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z, Congressional
Research
Service
Department of Defense's Use of Contractors to
Support Military Operations: Background,
Analysis, and Issues for Congress
Moshe Schwartz
Specialist in Defense Acquisition
Jennifer Church
U.S. Department of Army Fellow

May 17, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43074
CRS Report for Congress
Preparedfor -dlemnbers and Committees of Congress
Department of Defense's Use of Contractors to Support Military
Operations
Summary
Throughout its history, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
relied on contractors to support a
wide range of military operations. Operations over the last
thirty years have highlighted the
critical role that contractors play in supporting U.S. troops-both
in terms of the number of
contractors and the type of work being performed. Over the last
decade in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and before that, in the Balkans, contractors accounted for 50%
or more of the total military force.
Regardless of whether future operations are similar to-or
significantly different from- those of
the past decade most analysts and defense officials believe that
contractors will continue to play a
central role in overseas military operations. Consequently, these

observers believe that DOD
should be prepared to effectively award and manage contracts at
a moment's notice, anywhere in
the world, in unknown environments, and on a scale that may
exceed the total contract
obligations of any other federal agency.
Contractors provide a wide range of services, from
transportation, construction, and base support,
to intelligence analysis and private security. The benefits of
using contractors include freeing up
uniformed personnel to conduct combat operations; providing
expertise in specialized fields, such
as linguistics or weapon systems maintenance; and providing a
surge capability, quickly
delivering critical support capabilities tailored to specific
military needs. Because contractors can
be hired when a particular need arises and released when their
services are no longer needed,
contractors can be less expensive in the long run than
maintaining a permanent in-house
capability.
Just as the effective use of contractors can augment military
capabilities, the ineffective use of
contractors can prevent troops from receiving what they need,
when they need it, and can lead to
the wasteful spending of billions of dollars. Contractors can
also compromise the credibility and
effectiveness of the U.S. military and undermine operations, as
many analysts believe have
occurred in recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improved
planning for and management of
contractors may not eliminate all problems, but it could mitigate
the risks of relying on
contractors during overseas operations.

DOD's use of contractors has been a significant oversight issue
for Congress in recent years. With
the help of Congress, DOD has made substantial progress to
improve its use of operational
contract support; however, many observers believe the military
is not yet sufficiently prepared to
use contractors in future operations. In their view, better
planning, expanded educating and
training, ensuring sufficient resources to effectively manage and
oversee contractors, and
providing operational commanders with more reliable data can
help build the foundation for the
more effective use of contractors. In light of current and future
budget constraints, some
observers are concerned that DOD may not be able to
sufficiently fund efforts underway to
effectively prepare for the use of contractors in future
operations.
DOD's extensive use of contractors poses several potential
policy and oversight issues for the
1 13th Congress, including
1. To what extent will potential budget cuts or force structure
changes impact DOD reliance
on contractors?
2. To what extent is DOD preparing for the role of contractors
in future military operations?

Operations
3. To what extent is the use of contractors being incorporated
into DOD education, training,
and exercises?
4. What steps is DOD taking to ensure that sufficient resources
will be dedicated to create
and maintain the capabilities to ensure effective operational
contract support in the
future?
Congress' decisions on these issues could substantially affect
the extent to which DOD relies on
contractors and is capable of planning for and overseeing
contractors in future operations.
Operations
Contents
In tro d u c tio n
...............................................................................................
....................................... 1
The Role of Contractors in M ilitary Operations
.............................................................................. 1
DOD Was Inadequately Prepared for the Use of Contractors in
Iraq and Afghanistan ...... 4
Operational Versus Peacetime Contract Support

................................................................... 5
Consequences of Poor Use of Contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan ...................................... 8
Efforts to Improve Operational Contract Support
..................................................................... 9
What Has Enabled DOD Progress in Improving Operational
Contract Support? . . .. . ........ II
P rep arin g for th e F utu re
...............................................................................................
.................. 14
C u ltu ral C h an g e
...............................................................................................
........................ 15
Articulating the Importance of Contract Support
.......................................................... 16
Incorporating Operational Contract Support into Military
Education .......................... 17
Including Contractors in Command Post and Field Exercises
..................................... 18
S y stem ic C h an g e
...............................................................................................
...................... 19
P la n n in g
...............................................................................................
.............................. 1 9
Im p ro v in g D ata
...............................................................................................
.................. 2 0
Dedicating Sufficient Resources to Managing Contractors
......................................... 21
Issu e s fo r C o n g re ss
...............................................................................................

......................... 2 2
Figures
Figure 1. Contractor Personnel as Percentage of DOD
Workforce in Recent Operations ....... 2
Figure 2. DOD Peacetime vs. Operations Contract Obligation
Trends ..................................... 7
Figure 3. Select Legislative H istory
......................................................................................... 14
Tables
Table A-1. Contractor Personnel and Troop Level in
Afghanistan .......................................... 24
Table A-2. Contractor Personnel and Troop Level in Iraq
....................................................... 25
Table B-1. DOD Contract Obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan
vs. Other Agencies' Total
C o n tract O b lig atio n s
...............................................................................................
.................... 2 6
Theaters of Operation ........... 27
Appendixes
Appendix A. Number of Contractors vs. Number of Troops in
Iraq and Afghanistan .............. 24
A ppendix B . D O D Contract Obligations

................................................................................... 26
A ppendix C . Select Legislative H istory
................................................................................... 28
Operations
Contacts
A uthor C ontact Inform ation
...............................................................................................
...... 32
Operations
Introduction
Over the last two decades, contractors have played a critical
role in U.S. military operations,
making up more than half of Department of Defense's (DOD)
total workforce in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Balkans. With the end of combat
operations in Iraq and the drawdown of
forces in Afghanistan, DOD is turning its attention to preparing
for future military operations. As
reflected in recent defense strategic planning guidance, the

United States must prepare for a
diverse range of security challenges.' Although future
contingency operations may differ from
those of the past decade, many analysts and defense officials
believe that contractors will
continue to play a central role in military operations.2 These
observers believe that, in order to
meet the challenges of future operations, DOD should be
prepared to effectively award and
manage contracts at a moment's notice, anywhere in the world,
in unknown environments, and on
a scale that may exceed the total contract obligations of any
other federal agency.
This report provides background information and identifies
issues for Congress on the use of
contractors to support military operations. DOD's extensive use
of contractors poses several
potential policy and oversight issues for Congress and has been
the focus of numerous hearings.
contractors in and is capable of planning for and overseeing
Related CRS reports include CRS Report R42084, Wartime
Contracting in Afghanistan: Analysis
and Issues for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz, which focuses on
the challenges of contract support
in Afghanistan, and CRS Report R41820, Department of
Defense Trends in Overseas Contract
Obligations, by Moshe Schwartz and Wendy Ginsberg, which
focuses on trends in DOD contract
obligations around the world.
The Role of Contractors in Military Operations

DOD has long relied on contractors to support overseas military
operations. Post-Cold War
defense budget reductions resulted in significant cuts to military
logistics and other support
capabilities, requiring DOD to hire contractors to "fill the
gap."3 Recent operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and before that in the Balkans, have reflected this
increased reliance on contractors
supporting U.S. troops-both in terms of the number of
contractors and the type of work being
performed. According to DOD data, contractors, on average,
represented just over half of the
force in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq (see Figure 1).
1 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, p. 1,
4-7.
2 Ibid. Strategic planning guidance states the U.S. must be
prepared for a diverse range of security challenges; however,
military "forces will no longer be sized to perform long-term,
prolonged stability operations," p. 6. DOD's 2014 budget
guidance further states that the military is transitioning from "a
counterinsurgency-focused force to a force ready and
capable of operating across a full range of operations." See
Department of Defense, Defense Budget Priorities and
Choices Fiscal Year 2014, April 2013, p. 8.
3 Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense
Review, May 1997, Section 8. See
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/qdr/sec8.htl.

Operations
Figure I. Contractor Personnel as Percentage of DOD Workforce
in Recent Operations
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
G%
Balkans Afghanistan Iraq
Source: Balkans: Congressional Budget Office. Contractors'
Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq. August 2008. p. 13;
Afghanistan: CRS analysis of DOD data, calculated as an
average for the period September 2007-March 2013; Iraq:
CRS analysis of DOD data, calculated as an average for the
period September 2007-March 2011.
Note: DOD did not begin releasing data on contractors in U.S.
Central Command until the second half of 2007.
As of March 2013, there were approximately 108,000 DOD
contractor personnel in Afghanistan,
representing 62% of the total force (see Appendix A). Of this
total, there were nearly 18,000
private security contractors, compared to 65,700 U.S. troops.4

Over the last six fiscal years, DOD
obligations for contracts performed in the Iraq and Afghanistan
areas of operation were
approximately $160 billion and exceeded total contract
obligations of any other U.S. federal
agency (see Appendix B).5
According to government officials and analysts, the military is
unable to effectively execute many
operations, particularly those that are large-scale and long-term
in nature, without extensive
operational contract support.6 Even in short-term operations,
contractors can play a variety of
critical roles. For example, the first fragmentary order for
Operation Tomodachi-DOD's
response to the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in
2011 -involved contract support.7
Given the extensive role of contractors in military operations,
many DOD officials and analysts
consider contract management a mission-essential task.
4 Department of Defense, Contractor Support of U.S.
Operations in the USCENTCOMArea of Responsibility to
Include Iraq and Afghanistan, April 2013; Boots on Ground
Report, March 2013.
5 Iraq areas of operation are Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and
Jordan. Afghanistan areas of operation are Afghanistan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan.
6 Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology,
Department of Defense Program for Contingency Contracting

Planning, Oversight, and Visibility: Report to the
Congress of the United States, November 2010, p. 18.
7 Department of Defense, Pacific Command J4. Fragmentary
Order for Joint Contracting Support Board for Operation
Tomodachi. March 21, 2011, p. 1-2 . DOD directed US Forces
Japan to establish a Joint Contracting Support Board
within 24 hours. A fragmentary order is used to modify or
execute a branch or sequel an existing operations order.
Operations
DOD has recognized the role contractors are likely to play in
future operations. As stated in its
Budget Request for FY2013, operational contract support is a
critical function in support of
military operations, natural disasters, and unanticipated
calamities."
A A
Contractors can provide significant operational benefits to
DOD, including freeing up uniformed
personnel to conduct combat operations; providing expertise in
specialized fields, such as
linguistics or weapon systems maintenance; and providing a
surge capability, quickly delivering
critical support capabilities tailored to specific military needs.
Contractors are often responsible
for such critical tasks as providing armed security to convoys
and installations, providing life
support to forward deployed warfighters, conducting

intelligence analysis, and training local
security forces. Because contractors can be hired when a
particular need arises and released when
their services are no longer needed, contractors can be less
expensive in the long run than
maintaining a permanent in-house capability. And when a
decision is made to limit the number of
troops on the ground, contractors can fulfill critical manpower
needs.
" Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request
Overview, February 2012, p. 3-5.
9 DOD's doctrinal definition of operational contract support is,
"the process of planning for and obtaining supplies,
services, and construction from commercial sources in support
of joint operations along with the associated contractor
management functions." See Joint Publication 4-10, Operational
Contract Support, October 2008, p. 167.
10 The Commission on Wartime Contracting was established
pursuant to Public Law 110-181 to assess the extent of
fraud, waste, and abuse associated with contracts supporting
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Operations

the wasteful spending of billions of dollars-dollars that could
have been used to fund other
operational requirements." Contractors can also compromise the
credibility and effectiveness of
the U.S. military and undermine operations, as many analysts
believe happened in Iraq and
Afghanistan.2 Improved planning for and management of
contractors may not eliminate all
problems, but it could mitigate the risks of relying on
3
Iraq and Afghanistan
DOD acknowledges that it was inadequately prepared to execute
large-scale operational contract
support in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 Military commanders and
service members have indicated that
they were not prepared for the extent of contractor support in
Iraq and did not receive enough
training to prepare them to manage or work with contractors.5
Some stated that they did not
receive enough exposure to the role of contractors in military
operations in the curriculum at
professional military educational institutions.'6 An Army
commission found that Contracting
Officer's Representatives responsible for managing contractors
are generally drawn from combat
11 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
February 2010, p. 93. U.S. See also Government
Accountability Office. Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Actions
Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over
U.S. Efforts and Investments, GAO-08-568T. March 11, 2008,

p. 4,6; Urgent Reform Required. Army Expeditionary
Contracting, Op. Cit., p. 2-3.
12 Many observers believe that the fallout from Abu Ghraib and
other incidents, such as the shooting of Iraqi civilians
by private security contractors hired by the United States
government, have hurt the credibility of the U.S. military and
undermined efforts in Iraq. See also: Department of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p.
93; Comnmission on Wartime Contracting In Iraq and
Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling
Costs, Reducing Risk, Final Report to Congress, August, 2011,
p. 5; U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Operational Contract Support. Management and Oversight
Improvements Needed in Afghanistan, GAO- 12-290,
March 29, 2012, p. 1-2.
13 For example, according to an Army investigative report, a
lack of good contractor surveillance at Abu Ghraib prison
contributed to fostering a permissive environment in which
prisoner abuses took place. See: Department of Defense.
Investigation of Intelligence Activities AtAbu Ghraib. August
23, 2004. p. 52. The report found "Proper oversight did
not occur at Abu Ghraib due to a lack of training and inadequate
contract management ... [T]his lack of monitoring was
a contributing factor to the problems that were experienced with
the performance of the contractors at Abu Ghraib."
See also: Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Strategic and
Operational Planning for Operational Contract Support
and Workforce Mix, Jan 24, 2011, p. 1; U.S. Government
Accountability Office, Operational Contract Support:
Sustained Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future
Contingencies, GAO-12-1026T, September 2012, p. 1;
Commission on Wartime Contracting In Iraq and Afghanistan,
Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs,
Reducing Risk, Final Report to Congress, August, 2011, p. 28.

14 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services,
Hearing on Operational Contract Support: Learningfrom the
Past and Preparing for the Future, Joint Testimony of Hon. Alan
F. Estevez, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Logistics
and Materiel Readiness, and Brigadier General Craig C.
Crenshaw, Vice Director, Joint Staff, J-4, 11 2th Congress,
September 12, 2012, p. 2; U.S. Army, Army Operational
Contract Support Audit Analysis Project, Results Summary,
April 29, 2011, p. 1.
15 U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Needs to
Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and
Continue to Improve Management and Oversight, GAO-08-
572T, Highlights page, March 11, 2008; also based on
discussions with military personnel deployed in Iraq.
16 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Operational
Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements
Needed in Afghanistan, GAO-12-290, March 2012, p. 17; based
on numerous CRS discussions with DOD personnel
from 2009-2013.
Operations
units and receive little, if any, training on how to work with
contractors.7 Many analysts and
officials believe that the military did not have enough trained
oversight personnel or an adequate
infrastructure to effectively execute and manage contractors in
Iraq and Afghanistan.8 In January
2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged DOD's

failure to adequately prepare for
the use of contractors when he testified that the use of
contractors occurred
without any supervision or without any coherent strategy on
how we were going to do it and
without conscious decisions about what we will allow
contractors to do and what we won't
allow contractors to do... We have not thought holistically or
coherently about our use of
contractors, particularly when it comes to combat environments
or combat training.1 9
DOD acknowledges that there was no comprehensive plan for
how to use contractors, and to what
extent. As a result, the use of contractors was done on an ad-hoc
basis, without significant
consideration of implications for foreign policy and without
putting in place the necessary
oversight. Observers believe insufficient resources were
dedicated to oversight, often resulting in
poor performance, billions of dollars of waste, and failure to
achieve mission goals. The
Commission on Wartime Contracting found that, "too often
using contractors [was] the default
mechanism, driven by considerations other than whether they
provide the best solution, and
without consideration for the resources needed to manage
them."
20
Contract support in operational environments is different, and
often more complex, than contract

support in peacetime. In peacetime, the goal of contracting is
generally to obtain the good or
service that is required.2' The measurements of success are
generally getting the right good or
service, on schedule, and at a fair price.2 2 During operations,
however-and particularly in an
expeditionary or counterinsurgency environment-cost, schedule,
and performance are often
secondary to the larger strategic goals of achieving military
objectives or denying popular support
for the insurgency. For example, in peacetime, the primary
purpose of building a road is often to
have the road built to specification in the most efficient and
least expensive way. Other policy
17 Urgent Reform Required. Army Expeditionary Contracting,
Op. Cit., p. 43.
18 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan: Key
Oversight Issues, GAO-13-218SP, February 2013, p. 31;
Operational Contract Support. Management and Oversight
Improvements Needed in Afghanistan, Op. Cit, p. 9, 23, 25;
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on
Contracting Oversight, The Comprehensive Contingency
Contracting Reform Act of 2012 (S.2139), Testimony of
Richard Ginman, Director, Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy, Department of Defense, 112th Cong., 2nd
sess., April 17, 2012, p. 6; Kathryn T.H. Syzmanski, Command
Counsel U.S. Army Materiel Command in Atlanta on
August 9, 2004. American Bar Association Section of Public
Contract Law, Contractors on the Battlefield: Exploration
of Unique Liability and Human Relations Issues, Volume II. See
also CRS Report R42084, Wartime Contracting in

Afghanistan: Analysis and Issues for Congress, by Moshe
Schwartz; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military
Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-
standing Problems with Management and Oversight of
Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO-07-145,
December 18, 2006.
19 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To
Receive Testimony on the Challenges Facing the
Department of Defense, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., January 27,
2009.
20 Comnmission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan, At What Risk? Correcting Over-reliance on
Contractors in Contingency Operations, Second Interim Report
to Congress, February 24, 2011, Forward.
21 Additional factors can come in to play in peacetime,
including stimulating the economy and creatingjobs.
22 The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR 1.102) states that
the goal of the government acquisition system is to
promote public policy considerations, such as transparency,
competition, and promotion of small business. Even within
this context, these considerations often play a secondary role to
the general focus on cost, schedule and performance.
Operations
considerations may be factored in (such as small business or
environmental concerns), but if the
road is built on time, on schedule, and to the required
specifications, the contract is usually
deemed a success. During operations, however, these may not
be the right measures, as other

goals may be equally or more important. In a
counterinsurgency, winning the support of the
local village is often more important than staying on schedule;
in responding to a humanitarian
crisis, rapidly providing critical supplies may be more important
than an increase in cost or
meeting some technical specifications.
Contract risks can also differ greatly between peacetime and
operational environments. Peacetime
risks generally include cost overruns, schedule slips, and poor
performance. Additional risks must
be considered when awarding a contract in an operational
environment. As then-Commander,
International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, General
John Allen, stated in his contracting
guidance to commanders in Afghanistan, it is important to
look beyond cost, schedule, and performance. Evaluate the
success of a contract by the
degree to which it supports the Afghan people and economy and
our campaign objectives.
Include operational criteria in decisions to award contracts,
such as the effect of the contract
on security, local power dynamics, and the enemy.24
For these reasons, contract support in an operational
environment is often far more complex to
execute and difficult to evaluate than contract support in
peacetime .25
The goods and services DOD buys during peacetime are very
different from those during
operations. In FY2012, 49% of all DOD contract obligations
were for goods, 41 % for services,
and 10% for research and development (R&D). 26 By …

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to
Support Military Operations: Background,
Analysis, and Issues for Congress
Moshe Schwartz
Specialist in Defense Acquisition
Jennifer Church
U.S. Department of Army Fellow
May 17, 2013
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43074
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Operations
Summary
Throughout its history, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
relied on contractors to support a
wide range of military operations. Operations over the last
thirty years have highlighted the
critical role that contractors play in supporting U.S. troops—
both in terms of the number of
contractors and the type of work being performed. Over the last
decade in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and before that, in the Balkans, contractors accounted for 50%
or more of the total military force.
Regardless of whether future operations are similar to−or

significantly different from− those of
the past decade most analysts and defense officials believe that
contractors will continue to play a
central role in overseas military operations. Consequently, these
observers believe that DOD
should be prepared to effectively award and manage contracts at
a moment's notice, anywhere in
the world, in unknown environments, and on a scale that may
exceed the total contract
obligations of any other federal agency.
Contractors provide a wide range of services, from
transportation, construction, and base support,
to intelligence analysis and private security. The benefits of
using contractors include freeing up
uniformed personnel to conduct combat operations; providing
expertise in specialized fields, such
as linguistics or weapon systems maintenance; and providing a
surge capability, quickly
delivering critical support capabilities tailored to specific
military needs. Because contractors can
be hired when a particular need arises and released when their
services are no longer needed,
contractors can be less expensive in the long run than
maintaining a permanent in-house
capability.
the wasteful spending of billions of dollars. Contractors can
also compromise the credibility and
effectiveness of the U.S. military and undermine operations, as
many analysts believe have
occurred in recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improved

planning for and management of
contractors may not eliminate all problems, but it could mitigate
the risks of relying on
DOD’s use of contractors has been a significant oversight issue
for Congress in recent years. With
the help of Congress, DOD has made substantial progress to
improve its use of operational
contract support; however, many observers believe the military
is not yet sufficiently prepared to
use contractors in future operations. In their view, better
planning, expanded educating and
training, ensuring sufficient resources to effectively manage and
oversee contractors, and
providing operational commanders with more reliable data can
help build the foundation for the
more effective use of contractors. In light of current and future
budget constraints, some
observers are concerned that DOD may not be able to
sufficiently fund efforts underway to
effectively prepare for the use of contractors in future
operations.
DOD’s extensive use of contractors poses several potential
policy and oversight issues for the
113th Congress, including
1. To what extent will potential budget cuts or force structure
changes impact DOD reliance
on contractors?
2. To what extent is DOD preparing for the role of contractors
in future military operations?

Antione Norris
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contrary
Operations
3. To what extent is the use of contractors being incorporated
into DOD education, training,
and exercises?
4. What steps is DOD taking to ensure that sufficient resources
will be dedicated to create
and maintain the capabilities to ensure effective operational
contract support in the
future?
contractors and is capable of planning for and overseeing

Operations
Contents
Introduction
...............................................................................................
....................................... 1
.............................................................................. 1
Iraq and Afghanistan ............. 4
....................................................................... 5
Consequences of Poor Use of Contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan .......................................... 8
Efforts to Improve Operational Contract Support
..................................................................... 9
What Has Enabled DOD Progress in Improving Operational
Contract Support? ............. 11
Preparing for the Future
...............................................................................................
.................. 14
Cultural Change
......................................................................................... ......
........................ 15
Articulating the Importance of Contract Support
.............................................................. 16
Incorporating Operational Contract Support into Military
Education .............................. 17
Including Contractors in Command Post and Field Exercises

.......................................... 18
Systemic Change
...............................................................................................
...................... 19
Planning
...............................................................................................
.............................. 19
Improving Data
...............................................................................................
.................. 20
Dedicating Sufficient Resources to Managing Contractors
.............................................. 21
Issues for Congress
...............................................................................................
......................... 22
Figures
Workforce in Recent Operations ............... 2
Figure 2. DOD Peacetime vs. Operations Contract Obligation
Trends ........................................... 7
Figure 3. Select Legislative History
..............................................................................................
14
Tables
Table A-1. Contractor Personnel and Troop Level in
Afghanistan ................................................ 24
Table A-2. Contractor Personnel and Troop Level in Iraq
............................................................. 25
vs. Other Agencies’ Total

Contract Obligations
...............................................................................................
.................... 26
Theaters of Operation ................ 27
Appendixes
Appendix A. Number of Contractors vs. Number of Troops in
Iraq and Afghanistan .................. 24
Appendix B. DOD Contract Obligations
....................................................................................... 26
Appendix C. Select Legislative
History....................................................................................
..... 28
Operations
Contacts
Author Contact
Information.............................................................................
.............................. 32

Operations
Congressional Research Service 1
Introduction
Over the last two decades, contractors have played a critical
role in U.S. military operations,
making up more than half of Department of Defense’s (DOD)
total workforce in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Balkans. With the end of combat
operations in Iraq and the drawdown of
forces in Afghanistan, DOD is turning its attention to preparing
for future military operations. As
reflected in recent defense strategic planning guidance, the
United States must prepare for a
diverse range of security challenges.1 Although future
contingency operations may differ from
those of the past decade, many analysts and defense officials
believe that contractors will
continue to play a central role in military operations.2 These
observers believe that, in order to
meet the challenges of future operations, DOD should be
prepared to effectively award and
manage contracts at a moment's notice, anywhere in the world,
in unknown environments, and on
a scale that may exceed the total contract obligations of any
other federal agency.
This report provides background information and identifies
issues for Congress on the use of
contractors to support military operations. DOD’s extensive use
of contractors poses several
potential policy and oversight issues for Congress and has been
the focus of numerous hearings.

contractors in and is capable of planning for and overseeing
Related CRS reports include CRS Report R42084, Wartime
Contracting in Afghanistan: Analysis
and Issues for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz, which focuses on
the challenges of contract support
in Afghanistan, and CRS Report R41820, Department of
Defense Trends in Overseas Contract
Obligations, by Moshe Schwartz and Wendy Ginsberg, which
focuses on trends in DOD contract
obligations around the world.
DOD has long relied on contractors to support overseas military
operations. Post-Cold War
defense budget reductions resulted in significant cuts to military
logistics and other support
capabilities, requiring DOD to hire contractors to “fill the
gap.”3 Recent operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and before that in the Balkans, have reflected this
increased reliance on contractors
supporting U.S. troops—both in terms of the number of
contractors and the type of work being
performed. According to DOD data, contractors, on average,
represented just over half of the
force in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq (see Figure 1).
1 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, p. 1,
4-7.
2 Ibid. Strategic planning guidance states the U.S. must be
prepared for a diverse range of security challenges; however,

military “forces will no longer be sized to perform long-term,
prolonged stability operations,” p. 6. DOD’s 2014 budget
guidance further states that the military is transitioning from “a
counterinsurgency-focused force to a force ready and
capable of operating across a full range of operations.” See
Department of Defense, Defense Budget Priorities and
Choices—Fiscal Year 2014, April 2013, p. 8.
3 Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense
Review, May 1997, Section 8. See
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/qdr/sec8.html.
Operations
Workforce
in Recent Operations
Source: Balkans: Congressional Budget Office. Contractors’
Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq. August 2008. p. 13;
Afghanistan: CRS analysis of DOD data, calculated as an
average for the period September 2007–March 2013; Iraq:
CRS analysis of DOD data, calculated as an average for the
period September 2007–March 2011.
Note: DOD did not begin releasing data on contractors in U.S.
Central Command until the second half of 2007.
As of March 2013, there were approximately 108,000 DOD
contractor personnel in Afghanistan,

representing 62% of the total force (see Appendix A). Of this
total, there were nearly 18,000
private security contractors, compared to 65,700 U.S. troops.4
Over the last six fiscal years, DOD
obligations for contracts performed in the Iraq and Afghanistan
areas of operation were
approximately $160 billion and exceeded total contract
obligations of any other U.S. federal
agency (see Appendix B).5
According to government officials and analysts, the military is
unable to effectively execute many
operations, particularly those that are large-scale and long-term
in nature, without extensive
operational contract support.6 Even in short-term operations,
contractors can play a variety of
critical roles. For example, the first fragmentary order for
Operation Tomodachi—DOD’s
response to the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in
2011—involved contract support.7
Given the extensive role of contractors in military operations,
many DOD officials and analysts
consider contract management a mission-essential task.
4 Department of Defense, Contractor Support of U.S.
Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility to
Include Iraq and Afghanistan, April 2013; Boots on Ground
Report, March 2013.
5 Iraq areas of operation are Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and
Jordan. Afghanistan areas of operation are Afghanistan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan.
6 Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology,

Department of Defense Program for Contingency Contracting
Planning, Oversight, and Visibility: Report to the
Congress of the United States, November 2010, p. 18.
7 Department of Defense, Pacific Command J4. Fragmentary
Order for Joint Contracting Support Board for Operation
Tomodachi. March 21, 2011, p.1-2. DOD directed US Forces
Japan to establish a Joint Contracting Support Board
within 24 hours. A fragmentary order is used to modify or
execute a branch or sequel an existing operations order.
Operations
DOD has recognized the role contractors are likely to play in
future operations. As stated in its
Budget Request for FY2013, operational contract support is a
critical function in support of
military operations, natural disasters, and unanticipated
calamities.8
What is Operational Contract Support?
Operational contract support is the term used in DOD doctrine
to describe the use of contractors to support military
operations. 9 Operational contract support is the process of
planning for and obtaining goods and services from
commercial sources to support operations (including contractor
management and oversight).
A number of different terms are commonly used by various
observers to describe the use of contractors during
operations, including operational contract support, contingency

contracting, expeditionary contracting, and wartime
contracting.
• Contingency contracting refers to the act of procuring goods
and services in support of a contingency
operation as defined in 10 USC 101(a)(13).
• Expeditionary contracting refers to the act of procuring goods
and services in support of both overseas and
domestic emergency operations.
• Wartime contracting generally refers to operational contract
support in a wartime environment. This term
was popularized by the establishment of the Commission on
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.10
Operational contract support encompasses, but is not limited to,
all of these terms.
Operational contract support is more than just the process of
executing a contract; it includes planning,
identifying a requirement, contracting, management and
oversight, payment, and contract closeout (as
depicted below).
Contractors can provide significant operational benefits to
DOD, including freeing up uniformed
personnel to conduct combat operations; providing expertise in
specialized fields, such as
linguistics or weapon systems maintenance; and providing a
surge capability, quickly delivering
critical support capabilities tailored to specific military needs.
Contractors are often responsible
for such critical tasks as providing armed security to convoys

and installations, providing life
support to forward deployed warfighters, conducting
intelligence analysis, and training local
security forces. Because contractors can be hired when a
particular need arises and released when
their services are no longer needed, contractors can be less
expensive in the long run than
maintaining a permanent in-house capability. And when a
decision is made to limit the number of
troops on the ground, contractors can fulfill critical manpower
needs.
8 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request
Overview, February 2012, p. 3-5.
9 DOD’s doctrinal definition of operational contract support is,
“the process of planning for and obtaining supplies,
services, and construction from commercial sources in support
of joint operations along with the associated contractor
management functions.” See Joint Publication 4-10, Operational
Contract Support, October 2008, p. 167.
10 The Commission on Wartime Contracting was established
pursuant to Public Law 110-181 to assess the extent of
fraud, waste, and abuse associated with contracts supporting
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Operations

the wasteful spending of billions of dollars—dollars that could
have been used to fund other
operational requirements.11 Contractors can also compromise
the credibility and effectiveness of
the U.S. military and undermine operations, as many analysts
believe happened in Iraq and
Afghanistan.12 Improved planning for and management of
contractors may not eliminate all
problems, but it could mitigate the risks of relying on
contractors during overseas operations.13
Iraq and Afghanistan
DOD acknowledges that it was inadequately prepared to execute
large-scale operational contract
support in Iraq and Afghanistan.14 Military commanders and
service members have indicated that
they were not prepared for the extent of contractor support in
Iraq and did not receive enough
training to prepare them to manage or work with contractors.15
Some stated that they did not
receive enough exposure to the role of contractors in military
operations in the curriculum at
professional military educational institutions.16 An Army
commission found that Contracting
Officer’s Representatives responsible for managing contractors
are generally drawn from combat
11 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
February 2010, p. 93. U.S. See also Government
Accountability Office. Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Actions
Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over
U.S. Efforts and Investments, GAO-08-568T. March 11, 2008,

p. 4,6; Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary
Contracting, Op. Cit., p. 2-3.
12 Many observers believe that the fallout from Abu Ghraib and
other incidents, such as the shooting of Iraqi civilians
by private security contractors hired by the United States
government, have hurt the credibility of the U.S. military and
undermined efforts in Iraq. See also: Department of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p.
93; Commission on Wartime Contracting In Iraq and
Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling
Costs, Reducing Risk, Final Report to Congress, August, 2011,
p. 5; U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight
Improvements Needed in Afghanistan, GAO-12-290,
March 29, 2012, p. 1-2.
13 For example, according to an Army investigative report, a
lack of good contractor surveillance at Abu Ghraib prison
contributed to fostering a permissive environment in which
prisoner abuses took place. See: Department of Defense.
Investigation of Intelligence Activities At Abu Ghraib. August
23, 2004. p. 52. The report found “Proper oversight did
not occur at Abu Ghraib due to a lack of training and inadequate
contract management ... [T]his lack of monitoring was
a contributing factor to the problems that were experienced with
the performance of the contractors at Abu Ghraib.”
See also: Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Strategic and
Operational Planning for Operational Contract Support
and Workforce Mix, Jan 24, 2011, p. 1; U.S. Government
Accountability Office, Operational Contract Support:
Sustained Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future
Contingencies, GAO-12-1026T, September 2012, p. 1;
Commission on Wartime Contracting In Iraq and Afghanistan,
Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs,
Reducing Risk, Final Report to Congress, August, 2011, p. 28.
14 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services,
Hearing on Operational Contract Support: Learning from the

Past and Preparing for the Future, Joint Testimony of Hon. Alan
F. Estevez, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Logistics
and Materiel Readiness, and Brigadier General Craig C.
Crenshaw, Vice Director, Joint Staff, J-4, 112th Congress,
September 12, 2012, p. 2; U.S. Army, Army Operational
Contract Support Audit Analysis Project, Results Summary,
April 29, 2011, p. 1.
15 U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Needs to
Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and
Continue to Improve Management and Oversight, GAO-08-
572T, Highlights page, March 11, 2008; also based on
discussions with military personnel deployed in Iraq.
16 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Operational
Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements
Needed in Afghanistan, GAO-12-290, March 2012, p. 17; based
on numerous CRS discussions with DOD personnel
from 2009-2013.
Operations
units and receive little, if any, training on how to work with
contractors.17 Many analysts and
officials believe that the military did not have enough trained
oversight personnel or an adequate
infrastructure to effectively execute and manage contractors in
Iraq and Afghanistan.18 In January
2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged DOD's
failure to adequately prepare for
the use of contractors when he testified that the use of
contractors occurred

without any supervision or without any coherent strategy on
how we were going to do it and
without conscious decisions about what we will allow
contractors to do and what we won't
allow contractors to do... We have not thought holistically or
coherently about our use of
contractors, particularly when it comes to combat environments
or combat training.19
DOD acknowledges that there was no comprehensive plan for
how to use contractors, and to what
extent. As a result, the use of contractors was done on an ad-hoc
basis, without significant
consideration of implications for foreign policy and without
putting in place the necessary
oversight. Observers believe insufficient resources were
dedicated to oversight, often resulting in
poor performance, billions of dollars of waste, and failure to
achieve mission goals. The
Commission on Wartime Contracting found that, “too often
using contractors [was] the default
mechanism, driven by considerations other than whether they
provide the best solution, and
without consideration for the resources needed to manage
them.”20
Contract support in operational environments is different, and
often more complex, than contract
support in peacetime. In peacetime, the goal of contracting is
generally to obtain the good or
service that is required.21 The measurements of success are
generally getting the right good or
service, on schedule, and at a fair price.22 During operations,
however—and particularly in an

expeditionary or counterinsurgency environment—cost,
schedule, and performance are often
secondary to the larger strategic goals of achieving military
objectives or denying popular support
for the insurgency. For example, in peacetime, the primary
purpose of building a road is often to
have the road built to specification in the most efficient and
least expensive way. Other policy
17 Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,
Op. Cit., p. 43.
18 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan: Key
Oversight Issues, GAO-13-218SP, February 2013, p. 31;
Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight
Improvements Needed in Afghanistan, Op. Cit, p. 9, 23, 25;
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on
Contracting Oversight, The Comprehensive Contingency
Contracting Reform Act of 2012 (S.2139), Testimony of
Richard Ginman, Director, Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy, Department of Defense, 112th Cong., 2nd
sess., April 17, 2012, p. 6; Kathryn T.H. Syzmanski, Command
Counsel U.S. Army Materiel Command in Atlanta on
August 9, 2004. American Bar Association Section of Public
Contract Law, Contractors on the Battlefield: Exploration
of Unique Liability and Human Relations Issues, Volume II. See
also CRS Report R42084, Wartime Contracting in
Afghanistan: Analysis and Issues for Congress, by Moshe
Schwartz; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military
Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-
standing Problems with Management and Oversight of
Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO-07-145,
December 18, 2006.
19 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To
Receive Testimony on the Challenges Facing the

Department of Defense, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., January 27,
2009.
20 Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan, At What Risk? Correcting Over-reliance on
Contractors in Contingency Operations, Second Interim Report
to Congress, February 24, 2011, Forward.
21 Additional factors can come in to play in peacetime,
including stimulating the economy and creating jobs.
22 The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR 1.102) states that
the goal of the government acquisition system is …
A Case for Contracting in Today's Environment
Kilbride, John P. Army Sustainment; Fort Lee Vol. 42, Iss. 4,
(Jul/Aug 2010): 42-43.
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[...] I believe that the continued use of contractors to support
operations is a crucial enabler that allows the military to
allocate greater combat power to accomplishing the mission,
reducing the risk to Soldiers and the cost to the United States.
[...] many taxpayers take issue with the excessive choices
provided to Soldiers in a dining facility, calling the variety "an
unnecessary cost."
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Niccolo Machiavelli, an Italian writer and philosopher,
demonstrates how governments of previous centuries were
intensely opposed to the use of military contractors in the
following quote from his political treatise The Prince
(translated by Wayne A. Rebhorn):
The mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and
if anyone has a state founded on the arms of mercenaries, he
will never be stable or secure, because they are disunited,
ambitious, without discipline, disloyal; bold among friends,
among enemies cowardly; without fear of God, without faith in
men; and your ruin is deferred only as long as the assault is
deferred; and in peace you are plundered by them, in war by the
enemy.
This argument is still prevalent today among those who are
opposed to contractors on the battlefield, although few express
their disdain for military contracting with as much fervor as

Machiavelli.
Generally, opponents categorize military contractors as self-
serving individuals beholden only to the highest bidder and not
necessarily to the ideals of their country. While I find it hard to
disagree that a military cotractor can bring a difficult and often
unclear dynamic to a dangerous battlefield - especially when
acting as security forces for foreign investors or international
corporations - I do see the merit of using military cotractors in
roles that support national interests and military objectives.
Contractors who serve as logistics, administrative, and technical
advisers in support of our military's efforts under the direction
of the ground commanders are valuable. In fact, I believe that
the continued use of contractors to support operations is a
crucial enabler that allows the military to allocate greater
combat power to accomplishing the mission, reducing the risk to
Soldiers and the cost to the United States.
Increase in Combat Power
Today, the U.S. Armed Forces are smaller than they were 20
years ago. They are fighting two major conflicts in two different
countries, and the service most affected is the Army. Currently,
some 1,090,000 Soldiers are on active duty, including 550,000
who are activated from the Reserve component. Most of these
Soldiers are either deployed or preparing to deploy in support of
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This poses an incredible
predicament: the Army lacks the Soldiers to conduct all of its
required operations. The solution of outsourcing logistics,
administrative, and technical support has helped to remedy this
troop-to-task dilemma.
From my own experience, contractors have provided the Army
with the ability to focus and commit combat power toward
offensive and stability operations. In Afghanistan, contract
workers provided a fuel truck regularly, saving Soldiers 9- to 1
1-hour trips to Bagram Air Base from the base camp in Paktika
province. As a company commander, the fact that I did not need
to commit men and resources to complete logistics and
administrative tasks enabled a greater focus on the combat

mission and the projection of more combat power into the area
of operations without interruption. This increased combat power
improved the safety, stability, and security of the environment.
Reducing Risk
The use of contractors reduces the exposure of Soldiers to
unnecessary risk. Our enemies are thoroughly familiar with
what types of vehicles we drive, what weapons capabilities we
have, and how often we conduct routine logistics and
administrative missions. For these reasons, contractors are
important. Often, local national contractors are able to pass
through potentially dangerous areas unnoticed to deliver needed
fuel and supplies to U.S. bases.
Indeed, some missions require U.S. Soldiers to ensure that
contractors are able to move supplies safety and unhindered.
(This is certainty the case in Iraq, where contractors conduct
logistics resuppty convoys from Kuwait north to Bagdad with
U.S. security elements.) However, in most cases, the contractors
will knowingly accept risk for the right price. The decision
contractors make to accept risk provides coalition combat forces
with the ability to aggressively and diligently project more
forces against the enemy and reduces the risks posed to convoy
operations.
Reducing Cost
The cost of outsourcing logistics and administrative operations
reduces the overall cost to taxpayers. On the surface, contracts
appear to entail large costs. In fact, many taxpayers take issue
with the excessive choices provided to Soldiers in a dining
facility, calling the variety "an unnecessary cost." Others
believe technicians who fix air conditioners or drive supplies
between bases are excessively overpaid.
However, the U.S. Government pays one cost, and how
contracted companies dole out their salaries and cover messing
costs is irrelevant to some degree. The military is not
responsible for feeding, insuring, and paying disability or
pensions for contractors, as it would be if Soldiers were
performing these missions. Further cost savings are realized in

not enlisting, training, equipping, and deploying Soldiers to
perform tasks that can be contracted. In the end, it does become
more cost effective to employ contractors for specific functions.
The argument that military contracting is unnecessary is
unfounded; contracting brings an increased focus of combat
power in theater, reduces the risk to Soldiers, and reduces the
cost to the Government. Monitoring through additional
oversight and periodic reviews ensures that the objectives of
contracts are met while alleviating concerns of fraud, waste, and
abuse. Arguably, there are merits and demerits to using
contractors, but there is value in outsourcing.
Sidebar
A "jingle truck" delivers tires to a customer in Wardak
province, Afghanistan. Local contractors, such as jingle truck
drivers, allow Soldiers to focus on security missions instead of
logistics missions. (Photo by SGT Russell Gilchrest, Joint
Combat Camera Afghanistan)
A contractor fixes a mud flap on a medium lightweight truck at
the maintenance facility in Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, as part of the
retrograde operation for drawdown in Iraq and buildup in
Afghanistan. (Photo by SPC Brandon Babbitt, 203d Public
Affairs Detachment)
AuthorAffiliation
BY MAJOR JOHN P. KILBRIDE
AuthorAffiliation
MAJOR JOHN P. KILBRIDE WAS THE OPERATIONS
OFFICER FOR THE 30 SQUADRON, 61ST CAVALRY
REGIMENT, 4TP BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 4TP
INFANTRY DIVISION, DURING ITS DEPLOYMENT IN
SUPPORT OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. HE
HOLDS A B. S. DEGREE IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
FROM THE UNITED STA TES MILITARY ACADEMY AND
AN M.B.A. DEGREE FROM WEBSTER UNIVERSIN. HE IS A
GRADUATE OF THE INFANTRY OFFICER BASIC AND
ADVANCED COURSES, THE COMBINED ARMSAND
SERVICES STAFF SCHOOL, AND THE ARMY COMMAND

AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE.
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https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17439760.2016.1
163403?src=recsys
Military Contractors & the American Way of War
Avant, Deborah D; de Nevers, Renée. Daedalus; Boston Vol.
140, Iss. 3, (Summer 2011): 88-99.
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Contractors are deeply intertwined with the American military

and U.S. foreign policy. Over half of the personnel the United
States has deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 have
been contractors. Their relationship with the U.S. government,
the public, and domestic and international law differs from that
of military personnel, and these differences pose both benefits
and rish. America's use of private military and security
companies (PMSCs) can provide or enhance forces for global
governance. Yet PMSCs can also be used to pursue agendas that
do not have the support of American, international, or local
publics. Thus far, the use of PMSCs has proved a mixed bag in
terms of effectiveness, accountability, and American values.
Moving forward in a way that maximizes the benefits of
contractors and minimizes their risks will require careful
management of the uncomfortable trade-offs these forces
present. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

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Headnote
Abstract: Contractors are deeply intertwined with the American
military and U.S. foreign policy. Over half of the personnel the
United States has deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003
have been contractors. Their relationship with the U.S.
government, the public, and domestic and international law
differs from that of military personnel, and these differences
pose both benefits and rish. America's use of private military
and security companies (PMSCs) can provide or enhance forces
for global governance. Yet PMSCs can also be used to pursue
agendas that do not have the support of American, international,
or local publics. Thus far, the use of PMSCs has proved a mixed
bag in terms of effectiveness, accountability, and American

values. Moving forward in a way that maximizes the benefits of
management of the uncomfortable trade-offs these forces
present.
More than one-half of the personnel the United States has
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 have been
contractors. Part of the global private military and security
industry, contractors are deeply intertwined with the American
mUitary and U.S. foreign policy.1 Whatever one chooses to caU
them - mercenaries, contractors, or private mihtary and security
companies (PMSCs) - they have a different relationship to the
U.S. government, the American public, and domestic and
international law than do mUitary personnel. These differences
pose both benefits and risks to the effectiveness, accountability,
and values represented in American actions abroad.
In the best case, American use of PM S Cs can provide or
enhance forces for global governance. PMSCs can recruit from
around the world to quickly mobUize expertise as needed. If
their employees are instilled with professional values and skills
and engaged in a way that is responsive to the demands of the
U.S. public, the international community, and local concerns,
these forces could contribute to managing a global demand for
security that U.S. forces alone cannot meet. In the worst case,
PMSCs can provide a means for pursuing agendas that do not
have the support of American, international, or local publics.
They may siphon off U.S. dollars for practices that are wasteful,
are antithetical to U.S. interests, or undermine global stability.
Thus far, the use of PMSCs has produced mixed results: it has
increased effectiveness somewhat, but often at the expense of
accountability and with dubious attention to the values the
United States and the international community hold dear.
Moving forward in a way that maximizes the benefits of
management of the uncomfortable trade-offs these forces pose.
JL he degree to which the United States relies on private
security vendors has become clear during the hostilities in Iraq

and Afghanistan, as contractors have provided logistical support
for U.S. and coalition troops. Less well known is that as U.S.
forces were stretched thin by the lawlessness resulting from the
fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the first "surge" involved
private personnel mobilized to protect expatriates working in
the country and train the Iraqi police force and army; and a
private Iraqi force was hired to guard government facilities and
oil fields.2 Retired military or police from all over the world,
employed by a wide array of PMSCs, worked for the U.S.
government (and others) throughout the country.
Although precise figures are difficult to determine, by 2008, the
number of personnel in Iraq under contract with the U.S.
government roughly equaled or was greater than the number of
U.S. troops on the ground.3 In September 2009, two months
prior to the Obama administration's announcement of the troop
surge in Afghanistan, contractors made up an estimated 62
percent of the U.S. presence in that country.4 The use of
contractors in these conflicts represents a dramatic expansion in
the U.S. military's reliance on PMSCs. During the 1991 Gulf
conflict, the ratio of troops to contractors was roughly ten to
one; in 2007, the ratio of troops to contractors in Iraq was
roughly one to one.5 In Afghanistan in 2010, there were roughly
1.43 contractors for every American soldier.6 The Commission
on Wartime Contracting (cwc), established by Congress in 2008,
estimates conservatively that at least $177 billion has been
obligated in contracts and grants to support U.S. operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001.7
IMSCs offer a wide range of services, including tasks
associated with military operations, policing, and the gray area
between the two that is an increasingly large part of twenty-
first- century conflict. Common services include support for
weapons systems and equipment, military advice and training,
logistical support, site security (armed and unarmed), crime
prevention, police training, and intelligence.8 While some firms
specialize in a specific area, others provide an array of services,
and a few offer the entire range. The cwc divides the services

provided by contractors into three categories: logistics,
security, and reconstruction.9
Logistics services include the supply of food, laundry, fuel, and
base facility construction. Kellogg Brown and Root (kbr) held
the U.S. Army's logistics civil augmentation contract (logcap)
in the early years of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. In June
2007, the new contract (LOGCAP IV) was awarded to three
companies: DynCorp International LLC, Fluor Intercontinental,
Inc., and KBR. In Iraq alone, the LOGCAP contract paid out
$22 bulkm between 2003 and 2007.10
Security services include guarding peopie, buildings, and
convoys. Many security contractors are armed ; in carrying out
their duties, they routinely shoot and are shot at.11 The
Congressional Budget Office estimated that in 2008, 30,000 to
35,000 of the contractors working in Iraq were armed; in early
2010, private security contractors numbered roughly 11,00?.12
Blackwater (now Xe) employees, recruited to support both the
mUitary and the U.S. State Department, have received the most
notoriety for their security work in Iraq and, more recently, in
Afghanistan. Working under the State Department's Worldwide
Personal Protective Services (WPPS) contract in Iraq,
Blackwater personnel carried weapons, had their own
helicopters, and defended against insurgents in ways hard to
distinguish from mUitary actions.13 They were later joined by
newer companies such as Triple Canopy, Crescent Security
Group, and Custer Battles.14
Reconstruction services incorporate everything from building
physical infrastructure (for roads, communication, water, and
power) to strengthening institutions (for example, by training
government employees, including military, police, and justice
personnel at the national, provincial, and local levels;
supporting civil society groups ; and promoting rule of law and
democratization). A wide range of PMSCs, along with other
contractors, have dehvered these services. DynCorp, an old
company with roots in technical support and an increasing
presence in policing and police training, has trained Iraqi

police, constructed police and prison facUities, and buUt
capacity for a justice system.15 Three companies that provided
training for the new Iraqi Army early in the conflict are VinneU
Corporation, a company with a long history of providing
military training in Saudi Arabia; MPRl, a firm that gained
prominence by training Croatian and then Bosnian troops in the
1990s; and USlS, which was established as the result of an
Office of Management Personnel privatization effort in 1994. l6
Parsons Corporation, another older firm with a long record in
the buUding of infrastructure, has worked on many large
infrastructure projects. Myriad others have delivered various
capacity-building services.17
Though their use in Iraq and Afghanistan dominates the
discussion of contractors in the U.S. context, PMSCs are
important players in all aspects of the U.S. mUitary and U.S.
foreign policy.18 Contractors working for the Departments of
Defense (dod) and State contribute significantly to U.S. foreign
policy projects aimed at enhancing development and security in
a number of states ; they also support U.S. troops and
diplomats. Their tasks cover all three categories noted above.
Consider, for instance, the contractor support for U.S. foreign
assistance policies in Africa and Latin America.
In Africa, the United States has relied on the private sector to
support missions such as military training and peacekeeping
operations. These programs fall within AFRlCOM, the U.S.
military command for Africa established in 2007, and the State
Department's Africa Peacekeeping program (AFRICAP), which
is simüar in structure to the army's logcap contract. In 2008,
AFRICAP' s stated objectives were to enhance regional peace
and stability in Africa through training programs in
peacekeeping and conflict management and prevention for
African armed forces, as weU as through logistics and
construction activities in support of peacekeeping and training
missions. 1V AFRlCOM's stated purposes are "to buüd strong
military- to-military partnerships, " to help African countries
better address the threats they face by improving African

military capacity, and to bolster peace and security there.20
Since its inception, AFRlCOM has awarded contracts for
training, air transport, information technology, and public
diplomacy to companies such as DynCorp, which is training
Liberia's armed forces, and PAE, a company specializing in
infrastructure, mission support, and disaster relief.21
U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, dominated since at least
2000 by antinarcotics and counterterrorism efforts, also relies
heavily on contractors.22 Plan Colombia, the central element of
a counterdrug initiative focused on the Andean region, has
sought to reduce drug production in Colombia and strengthen
Colombian security forces to better secure the state against
threats posed by terrorists, drug traffickers, and paramilitary
groups. The program has failed to slow drug production there,
but military and police training conducted by both U.S. troops
and civilian contractors has led to security improvements.23
Roughly half of the military aid to Colombia is spent on private
contractors funded by the DOD and the State Department. Like
Plan Colombia, the 2007 Mérida Initiative, a U.S. -Mexico
assistance agreement, seeks to disrupt drug-trafficking activities
by providing equipment and training to Mexican security
forces.24
IMSCs are incorporated in many countries and employ a mix of
U.S. citizens, local citizens, and "third country nationals"
(recruits from neither the United States nor the host state). That
combination changes over time and from contingency to
contingency. For example, an April 30, 2008, census by the U.S.
Army Central Command found that the 190,200 contractors in
Iraq included about 20 percent (38,700) U.S. citizens, 37
percent (70,500) Iraqis, and 43 percent (81,006) third country
nationals.25 In March 2010, the total number of contractors had
dropped to 95,461, 26 percent of which were U.S. citizens, 56
percent third country nationals, and 18 percent Iraqis.26 The
number of locals working as private security contractors (as
opposed to logistics or reconstruction contractors) in Iraq has
been relatively low: about 10 percent of private security

contractors in 2010 were Iraqi. In Afghanistan, the DOD has
relied more heavily on locals. The total number of contractors
in March 2010 was 112,092, 14 percent of which were U.S.
citizens, 16 percent third country nationals, and 70 percent
Afghans. Also, the numbers of locals who work in private
security are higher than those who provide other services.
About 93 percent of the private security contractors in 2010
were Afghans.27
When the United States hires PMSCs to train militaries abroad,
the contractor may take a small team of U.S. personnel (as
MPRI did in Croatia), or it may recruit an international team (as
DynCorp did in Liberia). Companies providing logistics support
abroad often rely on locals or third country nationals to cut
costs. Hiring locals or third country nationals can also avoid a
variety of political restrictions and diminish visibility when the
United States is undertaking more controversial missions. For
instance, Congress restricted the number of American
contractors the United States could use under Plan Colombia to
three hundred (raised to four hundred in 2001) ; PMSCs
bypassed this restriction by hiring personnel from Peru,
Guatemala, and other Latin American countries.28
In addition to nationality, personnel hired by PMSCs vary in
their employment backgrounds. PM S Cs that offer mihtary
training primarUy hire former military officers. Those that offer
armed security services line a broader range of military
veterans. Those that offer police training often hire former
police officers. As the number of companies and the range of
services they offer have expanded to meet market demand,
companies have hired employees with more diverse experience.
Contracting for mUitary and security services has raised
questions about the effectiveness of using force, political
accountabUity for the use of force, and the social values to
which force adheres. Some concerns vary according to which
service is provided, whUe others apply more generally across
different tasks.
Military effectiveness rests on a range of components, including

skUl of personnel, quality of materiel, and military
responsiveness to contextual or external constraints. A critical
component noted in recent research is integration : that is, the
degree to which mUitary plans follow from overarching state
goals and to which activities are internally consistent and
mutually reinforcing.29
Contracting can influence both the mUitary's effectiveness and
its broader mission. For example, when U.S. goals change, as
they did after the Cold War's end, contracting enhances the
military's ability to integrate forces with (new) political goals.
Speed and flexibility are the hallmark benefits of contracting,
and contractors can quickly provide tools or skills for new
missions that regular mUitary forces may lack - or cannot
identify rapidly within then ranks. Using a contract with MPRl,
for instance, the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRl)
military training courses for French-speaking African countries
were staffed with employees who spoke French. The U.S.
military was also able to mobilize civilian police forces, first
for Haiti in 1994, and then for contingencies in the Balkans, via
contracts with DynCorp.
Different concerns regarding effectiveness emerge with
contracting for logistics, security, and reconstruction services.
Logistics services are fundamental to the military's ability to
operate. Without personnel to provide logistics services, the
U.S. mUitary simply cannot go to war. Contracting for logistics
also requires strong oversight. Early in the Iraq conflict, serious
concerns were raised about adequate staffing for logistics
contracts. General Charles S. Mahan, Jr., then the Army's top
logistics officer, complained of troops receiving inadequate
support because of problems deploying contractors.30 After the
Coalition Provisional Authority appointed him the new Head of
Contracting Authority in February 2004, Brigadier General
Stephen Seay hired more acquisition staff, enabling
overburdened contracting officers to do then jobs more
effectively31 More recently, military personnel have expressed
general satisfaction with the quality of logistics services.32

Many worries over logistics contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
have focused on lack of oversight (particularly inadequate
numbers of contract officers), along with waste and fraud.33
But logistics contracts require fewer skills specific to military
personnel, and logistics contractors do not need to work as
closely with military personnel on the ground as do security and
reconstruction contractors.
The activities of contractors who provide security services are
most similar to those performed by soldiers. Many are armed
and, in carrying out their duties, pose deadly risks to those
working around them. Periodic tensions between contractors and
regular forces - aggravated by disparities in pay and
responsibilities - have raised the issue of whether these two
types of forces can work together effectively. A recent survey
of DOD personnel and their perceptions of private security
contractors suggests that combining these forces in conflict
zones is problematic. Lower-ranking and younger personnel in
particular claim that pay disparities between military personnel
and contractors are detrimental to the morale of their units in
Iraq.34 However, many security services tasks do not require
close interaction with military personnel. Roughly one-third of
military personnel surveyed in Iraq, for example, had no
firsthand experience with private security contractors.35 These
tasks are also frequently less crucial to the performance of
military units than are logistics services.
Nonetheless, the behavior of contracted security personnel
matters to the overall U.S. mission. The hazards of questionable
behavior were demonstrated most vividly in the September 2007
Blackwater shoot-out in Nisoor Square. Both Iraqis and
Americans, however, had consistently reported this type of
behavior long before that dramatic incident. Private forces have
tended to focus on the strict terms of their contracts (protecting
particular people or facilities) rather than on the overarching
goals of the United States (effectively countering the
insurgency). Some of the tactics developed to protect clients,
such as driving fast through intersections and rapid resort to

force, alienated the local population in ways that undermined
the broader counterinsurgency strategy. Similar problems
persist in Afghanistan. Among military personnel who had
experience with security contractors, approximately 20 percent
reported firsthand knowledge of PMSC failure to coordinate
with military forces "sometimes"; another 15 percent of this
population witnessed such coordination problems "often."36
In today's conflicts, reconstruction tasks - particularly training -
are often more crucial for achieving the goals of the war effort
than either logistics or security services. Often, reconstruction
tasks must be coordinated so that police training and justice
reform, for instance, complement one another, and so that
civilian leaders understand the military they are expected to
oversee. Contractors who provide reconstruction services must
not only deliver quality work but coordinate that delivery with
other contractors, the U.S. military, and other government
agencies. Thus, these services are among the most crucial for
U.S. goals and the most challenging to coordinate. Moreover,
concerns have been raised about the military's ability to ensure
that these tasks are carried out effectively when they have been
outsourced. Notably, DynCorp' s training of the Afghan
National Police and Army is widely regarded as a failure, but
the DOD has been unable to move the training contract to a
different company because of DynCorp's legal protest regarding
contract competition.37 Yet these jobs are less important to the
functioning of military units than logistics support, and they
pose less deadly risk than security operations do. Problems with
integration of activities - or unity of effort -were among the
most significant challenges to reconstruction, as noted by the
CWC's 2009 interim report.38
Thus, the overall picture of how contractors shape effectiveness
is complicated. Clearly, contractors can quickly deploy skilled
personnel, and the majority of contractors are good at what they
do. But the United States does not have the capacity to oversee
these contracts successfully, and this failure has led to waste,
fraud, and particularly with regard to security contracts, abuse.

Furthermore, the level of integration needed for the most
effective delivery of services has lagged in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Alow does contracting for mUitary and security services affect
the United States' capacity to take political accountability for
forces? Mobilization via contract operates differently than
mUitary enlistment, with consequences for the relationship
between the force and civilians - the political elite and the
pubhc included. The U.S. experience in Iraq suggests that forces
raised via contract operate much more opaquely than military
forces. Largely because of this reduced transparency, Congress
has struggled to exercise constitutional authorization and
oversight. Furthermore, the public has less information about
the deployment of contractors. Though evidence suggests that
the public is just as concerned about the deaths of contractors as
it is about mUitary deaths, statistics on the former are much less
likely to be known.39
Using contractors speeds policy response but hmits input into
the policy process. As the insurgency grew in Iraq, for example,
the United States mobUized 150,000 to 170,000 private forces
to support the mission there, all with little or no congressional
or public knowledge - let alone consent. President Bush was not
required to appeal to Congress or the public for these additional
forces, which doubled the U.S. presence in Iraq. As evidence
from the reaction to the request for a mere twenty thousand
troops for the 2007 surge suggests, the president may well not
have been allowed to deploy additional personnel if he had been
required to obtain permission. Because the use of pmscs garners
little attention, their employment reduces public arousal,
debate, commitment, and response to the use of force.
How contracted forces relate to civilian leaders is an important
question. Some claim contracted forces can be more responsive
(given the potential for losing their contracts) than the mUitary
bureaucracy. FlexibUity in how contracts are written can
accelerate mobUization in ways that mUitary organizations
often cannot deliver. Certainly, contractors are designed to

deliver whatever the client wants. They are thus much less
prone to standard operating procedures or organizational bias
that can inhibit responsiveness in mUitary organizations.
Not at ah apparent, however, is the U.S. government's capacity
to oversee contracts in a manner sufficient to generate
responsiveness. Even as DOD contract transactions increased by
328 percent between 2000 and 2009, the staff responsible for
reviewing contractor purchasing at the Defense Contract
Management Agency declined from seventy in 2002 to fourteen
in 2009.40 Contracting in individual service branches faced
similar problems. The dearth of contract officers makes it
difficult to effectively oversee contracts at home, but concerns
about adequate oversight are even more pressing when PMSCs
are operating abroad. The relevant contracting officer is often
not even in theater. Inadequate contract staffing and oversight
have been important complaints in both Iraq and Afghanistan
and have been tied to numerous problems - from poor
performance to waste, fraud, and abuse. Though the risks of
poor oversight vary according to task, difficulties in overseeing
contractors have been common to aU three areas of contract
services. The challenge of overseeing expeditionary operations
may undermine companies' responsiveness to contractual
obligations.
Overall, then, the use of contractors has skirted accountabUity,
making half of U.S. mobUization largely invisible to Congress
and the public; as a result, it has masked the number of conflict-
related casualties.41 Though one could argue that contractors
are more responsive to political leaders, this likelihood can only
be the case once political leaders know what contractors are
doing -and evidence shows that this has not been the case in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
A final point of evaluation is to look at whether contractors
allow the exercise of force in a way that is consistent with the
larger values, culture, and expectations of the society they
represent. Over the course of the Cold War and in its aftermath,
military professionalism within advanced industrial states

increasingly enshrined principles drawn from theories of
democracy (civilian control of the military and abidance by the
rule of law), liberalism (respect for human rights), and the laws
of war.42 Though marginal differences exist, the values that
govern U.S. military personnel are largely shared with their
Western partners. The ease of mobilization that contracting
offers is viewed by some as consistent with the United States'
evolving concerns with global security and global governance.
But in practice, the use of PMSCs has not fit well within the
normative and legal frameworks that underpin global security.
Two factors strain the impact of contracting on the values
represented by military forces. First, precisely which
professional norms inform the PMSC industry remains unclear.
Americans employed by PMSCs have a range of military and
law enforcement backgrounds - some distinguished and others
less so. However, the industry increasingly recruits from a
global market. As recruiting and subcontracting have become
more transnational, personnel are from countries as diverse as
the United Kingdom, Nepal, Fiji, South Africa, El Salvador,
Colombia, and India. These geographic differences bring an
even more diverse array of professional norms. Concerns about
lax industry vettmg of employees have raised the question of
whether PMSCs are increasingly hiring employees with less
distinguished service records.43 Finally, many PMSCs also hire
local personnel. In addition to lower costs, these forces bring
many benefits: local knowledge and ties that can aid companies'
effectiveness. However, they also bring local values that may
not be consistent with democracy, liberalism, or the laws of
war. For instance, evidence suggests that local companies hired
by the United States to provide convoy security in Afghanistan
funneled money to Taliban forces or were otherwise engaged in
corrupt practices that promise to undermine U.S. goals and the
values it seeks to support in Afghanistan.44
Even if all contractors were well-socialized military or police
professionals, they nonetheless operate in a different
environment-vis-a-vis both the law and command and …

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