Slides from Copenhagen presentation by Jesse C. Ribot. Full title: Double Standards on an Uneven Playing Field: Distribution along Senegal’s Charcoal Commodity Chain - A Case Study of POLICY & PROFIT

1. Double Standards on an Uneven Playing Field: Distribution along Senegal’s Charcoal Commodity Chain

2. Double Standards on an Uneven Playing Field: Distribution along Senegal’s Charcoal Commodity Chain A Case Study of POLICY & PROFIT Jesse C. Ribot/ World Resources Institute (WRI) Institutions and Governance Program [email_address]

5. Senegal Case 1986 / 2006

6. Urban population Retailers Urban wholesalers Transporters Co-operatives Merchants/ Patrons Migrant Woodcutters Forest Villages Rural Intermediaries Kontrapalaas Identify Market Actors

9. Urban population Retailers Wholesalers Transporters Migrant Woodcutters Forest Villages Other Institutions - Unions - Religious Brotherhoods Ministries National Forest Department Rural Intermeidaries kontrapalaas Regional Forest Service Local Forest Service Elected Regional Council Local Rural Council/PCR Wood & Charcoal Loans Market regulations Unofficial relations Co-operatives Merchants/ Patrons

10. PRICE STRUCTURE AND PROFIT MARGINS FOR A SACK OF CHARCOAL (IN 2002 CONSTANT CFA) - [~183] 519 Retailer +41% 317 225 Urban Wholesalers +29% 774 598 Merchants - 30 - Rural Intermediary -1% 727 734 Woodcutter Profit Margins (all costs deducted) [~4076] 3639 Retailer to Customer in Dakar 3769 3031 Wholesaler price to Retailer 3452 2806 Merchant price to Wholesaler 778 839 Urban Woodcutter price to Merchant Average Prices Change 2002-2003 1987

11. AVERAGE ANNUAL PROFIT OF ACTORS IN CHARCOAL MARKET ??> 180,000 $360 Retailer 1,600,000 $3200 Urban Wholesaler 2.000.000 $4000 Merchant 236.000 $562 Rural Intermediary 72.000 $144 Woodcutter Annual Average Profit (CFA) Actor

12. PROFIT DISTRIBUTION IN MARKET 7% 22% - - 54% 16% 3% Even Skewed - - Skewed Even Skewed Urban population Retailers Urban wholesalers Transporters Co-operatives Merchants/ Patrons Migrant Woodcutters Forest Villages Rural Intermediaries

13. Retailers 10,000 Urban Wholesalers 200 Merchants/Patrons 5000-160 active Migrant Woodcutters 18,000 Forest Villages FONT-SCALED PROFIT DISTRIBUTION

23. Without dismantling the “Environmental” policies that concentrate market access control with urban merchants, there is no economic decentralization

25. There is plenty of profit in this market. Forestry policies exclude local people from the benefits while enabling urban merchants to profit. Without dismantling the policies that concentrate forestry market access control with urban merchants, there is no economic decentralization THE POVERTY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

29. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Note: The following section of the power point was not presented at the talk.