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Illicit QQ Communities: What’s Being Shared?
Aaron Shraberg, Senior Analyst II
1
● Started studying Mandarin in high school as part of a pilot
program
● 4.5 years in-country experience
● Asian Studies at GW
● 10+ Years of research and analysis of security issues with an
emphasis on China for public and private sectors
2
About Me
● What is QQ?
● Frequently found fraud types
● A unique language
● Detection Avoidance versus “Turning a Blind Eye”
● The future of threat detection
3
AGENDA
4
What is QQ?
hxxps://www[.]chinainternetwatch[.]com/30383/tencent-q4-2019/
hxxps://www[.]imqq[.]com/English1033[.]html
● Initial release 1999
● About 800 million
MAU
● Allows creation of
groups with size
limitations
● Used mostly to
converse about
innocuous topics
● Super App
● Registration Reqs
5
Where does QQ stand?
hxxps://datareportal[.]com/reports/digital-2019-internet-trends-in-q3
1.114 billion
823 million
6
What is an “illicit community”?
hxxps://go[.]flashpoint-intel[.]com/docs/navigating-illicit-online-communities/
● A 2020 Flashpoint report defined these
as communities that support fraud,
cybercrime for financial gain, money
laundering and other illegal activities.
● Some groups also discuss fraud and
hacking tools and techniques.
7
What is an “illicit community”?
8
What’s being shared?
hxxps://110[.]qq[.]com/article_detail[.]html?id=1F4EBB0600EFE1FE679B
Business fraud
Top Fraud Types: January - August, 2020
Income schemes
Friend schemes
● Credit card fraud
● Retail and online fraud / E-commerce fraud
○ Account sales
○ Database sales
● Phishing
○ Emails
○ Source Code
● DDoS
● Ransomware
● Tools and Files
○ Webshells
○ RATs
○ Scanners
○ Brute forcing tools
○ And much much more...
9
What’s being shared?
10
Credit Card Fraud
● Internationalized
● Highly commercial
○ Supporting
cryptocurrency
payments
● Nexus with other chat
tools that are used
abroad
Threat actor active on at
least 4 other TG channels
11
Credit Card Fraud
● Pivoting to Telegram groups for
continuing transactions and
wider market
● Discussions around EMV fraud
12
Retail and online fraud / E-commerce fraud
13
Retail and online fraud / E-commerce fraud
● Online store account sales
○ Types of offerings expanding
● Proxy account openings and payment services
● Account or merchant IDs
○ Furnished with proof of identity
documentation
● Amazon storefronts selling from 600 to 6,800
RMB, depending on whether or not they are
"second hand," "firsthand," and country.
Prolific Account Seller
E-commerce Accounts Sales Ad
14
Account Sales (Case Study) Account Sales Advertisement
15
Account Sales
Sample Price List
16
Database Sales
Sample Advertisement
17
Phishing
Sample Advertisement10,000 Emails for 100RMB (~1569 Yen or ~15USD)
18
Phishing
Phishing Code File Name File Type
King Glory Phishing Source Code .zip
DNF Phishing Source Code .rar
Bot Phishing Source Code .rar
Hero League Phishing Source Code .zip
Hacker Phishing Source Code .zip
QQ Space Phishing Code .zip
● Alleged source code shared
● Proof of Concept?
Shared Phishing Source Code Files
Phishing Source Code
19
DDoS
Taking DDoS and CC Attack Orders
Meme advertising DDoS/CC Attacks
● A large number of booters/stressors
○ Ambiguity around testing
versus offensive use of DDoS
● DDoS-as-a-Service
○ Some actors advertise DDoS
protection services
● Use of slang and ads may help avoid
detection
● Most appear aimed at disrupting
gambling, payment, and
pornography sites
20
DDoS (Case Study)
21
Ransomware
Ransomware-themed Group
22
Tools and Files
● Webshells
● RATs
● Scanners
● Brute forcing tools
● And much more
Sample Files Shared List
China Chopper
"Intrusion Tool"
"Security Scanner"
"Grey Pigeon" RAT
23
TTPs
●
● Phone
● VPN
● Translation Tool
24
Illicit QQ Communities
● Online fraud focus has been on
vaguely defined areas of business
fraud, friendship/romance scams
and sexually explicit content
● Regulatory and law enforcement
arms focused on restricting access
outside Great Fire Wall and
sensitive content control
● These may be areas that matter
more to everyday people than
more sophisticated fraud
● Fraud from QQ space to outside
likely shielded by slang and use of
other tools like Telegram that are
blocked in China and not easily
detectable by monitors
Thank You
flashpoint-intel.com
ashraberg@flashpoint-intel.com

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[CB20] Illicit QQ Communities: What's Being Shared? by Aaron Shraberg

  • 1. Illicit QQ Communities: What’s Being Shared? Aaron Shraberg, Senior Analyst II 1
  • 2. ● Started studying Mandarin in high school as part of a pilot program ● 4.5 years in-country experience ● Asian Studies at GW ● 10+ Years of research and analysis of security issues with an emphasis on China for public and private sectors 2 About Me
  • 3. ● What is QQ? ● Frequently found fraud types ● A unique language ● Detection Avoidance versus “Turning a Blind Eye” ● The future of threat detection 3 AGENDA
  • 4. 4 What is QQ? hxxps://www[.]chinainternetwatch[.]com/30383/tencent-q4-2019/ hxxps://www[.]imqq[.]com/English1033[.]html ● Initial release 1999 ● About 800 million MAU ● Allows creation of groups with size limitations ● Used mostly to converse about innocuous topics ● Super App ● Registration Reqs
  • 5. 5 Where does QQ stand? hxxps://datareportal[.]com/reports/digital-2019-internet-trends-in-q3 1.114 billion 823 million
  • 6. 6 What is an “illicit community”? hxxps://go[.]flashpoint-intel[.]com/docs/navigating-illicit-online-communities/ ● A 2020 Flashpoint report defined these as communities that support fraud, cybercrime for financial gain, money laundering and other illegal activities. ● Some groups also discuss fraud and hacking tools and techniques.
  • 7. 7 What is an “illicit community”?
  • 8. 8 What’s being shared? hxxps://110[.]qq[.]com/article_detail[.]html?id=1F4EBB0600EFE1FE679B Business fraud Top Fraud Types: January - August, 2020 Income schemes Friend schemes
  • 9. ● Credit card fraud ● Retail and online fraud / E-commerce fraud ○ Account sales ○ Database sales ● Phishing ○ Emails ○ Source Code ● DDoS ● Ransomware ● Tools and Files ○ Webshells ○ RATs ○ Scanners ○ Brute forcing tools ○ And much much more... 9 What’s being shared?
  • 10. 10 Credit Card Fraud ● Internationalized ● Highly commercial ○ Supporting cryptocurrency payments ● Nexus with other chat tools that are used abroad Threat actor active on at least 4 other TG channels
  • 11. 11 Credit Card Fraud ● Pivoting to Telegram groups for continuing transactions and wider market ● Discussions around EMV fraud
  • 12. 12 Retail and online fraud / E-commerce fraud
  • 13. 13 Retail and online fraud / E-commerce fraud ● Online store account sales ○ Types of offerings expanding ● Proxy account openings and payment services ● Account or merchant IDs ○ Furnished with proof of identity documentation ● Amazon storefronts selling from 600 to 6,800 RMB, depending on whether or not they are "second hand," "firsthand," and country. Prolific Account Seller E-commerce Accounts Sales Ad
  • 14. 14 Account Sales (Case Study) Account Sales Advertisement
  • 17. 17 Phishing Sample Advertisement10,000 Emails for 100RMB (~1569 Yen or ~15USD)
  • 18. 18 Phishing Phishing Code File Name File Type King Glory Phishing Source Code .zip DNF Phishing Source Code .rar Bot Phishing Source Code .rar Hero League Phishing Source Code .zip Hacker Phishing Source Code .zip QQ Space Phishing Code .zip ● Alleged source code shared ● Proof of Concept? Shared Phishing Source Code Files Phishing Source Code
  • 19. 19 DDoS Taking DDoS and CC Attack Orders Meme advertising DDoS/CC Attacks ● A large number of booters/stressors ○ Ambiguity around testing versus offensive use of DDoS ● DDoS-as-a-Service ○ Some actors advertise DDoS protection services ● Use of slang and ads may help avoid detection ● Most appear aimed at disrupting gambling, payment, and pornography sites
  • 22. 22 Tools and Files ● Webshells ● RATs ● Scanners ● Brute forcing tools ● And much more Sample Files Shared List China Chopper "Intrusion Tool" "Security Scanner" "Grey Pigeon" RAT
  • 24. 24 Illicit QQ Communities ● Online fraud focus has been on vaguely defined areas of business fraud, friendship/romance scams and sexually explicit content ● Regulatory and law enforcement arms focused on restricting access outside Great Fire Wall and sensitive content control ● These may be areas that matter more to everyday people than more sophisticated fraud ● Fraud from QQ space to outside likely shielded by slang and use of other tools like Telegram that are blocked in China and not easily detectable by monitors