is position, and that
existence is absolute position [we are not interested in God as a being]. But, we must
ask whether this is adequate, by pushing the Kantian account to its limits to
test its clarity.
“Can we reach a greater degree of clarity within the Kantian
approach itself?
Can it be shown that the Kantian explanation does not really have
the clarity it claims?
Does the thesis that being equals position, i.e. existence equals
absolute position, perhaps lead us into the dark?” pp. 42-43

§ 8. Phenomenological analysis of the explanation of the concept of being
or of existence given by Kant
a) Being (existence [Dasein, Existenz, Vorhandensein]), absolute position, and
perception
For Kant (and the tradition), reality is what belongs to a thing, for example, walls
and color belong to a house. Actuality, on the other hand, does not determine
the what, but rather the how of a being. Negatively, actuality is not a real
determination, is not itself anything actual. As Heidegger repeatedly says:
being [to be] is not a being.
Positively, Kant identifies being with position and existence with absolute
position.
Can we understand this more clearly?
Is this account justifiable?

Kant sidesteps methods that decide on the formal definition of a concept first,
and instead, looks at what can be said with certainty about the object to be
defined. With respect to existence, he thinks that existence is nearly
unanalyzable.
Can there be more clarity than this?
What does “position” mean?
Are the phenomena used in Kant’s clarification transparent?
Is the explication of the meaning of “position” itself well founded?

Predication involves a synthesis of the predicate with a subject.
In attributing existence, positing is added to the concept of the thing, but
not as a real relationship among the real determinations of a thing, nor as a
relationship between things; rather the whole thing is related to my
thought of the thing – the mere representing of the thing becomes different
due to the addition of absolute positing – the actual being is put in relation
to the concept which is merely thought.

In the table of categories with respect to modality:
Existence, then (for Kant), expresses a relation between the object and
the faculty of cognition [knowing].
Possibility (for Kant) expresses the relation of the object, with all its
determinations, with respect to mere thinking.
Actuality (for Kant) correlates with the empirical use of the faculty of the
understanding.
Necessity (for Kant) correlates the object with reason, insofar as reason
is applied to experience.

Since, for Kant, actuality is confined to experience, actuality applies only
insofar as a thing can be given in perception before its concept is given.
Perception, then, constrains the scope of existence, i.e. extantness
(Vorhandensein); absolute position reveals itself in perception. Modal categories
add the faculty of knowledge (something subjective) to the concept of a thing –
actuality adds perception to the concept of a thing.
What does it mean that I add perception to the concept of a thing (for example a
window)?
It means, given Kant’s interpretation of existence, that the subject takes up
the thing ‘in and for itself’ in a perceptual awareness of it.
How is this subjective faculty added to an object?
The thing is posited in a cognition in which the extant thing gives itself
in its own self – the real shows itself as an actual entity.
Does perception elucidate the concept of existence?

b) Perceiving, perceived, perceivedness. Distinction between
perceivedness and extantness of the extant
Since perception is an action, perceiving, done by the ego, it is itself actual
and so cannot be the same as the modality of actuality; perception is an actual
action but is not the actuality of the object perceived. Perceiving, then, is not
the same as existence (extantness); instead, perceiving is the perceiving of the
extant object.
“Perception,” however, may also refer to the perceived. The perceived cannot
be the same as actuality nor existence, since the perceive is a real being. The
Kantian denial that existence is a real being rules this out.
So, if existence is not the same as perceiving and existence is not the same as
the perceived, then in what sense can Kant claim that perception is existence?

Perhaps, existence is the being-perceived of the perceived, its
perceivedness (its being uncovered in perception).
Kant fails to clarify the concept of existence with respect to perception, and
we must clarify extantness (Vorhandensein) further in terms of perceiving, the
perceived, the perceivedness of the perceived, or their unity.
The same unclarity is found in the notion of position – does it mean
positing, the posited, or the positedness of the posited?

For the sake of discussion, we will provisionally accept that existence is the
perceivedness or positedness and that being in general is positedness in
general.
Does the perceivedness of a being constitute its existence?
It seems not, the object does not exist because I perceive it, rather I perceive
it because it exists. Perceivedness presupposes perceivability which
requires the existence of the perceived being. Hence, perception is the mode
of access to the extant, the way it is uncovered, but uncoveredness is not the
extantness of the extant, which already belongs to the extant being before it is
uncovered (explaining the possibility that it can be uncovered). Similarly with respect to
positedness which is the how of something’s being apprehended.
Therefore, Kant’s interpretation is unclear and, even favorably interpreted, is
dubious.
We seek to continue to pursue Kant’s direction nevertheless, and so we must
clarify the horizon from and within which existence may be clarified.

§ 9. Demonstration of the need for a more fundamental formulation of the
problem of the thesis and of a more radical foundation of this problem
a) The inadequacy of psychology as a positive science for the ontological
elucidation of perception
Why and how does Kant orient his account of existence to position and
perception?
What is the source of this orientation which makes position possible?
While the uncoveredness of the existent (extant) is not the same as its existence,
that existence is itself uncovered as existent in the uncovering. Positedness is
how the positing entity confirms the being of that entity. By clarifying
positedness and perceivedness it is, therefore, possible that we will also clarify
extantness. We clarify these by means of what makes the comportments
(intentionalities) of cognitive powers possible.

Kant treats all positing as an I-think, and so he must clarify states of the
ego, its states and behavior. Perhaps, a less crude psychology might provide
the factual basis for a more detailed clarification.
Does scientific psychology provide the means for solving Kant’s (and hence
every) philosophical problem?
Psychology is a positive science of a specific (kind of) being, grounded in
facts, inductively investigated (in the nineteenth century it took mathematical physics as its
model). Some approaches to psychology claim to exceed naturalism taking life
as its object of study, and hence as doing philosophy and providing a world
view (this refers, in particular, to the work of Wilhelm Dilthey). These forms of
psychological science claim to provide a philosophical anthropology by
developing a life-view with a world-view. But, this latter is a claim
irrelevant to its factual and positive scientific claims.

However, even this sort of psychology has not got beyond naturalism.
The shift toward life phenomena was an advance for psychology as a positive
science, and psychology, then, asks better questions within its mode of
inquiry, but psychology cannot criticize its own manner of inquiry nor
discover the meaning of the entities it takes as its theme.
The extension to life phenomena only completes the domain of psychology, so
that psychology becomes the inquiry into the specific beings which have life.
Therefore, psychology is still a positive science, and as such requires an
ontological account of its objects (the being of these beings), a priori, that it cannot
itself provide, but which must be provided by philosophy (as science of being).
“The result of positive inquiry can always corroborate only the fundamental mode of inquiry in
which it moves. But it cannot substantiate the fundamental mode of inquiry itself and the manner
of thematizing entities that is implicit in it. It cannot even ascertain their meaning.” p. 52

Like geometry, philosophy’s method of knowing is a priori (that is why there
have been philosophical attempts at solving problems more geometrico). But, geometry
still studies a specific being with a specific what-content – pure space
which subsists so that it is not accessible to sense experience. Geometry
still makes use of ontological presuppositions (which constitute the being of its
objects) it cannot account for. The on (in the Greek ontos on), i.e., the being of
beings cannot be accessible to the positive sciences. So, for example,
geometry must use the law of non-contradiction, but cannot explicate that
law.

The inaccessibility of the constitution of the being of their domains applies
even more to the factual sciences, for example, psychology inevitably makes
presuppositions about the constitution of Dasein and her way of being. So, as
Plato says [Republic VII, 533b6ff], positive sciences only dream about the
existence of their objects, because of their inevitable presuppositions.
Yet while dreaming in this way, the positive sciences arrive at their results,
only momentarily waking now and then to the need to examine the being of
their domains, when their basic concepts are in question.
In contrast, philosophy takes the a priori as such as its theme.
Philosophy, then, is uncomfortable for common understanding, and the
positive science’s (in particular psychology’s) conception of philosophy is displaced
to make it accessible to common understanding, since the common
understanding is impressed by facts.

Therefore, even had Kant had an adequate psychology of perception and
knowledge, it still could not have elucidated the concept of existence.
Kant needed, not facts, but a better a priori understanding of the
ontology of Dasein.
Psychology and anthropology (etc.) cannot help solve these problems of
perception and existence, because they need help which they cannot provide,
anymore than physics can help solve problems in geometry.
Psychology must proceed as if it already knew what perception is (i.e. the being
of perception) for psychology to be able to succeed in its factual investigation of
perception.

b) The ontological constitution of perception. Intentionality and
transcendence
Kant leaves the ontological nature of perception (and position)
undetermined. This leaves the comportments of the ego – Dasein –
undefined, and so unrecognized.
An adequate treatment of the ontology of Dasein is presupposed to clarifying
what it means to be.

Here we will proceed by following Kant’s problem and only come to the
ontology of Dasein later. Kant interprets existence as perception. Perception
has a three fold meaning: perceiving, perceived, perceivedness of the
perceived. This three fold division goes back to the thing which is itself
signified by the ambiguous term “perception.” These three moments include:
(a) perceiving, i.e., perceptual comportment (comportment means to conduct
oneself toward, as in a demeanor, bearing, manner, or style),
(b) the perceived, i.e., that toward which perceptual comportment is
directed.
(c) the perceivedness of the perceived, i.e., the being perceived of what
is perceived in perceptual comportment.

The unitary structure of perceiving, the perceived, and the perceivedness of
the perceived is the perceptual directing toward what is perceived so that
the perceived is understood as perceived in its perceivedness. This is not a
tautology. Perception and the perceived belong together in the perceivedness
of the perceived. The belonging together of perceiving, the perceived, and
the perceivedness of the perceived has the character of directedness toward,
which constitutes the whole framework of perception.
All comportments (for example, representing, judging, loving, striving...) are directed
toward something, and hence are types of directedness toward. This
may seem, but is not, trivial.
“that which is taken for granted is the sole theme of philosophy” p. 58

This structure is called “intentionality”, from the scholastics “intentio”
which referred to the direction of the will.
Brentano used “intentionality” more broadly than the scholastics; he used
“intentionality to designate that which classifies all experiences, i.e.
every experience can and must be classified with respect to its intentionality.
Husserl first elucidated the nature of this structure in his Logical
Investigations and in his Ideas.
Every comporting-toward (intentio) has its specific toward-which of the
directedness (intentum). Intentionality comprises both moments - intentio
and intentum - within its unity. The two moments are different in each
comportment and their diversity constitutes the diversity of comportments.

The task, then, becomes the elucidation of the structure of intentionality.
Intentionality is a structure of Dasein’s comportments.
How is intentionality grounded ontological in the constitution of Dasein?
We must avoid misinterpretation due either to philosophical theories or,
especially, to a naive naturalistic approach (including everyday “good sense”).
Firstly, it is, mistakenly, supposed that intentionality in perception, for
example, is a relation between two beings: an extant subject and an extant
object.
Given this naturalistic conception, we see what happens if we vary these, and
we find that if either subject or object vanishes so does the relation. So,
intentionality, as understood within the natural attitude, requires the
extantness of both object and subject, where each would remain were the
other removed [for example as in Descartes’ doubting the existence of the causes of his ideas].

This approach (within the natural attitude) misses both the nature and mode of
being of intentionality: the mistake is to suppose that intentionality accrues to
the subject due to the extant object (implying that the subject could be isolated from any
object and that the subject could be without intentionality), but the subject is, in itself,
structured intentionally.
Consider the following counterexample: suppose an hallucination directed
perceptually to elephants even though no extant elephants are around. The
hallucinatory consciousness is still directed toward something, the elephants.
Only because hallucinatory perception is intrinsically a comporting-toward
can something be intended in an hallucinatory or illusory way, perceiving, for
example, must be a perceiving-of something for it even to be deceptive.
Hence, intentionality lies in the comportment, i.e. in the hallucinatory
perceiving itself.

Intentionality is the a priori comportmental character of comporting; it
is not a relation between extant entities, but rather intentionality is an
intrinsic property of perceiving itself as a comportment, i.e. intentionality
necessarily belongs to the comportmental character of the perceiving.
Intentionality is, then, a structure of the subject that comports itself
toward something. “Intentional comportment” is a pleonasm (like “spatial
triangle”), if intentionality is not seen as the essence of comportments, thought
is confused.

However, characterizing intentionality as something subjective constitutes a
second misinterpretation.
This subjectivism is a theoretical construct, for example, Locke’s theory of
sensation which was derived from, and dogmatically presupposes, physical
theory, and as such a construct is not derived from the matters
themselves, from the phenomena.
If intentional experiences were immanent to (and part of) the subject (as it was
thought to be according to modern philosophy since Descartes), they would be the subject’s
experiences, and therefore would be subjective.

This (theoretical approach) seems to raise several questions:
How do these subjectivities relate to objectivities?
What can this immanent relation contribute to the philosophical
elucidation of transcendence [that which is outside the subject]?
“How do we proceed from inside the intentional experiences in the subject outward to things as
objects?” p. 62
How can experiences transcend [get outside] the subjective sphere?
“How do experiences and that to which they direct themselves as intentional, the subjective in
sensations, representations, relate to the objective?” p. 62

These seemingly plausible questions are misguided, led astray by
theory, and forgetting the necessity to align theory to the phenomena.
The interpretation misses the phenomenon of intentionality.
The source of this misinterpretation lies in the misinterpretation of the
intentum. It is natural to infer that since intentionality is a characteristic of
experiences and these are subjective that that toward which these immanent
experiences are directed is itself immanent (to the subject, i.e. subjective), i.e.
mistakenly inferring that the objects toward which these immanent
experiences are directed are also part of the subject, but this fails to see the
phenomena.

In a concrete perception, am I oriented toward sensations, in the sense
(accepted by the tradition following Descartes) of representational images?
NO!! That is pure theory. The concrete perception (or illusion) intends the
being that is extant (the illusory object, for example, the man for whom I mistake a tree).
Consider the perception of a picture, for example, this is indeed an example of
a representation - one in which a picture object such as a postcard intervenes.
This has a different structure than simple perception. A postcard, for
instance, is itself bodily given. It is a picture-thing, not a simple thing. I see
through it to the object pictured. (The bodily given picture thing is not often thematically
apprehend.)

Note how different seeing a picture (representation) is from simple perception
where the picture-thing is not found. Picture or image theories of perception
miss this fact. The rejection of representational theories of perception is
grounded in what is phenomenologically given. If every perception were the
apprehension of an immanent picture of a transcendent thing, then how is the
transcendent thing apprehended?
Also, if every apprehension of an object is a consciousness of a picture, then I
need another picture to depict the immanent picture, and so on indefinitely.
However, the main point is that such a thing is not present in
consciousness, so we do not reject the theory because there is an infinite
regress, but because it does not accord with the phenomena. In perceiving a
picture thing as bodily present, the perception does not come to completion.
We tend to see the something-pictured in a flash, but we only see the picture-
thing with a modification of our regard.

Thus, the question “How does an inner intentional experience arrive at an
outside?” is put the wrong way, since the intentional comportment always
already (a priori) orients itself toward the extant.
“I do not need to ask how the immanent intentional experience acquires transcendent validity;
rather what has to be seen is that it is precisely intentionality and nothing else in which
transcendence consists.” p. 63
The second misinterpretation lies in an erroneous subjectivizing of
intentionality since the transcending of subjectivity is itself constituted
by intentional comportments, intentionality must not be misinterpreted on
the basis of arbitrary concepts of ego and the subject. Intentionality, like
transcendence, must be determined in their essence on the basis
intentionality.

The usual separation between subject and object is a construct and occasions
more constructions (and errors) therefore let us say “Dasein” (not “subject”).
The mode of being of Dasein is always already (a priori) dwelling with the
extant. Dasein exists not like an extant thing but as the whole unified
structure of comportment towards extant things (including as abstract parts both
the extant things and the way of being directed, comported, towards those extant things).
“The statement that the comportments of…Dasein are intentional means that the mode of being of
our own self,…Dasein, is essentially such that this being, so far as it is, is always already dwelling
with the extant.” p. 64

We may summarize the two faulty interpretations:
(1) Against erroneous objectivising of intentionality, intentionality is
not an extant relationship between an extant subject and an extant
object. Instead, intentionality is a structure that constitutes the
comportmental character of Dasein.
(2) Against the erroneous subjectivizing of intentionality,
intentionality is not a part of, nor immanent to a self-enclosed subject
that would then have to be transcended to get to the object. Instead,
intentionality is the ontological condition of the possibility of every and
any transcendence (going over to dwell among extant things).

“Perceiving, as intentional, falls so little into a subjective sphere that, as soon as we wish to talk
about such a sphere, perceiving immediately transcends it.” p. 69
Intentionality is neither objective nor subjective in the usual sense,
yet it is both in a more original sense, since intentionality makes it possible
for Dasein to comport itself toward the extant.
Therefore, any recourse to the psychological subject and to psychology as a
positive science have become problematic.

That comportments (judgings, willings, lovings, thinkings, etc.) are intentionally
structured is not a basis for inferences, but a directive to bring these
structures to givenness and adequate description.
The errors, we have examined, result from Dasein's natural attitude.
Dasein’s mode of being is to take every being as extant. So, it naturally has the
erroneous tendency to take “the subject” and intentionality as extant.
However, the being (Dasein) to which this neither subjective nor objective
phenomenon, intentionality, belongs must be conceived differently.
Kant made these mistakes: things are not related to an internal cognitive
faculty, but rather cognitive (affective, and volitional) faculties are intentionally
structured. So, the notions of an inside and an outside are absurd.
Correcting Kant is not a verbal quibble, but is rather a turn to evidence that
shows Kant's confusions turn on the ambiguity of “perception” which may
designate representation, or instead may designate a mode of intentionality.

c) Intentionality and understanding of being. Uncoveredness
(perceivedness) of beings and disclosedness of being
We must, now, come to see that the actual lies in the being perceived
(perceivedness) of the perceived. Insofar as perceivedness is a necessary
(albeit not sufficient) condition of access to the extant, we need to characterize
perceivedness as such.
This means concentration on the intentum of intentionality, since
intentionality aims at the extant as extant. The extant (Zuhandensein) in its
functionality (Bewandtniis, for example, the functionality of an instrument) differs from the
extant insofar as it is a thing (Vorhandensein). Perceivedness, like ways of being
extant, extantness (what it means to be extant), cannot be a (real) determination
of the thing.

“Time and again it becomes necessary to impress on ourselves the methodological maxims of
phenomenology not to flee prematurely from the enigmatic character of phenomena nor to explain
it away by the violent coup de main of a wild theory but rather to accentuate the puzzlement.
Only in this way does it become palpable and conceptually comprehensible, that is, intelligible and
so concrete that the indications for resolving the phenomenon leap out toward us from the
enigmatic matter itself.” p. 69 [emphasis PT]
This applies to the problem of perceiving, namely, that perceiving belongs
somehow to the object without being objective and belongs somehow to
Dasein without being subjective.

Perception, in the sense of the perceivedness of the extant is not itself
extant, but belongs to Dasein without being subjective.
• Perception uncovers the extant so that the extant thing can show
itself, and the uncoveredness of the extant is already implicit in
perception.
• In perception the extant shows itself in its own self (is itself presented).
• Perception is not equivalent to representation (representation also intends
the object, but in representation the extant is not itself presented, in its own self).
• Perception is a mode of intentionality in which the extant is released
and lets itself be encountered. Therefore, perception is a mode of
uncoveredness.
• Dasein exists as uncovering [i.e. Dasein exists as the act of uncovering of that which
is extant].

There are different modes of uncoveredness (for example, geometric relations are
uncovered differently than are physical objects).
a) The different modes of uncoveredness are determined by the way
of being of the entity to be uncovered.
b) In the intentio something like an understanding (a pre-understanding,
which is not necessarily clear nor explicit) must always already be present a
priori.
According to its direction, perceiving intends the extant in its extantness.
However, we must distinguish between the manner in which Dasein is
aware of the extant, uncovering, from the manner in which Dasein is
aware of the conditions under which it is possible for Dasein to uncover
the extant, its disclosedness. Disclosedness is pre-conceptually prior to the
uncovering of the extant as part of the constitution of Dasein, i.e. the mode of
being of what is intended in the intentum belongs to intentionality.

Disclosedness (that the mode of being of the extant is disclosed in a pre-understanding) is the
condition of the possibility of uncoveredness (that the extant is uncovered in an
actual appearance) – both belong to the entity perceived in perception.
It is manifestly this understanding of being to which Kant recurs without seeing it clearly when he
says that existence, actuality, is equivalent to perception. Without already giving the answer to the
question how actuality is to be interpreted, we must keep in mind that over against the Kantian
interpretation, actuality equals perception, there is presented a wealth of a structures and structural
moments of that to which Kant basically recurs. In the first place we meet with intentionality. Not
only intentio and intentum but with similar originality a mode of uncoveredness of the intentum
uncovered in the intentio belong to it. Not only does its uncoveredness – that it is uncovered – belong
to the entity which is perceived in the perception, but also the being-understood, that is, the
disclosedness of the that uncovered entity's mode of being. We therefore distinguish not only
terminologically but also for reasons of intrinsic content between the uncoveredness of a being and
the disclosedness of its being. A being can be uncovered, whether by way of perception or some other
mode of access, only if the being of this being is already disclosed – only if I already understand it.
Only then can I ask whether it is actual or not and embark on some procedure to establish the
actuality of the being. p. 72

We must now manage to exhibit more precisely the interconnection between the uncoveredness of a
being and the disclosedness of its being and to show how the disclosedness (unveiledness) of being
founds, that is to say, gives the ground, the foundation, for the possibility of the uncoveredness of the
being. In other words, we must manage to conceptualize the distinction between uncoveredness and
disclosedness, its possibility and necessity, but likewise also to comprehend the possible unity of the
two. This involves at the same time the possibility of formulating the distinction between the being
[Seienden] that is uncovered in the uncoveredness and the being [Sein] which is disclosed in the
disclosedness, thus fixing the differentiation between being and beings, the ontological difference. In
pursuing the Kantian problem we arrive at the question of the ontological difference. Only on the path
of the solution of this basic ontological question can we succeed in not only positively corroborating
the Kantian thesis that being is not a real predicate but at the same time positively supplementing it by
a radical interpretation of being in general as extantness (actuality , existence). p. 72
Hence we have arrived at the question of the ontological difference which we
aimed at in following the Kantian problematic. We can conclude that the
question of the ontological difference can not be extricated from the
investigation of intentionality (i.e. of all intentionalities, not just that of perception).

Neither the ancients nor the medievals made the appropriate distinctions (they
saw only logos and psuche) to see the ontological difference and so adequately to
inquire what it means to be.
Among the moderns the doctrine of innate ideas belonging to the subject
evades the problem by locating the a priori understanding of being in the
subject, but without elucidating it.
Therefore, an answer to the question what it means to be requires an
ontological analysis of Dasein.

PL-407: Phenomenology and Existentialism
First Essay Assignment
I. Content:
Write an essay that explicates intentionality phenomenologically and
demonstrates its relevance to the Kantian claim that existence is absolute
position.

II. Tips and Hints:
(1) Be specific! Make sure what you write does not just state vague
generalities. Explain what you mean in a clear and specific manner. Make all
connections clear and explicit.
(2) Organize your essay using an outline before beginning writing. This will
help the whole essay, and especially make the introductory paragraph specific
and detailed. In organizing essays it, make sure to do the following (not
necessarily in this order):
(a) explicate the Kantian claim that existence is absolute position, and
(b) give a positive explication of the essential aspects of intentionality (as
far as we have investigated them up to this point in the course), and
(c) show specifically and in detail how the explication of intentionality
given above is relevant to the Kantian claim.
(d) demonstrate how and why important misinterpretations (those on
which Heidegger comments) must be guarded against, and
(e) explicate the positive importance of removing these
misinterpretations, and
(f) Make sure you ground all your claims in actual phenomena, in the
matters themselves, i.e., make sure you clarify all your claims by showing
how they are exemplified in the phenomena.

(3) Make sure your essay makes all important distinctions clearly and
explicitly. Avoid vague formulations that blur distinctions. When making a
distinction, do not just say that the distinct things are different. Say what they
are and what difference makes the difference between them.
(4) Write efficiently! Write sentences that make connections between elements
and which link smoothly together. Avoid vague sentences that gesture at a
claim without stating it. Careful choice of verbs will facilitate the smooth flow
of your essay. (Try this: whenever you write a sentence using forms of the verb
“to be”, i.e., “is” “are” “was” “were” etc., rewrite the sentence using a more
specific and appropriate verb. This will often lead to condensing two sentences
into a single clearer sentence.)
(5) Don’t merely describe the different positions, make sure your essay
emphasizes important arguments and distinctions that have a bearing on both
the explication of intentionality and its relation to the Kantian claim that
existence is absolute position.
(6) START NOW!!!!

III. Format and Standards:
(1) Essays should not exceed three double spaced typed pages (in 12 pt.
times new roman font or other font of this size), with all four margins at least
one inch each.
(2) All essays are to be produced on a word processor or typed, double spaced
and stapled in the upper left hand corner (with an actual staple, no covers,
folders, paper clips, or dog eared pages will be acceptable). Pages must be
numbered consecutively. Do not use title pages, covers, or folders!
(3) Essays must be composed in clear grammatical English. All obscurities due
to grammatical problems or poor sentence structure will lower the grade the
essay receives.
(4) No quotations will be allowed in the body of essays. Any part of an essay
that exactly reproduces the wording of some other source is a quotation. If a
quotation is necessary as evidence that an author said what your essay claims
that the author said, then the quotation should be placed in a footnote. Such
footnotes should include the authors exact words, punctuation, and spelling
and do not count with respect to the required length of the essay.

(4) Essays will be evaluated on grasp of the substantive issues, quality of
argumentation, organization, clarity of exposition, and attention to details.
(5) Plagiarism will result in a grade of F for the course!
(6) Essays are due by Friday, February 27, 2015.

Heidegger_Basic_Problems_ch_1_ppt.pptx

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Heidegger_Basic_Problems_ch_1_ppt.pptx