3. Who is bringing wood?
● In small groups there is no problem with that.
● But imagine a fire for a few dozens of people.
This will not happen so spontaneously
4. Mancur Olson “Logic of Collective
Action”
● Group definition – all who cannot be excluded
from consumption of a good.
● For example the warmth of the fire. This shows
the relativity – physically it would be possible
to exclude someone, but that would break some
silent rules. Other similar examples: roads, TV
program, national defence, environment.
● Another example – workers of a company.
5. Mancur Olson “Logic of Collective
Action”
● In small groups it is often rational to do
something for the group only because we
would benefit from it as well. For example
bring wood for the fire.
● In big groups the situation is different – our
benefit is lower than the effort needed to
produce the good. For example bring wood for
the fire for a 1000 people.
6. Mancur Olson “Logic of Collective
Action”
● Big groups need other means to incentivise
their members.
● This can be: rules of law, various social
pressure etc.
● But it is a big threshold because it changes the
expectation of the members about the actions of
their peers. Sometimes those who act ostensibly
for the benefit of the group are shunned for
being gullible (i.e. maybe their actions are not
really good).
8. The tragedy of the commons
Copyright Chris Yeates and licensed for reuse under this Creative Commons Licence.
9. The tragedy of the commons
● Overgrazing
● One more cow – benefit for the owner, costs
shared
● It is actually the same as the above – just with
negative numbers
● Hardin's conclusion is that there are only two
solutions either privatisation or state control.
11. Common Pool Resources
● Underground water in some location
● Irrigation systems
● Common pastures
● Forests
● Fisheries
12. Common Pool Resources - definition
● It is hard (but not impossible) to exclude
someone.
● Using the resource deplets it
13. Classification of goods
Excludable Non-excludable
Rivalrous Private goods: food,
clothes, etc.
Environment, parking
space
Non-rival Club goods: private
schools, theaters,
cinemas, clubs
Public goods: national
defence, police, fire
fighting, information
14. “Governing the Commons”
● Watching others is also work.
● “The second-order problem”
● The state originally was mostly concerned
about defense – i.e. public good, but it now also
governs common pool and other types of
resources
15. “Governing the Commons”
● Pastures and forests (Toerbel w Szwajcarii,
Hirano, Nagaike i Yamanoka - wsie w Japonii)
● Irigation systems (Huerta in Spain and Zanjera
- Philipines)
● Underground water – case study in California
● Fisheries in Turkey, Sri Lanca and Nova Scotia
16. Governing the commons
● Clearly defined boundaries (effective exclusion
of external un-entitled parties)
● Rules regarding the appropriation and provision
of common resources that are adapted to local
conditions
17. Governing the Commons
● Collective-choice arrangements that allow most
resource appropriators to participate in the
decision-making process
● Effective monitoring by monitors who are part
of or accountable to the appropriators
18. Governing the commons
● A scale of graduated sanctions for resource
appropriators who violate community rules
● Mechanisms of conflict resolution that are
cheap and of easy access
19. Governing the Commons
● Self-determination of the community
recognized by higher-level authorities
● In the case of larger common-pool resources,
organization in the form of multiple layers of
nested enterprises, with small local CPRs at the
base level.
20. Governing the Commons
● Self-determination of the community
recognized by higher-level authorities
● In the case of larger common-pool resources,
organization in the form of multiple layers of
nested enterprises, with small local CPRs at the
base level.
21. Literature
● Ostrom, Elinor (1990). Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for
collective action. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN
9780521405997.
● Ostrom, Elinor (2005). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton: Princeton
University Press. ISBN 9780691122380.
● Olson, Mancur (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory
of Groups (PDF). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1965. ISBN 0-674-
53751-3.
● Hardin, G (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons". Science 162 (3859): 1243–1248.
