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Comparison between LEWG MDER Version 1.0 and VISA TDEG Version 2.0
No   Factors                    LEWG                                      VISA Transaction Data Encryption         NetMATRIX Terminal Line Encryption       Remarks
                                Minimum Data Encryption                   Guidelines Version 2.0                   Solution
                                Requirements Version 1.0
1    Data elements subject to   1 (Minimum) : CVV                         Basic : ADVV + PAN + PIN Block (if       Currently encrypting PAN, Expiry
     encryption                                                           implemented)                             Date, Track 2, CVV2 and random
                                                                                                                   number.
                                2 (Recommended) CVV + PAN                 Advance : ADVV + PAN + PIN Block
                                                                          (if implemented) + Transaction-unique    Can be configured to encrypt PIN
                                                                          Data Element (e.g. transaction           Block (if implemented)
                                                                          number, date/time stamp, random
                                                                          number)                                  Highest Supported
                                                                                                                   LEWG Ver.1.0 - Ranking 2
                                                                                                                   VISA Ver. 2.0 - Advance

2    Key storage in terminal    1 (Minimum) : Keys are stored             Basic : Keys are stored in the           Key storage is within the tamper-
                                outside a secure module                   protected memory of the terminal and     responsive terminal hardware.
                                                                          cannot be read through any User
                                                                          Interfaces.                              For added security, NetMATRIX
                                                                                                                   employs a unique mechanism for key
                                2 (Recommended) : Keys are stored         Recommended : Keys are stored            storage that renders the keys useless
                                inside a secure module (e.g. SAM,         inside a secure module (e.g. SAM,        during a Terminal-to-Terminal copy.
                                secure PIN-pad or tamper-responsive       secure PIN-pad or tamper-responsive
                                terminal hardware)                        terminal hardware)                       Highest Supported
                                                                                                                   LEWG Ver.1.0 - Ranking 2
                                                                                                                   VISA Ver. 2.0 - Recommended

3    Key usage methodologies    1 (Minimum) : Static Working Keys.                                                 NetMATRIX supports a more advance
                                                                                                                   level for both Static Working Keys and
                                2 : Derived Unique Working Keys per       Basic : Derived Unique Working Keys      Derived Unique Working Keys per
                                Session (session expires after each       per Session (session expires after       transaction methodologies, whereby
                                consecutive 1000th transaction or after   each consecutive 1000th transaction      each terminal has its own set of
                                Terminal log-on). Keys are derived        or after Terminal log-on). Keys are      Unique Keys (Working and Master).
                                from Master keys.                         derived from Master keys.
                                                                                                                   NetMATRIX is able to support up to 4
                                3 (Recommended) : Derived Unique          Recommended : Derived Unique             billion unique keys per terminal
                                Working Keys per transaction. Keys        Working Keys per transaction. Keys       application.
                                are derived from Master keys.             are derived from Master keys.
                                                                                                                   Highest Supported
                                4 (future-proof) : Derived Unique Key     Advance : Derived Unique Key Per         LEWG Ver.1.0 - Ranking 3
                                Per Transaction (DUKPT)                   Transaction (DUKPT)                      VISA Ver. 2.0 - Recommended


4    Key differentiation        1 (Minimum) : Uses same key for data      Basic : Uses same key for data           NetMATRIX supports using the same
                                encryption and message                    encryption and message                   key as well as different keys for data
                                authentication.                           authentication.                          encryption and message
                                                                                                                   authentication.
                                2 (Recommended) : Uses different          Recommended : Uses different keys
                                keys for data encryption and message      for data encryption and message          Highest Supported
                                authentication, i.e. Key 1 is used for    authentication, i.e. Key 1 is used for   LEWG Ver.1.0 - Ranking 2
                                encryption and Key 2 is used for          encryption and Key 2 is used for         VISA Ver. 2.0 - Recommended
                                message authentication.                   message authentication.

5    Encryption algorithms      1 (Minimum) : TEA in CBC mode (128                                                 NetMATRIX supports all encryption        Only one level of
                                bits key length)                                                                   algorithms and respective key lengths    encryption algorithm is
                                                                                                                   defined in LEWG Ver. 1.0 and VISA        defined in VISA Ver. 2.0
                                2 : DES in CBC mode (56 bits key                                                   Ver. 2.0
                                length)
                                                                                                                   Highest Supported
                                3 (Recommended) : TDES (112 bits          TDES (112 bits key length) or AES        LEWG Ver.1.0 - Ranking 3
                                key length) or AES (128 bits key          (128 bits key length) in CBC mode        VISA Ver. 2.0 - Supported
                                length) in CBC mode

6    Trusted/Security domain    1 (Minimum) : Security domain should      Basic : Trusted domain should only       NetMATRIX provides Trusted domain
     population                 only contain the minimum number of        contain the minimum number of            that contains only two devices. Each
NetMatrix TLE minimum data encryption guidelines end to end encryption terminal line encryption

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NetMatrix TLE minimum data encryption guidelines end to end encryption terminal line encryption

  • 1. Comparison between LEWG MDER Version 1.0 and VISA TDEG Version 2.0
  • 2. No Factors LEWG VISA Transaction Data Encryption NetMATRIX Terminal Line Encryption Remarks Minimum Data Encryption Guidelines Version 2.0 Solution Requirements Version 1.0 1 Data elements subject to 1 (Minimum) : CVV Basic : ADVV + PAN + PIN Block (if Currently encrypting PAN, Expiry encryption implemented) Date, Track 2, CVV2 and random number. 2 (Recommended) CVV + PAN Advance : ADVV + PAN + PIN Block (if implemented) + Transaction-unique Can be configured to encrypt PIN Data Element (e.g. transaction Block (if implemented) number, date/time stamp, random number) Highest Supported LEWG Ver.1.0 - Ranking 2 VISA Ver. 2.0 - Advance 2 Key storage in terminal 1 (Minimum) : Keys are stored Basic : Keys are stored in the Key storage is within the tamper- outside a secure module protected memory of the terminal and responsive terminal hardware. cannot be read through any User Interfaces. For added security, NetMATRIX employs a unique mechanism for key 2 (Recommended) : Keys are stored Recommended : Keys are stored storage that renders the keys useless inside a secure module (e.g. SAM, inside a secure module (e.g. SAM, during a Terminal-to-Terminal copy. secure PIN-pad or tamper-responsive secure PIN-pad or tamper-responsive terminal hardware) terminal hardware) Highest Supported LEWG Ver.1.0 - Ranking 2 VISA Ver. 2.0 - Recommended 3 Key usage methodologies 1 (Minimum) : Static Working Keys. NetMATRIX supports a more advance level for both Static Working Keys and 2 : Derived Unique Working Keys per Basic : Derived Unique Working Keys Derived Unique Working Keys per Session (session expires after each per Session (session expires after transaction methodologies, whereby consecutive 1000th transaction or after each consecutive 1000th transaction each terminal has its own set of Terminal log-on). Keys are derived or after Terminal log-on). Keys are Unique Keys (Working and Master). from Master keys. derived from Master keys. NetMATRIX is able to support up to 4 3 (Recommended) : Derived Unique Recommended : Derived Unique billion unique keys per terminal Working Keys per transaction. Keys Working Keys per transaction. Keys application. are derived from Master keys. are derived from Master keys. Highest Supported 4 (future-proof) : Derived Unique Key Advance : Derived Unique Key Per LEWG Ver.1.0 - Ranking 3 Per Transaction (DUKPT) Transaction (DUKPT) VISA Ver. 2.0 - Recommended 4 Key differentiation 1 (Minimum) : Uses same key for data Basic : Uses same key for data NetMATRIX supports using the same encryption and message encryption and message key as well as different keys for data authentication. authentication. encryption and message authentication. 2 (Recommended) : Uses different Recommended : Uses different keys keys for data encryption and message for data encryption and message Highest Supported authentication, i.e. Key 1 is used for authentication, i.e. Key 1 is used for LEWG Ver.1.0 - Ranking 2 encryption and Key 2 is used for encryption and Key 2 is used for VISA Ver. 2.0 - Recommended message authentication. message authentication. 5 Encryption algorithms 1 (Minimum) : TEA in CBC mode (128 NetMATRIX supports all encryption Only one level of bits key length) algorithms and respective key lengths encryption algorithm is defined in LEWG Ver. 1.0 and VISA defined in VISA Ver. 2.0 2 : DES in CBC mode (56 bits key Ver. 2.0 length) Highest Supported 3 (Recommended) : TDES (112 bits TDES (112 bits key length) or AES LEWG Ver.1.0 - Ranking 3 key length) or AES (128 bits key (128 bits key length) in CBC mode VISA Ver. 2.0 - Supported length) in CBC mode 6 Trusted/Security domain 1 (Minimum) : Security domain should Basic : Trusted domain should only NetMATRIX provides Trusted domain population only contain the minimum number of contain the minimum number of that contains only two devices. Each