C16SG6Assg7MiLBv100

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Determining if contract entrapment and
exploited labor are affecting MiLB players'
career outlook and motivation
Kyle Boas
University of San Francisco
Patrick Drolet
Ruben Orosco
This paper seeks to examine the effects of contract entrapment and exploited labor on MiLB
players’ career outlooks and motivation. Through surveying 315 current MiLB players, we found
that factors that contribute to contract entrapment and exploited labor have negative effects on
career outlooks and motivation. These negative effects could lead to career burnouts in players
that could have otherwise made a significant contribution to an organization if they had they not
faced adversity in minimum wage pay and exploited working conditions.
Introduction
The Minor League Baseball (MiLB) system can be traced back to Branch Rickey’s
concept he developed in the 1920s when he was the General Manager of the St. Louis Cardinals.
Rickey wanted to seek out a new way of obtaining players at efficient costs while maximizing
profitability. This mindset drove Rickey to sign amateur prospects to cut-rate contracts while
maintaining their property rights for an extended number of years (Broshuis, 2013). This
framework has remained relatively unchanged in the past 95 years as MiLB still experiences

Determining if contract entrapment and exploited labor are affecting MiLB players' career outlook and motivation
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contract entrapment and exploited labor. Further research can help determine whether or not
these two features of the MiLB system are affecting current players’ career outlook and
motivation.
Extremely low salaries have become a concern for players in terms of satisfaction, job
security, and way of life. It is not easy living below minimum wage, away from your family and
friends, and scraping just to get by. Since major league owners own the property rights of MiLB
players, they are focused on keeping the players costs low while “maximizing the number of
prospects under contract” (Broshuis, 2013, p. 62). Simply put, MiLB players take years to
develop and owners do not see value in investing in prospects right away. Owners are relying on
the MiLB system to filter out players who either do not have the drive or the talent it takes to
succeed.
Literature Review
Players are at a disadvantage from the time they are drafted and are under the contractual
agreement between themselves and the team. Once the Major League Uniform Player Contract
(MLUPC) has begun, “a player is forbidden from negotiating any part of his contract except for
the signing bonus and education stipend during his first seven seasons” (Szuchman, 1996, p. 5).
Although this is over 18 years ago, MiLB still upholds these contractual mandates. Another
aspect that puts MiLB players at a disadvantage is that most minor league contracts signed are
one year contracts, however, “a player is forced to grant his drafting team six successive and
annual renewal options” (Szuchman, 1996, p. 5). The one thing the player does have control over
is his performance. Although the player could have the best statistics in the league, no
performance incentives are allowed in their contract. Once the contract is signed, the player’s

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salary is solely based on the preset pay scale depending on which level the organization assigns
them.
This business format dehumanizes players and categorizes them as a commodity rather
than an individual. From the moment that a player is no longer scouted and is drafted to a team,
they become a commodity. The way that MiLB is set up today, players are expendable. Major
league ball clubs have around 200 players in their organization spanning across six divisions of
MiLB (Broshuis, 2013). Competition amongst this many players is what makes the MiLB so
effective but it does leave you to wonder if being paid such a low rate has detrimental effects on
the players.
Ninety-five years after Branch Rickey began instituting his system of cheap labor with
long-term property rights control, MiLB is still plagued with this issue. Owners utilize this
system to keep from overpaying players that are not contributing at the Major League level. The
entry-level wages of minor league baseball players “consist of $1100 per month, and they are
only paid over the course of the five-month season” (Broshuis, 2013, p. 63). MiLB players are
paid $1,670 per year, below the federal poverty line for a household of one according to the 2014
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. Wages below the poverty line limits these
players from sustaining a comfortable lifestyle. In addition to these wages, players deal with long
work days, “as teams typically require players to spend eight hours per day at their workplace for
six or seven days per week, and additional ‘optional’ work is encouraged” (Broshuis, 2013, p.
63). Adding to the intolerable living conditions faced by players are the long, uncomfortable bus
rides to cities that span all over the United States. In a keynote address discussing the change in
Minor League Baseball George Gmelch, recollects these standards of transportation. “Some of

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our buses in the 60’s did not have AC, or it was so weak it was cooler leaving the windows open,
even in the humid south” (Gmelch 2014, p.4).
At its early establishment baseball originally held antitrust laws for players. Decades later
it developed into an exemption of antitrust laws. As the National League monopolized most of
the early independent leagues, which were separate entities, very little regulation was set to
organized baseball. Although many court cases and lawsuits have been filed and overruled, little
or no progress had been made. Broshuis (2013) argues that unionization of the MiLB Player
Association as well as an abolishment of the antitrust law would lead to an increase in MiLB’s
minimum wage salary.
Similarly Yavner believes if MiLB was subject to antitrust laws, players would be able to
“negotiate minor league deals of any length they chose (Yavner, 2014, p. 270).” The theory of
low wage and antitrust laws have negative effects on players, in terms of living conditions, as
well as job satisfaction. In research performed by Schreurs et al. 2013, pay-level satisfaction was
seen to be correlated directly to how satisfying a job is perceived. We will be examined in this
research the understanding of attitudes and motivation of MiLB players in terms of low-wages,
exploitation, and contract entrapment.
Professional hockey, unlike baseball, is not exempt from antitrust laws and their minor
league players of the American Hockey League (AHL) and East Coast Hockey League (ECHL)
have chosen to unionize to negotiate higher wages (Yavner, 2014). The minor league hockey
players unionizing has given them leverage and negotiating power that the MiLB severely lacks.
Minor league hockey players are paid a minimum of $41,500 to $43,000 a season compared to
the paltry $10,750 that minor league baseball players are paid (Yavner, 2014). If more time and

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resources were available, Yavner’s study could be aided by research into the comparison of
wages and career motivation in minor league hockey and baseball players.
Schreurs et al., (2013) discuss the concept of pay-level satisfaction. It is understood as
what an employee perceives the value of their effort and being compensated in the same light.
Therefore we will attempt to correlate the low wages received by MiLB players and pay-level
satisfaction. It would suggest that MiLB players are not feeling like their effort is fairly
compensated. Schreurs et al. (2013) correlates low wages and decreased satisfaction, this
suggests that minor leagues players that experience similar low wages can potentially be
hindered in their motivation to reach the MLB. Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette (2004) theorize that
managers severely underestimate the motivational effect that wages can have on employees. This
can potentially suggest why the system of antitrust laws is still in effect today.
The Distributive Justice Theory is understood and “commonly equated with individuals’
reactions to economic allocations, such as pay level, pay raise, or job offer” (Schreurs et al.,
2013, p. 402). This is where our research will look to see if this feeling of low pay level
satisfaction correlates to player burnout. Rynes et al. (2004) highlights this point and emphasizes
that, “pay level is an important motivator for employees and has substantial implications for
employee behaviors and attitudes” (p. 396). Not only is there low job-satisfaction when an
employee is paid a low wage, but employees behaviors and attitudes will also be diminished.
Minor League players’ attitudes will be examined in reference to contract entrapment,
exploitation of labor, and low wages.
Schreurs, Guenter, Schumacher, Van Emmerik, & Notelaers (2013) theorize a potential
solution for pay-level satisfaction: employee involvement. According to the researchers,
organizations “can encourage employee commitment by sharing information and by providing

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employees opportunity to contribute to decision made at the workplace level” (Schreurs et al.,
2013, p. 402). What this theory implicates is that with an increase in employee involvement in
the workplace, pay-level satisfaction will increase as well. This suggest that the motivating
factor, involvement, yields great enough value to the particular employee. This theory can be
utilized to analyze the research done by Broshuis & Yavner et al.
Both Yavner and Broshuis suggest that with unionization of MiLB as well as applying
antitrust laws will lead to negotiation of MiLB minimum wages. Similarly, Broshuis (2013)
discuss the necessity of reformed unionization of players. Broshuis states, “destroying the entire
system and allowing all players to flood the market might not only further depress already
artificially depressed wages, but it also might result in an even worse system” (Broshuis, 2013, p.
67). Therefore an implication would be that with “employee involvement” (Schreurs et al., 2013)
and “unionization” (Broshuis & Yavner et al., 2013) are correlated in terms of attitudes and
motivations towards continuing their MiLB career. The researchers are trying to prove that with
negative “pay-level satisfaction” as well as limited “unionization” due to antitrust laws, MiLB
players can potentially lose motivation to continue their career due to these factors.
The aim of this study is to see if low salaries of MiLB players affects their quality of life
and motivation to keep on playing. That is, does being paid low wages decrease their motivation
to keep on playing in hopes of making the major leagues one day or is it simply a thought in the
back of their head. According to Schreurs et al. (2013), there are more than just economic effects
of wages, there are also motivational effects that carry, “important symbolic/emotional value for
the assessment of one’s self-worth, relationships, and status” (p. 402-403). Low wages might be
hard to live off of, but the sociological impact on players has gone unnoticed. There are many

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factors that go into a MiLB player’s decision to play or quit and we want to investigate if low
salary is a main determinant on decreased motivation and burnout.
Methodology
The research design of this study was a survey/cross-sectional approach. We conducted
an in-depth study on the effects of salary and exploited labor on MiLB players’ career outlook
and motivation through the use of surveys. Each participant of the study received the same set of
questions with filters in the beginning of the surveying eliminating any players with past MLB
experience or current MLB players. We researched questions from a study Dragos (2014) did on
motivation and tailored them to apply to MiLB players. The survey was targeted at gaining
valuable information on contract entrapment, perceptions of exploited labor, career outlook, and
career motivation. To measure the effects of contract entrapment, we first asked if they feel their
salary is too low on a five-point Likert scale. Similarly, we asked if they feel like they are
compensated properly for performance on the same Likert scale. Finally, we asked if they think
their contract limits them in any way. From these three questions, we compiled the main factors
in contract entrapment that we could correlate with career outlook and career motivation.
To measure the effects of exploited labor, we first asked players to rate their working
conditions on a five-point Likert scale. Secondly, we asked if they think they are being taken
advantage of financially. These two questions formed the main factors for exploited labor. In
order to see how these variables affected career outlook, we asked players where they see
themselves in one to three years (out of baseball, MiLB, or MLB). To see the effects of our

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variables on career motivation, we asked players how passionate they are about baseball as a
career on a five-point Likert scale.
Data was collected from current MiLB players in a variety of methods. We sent emails to
MiLB players directly, posted the survey link on several MiLB player forums, sent surveys
through directors of player personnel, and reached out to players through social media. Because
MiLB is vastly spread out, using a combination of all of these methods is gave us the greatest
response rate and most significant data possible.
The population of the study is all current MiLB players. There are six divisions of minor
league baseball (Triple-A, Double-A, High A, Low A, Short Season A, & Rookie) spanning
across six different countries (United States, Canada, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Venezuela,
& Puerto Rico). We randomly selected rosters of eight teams from each division and calculated
that there was an average of 25 players per roster (minimum 18, maximum 30). Estimating the
roster size to be 25 and multiplying that figure across the entire MiLB gave us a total population
of 6,000 players.
Members of our team are going to reach out to random MiLB teams and players and
request permission to interview certain players. The reason why we are choosing to use a
stratified random sample is that some players have already spent time in the MLB. In the case of
these players, their salary and perceptions are different than the majority of minor leaguers and
would skew our data and could make our findings insignificant. We have chosen to use a
stratified random sample to eliminate players who have played in the MLB as to more properly
reflect the population we are trying to study. We also plan on using some snowball sampling as
to increase the total response rate.

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The necessary sample size we calculated to be 361. To be at the 95% confidence level
with a population size of 6,000, we needed a sample size of 361. We were only able to get 315
valid surveys out of the 343 surveys we got back which gave us a confidence interval of 5.38.
Although we were short of our goal, we feel confident that our responses are a great
representation of the total population.
Since we are engaging in human subject research, we took every measure possible to
ensure that our data and the players’ information stays private and confidential. At the beginning
of each survey, we had a disclaimer that their answers will be recorded but their names and
personal information will be deleted and kept confidential. No names of teams, leagues, or
players will be used to maintain anonymity. Each participant had the chance of not completing
the survey, however, we did receive a 99% completion rate with only one survey failing to be
completed.
Results
Out of the 315 MiLB players surveyed, 80 projected themselves as being out of baseball,
102 projected they would still be playing in the MiLB system, and 133 projected themselves as
MLB players in one to three years. Below, Table 1 lists all the descriptive statistics for the data
collected regarding contract entrapment.
Table 1 Contract Entrapment on Career Outlook
Out of Baseball MiLB MLB
% of Sample (315 total) 25.4% 32.4% 42.2%
Average Dissatisfaction with
Salary (1-5 scale)
4.76 4.42 3.11
Average Perception of Not
Feeling Properly Compensated
(1-5 scale)
1.38 1.78 3.17
% of Sample that Perceived a
Limited Contract
91.25% 95% 63.9%

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Contract Entrapment
Using SPSS for Windows, we measured the effects of three factors on both career
outlook and career motivation. Testing our first hypothesis (H1), whether dissatisfaction with
salary negatively affects career outlook, a Pearson correlation shows us that there is a significant
correlation (r = -0.613, χ2 =0.000) between those who are satisfied and those who are dissatisfied
with their salary. Specifically, a Pearson correlation shows us that as dissatisfaction with salary
increases, career outlook decreases by a factor of 0.613. This correlation shows us that we can
reject the null hypothesis (H0_1) that dissatisfaction with salary has no effect on career outlook.
Testing our second hypothesis (H2), whether dissatisfaction with salary negatively affects
career motivation, we used a linear regression which indicated a significant negative relationship
(r = -0.773, χ2 =0.000). This indicates that as dissatisfaction with salary increases, career
motivation decreases by a factor of 0.773. This regression shows us that we can reject the null
hypothesis (H0_2) that dissatisfaction with salary has no effect on career motivation.
Testing the third hypothesis (H3), which measured the effect of MiLB players not feeling
compensated properly for their performance on career outlook, we found a significant correlation
between those who feel they are compensated properly and those who feel they are not. A
Pearson correlation shows us that there is a significant positive relationship between those
feeling compensated properly for their performance and career outlook (r =0.648, χ2 =0.000).
This shows us that as MiLB players perceive they are compensated properly for performance
increases, so does their career outlook by a factor of 0.648. This shows us that we can reject the
null hypothesis (H0_3) that perception of not feeling compensated for performance has no effect
on career outlook.
The fourth hypothesis (H4) measured the effect of MiLB players not feeling compensated
properly for their performance on career motivation. A linear regression shows us that as

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perception of feeling properly compensated for performance increases, career motivation
increases by a factor of 0.784 (r =0.784, χ2 =0.000). These results show us that we can reject the
null hypothesis (H0_4) that perception of feeling compensated for performance has no effect on
career motivation.
Measuring the fifth hypothesis (H5) that went into our analysis of contract entrapment, we
measured the perception of a limited contract on career outlook. A Crosstab analysis shows that
there is a significant correlation between those who feel their contract limits them and those who
do not (r =0.325, χ2 =0.000). Specifically, a Spearman’s correlation shows that there is a
significant positive relationship, indicating that as perception of a limited contract goes from yes
to no, career outlook goes up. This shows us that we can reject the null hypothesis (H0_5) that
perception of a limited contract has no effect on career outlook. It is interesting to point out that
80% of players that do not feel like their contract limits them saw themselves in the MLB in 1-3
years.
Finally, we measured the sixth hypothesis (H6) which measured the perception of a
limited contract and its effect on career motivation. Using both a One-way ANOVA and a
Pearson correlation, we found that there is a significant correlation between those who feel their
contract is limited and those who do not (r =0.401, χ2 =0.000). More specifically, a Pearson
correlation shows us that there is a significant positive relationship between the two variables.
This shows us that as perception of a limited contract goes from yes to no, career motivation
increases by a factor of 0.401. This means that we can reject the null hypothesis (H0_6) that
perception of a limited contract has no effect on career motivation. Table 2 lists all of the
correlation coefficients for contract entrapment with regards to both career outlook and
motivation. All coefficients were significant at the 0.01 significance level.

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Table 2 Contract Entrapment Correlation Coefficients
Dissatisfaction with
Salary
Perception of
Compensation
Perception of Limited
Contract
Career Outlook -0.613* 0.648* 0.325*
Career Motivation -0.773* 0.784* 0.401*
*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 3 lists all of the descriptive statistics with regards to exploited labor. As the
perception of baseball as a career and working conditions increase, the perception of being taken
advantage of financially decreases. While 42% of players sampled projected themselves to be in
the MLB within one to three years, 45% still perceive being taken advantage of financially.
Regardless of where a players sees himself in one to three years, the average perception of
working conditions was a 2.45 (out of 5) or slightly higher than neutral. Although their career
motivation is higher, players that see themselves in the MLB in one to three years still see
exploitation of labor as prevalent.
Table 3 Exploited Labor on Career Outlook
Out of Baseball MiLB MLB
% of Sample (315 total) 25% 33% 42%
Average Perception of Baseball as
a Career (1-5 scale)
1.85 2.25 4.26
Average Perception of Working
Conditions (1-5 scale)
1.60 1.53 3.67
% of Sample that Perceived Being
Taken Advantage of Financially
96% 87% 45%
Exploited Labor
Using the same methods as above, we measured two more factors affecting career
outlook and career motivation. We measured our seventh hypothesis (H7) which looked at the

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effect of working conditions on career outlook. Using a Pearson correlation, we found that there
is a significant positive relationship between working conditions and career outlook (r =0.670, χ2
=0.000). This demonstrates that as working conditions improve, career outlook improves by a
factor of 0.670. We can reject the null hypothesis (H0_7) that working conditions have no effect
on career outlook. Looking at Table 3 above, there is a significant difference between the
working conditions that players perceive for those who see themselves in the MiLB (1.53) and
out of baseball (1.60) versus MLB (3.67). Players who have a higher career outlook view their
working conditions as good whereas those with lower career outlooks view their working
conditions between poor and very poor.
Similarly, we tested hypothesis eight (H8) which measured the effect of working
conditions on career motivation. Using a linear regression, we found that there is a significant
positive relationship between working conditions and career motivation (r =0.907, χ2 =0.000).
This shows that that as working conditions improve, career motivation increases by a factor of
0.907. We can safely reject the null hypothesis (H0_8) that working conditions have no effect on
career motivation.
Looking at the last factor in our study, we tested hypothesis nine (H9) which analyzed the
perception of being taken advantage of financially on career outlook. A Crosstab analysis shows
us that there is a significant correlation between those who perceive they are taken advantage of
financially and those who do not (r =0.583, χ2 =0.000). A Spearman’s correlation shows us that
there is a significant positive relationship between the two variables. As perception changes from
yes to no, career outlook increases. This means that we can reject the null hypothesis (H0_9) that
perception of being taken advantage of financially has no effect on career outlook.

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Players who projected themselves out of baseball or still in the MiLB had perceptions of
being taken advantage of financially of 96% and 87% respectively. On the other hand, players
who projected themselves in the MLB had a much lower percentage of 45%. Although the
percentage of players who project themselves in the MLB is much lower, the rate of 45% is still
significantly high. This implies that even though their career outlook is much greater, there is
still a significant portion that feel taken advantage of financially.
Finally, we measured our last hypothesis (H10) which measured the perception of being
taken advantage of financially on career motivation. Using both a One-way ANOVA and a
Pearson correlation, we found that there is a significant correlation between those who perceive
they are taken advantage of financially and those who do not (r =0.582, χ2 =0.000). Specifically,
a Pearson correlation shows us that as perception of being taken advantage of goes from yes to
no, career motivation increases by a factor of 0.582. This means that we can reject the null
(H0_10) that perception of being taken advantage of financially has no effect on career motivation.
Table 4 below lists the correlation coefficients for the hypotheses tested under exploited labor.
All coefficients were significant at the 0.01 significance level.
Table 4 Exploited Labor Correlation Coefficients
Working Conditions Perception of Financial Treatment
Career Outlook 0.670* 0.583*
Career Motivation 0.907* 0.582*
*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Discussion & Limitations
The purpose of this study was to measure the effect of contract entrapment and exploited
labor on career outlook and motivation. In terms of contact entrapment, we studied how career
outlook and motivation were affected by dissatisfaction with salary, perception of not feeling

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properly compensated for performance, and perception of a limited contract. What this means is
that there is significant correlation with contract entrapment affecting both career outlook and
motivation negatively. The more dissatisfied players were with their salary, the lower their career
outlook was. Players who projected themselves in the MLB also had a much higher perception of
feeling properly compensated (3.17, or mildly satisfied) than those who saw themselves either
out of baseball (1.38, or dissatisfied) or still in the MiLB (1.78, or dissatisfied).
While these results are not all that surprising, the fact that the first six hypotheses tested
came back with significance at the 99% confidence interval is. We expected correlation between
the variables we were studying but the magnitude of the significance was a little surprising. The
hypotheses analyzing the factors of contract entrapment show us that MiLB players who
perceive their contracts as entrapping have significantly lower career outlooks and motivation.
Over half of the players sampled (182) projected themselves to either be out of baseball or still
playing in the MiLB. Our study gives evidence that the dissatisfaction with salary, perception of
not feeling properly compensated for performance, and perceiving a limited contract has an
effect on these players’ career outlook and motivation. All of these factors we group into contract
entrapment and with each factor having a significant correlation to both career outlook and
motivation, we believe there is a significant diminishing effect of contract entrapment. The more
restricted and limiting a player perceives themselves, the lower their outlook and motivation.
Through analyzing the hypotheses on exploited labor, we found that that exploited labor
has an effect on career outlook and motivation. Players that perceived poor working conditions
and felt like they were taken advantage of financially had lower career outlook and motivation.
As Dragos (2014) notes, lower motivation can lead to lower performance which would not be
optimal for MiLB. The point of the system is to weed players out however, the exploited labor

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conditions may be weeding out more than MiLB wants. With exploited labor, we studied
working conditions and perception of being taken advantage of financially.
Players who project themselves as out of baseball or still playing MiLB had significantly
lower perceptions of working conditions and significantly higher percent of feeling taken
advantage of financially than those who projected themselves in the MLB. However, even the
players projecting themselves as MLB players in one to three years had average perceptions of
working conditions (3.67 out of 5) and 45% still felt like they were being taken advantage of
financially. Out of all the statistics and analysis, this gave us the most concern. Almost half of
the players who had the highest career outlook and motivation still perceived themselves as
being taken advantage of financially while playing baseball in average working conditions. The
MiLB players with the most confidence in their skills and abilities still feel like their labor is
being exploited and they deserve more. What this means is that the structure that Branch Rickey
designed is affecting players’ morale and motivation. This could cause shorter careers in the
MLB, other issues with players off the field, or players getting burned out.
What this means in the overall picture is that MiLB players feel like they are working in
an environment of contract entrapment and exploited labor. There are significant effects of these
two factors on both career outlook and motivation. MiLB players who feel like they are trapped
in their contract and working in subpar conditions have lower career outlooks and career
motivation. Now while this might not affect everyone, it might be limiting and affecting the
careers of some promising players. Branch Rickey pioneered the MiLB system to collect a vast
number of players while keeping costs low and profits high. The MiLB system is still like that
today and with changing dynamics in the workforce and unions, there needs to be change.

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The MiLB system is built so it can weed out the great players from the rest but the penny-
pinching system’s effect on player outlook and motivation is detrimental to its success. MiLB
players who are dissatisfied with salaries, working conditions, and limiting contracts report low
levels of motivation and predict that they either still be playing MiLB or will leave baseball
entirely in one to three years. According to Dragos (2014), motivation is a “fundamental factor in
achieving superior performance (p. 49).” Players struggling to make a living and not feeling like
they are properly compensated are going to have low motivation and career outlook which could
lead to decreased performance. Dragos (2014) also notes that there is a significant relationship
between motivation and performance in that the people who are highly motivated are more
efficient and successful in everything they do. If MiLB players are not as motivated due to
contract entrapment and exploited labor, their performance is likely not as high as it could be.
While we did get great results, a larger sample or even the entire MiLB player pool
would give us more concrete evidence that exploited labor and contract entrapment have a
significant negative effect on MiLB players. Because we were limited on both time and
resources, we sampled the largest population possible (315); coming just shy of our target
sample size of 361. With more time, funds, and a more focused direction, I believe that we could
confirm our results with even greater significance. Even though the results were significant, it is
important to note that we used snowball sampling and stratified random sampling. We made an
attempt to make the results as random as possible however a more focused method could provide
us with more significant results.
Furthermore, with more time and resources we would like to compare these results across
multiple minor leagues. This would mean taking samples from the AHL, ECHL, and the NBA
D-League and comparing their results with the data we collected. Comparing responses from

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across all of these leagues would give us relevant and comprehensive data on whether or not
what is happening in MiLB is an isolated situation.
Recommendations & Conclusion
Paying MiLB players’ higher wages would increase moral and motivation which could
cause an increase in performance and outcomes (Dragos, 2014). Players are more motivated the
higher the satisfaction with their salary. If the MiLB was to raise the minimum pay to what the
AHL and ECHL pay ($41,000 - $43,000) player motivation and performance would increase.
Higher player salaries would ensure that the tiered system of minor league baseball would only
be eliminating players that were not good enough rather than those who just got tired of the
grind. Career burnout, even with the vast amount of players in MiLB, has to be a concern of
owners. No owner wants to miss out on the next great prospect and by paying players higher
salaries, this would ensure that no owner does again.
Since our research is exploratory and not much has been done on this subject, there is not
anything significant that we can compare out results to. Through using Dragos’s (2014) study,
we developed a way to measure career outlook and motivation in MiLB players. MiLB players
are being taken advantage of financially and it is decreasing their career outlook and motivation.
This decreased motivation and outlook can lead to decreased performance which is not optimal
for MiLB. Players with decreased motivation have lower performance which eventually leads to
their career burnout. Getting paid below minimum wage and trying to make a career out of that is
not easy and we have shown that there is a negative impact of exploited labor and contract
entrapment on both career outlook and motivation. You never know if the next Derek Jeter is
going to quit baseball because he was exploited and didn’t have the same motivation anymore.

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