User-Authorized Discovery
George Fletcher
Copyright © 2015 Cloud Identity Summit .All rights reserved. 2
Person to person Bluetooth discoveryEmail sharing NFC “tap”
Discovery Models
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User-Authorized Discovery
•  Machine readable
•  Location of services
•  Context aware
•  Under user control
•  Based on a “sharable identifier”
o  e.g. george@discover.example.com
o  QR code with embedded information
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Social web site
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Mint-like financial aggregation site
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What!!! Are you crazy?!
Security Privacy Sharing
Two standards
Webfinger — RFC 7033
• Protocol for performing “relationship” discovery
User Managed Access v1.0 (Kantara Initiative)
• Protocol for allowing user defined authorization
for access to a resource
Webfinger example
•  Query
•  resource: george@discover.example.com
•  relationship: http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer
•  Response
•  subject: george@discover.example.com
•  links
§  relationship: http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer
§  href: https://oidc.provider.example.com
§  property
●  name = http://oidc.provider.example.com/login_hint
●  value = gffletch
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User Managed Access (UMA)
UMA
Defined
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UMA & online sharing
• I want to share this stuff selectively
• Among my own apps
• With family and friends
• With organizations
• I want to protect this stuff from being
seen by everyone in the world
• I want to control access proactively,
not just feel forced to consent over
and over
Proposal: UMA protect webfinger
Leverage UMA to allow for security and privacy control of
personal discovery information
•  User control
•  Over what’s discoverable
•  Over authZ policy to access discovery information
•  Privacy enhancing
•  Transparency
•  Audit capabilities
Alice & Bob Calendar Sharing
Alice’s Calendar service registers calendar endpoints
and permissions with the UMAAS
Alice’s Calendar service registers calendar endpoints
with her discovery service
Alice’s Discovery service registers calendar discovery
information as a resource set with UMAAS
Alice defines authorization policy for Discovery requests
and Calendar access
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Discovery endpoint protected by UMA
UAD Identifier
UAD Identifier
Where is Alice’s
Calendar endpoint?
Please visit Alice’s
AS with this tokenThey need authZ.
Send them to me with
this token
Someone is trying
to access Alice’s
calendar
Alice’s
Discovery
Service
Alice’s
UMA
AS
Calendar
Client
Calendar
Service
Alice Bob
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Bob “wins” access
Hi Bob, you have
approval to access
the data. Use this token.
Hi, I’m Bob can I
please get access to Alice’s
calendar info?
Alice’s
Discovery
Service
Alice’s
UMA
AS
Calendar
Client
Calendar
Service
Alice Bob
Can Bob at Calendar client
access your discovery
service?
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Bob discovers Alice’s calendar service
Where is Alice’s
Calendar endpoint?
Here’s my token
Alice’s calendar
endpoint
Yes
Is this token
valid for Alice’s
calendar endpoint?
Alice’s
Discovery
Service
Alice’s
UMA
AS
Calendar
Client
Calendar
Service
Alice Bob
Bob’s Calendar Client
successfully discovered
calendar endpoint.
What’s missing
●  Taxonomy of relationship types
●  Easy UAD identifer for users
o  gffletch@discover.me
●  Mixing public and “private” discovery data
●  How to register link relations as resource sets in UMA
●  Optimizations to allow for returning “access tokens” from the
discovery service
●  Managing user authorization overload
Q & A
George Fletcher
george.fletcher@teamaol.com
Conclusion
Webfinger + UMA seems viable
Many details left to be worked out
Pilot effort needed to prove viability
User Authorization Overload
●  How to manage all the AuthZ policies
o  Discovery
o  Calendar service
o  Think about a world with IoT devices, Health care,
Enterprise, etc
What’s missing
•  Taxonomy of relationship types
•  Domain-specific in most cases
•  Easy PDS identifier for users
•  gffletch@discover.me
•  Mixing pblic and “private” discovery data
•  Discovery for photos should allow for return of my
public photography site without client authentication
•  How to register link relation as resource sets in UMA
•  Optimizations to allow for returning UMA RPTs from the
discovery service
UserAuthorization Overload
•  How to manage all the AuthZ policies
•  Discovery
•  Calendar service
•  Think about a world with loT devices, health care,
enterprise, etc.
Conclusion
•  Webfinger + UMA seems viable
•  Many details left to be worked out
•  Pilot effort needed to prove viability

CIS 2015- User-Authorized Discovery- George Fletcher

  • 1.
  • 2.
    Copyright © 2015Cloud Identity Summit .All rights reserved. 2 Person to person Bluetooth discoveryEmail sharing NFC “tap” Discovery Models
  • 3.
    Copyright © 2015Cloud Identity Summit .All rights reserved. 3 User-Authorized Discovery •  Machine readable •  Location of services •  Context aware •  Under user control •  Based on a “sharable identifier” o  e.g. george@discover.example.com o  QR code with embedded information
  • 4.
    Copyright © 2015Cloud Identity Summit .All rights reserved. 4 Social web site
  • 5.
    Copyright © 2015Cloud Identity Summit .All rights reserved. 5 Mint-like financial aggregation site
  • 6.
    Copyright © 2015Cloud Identity Summit .All rights reserved. 6 What!!! Are you crazy?! Security Privacy Sharing
  • 7.
    Two standards Webfinger —RFC 7033 • Protocol for performing “relationship” discovery User Managed Access v1.0 (Kantara Initiative) • Protocol for allowing user defined authorization for access to a resource
  • 8.
    Webfinger example •  Query • resource: george@discover.example.com •  relationship: http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer •  Response •  subject: george@discover.example.com •  links §  relationship: http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer §  href: https://oidc.provider.example.com §  property ●  name = http://oidc.provider.example.com/login_hint ●  value = gffletch
  • 9.
    Copyright © 2015Cloud Identity Summit .All rights reserved. 9 User Managed Access (UMA) UMA Defined
  • 10.
    Copyright © 2015Cloud Identity Summit .All rights reserved. 10 UMA & online sharing • I want to share this stuff selectively • Among my own apps • With family and friends • With organizations • I want to protect this stuff from being seen by everyone in the world • I want to control access proactively, not just feel forced to consent over and over
  • 11.
    Proposal: UMA protectwebfinger Leverage UMA to allow for security and privacy control of personal discovery information •  User control •  Over what’s discoverable •  Over authZ policy to access discovery information •  Privacy enhancing •  Transparency •  Audit capabilities
  • 12.
    Alice & BobCalendar Sharing Alice’s Calendar service registers calendar endpoints and permissions with the UMAAS Alice’s Calendar service registers calendar endpoints with her discovery service Alice’s Discovery service registers calendar discovery information as a resource set with UMAAS Alice defines authorization policy for Discovery requests and Calendar access
  • 13.
    Copyright © 2015Cloud Identity Summit .All rights reserved. 13 Discovery endpoint protected by UMA UAD Identifier UAD Identifier Where is Alice’s Calendar endpoint? Please visit Alice’s AS with this tokenThey need authZ. Send them to me with this token Someone is trying to access Alice’s calendar Alice’s Discovery Service Alice’s UMA AS Calendar Client Calendar Service Alice Bob
  • 14.
    Copyright © 2015Cloud Identity Summit .All rights reserved. 14 Bob “wins” access Hi Bob, you have approval to access the data. Use this token. Hi, I’m Bob can I please get access to Alice’s calendar info? Alice’s Discovery Service Alice’s UMA AS Calendar Client Calendar Service Alice Bob Can Bob at Calendar client access your discovery service?
  • 15.
    Copyright © 2015Cloud Identity Summit .All rights reserved. 15 Bob discovers Alice’s calendar service Where is Alice’s Calendar endpoint? Here’s my token Alice’s calendar endpoint Yes Is this token valid for Alice’s calendar endpoint? Alice’s Discovery Service Alice’s UMA AS Calendar Client Calendar Service Alice Bob Bob’s Calendar Client successfully discovered calendar endpoint.
  • 16.
    What’s missing ●  Taxonomyof relationship types ●  Easy UAD identifer for users o  gffletch@discover.me ●  Mixing public and “private” discovery data ●  How to register link relations as resource sets in UMA ●  Optimizations to allow for returning “access tokens” from the discovery service ●  Managing user authorization overload
  • 17.
    Q & A GeorgeFletcher george.fletcher@teamaol.com
  • 18.
    Conclusion Webfinger + UMAseems viable Many details left to be worked out Pilot effort needed to prove viability
  • 19.
    User Authorization Overload ● How to manage all the AuthZ policies o  Discovery o  Calendar service o  Think about a world with IoT devices, Health care, Enterprise, etc
  • 20.
    What’s missing •  Taxonomyof relationship types •  Domain-specific in most cases •  Easy PDS identifier for users •  gffletch@discover.me •  Mixing pblic and “private” discovery data •  Discovery for photos should allow for return of my public photography site without client authentication •  How to register link relation as resource sets in UMA •  Optimizations to allow for returning UMA RPTs from the discovery service UserAuthorization Overload •  How to manage all the AuthZ policies •  Discovery •  Calendar service •  Think about a world with loT devices, health care, enterprise, etc. Conclusion •  Webfinger + UMA seems viable •  Many details left to be worked out •  Pilot effort needed to prove viability