Comparative Politics Problem Set IIIComplete the following

Comparative Politics Problem Set III
Complete the following questions.
1. (36 points) In �Commitment Problems in Emerging
Democracies: The
Case of Religious Parties,� Stathis Kalyvas (2000) examines
whether reli-
gious parties are compatible with secular and liberal democratic
institu-
tions. He concludes that religious parties may be compatible
with democ-
racy as long as they can credibly commit not to impose a
theocratic dicta-
torship when they come to power. He goes on to argue that
some religions
are better able to provide these credible commitments than
others. We
now provide a Religious Party Game that throws light on the
credible
commitment problem facing religious parties that Kalyvas
describes.
The two players in our game are a dictatorial regime (Regime)
that has
recently introduced a process of democratization and a religious
party
(Religious Party) that seeks to gain power through the newly
proposed
democratic elections. The Religious Party is expected to win the
elec-
tions, and many fear that it will turn the country into a

theocracy rather
than continuing the process of democratic consolidation. The
Regime has
to decide whether to hold the elections as scheduled or to cancel
them and
retain power as a dictatorship. If elections are held and the
Religious Party
wins (which we are assuming will happen), then the Religious
Party has to
decide whether to pursue a moderate political agenda and
support demo-
cratic consolidation or to subvert the democratization process
and create
a religious regime. The Religious Party comes in two types-
moderate
and radical. One way to think about these types is that religious
parties
have both moderate and radical factions, and that whichever
faction is
dominant determines the Religious Party's type. Moderate
religious par-
ties prefer democratic consolidation to establishing a theocracy,
whereas
radical religious parties prefer the opposite. There are three
possible out-
comes in this game: Continued dictatorship, Religious
dictatorship, and
Democratic consolidation. The �gure below illustrates an
incomplete in-
formation version of this game with cardinal payo�s in which
the Regime
does not know whether it is interacting with a moderate
Religious Party
or a radical Religious Party.
(a) Based on the cardinal payo�s shown in the �gure above,

write down
Fall 2021
the preference ordering for (a) the Regime, (b) the moderate
Reli-
gious Party, and (c) the radical Religious Party over the three
possible
outcomes.
(b) Solve the subgame on the left, where the Religious Party is
moder-
ate, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the subgame perfect
equilibrium? What is the expected outcome? What are the
payo�s
that each player receives?
(c) Solve the subgame on the right, where the Religious Party is
radical,
as if there were no uncertainty. What is the subgame perfect
equi-
librium? What is the expected outcome? What are the payo�s
that
each player receives?
(d) What is the expected payo� for the Regime from �Cancel
elections�?
(e) What is the expected payo� for the Regime from �Hold
elections�?
(f) Use the expected payo�s from the two previous questions to

calcu-
late the critical probability at which the Regime will choose to
hold
elections rather than cancel them.
(g) If the Regime believes that the Religious Party is moderate
with
a probability of 0.75, will it choose to hold elections, will it
cancel
elections, or will it be indi�erent between these two actions?
Explain.
(h) If the Regime believes that the Religious Party is moderate
with
cancel
Explain.
(i) If the Regime believes that the Religious Party is moderate
with
cancel
Explain.
(j) If you represented a moderate religious party poised to win
the elec-
tions, would you want the Regime to believe that your party was
moderate or radical?
(k) If you represented a radical religious party poised to win the
elections,
would you want the Regime to believe that your party was
moderate
or radical?

(l) If you solved the game correctly, you will �nd that the
Regime will
hold elections as long as it believes that the Religious Party is
mod-
erate with a high enough probability. If there is some
uncertainty
on the part of the Regime and you are representing a moderate
re-
ligious party that wants the elections to go ahead, why might it
not
be enough for you to simply announce to the Regime that your
party
is a moderate religious party and not a radical one?
2. (5 points) On September 17, 2011, protesters occupied
Zuccotti Park in
the �nancial district of New York as part of a movement that
became
known as �Occupy Wall Street� (OWS). Many of the
protesters had been
inspired by the popular uprisings that had occurred in Egypt and
Tunisia
in early 2011. The OWS protesters were opposed to what they
perceived
Fall 2021
to be the undue in�uence of banks and multinational
corporations on the
political system. They believed that the wealthiest 1 percent of
society

had a disproportionate share of capital and political in�uence,
and they
used the slogan �We are the 99%� to highlight the problem of
social and
economic inequality. The OWS led to the creation of the
international
Occupy Movement, which has organized protests in dozens of
countries
around the world. The occupation of Zuccotti Park ended on
November
15, 2011, when the protesters were forcibly removed by the
police. Imagine
that you are discussing issues of inequality and the power of the
�nancial
sector with some of the �Occupy Wall Street� protesters in the
fall of 2011.
How would you explain the implications of the structural
dependence of
the state on capital to someone who doesn't understand why
left-wing
parties do not always �expropriate� the rich when they come to
power?
3. (24 points) Rather than classify regimes as either democratic
or dictato-
rial, selectorate theory characterizes all regimes in regard to
their location
in a two-dimensional institutional space. One dimension is the
size of
the selectorate (S), and the second dimension is the size of the
winning
coalition (W). These two dimensions are graphically shown in
Figure 10.9
along with the types of regimes that fall into each cell. Use
Internet and
other resources to determine into which cell of the two-

dimensional space
in the �gure belwo each of the following regimes should be
placed. Explain
your answers.
(a) Guinea Bissau
(b) Iraq under Saddam Hussein (pre-2003)
(c) The United States in 1776
(d) The United Arab Emirates
(e) Chile under Augusto Pinochet
(f) Argentina
Fall 2021
4. (21 points) Suppose that a political leader raises $1 billion in
tax revenue.
Assume that the leader can supply public goods worth $2,000 to
each
individual in society if he spends all of this tax revenue on
providing public
goods. Assume also that the size of the winning coalition is
250,000. With
all of this in mind, answer the following questions.
(a) If the leader were to spend all of the tax revenue on
providing private
goods, what would the maximum value of the private goods be

for
each member of the winning coalition if we assume that they all
receive the same amount?
(b) Would the leader prefer to provide only public goods or only
private
goods in this situation? Why?
(c) Now suppose that the size of the winning coalition is
750,000. Keep-
ing everything else the same, answer the following questions.
(d) If the leader were to spend all of the tax revenue on
providing private
goods, what would the maximum value of the private goods be
for
each member of the winning coalition if we assume that they all
receive the same amount?
(e) Would the leader prefer to provide only public goods or only
private
goods in this new situation? Why?
(f) Based on the answers you have given and the description of
selec-
torate theory in this chapter, why is providing public goods a
more
e�cient way for leaders in democracies to stay in power?
(g) Based on the answers you have given and the description of
selec-
torate theory in this chapter, why is providing private goods a
more
e�cient way for leaders in dictatorships to stay in power?
5. (16 points) In this chapter, we discussed the rules for

classifying democ-
racies as parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential. Look
at the
information from the following constitutions and decide
whether these
democracies are parliamentary, presidential, or semi -
presidential. Explain
your decision.
(a) 1991 Burkina Faso Constitution
• Article 37: The President of Faso is elected for �ve years by
universal,
direct, equal and secret su�rage. He is re-eligible one time.
• Article 46: The President of Faso appoints the Prime Minister
from
among the majority of the National Assembly and terminates his
func-
tions, either on the presentation by him of his resignation, or on
his
own authority in the superior interest of the Nation. On the pro-
posal of the Prime Minister, he appoints the other members of
the
Government and terminates their functions.
• Article 62: The Government is responsible before the
Parliament in
the conditions and following the procedures speci�ed by this
Consti-
tution.
Fall 2021

• Article 114: The reciprocal relations of the National Assembly
and of
the Government are expressed equally by: the motion of
censure; the
question of con�dence; the dissolution of the National
Assembly; the
procedure of parliamentary discussion.
• Article 115: The National Assembly can present a motion of
censure
with regard to the Government. The motion of censure is signed
by
at least one-third of the Deputies of the Assembly. To be
adopted, it
must be voted by an absolute majority of the members
composing the
Assembly. In case of rejection of the motion of censure, its
signatories
may not present another before the time period of one year.
(b) 1937 Irish Constitution
i. Article 12: There shall be a President of Ireland (Uachtarán
na hÉire-
ann), hereinafter called the President, who shall take precedence
over
all other persons in the State and who shall exercise and
perform the
powers and functions conferred on the President by this
Constitution
and by law. The President shall be elected by direct vote of the
people.
ii. Article 13: The President shall, on the nomination of the Dáil

Éireann,
appoint the Taoiseach, that is, the head of the Government or
Prime
Minister. The president shall, on the nomination of the
Taoiseach with
the previous approval of Dáil Éireann, appoint the other
members of
the Government. The President shall, on the advice of the
Taoiseach,
accept the resignation or terminate the appointment of any
member
of the Government. Dáil Éireann shall be summoned and
dissolved by
the President on the advice of the Taoiseach. The President may
in
his absolute discretion refuse to dissolve Dáil Éireann on the
advice of
a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority
in Dáil
Éireann. . . The President shall not be answerable to either
House of
the Oireachtas or to any court for the exercise and performance
of the
powers and functions of his o�ce or for any act done or
purporting to
be done by him in the exercise and performance of these powers
and
functions.
iii. Article 15: The National Parliament shall be called and
known, and
is in this Constitution generally referred to, as the Oireachtas.
The
Oireachtas shall consist of the President and two Houses, viz.: a
House
of Representatives to be called Dáil Éireann and a Senate to be

called
Seanad Éireann.
iv. Article 28: The Government shall consist of not less than
seven and
not more than �fteen members who shall be appointed by the
Pres-
ident in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. . .
The
Government shall be responsible to the Dáil Éireann. The head
of the
government, or Prime Minister, shall be called, and is in this
Consti-
tution referred to as, the Taoiseach.
(c) 1980 Chilean Constitution
• Article 4: Chile is a democratic republic.
• Article 24: The government and administration of the State are
vested
in the President of the Republic, who is the Chief of the State.
• Article 25: The President of the Republic shall hold o�ce for
a term
of eight years and may not be reelected for the consecutive
period.
• Article 26: The President shall be elected by direct ballot,
with an
absolute majority of the votes validly cast.
• Article 32: The special powers vested in the President of the
Republic
are the following: . . . To appoint, and remove at will, Ministers
of

Fall 2021
State, Undersecretaries, Intendants, Governors and Mayors
appointed
by him.
• Article 33: The Ministers of State are the direct and immediate
col-
laborators of the President of the Republic in governing and
adminis-
tering the State.
(d) 1947 Japanese Constitution
• Article 1: The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of
the
unit of the People, deriving his position from the will of the
people
with whom resides sovereign power.
• Article 4: The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters
of
state as are provided in the Constitution, and he shall not have
powers
related to government.
• Article 6: The Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minister as
desig-
nated by the Diet.
• Article 41: The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power,
and

shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.
• Article 42: The Diet shall consist of two Houses, namely the
House of
Representatives and the House of Councillors.
• Article 65: Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.
• Article 66: The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister,
who shall
be its head, and other Ministers of State, as provided for by law.
The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be
civilians.
The Cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, shall be
collectively
responsible to the Diet.
• Article 69: If the House of Representatives passes a non-
con�dence
resolution, or rejects a con�dence resolution, the Cabinet shall
resign
en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved
within ten
(10) days.
6. (8 points) The table below shows the results from the 2016
legislative
elections in South Korea.
(a) Based on the results, from which party would you expect the
forma-
teur to come if South Korea were a parliamentary democracy?
(b) South Korea is in fact a presidential democracy. In the 2012
presiden-
tial elections, Park Geun-hye of the Saenuri Party (SP) was
elected

president, and following the 2016 legislative elections, she still
had
nearly two years left in her term. Based on this new
information, from
which party would you now expect the formateur to come? Why
is
this?
Fall 2021
7. (8 points) The table below shows the results from the Oslo
district in the
2005 Norwegian elections. Answer the following questions. In
all of these
questions, you should ignore the �others� category.
(a) Copy the table. Imagine that the seventeen seats in Oslo are
to be
allocated according to the Hare quota with largest remainders.
Fill
in your table and indicate how Oslo's seventeen seats are
allocated
among the parties. How many automatic, remainder, and total
seats
does each party obtain?
(b) Now make another table and repeat the process using the
Droop
quota with largest remainders. Does the allocation of seats
change?
13: Elections and Electoral Systems 581

b. The Afghan electoral system has been heavily criticized by
numerous actors. In a 2012
briefing paper written for an independent research institute
based in Afghanistan,
political scientists Andrew Reynolds and John Carey wrote that
“The SNTV electoral
system came about by a path of missteps and was a disservice to
the millions of Afghans
who deserved a clear and transparent tool to craft their first
truly democratic parliament.
If the system is retained for subsequent elections, there is every
reason to believe that
the fragmentation and parochialism of the legislature will
continue, that the parliament
as a whole will be ineffective in articulating and representing
broad national interests,
and that incumbents who strong-arm and bribe their way into
office will thrive” (2012,
17). Explain the basis for Reynolds and Carey’s criticisms,
focusing on the problems
typically associated with SNTV electoral systems.
c. If you were designing an electoral system for Afghanistan,
what would it be and why?
How Do Electoral Systems Work?
5. In Table 13.14 we again show the results from the Oslo
district in the 2005 Norwegian
elections. Answer the following questions. In all of these
questions, you should ignore the
“others” category.
a. Copy Table 13.14. Imagine that the seventeen seats in Oslo
are to be allocated according

to the Hare quota with largest remainders. Fill in your table and
indicate how Oslo’s
seventeen seats are allocated among the parties. How many
automatic, remainder, and
total seats does each party obtain?
Legislative Elections in Oslo, Norway, 2005
(Using Quota Systems)TaBle 13.14
Party
SP KrF Kyst H Ap V SV FrP Others Total
Votes 3,270 11,168 551 61,130 97,246 28,639 41,434 53,280
12,116 308,834
Seats 17
Quota
Votes ÷ Quota
Automatic
seats
Remainder
Remainder
seats
Total seats
8. (12 points) As we note in the chapter, the actual number of
parties com-
peting in an election or winning seats is not necessarily a good
re�ection of

�how big� a country's party system is. As a result, political
scientists often
prefer to use a measure of the e�ective number of parties in a
country to
capture party system size. If you recall, the e�ective number of
electoral
Fall 2021
parties when there are four actual parties is calculated as
e�ective number
of electoral parties = 1
v2
1
+v2
2
+v2
3
+v2
4
where v1 is the vote share of party 1, v2
is the vote share of party 2, and so on. The e�ective number of
legislative
parties when there are four actual parties is calculated as
e�ective number
of legislative parties = 1

s2
1
+s2
2
+s2
3
+s2
4
where s1 is the seat share of party 1,
s2 is the seat share of party 2, and so on. These measures can
easily be
adapted to cases in which there are more parties or fewer
parties. For
example, the general formulas for the e�ective number of
parties are
1
P∑
1
v2i
(1)
1
P∑
1
s2i
(2)
where P is the total number of actual parties. The table below
shows the

results from the 2014 legislative elections in South Africa. As
you can see,
thirty parties won votes and thirteen parties won seats. This
would seem
to suggest that South Africa has a large multiparty system.
Answer the
following questions.
(a) What is the e�ective number of electoral parties in the 2014
South
African elections? What is the e�ective number of legislative
parties?
(You will probably want to use a calculator for this.)
(b) Compare the e�ective numbers of electoral and legislative
parties in
these elections with the actual number of parties winning votes
and
seats. Which measure-the actual or e�ective number of parties-
does a
better job, in your opinion, of capturing the size of the South
African
party system? Why? Are there circumstances in which you
would
be more likely to use the actual number of parties as the
measure of
party system size? Are there circumstances in which you would
be
more likely to use the e�ective number of parties?
(c) Based on your answers to the previous questions and the
information
in the table, what do you think is the most accurate
classi�cation of
the South African party system: nonpartisan, single party, one-
party

dominant, two party, or multiparty?
(d) Based on the e�ective numbers of electoral and legislative
parties that
you calculated, does the mechanical e�ect of South Africa's
electoral
system introduce much distortion in the way that votes are
translated
into seats? Based on your answer to this question, what type of
electoral system do you think South Africa employs a
permissive
or nonpermissive one? Use Internet resources to �nd out
whether
South Africa really does use a permissive or a nonpermissive
electoral
system.
Fall 2021
Make sure you explain how you arrive at your solution � you
won't receive
partial credit for incorrect answers unless we can see that you
have done a part
of the problem correctly. It is your responsibility to convey the
answers in a
clear and neat manner. Your TA may give you more precise
instructions and
is permitted to penalize you for sloppy presentation. The
problem set is due at
the beginning of class on October 30.
Fall 2021

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