GOV3320 Aldo Moro

Silent Sacrifice in Rome: The Assassination of Aldo Moro
By Carla Spensieri
Professor Federico Niglia
GOV 3320 Current Terrorist Movements
4,675 words
1

On May 9, 1978 on Via Caetani in the center of Rome, police opened the trunk of a red
Renault 4. Inside the trunk lay the body of Aldo Moro, law professor, politician, and president of
Italy’s Christian Democracy party (the DC). The crime had been committed against Moro
because of his Historic Compromise plan to allow the Italian Communist Party (the PCI) to enter
the government as an official political party in an alliance with the DC and the Italian Socialist
Party (the PSI). In the throes of the Years of Lead, this was a hotly debated issue in Italy and
abroad. The murder of Aldo Moro was started by an extreme left terrorist organization called the
Red Brigades that hoped Moro’s murder would lead Italy to an anarchist revolution. However,
blame also goes to strategists of tension in Italian politics, Propaganda Due (the P2 lodge),
NATO, and the United States who deliberately allowed the murder to happen, and by doing so
successfully impeded Moro’s political initiative the Historic Compromise.
On April 18, 1948, Italians voted in their first universal suffrage general elections. They
voted in favor of the DC (established five years before) and thus against the Popular Front, an
alliance of socialist and communist parties, amongst which was the PCI (established in 1921).
After this day, never again would a communist party participate in Italian government. There
have been 61 government turnovers in Italy since World War II ended in 1945. The country has
remained relatively stable all these years because from 1943 until 1994 the DC was always in
power. Their period of influence spans the entire Cold War, and this is underlined by their
repeated attempts to keep the PCI out of government, thus keeping Italy away from the Soviet
Union’s sphere of influence. Aldo Moro, however, came to a head with his own party, the DC, on
this topic, because he didn’t stand for excluding PCI and the PSI. In fact, Moro fought for their
inclusion in Italian government.1
1 Drake, Richard. The Aldo Moro Murder Case.
2

As a Christian Democrat by party association and literally, Aldo Moro was on the anti-
exclusionary front when it came to political parties and fought for the inclusion of all people and
their ideas in government. Born on September 23, 1916 in Puglia, Aldo Moro grew up in a
conservative Roman Catholic family in the south of Italy. Moro studied criminal law for four
years at the University of Bari and, after graduating, taught the subject at the university for
another twenty years. Elected vice president of the DC in 1946, voted into the Italian Parliament
by 1948, Italian Minister of Justice from 1955 to 1957, Italian Minister of Education from 1957
to 1959, National Secretary of the DC in 1959, and elected Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs for
three terms, Moro was on the rise halfway through the twentieth century. Finally, Aldo Moro was
in office as Prime Minister of Italy from December 4, 1963 to June 24, 1968, and again from
November 23, 1974 to July 29, 1976. Holding power for a combined total of more than six years,
Aldo Moro was one of Italy's longest serving Prime Ministers of the First Republic. In 1976,
Aldo Moro was elected president of the National Council of the DC. As a prominent figure of the
DC for twenty years, Moro was lauded as a proactive thinker and a tactful moderator, especially
with coordinating negotiations between the differing movements within the DC.2
In the 1950s and 1960s, a national campaign to include the PSI in the Italian government
succeeded, and on December 5, 1963 the DC grudgingly accepted this alliance along with two
other parties in a party congress in Naples. This entrance into the political arena of a socialist
party had been led by Aldo Moro, the then recently elected Prime Minister of Italy. The DC had
not wanted to accept a socialist party into Italian government because once the socialists would
join the alliance they would demand widespread reform of Italy’s social programs, which is true.
2 Drake, Richard. The Aldo Moro Murder Case
3

Because of the DC’s decreasing power in the early 1960s, however, which contemporaneously
corresponded with the PSI’s growing influence, the DC was constrained to do so.3
Aldo Moro was the grand master in the alliance between the DC and the PSI in 1963. As a
result, the left majority widened, satisfying speculative DC members, and socialists were given
an official voice in the government system. In 1978, Moro attempted the same plan for a party
alliance, but this time between the DC and the PCI. The demand to evolve was what pushed
Moro. In the 1960s and 1970s, Italy, along with the rest of the world, was experiencing a social
revolution, and because of this, the popular traditional DC mission needed to make room for new
secular and liberal missions coming from new groups, such as women, young people, and
laborers. Moro envisioned a more democratic way, in which cabinets in the Italian political
system would represent a larger percentage of voters and parties. Aldo Moro believed in
consociationalism, a government structure that promises group representation and which is
suggested for use by countries with societal fragmentation to avoid violence, and in the 1970s
Italian society was divided and violent.4
On June 20, 1976 the Italian general elections were held, and under Enrico Berlinguer the
PCI garnered 34% of total votes. The PCI was officially the largest communist party in Western
Europe and would remain so until its demise in 1991. As Christianity grew less relevant the
Years of Lead grew more so in Italy. Amidst a social revolution in moral values and the growing
prevalence of terrorism in Italy emerged the Historic Compromise. Aldo Moro came up with the
concept of a “national solidarity” cabinet, made up of the DC, the PSI, and the addition of the
PCI. As the PCI was openly linked to the USSR at that time, inclusion of the PCI was absolutely
impossible, but Moro’s idea sparked Berlinguer and the PCI to break relations with the USSR in
3 Sciascia, Leonardo. The Moro Affair.
4

the years 1976 and 1977 and instead reform to the eurocommunism structure. At this point, it
became a realistic option that the PCI could enter the Italian political system.5
The PCI was no longer tied to the USSR and was ready to mingle with the proposal of an
alliance with the DC and PSI in 1977. It is not coincidental that in 1977, the press accused Aldo
Moro of being involved in the Lockheed Scandal as Antelope Cobbler, the code name for one of
the bribe recipients. It is still unclear today as to which group or person paid off journalists to run
this false story. The allegation continued to circulate into 1978 in an effort to destroy Moro’s
reputation in politics and thus also destroy Moro’s “national solidarity” cabinet plan.6
The
Cobbler allegation failed, however, when Moro was revealed to be uninvolved with the
Lockheed Scandal in court on March 3, 1978. 13 days after Aldo Moro was cleared from the
Lockheed Scandal he was kidnapped by the Red Brigades.7
Operation DC-PSI-PCI alliance was back on the table. Both international super powers
were against it, however. The United States feared that by allowing communists to enter Italian
government, the communists would be able to steal NATO military strategies and project plans
more easily and relay them to the Soviet Union. In addition, after all of the United States’
negative propaganda about the communists, allowing communists to have an official voice in a
Western country would symbolize a failure for the United States. On the other side, the PCI had
broken relations with Moscow in a self-assertive move to become more European and enter in
the Italian government. Becoming more European equates to becoming friendlier with the United
States and democracy in general. Because of this, the Soviet Union was clearly insulted and also
opposed the alliance.8
6 Baget Bozzo, Gianni; Tassani, Giovanni. Aldo Moro: il politico nella crisi, 1962-1973.
7 Baget Bozzo, Gianni; Tassani, Giovanni. Aldo Moro: il politico nella crisi, 1962-1973.
5

So many different groups were opposed to the Historic Compromise. The United States,
all western countries that sided with democracy over communism, the USSR, the Italian secret
service, the extreme right secret Masonic lodge Propaganda Due, a criminal organization called
La Banda della Magliana that was involved in numerous events during the Years of Lead, and the
DC were all opposed. NATO’s stay-behind anti-communist network Gladio was only revealed to
the Italian Parliament and the world 12 years after Moro’s murder on October 24, 1990 by Prime
Minister Giulio Andreotti. Besides affiliation with facilitating Moro’s assassination for the Red
Brigades, Gladio also provided weapons to Western countries in case of a communist takeover.
In 2000, a report from the center-left Olive Tree alliance revealed to the Italian Parliament
Commission that the Gladio’s strategy of tension during the Cold War was backed by the USA in
order to "stop the PCI and, to a certain degree, the PSI from reaching executive power in the
country."9
Last but not least, the Historic Compromise was opposed by the extreme left Marxist-
Leninist-anarchist Italian terrorist organization the Red Brigades. The Red Brigades saw the
alliance between the DC and the PCI as a weakening of the PCI’s communist agenda in order to
assimilate into a democracy, and the Red Brigades were not wrong. In order to strike while
communism was more popular in Italy than it ever had been before, the Red Brigades decided to
make their definitive historical catalyst the assassination of the Italian Prime Minister Aldo
Moro. By killing Moro, the Red Brigades hoped to inspire Italian citizens to start an anarchist
revolution and overturn the Republic of Italy.10
At 10 o’clock in the morning on March 16, 1978 at Montecitorio in Rome, the Italian
Parliament was scheduled to sign an entrance agreement with the PCI that would make the
Italian Parliament the first Western European government to include communists. The endless
9 Collin, Richard O. “The Aldo Moro Murder Case”, 1187-1188.
10 Cutolo, Eugenio. Aldo Moro: la vita, l’opera, l’eredità.
6

phase of opposition was finally over and a new era was beginning for communists, or so it
seemed. 11
Aldo Moro’s body guards arrived at his home to take him to Parliament shortly before 9
o’clock in the morning. Aldo Moro promptly left at 9 o’clock and was soon on Via Fani, at the
end of which Red Brigade kidnappers had been awaiting him. At 2 minutes past 9 o’clock the
kidnappers had already left behind five corpses, kidnapped Aldo Moro alive, and fled the scene
of the crime. Before police arrived, a neighbor known as Signor Nucci rushed onto his balcony to
take some pictures of the crime scene. These photographs reveal people who were on the scene
and saw the kidnapping.12
By 10 o’clock, news had already broken that Aldo Moro had been kidnapped. At
Montecitorio, the DC-PSI-PCI coalition agreement signing was forced onto the back burner in
this emergency situation. Members of Italian parliament were de facto forced to elect an
emergency government led by then Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti as a sign of unity against
terrorism. Berlinguer also supported the emergency government move. Shortly afterwards, PM
Andreotti announced to Parliament and on public television the hard line front Italy would follow
against the Red Brigades and terrorism. Andreotti alleged that the hard line front had been put in
place because to negotiate with terrorists would be immoral on the part of the Republic of Italy.
Really, though, Andreotti, who was a P2 lodge member, an extreme right conservative, and a
long time enemy of Aldo Moro since their school days in Puglia, wanted the Red Brigades to get
rid of Aldo Moro so that the Historic Compromise would be put to bed. 13
Meanwhile, in the south of Rome, the Red Brigade kidnappers’ car reached the building
where Aldo Moro’s prison had been prepared. The kidnappers had rented an apartment on the
7

first floor and built a dividing wall in one of the bedrooms. It was here, in this so-called People’s
Prison by the Red Brigades, that Aldo Moro was to spend the next 55 days. This is where his
extreme left abductors were to interrogate the DC leader, submit him to a political trial, and
produce the first picture of him.14
One hour after abduction, police, military, and secret service had all arrived at the scene
of the crime on Via Fani. This is when a news blackout set in which still hasn’t been solved
today. Documents disappeared from Moro’s car and witnesses were sworn to secrecy. Signor
Nucci’s photos taken from his balcony as the crime happened were reported to the police and
then disappeared, also.15
One man who has been trying to break this silence for over thirty years is Sergio
Flamigni, writer, member of the PCI from 1968 to 1987, and member of the Parliamentary
Investigation Commission for the Aldo Moro case, and, later, the P2 lodge case and Mafia case
of the 1990s. He has written copiously on several interconnected groups in modern Italian
history: La tela del ragno. Il delitto Moro in 1988; Trame atlantiche. Storia della Loggia
massonica segreta P2. In 1996; Convergenze parallele. Le Brigate rosse, i servizi segreti e il
delitto Moro. in 1998, among others. In short, Sergio Flamigni is the main investigator in Italy
who has never stopped pushing for justice for the assassination Aldo Moro.16
According to his most recent book, Sergio Flamigni has reconstructed Aldo Moro’s
kidnapping about 200 times, each time revealing more complications. Flamigni: “There was a
hail of machine gun fire. 92 rounds, 49 from the same weapon, which means one person did most
of the work, more than half. This can only have been an elite marksman.” One of the marksmen
was Valerio Morucci, a man who knows more than he will say. It is interesting to note that he
14 Moss, David. “The kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro”, 265-295.
16 Flamigni, Sergio. Convergenze parallele. Le Brigate rosse, i servizi segreti e il delitto Moro.
8

rejects any doubts about the official version of events. Could this be a sign of gratitude to the
Italian State, which omitted more than 15 years of his 30 year sentence? The Red Brigades were
not capable of carrying out a precise kidnapping of this level alone. How could they murder five
bodyguards and not injure Aldo Moro? Someone helped the Red Brigades, but who? 17
The pictures taken from the balcony by Signor Nucci immediately after the abduction are
useful for this. Signor Nucci handed them over to a magistrate who doesn’t know what happened
to them or where they are. According to the magistrate, the photos have disappeared and have
never been found. Perhaps it is because a secret service car was recognized in the photographs.
The secret service colonel who was in the car has claimed that he was on Via Fani just by
chance. The colonel’s official alibi is that he had been invited to lunch by a friend who lived
nearby, and so he was there at 9 o’clock in the morning. Ex-terrorist Morucci supports the
colonel’s alibi, saying it’s a presidential area, so the lunch invitation could have been quite
possible. In reality, the secret service colonel was probably at the scene of the crime for
professional reasons, because he was an ambush technique teacher. 18
The Italian secret service had known about Aldo Moro’s kidnapping before it took place.
The deputy head of the antiterrorist squad Dr. Guglielmo Carlucci, now deceased, said after
Moro’s kidnapping took place that prior to the abduction of Moro he “had heard from credible
sources that preparations were being made to kidnap a leading figure” and that he passed this
information on to the head of police. On March 15, 1978, the day before the abduction, the same
head of police went to Aldo Moro’s house and told him that they had investigated reports and
there wasn’t any motive for alarm.19
9

The public, however, was given a show. In Rome 35,000 police and soldiers were
mobilized in the search for Aldo Moro.20
They were always visible interrogating people on the
streets and audible with car sirens on. This was a very scary time to be in Rome. After Aldo
Moro’s kidnapping, the government clearly wanted to cover up the fact that they had seemed
negligent, even though it wasn’t really negligence because the Italian government had let Moro
be kidnapped on purpose.
Two days after Aldo Moro’s kidnapping, on March 18, 1978, the police were hot on the
Red Brigades’ trail. With sirens blaring, they raced to the place where, if they had used more
discreet methods, they probably would have been able to find Aldo Moro and the head of the Red
Brigades, Mario Moretti. Being Moro’s main kidnapper and interrogator in the People’s Prison,
Moretti and his photo had already been published in all the newspapers. The trail took the police
to Via Gradoli 96 in the suburban north of Rome. People in the building had heard strange noises
and alerted the police. Staircase A, entrance 11 was the Red Brigades’ hiding place. The police
rang all the doors in the building. When nobody answered, they would break down the door.
They did this for each apartment with no answer, except for the door behind which was Mario
Moretti and Aldo Moro.21
The apartment that Mario Moretti was in was his home. Moretti had been one of the
founders of the Red Brigades, and was the only remaining leader from the First Generation after
all the other leaders of the First Generation were arrested in a police trap and sent to jail back in
1974 and 1975. Moretti had been arrested, too, but escaped soon after. The First Generation of
the Red Brigades was arguably less military based and more philosophical than the Second
Generation. Moretti had always been a follower of the armed movement, and was never part of
10

the intellectual wing of the organization. Only Moretti, a man who was ready to jump into armed
action, miraculously escaped. In fact, many of the other incarcerated First Generation Red
Brigades have come out and proposed that maybe this was deliberately planned. Founder of the
Red Brigades Alberto Franceschini has said, “Everything was done to try and get the Red
Brigades to develop in a direction that better suited the political projects of some of the people in
power. So it would be logical if some people were not arrested.”22
So, was Moretti spared by the
Italian government so he could be put to better use?
As a penal lawyer and one of the examining magistrates in Rome, Ferdinando
Imposimato was in charge of the search for Moro’s kidnappers. Imposimato asked himself early
on in the investigations whether certain people in the secret service were protecting the Red
Brigades. Imposimato: “This possibility that some politicians wanted the Red Brigades to expand
and continue to carry out attacks on the heart of the state apparatus was confirmed to me by
Meletti.”23
Meletti was at the time head of the secret Italian military service and in charge of the
anti terrorism unit. Imposimato: “He [Meletti] told me the Red Brigades were very well known,
but that the brakes were on, preventing the secret service from taking any action against them.”24
Clearly, there were some people who believed it was in their best interests to let the Red
Brigades develop and continue to carry out attacks. This explains why Moretti managed to
escape from jail and why the police avoided his apartment at Via Gradoli 96.
Imprisoned by the Red Brigades, Aldo Moro had no idea what was going on outside in
Rome and was fighting for his life. Unaware of Andreotti’s hard line front against terrorist
organizations, Aldo Moro wrote letter after letter, begging for help and for negotiations with his
22 Bartali, Roberto. “Red Brigades (1969-1974): An Italian Phenomenon and a Product of the Cold War”,
349-369.
349-369.
349-369.
11

kidnappers. In the beginning of his capture, Aldo Moro included in his letters that he still
considered his political allies as honest partners.
The building where Aldo Moro was imprisoned had not gone unnoticed after the police’s
initial search on March 18, 1978. People still called in, concerned over strange noises, but the
police didn’t go back. Even the Red Brigades themselves found this surprising, as Franceschini
said, “During Moro’s kidnapping, we realized there was a series of strange things that at first we
put down to incredible inefficiency, which, instead, could have only been complicity. We said, ‘If
anyone wants to help us, that’s fine. If someone is managing to help us, we’ll win.’” It was a
win-win situation; the Italian government got rid of Moro and potential communist control while
the Red Brigades were assisted by the Republic of Italy in their anarchist revolution.
What about extreme right terrorist organizations? What did they gain out of Moro’s
assassination? In the Years of Lead the strategy of tension theory had arisen internationally. In
Italy, extreme right forces in the police, military, and secret services were trying to bring about a
state of emergency through a wave of bloody terrorist bombings. This, they believed, would
create favorable circumstances for a rise in popularity of the right wing. The public would be
scared and cry for conservative leaders, traditionalism and security. Some of the men who
engineered this right wing terror campaign were found to be in the secret P2 lodge, to which
American secret service agents from the CIA also belonged. The head of the P2 lodge, Licio
Gelli, was a militant anti-communist with long standing links to the CIA. He was one of Moro’s
bitter enemies. The strategy of tension of the P2 lodge, the bombings throughout the Years of
Lead, and the assassination of Moro are separate historical facts, but when combined they form a
consistent fact: that right wing Italians, Europeans, and Americans absolutely did not want
communists to gain any more power.
12

Moro took his proposal to the United States in 1974. There he met the American
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The meetings were private, but it has been made clear that
Kissinger considered Moro’s policy to be the Trojan horse that would start a communist
revolution in Italy. How do we know? Moro abruptly terminated his visit. What exactly had
happened? Sergio Flamigni: “Moro’s wife, Eleonora, told us that Moro had been threatened, and
they said that these threats had been so serious that he had decided to return to Rome. According
to Moro, he was told this: “If you don’t give up your political plans to bring the communists into
the government, you’ll pay a heavy price.” As history shows, however, when Moro returned to
Rome he ignored the warning and continued to develop the Historic Compromise.25
On March 19, 1978, the Red Brigades started a political trial against Moro in the People’s
Prison. Moro feared he would be obliged to say things that might endanger Italy and this is why
he wrote several letters asking his political allies to open negotiations with his kidnappers. The
Red Brigades sent these letters to several newspapers, which published them. Andreotti, thinking
that Moro’s letters might turn the public sympathetic, declared: “The circumstances of Moro’s
detention remove any moral validity from his letters.”26
The DC believed Andreotti, so they
began to hand out a document on the streets that read: “The Moro speaking from the Red
Brigades prison is not the Moro we know.”27
At this point, the PCI’s Berlinguer had been put in a
situation in which he had needed to approve Andreotti’s state of emergency, and the DC had
declared through their flyers that they no longer believed in their own President. Not even Aldo
Moro’s closest allies were on his side anymore, either by force because of the situation or
manipulation.
25 Wagner-Pacifici, Robin. The Moro Morality Play: Terrorism as Social Drama.
13

At the central command of the Italian police, a crisis center was given the task of finding
the People’s Prison. Conveniently for the Italian government, many of the members of this crisis
unit also belonged to P2: the head of the military secret service, two secret service directors, and
a member of the finance police. Francesco Cossiga, who would later go on to become the 43rd
Prime Minister and 8th
President of the Republic of Italy, was at the time Minister of Internal
Affairs. So, Cossiga was in charge of finding Moro’s kidnappers, but he had surrounded himself
with P2 lodge members. On this point, Cossiga has admitted, “P2 [...] controlled the secret
services.”28
The secret services, increasingly involved with right wing terrorism, were supposed
to find Moro. Is it really surprising that they were so unsuccessful?
Near the end of his 55 stay in the People’s Prison, Aldo Moro began to sense that the end
was near. Moro wrote to the DC these famous words: “Is it possible with your so-called loyalty
to the state that you have all agreed to my death? Unless you do something, a terrible page will
be written in Italy’s history. My blood will be spilled over you, over the party, and over the
country.”29
There was no response to those who had received the letter. Aldo Moro, sensing that
he would no longer be saved, wrote down his true thoughts on the person he believed was
responsible for his death, Giulio Andreotti. Moro called Andreotti “a cold, pitiless, manipulator
enclosed in a dark dream of fame.”30
Andreotti would move on to become Prime Minister of Italy
in ten years.
A town called Gradoli, 100 kilometers from Rome, that happened to have the same name
as Via Gradoli then became the stage for a major Italian government production. A show was put
on for the cameras so that the public would believe that the Italian police and military were hotly
29 Klopp, Charles. Sentences: The Memoirs of Italian Political Prisoners from Benvenuto Cellini to Aldo
Moro.
Moro.
14

following the Red Brigades. For a whole day on April 6, 1978, 40 policemen and soldiers
searched for the People’s Prison in the wrong place. 31
On April 18, 1978, there was more sensational news. The Red Brigades released a
fictitious statement that the body of Aldo Moro was in Lake Duchessa. Police, military, and
secret service began a ridiculous hunt for Moro in a place that he absolutely could not be, seeing
as how Lake Duchessa was covered in ice and high up in the snowy mountains outside Rome
with no road access. Red Brigade Morucci: “We organized a trial run to overshadow the real
event, and that once it had been announced that Moro was really dead, the factual death would
have less effect since it already would have been announced and the people would have had time
to get used to it.” When Operation Lake Duchessa ended that day, the Red Brigades, having
abandoned Moretti’s apartment, had no more cards to play. 32
It was time to assassinate the Aldo Moro, the President of the DC. Moro’s final statement
reads, “I want no politicians to attend my burial, except for those who truly loved me and who
are therefore worthy to accompany me with their prayers.”33
The Red Brigades then put Aldo
Moro into the trunk of the infamous red Ranault 4 in a garage and Mario Moretti shot him eleven
times. Aldo Moro died in that moment on May 9, 1978 at the age of 61. The Red Brigades
abandoned the car on Via Caetani in the center of Rome, directly between the DC building and
the PCI building. In a pompous state ceremony, hundreds of government officials openly
displayed their grief for the man they had silently sacrificed.34
Moro.
15

Epilogue
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, politics in Italy became more progressive.
From 1992 to 1997, Italians, angered by Tangentopoli-a mixture of political stagnation, high
public debt, widespread corruption, and organized crime-called for political, economic, and
moral change. As a result, political parties either collapsed or reformed. After being convicted of
corruption allegations from 1992 to 1994, the DC suffered a decline in popularity and dissolved
on January 14, 1994. The DC changed its name to the Italian People’s Party. Since the DC had
comprised both left and right political groups, former DC members also joined the Christian
Democratic Center, Forza Italia, the Democratic Party of the Left and the National Alliance. Now
16

most former Christian Democrats are associated with the Democratic Party and The People of
Freedom. The PCI dissolved in 1991 and was replaced by the Democratic Party of the Left and
the Communist Refoundation Party, both of which have since split into various political groups.
Works Cited
Baget Bozzo, Gianni; Tassani, Giovanni. Aldo Moro: il politico nella crisi, 1962-1973. Rome:
Sansoni, 1983. Book. April 1, 2012.
Collin, Richard O. “The Aldo Moro Murder Case”. The American Historical Review 102.4
(October 1997): 1187-1188. Scholarly Journal. April 1, 2012.
Cutolo, Eugenio. Aldo Moro: la vita, l’opera, l’eredità. Milan: Teti, 1980. Book. April 1, 2012.
Bartali, Roberto. “Red Brigades (1969-1974): An Italian Phenomenon and a Product of the Cold
War”. Modern Italy Volume 12 Issue 3 (November 2007): 349-369. Scholarly Journal.
April 1, 2012.
Drake, Richard. The Aldo Moro Murder Case. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1995. Book.
April 1, 2012.
17

Drake, Richard. “The Aldo Moro Murder Case in Retrospect”. Journal of Cold War Studies 8.2
(Spring 2006): 114-125. Scholarly Journal. April 1, 2012.
Flamigni, Sergio. Convergenze parallele. Le Brigate rosse, i servizi segreti e il delitto Moro.
Milan: Kaos Edizioni 1998. Book. April 1, 2012.
Klopp, Charles. Sentences: The Memoirs of Italian Political Prisoners from Benvenuto Cellini to
Aldo Moro. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. Book. April 1, 2012.
Moss, David. “The kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro”. Archives europe’ennes de Sociologie
22.2 (1981): 265-295. Scholarly Journal. April 1, 2012.
Sciascia, Leonardo. The Moro Affair. New York: New York Review Books Classics, 2004.
Book. April 1, 2012.
Wagner-Pacifici, Robin. The Moro Morality Play: Terrorism as Social Drama. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1986. Book. April 1, 2012.
18

GOV3320 Aldo Moro

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to GOV3320 Aldo Moro

Similar to GOV3320 Aldo Moro (16)

GOV3320 Aldo Moro