United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed. 2d 672 (1968).
I. Procedural History:
The Defendant,O’Brien(Defendant),wasconvictedforsymbolicallyburninghisdraftcardundera
federal statute forbiddingthe alteringof adraft card. His convictionwasupheldafterthe Supreme Court
of the UnitedStates(Supreme Court) foundthe law constitutional.
II.Facts:
DavidPaul O’Brienwasconvictedforburningselective service registrationcertificateshopingothers
wouldadopthis antiwarbeliefs. DavidPaul O’Brienknew he wasviolatingfederal law.
III.Issue:
Was the 1965 amendmentunconstitutional becauseactof burningdraftcard wasprotected“symbolic
speech”withinthe First Amendmenteventhoughhe knew itwasinviolation of federal law?
Holding:No.The 1965 amendmentdidnotviolate hisconstitutional rights,since he wasaware burning
the draft card was illegal,itdid notqualifyassymbolicspeech underthe FirstAmendment.
IV.Reasoning:
Whena male reaches18, he is requiredbythe Universal MilitaryTrainingandService Acttoregister
withthe local draft board.By the 1965 amendment,addedto§ 12 (b) (3) of the 1948 Act whichisthe
provisionatissue.Thisprovisionstatessubjectingcriminal liabilitynotonly, one who forges,alters,orin
any matterwhochanges”but alsoone whoknowinglydestroysorknowinglymutilatescertificate.
O’Brienarguesthe 1965 amendmentwasunconstitutional asappliedtohimbecause hisactswere
“symbolicspeech”,whichall modes of communicationof ideasbyconduct,since he wasin
“demonstrationagainstthe war”. The court cannot view thatan apparentlylimitlessvarietyof conduct
can be labeled“speech”.The courtheldthatwhen“speech”and“nonspeech”elementscombinedin
the same course of conduct,a sufficientlyimportantgovernmentalinterestinregulatingthe nonspeech
elementcanjustifyincidental limitationsonFirstAmendmentfreedoms.Tocharacterize the qualityof
the governmental interestwhichmustappear,the courthas employedavarietyof descriptiveterms:
compelling,substantial,subordinating,paramount,cogent,andstrong.The courtfeelsitissufficiently
justifiedif itiswithinthe constitutionalpowerof the government;if itfurthersanimportantor
substantial governmentalinterest.The constitutional powerof Congresstoraise andsupportarmiesand
to make all lawsnecessary, andproperto thatendis broad andsweeping.The courtfeelsCongresshas
the powerto establishasystemof registrationforindividualsliable fortrainingandservice,andmay
require suchindividualswithinreasontocooperate inthe registrationsystem.If these certificateswere
destroyedthe followingwouldbe defeated:proof anindividualhasregistered,informationon
certificateswouldfacilitate communicationbetweenregistrantsandlocal boards,certificatescarry
continual reminders forregistranttochange information.The manyfunctionsperformedbythe
SelectiveServiceestablishbeyondareasonabledoubtthatCongresshasa legitimateandsubstantial
interestinpreventingthe unrestraineddestructionandassuringtheircontinuingavailabilityby
punishingpeople whoknowinglyandwilfullydestroyormutilate them.The courtmade itclearthat
1965 amendmentprotectsthissubstantial governmental interest.
Case Brief

Case Brief

  • 1.
    United States v.O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed. 2d 672 (1968). I. Procedural History: The Defendant,O’Brien(Defendant),wasconvictedforsymbolicallyburninghisdraftcardundera federal statute forbiddingthe alteringof adraft card. His convictionwasupheldafterthe Supreme Court of the UnitedStates(Supreme Court) foundthe law constitutional. II.Facts: DavidPaul O’Brienwasconvictedforburningselective service registrationcertificateshopingothers wouldadopthis antiwarbeliefs. DavidPaul O’Brienknew he wasviolatingfederal law. III.Issue: Was the 1965 amendmentunconstitutional becauseactof burningdraftcard wasprotected“symbolic speech”withinthe First Amendmenteventhoughhe knew itwasinviolation of federal law? Holding:No.The 1965 amendmentdidnotviolate hisconstitutional rights,since he wasaware burning the draft card was illegal,itdid notqualifyassymbolicspeech underthe FirstAmendment. IV.Reasoning: Whena male reaches18, he is requiredbythe Universal MilitaryTrainingandService Acttoregister withthe local draft board.By the 1965 amendment,addedto§ 12 (b) (3) of the 1948 Act whichisthe provisionatissue.Thisprovisionstatessubjectingcriminal liabilitynotonly, one who forges,alters,orin any matterwhochanges”but alsoone whoknowinglydestroysorknowinglymutilatescertificate. O’Brienarguesthe 1965 amendmentwasunconstitutional asappliedtohimbecause hisactswere “symbolicspeech”,whichall modes of communicationof ideasbyconduct,since he wasin “demonstrationagainstthe war”. The court cannot view thatan apparentlylimitlessvarietyof conduct can be labeled“speech”.The courtheldthatwhen“speech”and“nonspeech”elementscombinedin the same course of conduct,a sufficientlyimportantgovernmentalinterestinregulatingthe nonspeech elementcanjustifyincidental limitationsonFirstAmendmentfreedoms.Tocharacterize the qualityof the governmental interestwhichmustappear,the courthas employedavarietyof descriptiveterms: compelling,substantial,subordinating,paramount,cogent,andstrong.The courtfeelsitissufficiently justifiedif itiswithinthe constitutionalpowerof the government;if itfurthersanimportantor substantial governmentalinterest.The constitutional powerof Congresstoraise andsupportarmiesand to make all lawsnecessary, andproperto thatendis broad andsweeping.The courtfeelsCongresshas the powerto establishasystemof registrationforindividualsliable fortrainingandservice,andmay require suchindividualswithinreasontocooperate inthe registrationsystem.If these certificateswere destroyedthe followingwouldbe defeated:proof anindividualhasregistered,informationon certificateswouldfacilitate communicationbetweenregistrantsandlocal boards,certificatescarry continual reminders forregistranttochange information.The manyfunctionsperformedbythe SelectiveServiceestablishbeyondareasonabledoubtthatCongresshasa legitimateandsubstantial interestinpreventingthe unrestraineddestructionandassuringtheircontinuingavailabilityby punishingpeople whoknowinglyandwilfullydestroyormutilate them.The courtmade itclearthat 1965 amendmentprotectsthissubstantial governmental interest.