Chinese banking system

State of the Chinese economy and the
Chinese banking system

2unit.org.au/blog/
Project Director
Acknowledgements
Trevor Tsui
(IV LL.B / Commerce)
Project Analysts
Lisa Chhang
(II Commerce)
Eugina Kwon
(II LL.B / Commerce)
Buwaneka Arachchi
Sam Tidswell
Shirley Song
Olivia Guo
Vishal Uppal
(I LL.B / Commerce)

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Disclaimer

Overview of China‟s economy and national debt 5
Overview of China‟s financial market 9
Overview of China‟s banking sector 11
Study on Agricultural Bank of China 12
Study on Bank of Communications 14
Study on Bank of China 16
Study on Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 18
Study on Hua Xia Bank 20

5unit.org.au/blog/
State of the Chinese Economy
Overview of China‟s economy
While GDP growth is expected to further compress and stabilise in the short-term, China‟s transition to
a more sustainable economy driven by consumer consumption, lower aggressive lending practices
and higher credit quality presents an optimistic long-term outlook
Overview
HSBC PMI relativeto 50.03
• Key reforms to tighten credit markets and transition into a middle-class
consumption driven economy
─ GDP growth is expected to compress further1
─ Historically high levels of GDP growth (2008 – 2010) were driven by
extreme credit expansion, spurred on by government stimulus and
subsequentprivate investment activity2
─ Property controls and tighter credit lending standards are now in
place to curb unsustainable growth in credit and private investments,
which have inflated the economy
• Robust levels of investments in construction and property are likely to be
supported by China‟s rural-urban migration plan
GDP growth (%)
(1) Source: Rabobank (13 Nov 2013). (2) Source: J.P. Morgan (6 Dec 2013). (3) Note: values below 50.0 indicate “contraction”, while values above 50.0 indicate “expansion”. (4) Note: Represented by solid orange line.
Company 2014E
Deutsche 8.6%
UBS 7.8%
BAML 7.6%
Bloomberg mean4 7.5%
Goldman Sachs 7.4%
Nomura 7.4%
(3.5)
(2.5)
(1.5)
(0.5)
0.5
1.5
2.5
Feb-12 May-12 Aug-12 Nov-12 Feb-13 May-13 Aug-13 Nov-13 Feb-14
PMI Manufacturing PMI Services
7.0%
7.5%
8.0%
8.5%
9.0%
9.5%
10.0%
10.5%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014E

6unit.org.au/blog/
National debt
The volume of debt circulating in China‟s financial system does not appear to be an imminent threat.
Rather, growth in credit represents a key risk for the economy that has raised concerns regarding
credit quality. Thus, negative shocks are likely to exacerbate default fears given uncertainty
Overview
Global debt / GDP ratios2
• The Chinese economic stimulus plan announced on 9 Nov 2008
(c. A$869bn1) ignited credit markets and spurred private investments in
infrastructure and real estate
─ Stimulus focused, inter alia, on infrastructure investments,
supporting iron and steel producers, as well as property developers
─ Prior to this the interest rate was cut and measures were also
introduced to spur property sales
• However, a global comparison reveals that China‟s total-debt-to-GDP is
in fact relatively low against major developed countries, suggesting that
the quantity of debt in the market is not problematic
• Growth in the volume of debt appears to be the salient concern, given
the abnormality and irregularity of the spike
─ Inherent in the issue of “growth in credit” is the concern that
aggressive lending has jeopardised the quality of the loans, such
that debt securities being actively traded in the market may carry a
high level of risk, unbeknown to its holder
─ This also raises an issue of “chain causality”, as it is not clear
whether conventional banks carry loans to on-lenders on their books,
who may be exposed to borrowers of high default risk
─ On-lenders tend to be those operating in the shadow banking sector,
who have lower lending standards and primarily lend to a high risk
segment
─ This „uncertainty‟ means that any default or collapse in the shadow
banking market is likely to severely affect conventional banks as
there is no certainty as to whether these banks are indirectly
exposed through causality chains
Total debt / GDP ratio1
(1) Note: Converted to AUD based on AUD / USD of 1.483 on 9 Nov 2008. (2) Source: J.P. Morgan (6 Dec 2013).

7unit.org.au/blog/
National debt
Uncertainty has arisen from rampant shadow banking activity through trust products that have been
predominantly tied to loans made to coal operators. Key reforms, including anti-pollution policies, have
increased borrowing costs, depressed coal prices and increased operating costs in the coal industry
Overview
Wealth Management Product issurances2
UNIT is a publically listed commercial bank that is one of China‟s top
4 lenders and advances a number of loans to on-lenders in the
shadow banking industry
The on-lender specialises in project financing for coal operators and
coal powered generators
Given China‟s new energy policies, a number of coal power
generators have closed, of which the on-lender is exposed
Problematically, the on-lender provides project financing to coal
operators who are heavily exposed to coal power suppliers who have
been severely effected by China‟s clean energy policy
Non-performing loans and write downs increase, which subsequently
increases the credit risk of UNIT‟s loan portfolio as the on-lender is
now subject to financial stress. As the market is unaware of the
bank‟s exposure, fear plagues the financial sector
• Shocks to the wholesale debt and general credit markets caused by
defaults of trustees and shadow banking lenders are likely to be
exacerbated by the retail sectors exposure to the shadow banking sector
through Wealth Management Products (WMPs)
– WMPs in shadow banking to acquire working capital
– Offer higher yields than deposits and marketed as „risk free‟
– New WMPs are issued to satisfy the maturation of old WMPs
– Therefore, the default of one issuer will create a negative shock on
the demand for WMPs potentially causing other issuers to default
when old WMPs mature
• Default on WMPs increases NPLs and credit risk of conventional banks
as the retail market, through its exposure, is impacted
Chain of causalityillustration
(1) Note: J.P. Morgan (3 Feb 2013).
UNIT
On-lender
Coal operator
1
Coal operator
2
Coal power
plant operator
1
2
344
5
1
2
3
4
5

8unit.org.au/blog/
44.0%
45.0%
46.0%
47.0%
48.0%
49.0%
50.0%
51.0%
52.0%
53.0%
54.0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
China United
States
United
Kingdom
Japan Germany Australia
Credit risk
The relatively high savings rate suggests that conventional banks appear to possess sufficient buffer
against financial stress, given a non-reliance upon wholesale debt markets, contrasting the collapse of
banks including Northern Rock and Nippon Bank
Chinese economy(deposits/ GDP ratio) Global comparison (deposits/ GDP ratio)

9unit.org.au/blog/
China‟s shadow banking system is worth US$7.5tn and has driven abnormal GDP growth (easy
credit). As the government tightens credit growth, RMB$634bn of trust loans to property developers
and the troubled coal mining industry are in jeopardy. RMB $5bn of trust WMPs also mature this year
Shanghai CompositeIndex rebased to 100
Chinese financial market
80.0
85.0
90.0
95.0
100.0
105.0
110.0
Jan-13 Feb-13 Mar-13 Apr-13 May-13 Jun-13 Jul-13 Aug-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Nov-13 Dec-13 Jan-14 Feb-14 Mar-14 Apr-14
19 Jun 2013: Federal Reserve
Chairman, Ben Bernanke, announces
plans to gradually taper QE by the end
of 2013
20 Jun 2013: Markets respond to Fed‟s
tapering plans – Chinese inter-bank rates
(Shibor) spikes, overnight repo at record
high 12.06% and 7-day repo soars to
13.85%. PBoC abstains from injecting
liquidity. Coupled effect results in concerns
of a cash-crunch from illiquidity
Jan 2014: Increasing coverage of China Credit Trust Co.
injects fear in the market, as its RMB$3bn WMP matures at
the end of Jan. The money was raised in 2010 under a
product called “China Credit / Credit Equals Gold #1
Collective Trust Product” to lend to an unlisted coal
company, Shanxi Zhenfu Energy Group, which declared
bankruptcy in 2013. The product offered a 10% yield
compared to 3% depositrate
27 Jan 2014: China Credit Trust Co is bailed out by the
Chinese government, and Premier Li Keqiang states that
some defaults will be unavoidable as government policy
shifts to credit tightening. Market obtains relief from
governmentsupport over a hard stance
17 Mar 2014: Real estate developer, Zhejiang
Xingrun Real Estate collapses with insufficient
cash to meet debt repayments, holding
RMB$3.5tn in debt. China Construction Bank
holds RMD$1bnof debtin the company
7 Mar 2014: Shanghai
Chaori Solar Energy
Science & Technology
Co. defaults on
corporate bond`

10unit.org.au/blog/
Since Jan 2013 a significant support level has developed at c. 2000. Downward resistance and
sideways price action has created a bilateral wedge, such that price breakout can either be on the up
or downside. Unexpected defaults in the shadow banking sector are a likely negative catalyst
Shanghai CompositeIndex technical analysis
Chinese financial market
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
Jan-08 May-08 Sep-08 Jan-09 May-09 Sep-09 Jan-10 May-10 Sep-10 Jan-11 May-11 Sep-11 Jan-12 May-12 Sep-12 Jan-13 May-13 Sep-13 Jan-14
Downward trading channel creating
medium-term support and
resistance levels
Appears to be a bilateral wedge in
which case price breakout can
either be on the up or downside.
However, given that there are
higher „closing lows‟, the pattern
may represent a bearish pennant,
consistent with a likely negative
catalyst given strains in the shadow
banking sector. Price action likely
to be ‘downside risk’

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Major banks in the China are well-capitalised and in a strong position to weather distress in financial
markets, given their low reliance on wholesale debt markets to fund operations. However, as the
market comes to terms with the unsustainable pace of credit growth, P/B will continue to decline
Key points
Banking sector
(1) Note: Hua Xia Bank has been excluded from the sample due to an abnormally large average debt-to-deposit ratio of 15.3% over approximately 5 years, with its most recent figure 5.4% being materially above the industry average for
China‟s major banks. The average is upwardly skewed by abnormally high levels of debt in 2008 and 2009.
Based on a study of a number of China‟s major authorised depositary institutions including the Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of Communications, Bank of
China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Hua Xia Bank the critical findings are as follows:
• The rate of growth in lending has increased on average 17.9% over approximately 5 years since 2008, with a 5-year compound annual growth rate of
17.6%
• In comparison, the rate of growth in deposits has increased on average 16.1% over approximately 5 years since 2008, with a 5-year compound annual
growth rate of 15.9%
• As a proxy measure of sensitivity to wholesale debt market distress, the average debt-to-deposit ratio in 3Q13 is 3.27%, which is only fractionally higher
than FY12 of 2.6%. Meanwhile, the average debt-to-deposit ratio since 2008 is 2.5%.1 This reveals that, at least among China‟s major banking players,
financial operations are not reliant upon the liquidity of wholesale debt markets. This is a positive for the Chinese banking system as it is less sensitive to
negative shocks in the credit market, and in the event that liquidity dries up
• All banks included in the study have strong regulatory capital ratio positions, most importantly core tier 1 and are well-above minimum standards
• As a key risk, while non-performing loan ratios have declined since 2008, the effects on the credit quality of each bank‟s lending portfolio may not yet be
truly compounded in the NPL ratios and this is supported by declining P/B ratios are all banks (<1) which suggests that markets are now pricing in future
write-downs on loans in anticipation of an increase in bad debts

12unit.org.au/blog/
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)
ABC‟s share price incorporates expectations of greater bad debt provisioning, with growth in loans
outpacing deposits. While the NPL ratio has consistently declined, aggressive growth may have
jeopardised credit quality. The NPL ratio might not reflect this given delays in realising write-downs
Market expectations
P/BV and return on equity Share price performance (rebased to 100) and P/BV
• While the bank‟s share price and ROE has performed positively, P/BV
has consistently declined since 2009
– Despite the upward trend in ROE, the persistent decline in P/BV may
indicate that this trend is unsustainable, rather than ABC being
undervalued
– The value of the bank‟s assets are forecasted to be less than the
current book value of the company
• An analysis of share price performance against P/BV further alludes to
the markets expectations of future write downs
– While the NPL ratio has been decreasing, the bank incurred its first
increase in bad debts in 5 years growing at a rate of 3.06% from
2012 to 3Q13
Growth in customer deposits and loans
15.0%
15.5%
16.0%
16.5%
17.0%
17.5%
18.0%
18.5%
19.0%
19.5%
20.0%
-
0.2x
0.4x
0.6x
0.8x
1.0x
1.2x
1.4x
1.6x
1.8x
2.0x
FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 3Q13
P/BV
0.8x
1.0x
1.2x
1.4x
1.6x
1.8x
2.0x
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
110.0
120.0
130.0
Aug-10 Feb-11 Aug-11 Feb-12 Aug-12 Feb-13 Aug-13 Feb-14
44.0%
46.0%
48.0%
50.0%
52.0%
54.0%
56.0%
58.0%
60.0%
-
2,000.0
4,000.0
6,000.0
8,000.0
10,000.0
12,000.0
14,000.0
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 3Q13
Inbillions
Deposits Loans Loan / deposit
5-year CAGR (deposits): 14.12%
5-year CAGR (loans): 17.67%

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Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)
Despite market consensus, ABC is well-capitalised and non-reliant on funding from wholesale debt
markets. Although total debt has increased, it constitutes c. 2.0% of total operational funding, relatively
immaterial when compared to the quantum of deposits
Capital regulatory ratios
Total debt and customer deposits
Lending operations
(1) Note: Includes debt issuances and repo agreements.
8.0%
7.7%
9.8%
9.5%
9.7%
9.4%
1.4%
2.3%
1.8%
2.4%
2.9%
2.7%
0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0%
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
3Q13
Tier 1 Tier 2
-
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
-
2,000.0
4,000.0
6,000.0
8,000.0
10,000.0
12,000.0
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 3Q13
Inbillions
Debt Deposits Debt / deposits
-
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
4.5%
5.0%
2,500.0
3,000.0
3,500.0
4,000.0
4,500.0
5,000.0
5,500.0
6,000.0
6,500.0
7,000.0
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 3Q13
Inbillions
Loans Bad debts NPL ratio

14unit.org.au/blog/
Bank of Communications (BoCom)
BoCom‟s declining share price appears to reflect expectations of future bad debt provisioning, that
may be associated with the bank‟s increase in loans. The declining NPL ratio may therefore fails to
reflect the true credit quality at the time of reporting
Market expectations
• The bank‟s share price appears to have been in steady decline since
2010
– The similar decline in P/BV appears to suggest a steady book value
– Decline may therefore be driven by the market‟s perception of
BoCom‟s shares as overvalued
• Continuing declines in share price in the face of an apparently
decreasing NPL ratio may reflect expectations of future write-downs
– Growth in lending may be masking a slower increase in the dollar
value of bad debts
– Rising total debt may also be of influence
P/BV
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
16.00%
18.00%
20.00%
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13
ROE P/BV
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
-
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
-
500,000.0
1,000,000.0
1,500,000.0
2,000,000.0
2,500,000.0
3,000,000.0
3,500,000.0
4,000,000.0
Deposits from customers Loans Loan-to-deposit ratio

15unit.org.au/blog/
Bank of Communications (BoCom)
Rising lending and deposits evidence BoCom‟s expanding operations over the past five years. Debt
represents only a small portion of financing, particularly when compared with customer deposits, and
may thus be sustainable
Lending operations
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
-
500,000.0
1,000,000.0
1,500,000.0
2,000,000.0
2,500,000.0
3,000,000.0
3,500,000.0
-
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
-
500,000.0
1,000,000.0
1,500,000.0
2,000,000.0
2,500,000.0
3,000,000.0
3,500,000.0
4,000,000.0
inbillions
9.54%
8.15%
9.37%
9.27%
11.24%
9.76%
0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00%
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
Core Tier 1

16unit.org.au/blog/
Bank of China (BOC)
BOC‟s risen share price incorporates increasing bad debt provisioning, with loans steadying in growth
with deposits. Additionally, NPL has declined while the debt issuances of BOC have consistently been
increased
Market expectations
• The Bank‟s share price experienced a drop late 2011 and since then,
has overall been increasing
• ROE has slightly increased while P/BV is recovering from a recent
decline
– The similar patterns of ROE and P/BV may indicate that this
trend is sustainable
– If the rising trend continues, the bank‟s assets may be valued
more than the current book value
• Share price and P/BV have display a similar pattern, which suggests
possible future write downs
56.00%
58.00%
60.00%
62.00%
64.00%
66.00%
68.00%
70.00%
72.00%
74.00%
76.00%
-
2,000.0
4,000.0
6,000.0
8,000.0
10,000.0
12,000.0
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 3Q13
Inbillions
0.80x
1.00x
1.20x
1.40x
1.60x
1.80x
2.00x
2.20x
2.40x
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
110.0
120.0
130.0
12.0%
12.5%
13.0%
13.5%
14.0%
14.5%
15.0%
15.5%
16.0%
16.5%
-
0.2x
0.4x
0.6x
0.8x
1.0x
1.2x
1.4x
1.6x
1.8x
FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 3Q13
ROE P/BV

17unit.org.au/blog/
Bank of China (BOC)
Bank of China is well-capitalised as most of its funding is not sourced from wholesale debt markets,
with steady Tier 1 percentages. Total debt has also been steadily increasing but it is not a material
component of operational funding being around 2.5%.
Lending operations
10.83%
9.09%
10.11%
10.08%
10.54%
9.52%
2.62%
2.07%
2.49%
2.90%
3.09%
2.83%
0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 14.00% 16.00%
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
3Q13
Tier 1 Tier 2
-
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
2,500.0
3,000.0
3,500.0
4,000.0
4,500.0
5,000.0
5,500.0
6,000.0
6,500.0
7,000.0
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 3Q13
Inbillions
-
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
3.00%
3.50%
-
2,000.0
4,000.0
6,000.0
8,000.0
10,000.0
12,000.0
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 3Q13
Inbillions

18unit.org.au/blog/
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)
With China‟s slow and fragile economy, the persistent decline in ICBC‟s share price was anticipated,
caused by the rising of bad debts and aggravation of credit conditions. Although ICBC has beaten
analysts‟ forecast regarding its 2014 first quarter profits, ICBC‟s outlook remains uncertain
Market expectations
• Although ICBC‟s share price is gradually increasing, the decline in P/BV
and profit persists since 2009
– Despite increases in net profit, ROE is declining since 2011
– The non-performing loans ratio has increased as well as the level of
bad debts since 2012, indicating an aggravation of credit conditions
– More people seek loans from non-financial institutions
– While the EPS has been increasing, the bank is still experiencing
weak profit growth since 2009
– ICBC‟s core capital adequacy ratio remained at 10.57%, compared
to 10.62% in 2012
50.00%
52.00%
54.00%
56.00%
58.00%
60.00%
62.00%
64.00%
66.00%
68.00%
-
2,000.0
4,000.0
6,000.0
8,000.0
10,000.0
12,000.0
14,000.0
16,000.0
Inbillions
18.0%
19.0%
20.0%
21.0%
22.0%
23.0%
24.0%
-
0.5x
1.0x
1.5x
2.0x
2.5x
3.0x
FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13
ROE P/BV
0.80x
1.00x
1.20x
1.40x
1.60x
1.80x
2.00x
2.20x
2.40x
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
110.0
120.0
Share price P/BV

19unit.org.au/blog/
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)
Despite ICBC‟s weak profit growth, ICBC is China‟s largest lender by assets is well-capitalised and
remain committed to support China‟s fragile economy.
Lending operations
10.75%
9.90%
9.97%
10.07%
10.62%
10.57%
2.34%
2.46%
2.30%
3.10%
3.04%
2.55%
0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 14.00% 16.00%
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
Tier 1 Tier 2
-
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
2,500.0
3,000.0
3,500.0
4,000.0
4,500.0
5,000.0
5,500.0
6,000.0
6,500.0
7,000.0
Inbillions
-
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
-
2,000.0
4,000.0
6,000.0
8,000.0
10,000.0
12,000.0
14,000.0
16,000.0
Inbillions

20unit.org.au/blog/
Hua Xia Bank
Hua Xia‟s growth in loans took a hit in 09-10 which corresponded to a decline in the growth of
deposits. This, alongside large declines in share price performance, reflect the negative market
sentiment behind China‟s banking system that was prevalent in the close of the last decade
Market expectations
• Although Hua Xia‟s ROE has performed strongly from 09-12, P/BV has
consistently declined during this period.
– Similarly, the NPL ratio has declined, although favourably, reflecting
that the bank‟s financial position continues to improve year on year.
– Indeed, Hua Xia‟s net profits have continued to climb through a
steady gain of liquid assets (increasing book value).
• However, predictions of share performance indicate the high risk of
future write-downs.
– The bank also experienced a large drop in debt/deposit ratio as debt
issuances continue to fall to relative lows and growing middle-class
customers seek to invest in the climbing RMB.
-
0.20x
0.40x
0.60x
0.80x
1.00x
1.20x
-
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
Aug-10 Feb-11 Aug-11 Feb-12 Aug-12 Feb-13 Aug-13 Feb-14-
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
-
0.2x
0.4x
0.6x
0.8x
1.0x
1.2x
1.4x
1.6x
FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12
P/BV
64.00%
66.00%
68.00%
70.00%
72.00%
74.00%
76.00%
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
Inbillions
5-year CAGR (deposits): 16.38%
5-year CAGR (loans): 15.17%

21unit.org.au/blog/
Hua Xia Bank
Hua Xia‟s funding has moved away from debt (which now constitutes a small portion of total
operational funding). In terms of risk management, the bank‟s capital adequacy fluctuations have
primarily reflected the changes in debt/deposit and loan/deposit ratios
Total debt and customer deposits Lending operations
7.46%
6.84%
6.65%
8.72%
8.18%
3.94%
3.36%
3.93%
2.96%
2.67%
0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 14.00%
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
Tier 1 Tier 2
-
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
1.4%
1.6%
1.8%
2.0%
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
In100millions
-
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
-
200.0
400.0
600.0
800.0
1,000.0
1,200.0
Inbillions

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