Essay #2 Instructions For Essay #2 you will need to choos.docx

Essay #2 Instructions
For Essay #2 you will need to choose ONE of the two options
listed below, related to Chapter 12 and
Chapter 14 (respectively), and write an essay addressing the
topic.
Option 1: You are working for a weight-loss clinic. The clinic
management has decided that they want to
develop a new obesity treatment based on brain plasticity and
modifying the hypothalamus. What brain
areas would the company target to control obesity? Why is this
not a good idea?
Option 2: Considering the symptoms of Wernicke's Aphasia,
Broca's Aphasia, and Anomia, which would
be most difficult for a patient? Which would be most difficult
for a caregiver? What specific symptoms
would cause difficulty?
Your essay should be based primarily on information from the
class textbook and other assigned
materials. Other sources may be used sparingly. All sources
(including the textbook and assigned
class materials) should be cited using correct APA style and you
should include an APA style
reference page following your essay (even if it only has one
reference).
Submit your assignment as a Word (.doc or .docx) file; other
formats are not acceptable. Your response
should be about 500 words (450-550, not counting citations),

typed using Time New Roman 12 point
font, with 1-inch margins. The text should be left aligned with a
right ragged edge and double spaced
throughout. NO direct quotes are permitted; all information
should be correctly paraphrased.
Use the automatic numbering feature of Word to add right
aligned page numbers in the header of your
document. Do not include a title page. On the first line of the
first page, type your name (no other
information required; not included in the word count). On the
next line, type the topic you’ve chosen
(option 1 or option 2; not included in the word count). Begin
your response on the next line and type your
response. The last page of your document should include your
APA-style reference section (not included
in word count). A submission that fails to include citations and
reference(s) constitutes plagiarism; see
below. Save your as LastnameF_3106_Essay2.docx (where you
substitute your last name and the first
initial of your first name). Upload the file in eLearning before
10AM on Monday, May 4, 2020.
Plagiarism
Plagiarism is presenting someone else's work as your own.
Many students are not aware that there are
different types of plagiarism. You are responsible for being
familiar with the following information
regarding plagiarism as it relates to your work in this class.
Intentional plagiarism involves knowingly and deliberately
presenting someone else’s work or ideas

as your own. Copying work from a website is an example of
intentional plagiarism. Copying work from
the textbook is an example of intentional plagiarism. Copying
work from another student is an example of
intentional plagiarism. Engaging in plagiarism is a violation of
the Savannah State University Code of
Conduct instances of intentional plagiarism in this class will be
handled as academic dishonesty.
Unintentional plagiarism occurs when you fail to give proper
credit for someone else's ideas or
work even if you did not intend to present them as your own.
Writers sometimes do this without being
aware of it, when they fail to follow proper scholarly
procedures for citation. To avoid unintentional
plagiarism, it is important to remember that you must give
credit to all of the original sources of
information that influence your work, including direct quotes as
well as paraphrased material.
• Generally, direct quotations should be used sparingly;
typically, only in cases where the exact
phrasing of the original material is crucial to your point. When
including direct quotes of fewer than
40 words, use quotation marks around the words you are
borrowing directly and provide an
appropriate citation in APA style. Direct quotations that are 40
words or longer should be placed in a
free-standing block of typewritten lines without quotation marks
and be accompanied by an

appropriate citation in APA style. NOTE: You may not include
direct quotations in your work for
this class.
• Paraphrasing means restating information from original
sources in your own words using your own
syntactical structure. When paraphrasing, it is important to
make sure that you are doing so
appropriately. Inappropriate paraphrasing probably is the most
common type of unintentional
plagiarism. It occurs when an author only makes cosmetic
changes to the source text, such as using
synonyms to replace one or two words, rearranging the order of
the original text, using passive
instead of active voice, or changing the verb tense. You should
work hard to make sure you are
paraphrasing appropriately in all of the work submitted for this
class.
As you have been instructed to include citations and references,
the content of essays that do not
include both APA style citations and APA style references will
not be scored and a score of 0 will be
assigned. Including direct quotes and instances of unintentional
plagiarism will result in reduced scores
for the submitted work. More than two instances will result in a
maximum of 50% earned credit on the
assignment.
The scoring rubrics for the two options appear on the pages that
follow.

Option 1: Obesity Essay Rubric
Obesity Essay Exemplary Average Fair Poor
Missing/Unacceptable
Development of Ideas
50%
How clear and
focused is the essay?
How well does the
writer know the
topic? Is there a clear
main idea?
Response correctly
describes brain areas
believed involved in
controlling eating
behaviors. • Lateral
hypothalamus believed to
initiate feeding behavior. •
Lesioning LH would
prevent eating. •
Ventromedial
generate satiety signals. •
Stimulating VH would
prevent eating. • Evidence
disproves these ideas.
Response correctly
describes some brain areas

controlling eating
initiate feeding behavior. •
Lesioning LH would
prevent eating. •
Ventromedial
prevent eating. • Evidence
disproves these ideas.
Response correctly describes
brain areas believed involved
in controlling eating
initiate feeding behavior.•
Lesioning LH would prevent
eating. • Ventromedial
prevent eating. • Fails to state
later evidence disproves these
ideas.
Response fails to
describe brain areas
controlling eating
hypothalamus believed
to initiate feeding
behavior. • Lesioning

LH would prevent
eating. • Ventromedial
hypothalamus believed
to generate satiety
signals. • Stimulating
VH would prevent
eating. • Fails to state
later evidence disproves
these ideas.
Unrelated to the topic or
missing
Organization 10%
Is the essay well
structured? Does the
organization enhance
understanding? How
well are transitions
used? Are the
introduction and
conclusion clear?
Organization is effective
and supports the logical
flow of the response. •
Transitions effectively
connect concepts. • May
contain an effective
introduction and/or
conclusion.
Organization is clear and
appropriate. • Transitions
appropriately connect
concepts. • May contain an

appropriate introduction
and/or conclusion.
Organization is skeletal or
otherwise limited, which may
detract from the reader’s
ability to follow the response.
• Some simple or basic
transitions are used, but they
do not necessarily support the
response. • May contain a
minimal introduction and/or
conclusion.
Response lacks a clear
sense of direction. •
Transitions are lacking
or do not help the reader
follow the essay. • Both
the introduction and
conclusion are minimal
and/or absent.
Incomprehensible or
missing
Conventions 10%
Is the essay well-
edited? Does the
writer use a wide
variety of conventions
that enhance the text?
How much do errors
interfere with
meaning?

Demonstrates
sophistication and skill
with a wide variety of
conventions. • Response
may contain minor editing
errors in grammar,
spelling, punctuation, or
sentence construction. •
Errors do not interfere with
the reader’s understanding.
Demonstrates adequate
control over a variety of
may contain some errors in
grammar, spelling,
punctuation, and/or
Most errors do not interfere
with the reader’s
understanding.
Although basic conventions
may be mostly controlled,
overall the response
demonstrates inconsistent
control over conventions.
Response may not use a
variety of conventions (or
only basic conventions may
be used.) • Response may
contain a substantial number
of errors in grammar, spelling,
punctuation, and/or sentence
construction. • Some errors

interfere with the reader’s
understanding.
Demonstrates a lack of
control over basic
may contain a large
number of errors in
grammar, spelling,
punctuation, and/or
sentence structure OR
the errors are severe. •
Errors interfere with the
reader’s understanding
OR the response is
minimal with a density
of errors.
Complete disregard for
conventions or missing
Option 1: Obesity Essay Rubric continued
Obesity Essay Exemplary Average Fair Poor
Voice 10%
Is the writer’s voice
distinctive? Does the
voice enhance the
essay? Does the essay
beg to be read aloud?

Is the voice
appropriate for the
audience (not too
formal or informal)?
Voice is appropriately
authoritative indicating a
high level of comfort with
the material. • Words used
are precise and well-
chosen. • Sentences are
varied and have a natural
fluidity.
Voice is appropriate and
clear. • Word choice is
appropriate to the subject
matter and functional. •
Sentences are appropriate
and varied, making the
response easy to read.
Voice may be artificial or
uneven. • Word choice may be
correct for the subject matter,
but original material be
limited or may demonstrate a
limited vocabulary range. •
Sentences may be choppy,
rambling, or repetitive in a
way that limits fluency.
Voice may be lacking or
inappropriate. • Original

word choices may be
simplistic, vague,
inappropriate, or
incorrect. • Sentences
may be limited in variety
or be comprised of
awkward fragments or
run-ons which produce a
halting voice.
appropriate voice or
missing
Focus and Coherence
15%
The extent to which
the document
establishes and
maintains a
controlling idea or
bottom line, and an
understanding of
purpose and
audience, and
completes all parts of
the task.
Response persuasively
justifies its conclusions
through logic, examples,
and illustrative language.
References to concepts,
theories, etc. effectively

demonstrate a strong
command of the
biopsychology of obesity.
Response justifies its
conclusions through some
combination of logic,
examples, and illustrative
language. References to
concepts, theories, etc.
effectively demonstrate a
good command of the
Response provides some
justification for its
conclusions.
Some combination of logic,
language are present but are
inconsistent or somewhat
ineffective. References to
partial command of the
Response provides no
significant justification
for its conclusions.
Logic, examples, and
illustrative language are
absent, inconsistent,
and/or ineffective.

demonstrate a weak
grasp of the
biopsychology of
obesity.
Complete lack of focus
and coherence or missing
Following
Instructions 5%
Follows all instructions Failed to follow 1-2
instructions
Failed to follow 3-4
instructions
instructions
Fails to follow more than
6 instructions.
Option 2: Aphasias Essay Rubric
Aphasias Essay Exemplary Average Fair Poor
Development of Ideas
50%
How clear and
focused is the essay?

How well does the
writer know the
topic? Is there a clear
main idea?
Response correctly
identifies key symptoms in
each disorder and relates
those symptoms to the
communication between
patient and caregiver. •
Wernicke’s Aphasia
represents a lack of
comprehension •
patients are not aware of
their communication
difficulty • Wernicke’s
Aphasia patients expect
caregivers to understand
them • Broca’s Aphasia
patients are unable to
produce fluent speech •
Broca’s Aphasia patients
are aware of their
communication difficulty •
understand caregivers are
not receiving information •
Anomia patients have
trouble with word-finding •
Anomia patients are aware
of their communication
difficulty • Anomia
patients and caregivers can
find work-arounds for

missing words
Response correctly
identifies key symptoms in
referenced disorders and
relates those symptoms to
the communication between
comprehension •
patients are not aware of
their communication
difficulty • Wernicke’s
Aphasia patients expect
caregivers to understand
them • Broca’s Aphasia
patients are unable to
produce fluent speech •
are aware of their
difficulty • Anomia patients
and caregivers can find
work- arounds for missing
words
Response correctly identifies

some symptoms in
referenced disorders and
relates those symptoms to
the communication between
comprehension • Wernicke’s
Aphasia patients are not
aware of their
Wernicke’s Aphasia patients
expect caregivers to
understand them • Broca’s
Aphasia patients are unable
to produce fluent speech •
Broca’s Aphasia patients are
aware of their
understand caregivers are not
receiving information •
Anomia patients are aware of
their communication
words
Response fails to identify
key symptoms in referenced
disorders and/or fails to
relate those symptoms to the
communication between

comprehension • Wernicke’s
Aphasia patients are not
aware of their
Wernicke’s Aphasia patients
expect caregivers to
understand them • Broca’s
Aphasia patients are unable
to produce fluent speech •
Broca’s Aphasia patients are
aware of their
words
Unrelated to the topic
or missing
Organization 10%
Is the essay well
structured? Does the
organization enhance
understanding? How
well are transitions

used? Are the
introduction and
conclusion clear?
Organization is effective
and supports the logical
flow of the response. •
Transitions effectively
connect concepts. • May
contain an effective
introduction and/or
conclusion.
Organization is clear and
appropriate. • Transitions
appropriately connect
concepts. • May contain an
appropriate introduction
and/or conclusion.
Organization is skeletal or
otherwise limited, which
may detract from the
reader’s ability to follow the
response. • Some simple or
basic transitions are used,
but they do not necessarily
support the response. • May
contain a minimal
introduction and/or
conclusion.
Response lacks a clear sense
of direction. • Transitions
are lacking or do not help
the reader follow the essay. •

Both the introduction and
conclusion are minimal
and/or absent.
Incomprehensible or
missing
Option 2: Aphasias Essay Rubric continued
Aphasias Essay Exemplary Average Fair Poor
Conventions 10%
Is the essay well-
edited? Does the
writer use a wide
variety of conventions
that enhance the text?
How much do errors
interfere with
meaning?
Demonstrates
sophistication and skill
with a wide variety of
may contain minor editing
errors in grammar,
spelling, punctuation, or
Errors do not interfere with

Demonstrates adequate
control over a variety of
may contain some errors in
grammar, spelling,
punctuation, and/or
Most errors do not interfere
with the reader’s
understanding.
Although basic conventions
may be mostly controlled,
overall the response
demonstrates inconsistent
control over conventions.
Response may not use a
variety of conventions (or
only basic conventions may
be used.) • Response may
contain a substantial number
of errors in grammar,
spelling, punctuation, and/or
Some errors interfere with
Demonstrates a lack of
control over basic
may contain a large number
of errors in grammar,
spelling, punctuation, and/or
sentence structure OR the
errors are severe. • Errors

interfere with the reader’s
understanding OR the
response is minimal with a
density of errors.
conventions or missing
Voice 10%
Is the writer’s voice
distinctive? Does the
voice enhance the
essay? Does the essay
beg to be read aloud?
Is the voice
appropriate for the
audience (not too
formal or informal)?
Voice is appropriately
authoritative indicating a
high level of comfort with
the material. • Words used
are precise and well-
chosen. • Sentences are
varied and have a natural
fluidity.
Voice is appropriate and
clear. • Word choice is
appropriate to the subject
matter and functional. •
Sentences are appropriate
and varied, making the
response easy to read.

Voice may be artificial or
uneven. • Word choice may be
correct for the subject matter,
but original material be
limited or may demonstrate a
limited vocabulary range. •
Sentences may be choppy,
rambling, or repetitive in a
way that limits fluency.
Voice may be lacking or
inappropriate. • Original
word choices may be
simplistic, vague,
inappropriate, or
incorrect. • Sentences
may be limited in variety
or be comprised of
awkward fragments or
run-ons which produce a
halting voice.
appropriate voice or
missing
Focus and Coherence
15%
The extent to which
the document
establishes and
maintains a

controlling idea or
bottom line, and an
understanding of
purpose and
audience, and
completes all parts of
the task.
Response persuasively
justifies its conclusions
through logic, examples,
and illustrative language.
demonstrate a strong
command of language
physiology and
communication.
Response justifies its
conclusions through some
combination of logic,
language. References to
good command of language
physiology and
communication.
Response provides some
justification for its
conclusions.
Some combination of logic,
language are present but are

inconsistent or somewhat
ineffective. References to
partial command of language
physiology and
communication.
Response provides no
significant justification
for its conclusions.
Logic, examples, and
illustrative language are
absent, inconsistent,
and/or ineffective.
demonstrate a weak
grasp of language
physiology and
communication.
Complete lack of focus
and coherence or missing
Following
Instructions 5%
Follows all instructions Failed to follow 1-2
instructions
instructions
instructions

Fails to follow more than
6 instructions.
What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy
Require?
Author(s): Robert A. Dahl
Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 120, No. 2 (Summer,
2005), pp. 187-197
Published by: The Academy of Political Science
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20202514
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What Political Institutions
Does Large-Scale
Democracy Require?
ROBERT A. DAHL
What does it mean to say that a country is governed democrati
cally? Here, we will focus on the political institutions of
democracy on a large
scale, that is, the political institutions necessary for a
democratic country. We
are not concerned here, then, with what democracy in a very
small group might
require, as in a committee. We also need to keep in mind that
every actual de
mocracy has always fallen short of democratic criteria. Finally,
we should be
aware that in ordinary language, we use the word democracy to
refer both to
a goal or ideal and to an actuality that is only a partial
attainment of the goal.
For the time being, therefore, I'll count on the reader to make
the necessary
distinctions when I use the words democracy, democratically,
democratic gov
ernment, democratic country, and so on.1

How Can We Know?
How can we reasonably determine what political institutions
are necessary for
large-scale democracy? We might examine the history of
countries that have
changed their political institutions in response, at least in part,
to demands for
broader popular inclusion and effective participation in
government and politi
1 Political arrangements sound as if they might be rather
provisional, which they could well be in a
country that has just moved away from nondemocratic rule. We
tend to think of practices as more
habitual and therefore more durable. We usually think of
institutions as having settled in for the long
haul, passed on from one generation to the next. As a country
moves from a nondemocratic to a demo
cratic government, the early democratic arrangements gradually
become practices, which in due time
turn into settled institutions. Helpful though these distinction
may be, however, for our purposes it will
be more convenient if we put them aside and settle for
institutions.
ROBERT A. DAHL is Sterling Professor Emeritus of Political
Science, Yale University. He has pub
lished many books on democratic theory and practice, including
A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956)
and Democracy and Its Critics (1989). This article was adapted
from his recent book, On Democracy,
Yale University Press.
Political Science Quarterly Volume 120 Number 2 2005 187

2020 15:52:51 UTC
188 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
FIGURE 1
What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy
Require?
Large-scale democracy requires:
1. Elected officials
2. Free, fair, and frequent elections
3. Freedom of expression
4. Alternative sources of information
5. Associational autonomy
6. Inclusive citizenship
cal life. Although in earlier times those who sought to gain
inclusion and partici
pation were not necessarily inspired by democratic ideas, from
about the eigh
teenth century onward they tended to justify their demands by
appealing to
democratic and republican ideas. What political institutions did
they seek, and
what were actually adopted in these countries?
Alternatively, we could examine countries where the
government is gener
ally referred to as democratic by most of the people in that
country, by many
persons in other countries, and by scholars, journalists, and the

like. In other
words, in ordinary speech and scholarly discussion the country
is called a de
mocracy.
Third, we could reflect on a specific country or group of
countries, or per
haps even a hypothetical country, in order to imagine, as
realistically as possi
ble, what political institutions would be required in order to
achieve democratic
goals to a substantial degree. We would undertake a mental
experiment, so to
speak, in which we would reflect carefully on human
experiences, tendencies,
possibilities, and limitations and design a set of political
institutions that would
be necessary for large-scale democracy to exist and yet feasible
and attainable
within the limits of human capacities.
Fortunately, all three methods converge on the same set of
democratic
political institutions. These, then, are minimal requirements for
a democratic
country (Figure 1).
The Political Institutions of Modern
Representative Democracy
Briefly, the political institutions of modern representative
democratic govern
ment are
Elected officials. Control over government decisions about
policy is consti

tutionally vested in officials elected by citizens. Thus modern,
large-scale
democratic governments are representative.
Free, fair and frequent elections. Elected officials are chosen in
frequent and
fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively
uncommon.
2020 15:52:51 UTC
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY | 189
Freedom of expression. Citizens have a right to express
themselves without
danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly
defined, includ
ing criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the
socioeconomic or
der, and the prevailing ideology.
Access to alternative sources of information. Citizens have a
right to seek
out alternative and independent sources of information from
other citizens,
experts, newspapers, magazines, books, telecommunications,
and the like.
Moreover, alternative sources of information actually exist that
are not un
der the control of the government or any other single political
group at
tempting to influence public political beliefs and attitudes, and
these alter

native sources are effectively protected by law.
Associational autonomy. To achieve their various rights,
including those re
quired for the effective operation of democratic political
institutions, citi
zens also have a right to form relatively independent
associations or organi
zations, including independent political parties and interest
groups.
Inclusive citizenship. No adult permanently residing in the
country and sub
ject to its laws can be denied the rights that are available to
others and are
necessary to the five political institutions just listed. These
include the right
to vote in the election of officials in free and fair elections; to
run for elec
tive office; to free expression; to form and participate in
independent politi
cal organizations; to have access to independent sources of
information;
and rights to other liberties and opportunities that may be
necessary to the
effective operation of the political institutions of large-scale
democracy.
The Political Institutions in Perspective
Ordinarily these institutions do not arrive in a country all at
once; the last two
are distinctly latecomers. Until the twentieth century, universal
suffrage was
denied in both the theory and practice of democratic and

republican govern
ment. More than any other single feature, universal suffrage
distinguishes mod
ern representative democracy from earlier forms of democracy.
The time of arrival and the sequence in which the institutions
have been
introduced have varied tremendously. In countries where the
full set of demo
cratic institutions arrived earliest and have endured to the
present day, the
"older" democracies, elements of a common pattern emerge.
Elections to a leg
islature arrived early on?in Britain as early as the thirteenth
century, in the
United States during its colonial period in the seventeenth and
eighteenth cen
turies. The practice of electing higher lawmaking officials was
followed by a
gradual expansion of the rights of citizens to express
themselves on political
matters and to seek out and exchange information. The right to
form associa
tions with explicit political goals tended to follow still later.
Political "factions"
and partisan organization were generally viewed as dangerous,
divisive, subver
sive of political order and stability, and injurious to the public
good. Yet be
2020 15:52:51 UTC

cause political associations could not be suppressed without a
degree of co
ercion that an increasingly large and influential number of
citizens regarded as
intolerable, they were often able to exist as more or less
clandestine associa
tions until they emerged from the shadows into the full light of
day. In the legis
lative bodies, what once were "factions" became political
parties. The "ins" who
served in the government of the day were opposed by the
"outs," or what in
Britain came to be officially styled His (or Her) Majesty's
Loyal Opposition.
In eighteenth-century Britain, the faction supporting the
monarch and the op
posing faction supported by much of the gentry in the
"country" were gradually
transformed into Tories and Whigs. During that same century
in Sweden, parti
san adversaries in Parliament somewhat facetiously called
themselves the Hats
and the Caps.2
During the final years of the eighteenth century in the newly
formed repub
lic of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, the vice president,
and James Madi
son, leader of the House of Representatives, organized their
followers in Con
gress to oppose the policies of the Federalist president, John
Adams, and his
secretary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton. To succeed in

their opposition,
they soon realized that they would have to do more than oppose
the Federalists
in the Congress and the cabinet: they would need to remove
their opponents
from office. To do that, they had to win national elections, and
to win national
elections they had to organize their followers throughout the
country. In less
than a decade, Jefferson, Madison, and others sympathetic with
their views cre
ated a political party that was organized all the way down to
the smallest voting
precincts, districts, and municipalities, an organization that
would reinforce the
loyalty of their followers between and during election
campaigns and make
sure they came to the polls. Their Republican Party (soon
renamed Democratic
Republican and, a generation later, Democratic) became the
first popularly
based electoral party in the world. As a result, one of the most
fundamental and
distinctive political institutions of modern democracy, the
political party, had
burst beyond its confines in parliaments and legislatures in
order to organize
the citizens themselves and mobilize party supporters in
national elections.
By the time the young French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville
visited the
United States in the 1830s, the first five democratic political
institutions de
scribed above had already arrived in America. The institutions
seemed to him

so deeply planted and pervasive that he had no hesitation in
referring to the
United States as a democracy. In that country, he said, the
people were sover
eign, "society governs itself for itself," and the power of the
majority was unlim
ited.3 He was astounded by the multiplicity of associations into
which Ameri
cans organized themselves, for every purpose, it seemed. And
towering among
these associations were the two major political parties. In the
United States, it
appeared to Tocqueville, democracy was about as complete as
one could imag
ine it ever becoming.
2 "The Hats assumed their name for being like the dashing
fellows in the tricorne of the day_The
Caps were nicknamed because of the charge that they were like
timid old ladies in nightcaps." Franklin D.
Scott, Sweden: The Nation's History (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1977), 243.
3 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 1 (New
York: Schocken Books, 1961), 51.
2020 15:52:51 UTC
During the century that followed, all five of the basic
democratic institu

tions Tocqueville observed during his visit to America were
consolidated in
more than a dozen other countries. Many observers in Europe
and the United
States concluded that any country that aspired to be civilized
and progressive
would necessarily have to adopt a democratic form of
government.
Yet everywhere, the sixth fundamental institution?inclusive
citizenship?
was missing. Although Tocqueville affirmed that "the state of
Maryland, which
had been founded by men of rank, was the first to proclaim
universal suffrage,"
like almost all other men (and many women) of his time he
tacitly assumed
that "universal" did not include women.4 Nor, indeed, some
men. Maryland's
"universal suffrage," it so happened, also excluded most
African Americans. Else
where, in countries that were otherwise more or less
democratic, as in America,
a full half of all adults were completely excluded from national
political life
simply because they were women; in addition, large numbers of
men were de
nied suffrage because they could not meet literacy or property
requirements,
an exclusion supported by many people who considered
themselves advocates
of democratic or republican government. Although New
Zealand extended suf
frage to women in national elections in 1893 and Australia in
1902, in countries

otherwise democratic, women did not gain suffrage in national
elections until
about 1920; in Belgium, France, and Switzerland, countries
that most people
would have called highly democratic, women could not vote
until after World
War II.
Because it is difficult for many today to grasp what
"democracy" meant to
our predecessors, let me reemphasize the difference: in all
democracies and re
publics throughout twenty-five centuries, the rights to engage
fully in political
life were restricted to a minority of adults. "Democratic"
government was gov
ernment by males only?and not all of them. It was not until the
twentieth cen
tury that in both theory and practice democracy came to require
that the rights
to engage fully in political life must be extended, with very
few if any excep
tions, to the entire population of adults permanently residing in
a country.
Taken in their entirety, then, these six political institutions
constitute not
only a new type of political system but a new kind of popular
government, a
type of "democracy" that had never existed throughout the
twenty-five centu
ries of experience since the inauguration of "democracy" in
Athens and a "re
public" in Rome. Because the institutions of modern
representative democratic
government, taken in their entirety, are historically unique, it is

convenient to
give them their own name. This modern type of large-scale
democratic govern
ment is sometimes called polyarchal democracy.
Although other factors were often at work, the six political
institutions of
polyarchal democracy came about, in part at least, in response
to demands for
inclusion and participation in political life. In countries that
are widely referred
to as democracies today, all six exist. Yet you might well ask:
Are some of these
institutions no more than past products of historical struggles?
Are they no
4 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 50.
2020 15:52:51 UTC
longer necessary for democratic government? And if they are
still necessary
today, why?5
The Factor of Size
Before answering these questions, I need to call attention to an
important qual
ification. We are considering institutions necessary for the
government of a

democratic country. Why "country"? Because all the
institutions necessary for
a democratic country would not always be required for a unit
much smaller than
a country.
Consider a democratically governed committee, or a club, or a
very small
town. Although equality in voting would seem to be necessary,
small units like
these might manage without many elected officials: perhaps a
moderator to pre
side over meetings, a secretary-treasurer to keep minutes and
accounts. The
participants themselves could decide just about everything
directly during their
meetings, leaving details to the secretary-treasurer.
Governments of small or
ganizations would not have to be full-fledged representative
governments in
which citizens elect representatives charged with enacting laws
and policies.
Yet these governments could be democratic, perhaps highly
democratic. So,
too, even though they lacked political parties or other
independent political
associations, they might be highly democratic. In fact, we
might concur with the
classical democratic and republican view that in small
associations, organized
"factions" are not only unnecessary but downright harmful.
Instead of conflicts
exacerbated by factionalism, caucuses, political parties, and so
on, we might
prefer unity, consensus, agreement achieved by discussion and
mutual respect.

The political institutions strictly required for democratic
government de
pend, then, on the size of the unit. The six institutions listed
above developed
because they are necessary for governing countries, not smaller
units. Poly
archal democracy is democratic government on the large scale
of the nation
state or country.
To return to our questions: Are the political institutions of
polyarchal de
mocracy actually necessary for democracy on the large scale of
a country? If
so, why? To answer these twin questions, let us recall what a
democratic process
requires (Figure 2).
5 Polyarchy is derived from Greek words meaning "many" and
"rule," thus "rule by the many," as
distinguished from rule by the one, or monarchy, and rule by
the few, oligarchy or aristocracy. Al
though the term had been rarely used, a colleague and I
introduced it in 1953 as a handy way of refer
ring to a modern representative democracy with universal
suffrage. Hereafter I shall use it in that sense.
More precisely, a polyarchal democracy is a political system
with the six democratic institutions Usted
above. Polyarchal democracy, then, is different from
representative democracy with restricted suf
frage, as in the nineteenth century. It is also different from
older democracies and republics that not
only had a restricted suffrage but lacked many of the other
crucial characteristics of polyarchal democ

racy, such as political parties, rights to form political
organizations to influence or oppose the existing
government, organized interest groups, and so on. It is
different, too, from the democratic practices
in units so small that members can assemble directly and make
(or recommend) policies or laws.
2020 15:52:51 UTC
FIGURE 2
Why the Institutions Are Necessary
In a unit as large as a country, are necessary to satisfy
these political institutions the following democratic
of polyarchal democracy ... criteria:
1. Elected representatives... Effective participation
Control of the agenda
2. Free, fair and frequent elections... Voting equality
3. Freedom of expression... Effective participation
Enlightened understanding
4. Alternative information... Effective participation

5. Associational autonomy... Effective participation
6. Inclusive citizenship... Full inclusion
Why (and When) Does Democracy Require
Elected Representatives?
As the focus of democratic government shifted to large-scale
units like nations
or countries, the question arose: How can citizens participate
effectively when
the number of citizens becomes too numerous or too widely
dispersed geo
graphically (or both, as in the case of a country) for them to
participate conve
niently in making laws by assembling in one place? And how
can they make
sure that matters with which they are most concerned are
adequately consid
ered by officials?that is, how can citizens control the agenda of
government
decisions?
How best to meet these democratic requirements in a political
unit as large
as a country is, of course, enormously difficult, indeed to some
extent unachiev
able. Yet just as with the other highly demanding democratic
criteria, this, too,
can serve as a standard for evaluating alternative possibilities
and solutions.
Clearly the requirements could not be met if the top officials of
the government
could set the agenda and adopt policies independently of the

wishes of citizens.
The only feasible solution, though it is highly imperfect, is for
citizens to elect
their top officials and hold them more or less accountable
through elections by
dismissing them, so to speak, in subsequent elections.
To us that solution seems obvious. But what may appear self-
evident to us
was not at all obvious to our predecessors.
2020 15:52:51 UTC
Until fairly recently the possibility that citizens could, by
means of elections,
choose and reject representatives with the authority to make
laws remained
largely foreign to both the theory and practice of democracy.
The election of
representatives mainly developed during the Middle Ages,
when monarchs real
ized that in order to impose taxes, raise armies, and make laws,
they needed to
win the consent of the nobility, the higher clergy, and a few
not-so-common
commoners in the larger towns and cities.
Until the eighteenth century, then, the standard view was that
democratic

or republican government meant rule by the people, and if the
people were to
rule, they had to assemble in one place and vote on decrees,
laws, or policies.
Democracy would have to be town meeting democracy;
representative democ
racy was a contradiction in terms. By implication, whether
explicit or implicit,
a republic or a democracy could actually exist only in a small
unit, like a town or
city. Writers who held this view, such as Montesquieu and
Jean-Jacques Rous
seau, were perfectly aware of the disadvantages of a small
state, particularly
when it confronted the military superiority of a much larger
state, and were
therefore extremely pessimistic about the future prospects for
genuine de
mocracy.
Yet the standard view was swiftly overpowered and swept aside
by the on
rushing force of the national state. Rousseau himself clearly
understood that
for a government of a country as large as Poland (for which he
proposed a con
stitution), representation would be necessary. And shortly
thereafter, the stan
dard view was driven off the stage of history by the arrival of
democracy in
America.
As late as 1787, when the Constitutional Convention met in
Philadelphia
to design a constitution appropriate for a large country with an

ever-increasing
population, the delegates were acutely aware of the historical
tradition. Could
a republic possibly exist on the huge scale the United States
had already at
tained, not to mention the even grander scale the delegates
foresaw?6 Yet no
one questioned that if a republic were to exist in America, it
would have to take
the form of a representative republic. Because of the lengthy
experience with
representation in colonial and state legislatures and in the
Continental Con
gress, the feasibility of representative government was
practically beyond debate.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the traditional view
was ignored,
forgotten, or, if remembered at all, treated as irrelevant. "It is
evident," John
Stuart Mill wrote in 1861
that the only government which can fully satisfy all the
exigencies of the social state
is one in which the whole people participate; that any
participation, even in the
smallest public function, is useful; that the participation should
everywhere be as
great as the general degree of improvement of the community
will allow; and that
nothing less can be ultimately desirable than the admission of
all to share in the sov
6 A few delegates daringly forecast that the United States
might ultimately have as many as one
hundred million inhabitants. This number was reached in 1915.

2020 15:52:51 UTC
ereign power of the state. But since all cannot, in a community
exceeding a single
small town, participate personally in any but some very minor
portions of the public
business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government
must be represen
tative.7
Why Does Democracy Require Free, Fair,
and Frequent Elections?
As we have seen, if we accept the desirability of political
equality, then every
citizen must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote,
and all votes must
be counted as equal. If equality in voting is to be implemented,
then clearly,
elections must be free and fair. To be free means that citizens
can go to the
polls without fear of reprisal; and if they are to be fair, then all
votes must be
counted as equal. Yet free and fair elections are not enough.
Imagine electing
representatives for a term of, say, twenty years! If citizens are
to retain final
control over the agenda, then elections must also be frequent.

How best to implement free and fair elections is not obvious. In
the late
nineteenth century, the secret ballot began to replace a public
show of hands.
Although open voting still has a few defenders, secrecy has
become the general
standard; a country in which it is widely violated would be
judged as lacking
free and fair elections. But debate continues as to the kind of
voting system
that best meets standards of fairness. Is a system of
proportional representation
(PR), like that employed in most democratic countries, fairer
than the first
past-the-post system used in Great Britain and the United
States? Reasonable
arguments can be made for both. In discussions about different
voting systems,
however, the need for a fair system is assumed; how best to
achieve fairness
and other reasonable objectives is simply a technical question.
How frequent should elections be? Judging from twentieth-
century prac
tices in democratic countries, a rough answer might be that
annual elections for
legislative representatives would be a bit too frequent and
anything more than
five years would be too long. Obviously, however, democrats
can reasonably
disagree about the specific interval and how it might vary with
different offices
and different traditional practices. The point is that without
frequent elections,
citizens would lose a substantial degree of control over their
elected officials.

Why Does Democracy Require Free Expression?
To begin with, freedom of expression is required in order for
citizens to partici
pate effectively in political life. How can citizens make their
views known and
persuade their fellow citizens and representatives to adopt them
unless they
can express themselves freely about all matters bearing on the
conduct of the
government? And if they are to take the views of others into
account, they must
7 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative
Government [1861] (New York: Liberal Arts
Press, 1958), 55.
2020 15:52:51 UTC
be able to hear what others have to say. Free expression means
not just that
you have a right to be heard. It also means that you have a right
to hear what
others have to say.
To acquire an enlightened understanding of possible
government actions
and policies also requires freedom of expression. To acquire
civic competence,

citizens need opportunities to express their own views; learn
from one another;
engage in discussion and deliberation; read, hear, and question
experts, politi
cal candidates, and persons whose judgments they trust; and
learn in other ways
that depend on freedom of expression.
Finally, without freedom of expression, citizens would soon
lose their ca
pacity to influence the agenda of government decisions. Silent
citizens may be
perfect subjects for an authoritarian ruler; they would be a
disaster for a de
mocracy.
Why Does Democracy Require the Availability of …
Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method
Author(s): Arend Lijphart
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3
(Sep., 1971), pp. 682-693
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1955513
Accessed: 18-03-2020 15:36 UTC
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2020 15:36:42 UTC
Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method*
AREND LIJPHART
University of Leiden
Among the several fields or subdisciplines
into which the discipline of political science is
usually divided, comparative politics is the only
one that carries a methodological instead of a

substantive label. The term "comparative poli-
tics" indicates the how but does not specify the
what of the analysis. The label is somewhat
misleading because both explicit methodologi-
cal concern and implicit methodological aware-
ness among students of comparative politics
have generally not been very high.1 Indeed, too
many students of the field have been what
Giovanni Sartori calls "unconscious thinkers"
-unaware of and not guided by the logic and
methods of empirical science, although perhaps
well versed in quantitative research techniques.
One reason for this unconscious thinking is un-
doubtedly that the comparative method is such
a basic, and basically simple, approach, that a
methodology of comparative political analysis
does not really exist. As Sartori points out, the
other extreme-that of the "overconscious
thinkers," whose "standards of method and the-
ory are drawn from the physical paradigmatic
sciences" -is equally unsound.2 The purpose of
this paper is to contribute to "conscious think-
ing" in comparative politics by focusing on
comparison as a method of political inquiry.
The paper will attempt to analyze not only the
inevitable weaknesses and limitations of the
comparative method but also its great strengths
and potentialities.
* This article is a revised version of a paper pre-
sented to the Round Table Conference on Compara-
tive Politics of the International Political Science
Association, held in Turin, Italy, September 10-14,
1969. I am very grateful to David E. Apter, Donald
T. Campbell, Robert A. Dahl, Giuseppe Di Palma,
Harry Eckstein, Lewis J. Edinger, Samuel E. Finer,

Galen A. Irwin, Jean Laponce, Juan J. Linz, Stefano
Passigli, Austin Ranney, Stein Rokkan, Dankwart A.
Rustow, and Kurt Sontheimer for their comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts of the paper, which were
very helpful in the preparation of the revision.
1 The reverse applies to the relatively new field of
"political behavior": its name indicates a substantive
field of inquiry, but especially the derivative "be-
haviorism" has come to stand for a general approach
or set of methods. See Robert A. Dahl, "The Be-
havioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a
Monument to a Successful Protest," American Politi-
cal Science Review, 55 (December, 1961), pp. 763-
72.
2 Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Com-
parative Politics," American Political Science Review,
64 (December, 1970), p. 1033.
In the literature of comparative politics,
a wide variety of meanings is attached to
the terms "comparison" and "comparative
method." The comparative method is defined
here as one of the basic methods-the others
being the experimental, statistical, and case
study methods-of establishing general empiri-
cal propositions. It is, in the first place, defi-
nitely a method, not just "a convenient term
vaguely symbolizing the focus of one's research
interests."3 Nor is it a special set of substantive
concerns in the sense of Shmuel N. Eisenstadt's
definition of the comparative approach in social
research; he states that the term does not
"properly designate a specific method. .., but
rather a special focus on cross-societal, institu-

tional, or macrosocietal aspects of societies and
social analysis."4
Second, the comparative method is here de-
fined as one of the basic scientific methods, not
the scientific method. It is, therefore, narrower
in scope than what Harold D. Lasswell has in
mind when he argues that "for anyone with a
scientific approach to political phenomena the
idea of an independent comparative method
seems redundant," because the scientific ap-
proach is "unavoidably comparative."5 Like-
wise, the definition used here differs from the
very similar broad interpretation given by Ga-
briel A. Almond, who also equates the compar-
ative with the scientific method: "It makes no
sense to speak of a comparative politics in po-
litical science since if it is a science, it goes
without saying that it is comparative in its ap-
proach."6
"Arthur L. Kalleberg, "The Logic of Comparison:
A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of
Political Systems," World Politics, 19 (October 1966),
p. 72.
4Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Social Institutions: Com-
parative Study," in David L. Sills, ed., International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York:
Macmillan & Free Press, 1968), Vol. 14, p. 423. See
also Eisenstadt, "Problems in the Comparative Analy-
sis of Total Societies," Transactions of the Sixth
World Congress of Sociology (Evian: International
Sociological Association, 1966), Vol. 1, esp. p. 188.
"Harold D. Lasswell, "The Future of the Com-

parative Method," Comparative Politics, 1 (October,
1968), p. 3.
6 Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Theory and Po-
litical Science," American Political Science Review,
60 (December, 1966), pp. 877-78. Almond also ar-
gues that comparative politics is a "movement" in
political science rather than a subdiscipline. See his
682
2020 15:36:42 UTC
1971 Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method 683
Third, the comparative method is here re-
garded as a method of discovering empirical re-
lationships among variables, not as a method of
measurement. These two kinds of methods
should be clearly distinguished. It is the latter
that Kalleberg has in mind when he discusses
the "logic of comparison." He defines the com-
parative method as "a form of measurement";
comparison means "nonmetrical ordering," or
in other words, ordinal measurement.7 Simi-
larly, Sartori is thinking in terms of measure-
ment on nominal, ordinal (or comparative),
and cardinal scales when he describes the con-
scious thinker as "the man that realizes the lim-
itations of not having a thermometer and still
manages to say a great deal simply by saying
hot and cold, warmer and cooler."8 This impor-

tant step of measuring variables is logically
prior to the step of finding relationships among
them. It is the second of these steps to which
the term "comparative method" refers in this
paper.
Finally, a clear distinction should be made
between method and technique. The comparative
method is a broad-gauge, general method, not a
narrow, specialized technique. In this vein,
Gunnar Heckscher cautiously refers to "the
method (or at least the procedure) of compari-
son,"9 and Walter Goldschmidt prefers the
term comparative approach, because "it lacks
the preciseness to call it a method."'0 The com-
parative method may also be thought of as a
basic research strategy, in contrast with a mere
tactical aid to research. This will become clear
in the discussion that follows.
The Experimental, Statistical, and
Comparative Methods
The nature of the comparative method can
be understood best if it is compared and con-
"Comparative Politics," in International Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12, pp. 331-36.
TKalleberg, op. cit., pp. 72-73; see also pp. 75-78.
"Sartori, op. cit., p. 1033. See also Paul F. Lazars-
feld and Allen H. Barton, "Qualitative Measurement
in the Social Sciences: Classification, Typologies, and
Indices," in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell,
eds., The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in

Scope and Method (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1951), pp. 155-92.
9Gunnar Heckscher, The Study of Comparative
Government and Politics (London: Allen and Un-
win, 1957), p. 68 (italics added).
"Walter Goldschmidt, Comparative Functionalism:
An Essay in Anthropological Theory (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1966), p. 4. Oscar Lewis
argues that "there is no distinctive 'comparative meth-
od' in anthropology," and that he therefore prefers to
discuss "comparisons in anthropology rather than the
comparative method." See his "Comparisons in Cul-
tural Anthropology" in William L. Thomas, Jr., ed.,
Current Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1956), p. 259.
trasted with the two other fundamental strate-
gies of research; these will be referred to,
following Neil J. Smelser's example, as the ex-
perimental and the statistical methods." All
three methods (as well as certain forms of the
case study method'2) aim at scientific explana-
tion, which consists of two basic elements: (1)
the establishment of general empirical relation-
ships among two or more variables,'3 while (2)
all other variables are controlled, that is, held
constant. These two elements are inseparable:
one cannot be sure that a relationship is a true
one unless the influence of other variables is
controlled. The ceteris paribus condition is vital
to empirical generalizations.
The experimental method, in its simplest
form, uses two equivalent groups, one of which

(the experimental group) is exposed to a stim-
ulus while the other (the control group) is not.
The two groups are then compared, and any
difference can be attributed to the stimulus.
Thus one knows the relationship between two
variables-with the important assurance that
no other variables were involved, because in all
respects but one the two groups were alike.
Equivalence-that is, the condition that the
cetera are indeed paria-can be achieved by a
process of deliberate randomization. The exper-
imental method is the most nearly ideal method
for scientific explanation, but unfortunately it
u For the idea of discussing the comparative meth-
od in relation to these other basic methods, I am in-
debted to Neil J. Smelser's outstanding and most en-
lightening article "Notes on the Methodology of
Comparative Analysis of Economic Activity," Trans-
actions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology
(Evian: International Sociological Association, 1966),
Vol. 2, pp. 101-17. For other general discussions of
the comparative method, see LUo Moulin, "La Moth-
ode comparative en Science Politique," Revue Inter-
nationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionelle, 7
(January-June, 1957), pp. 57-71; S. F. Nadel, The
Foundations of Social Anthropology (London: Cohen
and West, 1951), pp. 222-55; Maurice Duverger,
MAthodes des Sciences Sociales (3rd ed., Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), pp. 375-99;
John W. M. Whiting, "The Cross-Cultural Method,"
in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psy-
chology (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol.
1, pp. 523-31; Frank W. Moore, ed., Readings in
Cross-Cultural Methodology (New Haven, Conn.:
HRAF Press, 1961); Adam Przeworski and Henry

Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry
(New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970); and Robert T.
Holt and John E. Turner, "The Methodology of Com-
parative Research," in Holt and Turner, eds., The
Methodology of Comparative Research (New York:
Free Press, 1970), pp. 1-20.
13 The case study method will be discussed below.
" Eugene J. Meehan, The Theory and Method of
Political Analysis (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press,
1965). He expresses this idea in three short sentences:
"Science seeks to establish relationships" (p. 35);
"Science . . . is empirical" (p. 37); "Science is a
generalizing activity" (p. 43).
2020 15:36:42 UTC
684 The American Political Science Review Vol. 65
can only rarely be used in political science be-
cause of practical and ethical impediments.
An alternative to the experimental method is
the statistical method. It entails the conceptual
(mathematical) manipulation of empiricially ob-
served data-which cannot be manipulated sit-
uationally as in experimental design-in order
to discover controlled relationships among vari-
ables. It handles the problem of control by
means of partial correlations. For instance,
when one wants to inquire into the relationship

between political participation and level of edu-
cation attained, one should control for the in-
fluence of age because younger generations have
received more education than older genera-
tions. This can be done by partialing-dividing
the sample into a number of different age
groups and looking at the correlations between
participation and education within each sepa-
rate age group. Paul F. Lazarsfeld states that
this is such a basic research procedure that it
"is applied almost automatically in empirical
research. Whenever an investigator finds him-
self faced with the relationship between two
variables, he immediately starts to 'cross-tabu-
late,' i.e., to consider the role of further vari-
ables."114
The statistical method can be regarded,
therefore, as an approximation of the experi-
mental method. As Ernest Nagel emphasizes,
"every branch of inquiry aiming at reliable gen-
eral laws concerning empirical subject matter
must employ a procedure that, if it is not
strictly controlled experimentation, has the es-
sential logical functions of experiment in in-
quiry."15 The statistical method does have these
essential logical functions, but it is not as
strong a method as experimentation because it
cannot handle the problem of control as well. It
cannot control for all other variables, merely
for the other key variables that are known or
suspected to exert influence. Strictly speaking,
14 Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Interpretation of Statistical
Relations as a Research Operation," in Lazarsfeld and
Morris Rosenberg, eds., The Language of Social Re-

search: A Reader in the Methodology of Social Re-
search (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), p. 115. How-
ever, control by means of partial correlations does not
allow for the effects of measurement error or unique
factor components; see Marilynn B. Brewer, William
D. Crano and Donald T. Campbell, "Testing a Single-
Factor Model as an Alternative to the Misuse of Par-
tial Correlations in Hypothesis-Testing Research, Soci-
ometry, 33 (March, 1970), pp. 1-11. Moreover, par-
tial correlations do not resolve the problem of the
codiffusion of characteristics, known in anthropology
as "Galton's problem"; see Raoul Naroll, "Two So-
lutions to Galton's Problem," Philosophy of Science,
28 (January, 1961), pp. 15-39, and Przeworski and
Teune, op. cit., pp. 51-53.
16 Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), pp. 452f.
even the experimental method does not handle
the problem of control perfectly, because the
investigator can never be completely sure that
his groups are actually alike in every respect.16
But experimental design provides the closest
approximation to this ideal. The statistical
method, in turn, is an approximation-not the
equivalent-of the experimental method. Con-
versely, one can also argue, as Lazarsfeld does,
that the experimental method constitutes a spe-
cial form of the statistical method, but only if
one adds that it is an especially potent form.'7
The logic of the comparative method is, in
accordance with the general standard ex-
pounded by Nagel, also the same as the logic of
the experimental method. The comparative

method resembles the statistical method in all
respects except one. The crucial difference is
that the number of cases it deals with is too
small to permit systematic control by means of
partial correlations. This problem occurs in sta-
tistical operations, too; especially when one
wants to control simultaneously for many vari-
ables, one quickly "runs out of cases." The com-
parative method should be resorted to when the
number of cases available for analysis is so
small that cross-tabulating them further in or-
der to establish credible controls is not feasible.
There is, consequently, no clear dividing line
between the statistical and comparative meth-
ods; the difference depends entirely on the
number of cases.'8 It follows that in many re-
16 For instance, if the groups are made equivalent
by means of deliberate randomization, the investigator
knows that they are alike with a very high degree of
probability, but not with absolute certainty. More-
over, as Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., states, so-called
"forcing variables" cannot be controlled by randomi-
zation. See his Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental
Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1964), pp. 23-26. In general, Blalock empha-
sizes "the underlying similarity between the logic of
making causal inferences on the basis of experimental
and nonexperimental designs" (p. 26).
17Lazarsfeld, "Interpretation of Statistical Relations
as a Research Operation," p. 119. Talcott Parsons
makes a similar statement with regard to the com-
parative method: "Experiment is . . . nothing but the
comparative method where the cases to be compared
are produced to order and under controlled condi-

tions." See his The Structure of Social Action (2nd
ed., New York: Free Press, 1949), p. 743. Another
advantage of the experimental method is that the time
variable is controlled, which is especially important if
one seeks to establish causal relationships. In statistical
design, this control can be approximated by means of
the panel method.
18In order to highlight the special problems arising
from the availability of only a small number of cases,
the comparative method is discussed as a distinct
method. Of course, it can be argued with equal justice
that the comparative and statistical methods should be
regarded as two aspects of a single method. Many
authors use the term "comparative method" in the
2020 15:36:42 UTC
1971 Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method 685
search situations, with an intermediate number
of cases, a combination of the statistical and
comparative methods is appropriate. Where the
cases are national political systems, as they of-
ten are in the field of comparative politics, the
number of cases is necessarily so restricted that
the comparative method has to be used.
From the vantage point of the general aims
and the alternative methods of scientific in-
quiry, one can consider the comparative
method in proper perspective and answer such

questions as the following, raised by Samuel H.
Beer and by Harry Eckstein: Can comparison
be regarded as "the social scientist's equivalent
of the natural scientist's laboratory?"'9 and: "Is
the comparative method in the social sciences
. . . really an adequate substitute for experimen-
tation in the natural sciences, as has sometimes
been claimed?"20 The answer is that the com-
parative method is not the equivalent of the ex-
perimental method but only a very imperfect
substitute. A clear awareness of the limitations
of the comparative method is necessary but
need not be disabling, because, as we shall see,
these weaknesses can be minimized. The
"conscious thinker" in comparative politics
should realize the limitations of the compara-
tive method, but he should also recognize and
take advantage of its possibilities.
broad sense of the method of multivariate empirical,
but nonexperimental, analysis, i.e., including both the
comparative and statistical methods as defined in this
paper. This is how A. R. Radcliffe-Brown uses the
term when he argues that "only the comparative
method can give us general propositions." (Brown,
"The Comparative Method in Social Anthropology,"
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of
Great Britain and Ireland, 81 [1951], p. 22.) Pmile
Durkheim also follows this usage when he declares
that "comparative sociology is not a particular branch
of sociology; it is sociology itself, in so far as it ceases
to be purely descriptive and aspires to account for
facts." (Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method,
translated by Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller,
[8th ed., Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1938], p. 139.) See
also the statements by Lasswell and Almond cited

above. Rodney Needham combines the two terms, and
speaks of "large-scale statistical comparison," i.e., the
statistical method. (Needham, "Notes on Compara-
tive Method and Prescriptive Alliance," Bijdragen tot
de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 118 [1962], pp. 160-
82.) On the other hand, E. E. Evans-Pritchard uses
exactly the same terminology as used by Smelser and
as adopted in this paper, when he makes a distinction
between "small-scale comparative studies" and "large-
scale statistical ones." See his The Comparative Meth-
od in Social Anthropology (London: Athlone Press,
1963), p. 22.
"'Samuel H. Beer, "The Comparative Method and
the Study of British Politics," Comparative Politics, 1
(October, 1968), p. 19.
20Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative
Politics, Past and Present," in Eckstein and David E.
Apter, eds., Comparative Politics: A Reader (New
York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 3.
The Comparative Method: Weaknesses
and Strengths
The principal problems facing the compara-
tive method can be succinctly stated as: many
variables, small number of cases. These two
problems are closely interrelated. The former is
common to virtually all social science research
regardless of the particular method applied to
it; the latter is peculiar to the comparative
method and renders the problem of handling
many variables more difficult to solve.
Before turning to a discussion of specific sug-

gestions for minimizing these problems, two
general comments are in order. First, if at all
possible one should generally use the statistical
(or perhaps even the experimental) method in-
stead of the weaker comparative method. But
often, given the inevitable scarcity of time, en-
ergy, and financial resources, the intensive
comparative analysis of a few cases may be
more promising than a more superficial statisti-
cal analysis of many cases. In such a situation,
the most fruitful approach would be to regard
the comparative analysis as the first stage of re-
search, in which hypotheses are carefully for-
mulated, and the statistical analysis as the sec-
ond stage, in which these hypotheses are tested
in as large a sample as possible.
In one type of comparative cross-national re-
search, it is logically possible and may be ad-
vantageous to shift from the comparative to the
statistical method. Stein Rokkan distinguishes
two aims of cross-national analysis. One is the
testing of "macro hypotheses" concerning the
"interrelations of structural elements of total
systems"; here the number of cases tends to be
limited, and one has to rely on the comparative
method. The other is "micro replications," de-
signed "to test out in other national and cul-
tural settings a proposition already validated in
one setting."21 Here, too, one can use the com-
parative method, but if the proposition in ques-
tion focuses on individuals as units of analysis,
one can also use the statistical method; as Mer-
ritt and Rokkan point out, instead of the "one-
nation, one-case" approach, nationality can
simply be treated as an additional variable on a

par with other individual attributes such as oc-
cupation, age, sex, type of neighborhood, etc.22
21 Stein Rokkan, "Comparative Cross-National Re-
search: The Context of Current Efforts," in Richard
L. Merritt and Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The
Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 19-
20. Rokkan specifically recommends the use of "paired
comparisons" for this purpose; see his "Methods and
Models in the Comparative Study of Nation-Build-
ing," in Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the
Comparative Study of the Processes of Development
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), p. 52.
22Merritt and Rokkan, op. cit., p. 193.
2020 15:36:42 UTC
686 The American Political Science Review Vol. 65
Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein
make a similar distinction between truly "cross-
national studies" in which total systems are the
units of analysis, and "multi-national but cross-
individual research."23
The second general comment concerns a
dangerous but tempting fallacy in the applica-
tion of the comparative method: the fallacy of
attaching too much significance to negative
findings. The comparative method should not

lapse into what Johan Galtung calls "the tradi-
tional quotation/ illustration methodology,
where cases are picked that are in accordance
with the hypothesis-and hypotheses are re-
jected if one deviant case is found."24 All cases
should, of course, be selected systematically,
and the scientific search should be aimed at
probabilistic, not universal, generalizations.
The erroneous tendency to reject a hypothesis
on the basis of a single deviant case is rare
when the statistical method is used to analyze a
large sample, but in the comparative analysis of
a small number of cases even a single deviant
fitiding tends to loom large. One or two deviant
cases obviously constitute a much less serious
problem in a statistical analysis of very many
cases than in a comparative study of only a few
-perhaps less than ten-cases. But it is never-
theless a mistake to reject a hypothesis "be-
cause one can think pretty quickly of a con-
trary case."25 Deviant cases weaken a probabi-
listic hypothesis, but they can only invalidate it
if they turn up in sufficient numbers to make
the hypothesized relationship disappear alto-
gether.26
23 Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein,
"The Comparative Study of National Societies," So-
cfrzl Science Information, 6 (October, 1967), pp. 27-
33 (italics added). See also Przeworski and Teune,
op. cit., pp. 34-43.
24He adds: "This is a very naive conception of so-
cial science propositions; if only perfect correlations
should be permitted social science would not have
come very far." Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods

of Social Research (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1967),
p. 505. The functions of deviant case analysis will be
discussed below.
25W. J. M. Mackenzie, Politics and Social Science
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 52. I
have been guilty of committing this fallacy myself. In
my critique of Giovanni Sartori's proposition relating
political instability to extreme multipartism (systems
with six or more significant parties), one of my argu-
ments consists of the deviance of a single historical
case: the stable six-party system of the Netherlands
during the interwar years. See Arend Lijphart, "Typol-
ogies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political
Studies, 1 (April, 1968), pp. 32-35.
26 t is clearly incorrect, therefore, to argue that on
logical grounds a probabilistic generalization can
never be invalidated; cf. Guenter Lewy's statement:
"To be sure, a finding of a very large number of . . .
(deviant cases would cast doubt upon the value of the
After these introductory observations, let us
turn to a discussion of specific ways and means
of minimizing the "many variables, small N"
problem of the comparative method. These
may be divided into four categories:
(1) Increase the number of cases …
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in

advanced democracies
Boix, Carles
The American Political Science Review; Sep 1999; 93, 3;
ProQuest Central
pg. 609

Why is Democracy
Performing so Poorly?
Francis Fukuyama
Francis Fukuyama is Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the
Center
on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford.
His most
recent book is Political Order and Political Decay: From the
Industrial
Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (2014).
The Journal of Democracy published its inaugural issue a bit
past the
midpoint of what Samuel P. Huntington labeled the “third
wave” of de-
mocratization, right after the fall of the Berlin Wall and just
before the
breakup of the former Soviet Union.1 The transitions in
Southern Europe
and most of those in Latin America had already happened, and
Eastern
Europe was moving at dizzying speed away from communism,

while the
democratic transitions in sub-Saharan Africa and the former
USSR were
just getting underway. Overall, there has been remarkable
worldwide
progress in democratization over a period of almost 45 years,
raising
the number of electoral democracies from about 35 in 1970 to
well over
110 in 2014.
But as Larry Diamond has pointed out, there has been a
democratic
recession since 2006, with a decline in aggregate Freedom
House scores
every year since then.2 The year 2014 has not been good for
democracy,
with two big authoritarian powers, Russia and China, on the
move at
either end of Eurasia. The “Arab Spring” of 2011, which raised
expecta-
tions that the Arab exception to the third wave might end, has
degener-
ated into renewed dictatorship in the case of Egypt, and into
anarchy
in Libya, Yemen, and also Syria, which along with Iraq has seen
the
emergence of a new radical Islamist movement, the Islamic
State in Iraq
and Syria (ISIS).
It is hard to know whether we are experiencing a momentary
setback
in a general movement toward greater democracy around the
world, simi-
lar to a stock-market correction, or whether the events of this

year signal
a broader shift in world politics and the rise of serious
alternatives to
democracy. In either case, it is hard not to feel that the
performance of
Journal of Democracy Volume 26, Number 1 January 2015
© 2015 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins
University Press
12 Journal of Democracy
democracies around the world has been deficient in recent
years. This
begins with the most developed and successful democracies,
those of the
United States and the European Union, which experienced
massive eco-
nomic crises in the late 2000s and seem to be mired in a period
of slow
growth and stagnating incomes. But a number of newer
democracies,
from Brazil to Turkey to India, have also been disappointing in
their per-
formance in many respects, and subject to their own protest
movements.
Spontaneous democratic movements against authoritarian
regimes
continue to arise out of civil society, from Ukraine and Georgia
to Tu-
nisia and Egypt to Hong Kong. But few of these movements
have been
successful in leading to the establishment of stable, well-

functioning
democracies. It is worth asking why the performance of
democracy
around the world has been so disappointing.
In my view, a single important factor lies at the core of many
demo-
cratic setbacks over the past generation. It has to do with a
failure of
institutionalization—the fact that state capacity in many new
and ex-
isting democracies has not kept pace with popular demands for
demo-
cratic accountability. It is much harder to move from a
patrimonial or
neopatrimonial state to a modern, impersonal one than it is to
move
from an authoritarian regime to one that holds regular, free, and
fair
elections. It is the failure to establish modern, well-governed
states
that has been the Achilles heel of recent democratic transitions.
Some Definitions
Modern liberal democracies combine three basic institutions:
the
state, rule of law, and democratic accountability.
The first of these, the state, is a legitimate monopoly of
coercive
power that exercises its authority over a defined territory. States
con-
centrate and employ power to keep the peace, defend
communities from
external enemies, enforce laws, and provide basic public goods.

The rule of law is a set of rules, reflecting community values,
that are
binding not just on citizens, but also on the elites who wield
coercive
power. If law does not constrain the powerful, it amounts to
commands
of the executive and constitutes merely rule by law.
Finally, democratic accountability seeks to ensure that
government
acts in the interests of the whole community, rather than simply
in the
self-interest of the rulers. It is usually achieved through
procedures such
as free and fair multiparty elections, though procedural
accountability is
not always coincident with substantive accountability.
A liberal democracy balances these potentially contradictory
institu-
tions. The state generates and employs power, while rule of law
and
democratic accountability seek to constrain power and ensure
that it is
used in the public interest. A state without constraining
institutions is a
dictatorship. And a polity that is all constraint and no power is
anarchic.
13Francis Fukuyama
As Samuel Huntington used to argue, before a polity can
constrain

power, it must be able to employ it. In the words of Alexander
Hamilton,
“A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution;
and a gov-
ernment ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in
practice,
a bad government.”3
There is a further critical distinction to be made between
patrimonial
and modern states. A modern state aspires to be impersonal,
treating
people equally on the basis of citizenship rather than on
whether they
have a personal relationship to the ruler. By contrast,
patrimonial states
are ones in which the polity is regarded as a species of personal
prop-
erty, and in which there is no distinction between the public
interest
and the ruler’s private interest. Today there are no fully
patrimonial
societies, since no one dares any longer to claim ownership of
an entire
country, as kings and queens did in ages past. There are,
however, many
neopatrimonial states that pretend to be modern polities, but
these in
fact constitute rent-sharing kleptocracies run for the private
benefit of
the insiders. Neopatrimonialism can coexist with democracy,
producing
widespread patronage and clientelism in which politicians share
state
resources with networks of political supporters. In such
societies, indi-

viduals go into politics not to pursue a vision of public good,
but rather
to enrich themselves.
Coercion remains central to the functioning of the state, which
is
why state power so often generates fear and hatred. Michael
Mann has
famously distinguished between “despotic” and “infrastructural”
power,
the former related to coercion and the latter to the ability to
provide
public goods and look after the public interest.4 This distinction
might
tempt us to say that “good” states have infrastructural power,
while
“bad” states make use of despotic power. But, in fact, coercion
is impor-
tant to all states. Successful states convert power into
authority—that is,
into voluntary compliance by citizens based on the belief that
the state’s
actions are legitimate. But not all citizens agree to obey the
law, and
even the most legitimate democracies require police power to
enforce
the law. It is impossible to control corruption, for example, or
to collect
taxes if nobody goes to jail for violating the law. Enforcement
capac-
ity does not emerge simply through passing laws; it also
requires in-
vestment in manpower and training, and in establishing the
institutional
rules that govern its exercise.

If there is anything that the experience of the past 25 years
should
have taught us, it is that the democratic leg of this tripod is
much easier
to construct than the rule of law or the modern state. Or to put it
slightly
differently, the development of modern states has not kept pace
with
the development of democratic institutions, leading to
unbalanced situa-
tions in which new (and sometimes even well-established)
democracies
have not been able to keep up with their citizens’ demand for
high-
quality government services. This has led, in turn, to the
delegitima-
tion of democracy as such. Conversely, the fact that
authoritarian states
like China and Singapore have been able to provide such
services has
increased their prestige relative to that of democracy in many
parts of
the world.
The recent experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate this
prob-
lem. After the U.S. invasion and occupation of these countries
in 2001
and 2003, respectively, the United States was able, with some
interna-
tional help, to organize democratic elections that led to the

seating of
new governments in both countries. The quality of democracy in
both
places—especially in Afghanistan, where the presidential
elections of
2009 and 2014 were marred by serious allegations of fraud5—
was ques-
tioned by many, but at least a democratic process was in place
to provide
leadership that had some semblance of legitimacy.
What did not occur in either place was the development of a
modern
state that could defend the country’s territory from internal and
exter-
nal enemies and deliver public services in a fair and impartial
manner.
Both countries were beset by internal insurgencies, and in 2014
the
U.S.-trained Iraqi army collapsed in the north under the
onslaught of
ISIS. Both countries were plagued by extremely high levels of
cor-
ruption, which in turn undermined their ability to deliver
government
services and undercut their legitimacy. The huge investments in
state-
building in both places by the United States and its coalition
partners
seem to have had limited effect.
State-building failures also played a key role in events in
Ukraine.
Western friends of democracy cheered when the Orange
Revolution
forced a new presidential election in 2004, leading to the defeat

of in-
cumbent prime minister Viktor Yanukovych by Viktor
Yushchenko. But
the new Orange Coalition proved feckless and corrupt, and did
nothing
to improve the overall quality of governance in Ukraine. As a
result,
Yanukovych defeated Yushchenko in 2010 in what most
observers cred-
ited as a free and fair election. Yanukovych’s presidency was
marked
by even higher levels of predatory behavior, generating a new
round
of protests in Kyiv after his announcement in late 2013 that he
would
pursue association with Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Union rather
than
with the European Union. In the meantime, Putin had
consolidated his
increasingly illiberal rule in Russia and strengthened his state’s
position
vis-`a-vis the outside world, making possible the outright
annexation of
Crimea following Yanukovych’s ouster in February 2014.
I would argue that the current conflict pitting Russia against the
new
Ukrainian government and its Western backers is less one over
democ-
racy per se than over modern versus neopatrimonial political
orders.
There is little question that, in the wake of the Crimean
annexation,
Vladimir Putin has become very popular in Russia and would be
likely
to win overwhelmingly if a new election were to be held. The

real choice
facing people in this region is a different one—whether their
societies
15Francis Fukuyama
are to be based on governments seeking to serve the public
interest in
an impersonal manner, or are to be ruled by a corrupt coalition
of elites
who seek to use the state as a route to personal enrichment.
The legitimacy of many democracies around the world depends
less
on the deepening of their democratic institutions than on their
ability
to provide high-quality governance. The new Ukrainian state
will not
survive if it does not address the problem of pervasive
corruption that
brought down its Orange Coalition predecessor. Democracy has
become
deeply entrenched in most of Latin America over the past
generation;
what is lacking now in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and
Mexico
is the capacity to deliver basic public goods like education,
infrastruc-
ture, and citizen security. The same can be said of the world’s
largest
democracy, India, which suffers from pervasive clientelism and
corrup-
tion. In 2014, it decisively turned to the BJP’s Narendra Modi
in hopes

that he would provide decisive leadership and strong
government in
place of the feckless and corrupt Congress-led coalition that had
been in
power for the past decade.
How to Get to a Modern State
There is by now a huge literature on democratic transitions,
much of
it published originally in the Journal of Democracy. There is a
much
smaller literature available on the question of how to make the
transition
from a neopatrimonial to a modern state, though some progress
has been
made over the past decade and a half. This reflects a conceptual
deficit,
rooted in misconceptions of the nature of the underlying
problem.
For example, there is a tendency to associate state modernity
with the
absence of corruption. Corruption, of course, is a huge problem
in many
societies and has generated its own large literature. But while
there is a
high degree of correlation between levels of corruption and poor
state
performance, they are not the same thing. A state may be
relatively un-
corrupt and yet be incapable of delivering basic services due to
a lack of
capacity. No one has argued, for example, that Guinea, Sierra
Leone, or
Liberia has been unable to deal with the recent Ebola epidemic

because
of pervasive corruption in their respective public-health
systems; rather,
the problem is one of insufficient human and material
resources—doc-
tors, nurses, and hospitals with electricity, clean water, and the
like.
“State capacity” therefore comes much closer than the absence
of
corruption to describing what is at the core of state modernity.
Modern
states provide a bewildering array of complex services, from
keeping
economic and social statistics to providing disaster relief,
forecasting
the weather, and controlling the flight paths of airplanes. All
these ac-
tivities require huge investments in human resources and in the
material
conditions that allow agents of the state to operate; the simple
absence
of corruption does not mean that these will exist. Yet even the
term
“state capacity” fails to capture the ends that this capacity
serves and the
degree to which it is being employed impersonally.
There is, moreover, a serious lack of clarity about the ways in
which
strong state capacity has been generated in the past. At the

moment,
there is something of a consensus within the international donor
com-
munity on how to pursue good gover-
nance, a consensus that is embedded in
programs like participatory budgeting,
the Open Government Partnership,
and the initiatives of the numerous
organizations promoting government
transparency around the world. Under-
lying these approaches is the theory
that good governance is the product
of greater transparency and account-
ability. These approaches assume that
more information about government
corruption or malfeasance will lead to
citizen anger and demands for better state performance, which
will in
turn push governments to reform themselves. Better-quality
democracy,
in other words, is seen as the solution to the problem of
corruption and
weak state capacity.
The only problem with this strategy is that there is strikingly
little
empirical evidence demonstrating that such an approach is how
existing
high-performing governments have been created, either
historically or
under contemporary circumstances. Many states with relatively
high-
performing governments—China, Japan, Germany, France, and
Den-

mark, for example—created modern “Weberian” bureaucracies
under
authoritarian conditions; those that subsequently went on to
become
democracies inherited meritocratic state apparatuses that simply
sur-
vived the transition. The motive for creating modern
governments was
not grassroots pressure from informed and mobilized citizens
but rather
elite pressure, often for reasons of national security. Charles
Tilly’s fa-
mous aphorism that “war makes the state and the state makes
war” sums
up the experience not just of much of early modern Europe, but
also of
China during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States
periods, lead-
ing to the emergence of an impersonal state during the Qin
unification
in the third century B.C.E.6
Similarly, there is strikingly little evidence that current donor
and
NGO efforts to promote good governance through increasing
transpar-
ency and accountability have had a measurable impact on state
perfor-
mance.7 The theory that there should be a correlation between
the in-
creased availability of information about government
performance and
the quality of final government outputs rests on a number of
heroic as-
sumptions—that citizens will care about poor government
performance

Although democracy is
a driver of clientelism
at low levels of per
capita income, it may
open a path toward the
creation of higher-quality
government as nations
grow richer.
17Francis Fukuyama
(as opposed to being content to benefit from practices like
ethnic-based
patronage); that they are capable of organizing politically to put
pres-
sure on the government; that the country’s political institutions
are ones
that accurately transmit grassroots sentiment to politicians in
ways that
make the latter accountable; and finally, that the government
actually
has the capacity to perform as citizens demand.
The actual history of the relationship between state modernity
and
democracy is far more complicated than the contemporary
theory sug-
gests. Following the framework first established by Martin
Shefter, I
have argued elsewhere that the sequence by which democracy
(mea-
sured by the degree of universality of the franchise) and state
modernity

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