The document projects the potential role of nuclear power in UK electricity generation from 2015 to 2035 under different scenarios. It first examines projections of UK electricity demand which is expected to rise around 20% by 2035. It then provides tables outlining currently operating reactors and planned new reactors. Under the assumption that all planned reactors are built on schedule, the document estimates electricity generation and provides graphs to illustrate this scenario and alternative scenarios factoring in possible delays. The key projections provide insight into the extent to which the UK is already committed to nuclear power expansion over the coming decades.

1. 1
Nuclear electrical power in the UK: the debate over expansion
Candidate number: 930

2. 2
Note: All of the footnotes contain specific references (page numbers where possible). Full
references and links to the articles can be found in the bibliography.
Contents
Section 1 – Research Area
1.1 – Objective ...........................................................................................................................4
1.2 – Introduction.......................................................................................................................4
1.3 – What is the debate about? .................................................................................................5
1.4 – Why is there a debate? ......................................................................................................5
Section 2 – My Projections
2.1 – Demand for Electricity in the UK .....................................................................................7
2.2 – Electricity generation from nuclear power if all planned and proposed reactors are
constructed on time ....................................................................................................................9
Nuclear Reactor Sites
2.3.1 – Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C ..................................................................................12
2.3.2 – Wylfa and Oldbury.......................................................................................................14
2.3.3 – Moorside ......................................................................................................................16
2.3.4 – Bradwell.......................................................................................................................17
2.4 – Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios for Nuclear Electricity Generation in the UK .....18
2.5 – My Results ......................................................................................................................21
Section 3 – Debate over Expansion in the UK
3.1 – The Role of the Government...........................................................................................23
3.2 – Costs and Benefits...........................................................................................................25
3.3 – Generation III vs Generation IV .....................................................................................27
3.4 – The Grid ..........................................................................................................................28
3.5 – Nuclear Waste.................................................................................................................29
Section 4 – Conclusions
4.1 – What has my research shown?........................................................................................30
4.2 – What were the limitations in my research? .....................................................................31
4.3 – How has the debate changed? .........................................................................................32
4.4 – Concluding Statement.....................................................................................................33

3. 3
Tables
Table 1 – DECC’s projections of energy demand up to 2035 ...................................................7
Table 2 – Reactors currently operating in the UK .....................................................................9
Table 3 – Reactors planned and proposed in the UK...............................................................10
Table 4 – Electricity generation if all planned and proposed reactors are built to schedule ...11
Table 5 – Electricity generation if Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C face delays ....................14
Table 6 – Planned and proposed reactor start up dates if they are delayed by eleven years ...19
Table 7 – Pessimistic and Optimistic projections of nuclear electricity generation in the UK
from 2015 to 2035....................................................................................................................20
Figures
Fig.1 – Electricity generation if all planned and proposed reactors are built to schedule .......11
Fig. 2 – Electricity generation if Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C face delays .......................14
Fig.3 – Pessimistic and Optimistic projections of nuclear electricity generation in the UK from
2015 to 2035.............................................................................................................................20
Bibliography.......................................................................................................................34

4. 4
Section 1 – Research Area
1.1 – Objective
The objective of my research is twofold: firstly I project the likely role of nuclear electricity
generation in the UK for the period of 2015 to 2035 in order to see how far we are already
committed to nuclear electrical expansion; secondly I discuss the key areas of the debate over
nuclear electricity expansion in the UK by pinpointing the levels of disagreement.
1.2 – Introduction
For the purposes of my research I focus mainly on the electricity generating capabilities of
nuclear reactors in the UK. There are many assumptions I have to make regarding the cost of
construction of nuclear reactors, the timeframes for construction, the cost of nuclear waste
disposal, the benefits of nuclear expansion in terms of job creation and economic growth etc.
One critical assumption I make is that nuclear power has significant carbon saving benefits and
is a green source of energy. This appears to be the perception as the UK is “currently witnessing
a new framing of nuclear power as a sustainable energy”.1
As a starting point I use the Birmingham Policy Commission’s (BPC) report: The Future of
Nuclear Energy in the UK published in July 2012. The BPC brings leading figures from the
public service, industry and voluntary sectors together with university academics.2 The reason
I chose this publication is because it is published by the University of Birmingham and it
provides a comprehensive, factual, and independent overview to the debate. Although the
report is now four years old, it still provides a good basis for many of the main areas of debate.
I also rely on the World Nuclear Association’s report: Nuclear Power in the UK (2016) which
provides up-to-date statistics on nuclear power in the UK. The Association is a non-profit
company that promotes nuclear power, so their opinions must be interpreted in the context that
they support nuclear power. They take plans published by nuclear power companies at face
value too readily, so when making projections it is important to look at different sources of
information based on different assumptions. This way I can build up an optimistic view and
pessimistic view of the role of nuclear electricity generation in the UK.
1 pg.146 Reframing nuclear power in the UK energy debate
http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/22419/ssoar-2008-2-bickerstaff_et_al-
reframing_nuclear_power_in_the.pdf?sequence=1
2 pg.8 Birmingham Policy Commission (BPC)
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/documents/research/socialsciences/nuclearenergyfullreport.pdf

5. 5
It is widely believed that renewable sources alone cannot meet the full UK demand.3 The BPC
(pg.14) highlight a drawback of renewable energy sources in that they need a lot of space: “to
meet UK demand, wind turbines would have to cover a third to half of the UK landmass”.4 On
the assumption that renewables cannot sufficiently replace fossil fuels, it is important to
examine nuclear power as a potential alternative to renewables or to work alongside renewables
in a portfolio of greener energy sources.
According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA) (2016): “The government assumes that
the UK will require of 60 GWe of new generating capacity by 2025, of which 35 GWe is to
come from renewables”. The Draft National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power
Generation states that the expectation is for “a significant proportion” of the remaining 25 GWe
to come from nuclear. The Association go on to state that “although the government has not
set a fixed target for nuclear capacity Government ministers have consistently said that 16 GWe
of new nuclear capacity should be built at five sites by 2025, though this target date has slipped
to 2030”. 5
1.3 – What is the debate about?
Currently 70% of UK electricity is produced by CO2 generating fossil fuel powered stations.6
The current contribution of nuclear power to the UK electricity generation is 18%, but about
half of this capacity is to be retired by 2025 according to the WNA.7 The 2008 Climate Change
Act made a unilateral commitment to reduce UK greenhouse gas emissions by 80% of 1990
levels by 2050.8 With limits on the potential of renewables and the growing need to move away
from fossil fuels, there is debate over whether or not increased nuclear generation can provide
a solution. The main area of debate relates to the capability of new build nuclear reactors to
meet electricity demand in the UK.
1.4 – Why is there a debate?
According to a new report published in January 2016 by the Institution of Mechanical
Engineers: “The UK government's policy to close all coal-fired power plants by 2025,
combined with the retirement of the majority of the country’s ageing nuclear fleet and growing
electricity demand, will leave the UK facing a 40-55% electricity supply gap”. The Institution
claims that “plans to build combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants to cover the shortfall are
unrealistic as the UK would need to build about 30 new CCGT plants in less than 10 years”.9
The debate over nuclear expansion is so urgent because there is a need to find new sources of
electricity for the immediate, short term future, ie the next 20 years.
3 pg.7 BPC
4 pg.14 BPC
5 World Nuclear Association http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-
z/united-kingdom.aspx
6 pg.12 BPC
7 World Nuclear Association
8 Climate Change Act (2008) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/part/1/crossheading/the-target-for-
2050
9 World Nuclear News http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/EE-Study-warns-of-worsening-UK-electricity-
supply-gap-26011601.html

6. 6
Section 2 – My Projections
It is necessary to project the likely level of electricity generation from nuclear reactors over the
next 20 years because there is great uncertainty surrounding the state of UK nuclear power with
several new reactors planned, with some under construction already, and others still in the
preliminary negotiation stage. Most reports focus only on energy demand or energy projections
in general which is not useful for predicting electricity generation from nuclear power. My
contribution is to clarify the extent to which we are committed to nuclear power by projecting
the implications of the various current plans and proposals for nuclear reactors in terms of
electricity generation. Literature is available on current reactors operating in the UK and
potential electricity generation from new reactors, but I have not been able to find a
comprehensive scenario for nuclear electricity generation as a whole. My research is necessary
because before we can discuss whether or not expansion would be a desirable outcome, it is
first necessary to analyse the level of expansion to which the UK has already committed.
I provide my own projections for UK nuclear electrical power for the next 20 years by using
projection data that already exists and existing knowledge of likely nuclear electricity
expansions in the UK.
My different scenarios are based on different assumptions related to the likelihood of the
planned and proposed reactors being followed through and being on schedule. I start by
outlining the likely level of electricity generation should all planned and proposed reactors go
ahead. I then examine the progress of specific sites where the nuclear reactors are set to be built
and analyse how likely it is that there will be delays on these sites. Then I provide a
comprehensive illustration showing an optimistic and pessimistic scenario for the state of
nuclear electricity generation in the UK from 2015 to 2035.

7. 7
2.1 – Demand for Electricity in the UK
Firstly it is important to look at likely demand for electricity over the next 20 years in order to
illustrate the need for new nuclear electricity generating capacity. The Department of Energy
and Climate Change (DECC) released in November 2015 their Updated energy and emissions
projections which provides data for the UK’s energy demand until 2035. The data is up-to-date
and takes account of the emissions targets for greenhouse gases introduced in the 2008 Climate
Change Act.10
The following table is from the DECC’s “reference scenario” in Annex E of their Report.11
Some of the years have been removed in order to make the table smaller:
Projection of Primary Energy
Demand by source
Mtoe
2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
Electricity net imports 1 1 1 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 5
Natural gas 67 71 66 65 64 66 69 67 65 66 66
Nuclear 15 14 14 14 14 10 15 24 24 27 30
Oil 73 71 69 67 66 66 66 67 67 67 68
Renewables & waste 15 20 25 28 28 29 27 26 27 27 27
Solids 37 21 20 14 9 8 7 6 6 6 6
Total primary energy
demand 207 198 195 190 186 183 187 194 193 197 201
Table 1 – DECC’s projections of energy demand up to 2035
The DECC looked at “primary demand” and provided their statistics in “Mtoe” where “M”
stands for “mega” and “toe” stands for “tonne of oil equivalent” which is a unit of energy
defined as the amount of energy released by burning one tonne of crude oil. They focus on
energy demand, but on the assumption that demand for electricity for a certain source (eg
nuclear) closely follows demand for energy, this is not too much of an issue.
As the table shows, there is falling demand for “solids” (ie coal) which is due to the tighter
restrictions on this source of energy. Based on the government’s assumptions about the ability
of nuclear capacity to expand, the DECC projects demand for nuclear energy in terms of Mtoe
doubles between 2015 and 2035.
10 pg.7 Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) (2015)
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/501292/eepReport2015_160205.
pdf
11 DECC (2015) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478329/Annex-
e-primary-energy-demand-updated_191115.xls

8. 8
Jenifer Baxter, head of energy and environment at the Institution of Mechanical Engineers,
said: “As the UK population rises and with the greater use of electricity in transport and heating
it looks almost certain that electricity demand is going to rise.”12 The DECC also discuss “final
demand” which describes the demand for energy in the final form that it is consumed in, eg
electricity, and this allows electricity consumption to be compared between different sources.13
The DECC (pg.19 of their report) state that the overall “final energy demand” between 2015
and 2035 shows an increase in demand for electricity by nearly 20%.14 The reason why an
increase in demand for electricity between 2015 and 2035 is possible despite falling total
primary energy demand is because the DECC assumes that there will be greater reliance on
more efficient sources such as nuclear power and renewables.
The DECC (pg.21) project electricity generation from fossil fuels as a share of total electricity
generation and predict a steady decline from 60% in 2015 to 13% in 2035.15 Given this
expected fall in electricity generation from fossil fuels and rising demand for electricity, it can
be argued that there is an urgent need for nuclear expansion.
12 World Nuclear News http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/EE-Study-warns-of-worsening-UK-electricity-
supply-gap-26011601.html
13 pg.17 DECC
14 pg.19 DECC
15 pg.21 DECC
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/501292/eepReport2015_160205.
pdf

9. 9
2.2 – Electricity generation from nuclear power if all planned and
proposed reactors are constructed on time
It is important to look at the potential of new build in the UK by projecting electricity
generation under the assumption that all planned and proposed reactors go ahead.
I have used the two tables in World Nuclear Association’s report (Updated 27th November
2015) on Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom.16 These two tables show existing reactors and
planned and proposed reactors separately from each other.
Table 2 – Reactors currently operating in the UK
I assume that the Hartlepool reactors (Table 2) shut down in 2024 rather than 2019 – based on
a 2013 news article by the BBC.17
16 World Nuclear Association http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-
z/united-kingdom.aspx
17 The BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-tees-24824816
Plant
Present Capacity
(MWe Net)
Expected
Shutdown
Wylfa 1 490 2015
Dungeness B 1&2 1040 2028
Hartlepool 1&2 1180 2019 or 2024
Heysham I 1&2 1155 2019
Heysham II 1&2 1220 2023
Hinkley Point B 1&2 945 2023
Hunterston B 1&2 960 2023
Torness 1&2 1185 2023
Sizewell B 1198 2035
Total: 16 units 9373

10. 10
Table 3 –
Reactors planned and proposed in the UK
It is unclear when the Sizewell reactors (Table 3) will start up, but for the purposes of
projections I assume they follow the same schedule as Hinkley Point (and will open in 2023
and 2024) because they comprise of the same type of reactor being built by the same company
– EDF.
Similarly for the Moorside reactors 2 and 3, I assume they open at the same time as Moorside
1 in 2024.
For the Oldbury reactors I assume that they will open in 2029.
For the Bradwell site, reactor designs have been approved, but there is currently no proposed
start up date, so I assume that they open later than the other reactors in 2031 because it was
only very recently in October 2015 that Chancellor Osborne and China General Nuclear Power
Group (CGN) agreed plans to build new reactors at Bradwell.18
Combining the data in Tables 2 and 3 on existing reactors and planned and proposed reactors,
I project the level of nuclear electricity generation up to 2035. This provides a comprehensive
18 The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/19/chinese-built-reactor-bradwell-impact-
essex-estuary-plant-nuclear
Proponent Site
Capacity
(MWe
Gross)
Start Up
EDF Energy Hinkley Point C-1 1670 2023
Hinkley Point C-2 1670 2024
EDF Energy Sizewell C-1 1670 ?
Sizewell C-2 1670 ?
Horizon Wylfa Newydd 1 1380 2025
Wylfa Newydd 2 1380 2025
Horizon Oldbury B-1 1380 Late 2020s
Oldbury B-2 1380 Late 2020s
NuGeneration Moorside 1 1135 2024
Moorside 2 1135 ?
Moorside 3 1135 ?
China Nuclear Group Bradwell B-1 1150
Bradwell B-2 1150
Total 17900

11. 11
projection of electricity generation from nuclear power for the UK. I have not been able to find
an equivalent in any government reports (including the DECC’s) or any private commission
reviews.
It is important to reiterate that these projections are based on the assumption that all planned
and proposed reactors go ahead and start up on the dates announced by the proponents.
Table 4 – Electricity generation if all planned and proposed reactors are built to schedule
Fig.1 – Electricity generation if all planned and proposed reactors are built to schedule
The graph shows that as current nuclear stations begin to shut (mostly by 2024), electricity
generation by UK nuclear reactors falls, but with the opening of many new reactors from 2025
onwards, electricity generation of nuclear reactors begins to rise again (slight fall in 2035 due
to the closure of Sizewell B) until we reach the point in 2035 where generation of electricity
by nuclear reactors is 91% higher than 2015 levels.
Table 4 shows that by 2035 nuclear reactors in the UK are projected to produce 17.9 GWe of
electricity. This would be in line with the government’s target for 16GWe of electricity
generation from nuclear power by 2030.
Of course there are many assumptions such as: there is enough funding for this level of new
build, construction of all of these reactors goes ahead, they run to schedule, etc.
It is now important examine how likely it is that certain reactors at certain sites go ahead and
are built on time.
Year
Capacity
(MWe)
2015 9373
2017 8883
2019 7728
2021 7728
2023 3418
2025 12323
2027 15083
2029 14043
2031 16803
2033 19103
2035 17905
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
Capacity (MWe)

12. 12
According to the head of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) construction accounts for 60% of
the project’s total investment, compared to 40% for coal and 15% for natural gas.19 Similar
estimates were found by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) which estimated
that 74% of the total cost for nuclear reactors is made up by the cost of construction.20 This
means that cost escalations are likely to lead to significant delays because construction is often
put on hold until funding is secured.
Lovering et al (2016) carried out a study of historical construction costs of nuclear reactors
which “covered the full cost history for 349 reactors in the US, France, Canada, West Germany,
Japan, India, and South Korea, encompassing 58% of all reactors built globally.” They
concluded that: “trends in costs have varied significantly in magnitude and in structure by era,
country, and experience… Our new findings suggest that there is no inherent cost escalation
trend associated with nuclear technology.”21 The varied experiences across countries means
that there is a need to look specifically at UK reactors in order to determine the likelihood of
cost escalations and delays.
2.3.1 – Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C
19 pg.28 Nuclear Nonsense http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=wmelpr
20 US EIA http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf
21 pg.371 Energy Policy 91 (2016) http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0301421516300106/1-s2.0-S0301421516300106-
main.pdf?_tid=9c4f4e36-ff49-11e5-abce-
00000aab0f27&acdnat=1460312912_5e12e021b3cb93490f23b60ecf8cada7

13. 13
World Nuclear News reports that: “EDF Energy’s Hinkley Point C will comprise two EPR
reactors, with first operation scheduled for 2025. Together, the two reactors will provide about
7% of the UK's electricity”.22
The nuclear industry in Europe does not have a good track record of keeping projects within
budget and on time. The Flamanville EPR plant in France is now expected to cost €8bn by the
time it comes online, whereas the initial estimate of costs was €3.3bn.23 Flamanville was also
supposed to be online by 2012, but is now not expected until 2018 at the earliest.24 The BPC
(pg. 21) asserts that the “success” of any major new build programme relies on the completion
of the first reactor, Hinkley Point C, to be on time and within budget. If the construction of the
first reactor fails to meet its announced opening date, then “downturn in public support could
see the premature termination of the entire project”.25
Originally the building cost of Hinckley Point C was estimated to be £18bn. However Carbon
Brief (2015) believe that the overall cost will be £24.5bn.26 This has led to fears that Hinkley
Point C may not be online by the date estimated: The Telegraph has reported that Hinkley Point
“won’t be ready by 2023”.27 In Spring 2015 the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) reported
that: “whilst NNB GenCo Ltd (a subsidiary of EDF Energy) will continue to progress [with]
preparation of the Hinkley Point C site-specific safety case and production of the detailed
design, it does not intend at this stage to commence significant construction activity”.28 At this
point in time it seems likely that Hinkley Point C will miss its 2023 opening date.
It is difficult to predict when Hinkley Point Cwill open, but given that the arrangement between
EDF and Areva (the designers of EPR reactors) is similar to that for the EPRs built at
Flamanville, it may be assumed that similar levels of delays will follow. The reactors in France
22 World Nuclear News http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/EE-Study-warns-of-worsening-UK-electricity-
supply-gap-26011601.html
23 pg.25 Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Policy Report
24 The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/nuclearpower/11945485/Nuclear-go-ahead-
construction-of-new-plant-to-begin-within-weeks.html
25 pg.21 BPC
26 Carbon Brief (2015) http://www.carbonbrief.org/new-nuclear-power-in-uk-would-be-the-worlds-most-costly-
says-report
27 The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/11841733/Nuclear-delay-EDF-
admits-Hinkley-Point-wont-be-ready-by-2023.html
28 ONR http://www.onr.org.uk/hinkley-point-c/

14. 14
were five years behind schedule29 and so on the assumption that Hinkley Point C is also five
years behind, and assuming that Sizewell C follows a similar pattern, the opening dates for
reactors at the two major sites could be 2028 and 2029.
Table 5 – Electricity generation if Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C face delays
Fig. 2 – Electricity generation if Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C face delays
As the graph shows, the delays to Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C do not change the pattern so
much compared with Fig.1 because Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C reactors are likely to be
constructed no matter what because they have substantial government backing and they are
viewed as the leaders of a new fleet of reactors. The World Nuclear Association states that “in
September 2015 the government announced a £2 billion loan guarantee for the project, and said
more would be available if EDF met certain conditions”.30 It seems probable that Hinkley Point
C and Sizewell C will be fully operational by 2035.
2.3.2 – Wylfa and Oldbury
29 World Nuclear Association http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-
z/united-kingdom.aspx
30 World Nuclear Association
Year
Capacity
(MWe)
2015 9373
2017 8883
2019 7728
2021 7728
2023 3418
2025 8403
2027 8403
2029 16803
2031 19103
2033 19103
2035 17905
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
Capacity (MWe)

15. 15
It is useful to look at Wylfa and Oldbury together because they are both built by Horizon.
Horizon themselves state that they “aim to secure the electricity generation
at Wylfa Newydd within the first half of the 2020s”.31 Similarly the Planning and Consents
Manager at Oldbury believes that: “Preliminary works could then commence in 2016, followed
by main construction in 2019, playing a key role in achieving Horizon's overall aim of
delivering around 6,000MW of new nuclear power for the UK by 2025”.32
However there have been issues with these two sites, with the World Nuclear Association
reporting that: “early in 2012 German-based RWE and E.ON announced that they wanted to
withdraw from Horizon. In October 2012 the £696 million Hitachi bid was accepted, making
Horizon a 100% subsidiary of Hitachi Ltd. It planned to build two or three of the 1380 MWe
units at each site, and in April 2013 applied to ONR for Generic Design Assessment (GDA),
which is expected to take until the end of 2017.”33 The change of ownership, the lack of a
specific number of units to be built, and the fact that the GDA has yet to be completed would
suggest that there may be some delays on these sites.
Although newspapers may not be reliable sources of information, it is useful to look at them as
they provide the latest updates and reveal information that is often covered up by the companies
involved. Wales Online reported in 2016 that the Wylfa site faces issues because: “the company
behind the project said issues over the Hinkley Point nuclear project has thrown up "very
serious concerns" about its investment in the UK.” Mr Nakanishi, Chairman of Hitachi, said
“the challenges faced by Hinkley Point could also affect Horizon. The DECC worries about
the stability of the scheduled construction of the Hinkley Point nuclear power plant, so some
of the conditions – the credit requirements – those kind of things may affect us.”34 It would
appear that the BPC were wise to assert that the success of a new fleet of reactors hinged on
Hinkley Point because ultimately Hinckley Point is the leader of a new fleet and uncertainty
over Hinkley Point causes uncertainty for all planned and proposed reactors.
On the other hand the World Nuclear Association (WNA) has stated that for both Wylfa and
Oldbury “works would begin 12-18 months [before the GDA is completed in 2017], and full
construction possibly from 2019”. In addition to this the WNA state: “In December 2013 the
government signed a cooperation agreement with Hitachi and Horizon “to promote external
financing” for the Wylfa Newydd project under the 2012 UK Guarantee Scheme for
infrastructure, with a view to a guarantee by the end of 2016 similar to that for Hinkley
Point.”35 It would appear that reactors on these two sites are guaranteed to go ahead and have
government backing. However it remains unclear whether or not construction will be hit by
delays, and there is a lot of uncertainty regarding the progress of these two sites.
31 Horizon Nuclear Power http://www.horizonnuclearpower.com/wylfa
32 Oldbury Nuclear Viewpoint http://www.oldburynuclearviewpoint.org.uk/news/article-43/new-timetable-for-
new-nuclear-power-generation-at-oldbury
33 World Nuclear Association http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-
z/united-kingdom.aspx
34 Wales Online http://www.walesonline.co.uk/business/business-news/new-14bn-nuclear-power-station-
10813405
35 World Nuclear Association

16. 16
2.3.3 – Moorside
According to the WNA, NuGeneration (the company behind the Moorside reactors) “was in
discussion with DECC regarding terms for the contracts for difference (CfD) for the
plant, which need to be agreed before the 2018 investment decision.”36 Seeing as a final
investment decision has yet to be made, and that the CfDs have yet to be agreed there is great
uncertainty surrounding this site. Moorside is different to the Hinkley Point, Sizewell, Wylfa,
and Oldbury in that construction has yet to start on the site, which could imply that it has yet
to be confirmed that new reactors will go ahead. On the other hand NuGen in late 2014 claimed
that, “The first reactor is expected to be connected to the grid by the end of 2024 – with all
three providing 3.4GW of power by the end of 2026… NuGen expects to have the full range
of licences and permissions in place for the development, ahead of a Final Investment Decision
in 2018”.37 Again it is uncertain how much delay is likely.
36 World Nuclear Association http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-
z/united-kingdom.aspx
37 NuGen http://www.nugeneration.com/news-02122014.html

17. 17
2.3.4 – Bradwell
The WNA states that: “no firm proposals have so far been brought forward. Chinese General
Nuclear Power Group (CGN) has expressed interest, and in connection with the Hinkley Point
agreement in October 2015, EDF and CGN agreed to form a joint venture company to advance
plans for a new plant at Bradwell and seek regulatory approval”.38 Bradwell is more in the
“proposed” stage as opposed to the “planned” stage, so there are no guarantees that it will go
ahead and very little information on when it is likely to be opened.
Seeing as CGN already has a stake in both Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C, delays to those
sites would likely cause delays to the Bradwell site. Hinkley Point C was supposed to be online
by 2017 originally, but that date has been revised to 2023 and with fears that there will be
further delays, it is likely to miss this date too. Hinkley Point C when it is finally opened may
be ten years behind schedule. Given that Hinkley Point C takes priority and will not be open
until the mid-2020s at the earliest, and going on the assumption that EDF and CGN are unlikely
to start significant construction at Bradwell until Hinckley Point C is up and running, and given
the potential delays that may arise with Bradwell if it experiences the same issues as Hinkley
Point C, there is a strong possibility that reactors at Bradwell will not be operational by 2035.
38 World Nuclear Association http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-
z/united-kingdom.aspx

18. 18
2.4 – Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios for Nuclear Electricity
Generation in the UK
The BPC (pg.22) claims that “in building new nuclear power stations, it takes approximately
five years to get to the point of construction and a further five years to complete construction”.39
However the assumption that the construction period is only five years long may be unrealistic
given the history of delays in the nuclear industry.
Using figures from the World Nuclear Industry Status Report (WNISR) 2015: “As of
1 July 2015, the 62 reactors currently being built [worldwide] have been under construction for
an average of 7.6 years… experiencing mostly year long delays.”40 In some cases the
construction times have been over 30 years and the mean construction time for all start-ups
[worldwide] between 2005 and July 2015 worldwide was 9.4 years.41 While experiences may
vary across countries, with some (such as Japan) having average construction times of less than
five years, it seems, that both historically and in the present, the majority of reactors are
inevitably hit by construction delays.
The reactors to be built at Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C are EPR reactors, while those at the
Moorside site are AP1000 reactors. According to the WNISR (2015): “In terms of delays, the
record of AP1000 and EPR appears comparably bad… The instrumentation & control system
for EPR caused delays because of problems persuading the regulators of its adequacy… while
the AP1000 suffered serious quality issues at the module suppliers’ facilities”.42 Given these
issues, there are potentially significant delays ahead for the UK’s new fleet of reactors.
Repetition of past delays experienced in other countries does not necessarily mean that the UK
will experience similar delays. If a negative outlook is taken, it can be argued that the delays
will be even worse in the UK because “no nuclear reactors have been built or ordered in the
UK since 1985”43 and the UK has no experience constructing EPR and AP1000 reactors.
39 pg.22 BPC
40 World Nuclear Report (2015) http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-Report-
2015-HTML.html#h.3o7alnk
41 World Nuclear Report (2015)
42 World Nuclear Report (2015)
43 pg.146 Reframing nuclear power in the UK energy debate
http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/22419/ssoar-2008-2-bickerstaff_et_al-
reframing_nuclear_power_in_the.pdf?sequence=1

19. 19
In my analysis of the individual sites, I assumed that reactors at Hinkley Point C would open
in 2028 and 2029. This would mean that they would be eleven years behind their initial
proposed opening date of 2017. Given that Hinkley Point C has a knock on effect on other
nuclear reactors, a pessimistic scenario where every reactor is subsequently eleven years behind
schedule can be illustrated.
Table 6 – Planned and proposed reactor start up dates if they are delayed by eleven years
It is useful to see how this pessimistic scenario compares to the optimistic scenario where all
planned and proposed reactors went ahead and were opened by the date the proponents claimed
they would be.
Site Start Up
Hinkley Point C-1 2028
Hinkley Point C-2 2029
Sizewell C-1 2028
Sizewell C-2 2029
Wylfa Newydd 1 2036
Wylfa Newydd 2 2036
Oldbury B-1 2040
Oldbury B-2 2040
Moorside 1 2035
Moorside 2 2035
Moorside 3 2035
Bradwell B-1 2042
Bradwell B-2 2042

20. 20
Table 7 – Pessimistic and Optimistic projections of nuclear electricity generation in the UK
from 2015 to 2035
Fig.3 – Pessimistic and Optimistic projections of nuclear electricity generation in the UK from
2015 to 2035
As the graph shows, the two scenarios follow the same pattern up to 2024 as the old reactors
shut down and no new build is scheduled to come online. However after this point there is a
divergence between the two scenarios. In the pessimistic scenario only the reactors at Hinkley
Point and Sizewell are up and running before 2035 and in 2035 the Moorside reactors come
online also. Electricity generation from nuclear power in the UK in 2035 in this scenario would
be 10 GWe as opposed to nearly 18 GWe in the optimistic scenario.
Year
Pessimistic
Scenario
Capacity
(MWe)
Optimistic
Scenario
Capacity
(MWe)
2015 9373 9373
2017 8883 8883
2019 7728 7728
2021 7728 7728
2023 3418 3418
2025 2238 12323
2027 2238 15083
2029 7878 14043
2031 7878 16803
2033 7878 19103
2035 10085 17905
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
Capacity (MWe)
Pessimistic Scenario Optimistic Scenario

21. 21
2.5 – My Results
The optimistic and pessimistic comparison represents the level of uncertainty regarding the
construction timeframes of the new build reactors in the UK. However even in the pessimistic
scenario the UK would still be generating 10 GWe of electricity from nuclear reactors in 2035
which is similar to the amount produced by existing reactors in 2015.
In addition to this, the pessimistic scenario assumed that all reactors would follow similar
delays that Hinkley Point C has been faced with. However it must be remembered that the
reactors at Hinkley Point would be the first ones built in over 20 years in the UK, so perhaps
delays were inevitable. Subsequent sites, particularly Bradwell where EDF and CGN are
stakeholders (as they are in Hinkley Point), are likely to learn from the mistakes made at
Hinkley and are less likely to face such significant delays.
Even if the current planned expansion is hit by significant delays it would appear that all
planned and proposed reactors are likely to go ahead. This would suggest that the government
targets for electricity generation from nuclear reactors are likely to be met eventually, though
not necessarily by 2035. The uncertainty lies in whether or not there will be delays and how
long these delays will be, but it seems certain that the UK has committed to new build.

22. 22
Section 3 – Debate over Expansion in the
UK
The aim of this section is to discuss some of the areas of contention over expansion of nuclear
electricity generation in the UK given that it seems that the UK has committed to at least
replacing the ageing fleet of reactors. There are debates about: the cost of investment and who
will cover these costs; the proposed benefits of investment in nuclear reactors in terms of job
creation; how far investment (or lack of investment) will affect the UK’s ability to take
advantage of new nuclear technologies in the very long term future (ie 40+ years) etc. The
reason it is important to look at these aspects is because it makes it clearer whether or not the
planned expansion of nuclear reactors in the UK is viable, reasonable, and sufficient.
The broad conclusion of the Birmingham Policy Commission (BPC pg.10) is that there are
strong arguments for a new fleet of nuclear reactors and that “nuclear power should be part of
an overall programme of developing renewable sources and maximising energy efficiency”.44
It is useful to compare their view to that of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research
(2013) Review of Research Relevant to New Build Nuclear Plants in the UK. Comparison
between the two reports is insightful because Tyndall’s publication is an independent report by
the University of Manchester and much like the BPC: “The research is a critical examination
of published material supplemented with personal communications with researchers where
required”.45 It is not a wide-reaching as the BPC as it does not discuss new nuclear technologies
or deregulation of the energy market in as much depth, but it is worth examining as it provides
an alternative opinion to the BPC’s.
The Tyndall report (pg.24) takes a very negative view of nuclear power and asserts that:
“studies that provide lower estimates of nuclear costs for the UK have not fully accounted for
interest during construction or the historic experience with cost escalations”. Tyndall believe
that “claims that nuclear power is cheaper than all other low carbon options are unlikely to be
borne out in reality”. They stress that given the level of uncertainty, it is not possible to state
which option is the most cost effective.46
Even the BPC (pg.53) who support nuclear expansion agree that it is impossible to know for
sure whether building nuclear power stations will increase or decrease the cost of the UK’s
electricity supplies relative to alternative options.47 Given the level of uncertainty over nuclear
electricity generation and the differing outlooks, it is important to address the key areas of
debate.
44 pg.10 BPC
45 pg.6 Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Policy Report (2013)
https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/tyndall_evidence.pdf
46 pg.24 Tyndall
47 pg.53 BPC

23. 23
3.1 – The Role of the Government
When Ed Davey MP was Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change in the Coalition
Government, he asserted that “there will be no public subsidy for nuclear power”.48 The
rationale of this approach was that there should be no direct government expenditure on the
construction of new nuclear reactors.
The BPC (pg.57) believe that government policy has been to “take active steps to open up the
way to construction of new nuclear power stations”. However it would be “for energy
companies to fund, develop, and build.”49 The BPC (pg.8) recognises that this “leave it to the
market to decide” approach means that the government relies on energy companies to
determine the energy mix. They also state that “deregulation of the energy markets needs to
strike the right balance to give utilities sufficient confidence to invest in new build”.50
The government did intervene in the nuclear industry by introducing a “Feed-in Tariff” with a
“Contract for Difference” (FiT with CfD). The BPC (pg.20) believes that “this has the potential
to fix a nuclear power station’s revenues at a sufficient level to cover its costs regardless of
savings in the wholesale price of power”.51 The Guardian article EDF Nuclear deal is a bad
economic bet (2014) states that “EDF has been guaranteed a price by the government and if
EDF sells less electricity than expected – the government makes up the price.”52 The issue with
this is that if the companies do not achieve their sale price, the government effectively
subsidises their revenue.
Some believe that the price guarantee to EDF Energy for Hinkley Point of £92.50MWh for 35
years from the start of operation of the reactors53 is too generous and acts as a form of subsidy.
The Financial Times (2015) reports that this equates to up to £2bn worth of guarantees.54 There
has been a lot of criticism since the guarantee was announced, particularly seeing as the price
of electricity today is about half of that guaranteed to EDF.
Vincent de Rivas, CEO of EDF, has defended the agreement: “Some critics have compared the
strike price to the current electricity price. The price today is not a relevant comparison to the
electricity Hinkley Point will produce in decades to come. Today’s market price depends on
fossil fuels and ageing plants. Our project will ensure we don't need to continue to depend on
them in future.”55 While the guarantee price is above current price levels, there is some
justification in that it may be necessary to get Hinkley Point C up and running. Subsidies to
help cover construction costs may be justified if reactors produce lower external costs than its
competitors once they are fully operational.
48 Liberal Democrat Voice http://www.libdemvoice.org/there-will-be-no-public-subsidy-for-nuclear-28150.html
49 pg.57 BPC
50 pg.8 BPC
51 pg.20 BPC
52 The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2014/jul/10/edf-nuclear-deal-is-a-bad-
economic-bet
53 World Nuclear News http://www.world-nuclear-
news.org/NN_Strike_price_deal_for_Hinkley_Point_C_2110131.html
54 The Financial Times http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d0c8d010-6043-11e5-9846-
de406ccb37f2.html#axzz43MExciaF
55 World Nuclear News http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Britain-needs-Hinkley-Point-C-says-EDF-
Energy-head-1609155.html

24. 24
The Guardian (2015) states that there was a footnote at the end of an announcement regarding
Hinckley Point C that read: “The government confirms that it is not continuing the ‘no public
subsidy policy’ [for nuclear power] of the previous administration”.56 Perhaps the reason that
the government has changed its “no subsidy” stance is because the European Commission in
October 2014 referred to the price guarantee for Hinkley Point as a “subsidy” when declaring
that the plans were compatible with EU rules.57 The recognition that the price guarantee is an
indirect subsidy would seem to suggest that the government is “not leaving it to the market”.
Therefore the question has to be asked: is a subsidy for nuclear reactors justified?
The BPC (pg.10) contend that the financial risks associated with building new nuclear reactors
are “beyond the balance sheets of many of the utilities and that risks need to be shared between
the private and public sectors”.58 Although EDF is owned by the French government, EDF
Energy, the UK subsidiary involved with Hinkley Point C, essentially acts as a privately run
company. The argument is that Hinkley Point C, one of the largest reactors in the world in
terms of electricity generation, is too much of a risk for just the just the private sector. Perhaps
it is the role of the government to provide financial support on such a large investment which
is hoped to bring economic growth and create jobs; especially as it seems to be too great a task
for the private sector alone as evidenced by the finance director of EDF stepping down in March
2016 because of fears over Hinkley Point C.59
There are arguments against subsidies: they should not be necessary to attract foreign
investment; the guaranteed price for Hinkley Point C is too high and it is inevitable that the
government will subsidise EDF; subsidising foreign companies displaces domestic investment
etc. However it is not politically viable for the UK government to directly fund investment in
nuclear power due to their dedication to austerity, and investment in nuclear power had been
stagnant before French and Chinese backing. Therefore the subsidies to some extent are useful
for getting construction of new reactors underway.
56 The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/environment/damian-carrington-blog/2015/oct/22/hinkley-point-
uk-energy-policy-is-now-hunkering-in-a-nuclear-bunker
57 The European Commission http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1093_en.htm
58 pg.10 BPC
59 The BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35741772

25. 25
3.2 – Costs and Benefits
It is very difficult to carry out cost/benefit analysis of new build because many of the non-
monetary costs and risks are unknown even to the companies carrying out the new build. These
risks could include: likelihood of breakdowns in negotiations for funding from investors,
breakdowns in negotiations with the government, likelihood of passing the GDA, likelihood
that delays on other sites cause delays on their own sites etc. These risks are substantial, but
are very hard to quantify as companies are unwilling to make them known to the public.
Analysis of all proposed reactors would be useful, but little information is available on many
of the sites. Therefore it may be worth looking at Hinkley Point C in particular because there
has been greater debate over this site and more statistics have been published about it.
Looking at Hinckley Point C, EDF claims that it will create “25,000 new employment
opportunities”.60 The Guardian goes on to state that over its 60 year lifetime Hinckley Point is
expected to create thousands of jobs – conservative estimates being 32,500 annually, other
estimates being 100,000.61 However there is a question over whether French and Chinese
investment will be benefit British workers as there is uncertainty over where the reactors will
be built. If the reactors are built in China and assembled in the UK62, there will be little job
creation for nuclear construction workers in the UK.
More worrying is the question over whether greater job creation simply reflects the higher cost
of construction. It is difficult to be clear about “benefits” of job creation, particularly as labour
can also be viewed as a “cost” of production. Furthermore investment in nuclear power can
displace other investment which reduces economic growth and jobs elsewhere. WWF claims
that “focusing on nuclear power will block innovation in the power supply sector and in
demand side efficiency. It has an opportunity cost… it displaces investment in more efficient
small-scale power supply and energy services and it limits employment opportunities to highly
specialised staff in a very capital-intensive industrial sector”.63 The benefits in terms of job
creation simply look at the total number of jobs created, but do not look at the opportunity cost
and potential jobs displaced. It is therefore very difficult to quantify the net effect on job
creation for investment in nuclear reactors.
60 EDF Energy http://www.edfenergy.com/energy/nuclear-new-build-projects/hinkley-point-c
61 The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2014/jul/23/investing-new-nuclear-power-uk-
carbon-energy
62 The Financial Times http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d0c8d010-6043-11e5-9846-
de406ccb37f2.html#axzz43MExciaF
63 WWF
http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/climate_carbon_energy/energy_solutions22/nuclear_power/

26. 26
EDF aims to sell electricity at £92/MWh. Carbon Brief (2015) compares this with other energy
sources: while it compares favourably with coal, the DECC estimates for the price of gas are
£80/MWh in 2013 and £85/MWh in 2019.64 Although gas is likely to be cheaper over the next
few years, the price of fossil fuels looks set to rise beyond 2020 and nuclear will become more
competitive.
The Grid [Future Energy Scenarios (FES) (2015)] (p.36) project their “base case” for baseload
electricity prices (ie average electricity prices) and estimate that average electricity prices will
be roughly £70/MWh in 2035.65 Therefore a price of £92/MWh for nuclear electricity does not
seem attractive in comparison. In addition to this the Policy Exchange estimates that onshore
wind prices would be £60/MWh by 202066 making nuclear power seem even less attractive in
comparison.
However the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) expect nuclear electricity prices to fall to
£65-75MWh by late 2020s. 67 This would be more in line with other sources of electricity and
would make nuclear power very competitive.
The price of electricity is set by the market and so if the expected fall in the price of nuclear
electricity does occur, the government would have to heavily subsidise EDF in order to make
up the difference because they guaranteed the price of £92/MWh. This would in turn cost the
taxpayer, therefore the benefits of lower electricity prices for electricity generated by nuclear
reactors are hard to quantify as they also come at the cost of potentially higher taxes.
Uncertainty over nuclear power in terms of prices of electricity again shows the difficulty of
quantifying the benefits.
64 Carbon Brief (2015) http://www.carbonbrief.org/new-nuclear-power-in-uk-would-be-the-worlds-most-costly-
says-report
65 pg.36 Grid Future Energy Scenario (FES) file:///C:/Users/Richard/Downloads/FESCover%20(1).pdf
66 Carbon Brief (2015)
67 Carbon Brief (2015)

27. 27
3.3 – Generation III vs Generation IV
The existing fleet of reactors in the UK are “Generation III”, as are the planned and proposed
reactors set to replace them. There is uncertainty over whether or not the UK will still be
looking to build current day nuclear technology beyond 2035 with “Generation IV’s”
commercial deployment anticipated by 2020-2030.68 The BPC (pg.67) envisage fast reactors
(Generation IV) as the potential long term future after the 60 year lifetime of the new fleet of
reactors comes to an end.69
The BPC (pg.26) estimate that at the current rate of use, the known resources of uranium would
run out in around 80 years from now.70 However this is contested with the Steve Fetter of
Scientific American (2009) stating that, “If the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has accurately
estimated the planet’s economically accessible uranium resources, reactors could run for more
than 200 years at the current rates of consumption”.71 The benefit of Generation IV is that there
is no need to worry about the supply of uranium because the fast breed reactors may reach a
situation where they produce as much plutonium as they consume, ie they are self-sustaining.72
The depleted uranium in the original feedstock can all be converted to fissile material and as a
result existing uranium resources can be made to last “thousands of years rather than tens of
years”.73 Not only does this mean that expenditure on raw materials for nuclear reactors would
fall, it also means that there would be less nuclear waste, and less CO2 produced as a result of
mining and transporting the uranium.
Another benefit of Generation IV reactors is that they are able to start up and shut down much
quicker than current day technology which would mean that they could adapt to infrequent
large shocks in demand for electricity or smaller, daily fluctuations.
However these fast breed reactors have faced delays and are several decades away from being
commercially available; “even the prototype systems cannot currently meet all of the
Generation IV goals”.74 Until it becomes financially and realistically viable in the near future,
it is not likely to be pursued, though it is interesting to keep an eye on the developments because
if there is a breakthrough it would reshape the nuclear debate beyond the period I have made
projections for.
68 pg.4323 Energy Policy 96 (2008) http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0301421508004448/1-s2.0-S0301421508004448-
main.pdf?_tid=4e75d9ac-ff56-11e5-9d44-
00000aab0f01&acdnat=1460318365_cf33e8f7e4c33de2e3b2749acdbabf55
69 pg.67 BPC
70 pg.26 BPC
71 Scientific American http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-long-will-global-uranium-deposits-last/
72 pg.67 BPC
73 pg.26 BPC
74 pg.4324 Energy Policy 96 (2008)

28. 28
3.4 – The Grid
Having a reliable grid is necessary for energy security which can be defined as having sufficient
supplies of energy available when they are required at a reasonable price.75 One of the
criticisms of a high proportion of nuclear electricity generation is that it is the most inflexible
source of electricity as it takes a long time for reactors to start up and shut down which makes
them unable to react to frequent or unexpected changes in demand for electricity.
For example: “During the August 2003 Northeast blackout, nine perfectly operating U.S.
nuclear units had to shut down. Twelve days of painfully slow restart later, their average
capacity loss had exceeded 50 percent”.76 WWF claims that nuclear power “is a ‘base-load’
technology whose energy output runs continuously and cannot be adjusted to specific consumer
and industrial demand”.77
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Energy Series states that: “A study
carried out in 2009 collected the data for approximately 630 plant-years of operation in the UK
and there were 55 identified events in which a nuclear plant experienced a complete loss of off-
site power (LOOP). The general conclusion is that the main cause of LOOP events in the UK
is a period of unusually bad weather.”78 These results suggest that LOOPs are very infrequent
in the UK. Given that the expansion of nuclear reactors is not likely to increase the proportion
of total electricity generation from nuclear reactors significantly, it can be assumed that new
build will not cause new problems for the electricity grid in the UK. If there were significant
expansion beyond what I have projected is likely, problems may arise. However this is only
likely to occur many decades into the future, by which time Generation IV reactors may be
available and their flexibility would mean that they would not face the same (or any) of the
grid problems that current day reactors face.
75 pg.52 BPC
76 pg.10 Nuclear Power: Climate fix or folly? file:///C:/Users/Richard/Downloads/E09-
01_NuclPwrClimFixFolly1i09.pdf
77 WWF
http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/climate_carbon_energy/energy_solutions22/nuclear_power/
78 pg.52-53 IAEA http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1542_web.pdf

29. 29
3.5 – Nuclear Waste
MacKerron (2012) states that, “the absence of coherent policy on radioactive waste
management between 1956 and 2002 has led to a costly, high volume waste legacy”.79 The
BPC (pg.45) argue that nuclear waste requirements will not increase too much: “a new build
fleet of reactors of the same electrical installed capacity as the historic UK fleet will produce
only an additional 10% of high level and intermediate level waste, yet because of their longer
operating lifetimes and increased efficiency, they will generate 140% more electricity”.80 If
this is accurate, then expansion of nuclear reactors should not be an issue in terms of nuclear
waste, but this is a contentious issue. As with most things relating to nuclear power, there is
uncertainty with regard to waste management.
79 pg.18 Tyndall
80 pg.43 BPC

30. 30
Section 4 – Conclusions
4.1 – What has my research shown?
In the first half of the paper I projected electricity generation from nuclear reactors in the UK
for the period of 2015 to 2035. This was necessary for discussion on expansion because it was
unclear how far the UK had committed to new build.
My projections showed that if all planned and proposed reactors went ahead there would be
17.9GW of new generating capacity from nuclear power by 2035.
Even in my projections where there were significant delays, I predicted there would be 10GW
of new capacity by 2035 which would still be a significant proportion of total electricity
generation in the UK.
From my projections it seems clear that the UK is committed to replacing the ageing fleet of
existing reactors in order to at least maintain a similar proportion of electricity generation from
nuclear reactors in 2035 as there is today.
The second half of the paper focused on the key areas of debate over expansion. The main
conclusion from this section is that there is a lot less certainty with regard to nuclear power in
the UK than is appreciated and there are many levels of disagreement on key areas.
There are areas of contention related to: how to fund the investment, whether or not government
subsidies are reasonable and justified, whether or not potential cost escalations and construction
delays make projects financially unviable, whether or not Generation III reactors ought to be
built in the present in order to maintain expertise for the potential introduction of Generation
IV, etc. There are no clear answers to these questions and people’s conclusions on these debates
tend be based on their opinion of what they think the more pressing concerns are.

31. 31
4.2 – What were the limitations in my research?
All of the reactors I examined have either just started construction or are still in the negotiation
stage. This made it very difficult to predict the severity of delays that they might face. In order
to get around this I looked at the experiences of other reactors which were of the same type and
built by the same company (such as those at Flamanville), as well as looking at delays that had
already occurred at Hinckley Point C. For some of the more recently proposed and smaller
reactors there was very little media coverage of their developments and very few
announcements from the companies involved in their construction regarding their progress.
Therefore I had to look at international experience of nuclear reactor construction delays and
apply them to UK reactors in order to carry out my optimistic and pessimistic projections.
On the general areas of debate, particularly with regard to the grid and to nuclear waste, it was
difficult to find UK-specific data and opinions so I had to make some generalised assumptions.

32. 32
4.3 – How has the debate changed?
Since the BPC report was published in 2012, there have been substantial developments in the
debate. The government has changed its stance on subsidies and is now providing substantial
backing to private investors. These private investors have also been the subject of recent debate
with critics arguing that the deals for the Chinese investors are too generous and that foreign
investment may not necessarily benefit the British economy in terms of job creation and
growth. However these compromises on previous policy have occurred in the context that
Hinkley Point C has been repeatedly delayed and has faced rising construction costs.
The areas of debate are likely to change again in the next few years as it becomes clearer how
far the government “guarantee” for EDF is really a substantial subsidy. There will also be
greater focus on the reactors once they are up and running with scrutiny over their final
construction costs, electricity sale price, and electricity generation. This is likely to raise more
debate over the success of nuclear power in the UK and whether or not we wish to expand
again.
Further down the line the debate may move onto Generation IV if it becomes commercially
available. This will be sometime in the future, at least 20 years from now, and in this time there
could be developments in other sources such as renewables. The debate may move onto
whether or not we need both nuclear and renewables and if not; which ought to be pursued.
The debate could even move onto whether we ought to move to a more distributed, smaller
scale generation with smart grid. Perhaps nuclear fission is just a “bridging technology”81 for
the next 20 years and in the coming decades there may be a shift of preference away from large
scale plants altogether.
The BPC (pg. 8) states that use of nuclear energy requires a “long term national commitment
entailing many decades of responsibility and a country should foresee an elapse of at least 100
years between the initial planning and the final decommissioning of the latest power plants”.82
The very long term future of nuclear power in the UK is very uncertain and given the extremely
long term nature of nuclear projects it is necessary to look beyond 2035 and this is where
research should focus in the future.
81 pg.24 BPC
82 pg.8 BPC

33. 33
4.4 – Concluding Statement
In this paper I have only covered the electricity generation aspect of the debate over nuclear
power. There are many other issues that I could have addressed in more detail such as: the
carbon saving benefits of nuclear power compared to other sources, public perception, the
issues of nuclear waste and health concerns, proliferation and terrorism threats etc. Nuclear
power is broad and complex and it may be impossible to persuade the public of nuclear power
on economic arguments alone. However the present planned expansion of nuclear power
appears to be viable, has been backed by the government, and will go ahead which is perhaps
as far as the UK are willing to push it at this point in time.

34. 34
Bibliography
The readings are listed in the order in which they appear in the footnotes of the main text.
Bickerstaff, K.; Lorenzoni, I.; Pidgeon, N.F.; Poortinga, W.; Simmons, P. (2008)
“Reframing nuclear power in the UK energy debate: nuclear power, climate change mitigation
and radioactive waste”
Open Access Repository (SSOAR)
http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/22419/ssoar-2008-2-
bickerstaff_et_al-reframing_nuclear_power_in_the.pdf?sequence=1
University of Birmingham, the Birmingham Policy Commission (2012)
“The future of Nuclear Energy in the UK”
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/documents/research/socialsciences/nuclearenergyfullreport.pdf
World Nuclear Association (2015, updated 2016)
“Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom”
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/united-
kingdom.aspx
Government Legislation, legislation.gov (2008)
“Climate Change Act 2008”
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/part/1/crossheading/the-target-for-2050
World Nuclear News (2016)
“Study warns of worsening UK electricity supply gap”
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/EE-Study-warns-of-worsening-UK-electricity-supply-
gap-26011601.html
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) (2015)
“Updated energy and emissions projections 2015”
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/501292/eepRe
port2015_160205.pdf
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) (2015)
“Updated energy and emissions projections 2015”
“Annex E: primary energy demand”
Link to the full site where the excel link in available:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/updated-energy-and-emissions-projections-
2015
Link to the excel spreadsheet:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478329/Annex
-e-primary-energy-demand-updated_191115.xls
The BBC (2013)
“Hartlepool power station to stay open until 2024”
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-tees-24824816

35. 35
The Guardian (2015)
“Chinese-built reactor at Bradwell could have 'major impact' on estuary”
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/19/chinese-built-reactor-bradwell-
impact-essex-estuary-plant-nuclear
Sovacool, B.; Cooper, C. (2008)
“Nuclear Nonsense: Why Nuclear Power is No Answer to Climate Change and the World's
PostKyoto Energy Challenges”
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, Volume 33 | Issue 1 Article 2
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=wmelpr
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2015)
“Annual Energy Outlook 2015 with projections to 2040”
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf
Lovering, J.; Yip, A.; Nordhaus, T. (2016)
“Historical construction costs of global nuclear power reactors”
Energy Policy 91 (2016) 371–382
http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0301421516300106/1-s2.0-S0301421516300106-
main.pdf?_tid=96609a94-ffe8-11e5-8957-
00000aacb35d&acdnat=1460381192_54ab0d64284588d7e79d6d7b4b60967f
The Telegraph (2015)
“New nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point to begin construction within weeks”
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/nuclearpower/11945485/Nuclear-go-ahead-
construction-of-new-plant-to-begin-within-weeks.html
Carbon Brief (2015)
“New nuclear power in the UK would be the world’s most costly, says report”
http://www.carbonbrief.org/new-nuclear-power-in-uk-would-be-the-worlds-most-costly-says-
report
The Telegraph (2015)
“Nuclear delay: EDF admits Hinkley Point won't be ready by 2023”
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/11841733/Nuclear-delay-EDF-
admits-Hinkley-Point-wont-be-ready-by-2023.html
The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) (2016)
“Hinkley Point C”
http://www.onr.org.uk/hinkley-point-c/
Horizon, Nuclear Power (2016)
“Wylfa – About Our Site”
http://www.horizonnuclearpower.com/wylfa
Oldbury Nuclear Viewpoint (2016)
“New timetable for new nuclear power generation at Oldbury”
http://www.oldburynuclearviewpoint.org.uk/news/article-43/new-timetable-for-new-nuclear-
power-generation-at-oldbury

36. 36
Wales Online (2016)
“New £14bn nuclear power station in North Wales could be at threat if the right deal isn't struck
says its Japanese backers”
http://www.walesonline.co.uk/business/business-news/new-14bn-nuclear-power-station-
10813405
NuGeneration (2014)
“Agreement signed on guarantee scheme for Moorside”
http://www.nugeneration.com/news-02122014.html
Schneider, M.; Froggatt, A.; Hazemann, J.; Katsuta, T.; Ramana, M.V.; Thomas, S.; Porritt, J.
(2015)
“The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2015, the Independent Assessment of Nuclear
Developments in the World”
http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-Report-2015-
HTML.html#h.3o7alnk
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research (2013)
“A Review of Research Relevant to New Nuclear Build Power Plants in the UK”
file:///C:/Users/Richard/Downloads/tyndall_evidence%20(1).pdf
The Liberal Democratic Voice (2012)
“Ed Davey MP writes… There will be no public subsidy for nuclear”
http://www.libdemvoice.org/there-will-be-no-public-subsidy-for-nuclear-28150.html
The Guardian (2014)
“EDF nuclear deal is a bad economic bet”
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2014/jul/10/edf-nuclear-deal-is-a-bad-
economic-bet
World Nuclear News (2013)
“Strike price deal for Hinkley Point C”
http://www.world-nuclear-
news.org/NN_Strike_price_deal_for_Hinkley_Point_C_2110131.html
The Financial Times (2015)
“China should not be the answer to Britain’s nuclear problems”
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d0c8d010-6043-11e5-9846-
de406ccb37f2,Authorised=false.html?siteedition=uk&_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.
com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2Fd0c8d010-6043-11e5-9846-
de406ccb37f2.html%3Fsiteedition%3Duk&_i_referer=&classification=conditional_standard
&iab=barrier-app#axzz43MExciaF
World Nuclear News (2015)
“Britain needs Hinkley Point C, says EDF Energy head”
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Britain-needs-Hinkley-Point-C-says-EDF-Energy-
head-1609155.html

37. 37
The Guardian (2015)
“Government finally admits it is subsidising nuclear - while cutting help for renewables”
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/damian-carrington-blog/2015/oct/22/hinkley-
point-uk-energy-policy-is-now-hunkering-in-a-nuclear-bunker
European Commission (2014)
“State aid: Commission concludes modified UK measures for Hinkley Point nuclear power
plant are compatible with EU rules”
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1093_en.htm
The BBC (2016)
“EDF finance chief quits ahead of Hinkley Point decision”
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35741772
EDF Energy (2016)
“Hinkley Point C, Securing the UK’s energy future”
https://www.edfenergy.com/energy/nuclear-new-build-projects/hinkley-point-c
The Guardian (2014)
“Not investing in new nuclear power would be a costly gamble for the UK”
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2014/jul/23/investing-new-nuclear-power-uk-
carbon-energy
WWF (2016)
“Why not nuclear power?”
http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/climate_carbon_energy/energy_solutions22/nucl
ear_power/
National Grid (2015)
“Future Energy Scenarios”
file:///C:/Users/Richard/Downloads/FESCover%20(1).pdf
Abram, T.; Ion, S. (2008)
“Generation-IV nuclear power: A review of the state of the science”
Energy Policy 36 (2008) 4323–4330
http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0301421508004448/1-s2.0-S0301421508004448-
main.pdf?_tid=dc3ac63e-ffed-11e5-a077-
00000aacb360&acdnat=1460383457_70cce087b226871f970707f2df2ccdc4
Fetter, S. (2009)
“How long will the world's uranium supplies last?”
Scientific American
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-long-will-global-uranium-deposits-last/

38. 38
Lovins, A.; Sheikh, I.; Markevich, A. (2008)
“Nuclear Power: Climate Fix or Folly?”
April 2008 RMI Solutions article “Forget Nuclear,” updated and expanded by ABL 31 Dec
2008
file:///C:/Users/Richard/Downloads/E09-01_NuclPwrClimFixFolly1i09.pdf
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Energy Series (2015)
“Electric Grid Reliability and Interface with Nuclear Power Plants”
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1542_web.pdf