3. Candidate No. 60413
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Introduction
“If you fail to plan, you plan to fail.” – Old proverb
In October 1920, the two-year-old Democratic Republic of Armenia fell into the
hands of the Soviet Union. Although not formally annexed into the Soviet Union until
1922, for all practical purposes after October 1920, Armenia no longer existed as an
independent entity. Despite the prior promises of the British government, widespread
British public support and Armenia’s place on the Allied agenda at the post-war
treaty talks, Armenia still fell to the hands of the Soviets1
.
The British relationship with Armenia first began in 1878, at the end of the Russo-
Turkish war of 1877 – 1878, after the Russians winning the war decisively. Keen to
restrain any further growth of Russian power, the British intervened during the
1 R. Hovannisian. Armenia on the Road to Independence 1918 University of California Press:
Berkeley, 1967. p. 248
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signing of the Treaty of San Stefano, making a key alteration to its terms regarding
Armenia in Article 61. The difference was that while the previous Treaty of San
Stefano made Ottoman reforms in Armenia entirely accountable to Russia, the
Treaty of Berlin made Ottoman reforms in Armenia accountable to all signatory
powers. This failed to address the Armenian problem as the Great Powers were only
interested in Armenia inasmuch as who retained territorial control, rather than any
real concern for the welfare of the Armenians. This meant that the Ottomans
essentially still retained a free hand in governance over the Armenians. It was this
singular intervention by the British in the Treaty of San Stefano that laid the key
foundation for the later British guilt over Ottoman mistreatment of the Armenians.
As the Ottoman Empire started to fall apart internally from rising nationalist
sentiment in all quarters, Ottoman persecution of the Armenians started to increase
in frequency, mainly due to the Ottomans attempting to maintain Muslim dominance
over the minorities and a growing Armenian national-consciousness. It wasn’t till
after 1915 however, when the Ottoman persecution of the Armenians reached a
devastating level, that the Allied governments were finally driven to reaction. The
British government in particular, felt responsible for the Armenian genocide, because
of prior British intervention during the Treaty of San Stefano2
. At the same time, the
British were keen to seek out a cause that would refute claims of Imperialistic
motivations driving British and Allied participation in World War One. These two twin
interests coincided nicely, with the Armenian cause soon occupying a key position in
British war rhetoric, allowing the British to paint their war effort in a moral and just
light, while promising the Armenians that after the end of the war, Britain would
guarantee her independence. At the end of World War One, it seemed that the
British and Allied governments were poised to take up the Armenian cause and
deliver them from their years of suffering at the hands of the Turks. Yet in the
2 A Nassibian Britain and the Armenian Question St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1984. p. 10
5. Candidate No. 60413
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October 1920, Armenia found herself standing alone and sandwiched between the
forces of Nationalist Turkey and Bolshevik Russia.
Although after World War One, Britain managed to maintain her position in the world
system on a superficial level, and even gain lands in the Middle East, her old
Imperial way of life had resolutely ended.3
Britain’s immense financial power had
been tested during the war, and severely reduced by the time the war ended. The
immediate post-war period marked a time where Britain sought to come to terms
with her new disempowerment, while at the same time fight to retain and protect her
existing scattered colonies. Even though her sensibilities remained considerably
Imperialistic, the reality was that she was no longer able to carry on as before. The
world had changed, with three old Imperial powers: the Ottomans, the Austro-
Hungarians and the Russians wiped off the map. Even the concept of mandates
itself, especially for Armenia, very much harkened to Britain’s old Imperial
sensibilities, yet the failure of British foreign policy in Transcaucasia from 1918 to
1920 were very much symptoms of both a new world order, Britain’s new inequities
and the subsequent failure to take these inequities into account for planning the
Transcaucasian policy.
This dissertation will attempt to account for the British abandonment of the Armenian
cause over 2 years, from 1918 to 1920. It will take the overarching view that the
source of all these problems stemmed from Britain trying to negotiate her new,
lowered, post-war situation, which lent heavily to a lack of a coherent British foreign
policy towards Transcaucasia. The three categories analysed in this dissertation will
be the failure of British military intervention in Transcaucasia, the failure of mandates
and finally British and French rivalry.
3 J Darwin The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830 – 1970
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2009. p. 305
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Firstly, British military intervention in Transcaucasia proved to be both disastrous
and contradictory to other aspects of British foreign policy, leading to the final
withdrawal of British troops. The main problem was that Britain never possessed a
singular congruent Transcaucasian foreign policy, but rather saw Transcaucasia as
a means to shore up her other foreign interests in Russia, the Middle East and India.
When British activities in Transcaucasia started to negatively affect those spheres of
interest – promoting stability in Transcaucasia contradicted the British policy of
supporting White Russia and British protection of Armenia at the expense of
upsetting the Middle East and India – the British withdrew their forces.
Secondly, the failure of mandates was very much the result of Britain’s new
weakened material capabilities. Financially and logistically, she was unable to
personally support the Armenian mandate. Meanwhile, Britain also failed to
adequately persuade America to take up the Armenian mandate, as America had
her own concerns to address. The unintended effect however, was that while waiting
for the Allied powers to determine her fate, Armenia was left floundering on her own,
which served only to further exacerbate her dire situation.
Lastly there was the problem of existing British and French rivalry, which stemmed
from their old Imperial attitudes, and worked only to impede British involvement in
Transcaucasia. France was both suspicious and envious of Britain’s preferential
status with the Armenians, the animosity only extended to the Americans when it
became clear that Britain strongly backed an American mandate. Meanwhile, any
incidence of Britain cooperating with France over Armenia stemmed from the desire
to reduce her Armenian responsibilities once it became clear that she was unable to
support Armenia.
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For the purposes of this dissertation, ‘Transcaucasia’ explicitly refers to the countries
of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Great Powers and Allies refer to Britain, the
United States and France.
British Military Campaigns and Foreign Policy in Transcaucasia (June
1918 to Oct 1918)
In the last months of World War One, the battered Turkish army turned its attention
towards the East and sought to occupy the power vacuum that had been created by
Russia’s sudden exit from the war. The goal of the Turkish surge Eastwards was to
capture Baku, the oil-rich capital of the newly formed Azerbaijani Republic. In July
1918, the British Foreign Office issued orders to General Dunsterville and his men,
Dunsterforce, to intercept the Turkish forces at Baku and prevent Baku from falling
into Turkish hands.
The Battle of Baku marked the beginning of British military intervention in
Transcaucasia. It’s key significant however lies in the fact that the same racial,
religious and political tensions in the population that bedevilled the British during the
Battle of Baku, plagued British policy afterwards. Armenian Christians were pitted
against Turkish forces and Muslim Azerbaijani forces. At the same time, outside
elements like the Bolsheviks in Baku along with elements of the Russian white army
and the British became involved. The main problem which haunted the entirety of
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Britain’s two year long involvement, was that Britain never had a singular congruent
foreign policy for Transcaucasia, but rather saw Transcaucasia as a means to an
end for her other foreign policy goals.
The British misadventure in Transcaucasia can be best divided into two main
phases: the first is the British military intervention in Transcaucasia in the Battle of
Baku and the subsequent fallout. The second is the post-war period, when British
foreign policy in Transcaucasia impinged upon her other, more important foreign
aims in both Russia and India. The British policy of supporting White Russia’s
General Denikin went contrary to aims of stabilising Transcaucasia, while the British
policy of supporting Armenia had the effect of endangering her position among her
colonies in the Middle East and India.
The Battle of Baku (September 1918)
Dunsterville’s orders to head towards Baku from Mesopotamia were by itself ill
thought out by the War Office, and influenced by outdated Imperial attitudes. Britain
still assumed that she could hold Baku with a small force and conveniently ignored
all signs indicating otherwise, all in order to protect the rest of her Middle Eastern
and Indian interests. Dunsterville and his force, known as Dunsterforce was only a
brigade of about 1,000 men.4
The target of his mission was altered from
Transcaucasia to Persia and back to Transcaucasia again within months.5
Then
there was the problem of Baku being controlled by the Soviets. Finally when
Dunsterville managed to make it into Baku, he found the local troops greatly wanting
in standard, morale and numbers. British involvement in the Battle of Baku was from
the outset, was a disaster.
4 B Cooper Busch Mudros to Lausanne, 1918 – 1923 SUNY Press: NY, 1976 p. 29.
5 The Diaries of General Lionel Dunsterville, 13 March 1918, online at:
http://www.gwpda.org/Dunsterville/Dunsterville_1918.html
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In July 1918, Baku was still controlled by the Baku Soviet, and hence ideologically
opposed to the British. On one hand the War Office refused to allow British aid or
negotiate with any Soviet ideologues, and on the other the Baku Soviet refused to
allow the British to enter Baku. Meanwhile, the bulk of the remaining population and
troops in Baku were not native Azerbaijanis but rather Armenians.6
From July to
August, the British monitored the political situation in Baku closely, unable to commit
to aiding Baku as long as the Soviets were still in power. 7, 8
Yet at the same time, it
was evident from British telegrams back that the Soviets were starting to lose power
in Baku, largely owing to the fact that the Armenians wanted military assistance in
any guise. 9, 10
When the British were finally able to enter Baku, they found the city
and her remaining forces in disarray. The Armenians had been under the impression
that British were sending a large military force that would save them from the
invading Turkish forces, only to be greeted with a comparatively smaller
Dunsterforce.11
Meanwhile, a cursory examination by Dunsterville led to the realisation that the
troops were not up to a high standard of training. On 19 August 1918, Dunsterville
wrote in his diary that the ‘Armenian citizen soldiers [were] very slack, [with] no
discipline and no organisation’12
. Furthermore, the only available military force that
6 F Kazemzadeh The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917 – 1921) Templar Press: Birmingham,
1951. p. 130
7 P 2969/1918 – Telegram between G. Q. C. Mesopotamia, War Office and D. M. I. on Armenian
force in Baku (3/7/1918)
8 IOR 11/137 P3132/1918 – Telegram between G. Q. C. Simle and D. M. I. on Capt. Jarvis’s
reconnaissance of Turkestan (13/7/1918)
9 P 3182/1918 – Telegram between G. Q. C. Mesopotamia and War Office on the political
situation in Baku (19/7/1918)
10 IOR 11/137 P3210/1918 – Telegram between G. Q. C. Mesopotamia and D. M. I. on the political
situation in Baku (19/7/1918)
11 F Kazemzadeh The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917 – 1921) Templar Press: Birmingham,
1951. p. 139
12 The Diaries of General Lionel Dunsterville, 19 August 1918, online at:
http://www.gwpda.org/Dunsterville/Dunsterville_1918.html
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existed and hence could be tapped was the band of motley Armenian soldiers.13
At
the same time, there were deep political cleavages within Baku, which extended
beyond the mere divisions that led to the expulsion of the Bolsheviks14
. These
divisions only lent to further fragmentation of the already disorganised defence
forces. Simply put, with the dire resources available to Dunsterville, it was near
impossible for him to put up a concerted resistance against the Turko-Azerbaijani
troops.
On 15 September 1918, on Dunsterville’s command and in the dead of the night, the
remaining British troops evacuated from Baku by sea. He wrote in his diary of a
telegram he sent to headquarters in Baghdad and the War Office afterwards arguing
that the War Office’s decision to attempt to hold Baku was in itself an already ill-
planned operation, but had been further hampered by mismanagement on the War
Office’s part when they choose to send such a small military force, ‘I sent a very
strong wire to Baghdad and the War Office, pointing out that their policy was a bad
one, but even then I could have got through if they had not run even their "bad"
policy badly.15
’
The Fallout of the Battle of Baku (September 1918 to October 1918)
By 20 September 1918, news of the Battle of Baku had reached Britain. Appended
to the general news report however, was also the inclusion of Colonel Dunsterville’s
negative comments on the Armenian troops, which unsurprisingly painted the Baku
Armenian troops in an unfavourable light. This marked the beginning of a public
13 IOR 11/137 P3132/1918 – Telegram between G. Q. C. Simle and D. M. I. on Capt. Jarvis’s
reconnaissance of Turkestan (13/7/1918)
14 IOR 11/138 P3418/1918 – Telegram between G. Q. C. Mesopotamia and War Officeon the
situation in Baku (7/8/1918)
15 The Diaries of General Lionel Dunsterville, 15 September 1918, online at:
http://www.gwpda.org/Dunsterville/Dunsterville_1918.html
11. Candidate No. 60413
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backlash against the Armenians, and contradicted the efforts of British efforts during
the war to portray the Armenians as a noble and worthy race. In the Times, the
Armenians were portrayed as having put up feeble resistance despite earlier appeals
for British assistance, forcing the British troops to withdraw.16
The Daily Mail
however, was far less forgiving and decried the actions of the Armenians in Baku,
calling it ‘treacherous’ and noting how ‘the Armenians refused to fight’ and failed to
support the British troops, leading to heavy British losses’.17
As far as the Foreign Office was concerned, the failure of the British in the Battle of
Baku and the subsequent public blaming of the Armenians was a disaster. Letters
from indignant members of the public, especially from pro-Armenian sources like
the Armenian National Delegation started to pour in to the office in protest, all
written on the same outraged lines, deigning the Foreign Office to refute the news
written in the British papers.
It wasn’t just non-governmental organisations like the Armenian National Delegation
that suffered from the backlash caused by the Battle of Baku. The Foreign Office in
particular, panicked. Since 1915, the Foreign Office had worked to portray the
Armenians as a noble race and a country worth saving, allowing Britain to paint her
participation in the war as moral and just to her people, refuting claims of Britain’s
participation in the war as part of Imperialistic ideology. The gravity of the backlash
was not lost on the members of the Political Intelligence department of the War
Office. In a memorandum from A. J. Toynbee to Mr. Oliphant on 3 October 1918,
Toynbee wrote that ‘it would be fatal if the Baku Communiqué were the last official
utterance by H. M. G. on the Armenian Question before Turkey asked for an
16 The Times (September 20, 1918) p. 1
17 The Daily Mail (September 20, 1918) p. 1
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Armistice.’18
Furthermore, an internal communiqué from the Political Intelligence department of
the War Office was published and circulated on 24 September 1918, detailing the
exact nature of backlash that the Foreign Office most feared – that the weakening of
the Armenian cause would lead to a weakening of the overall British war effort in the
Near East and fuel arguments of British Imperialism:
‘Discredit cast on the Armenians is a direct weakening of the anti-
Turkish cause. It has been hard to kill the superstition that the Turk is a
gentleman and his subject races curs…The treatment of the Armenians
by the Turks is H.M. Government's greatest asset in commending the
policy of a radical solution of the Turkish Problem to public opinion at
home and abroad.. Armenia is the Bohemia of Turkey. If Armenia has to
be liberated, the liberation of Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine follows
geographically. If Armenia's claims are weakened, the claims of the
other provinces will be exposed to a critical examination of their own
merits’19
In the end, the only way that the British government could resolve the problem
generated by the Baku Communiqué was to address it and dismiss it in parliament.
In a parliamentary debate held on 24 October 1918, Lord Cecil, the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, answered a question by Major George Peel regarding the
state of the relationship between the British and the Baku Armenians. Lord Cecil
stated in his answer that the negotiations between the Armenians and the Turko-
18 FO 371/3404 FILE 77508 DOC 1661169 – Memorandum from A. J. Toynbee to Mr. Oliphant on
the Baku Communiqué and Armenia (3/10/1918)
19 FO 371/3404 FILE 77508 DOC 162647 – Communiqué from the Political Intelligence
Department of the War Office on the Baku Communiqué (24/9/1918)
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Azerbaijani forces were conducted under Dunsterville’s advice, therefore and not a
cowardly move by the Armenians.20
Legacy and Impact of the Battle of Baku (November 1918 to June 1920)
After World War One, Baku continued to serve a boundary to protect the Middle
East, with elements of the British government, like Lord Curzon who argued that the
Near East also provided a protective barrier around Britain’s jewel in the East –
India.21
A new consideration however, emerged to further muddy the already murky
waters regarding British policy towards Transcaucasia: White Russia. The British
government had hopes that the White Russia forces would seize Russia back from
the Bolsheviks. Yet the policy of supporting General Denikin went against Allied aims
of promoting stability in Transcaucasia. Meanwhile, despite the Armistice, the
Armenians were still fighting with the Azerbaijanis. This served only to fuel already
present British worries that their Armenian aid was lending to perceptions of them
being anti-Muslim, which endangered Britain’s status in the Middle East and India. In
essence, Britian’s Foreign Policy in Transcaucasia even in the post-war period
continued to be marked by confusion and contradiction.
The main aim of the White Russian army, led by General Denikin, was to fight the
Bolshevik forces that currently held Russia. It was British Foreign Policy to support
the White Russian forces against the Bolsheviks, and this factored into the British
decision to withdraw their troops, in June 1919.22
However General Denikin’s forces
frequently intruded into Transcaucasia, creating a whirlwind of destruction and
disruption – contrary to Britain and the Allies professed aims. In one instance,
20 FO 371/3404 FILE 77508 DOC 179646 – Copy of parliamentary debate on the Baku
withdrawal (24/10/1918)
21 D Gilmour Curzon John Murray: London, 1994. p. 514
22 D Gilmour Curzon John Murray: London, 1994. p. 514.
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Denikin went completely antithetical to the Allied cause and declared war on
Georgia. In an urgent letter from the Secretary to the Army Council to the Foreign
Office on 15 December 1919, the Secretary relayed Denikin’s bellicose behaviour in
Georgia and its inherent contradiction to British Transcaucasian policy:
“Fraught with the gravest possible consequences to the whole peace of
Trans-Caucasia… General Denikin considered himself in a state of
War with Georgia on account, apparently, of a declaration of war
alleged to have been made by the latter in May of this year… It is
undoubted that General Denikin has recently ordered the following
steps to be taken with regard to Georgia which can only be described
as unfriendly acts, closely akin to war measures… It is however
emphatically the policy of His Majesty’s Government to prevent any
attack by General Denikin on the Trans-Caucasian Republics”23
Denikin’s devastating path through Transcaucasia wasn’t merely limited to Georgia.
In a telegram between the Tiflis Office and the Foreign Office, Wardrop, the
Commissioner, relayed fears that Denikin would attack Azerbaijan to sate his
disgruntled forces.24
Although Denikin never threatened Armenia specifically
because of her geographic position away from the Russian border, his presence and
deleterious forces destabilising Transcaucasia, and directly influenced the British
decision to pull out of the Near East.
Another aspect that weighed on the British consideration to withdraw from
Transcaucasia was that the British were unable to control the Armenians. This tied
23 L/PS/11/161 DOC 8119/1919 – Letter between The Secretary to the Army Council and the
Foreign Office (15/12/1919)
24 L/PS/11/161 DOC 8282/1919 – Telegram between Wardrop, Tiflis Office and Foreign Office
(9/12/1919)
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into the British fear that their Transcaucasian foreign policy was anti-Muslim. Despite
being under Allied protection and aid, the Armenians persisted with fighting against
both the Tartars and the Azerbaijanis. This had the effect of making the Armenians
appearing as if they were waging an anti-Muslim campaign that was condoned by
the British who were protecting them. In another telegram between the Tiflis Office
and the Foreign Office on 11 December 1919, Wardrop relayed the news that the
Armenians were committing atrocities against the Muslims:
“On December 1st
regular Armenian troops with two guns and six
machine guns attacked 9 Tartar Villages in Kigy Pass and burnt and
looted them. On November 26th
peaceful Mussulmans of Okhchi
district were collected and all men of military age blown up with
dynamite and others including women and children slaughtered in
mosque.”25
Furthermore, on 8 December 1919, the British High Commission forwarded a report
by the Turkish government on alleged Armenian atrocities against Muslims in the
Caucasus. The report contained news of Armenian military forces attacking various
villages with machine guns and cannons, stealing cattle and threats to the villagers’
safety.26
Although it was undeniable that the British were supporting Armenian Christians
against Muslim Turks, Tartars and Azerbaijanis, the last thing that the British
government wanted was to foster even an inkling of them pursuing an anti-Muslim
crusade in the Caucasus. This was very much a huge fear that existed in the Foreign
25 L/PS/11/161 DOC 8282/1919 – Telegram between Wardrop, Tiflis Office and Foreign Office
(11/12/1919)
26 L/PS/11/161 P 8429/1919 – Letter between the British High Commission in Constantinople
and Curzon on Armenian atrocities against Muslims (8/12/1919)
16. Candidate No. 60413
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and Colonial offices before any reports of atrocities by the Armenians. The reports of
Armenian-backed atrocities only confirmed and gave further grounds to such anti-
Muslim allegations.
There was very much evidence that British involvement in the Caucasus, especially
in her support of the Armenians, had directly led to religious misunderstanding in
the region’s population. In a telegram between the G. Q. C. in India and the War
Office on 21 July 1918, the writer informs the War Office that among the Muslim
Tartars, there was talk of religious persecution by the British government.27
The British fear of being perceived as being anti-Muslim was so immense that it
even extended into peace treaty considerations with the Turks. It was believed by
some elements of the British government that punitive demands could be construed
by their colonies as being anti-Muslim, and therefore severely harm relations
between the colonies and the British government. A report published by the War
Office on 15 March 1920 warned that: ‘that the Arab inhabitants of Palestine and
Mesopotamia and the Mahomedan portion of the Indian population will certainly not
receive the news with indifference… it must nevertheless be expected that our
difficulties in controlling the Mahomedan area of the Empire will bear a direct relation
to the severity of the terms of the Treaty with Turkey.’28
The British government simply could not afford, whether groundless or not, to be
accused of perusing an anti-Muslim agenda. The British colonies, in the Middle East
and India were far too valuable to Britain to be allowed to fall into strife. The actions
of the Armenians, while under the aegis of British protection, exacerbated British
27 IOR 11/137 P3220/1918 – Telegram between G. Q. C. in India and the War Office on the
situation in the Caucasus (21/7/1918)
28 WO 106/64/345 – Internal classified War Office memorandum on the situation in Turkey
(15/3/1920)
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fears of being viewed as anti-Muslim. Finally, the Allied support of Denikin was in
itself, contradictory to her professed Transcaucasian peace aims. In short, all that
military intervention in Transcaucasia had brought to Britain was trouble, and it
contradicted her major foreign concerns. Britain was left with little practical choice
but to pull out of Transcaucasia.
The Problem of Mandate (1919 – June 1920)
Despite the promises to guarantee Armenian independence made by the Allies
during the war, Armenia never obtained a mandatory power. The notion of a
mandate itself was a concept that stemmed from old Allied Imperial sensibilities, and
its ultimate failure was indicative of the new geopolitical reality of the post-war world.
Britain was no longer as strong as she was before, nor was America keen to involve
herself in the problems of the Old World.
Britain post-WWI was suffering financially and military from the damage wrought by
four years of total war. Although she had made many promises to the Armenians
and the British public about securing Armenian independence after the war, she
found herself unable to fulfil these commitments. British priorities and resources
post-WWI were concentrated on the maintenance of her empire. This meant any
extension of British responsibilities had to be considered in geo-strategic terms, a
category that Palestine and Mesopotamia fulfilled, but one that Armenia failed. It was
in this aspect, that it really hit home to the British their new post-war state of
diminished power.
The British were left with little choice it seemed, but to appeal to the USA for help. As
one of the Great Powers least affected by the ravages of WWI, America seemed the
18. Candidate No. 60413
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best candidate for the Armenian mandate. Furthermore, she was not involved with
the existing English-French rivalry, which satisfied Britain’s own worry of French
Imperialism. Finally, President Wilson, as author of the Fourteen Points was greatly
interested in the Armenian question, and supported the idea of an American
mandate for Armenia. However, despite the plausible a notion of an American
mandate for Armenia, the mandate still failed.
As Armenian fate hung on the delayed response from the United States, the British
and the French hesitated to step in as the Bolshevik and Turkish Nationalist forces
began to close in on all sides.
Lack of British Capacity (1919 – June 1920)
Although contemporary historians like Akaby Nassibian have largely attributed the
British failure to adopt an Armenian mandate to a lack of genuine commitment and
interest – a lack of will – it is clear from archival sources that the British failure was
also largely due to a lack of capacity. In 1920, the overall budget for the military was
slashed from £604 million to £292 million, reducing overall British armed force
strength by more than half.29
Britain post-World War One simply lacked the material
means and ability to adopt a mandate of another country – especially since she had
banked on Russia taking the Armenian mandate after the war.
On 15 March 1920, the War Office published a classified report on the Situation in
Turkey, highlighting the dire situation of the British armed forces, and the fiscal
inability of Britain to support an Armenian mandate. The report essentially summed
up the immense reconstruction and defence demands required by Armenia and
stressed the overstretched nature of the remaining British armed forces. The report
29 A Nassibian Britain and the Armenian Question St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1984.p. 268
19. Candidate No. 60413
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estimated that the Turks could easily tap on a force of about 100,000 men and at the
same time a ‘possibility of combined action between the Turks, Arabs and the
Bolsheviks’, concluding thus that ‘if the new territory is to be handed over to Armenia
the direct military assistance of the Allies will be needed’.30
The report also went on
to estimate that ‘the resulting operations would partake of the nature of guerrilla
warfare’ and as a result ‘many more men are required than were originally
estimated’.31
In the end, the report sums up the current military situation as being
insufficient overall, much less by adding further military responsibilities:
‘In short, the military assets of England are barely sufficient, if even
they are sufficient, for the needs of the British Empire, and beyond our
present effort in Batoum, Constantinople and the Straits, Palestine,
Egypt and Mesopotamia, nothing more can be done with the forces at
our disposal.’32
It seemed clear that Britain’s old Imperial power and ability had been severely
reduced. Yet this was something that the British politicians had been aware of as
early as mid-1919. It had been no secret that World War One had severely affected
the British economy, and had forced her to borrow immense amounts of money from
the American government in order to fund the war effort. Yet Britain still tended to
her old Imperial-style of thinking, and attempted to at least station peacekeeping
troops in Armenia. This proved to be unsustainable with her reduced military budget
and large military debt.
30 WO 106/64/345 – War Office report on The Situation in Turkey (15/3/1920)
31 WO 106/64/345 – War Office report on The Situation in Turkey (15/3/1920)
32 WO 106/64/345 – War Office report on The Situation in Turkey (15/3/1920)
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In a letter between Sir Davies and Arthur Henderson on 14 August 1919, Sir Davies
wrote of his worry regarding the delay in demobilisation adding to the British national
debt:
‘The Armenian situation is giving us much concern. The difficulty, as
you realise, rests on the fact that to maintain British Troops in the
Caucasus delays demobilisation, and add considerably to the national
expenditure at a time when it is otherwise very crushing.’33
The view that the British government could not afford to maintain any forces in
Transcaucasia extended the Prime Minister, Lloyd George. Lloyd George wrote to
Sir Davies, agreeing with Bonar Law’s assertion that all British troops ought to be
withdrawn34
. This was especially pertinent because of the delay in decided the
Armenian mandate:
‘I am very reluctantly driven to the same conclusion as Mr. Bonar Law,
that we cannot delay our departure from the Caucasus unless there is
a clear and definite undertaking on the part of either the Americans or
the French that they would on a fixed date take charge of our
responsibilities.’35
In the end the British withdrew all their forces on 28 June 1920, from Batum, shortly
after the Americans rejected the Armenian mandate.36
Despite the fact that Curzon
had strongly campaigned to Churchill, the Minister for War and Air, and the War
Office, to retain British troops in Transcaucasia on a moral basis, in the end financial
33 LG/F/27/3/37 – Letter between Sir John Davies and Arthur Henderson (14/8/1919)
34 BL/101/3/142 – Letter between Bonar Law and Balfour (4/9/1919)
35 LG/F/85/1/10 – Letter between Lloyd George and Sir John Davies (3/9/1919)
36 A Nassibian Britain and the Armenian Question St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1984. p. 195
21. Candidate No. 60413
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practicalities won.37
The withdrawal of the British removed the final barrier to both
Turkish and Soviet aggression.
The Failure of American Mandate (1919 – June 1920)
Despite British inability to provide for Armenia, a sense of responsibility towards
Armenia still remained. In a letter between Levenson-Gower, a member of the
Conservative administration, to Balfour in mid-January 1919, he urges Balfour that
‘the settlement of Armenia must be an important part of our policy at the Peace
Conference’.38
There was the prevalent sentiment that although Britain was unable
to take over the reins of Armenia, the next best thing she ought to do, and could do,
was to secure a suitable mandate for Armenia during the Peace Conference. The
best candidate it seemed, to the British, were the Americans.
In Lloyd George’s memoirs, he wrote frankly about his hopes for an American
mandate over Armenia. The most important factor in his consideration, and
undoubtedly the considerations of the British government, was the fact that America
was divorced from the age-old squabble among the European powers. At the same
time, in his view, America was capable economically and militarily of fulfilling an
Armenian mandate. 39
37 G Bennett British Foreign Policy During the Curzon Period 1919 – 1924 St Martin’s Press:
London, 1995. p. 64
38 FO 608/77/25 – Letter between G. Levenson-Gower and Balfour on the Peace Conference and
Armenia (?/1/1919)
39 D Lloyd George Memoirs of the Peace Conference Vol. 2 Yale University Press: New Haven,
1939. p. 813
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However it wasn’t Britain alone who wanted an American mandate for Armenia.
Lloyd George also wrote about Woodrow Wilson being extremely keen on adopting
the Armenian mandate’.40
At the same time, American contacts gave the British the
impression that there was a large degree of support from the American public for an
Armenian mandate, despite America’s avowed stance towards non-involvement in
the ‘Old World’. The chief rationale behind American support being that America had
a long relationship with Armenia, and had sent a lot of American missionaries to
Armenia. The Armenian genocide had also been widely publicized in America,
especially by Henry Morgenthau Snr., the American Ambassador to the Ottoman
Empire, and the American public had rallied behind the Armenian cause as a
result.41
In a memorandum between Lord Bryce and Lord Cecil on 13 February 1919,
Lord Bryce writes of his impression that the American public was receptive to an
Armenian mandate, and hence to attempt persuasion of the American peace
delegation to accept an Armenian mandate.42
There were of course, detractors, who disapproved of any American involvement in
the ‘Old World’. One of these detractors was Robert Lansing, who was a member of
the American delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Robert Lansing strictly
believed in the notion that America ought not to be involved in the diplomatic affairs
of other countries more than was necessitated.43
In his memoirs, Lansing harshly
criticized the British for their attempts to campaign the Armenian cause to the
Americans, accusing them of abusing American goodwill and Woodrow Wilson’s
sense of idealism:
40 D Lloyd George Memoirs of the Peace Conference Vol. 2 Yale University Press: New Haven,
1939. p. 814
41 H Morgenthau Snr. Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story Doubleday: New York, 1918
42 FO 608/79/1 No. 2001 – Memorandum between Lord Bryce and Lord Cecil on the US and
administration of Armenia (13/2/1919)
43 R Lansing The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative Constable and Company Ltd: London,
1921. p. 133
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‘It is not too severe to say of those who engaged in this propaganda
that the purpose was to take advantage of the unselfishness of the
American people and of the altruism and idealism of President Wilson
in order to impose on the United States the burdensome mandates’44
As time passed however, and the American government began to take stock of their
own limitations, it became obvious that they too would be unable to adopt the
Armenian mandate. In a conversation between Curzon and the American
Ambassador in Britain on 11 August 1919, the Ambassador noted that the American
troops that remained in Europe were unable to be reassigned to Transcaucasia
without a Congressional vote:
‘In first place he said that the Americans now only had 100,000 troops
remaining in Europe, the bulk of whom were under orders to return to
their country, and any of whom it would be impossible, in existing
conditions, to move to the Caucasus. Indeed any dispatch of American
troops to that region could not be attempted without the knowledge
and consent of Congress.’45
The conversation between the American Ambassador and Curzon also discussed
the nature of American public support for the Armenian mandate, with the American
ambassador confessing that he highly doubted that popular support would change
the stance of American Foreign Policy. At the same time, the Ambassador argued
that American popular support would erode quickly once the Americans learnt the
44 R Lansing The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative Constable and Company Ltd: London,
1921. p. 142
45 FO 608/79/1 No. 18011 – Minutes of a conversation between Earl Curzon and the American
Ambassador of Britain on proposed American mandate of Armenia (11/8/1919)
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extent of Armenia’s manifold problems46
. It wasn’t till 11 October 1919 that word
reached the British government of America’s intention to reject the Armenian
mandate. A telegram from the Baghdad Office to the India Office relayed the
alarming news that the Americans no longer had any intention of taking up the
Armenian mandate: ‘the majority of American Commission have realized than an
Armenian state is not a practical proposition.’47
In June 1920, America finally got around to officially rejecting the Armenian
mandate, a delay of more than 9 months. On 2 October 1919, Woodrow Wilson
suffered from a stroke that left him totally incapacitated, which had the result of
delaying the American response.48
In a conference held at 10 Downing Street on 12
February 1920, Curzon placed the blame for the delayed peace treaties and
Armenian resolution solely on the inaction of the Americans, ‘the delay in negotiating
the Treaty was exclusively due to the Powers having to await the decision of the
United States.’49
In the end, all the official American rejection of the Armenian
mandate did was to signal the final death knell of the Armenian Republic, leaving her
open to aggression on all sides. In his memoirs, Lloyd George sums up the entire
Armenian exploit by attributing its final ending to the American rejection: ‘The
independent Armenian State was a hopeless project from the moment America
refused to undertake the responsibility of protecting it.’50
The Problem of Delay (1919 – June 1920)
46 FO 608/79/1 No. 18011 – Minutes of a conversation between Earl Curzon and the American
Ambassador of Britain on proposed American mandate of Armenia (11/8/1919)
47 IOR 11/154 P3993/1919 – Telegram between Baghdad and India Office on American
sentiment to an Armenian mandate (11/10/1919)
48 D Lloyd George Memoirs of the Peace Conference Vol. 2 Yale University Press: New Haven,
1939. p. 819
49 D Lloyd George Memoirs of the Peace Conference Vol. 2 Yale University Press: New Haven,
1939. p. 820
50 D Lloyd George Memoirs of the Peace Conference Vol. 2 Yale University Press: New Haven,
1939. p. 866
25. Candidate No. 60413
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Another important factor, linked most definitely to both the failure and rejection of the
Armenian mandate by the British and the Americans was the problem of their delay
in response. Although Britain had long rejected the idea of accepting an Armenian
mandate, she put little pressure on the United States to push for a quick decision. As
long as America had not officially declined an Armenian mandate, Britain could still
refer the Armenians to her for aid. This meant that at least, Britain could share the
burden of emergency Armenian aid with America and to a lesser extent, France.
However this also meant that the Armenians were left in limbo for an extended
period of time, which brought about a set of perils; diffusion of British and Allied
responsibility, lack of official recognition as a country, and a massing Turkish threat.
On 27 March 1919, the Armenian Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference
appealed to Louis Mallet, the secretary of the British Delegation in a private meeting.
In the meeting the Armenian Delegation leaders requested more financial and
military aid from the British, to tide them over in the interim. The British response
however, was to tell the Armenians to appeal to the Americans instead of sending
them aid:
‘The season for sowing was nearly past and that people in Trans-
Caucasian Armenia were already dying of starvation in large
numbers… I referred to the general impression that the mandate in
Armenia would fall to America and advised them to apply to the
Americans for the military and economic assistance they required.’51
51 FO 608/79/3 DOC 5883 – Minutes of a conversation between Louis Mallet and the Armenian
Delegation (27/3/1919)
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Another problem with the delay in issuing a mandate was that the Allies had also
deliberately neglected to official recognize Armenia as a country. Armenia, along
with the other countries of Transcaucasia had declared their independence in May
1918, yet even till their demise in late 1920, their independence was never
recognized. This brought about its own set of problems as outlined in an appeal from
Khatissian, a member of the Armenian Delegation, to Wardrop:
‘But the non-recognition hitherto of the independence of the Republic of
Armenia by the Allied Powers constitutes an enormous hindrance to the
regular working of the state in the spheres of finance, politics and the
army.’52
Additionally, there was the ever-present complication of Turkish aggression. The
Turks were sore at the thought of losing their old lands, and sought to regain them,
in flagrant disregard of the Allies. The delay in mandate allowed the Turks to mass
and consolidate their military forces against Armenia. In a telegram between the
British High Commission for Transcaucasia and the Foreign Office on 22 July 1919,
the High Commission relayed the distressing news of Turkish troops massing on the
Armenian border, and the probable effect on British prestige.
‘Telegrams report of grave danger to Armenia from Turkish Forces,
Tartars and Kurds, who are massing on Southern and Eastern border,
and who on withdrawal of Allies will almost certainly overrun Armenian
territory… Situation will end in complete disaster for Armenia, with
consequent loss of prestige to Allied Powers, unless British forces in the
Caucasus intervene, or measures be taken to supplement, equip and
52 IOR 11/161 P7858/1919 – Letter between Khatissian and Wardrop on Armenian appeals to
Britain (16/10/1919)
27. Candidate No. 60413
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assist Armenian army.’53
In summation, the delay in the mandate led to many unintended consequences for
Armenia, which served only to worsen their position. Britain assumed that America
would take up the Armenian mandate and hence attempted to delegate Armenian
appeals for aid, at the same time the Allies refused to recognize the independence
of Armenia, which prevented her from seeking official loans. Finally the delay of
mandate gave the Turks the time that they needed to regroup their forces to
threaten Armenia. The delay in mandate proved to be unequivocally detrimental for
the Armenians.
53 FO 608/78/5 – Telegram between the British High Commission for Transcaucasia and the
Foreign Office on Danger to Armenia (22/7/1919)
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The English and French: Rivalries and Aspirations (December 1918 –
June 1920)
English and French aspirations for Armenia cannot be understood without reference
to their other interests in the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire and prior Imperial
rivalry. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, drafted in 1916 between France and Britain
under agreement from Russia, divided Asia Minor into three spheres of interests.
Armenia and most of Transcaucasia were designated into the Russian sphere of
interest. The end of the Russian Empire and rise of Bolshevik Russia however,
invalidated the Sykes-Picot Agreement and left the fate of Transcaucasia in limbo.
Although British and French mandates were already clearly delineated in the Sykes-
Picot Agreement – the British had Iraq and Palestine while the French had Syria and
Lebanon – a sceptre of mutual suspicion always hung over their relations towards
each other. France and Britain both feared that any intervention in Armenia and
surrounding Transcaucasia was part of a plot to usurp the other’s Middle Eastern
mandates. Thus any involvement in Transcaucasia was important to Britain and
France insofar as its ability to influence other regions. At the same time,
Transcaucasia held the appeal of oil fields in Azerbaijan, which acted as a
sweetener to establishing control over Transcaucasia.
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During the post-war settlements however, this mutual suspicion grew into something
larger and more potent, to something akin to veiled hostility. This animosity stemmed
from the fact that both countries were already suspicious of each other’s Eastern
intentions and aggravated further by the Armenian preference of Britain and the
United States, rather than France. Furthermore even when cooperation between
Britain and France over Armenia did occur, it was only because Britain felt that it was
a way to escape bearing the full burden of protecting and aiding Armenia.
The Armenian Preference of a British Mandate (1919 – June 1920)
From the outset it was clear to both Britain and France that the Armenians preferred
a British mandate. The Armenians, alongside large swathes of the British public, felt
that they shared a special relationship that developed from the Armenian massacres
of the 1890s. As a result, the Armenians held a strong preference for a British
mandate, and held no qualms making this apparent. In the minutes of a meeting held
on 26 December 1918, Mr James Malcolm, a representative of the Armenian
National Delegation declared the Armenian preference for ‘a British Protectorate.’54
Even when it later became apparent that Britain would not take up the Armenian
mandate, and that America was the most likely candidate, the Armenians never
stopped hoping for a miracle British mandate. Numerous references are made
throughout the archival papers of such appeals. In the minutes of a meeting on 27
March 1919 between Louis Mallet, the secretary of the British delegation, and the
Armenian delegation, Mallet recorded one such incident:
54 CAB 371/3401 No. 212706 – Minutes of a meeting between Mr. Malcolm and Foreign Office
representative on an Armenian mandate (26/12/1918)
30. Candidate No. 60413
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“I made it clear to them that there was no possibility of His Majesty’s
Government assuming further responsibilities in the region… they
showed great perturbation at the idea of the British occupation
coming to an end. They said it would be the end of the Armenians… I
referred to the general impression that the mandate in Armenia
would fall to America, and advised them to apply to the Americans for
the military and economic assistance they required.”55
Yet despite Mallet’s meeting in March, the Armenian delegation still appealed for a
British mandate later in June. In the minutes of another meeting on 19 June 1919,
the President of the Armenian delegation, Mr. Aharaonian, repeated his appeal to
Britain to accept an Armenian mandate.56
It seemed clear, that Armenia preferred a
British mandate above all others, which served only to fuel French suspicions of
British activities in Transcaucasia.
Further Armenian Preference of a US Mandate (1919 – June 1920)
The British solution to both her economic and political problems was to instead
encourage the United States to take up the Armenian mandate. A large part of the
British decision to back America as a candidate was that she thought America’s
presence would not raise the hackles of the French. French suspicions and enmity
towards the British however, only extended themselves to the Americans, especially
after the Armenians shifted their appeals for mandate. In a memorandum written
somewhere in 1919, the unknown writer notes that French rivalry had spread
55 FO 608/79/3 No. 5883 – Minutes of a meeting between Boghos Nubar Pasha, M. Aharonian
and Louis Mallet on Armenian aid (27/3/1919)
56 FO 608/78/1 – Minutes of a meeting between M. Aharonian and a Foreign Office
representative on the necessity of an Armenian mandate (19/6/1919)
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towards American aid for the Armenians, preventing the Americans from sending
urgent aid:
“It is more unfortunate that French rivalry is even holding back the
despatch of the American relief mission to Armenia… possibly the
American government might be willing to send an American contingent
or at any rate American officers. This might be acceptable to France.”57
French interference in Armenian-foreign affairs however, was not merely limited to
preventing foreign aid. It seemed that the French were upset that the Armenians
preferred the Americans to them. Yet this jealously did not merely have its roots in
affronted national pride. The Armenians, encouraged by their British allies, choose to
appeal to the Americans rather than the French. In a letter written by Lord Curzon to
Lord Balfour, Lord Curzon refers explicitly to a conversation relayed to him by Dr.
Thoumaian, a member of the Armenian delegation, detailing how the French now
refused to help the Armenians on the grounds that they had preferred an American
to French mandate:
“Dr. Thoumaian stated that M. Gout had informed him that the French
government washed their hands of the Americans as Nubar Pasha
would not commit himself to accepting the French mandate and had
foolishly trusted the Americans who would in the end do nothing. It was
now too late to appeal to the French as they were indifferent as to the
fate of the Armenians”58
57 FO 608/79/3 No. 3999 – Memorandum from the Foreign Office on French rivalry and
American aid for Armenia (date unknown)
58 FO 608/77/25 – Letter between Lord Curzon and Lord Balfour on negative French sentiment
to Armenia (26/4/1919)
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Such was the extent of French-British rivalry that the French even began to question
and equate Armenian preference of an American mandate to that of a British proxy.
At the same time, French displeasure at the Armenian preference of America was
not mere paranoia. Armenia was well aware of the French-British rivalry, and sought
out the American mandate in order to satisfy the British. In the minutes relayed on 26
December 1918 of the same meeting between Mr. Malcolm and a member of the
Foreign Office, Mr. Malcolm stated that:
“That it is not at all likely that Great Britain will consent to “protect” the new
Armenian state, as to do so would bring her into collusion with France.”59
Despite the fact that the United States was very much a separate and independent
great power in her own right, France still felt suspicious of her because of her close
ties to Britain. Such was the extent of the deep-rooted Imperial acrimony between
France and Britain that it engulfed any genuine humanistic sentiment in France to
aid Armenia.
British and French Cooperation (September 1919)
Yet for all of the rivalry between the French and the British, there were occasions
where both sides managed to set aside their differences in order to aid the
Armenians. This transcendence of old geo-political rivalries however, was done only
because the British felt French aid would relieve the British burden of responsibility
for Armenia. Despite the fact that World War One was over, the Armenians still faced
threats to their safety from her neighbouring rivals Georgia and Azerbaijan over
territorial disputes. In mid-1919, the Allies received reports of Turkish-backed
59 CAB 371/3401 No. 212706 – Minutes of a meeting between Mr. Malcolm and Foreign Office
representative on an Armenian mandate (26/12/1918)
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Azerbaijani forces massing on the Armenian border, threatening to overrun Armenia
once the Allied troops pulled out.60
In September 1919, despite the extreme
reluctance of British politicians like Bonar Law and Lloyd George – the French
offered to send an expeditionary force of 12,000 men to Armenia61
– in the end the
British relented. It is clear however, that the British only allowed the French to send
troops because they were afraid of further Armenian massacres, and hoped by
allowing the French to intervene that it would ameliorate the situation.
The first memorandum regarding the British stance appears on 3 September 1919,
in response to the French offer of aid on the 29 August 1919. In the internal Foreign
Office memorandum, author unknown, the author writes of suspicions on the British
side that the French offer to help is politically motivated; done only for the sake of
enhancing her position in Transcaucasia.62
More telling however are the private
papers of Bonar Law and Lloyd George from the Parliamentary Archives, which
detail British apprehensions, but at the same time show their want ultimately, to help
the Armenians.
In a letter from Lloyd George to Sir John Davies, written on 3 September 1919, Lloyd
George outlines his fear of the French trying to occupy more territory than agreed. At
the same time, the letter goes on to mention that that he, Lloyd George, was willing
to compromise on letting the French occupy certain parts of Transcaucasia to aid the
Armenians if the French did not exceed a boundary to the South.
60 Telegram between the British High Commission for Transcaucasia and the Foreign Office on
Danger to Armenia (22/7/1919)
61 FO 608/78/5 – Telegram between French Foreign Office and British Foreign Office on
Armenian aid (29/8/1919)
62 FO 608/78/5 – Memorandum from the Foreign Office on British suspicions of French motives
in Armenia (3/9/1919)
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“When I first heard of it I shared the suspicions of the C. I. G. S. that
the French, once they landed at Alexandrette would move to the S. F.
and not to the North... Personally, I should be in favour of allowing
them to occupy Alexandrette, Mersins and Cilicie, provided that they
give a definite guarantee not to go beyond a boundary line we should
agree upon in the Mosul direction.”63
However according to Bonar Law’s letters, Lloyd George only relented because he
wanted to relinquish British responsibility for Armenia. In September 1919 the British
had already been campaigning for America to take over the Armenian mandate for
some time, because they were logistically unable to maintain a permanent presence
in Armenia. At the same time, the British were fearful that the Azerbaijani troops
would overrun Armenia under their watch, leading to a horrendous massacre. While
an argument can be made from the British wanting the French to help aid their
peacekeeping efforts in Transcaucasia, Bonar Law’s letters appear to point more
towards the British wanting a wholesale transfer of their Armenian responsibilities.
In a letter written on 4 September 1919 from Bonar Law to Lord Balfour, he refers
directly to British responsibility for Armenia, and the French offer of aid:
“I should have thought it might have been worth your consideration
whether you should not see to what extent the French will really
undertake to do what is necessary for the Armenians and save us from
the responsibility.”64
63 LG/85/1/10 – Correspondence between Lloyd George and Sir Davies on personal sentiments
towards French aid for Armenia (3/9/1919)
64 BL/101/3/142 – Correspondence between Bonar Law and Balfour on British responsibility in
Armenia (4/9/1919)
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A second letter written on 5 September 1919 from Bonar Law to Lloyd George
however, leaves no room for doubt as to his true intentions of relinquishing British
responsibility for Armenia:
“It as our Military people tell us the sending of troops to Alexandretta is
of no use at all to the Armenians, then we are not helped out of our
difficulties in the least unless the French will accept the full
responsibility publicly for looking after the interests of the Armenians. If
they would do this and let us get away, though this is rather a cynical
thing to say, I would not care if they propose to help them from Mars
instead of Alexandretta.”65
Although Britain in all likelihood did possess a desire to aid the Armenians, this was
not enough to overcome her other concerns, like her geo-political rivalry with France
or her inability to support an Armenian mandate. Even her attempts to seek an
American mandate for Armenia only deepened animosities between the British and
the French. In the only instance where Britain successfully cooperated with France
over Armenia, it was because French aid benefitted Britain’s cause to protect the
Armenians. All French and British rivalry did was detract away from the more
important cause in Transcaucasia – the Armenian cause.
65 BL /101/3/143 – Correspondence between Bonar Law and Lloyd George on British
responsibility in Armenia (5/9/1919)
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Conclusion
On 15 January 1921, the Armenian Bureau sent a letter to Lloyd George. In the
letter, the writer pleaded for Britain to understand Armenia’s difficult choice of allying
herself with Soviet Russia, ‘yielding… solely for the sake of preserving the physical
existence of the Armenian people.’66
Despite the fact that Britain had done little to
assist Armenia in the post-war period, official policy was still to strongly condemn
Armenia and the rest of Transcaucasia for bowing to the Soviets. Fact was, from the
moment Britain withdrew her troops in June 1920, the Armenia’s fall was inevitable.
In 1920, Armenia still suffered from the same privations as in late 1918, when the
armistice was signed. The major source of aid sent by the Allies were peacekeeping
troops, rather than reconstruction and financial aid. There was also the problem of
Allied non-recognition of Armenia, which prevented her for even obtaining a state
loan. All of Britain’s lofty promises to Armenia made during World War One were left
unfulfilled.
Although Britain still emerged from World War One as a great power, the power she
wielded had diminished. The war had stretched the British Empire to the limits, and
66 LG/199/72 Letter between Armenia Bureau and Lloyd George on the Armenian treaty with
Soviet Russia (15/1/1921)
37. Candidate No. 60413
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the scale of change that both Britain and the other Great Powers faced was
immense. Britain still remained very much in control of her Empire, but not without
great effort. Yet in the post-war period, and especially in her relations with Armenia
and the rest of Transcaucasia, Britain still acted as if she still wielded her former
Imperial power, which was incompatible with her new lack of material capacity. As a
result of Britain’s new situation, she failed to come up with a coherent foreign policy
for Transcaucasia – setting the background to her other problems that eventually led
to the British abandonment of Transcaucasia and Armenia.
In the first instance, Britain clearly lacked a proper foreign policy for Transcaucasia,
and saw the region only as the means to an end. Military intervention in the Battle of
Baku proved to be a disaster because it was ill conceptualised, with the subsequent
discrediting of the Armenians weakening the overall British war effort. After the war,
Transcaucasia and Armenia became an even larger liability, with British policy in that
region contradicting other, more important, foreign policy goals of supporting White
Russia and pacifying the Muslim colonials. It seemed that the only way to salvage
the Transcaucasian situation was to pull her troops out.
Secondly, the British failure to adopt an Armenian mandate can be solely attributed
to the immense financial strain of World War One. Britain’s military budget was
halved, and in the post-war period she underwent massive demobilisation efforts.
Britain simply lacked the capacity to adopt the Armenian mandate. Yet at the same
time, her only back up plan for securing the independence of Armenia was to appeal
to America. When America rejected the Armenian mandate, Britain was unable to do
anything to further aid Armenia and instead withdrew her troops. Meanwhile the
delay, an unintended consequence of waiting for the American verdict, only
increased Armenia’s woes and gave hostile forces the time to regroup.
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38
Lastly came the problem of old, Imperial rivalries between France and Britain, which
acted as a deterrent to extensive foreign intervention in Transcaucasia. The
Armenian preference for a British mandate evoked the suspicions of the French, who
feared British interference in French Middle Eastern mandates. American
involvement in Transcaucasia only heightened French suspicions of a Near Eastern
conspiracy. Even in instances of British and French cooperation, the key motivation
was more for Britain to shirk her Armenian responsibilities than to aid the Armenians.
The French and British animosity only served to further pull Britain away from the
Armenian cause.
Although Britain never meant to wilfully mislead the Armenians, the end result was
the same. Through the war years, Armenia occupied an integral part in British
propaganda, supporting claims that Britain was fighting a ‘just’ war. In parliamentary
debates and private letters, the earnest desire of politicians like Lord Bryce and Earl
Curzon to ‘save’ Armenia could be discerned. Meanwhile, Armenia captured the
imagination of the general public. Thousands dug into their pockets in the midst of
war to donate money to the Lord Mayor’s Fund for Armenian Refugees67
. There
were a genuine, sincere want to help Armenia. Yet populist sentiment does not often
– and in this instance did not – translate into coherent and suitable government
policy. Finally there is a last point worth considering: that Britain only made promises
to Armenia because she never expected a need to deliver them. In the Sykes-Picot
Agreement, Armenia fell under the jurisdiction of Russia. Britain never conceived of
Russia turning Soviet, much less leaving responsibility for Armenia to her and the
other Allies.
9,799 words.
67 J Laycock Imagining Armenia: Orientalism, Ambiguity and Intervention Manchester University
Press: Manchester, 2009. p. 103
