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On deobfuscation
   in practice
    Vasily Bukasov
   Dmitry Schelkunov
Obfuscation applications
• Software protection against
  computer piracy

• Malware protection against
  automatic detection and to
  impede analysis of a
  malicious code
Obfuscators and protectors
• Manual obfuscation requires a lot
  of resources

• It’s much easier to use
  obfuscators and protectors which
  promise a strong obfuscation
Common code protection
     techniques
• Code encryption (out of
  scope of our report)
• Code virtualization
• Code morphing
Code virtualization
• Converts a source assembler
  code to the specially generated
  byte-code
• Inserts byte-code and byte-
  code interpreter into the source
  PE file
Code virtualization
 Byte-code mostly represents
original assembler instructions
 so its execution has the same
  effect as from the original
          instructions
Code virtualization
                   Get instruction byte-code

Byte-code
              Get instruction arguments from VM
 fetching      context or from another location
   loop
                      Process instruction

              Save result into VM context or into
                       another location
VM context

• Contains variables associated
  with processor registers
• Contains VM state
• Its location can be easily found in
  most cases
VM context location
• Dynamically allocated memory
  (VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc)
• Global memory (access via
  spinlock)
• Stack
VM stack context layout
                      0
    Not initialized
     VM context       rSP

    Reserved area

    Stack of the
   protected code
«Virtualized» addition
void unoptimal_addition( int a, int b, int *p )
{
    int u, v, t, *r;


    u = a;
    v = b;
    r = p;


    t = u + v;
    *r = t;
}
Virtualized code execution
   Getting byte-code
Loading from VM context   This code is
  Instruction execution   asking to be
 Saving to VM context
   Getting byte-code
                          optimized 
Loading from VM context
  Instruction execution
 Saving to VM context
         etc…
Code devirtualization
• We can locate VM context
• We can get CFG in most cases
• We can use common code
  optimization algorithms to
  deobfuscate a virtualized code
Code morphing
• Used to increase resistance to
  the static analysis
• Used for the CFG obfuscation
• Used to increase VM body
  analyzing complexity
Code morphing and CFG
       obfuscation
It’s a difficult task to decompile
a machine code

Therefore protectors don’t even
try to do it 
Code morphing and CFG
       obfuscation
Data dependencies analysis is
weak in protectors


Therefore they are limited in
choice of obfuscation techniques
Code morphing common
      techniques
              Recursive templates
                 Template      Template
                 Instruction
                 Instruction   Template
Instruction
                     …
                 Instruction
                               Template
Code morphing common
         techniques
• Dead code insertion
• Garbage code insertion
• Opaque predicates
• Jump address calculation
• Code cloning
Morphed code deobfuscation

• Decompilation into IR
• IR instruction emulation
• Collecting variables values
• Emulation-based deobfuscation
  techniques
Ariadne engine
• An engine for RE
• Can be used as IDA plugin
• Enables PE format analyzing,
  disassembling and modifying
• Supports GP, FPU, MMX, SSE,
  SSE2, SSE3, SSSE3, SSE4.1,
  SSE4.2, SSE4a, VMX, SMX
Ariadne engine
• Supports assembler instructions
  translation into Ariadne
  Intermediate Representation
  (AIR)
• Supports IR instructions
  emulation
• Contains emulator-based code
  tracing mechanisms
Ariadne engine

• Contains built-in trace
  deobfuscation (AIR Wave
  Deobfuscation Technology)
AIR Wave Deobfuscation
       Technology
• Static deobfuscation
 –based on the classical compiler
  theory approaches
 –doesn’t use emulation
AIR Wave Deobfuscation
       Technology
• Dynamic deobfuscation
 –uses Ariadne IR emulator
 –calculates values of variables
 –determines in a lot of cases where a
  pointer points to
 –used for dereferenced pointers
  deobfuscation
AIR Wave Deobfuscation
      Technology
• Deobfuscation techniques
 –dead code elimination
 –variables propagation
 –constant folding
 –math simplifications
AIR Wave Deobfuscation
      Technology
• Deobfuscation techniques
 –loop unrolling
 –common subexpression
  elimination
 –pointer analysis and alias
  classification
Our results
• Many obfuscators/protectors
  provide a weak obfuscation
• Ariadne engine can be
  effectively used for
  deobfuscation
AIR Wave Deobfuscation
       Technology
Tested on …

See it for yourself 
And our thanks go…
• To Rolf Rolles for his works
  about virtualization
  obfuscation unpacking
• To Leta Group for Ariadne
  sponsorship
Ariadne engine
http://ariadne.group-ib.ru

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Dmitry Schelkunov, Vasily Bukasov - About practical deobfuscation

  • 1. On deobfuscation in practice Vasily Bukasov Dmitry Schelkunov
  • 2. Obfuscation applications • Software protection against computer piracy • Malware protection against automatic detection and to impede analysis of a malicious code
  • 3. Obfuscators and protectors • Manual obfuscation requires a lot of resources • It’s much easier to use obfuscators and protectors which promise a strong obfuscation
  • 4. Common code protection techniques • Code encryption (out of scope of our report) • Code virtualization • Code morphing
  • 5. Code virtualization • Converts a source assembler code to the specially generated byte-code • Inserts byte-code and byte- code interpreter into the source PE file
  • 6. Code virtualization Byte-code mostly represents original assembler instructions so its execution has the same effect as from the original instructions
  • 7. Code virtualization Get instruction byte-code Byte-code Get instruction arguments from VM fetching context or from another location loop Process instruction Save result into VM context or into another location
  • 8. VM context • Contains variables associated with processor registers • Contains VM state • Its location can be easily found in most cases
  • 9. VM context location • Dynamically allocated memory (VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc) • Global memory (access via spinlock) • Stack
  • 10. VM stack context layout 0 Not initialized VM context rSP Reserved area Stack of the protected code
  • 11. «Virtualized» addition void unoptimal_addition( int a, int b, int *p ) { int u, v, t, *r; u = a; v = b; r = p; t = u + v; *r = t; }
  • 12. Virtualized code execution Getting byte-code Loading from VM context This code is Instruction execution asking to be Saving to VM context Getting byte-code optimized  Loading from VM context Instruction execution Saving to VM context etc…
  • 13. Code devirtualization • We can locate VM context • We can get CFG in most cases • We can use common code optimization algorithms to deobfuscate a virtualized code
  • 14. Code morphing • Used to increase resistance to the static analysis • Used for the CFG obfuscation • Used to increase VM body analyzing complexity
  • 15. Code morphing and CFG obfuscation It’s a difficult task to decompile a machine code Therefore protectors don’t even try to do it 
  • 16. Code morphing and CFG obfuscation Data dependencies analysis is weak in protectors Therefore they are limited in choice of obfuscation techniques
  • 17. Code morphing common techniques Recursive templates Template Template Instruction Instruction Template Instruction … Instruction Template
  • 18. Code morphing common techniques • Dead code insertion • Garbage code insertion • Opaque predicates • Jump address calculation • Code cloning
  • 19. Morphed code deobfuscation • Decompilation into IR • IR instruction emulation • Collecting variables values • Emulation-based deobfuscation techniques
  • 20. Ariadne engine • An engine for RE • Can be used as IDA plugin • Enables PE format analyzing, disassembling and modifying • Supports GP, FPU, MMX, SSE, SSE2, SSE3, SSSE3, SSE4.1, SSE4.2, SSE4a, VMX, SMX
  • 21. Ariadne engine • Supports assembler instructions translation into Ariadne Intermediate Representation (AIR) • Supports IR instructions emulation • Contains emulator-based code tracing mechanisms
  • 22. Ariadne engine • Contains built-in trace deobfuscation (AIR Wave Deobfuscation Technology)
  • 23. AIR Wave Deobfuscation Technology • Static deobfuscation –based on the classical compiler theory approaches –doesn’t use emulation
  • 24. AIR Wave Deobfuscation Technology • Dynamic deobfuscation –uses Ariadne IR emulator –calculates values of variables –determines in a lot of cases where a pointer points to –used for dereferenced pointers deobfuscation
  • 25. AIR Wave Deobfuscation Technology • Deobfuscation techniques –dead code elimination –variables propagation –constant folding –math simplifications
  • 26. AIR Wave Deobfuscation Technology • Deobfuscation techniques –loop unrolling –common subexpression elimination –pointer analysis and alias classification
  • 27. Our results • Many obfuscators/protectors provide a weak obfuscation • Ariadne engine can be effectively used for deobfuscation
  • 28. AIR Wave Deobfuscation Technology Tested on … See it for yourself 
  • 29. And our thanks go… • To Rolf Rolles for his works about virtualization obfuscation unpacking • To Leta Group for Ariadne sponsorship