- Borussia Dortmund is Germany's only publicly traded football club and has struggled with financial performance being too dependent on league performance. The CFO Thomas Treß commissioned reports to understand the key drivers of financial success in order to develop a strategy to reduce this dependency. - In the 2007/08 season, Dortmund finished 13th in the Bundesliga and failed to qualify for international competitions, losing out on the additional revenues they provide. The management defined a top 5 league finish as the minimum goal to qualify for these competitions and ensure financial stability. - Treß will present on the club's financial and brand positioning strategies at upcoming talks. He wants to identify factors to boost revenues independent of league results

1. Borussia Dortmund – Echte Liebe. 12-900 EN
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Case No. 12-900 EN
SEPTEMBER, 2012
Borussia Dortmund – True Love.
How to build a top national football club brand.
After publishing the preliminary figures for the fiscal year 2007/08, the management board of
Borussia Dortmund had no time to rest. Despite an improved financial performance and a reduction
in net debt, the financial room for manoevering for the only publicly listed football club in Germany
was still strictly limited. Thomas Treß who had been appointed Chief Financial Officer (CFO) three
years before, at a time when the club was experiencing a severe financial crisis, was able to complete
the financial restructuring. He was, however, well aware of the fact that the financial performance
depended still directly on the league performance of the club. If Borussia Dortmund failed to qualify
for an international competition for a 6th
time in a row, relevant sales revenues from ticketing,
television rights, sponsoring and merchandising would not be available for the turnaround.
For the next strategy talks with stakeholders, Thomas Treß planned to discuss possible approaches
for reducing the dependency of financial performance on league performance of Borussia Dortmund.
In order to prepare this discussion, he commissioned a detailed report on the sources, development,
and composition of the sales revenues from his division heads and managers.1
With this he expected
to develop a better understanding of the key success factors of Borussia Dortmund.
Borussia Dortmund – League Performance
Borussia Dortmund finished 13th
in the German Federal League(Bundesliga) at the end of the season
2007/08. As a result, the club did not qualify for international competitions, such as UEFA CUP or
Champions League. Therefore, additional income primarily generated by TV rights and ticketing from
international competitions could not be generated in the next season and the room for manoevering
in terms of investments was still very limited. The club management defined a top 5 position in the
national league table as a minimum objective for each future season in order to put the club on a
sustainable financial basis by participating in international competitions.
Tab. 1: League Performance 1999 - 2008
1
See attachment A 1 / A2 Organisational structure of Borussia Dortmund.
Prof. Dr. Jan-Philipp Büchler and Dr. Erhard Jürke wrote this case. CASEM cases are developed solely as the basis
for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of
effective or ineffective handling of management situations. This case was made possible through the generous
cooperation of Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA.
Copyright © 2012 casem. FH Dortmund, Emil-Figge-Str. 44, 44227 Dortmund

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Borussia Dortmund – Financial Performance
After the initial public offering (IPO) in 1999 the former management board made heavy investments
to sign on famous international players to Borussia Dortmund and to extend the existing grounds to
become the largest football stadium in Germany. After initial success in national and international
competitions contributing to a significant increase in sales revenues, the club missed out on
international qualifications in 2003/04 and thus suffered a dramatic decrease in sales revenues and
earnings. Within two years the club was unable to finance operating expenses and interest
payments. At the climax of its financial crisis in 2004/05, Borussia Dortmund installed a new
management board in order to rescue and restructure one of the football clubs with a very rich
tradition in Germany.
Tab. 2: Financial Performance 1999 - 2008
Sponsoring: This main pillar of revenue generation contributed 31.5% to sales revenues. As the
sponsors have an essential impact on revenues, the club management looked for strategic sponsors
and partners in order to establish a long-term relationship that would lead to long-term financial
stability.

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partnerships with SPARDA-BANK WEST and AWD were continued on a mid-term basis. The regional
champion partner WARSTEINER was exchanged for a long-term contract with Brinkhoffs No. 1. The
exclusive contract with supplier NIKE would expire at the end of season 2008/09.
Ticketing: In the season 2007/08 the sales revenues rose to a total of € 22.6m (+€ 4.3m vs. PY) thanks
to additional matches because the team qualified for the final round of the DFB-Cup
(+€ 3.9m) and because of several friendly matches. These additional sales revenues compensated for
the negative development from ticketing in the Bundesliga (-€ 0.2m vs. PY). In the season 2007/08
the club registered another decrease in spectators. Though Borussia Dortmund still reported the
highest number of spectators compared to an average attendance 41,802 in the German Bundesliga,
the capacity utilization in the biggest football arena in Germany decreased to an all-time-low of 88%.
Fig. 2 Merchandising 2008
Fans: For a long time, Borussia Dortmund had been perceived as “likeable second“ among the
football clubs in the national football league by supporters as well as interested parties. Borussia
Dortmund was one of the most famous football clubs with supporters all over Germany. In 2004,
right before the financial crisis, about 20 mill. people in Germany found the club likeable, with 63% of
fans from all over Germany.2
In terms of this national basis, Borussia Dortmund stood out from most
of the Bundesliga clubs, which only had local or regional fans (see Tab. 4 Fanbase).
2
Source: Sportive (2004): Football Case Study / European Football 2004, Sport+Markt AG, Köln.

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In the season 2004/05 Borussia Dortmund lost sympathy among all groups of supporters and
suffered a loss of image due to the financial crisis. Supporters and fans dissociated themselves from
the club and their protagonists eventually. They accused the managers and players of being arrogant,
megalomanic and detached from the club values. It was the first time in history that a club polarized
that many football fans in Germany. As a result, Borussia Dortmund lost fascination value and
sympathy and last but not least about 30% of its national fans.
In addition, the club also suffered a decline in the strength of its emotional image among supporters
in the Ruhr-Region. Thomas Treß reflected on the expectations and interests of the stakeholders of
Borussia Dortmund: While followers in the Ruhr-Region could be targeted with honest and authentic
communication because of their emotional relationship based on brand heritage, attractive new
sponsors and investors would base their support on clear facts and figures regarding the perception
and reputaion of the brand Borussia Dortmund on a regional and national level.3
3
See attachment A 4 for brand coverage of German Bundesliga clubs.

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Furthermore, a number of different claims have been used in the club´s communication since 1999,
such as “Wir sind Schwarz-gelb” (“We are the black-and-yellow team”), a reference to the existing
club colors since 1919 or “Mein Verein. Meine Stadt” (“My club. My city.”) and “ Unser ganzes Leben.
Unser ganzer Stolz” (“Our live. Our pride”). Here, the claims vary depending on the communication
channel and target group but with a strong regional focus. Regional supporters celebrate the so-
called “Ruhr mentality” and the traditional positioning as a working man’s club, which is rooted in a
deep sense of community and striving for solidarity. Borussia Dortmund´s fans associate these values
with their club and appreciate particularly the close relations to the club and the players. They see
themselves in the truest sense as a 12th
player and part of the team and present this in a unique way.
The largest standing terrace in Europe, which the fans call affectionately the “Yellow Wall”, is the
epitome of fan culture and pure passion creating an atmosphere in the Signal Iduna Park (stadium),
which is perceived as an intensive football experience by all spectators and even TV-viewers.4
Transfer revenues: The team was almost completely rebuilt after the financial crisis in 2004/05 and
transfer revenues decreased significantly. Sports director Michael Zorc made the best of a difficult
situation and systematically promoted and developed local youngsters. The result was a young and
talented team with real passion, ambition and identification with the club because of the local roots.
It's a team that is built on its internal strength and mutual understanding, concentrating on shared
experience and qualities. From a players’ perspective, Jürgen Klopp (head coach) is a real and
authentic motivator of the team. They describe him as “real and emotional, straight, sincere and also
extremely hungry for success”.
Preparing the Strategy Talks
Thomas Treß looked at the agenda of the strategy talks with the board of directors. He would have to
prepare and deliver presentations for the agenda items “Financial Performance of Borussia
Dortmund” and “Brand Positioning (national / international)”. A reasonable beginning seemed to be
a detailed situation analysis of Borussia Dortmund with regard to the drivers of financial and league
performance. A discussion with his board of directors would probably circle around potential levers
for uncoupling financial and league performance.
He wondered which key success factors and levers would be most relevant to boost revenue sales
independent of Borussia Dortmund’s positioning in the league table. How could he make use of the
traditional fan basis in order to increase brand awareness and attraction beyond the Ruhr-Region?
What brand positioning of Borussia Dortmund would be acceptable for the regional fan basis and
attractive for national fans and sponsors? How could he ensure that no stakeholder would be left
behind?
4
See attachment A 5 for stadium atmosphere and A 6 for a communication channel overview.

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Appendix
A 1: Organizational structure Borussia Dortmund Group (2008)
Source: Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA, Annual Report 2007/08

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Appendix
A 3: Merchandising: Football shirts 2004 – 2008
Source: Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA
A 4: Brand coverage of German Bundesliga clubs
Source: KIND (2008): Spitzenfußball als Markenprodukt.

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Appendix
A 5: Stadium atmosphere: Grandstand (“YELLOW WALL”)
Source: Advertisement Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
A 6: Branding and communication channels
Source: Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA