The new law on diminished responsibility differs from the previous law in several key ways:
1. Under the new law, the abnormality of mind must arise from a recognized medical condition, whereas the previous law did not require this.
2. The new law specifies that the abnormality must substantially impair the defendant's ability to understand the nature of their conduct, form a rational judgment, or exercise self-control.
3. While some mental conditions recognized under the old law like depression are still valid defenses, the new law limits diminished responsibility to abnormalities arising from recognized medical diagnoses.
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PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES ps.psychiatryonline.org October 2009 .docxamrit47
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES ' ps.psychiatryonline.org ' October 2009 Vol. 60 No. 10 11229955
In Atkins v. Virginia the U.S.
Supreme Court declared execu-
tion of persons with mental retar-
dation to constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment, and thus to be
unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. However, the Court
left all considerations regarding
how to implement the decision
explicitly to the states. Since
Atkins was decided in 2002, legis-
latures, courts, and mental health
experts have struggled with its
implementation, highlighting the
complexities that can arise when
the courts base legal rules on clin-
ical findings. This column reviews
the Atkins case and considers the
challenges associated with a clini-
cal determination that can have
life-or-death consequences for
capital defendants. (Psychiatric
Services 60:1295–1297, 2009)
I n 2002 the U.S. Supreme Courtdeclared execution of persons with
mental retardation to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, and thus to
be unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment (1). The case that trig-
gered the decision, reversing an earli-
er Supreme Court precedent (2), in-
volved Daryl Atkins, a man with 16
prior felony convictions, who faced
the death penalty for the abduction,
robbery, and murder of an airman
from a local military base. Since
Atkins v. Virginia was decided, legis-
latures, courts, and mental health ex-
perts have struggled with its imple-
mentation, highlighting the complex-
ities that can arise when the courts
base legal rules on clinical findings.
Atkins represented a distinct break
with the courts’ usual approach to the
impact on sentencing of a defendant’s
mental state at the time of the crime
(3). At least since the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Lockett v. Ohio in
1978 (4), capital defendants have had
the right to introduce evidence of
their mental state at the sentencing
hearing as a mitigating factor. In
essence, defendants were permitted
to argue that their mental retardation,
mental illness, intoxication, or other
impairing condition at the time of the
crime so diminished their responsibil-
ity for their actions that the ultimate
penalty of death should not be im-
posed. The jury was then charged
with weighing evidence of the defen-
dant’s mental state, along with other
mitigating factors, against the nature
of the crime and any other considera-
tions that might be considered aggra-
vating in deciding on a sentence.
Precisely this process was followed
in Daryl Atkins’ case. Testimony was
presented on his behalf by an expert
psychologist, who characterized him
as having mild mental retardation,
noting a full-scale IQ score of 59. A
jury nonetheless determined that the
death penalty should be imposed; af-
ter the initial sentence was vacated
because of a procedural error, a sec-
ond jury—which listened to an addi-
tional psychologist hired by the pros-
ecution who testified that Atkins was
of normal intelligence but had an an-
tisocial personality disorder—again
e ...
E DIGEST U/S 279, 337, 338,304 A, 304 II of India penal codesArjunRandhir2
E DIGEST ONU/S 279, 337, 338304 A, 304 II OFINDIAN PENAL CODE&OFFENCES RELATING TOM. V. ACT 1988.(SPECIALLY FOCUS ON ACCIDENTAL CASES)
Liabilities on civil as well criminal case
Insanity or unsoundness of mind is not defined in the act. It means a disorder of the mind, which impairs the cognitive faculty; that is, the reasoning capacity of man to such an extent as to render him incapable of understanding consequences of his actions. It means that the person is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or of realising that the act is wrong or contrary to law
it deals with insanity in tort law, contract, and ipc
Acetabularia Information For Class 9 .docxvaibhavrinwa19
Acetabularia acetabulum is a single-celled green alga that in its vegetative state is morphologically differentiated into a basal rhizoid and an axially elongated stalk, which bears whorls of branching hairs. The single diploid nucleus resides in the rhizoid.
Executive Directors Chat Leveraging AI for Diversity, Equity, and InclusionTechSoup
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MATATAG CURRICULUM: ASSESSING THE READINESS OF ELEM. PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS I...NelTorrente
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Read| The latest issue of The Challenger is here! We are thrilled to announce that our school paper has qualified for the NATIONAL SCHOOLS PRESS CONFERENCE (NSPC) 2024. Thank you for your unwavering support and trust. Dive into the stories that made us stand out!
How to Build a Module in Odoo 17 Using the Scaffold MethodCeline George
Odoo provides an option for creating a module by using a single line command. By using this command the user can make a whole structure of a module. It is very easy for a beginner to make a module. There is no need to make each file manually. This slide will show how to create a module using the scaffold method.
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Dive into the world of AI! Experts Jon Hill and Tareq Monaur will guide you through AI's role in enhancing nonprofit websites and basic marketing strategies, making it easy to understand and apply.
Normal Labour/ Stages of Labour/ Mechanism of LabourWasim Ak
Normal labor is also termed spontaneous labor, defined as the natural physiological process through which the fetus, placenta, and membranes are expelled from the uterus through the birth canal at term (37 to 42 weeks
"Protectable subject matters, Protection in biotechnology, Protection of othe...
Diminished responsibility guide
1. “The new law on diminished responsibility does not differ from the previous law it replaces.”
Critically Discuss this statement.
Question Analysis
Diminished Responsibility
Past Law – s 2 HA 1957
New Law
Differences/ Similarities.
Subject Matter of Content Analysis
1. The difference between DR and insanity (purpose: to provide some context and
general distinction between two defences of similar nature- max 2 para)
a. Consider the requirement for insanity – see the The M'Naghten Rule
b. Explain the Diminished Responsibility applies when the case cannot be
brought under the The M'Naghten Rule
2. Origin of diminished responsibility:
a. S 2, Homicide Act 1957 (explain what is DR under HA 1957)
i. The mind of the accused has been affected by
1. Abnormality of mind OR
2. inherent causes OR
ii. induced by disease or injury OR retarded development
iii. The abnormality of mind or inherent causes has substantially
impaired the mental responsibility
iv. Act or omission in doing or being a party to the killing
b. Vingre case – there must be clear evidence of mental imbalance – medical
reports ( R v Dix (1981), R v Matheson (1958) and R v Bailey (1977)
c. What it means by abnormality of mind? – explaination given by Lord Parker
CJ in R v Byrne [1960] – state of mind so different from that of ordinary
human beings that that the reasonable man would term it abnormal. Factors
to look at:
i. Anything affecting perception of the accused;
2. ii. Ability to form rational judgment – whether the act is right or wrong
iii. Ability to exercise will power to control physical acts in accordance
with rational judgment.
iv. Byrne’s case recognised the inability to control impulses is abnormality
of the mind.
d. Direction to Jury
i. R v Seers (1984) - Court of Appeal stated that Byrne’s direction should
be given to the jury.
ii. Limitation of s 2 defence – the accused must bring their abnormality of
mind within the meaning in section 2 HA 1957. If not, they will not be
able to use the partial defence and may be convicted of murder in the
absence of any other defence.
iii. Look R v Tandy (1988) and R v Inseal [1992]
iv. If there two causes – one can come under s 2 (X) and the other
cannot(Y) – then the judge has to direct the jury to disregard evidence
relating to the other (Y). – held in R v Fenton (1975)
e. The abnormality of mind must substantially impair mental responsibility
i. This is a matter of fact to be left to the jury
ii. R v Byrne – Lord Parker CJ explained
1. Medical evidence is relevant;
2. But medical evidence must show that firstly there was
impairment of mental responsibility and second it must show
that the impairment was substantial.
3. R v Campbell, the Court of Appeal stated that whether the
abnormality of the mind substantially impaired the accused
mental responsibility cannot be decided on medical evidence
alone. All evidence on the incident on trial should be
considered.
3. New Law – s 52, Coroners and Justice Act 2009
a. Purpose – to clarify the type of mental abnormality which can be ground for
DR and the means by which to establish the defence in court.
b. Under the new law – burden is on the defendant to prove the defence on a
balance of probabilities. (Same as the old law)
c. Elements of s 52 CJA 2009:
i. Abnormality of mind –
1. Arise from a recognized medical condition (same/different?)
3. 2. Substantially impair the D’s ability to do one or more of the
things mentioned in 52(1A) and
a. 52(1A) –
Understand the nature of conduct(same/different?)
To form rational judgment (same/different?)
To exercise self-control (same/different?)
3. DR explains the D’s Acts and omissions in doing or being a
party to the killing. – argue is a issue of causation. Therefore if
the DR could not be said to be a cause of the D’s act or omission,
then the DR fails as a defence.
d. First condition in s 52 – Abnormality of mental functioning arising from a
recognised mental condition
i. S 52 does not define ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ – then need to
depend on caselaw for definition.
ii. But case law must fit within the test given in s 52(1A) (which of the old
cases fit? Explain)
e. Second condition in s 52 – Recognized mental condition
i. Under the old law, there was no requirement that the defendant’s
mental abnormality resulted from a recognised medical condition so
long as it was caused by some ‘inherent’ condition. –(Comment – it is
flexible). Under old, recognised medical condition is a requirement in
law. What if the condition by the accused is not recognised yet?
ii. Recognised medical conditions can be found in authoritative
classificatory lists, including the World Health Organization’s
International Classification of Diseases and the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
(Comment: Is the list exhaustive?)
iii. Some old law cases recognised under new law (Analysis – first whether
same as old law? Second does this make the new law the same as the old law
(Argue)?):
1. Arrested or retarded mental development.
2. Depression (R v Gittens (1984)).
3. Bipolar (R v Inglis [2010] EWCA Crim 2269).
4. Paranoid schizophrenia (R v Sutcliffe (1981)).
5. Brain damage.
6. Psychopathy (Byrne (1961)).
7. Paranoid personality disorder (Martin (2002)).
4. 8. Postnatal depression (Reynolds (1998)).
4. Special situations: Alcohol and Drugs:
a. Old law distinguished between binge drinking and chronic alcoholism. This
separation is likely to be continued. Consuming alcohol or drugs is not a
medical condition - R v Fenton (1975).
b. Application of new law - R v Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim 281, (2012) MHLO
18, the Court of Appeal concluded that voluntary acute intoxication, whether
from alcohol or another substance, is not capable of founding diminished
responsibility. However, the abnormality of mental functioning does not have
to be the sole cause of the killing so long as it ‘provides an explanation’ for
D’s participation in the killing. So a person who kills due to the combined
effect of intoxication and a recognised mental condition may still have a
defence (R v Dietschmann [2003] 1 All ER 897 (Old law), disapproving R v
Egan [1992] 4 All ER 470) (Old Law). (Focus of analysis – why Egan was
disapproved?).
c. Under the old law, chronic alcoholism could ground the defence as it was
inherent to the defendant (R v Wood [2009] 1 WLR 496 Court of Appeal; R v
Stewart [2009] 1 WLR 2507). This is likely to continue to be the law, since
chronic alcoholism is a recognised medical condition and its effect, which is
well known, is to provoke irresistable cravings for alcohol and consequently a
reduced capacity for self control and foming rational judgements.
d. Example – R v Wood - Wood is a typical case of this nature, involving a
homeless alcoholic who, heavily intoxicated, killed an associate who had
made a homosexual advance. The trial judge gave the misleading impression
to the jury that the defendant’s consumption of alcohol had to be entirely
involuntary to count as an internal pathology capable of grounding the
defence. The defendant’s appeal was allowed for misdirection. The President
of the Queen’s Bench rejected the trial judge’s proposition to the effect that
‘unless every drink consumed that day by the appellant was involuntary, his
alcohol dependency syndrome was to be disregarded’.
5. DR must provide an explanation for the killing
a. The new provision requires that the abnormality must provide an
explanation for the defendant’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party
to the killing.
5. b. The standard the reason must achieve - Section 52(1B) of the Coroners and
Justice Act 2009 states that an explanation will be provided if ‘it causes, or is a
significant contributory factor in causing, D to carry out that conduct’.
Whether it does provide an explanation for the killing is a question for the
jury which, in cases involving multiple causes – for example depression and
intoxication (see R v Gittens) or chronic alcoholism and intoxication (see
Wood) – could prove a bit of a challenge.
Conclusion:
6. Are the laws the same?
a. Where are they similar?
b. Where are they different?
c. Does the difference reflect a significant change? Your reasons.