Beyond Recommendations and Interpretive Notes: An Examination of How NGO Accountability Can Strengthen Development NGOs Contribution to the War on Terror

Beyond Recommendations and Interpretive Notes:
An Examination of How NGO Accountability Can Strengthen Development NGOs Contribution to the War on
Terror
Lydia A. Boyer
International Criminal Justice 794 (Independent Study)
Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism
Professor George Andreopoulos
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York
January 22, 2014

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Abstract
The security challenges of countering terrorism are well-known to international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs). INGOs focused on development are on the front lines of combatting underlying causes
of terrorism, but they face an additional challenge: the international regime on Anti-Money
Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT). This paper examines the disconnect between
the state security and civil society sectors in the war on terrorism and looks to NGO accountability work as
holding some critical components for how to move forward.

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Table of Contents
The NGO Sector ......................................................................................................................................................5
Terminology.........................................................................................................................................................6
Scope and Structure .............................................................................................................................................7
Rights and Protections of the NGO Sector ..........................................................................................................8
NGO Responsibilities and Accountability...........................................................................................................9
NGO Accountability Mechanisms.....................................................................................................................14
A Background on Terrorism...................................................................................................................................16
Defining Terrorism.............................................................................................................................................17
Causes of Terrorism...........................................................................................................................................19
Why Development Matters to Countering Terrorism ........................................................................................23
The International Counter-Terrorism Framework..................................................................................................24
The UN-Led Counter-Terrorism Structure ........................................................................................................24
International Organizations Involved in UN-Led Counter-Terrorism ...............................................................25
An Overview of Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)........................................................................26
Where Does CFT Meet Civil Society and NGOs? ................................................................................................28
Encroachment on and the Violation of the Fundamental Rights of NGOs........................................................29
Uneven Applications of AML/CFT Policies......................................................................................................31
Overall Trends....................................................................................................................................................32
A Place for NGO Accountability?..........................................................................................................................33
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................36
Tables and Figures .................................................................................................................................................38
Appendixes ............................................................................................................................................................41
Bibliography ..........................................................................................................................................................46
List of Figures
Table 1: NGO Responsibilities .............................................................................................................................10
Table 2: Phases of NGO Accountability I..............................................................................................................12
Table 3: Phase of NGO Accountability (II) ...........................................................................................................13
Table 4: Types of NGO Accountability Mechanisms by Directionality ................................................................16
Figure 2: Best Practice Legal Definition of Terrorism from the UN Special Rapporteur......................................18
Figure 4: Terrorism Development (I) – Diagram of the Process and Feedback of Terrorism in Society (1).........38
Figure 5: Terrorism Development (II) – Diagram of the Process and Feedback of Terrorism in Society (2)........38
Figure 6: Model of How the AML/CFT Operates on a National Level.................................................................40
Appendix 1:Table 5: Academic Breakdown on the Causes of Terrorism ..............................................................41
Appendix 2: List of International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism.........................................................45

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There is a fundamental conflict between financing development and preventing the financing of terrorism
(CFT). Both are critical to the common goal of countering terrorism, but in practice there has been difficulty
harmonizing their efforts. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work on development issues are caught
between the imperative of their mission and counter-terrorism policies that in effect require them to change their
working practices. This has produced a sector-wide reticence to engage in areas that are high risk for terrorism.
High risk areas are often areas that would gain the most benefit from NGO involvement. At its core, global
counter-terrorism efforts since 9/11 have developed CFT practices that hamstring NGOs engaged in development
work from pursuing projects in areas where it would assist CT missives most.
Fully understanding the dynamics of international anti-money laundering/countering the financing of
terrorism (AML/CFT) efforts and their impact on NGOs is not an easy task. It is currently of concern to many
people; however, most focus on humanitarian relief organizations. In contrast, this paper is focused on
development organizations.
What is striking about the conflict between AML/CFT and NGOs is that it mirrors one discussed in the
field of NGO accountability. NGO accountability is a field of study that can be loosely defined as the study of
how and why NGOs are held responsible for their obligations to stakeholders.1
The contemporary conflict in this
field is between state control of the NGO sector and the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms upon
which NGOs are based. The security-centric view is very similar to the AML/CFT approach to controlling
financing while the NGO perspective promotes a focus on self-governance. This approach, one would posit, would
encourage a self-governance model of accountability for the NGO sector.
This paper examines the conflict between the international policies on AML/CFT and its interaction with
NGOs and possible improvements to the current situation as informed by work on NGO accountability. In order
to do so, this paper asks two questions. First, what problems have government policies on anti-money
laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) caused for NGOs? Second, what solutions do
studies of NGO accountability offer these problems? How could solutions be used to ameliorate the seeming
conflict between AML/CFT policies and the working methods of international development NGOs?
The first question focuses on what has already happened. Based solely on the discussion among
policymakers, academics and NGO leaders, one would assume that the CFT laws have negatively affected NGOs.
Upon beginning this study, the expected answer to this question was that studies since 2001 would demonstrate
that international and national AML/CFT politics have negatively impacted funding of NGOs, increased NGO
1
Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl, “Rights and Responsibilities in the Political Landscape of NGO Accountability:
Introduction and Overview,” in NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations, eds. Lisa Jordan and Peter van
Tuijl (London: Routledge, 2006). See also: Kenneth Anderson, “What NGO Accountability Means – and Does Not Mean,”
American Journal of International Law 103 (2009): 170-78; Robert Lloyd, “The Role of NGO Self-Regulation in
Increasing Stakeholder Accountability,” (London: One World Trust. 2005); Robert Lloyd and Lucy de las Casas, “NGO
Self-Regulation: Enforcing and Balancing Accountability,” (London: One World Trust, n.d.); and Leif Wenar Leif.
“Accountability in International Development Aid” (draft), Ethics and International Affairs (2006).

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risk aversion leading to self-censorship to prevent criminal prosecutions and created more administrative work.
What was found was that there has been encroachment and violations upon the fundamental rights and freedoms
of NGOs and uneven applications of AML/CFT laws in addition to some data to support the negative impact upon
funding and self-censoring behavior among NGOs.
The second question, of which there are two parts, is focused on how to improve the current situation with
the understanding that there is a fundamental disconnect between the security and NGO sectors on how counter-
terrorism should be approached. This portion of the study was guided by the principles of study of NGO
accountability: focusing on transparency and reporting would provide greater public trust. It was expected that the
proposition of two conflicting models of NGO accountability and regulation, a state-centric model and a self-
regulatory model, would be supported by the literature and would be the starting point for examining how to
bridge the gap in AML/CFT policy. It was expected that the most important dimensions of the solutions would be
(a) increasing information sharing between the NGO sector and government agencies for ensuring complicit, (b)
creating more efficient means for NGOs to follow best practices, and (c) shifting the focus of NGO abuse to NGO
accountability to ensure that the donations reach their intended purposes.
To analyze this complex issue, the paper will start with a discussion of the NGO sector and NGO
accountability, then move to counter-terrorism theory and policy, then it will look at several cases, and finally it
will discuss the findings on a whole.
The NGO Sector
Civil Society organizations (CSOs) have been increasing in numbers, size and capacity over the latter half
of the 20th
century and beginning of the 21st
century. They have become a critical actor in international affairs
because the sector is a “central mechanism in the global voluntary redistribution of wealth and provision of
assistance to those most in need, and fulfils a range of positive cultural, religious, education and other social
purpose.”2
The non-profit organization (NPO) sector annually operates with a budget that dwarfs governmental
and intergovernmental equivalents.3
However, with that size and capacity comes other issues of responsibility,
oversight, accountability and security.
The following section explores the NGO sector from multiple perspectives. By utilizing multiple
perspectives, the intention is to gain a well-rounded understanding of what the NPO sector is, its operations, the
size of the sector globally, and what kinds of operations it is engaged in. Next, it will examine the international
laws that protect NGOs. Finally, it will move on to discuss the concepts of NGO responsibilities and
accountability. These concepts are closely linked to organizational theories and will address who the stakeholders
are.
2
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC). “Expert Working Group Meeting on Preventing the Abuse of
the Non-Profit Sector for the Purpose of Terrorist Financing.” Discussion Paper, January 18-20, 2011, quoted in
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), “Typologies Report: NPO Sector Vulnerabilities” (India, APG, 2011), 10.
3
APG, “Typologies Report: NPO Sector Vulnerabilities”, 10.

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Terminology
Oversimplification and generalization of language in this area can cause confusion about an already
complex issue. Many papers on this topic seem to negate defining their subject area – they pick a term and use it
as a catchall for the organizations they are discussing. In many cases, this seems harmless, but if papers discussing
the same examples use different terms, it can lead to confusion. There is good reason for confusion; terminology
often varies by standards determined by a government or organization. This leads to many papers using NGO,
NPO and CSO interchangeably despite that they often refer to distinct parts of civil society organizations. The
following section will provide clarity for the context of this paper and for approaching others in the same area.
NGO, NPO and CSO are terms that are used almost interchangeably with one used standardly in an
organization as the designated terminology. Consider the following description of NGOs:
NGOs are self-governing, private, not-for-profit and with an explicit social mission [and...] are
embedded in civil society as distinct from political society. While they can organize for a voice in
political debates, they are not organized to participate in elections or control the levels of state
power, like a political party. NGOs may provide services or advocacy to promote particular issues.
NGOs are active in such fields as human rights, environment and conservation, development and
peace, or they may have other social objectives. They are usually non-membership based and linked
to each other in networks or alliances that sometimes take the form of more formal associations.4
NGOs, furthermore, are distinctive from community-based organizations (CBOs) and social movements because
they are not limited to a specific community, like CBOs, nor are they so universal as to reach a “mass-based
constituency of support” like social movements.5
Furthermore, NGOs function under an explicit lawful framework
and regulatory structure, which enables them to receive donations, while CBOs and social movements may convey
the interests of their supporters more directly, but receive less or no financial support.6
The term civil society refers
to the public sphere “where citizens associate voluntarily, outside their families or businesses, to advance their
interests, ideas or ideologies.”7
As civil society is a very broad concept, NGOs, CBOs and social movements,
religious organizations and professional associations are all part of it.8
Unfortunately, in some cases, CSO may be
used interchangeably with NGO when only NGOs are meant and vice-versa. This problem CBOs operating in a
country where they register as an NGO, which leads to confusion. Best efforts will be made in this paper to ensure
clear delineation of NGOs versus CSOs.
There is relatively little, if any, difference between NGOs and NPOs. Clarifying between the two can be
almost impossible as seen here:
While NGOs have no fixed or formal definition, they are generally defined as nonprofit entities
independent of governmental influence (although they may receive government funding). ...the
difference between nonprofit organizations (NPOs) and NGOs is slim. However, the term "NGO"
is not typically applied to U.S.-based nonprofit organizations. Generally, the NGO label is given
4
Jordan and van Tuijl, “Rights and Responsibilities in the Political Landscape of NGO Accountability: Introduction and
Overview,” 8.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.

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to organizations operating on an international level although some countries classify their own
civil society groups as NGOs. 9
Consider in this vein that in the US, NPO is the preferred term because of how these organizations file their tax
exempt document, whereas in the UK charity is the dominant term.10
The FATF uses the term to refer to the sector
as a whole. Countries tend to favor NGO or NPO as a term depending on their own laws. Some NGOs also
operate beyond the borders of a single state. These international NGOs ae often referred to as INGOs and are
vulnerable to AML-CFT laws as they are often operating in higher risk areas and take donations in multiple
jurisdictions.
Ultimately, it is not inappropriate to use NGO and NPO interchangeably. Preference may be given to the
use of the term NGO and INGO, but efforts will be made to clarify the intended definition of the source materials
discussed throughout the paper.
Scope and Structure
The key to understanding the CSO sector – including the NGO portion - is understanding that it is very
large and diverse. The size, type and mission of organizations in the sector are hugely varied and they work in
every country across the globe. The millions of organizations handle billions of dollars and undertake projects in
all fields. This sector will explore some of these dimensions.
The number of NGOs operating globally is hard to fix. Most countries have overlapping categories in the
CSO sector, which groups different types of organizations together.
The economic capacity of civil society is enormous. According to a report from the Johns Hopkins Center
for Civil Society, the annual operating expenditure of the NGO sector operating in 36 jurisdictions is USD $1.3
trillion with USD $20 billion being transferred to developing countries.11
Comparatively, in 2009, the members
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OEDC) Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) provided USD $119.3 billion.12
NGOs participate in a variety of activities, which are often influenced by the environment the NGO is
located in and whether its mission is focused domestically, internationally or both. The aforementioned study done
by the Center on Civil Society Studies identifies some areas of NGO work; these include cultural, health, social
9
“NGO definition and role,” Grant Space, accessed on August 11, 2013, http://grantspace.org/Tools/Knowledge-
Base/Resources-for-Non-U.S.-Grantseekers/NGO-definition-and-role.
10
“Understanding International NGOs and Nonprofits,” Maxwell School of Syracuse University, accessed on August 11,
2013, http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/career.aspx?id=202.
11
Lester M. Salamon, Helmut K. Anheier, and Associates, “Civil Society in Comparative Perspective,” in Global Civil
Society: Dimension of the Non-Profit Sector. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999),
3-39. While this report was published in 1999, it was cited in a 2011 report by the Asia/Pacific Group on Money
Laundering (APG). The APG report has been routinely cited regarding the size and importance of the NGO sector and there
does not appear to be another study that has amassed the same data since that point. It is important to note that these
numbers included non-profits in developed countries, like the United States, that do political fund-raising for campaigns.
These inclusions might skew some of data numbers, but these numbers have been quoted in documents being used in
current policy-making circles.
12
APG, “Typologies Report: Vulnerabilities of the NPO Sector”, 10.

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service, development, civic and advocacy, philanthropy, and religious congregations.13
The geographical location
of NGOs often influences whether they focus on national issues or look more globally; developed countries offer
better infrastructure for launching projects abroad while NGOs in developing countries tend to focus their projects
at home to meet local needs before global needs.14
The size and wealth of NGOs varies greatly as well. Developed
countries offer better infrastructure and donor pools.15
NGOs use a variety of funding. It can come from, for example, donors, grants, memberships, and product
sales (such as research reports). Donors can be individuals, corporations, other CSOs, governments or
international organizations. Many foundations provide grants to NGOs that fund their projects. At the same time,
governments often have branches that fund INGO projects such as the United Kingdom's Department for
International Development (DFIT), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the
Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA).16
Corporations often donate money to foundations as part of tax
exempt giving.17
NGO funders give for a variety of reasons ranging from tax exemptions to supporting causes and
policies.
Rights and Protections of the NGO Sector
The rights and protections of the NGO sector are based in international law. These rights are critical for
the sector to maintain its independence from the government and undertake social missions. The basic principle
is that NGOs have rights extending from the rights of individuals; this is to say that if these rights and protections
are not respected in civil society, then the rights of individuals are being violated. Upholding these rights is critical
to a well-functioning NGO sector that is able to positively contribute to greater society.
The most basic of these rights are the Freedom of Association, Freedom of Expression and the Right to
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly. NGOs have argued and taken these further to include other rights, including the
protection of the rights of the NGOs from government interference, the right to communication and cooperation
among NGOs, and the right to seek and secure resources.18
These rights should ultimately be upheld by the state
as part of its duties to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.19
NGOs enjoy these rights and in return
are considered to have responsibilities to their stakeholders and are accountable for their actions. These rights are
based in international law and have been subscribed to by the majority of the international community.20
13
Salamon et. al., “Civil Society in Comparative Perspective,” 7. INGOs have been given their own category in this study.
14
APG, “Typologies Report: Vulnerabilities of the NPO Sector,” 11.
15
Ibid..
16
Jem Bendell and Phyllida Cox, “The Donor Accountability Agenda,” in NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and
Innovations, eds. Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl (London: Routledge, 2006), 110.
17
Ibid.
18
International Center for Non-for-Profit Law (ICNL) and World Movement for Democracy Secretariat at the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED), “Defending Civil Society,” 2nd
Edition. International Journal for Not-for-Profit Law
13, no 3 (2012): 13-14.
19
Overview,” 8.
20
The Declarations, Covenants, Conventions and other documents of international law referred to here are general accepted

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Governments can infringe on these rights in a number of ways. Jordan and van Tuijl identify five ways
that governments can infringe on the rights of NGOs: challenging an organization's credibility, co-opting or
corrupting organizations, legally challenging organizations, disturbing an organization's operations, and
intervening in an organization beyond the rule of law.21
The report “Defending Civil Society” from the
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) and the World Movement for Democracy Secretariat at the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) identifies six “barriers” to CSOs rights, which directly correspond to
the rights they identify. These six barriers are: barriers to forming organizations, barriers to operations and
activities, barriers to free expression including advocacy, barriers to contact and communication among CSOs and
those outside of CSOs, barriers to “peaceful public gatherings”, and barriers that prevent organizations from
securing financial resources.22
The common thread among the two lists in that government infringement and
violation of rights are directly connected to fundamental freedoms.
The ICNL and NED report highlights the importance of striking a balance between the rights of the
individual (person or association) against the rights of the whole. Juxtaposing these sometime competing rights
illustrates the challenges for ensuring public safety. The report argues that “legitimate state interests can never
justify the use of disproportionate constraints.”23
The legal term for this idea is that of proportionality. The principle
of proportionality is critical for considering regulation of and interference with the NGO sector. An assessment,
risk or impact based, will illustrate key components of policy. Overly restrictive policy can never be justified
under this principle, even in the case of public security.24
NGO Responsibilities and Accountability
NGOs are seen as legitimate actors on the global stage for certain purposes, but the sector has been asked
fundamental questions in recent years. What are an organizations' responsibilities? Who are they accountable to?
What should the answers to these two questions be? How can accountability best be achieved? Responsibility and
accountability, however, are not the same thing. Accountability is “second-order responsibility”, which is to say
by the intentional community, though not universally. States must ratify each document and oversee their enforcement.
Ratification and periodic reports of the documents relevant to the NGO sector can be found online at the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (www.ohchr.org). Periodic reports under each treaty can be found here:
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/NewhvVAllSPRByCountry.
21
Overview,”, 6.
22
ICNL and NED, “Defending Civil Society.”, 13-14.
23
Ibid., 15-32, 35. Overly restrictive constraints are named in the report as: “arrest of individuals simply for participating in
the activities of an unregistered organization; restriction of the right to register an NGO to citizens only; denial of registration
to an NGO dedicated to cultural preservation of a minority group or to human rights; restriction of NGO activities to the
confines of governments’ predefined development priorities and plans; granting of unlimited authority to the state to inspect
NGO premises or attend any NGO meeting or event; harassment, arrest, and imprisonment of peaceful critics of the
government; closure of international NGOs for engaging in peaceful, lawful activities; arrest of local NGO representatives
for meeting with foreign students; requirement that NGOs receive advance permission from the state before meeting or
participating in foreign NGO networks; and/or placement of stifling restraints on the ability to access resources.”
24
Ibid., 35.

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they have the added responsibility to be able to demonstrate that they have fulfilled their responsibilities.25
This
section will parse out the areas of NGO responsibility and then discuss NGO accountability.
According to Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl, NGOs have three major areas of responsibility:
organizational, mission and obligations to stakeholders (see Error! Reference source not found..26
NGO
responsibilities are based in the organizational structures and the social missions of the organizations. What NGOs
are responsible for, and how, has evolved as the sector has changed and adapted. Organizational responsibilities
include transparency, efficiency and working within legal confines. Functioning legally assumes that universal
rights are respected, which in turn ensures that the rights of the NGO sector are protected by the state. Mission
responsibilities mean that the organization fulfills the state goals of an organization. Finally, the responsibilities
that NGOs have to internal and external stakeholders include communication with both those impacted or involved
in the activities of the NGOs as well as those less directly involved.27
Information regarding an organization’s
responsibilities are often published on its website for the public to see; for example the mission statement will
often identify the organization’s goals and the methods by which the organization intends to achieve them.
Table 1: NGO Responsibilities 28
Organizational
Responsibilities
Transparency in decision-making and accountability
Efficiency in operations
Working within legal confines in a transparent mannerA
Mission Responsibilities Fulfilling the stated goals of the organization.
ex. promoting the rights of the poor, alleviation of hunger etc.
Responsibilities to
Stakeholders
Obligations to those impacted or involved in the activities of the NGO. Includes
internal and external stakeholders.
A
This assumes universal rights are respected and the state protects the rights of the sector
This is the point where oversight and accountability should be disambiguated. Oversight and
accountability are not necessarily the same thing, though sometimes they are used interchangeably or one is used
when the other is meant. Oversight indicates that a person or body is viewing the activity of an organization to
review and commend or censure as appropriate. Oversight mechanisms may also have impacts on the regular
functioning of the organization, such as funding. The oversight body is metaphorically over the organization.
Oversight comes close to a definition of accountability from the 1990s where it is defined as “the means by which
individuals or organizations report to a reorganized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their
25
Leif Wenar,“Accountability in International Development Aid” (draft). Ethics and International Affairs (2006): 5.
26
Overview,”, 6.
27
Ibid.
28
Overview,” 4.

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actions.”29
Oversight thus indicates the supervision of a body over the organization; accountability does not
always fit into this definition. In some cases, accountability may be to a body that is above (vertically upwards),
but accountability can also have directionality downwards or horizontal, as well as to either internal or external
stakeholders.
NGO accountability is the process by which NGOs are both held responsible and take responsibility for
their actions. Accountability can take place within an organization, among organizations, within the sector, or
beyond the sector. Furthermore, it includes the concepts of accountability to stakeholders – these can include a
governing body, donors, people affected by the policies and programs of the organization, and in the case of
counter-terrorism, the security sector.30
Accountability is also an ongoing process (see Error! Reference source
not found. ) that should be
ongoing.
The demand for NGO
accountability is directly
connected to the rise of NGOs in
the latter part of the 20th century.
As NGOs became prominent
national and international actors
that were viewed as agents of
public action and received public
and private funding to implement
programs, stakeholders began to
ask for more accountability in the
sector. The change in public
perception of NGOs and their
effectiveness and legitimacy has
directly impacted the
accountability debate. Jordan and
van Tuijl's volume “NGO
Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovation” describes this evolution and how the post-9/11 world is
struggling with contradicting demands on how to meet NGO accountability needs, and maintain – or (re-)create –
positive relations among NGOs and governments. Error! Reference source not found. (Error! Reference
29
Michael Edwards and David Hulme, “Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on Nongovernmental
Organizations.” World Development 24, no. 6 (1996): 967 quoted in Alnoor Ebrahim, “Accountability In Practice:
Mechanisms for NGOs,” World Development 31, no 5 (2003): 813-814.
30
Overview,” 4-7.
Figure 1: Accountability Process for NGOs

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source not found. below) shows what Jodan and van Tuijl call the first three syllogisms31
of NGO accountability
that shows the rise of NGOs coincided with a lack of trust of the state and belief that NGOs were better able to
implement action on the ground.32
Error! Reference source not found. (Error! Reference source not found.
below) shows the current era where a schism has emerged that are not entirely compatible: a state-centered
approach and a rights-based approach.
Table 2: Phases of NGO Accountability I33
Syllogism Statements34
Syllogism1:
Complementing
Government
1980-1989
1. Governments are not good at delivering public services.
2. NGOs are closer to the public.
3. NGOs are good at delivering public services.
Summation: “Perceptions of NGO accountability focused on financial accountability, organizational
capacity, efficiency, and performance delivery.”
- NGOs were seen as capable and willing to do something that governments could not and would not do.
- Governments viewed as too large, inefficient or corrupt. Aid and other financial resources shifted from
government agencies to NGOs.
- NGO work shifted from charity and emergency relief to longer term sustainable development. There
was very little discussion of NGO accountability beyond financial accountability.
Syllogism2:
TheRiseofCivil
Society
1989-1995
1. Civil society is necessary for democracy.
2. NGOs are civil society.
3. NGOs are good for democratic development.
Summation: During this period, perception of NGO accountability focused on internal governance and
formalization of organizational intent and behavior through codes of conduct and mission statements.
- This period corresponded with the fall of the Berlin Wall where NGOs were seen as a driving force
behind democratization.
Syllogism3:
TheRiseofGood
Governance
1995-2002
1. Good governance is necessary for development.
2. NGOs are not different from other organizations in civil society.
3. NGOs need to apply to principles of good governance.
Summation: Perception of NGO accountability focused on legitimacy and establishing self-regulation
or independent accreditation mechanisms.
- This period resulted from a backlash against the Washington Consensus development model.
- NGOs became part of the good governance movement to help them respond better to the public
31
The term syllogism is not a common term; Jordan and van Tuijl use it to formulate a sophisticated argument about the
evolution of NGO accountability and there is no adequate substitution for its use in the context. At its core, a syllogism is
an argument based in deductive reasoning. Dictionary.com provides this definition: “Logic. an argument the conclusion of
which is supported by two premises, of which one (major premise) contains the term (major term) that is the predicate of
the conclusion, and the other (minor premise) contains the term (minor term) that is the subject of the conclusion; common
to both premises is a term (middle term) that is excluded from the conclusion. A typical form is “All A is C; all B is A;
therefore all B is C.” Similarly, the Merriam Webster Dictionary alters
32
Ibid.
33
Adapted from Jordan and van Tuijl, “Rights and Responsibilities in the Political Landscape of NGO Accountability:
Introduction and Overview,” 9-13. Significant portions are directly quoted to ensure accurate representation of their model.
The names of each syllogism, time span and analysis through the use of syllogisms is all the work of Jordan and van Tuijl.
34
The statements and conclusions of the syllogisms, in the shaded boxes, are taken directly from Jordan and van Tuijl,
“Rights and Responsibilities in the Political Landscape of NGO Accountability: Introduction and Overview,” 9-13. The
syllogism summaries in the box below the numbered statements are summaries of context for the syllogisms. Only direct
quotes in the summaries are acknowledged.

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contrary to other development agents.
- NGOs developed with independent accreditation mechanisms and self-regulation through federations
and associations.
Error! Reference source not found. (below) shows is Jordan and van Tuijl's argument for the claim that
there is a schism in the dominant perception of NGO accountability and how best to hold them responsible. On
the one hand is the perspective dominated by security concerns that argues that the state should regain its
prominent role as the central authority and regulate civil society. However, the second perspective, called a rights-
based approach, focuses on NGOs rights as representatives of civil society and their obligations to multiple
stakeholders to create mechanisms within their own organizations and within the sector to hold them
accountable.35
The disconnect between these two points of view of NGO accountability is reflected in the counter-
terrorism debates between the NGO and security sectors. The impasse between government and NGOs in matters
of oversight, regulation, and accountability factors significantly into problems in the AML/CFT implementation.
As will be examined further, INGOs and international terrorist organizations, domestic civil society and domestic
terrorists seek to build communication and transportation networks that can “at times [be] used to circumvent state
control.”36
Table 3: Phase of NGO Accountability (II)37
Syllogism Statements and Summaries38
Syllogism4:
TheReturntoState
Supremacy
(2002onwards)
1. Government is essential to ensure safety and development.
2. NGOs' influence is not proportion to their credentials.
3. NGOs need to be kept in check by legitimate government frameworks.
Summation: Perceptions of NGO accountability focused on legitimacy and establishing self-regulation or
independent accreditation mechanisms.
- Perception of NGO accountability became based on screening credibility and promoting external (state)
control.
- This period showed a return to state centrality. Some states reclaimed control over aid distribution, like
the US.
- Increase in NGO laws, both nationally and globally.
- Focus on counter-terrorism has supported the state-centered moved against NGOs.
Syllogism
5:
ARights
Based
Approach
(2002
onwards)
1. There is no democratic global governance supporting universal human rights.
2. NGOs assert and solidify human rights in different political arenas and regardless of the state of
governance.
3. NGOs contribute to democratic governance by articulating public policy needs and practicing solutions
and resolving public needs.
35
Ibid. 12-13.
36
Elizabeth A. Bloodgood and Joannie Tremblay-Boire, “International NGOs and National Regulation in an Age of
Terrorism,” Voluntas 22 (2011): 146.
37
Adapted from Jordan and van Tuijl, “Rights and Responsibilities in the Political Landscape of NGO Accountability:
Introduction and Overview,” 9-13. Significant portions are directly quoted to ensure accurate representation of their model.
The names of each syllogism, time span and analysis through the use of syllogisms is all the work of Jordan and van Tuijl.
38
The statements and conclusions of the syllogisms, in the shaded boxes, are taken directly from Jordan and van Tuijl,
“Rights and Responsibilities in the Political Landscape of NGO Accountability: Introduction and Overview,” 9-13. The
syllogism summaries in the box below the numbered statements are summaries of context for the syllogisms. Only direct
quotes in the summaries are acknowledged.

Boyer 14
Syllogism Statements and Summaries38
Summation: “Perception of NGO accountability focused on balancing multiple responsibilities to different
constituencies or stakeholders, using a variety of mechanisms, servicing accreditation rather than
regulation.
- Based on the principles of human rights and supported by the differences of trust in different institutions,
this syllogism competes with the fourth syllogism for supremacy in the contemporary period. It is in
opposition to the rise of state centrality and greater control over NGOs.
- Global public opinion (at least what has been surveyed) seems to believe that NGOs contribute to the
public good.
- “...the publics surveyed believed NGOs were the closest organizational form to their own personal social
networks and offered more reliable information than leaders, experts, the media, governments and
corporations. The public expectation of NGO accountability, we would posit, relates to the missions and
services provided to the beneficiaries.”39
(p. 13)
So how do NGOs work to demonstrate that they are upholding their responsibilities? NGOs have
developed different types of accountability mechanisms depending on the issues at stake, resources available and
stakeholders asking for information.
NGO Accountability Mechanisms40
There are many types of accountability mechanisms. The one used by an NGO depends on the one best
suited to the type of accountability the organization seeks to demonstrate and who they are attempting to
demonstrate it to. Some types of accountability mechanisms are better known, like annual reports and financial
audits, while others like ethics committees and certification systems may not be. The following discussion will
look at mechanisms based upon the direction of accountability: vertical (upwards), horizontal, and vertical
(downwards). By grouping mechanisms in these categories, similar mechanisms that may target different groups
of stakeholders in the same direction may be addressed together. It will also assist in parsing out issues in the
conflict between the public security and NGO sectors.
Accountability mechanisms also meet different types of needs for the organization. Some are aimed at
ensuring there is no wrong-doing while others attempt to gather feedback about impact and assess whether the
program is meeting its intended goals. At its best, accountability can be viewed as a learning process where the
demonstration of responsibility leads one to learn how to improve on existing practices or programs. Consider
these additional components as the following examples are discussed.
Vertical accountability moves either upwards or downwards. Upwards accountability indicates that the
stakeholders are above the organization. These may be donors, Boards (Trustees, Directors or similar), or oversight
bodies (like government agencies or ethics committees). These groups seek information as a means of ensuring
39
Ibid., 13.
40
This section draws on the knowledge from many of the experts in the field. It has been particularly influenced by: Lisa
Jordan, “Mechanisms for NGO Accountability,” Global Public Policy Research Institute Research Series Paper No. 3,
Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), (2009): 9-11; Wenar,“Accountability in International Development Aid.”;

Boyer 15
that an organization is operating as it intended, legally and that there is no misappropriation of resources. The
types of accountability mechanisms that may be used here are annual reports, financial accounts (annually or
quarterly, narrative or spreadsheets depending on who is being reported to), performance assessments of the entire
organization or of a particular program, quarterly reports, independent evaluations, legal status registration,
accreditation, audits, certification systems, ratings systems, administrative courts, logical framework analysis and
metrics.41
The mechanisms that are directed upwards are generally targeted to the audience they seek to address.
For example, financial accounts may differ in presentation whether they are incorporated into the annual report
for donors, or whether they are being submitted to the government for a tax-exempted status.
Horizontal accountability mechanisms are mechanisms that occur within the NGO sector and often occur
within the context of NGO collaborations, networks or joint efforts. Accountability mechanisms here could also
include tools that work for stakeholders within the organization. For example, whistleblower protection policies
ensure that employees are protected when revealing wrongdoing; this can ensure internal accountability that
contributes to the accountability to external stakeholders. Other examples of horizontal accountability mechanisms
are annual reports, codes of conduct, ethics committees, performance reviews, ombudsman (for internal or external
stakeholder concerns, independent evaluation systems, certification systems, rating systems, administrative
courts, infrastructure management and capacity building tools, and accreditation. These mechanisms are generally
administered by the organization itself or another NGO in the sector. The resulting material, when appropriate, is
used by the organization to improve. Some processes, like accreditation, codes of conduct, and certification
systems, are a means of providing additional legitimacy to NGOs willing to undertake the initiative. They are
frequently administered by other NGOs or groups of NGOs. Often the horizontal mechanisms have little
enforcement power, which may erode their legitimacy from some points of view.42
Vertical accountability downwards is the accountability to those impacted by the actions of the NGO. In
the case of development NGOs, this most frequently means those that receive the services.43
It is the least relevant
for the scope of this paper, but important to note. Downward accountability is very difficult because it is frequently
overlooked. Mechanism types include financial accounts, performance assessments, stakeholder assessments,
ombudsmen, independent evaluations, complaint procedures, and social audits.
There are shared types of mechanisms in all three types of accountability. The simple explanation for this
is that different circumstances require different structures. A certification or accreditation system may be
implemented by either the government or an NGO network, partnership, federation or coalition. [NGO networks
or partnerships are groups of NGOs with similar goals who agree to work together.] A large state with significant
funding may have the potential to accredit NGOs while in other cases, it may be logistically – and perhaps
financially – more practically realistic if a group of NGOs working on a specific issue accredit the NGOs working
41
Jordan, “Mechanisms for NGO Accountability,” 9-11; and Wenar,“Accountability in International Development Aid,” 18.
42
Ibid.
43
Jordan, “Mechanisms for NGO Accountability”, 9.

Boyer 16
on the same issue. Financial accountability remains one of the greatest issues as the misuse of funds is a criminal
matter and in many countries NGOs enjoy a tax-exempt status. Governments generally regulate financial audits
and review the financial statements, particularly for organizations with large donor contributions.
Table 4: Types of NGO Accountability Mechanisms by Directionality
Type of NGO Accountability
Mechanism
Vertical (Upwards)
Accountability
Mechanisms
Horizontal
Accountability
Mechanisms
Vertical (Downwards)
Accountability
Mechanisms
Annual Reports X X
Financial Accounts or Reports X X
Ethics Committees X X
Performance Assessments X X
Codes of Conduct X X
Quarterly Reports X
Ombudsman X X
Stakeholder Assessment X
Independent Evaluations X X X
Complaints Procedures X
Certification Systems X X
Ratings Systems X X
Social Audit X
Administrative Courts X X X
Audits X
Accreditation X X
Legal Status Registration X
Logistical Framework Analysis X
Metrics X
Infrastructure Management and
Capacity Building Tools
X
Whistleblower Protection Policies X
The important thing to take away about these mechanisms is that they are adaptable and can be adjusted
to the situation. Focusing on a single type of accountability mechanism, however, when responsibilities and
operations are interconnected will most likely not produce the best results. As the discussion moves on to
terrorism, consider the issues that NGOs confront in their programming work and their overall organization from
a management perspective.
A Background on Terrorism
Similar to other complex social phenomena, international terrorism is not the result of a single, or even a
dozen, causes. Answering the six basic W and H questions (who, what, when, where, how and why) is a complex
process that has interested parties rising to the challenge. Answering these six basic questions could help the
universal understanding of terrorism and help lead to a comprehensive policy that could be applied regardless of
space and time. For now, to understand the discourse on terrorism, in academic circles as well as among

Boyer 17
practitioners, is the most important part of tacking these issues. The following section will provide insight on the
present challenges in study and practice by focusing on two basic components: the “what” (definitions of
terrorism) and the “why” (causes of terrorism).
Defining Terrorism
There is no universally used or agreed upon definition of terrorism.44
Invested parties have been trying to
use the many cases of terrorism to capture the phenomenon in a single, comprehensive definition. Definitions,
however, suffer from the problem that they are recognized when they occur, but are often are too broad or too
narrow. Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman describes this problem as a result of the frequency with which the word
is used such that “most people have a vague idea or impression of what [it] is, but lack a more precise, concrete
and truly explanatory definition of the word.”45
Americans best understand this dilemma as illustrated by the
opinion of American Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's in Jacobellis v. Ohio regarding the definition of
pornography: “I shall not...attempt further to define [it], and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing
so. But I know it when I see it (emphasis added).”46
The following paragraphs will highlight these difficulties
through examples.
Academic researchers tend to define major trends among terrorists or terrorists organizations, based on
both qualitative and quantitative data, in order to define terrorism. Martha Crenshaw and Maryann Cusimano Love
identify that terrorism is illegitimate violence (that is to say violence or force not authorized by a state authority)
by non-state actors.47
They also describe it as “organized and purposive political violence that is perceived as
unacceptable by society because of its cruelty and unexpectedness.”48
Bruce Hoffman dedicates an entire chapter
in his seminal work Inside Terrorrism to the definition terrorism and its evolution over time. He defines terrorism
as “the deliberate create of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change,” but
not until after he has examine the social evolution, what is not terrorism, and the inconsistency with which the
word is used.49
Bueno de Mesquita defines it as “any act of violence undertaken for the purpose of altering a
government’s political policies or actions that target those who do not actually have the personal authority to alter
governmental policy.” The actions aim to “spread fear and anxiety (terror) though the population so that it will, in
turn, put pressure on its leaders to change policies in a way favored by terrorists.”50
While the academic community
44
Rhonda L. Callway and Julie Harrelson-Stephens,”Toward a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant of
Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no 8 (2006): 680.
45
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998): 13
46
Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 US. 184 (1964); “Jacobellis v. Ohio | LIL /Legal Information Institute,” Legal Information Institute
Cornell University Law School, accessed on August 16, 2013,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0378_0184_ZC1.html.
47
Martha Crenshaw and Mariann Cusimano Love, “Networked Terror,” in Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda
2006 (3rd ed.) edited by Mariann Cusimano Love (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth): 120.
48
Ibid., 119.
49
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 43.
50
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. Principles of International Politics: People’s Power, Preferences,
and Perceptions. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), 339 in Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens, “Toward a Theory of

Boyer 18
cannot agree on the precise definition of terrorism in terms of language, the definitions show a common use of
illegitimate violence for an ideological or political purpose.
The international community uses international law to define terrorism, but does not use a single
definition. There are 14 protocols and conventions that define the actions and behaviors of terrorism (see Appendix
2: List of International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism on p. 45 for full list). While this may avoid some
diplomatic issues, it does not assist in creating a normative
policy. The UN Security Council has not attempted to
define terrorism through resolution despite having passed
numerous resolutions regarding international terrorism.
The practitioners that deal with the effective use of what
the definition means legally focus on criminalization of the
acts (see for example the UN Counter-Terrorism
Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) Technical
Guide).51
In an attempt to provide guidance to states
drafting counter-terrorism laws, the first Special
Rapporteur on Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, defined a best
practice for criminalizing terrorism within a penal code by
clearly identifying the action, the intent of the action and
that it must correspond to a serious crime in national law.52
The legal approach enables states to fit the legal definition
within their legal structure while ensuring that they comply
with their treaty obligations. It also enables states to frame
the issue of terrorism within the unique cultural context of
their state.
In sum, terrorism is political violence motivated by a cause where the act seeks to trigger fear in order to
force decision makers to concede to the perpetrator’s demands. Variations exist, and are often identified after the
fact.
Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant of Terrorism,” 775.
51
United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), “Technical Guide to the Implementation of
Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001),” CTED, (New York, NY: CTED, 2009),
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/technical_guide_2009.pdf.
52
United Nations Human Rights Council, 16th
Session, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, Ten areas of best practices while countering
terrorism,” (A/HRC/16/51), December 22, 2010.
Figure 2: Best Practice Legal Definition of
Terrorism from the UN Special Rapporteur
Practice 7. Model definition of terrorism
Terrorism means an action or attempted action where:
1. The action:
(a) Constituted the intentional taking of
hostages; or
(b) Is intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to one or more members of the general
population or segments of it; or
(c) Involved lethal or serious physical violence
against one or more members of the general
population or segments of it;
and
2. the action is done or attempted with the intention of:
(a) Provoking a state of terror in the general
public or a segment of it; or
(b) Compelling a Government or international
organization to do or abstain from doing
something;
and
3. The action corresponds to:
(a) the definition of a serious offence in national
law, enacted for the purpose of complying
with international conventions and protocols
relating to terrorism or with resolutions of the
Security Council relating to terrorism; or
(b) All elements of a serious crime defined by
national law.

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Causes of Terrorism
The “why” of terrorism is closely connected to the “what.” Prevention is the ultimate policy goal, which
makes understanding what causes it invaluable. However, just as there is no consensus on the definition, definitive
causes seem just as elusive. The following section will attempt to shed some light on the discourse, what consensus
does exist and what relationship development work has to terrorism.
The amount of academic research on the root causes of terrorism is expansive, especially since 9/11,
though many studies seem to be re-testing the theories of others and there is no universally defined approach for
how to analyze the connections between the conditions in a place that generates the perpetrators of terrorism or
where the targets of terrorism are most likely to be. For every study that produces an assertion of causality that
seems empirically rooted, there seems to be another arguing the lack of a significant relationship, or even the
inverse. What can be gleaned from the multitude of studies is what assumptions they make, the major theories that
drive how terrorism is understood, the indicators used to predict terrorism and ultimately what this says about the
current state of the understanding of the study of terrorism - particularly the predictors.
There are two theories that run through the literature related to the causes of terrorism: relative deprivation
attributed to Ted Robert Gurr and political opportunity structures attributed to Charles Tilly. As much of the
literature that examines the causes of terrorism is based on one of these two theories.53
James A. Piazza explains:
“...Gurr developed the term 'relative deprivation,' which links economic disparity with the
propensity of individuals to resort to violent political action. Gurr uses relative deprivation to
'denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective
value satisfaction that disposes men to violence.' When individuals' expectations of economic or
political goods exceed the actual distribution of those goods, political violence is more likely.”54
In sum, relative deprivation explains why the poorest may not revolt while those with the knowledge of their
unequal position may resort to political violence. On the other hand, Tilly's explanation of political violence is
based upon the opportunities and settings of the violence. Piazza describes Tilly's argument as follows:
“...the primary predictor of revolutions, strikes, insurgencies, and incidents of mass political
terror is the degree to which the existing political system that contextualizing these events
facilitates independent organization and collective action. Though the citizenry of a dictatorship
might be deprived materially, the paucity of avenues for expression of discontent or the degree
of state repression of autonomous political expression will suppress activity like terrorism. In
societies where independent political expression is permitted, non-state political association is
allowed and the government does not resort to oppression to control political outcomes,
deprivation can indeed lead to political violence. However, the opportunity structure is
requisite.”55
Previous research on conflict has proved that both of these theories demonstrate causal relationships with violent
53
James A. Piazza, “Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages,” Terrorism and
Political Violence 18, no. 1(2006): 159-164.
54
Ibid., 162.
55
Ibid., 162.

Boyer 20
political conflict. These two theories may serve as a starting basis for understanding the causes of terrorism, but
they don't help define the specific causes.
If much of the literature on the causes and conditions of terrorism begin at the fundamentals described by
Gurr and Tilly, then why is there so much literature dedicated to the causes and so little consensus? The answer is
similar to why terrorism cannot be defined. The biggest problem faced by any researcher in determining the causes
of terrorism is that there is no definition of terrorism. Joseph Pilat describes this problem eloquently:
Determining the causes of terrorism depends on the definition of terrorism; a common
definition has proven elusive, as the phrase ‘one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom
fighter’ suggests. Not only is there is no agreed general definition of terrorism, the term
is laden with ideological, political and moral baggage. However, there has been some
convergence on this matter in recent years, especially since 9/11.56
With this in mind, it is possible to embark into the murky waters of defining the causal links between the causes
and the permissive conditions, and what gives way to terrorism.
By simply querying academic databases, it becomes possible to see the thematic groupings within which
researchers delineate the different causes of terrorism. On a large level one can reduce the causes of terrorism into
four thematic groups of variables: political, economic, social, conflict, and global variables. Political factors
include a lack of rule of law57
, the institutional order58
, political transition59
, and perpetuation of factors and/or
terrorism by the state through policy.60
Social factors include radicalization through social processes61
,
contagion62
, identity conflict63
, “youth bulge”64
, social change65
, sense of humiliation or alienation66
, and
exclusion.67
Conflict factors include violent conflict68
and human rights violations69
. Economic and development
factors include poverty70
, modernization (development)71
, urbanization72
, and inequality.73
Global factors include
56
Joseph F. Pilat, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Journal of Organizational Transformation and Social Change 6, no. 2 (2009):
171.
57
See Tom Parker, “Why Right is Might: How the Social Science on Radicalism suggest that International Human Rights
Norms actually help frame Effective Counterrorism Policies,” Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 3 (2012); and David H.
Gray and Kristina LaTour, “Terrorist Black Holes: Global Regions Shrouded in Lawlessness,” Global Security Studies 1,
no. 1 (2010).
58
See Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks. "What causes terrorism?." Public Choice 147, no. 1-2 (2011): 3-27.
59
Ibid.
60
See Parker, “Why Right is Might.”
61
Ibid.
62
See Krieger and Meierrieks, “What Causes Terrorism?”.
63
See Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, and Alan S. Waterman. "Terrorism: An identity theory perspective." Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 6 (2009): 537-559.; Krieger and Meierrieks, “What Causes Terrorism?”.; and Milton J. Esman,
An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict. (Cambridge:Polity Press, 2004).
64
See Parker, “Why Right is Might.”; and Edward Newman, “Exploring the “root causes” of terrorism." Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 8 (2006): 749-772.
65
See Newman, “Exploring the “root causes” of terrorism,” 749-772.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
68
See Newman, “Exploring the “root causes” of terrorism,” 749-772.; and Esman, An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict.
69
See Parker, “Why Right is Might.”
70
71
Krieger and Meierrieks, “What Causes Terrorism?”.; and Newman, “Exploring the “root causes” of terrorism,” 749-772.
72
73
Ibid.

Boyer 21
globalization74
, increased global access at a decreasing cost75
, sense of foreign occupation or hegemony76
and the
negative effects or impact of globalization.77
While the aforementioned list is not exhaustive, it could be endless
because of the obstacle described by Pilat.78
Each groups has generated indicators that researchers have used to determine what influences terrorism:
political, economic, social and conflict. Table 5 (see Appendix 1 on p. 41) depicts what information has been
gleaned by researchers Gassebner and Luechinger by examining all of the research done up to 2011 and compiling
the information on academic research, the indicators used in the studies and it gives a compelling description of
what research has been done already.79
The information in the table takes the data that Gassebner and Luechinger
use for their own regressional analyses (of which they performed hundreds) to determine what variables show
significant correlation to terrorist attacks. Gassebner and Luechinger only use certain variables that they highlight
to look for significance despite their extensive review of all the literature.
Gassebner and Luechinger’s literature review demonstrates what seems to be a common problem in
research done on the causes of terrorism. Certain indicators are favored over others for studying the causes of
terrorism in such a way that reflects the assumptions and biases of the fields that produced them. For example,
economic studies appear to give priority to GDP, but few look at indicators that explain the overall health of the
economy, like employment or inflation rates. There is already disagreement in the field of economists over the
best measures, for example in examining economic health or development, and this debate doesn't disappear for
scholars studying the causes of terrorism. By far, the majority of studies surveyed by Gassebner and Luechinger
that look at economic causes utilize GDP per capita as their indicator (38 studies) whereas 12 utilized GDP growth
and 8 utilized the GINI coefficient for income disparity. Other factors such as economic aid received, economic
freedom, Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), transfers (likely in the form of remittances), the inflation rate, the
unemployment rate and government consumption were flagged as having been studied in fewer than 5 studies
each.80
Studies since 2011, when Gassebner and Luechinger published their study, seem to have improved in the
diversity of measures used, but there is still room for improvement.
Skirting the issue of what is the “best” indicator in each of field, there is a lack of diversity in the research
that tackles the underlying question of what causes terrorism. The homogeneity of the research means that there
are factors that remain underexplored or perhaps entirely unexplored. The UN, as discussed below, has put forward
74
See Martha Crenshaw and Mariann Cusimano Love, “Networked Terror,” 114-135.
75
Ibid.
76
77
Ibid.
78
Pilat, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 171.
79
Martin Gassebner and Simon Luechinger, “Lock, Stock, and Barrell: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Determinants
of Terror,” Public Choice 149, no. 3-4 (2011): 235-261.
80
Gassebner and Luechinger, “Lock, Stock and Barrel: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Determinants of Terrorism,”
239-246. All of these studies were done prior to the article's publication in 2011. While the authors do not specify their
time frame for looking at articles, similar searches yielded similar results with very few studies looking at indicators other
than GDP for economic factors.

Boyer 22
official statements on what factors contribute to terrorism. These groupings cover political, economic, social and
conflict areas. What can be gleaned from examining the issues in this area is that there needs to be more
comprehensive research about the relationships among the variables.
The underlying issue with this type of statistical research of this type is that it attempts to reduce human
behaviors to numbers. The scales used in the calculations may depend on judgments by the researchers and may
vary between inquiries, which may lead to variations in causal relationships.
This doesn’t mean that there is nothing to be gained from analyzing the factors that have been identified
to make inferences about what determines terrorism. Findley and Young analyzed the impact of foreign aid (or
assistance) on terrorism. The results of their study demonstrated a positive impact towards particular sectors
(education, health, civil society, and conflict prevention).81
Based upon their definitions for their study, the central
role of the NPO sector to combatting terrorism seems paramount in CT. The interaction among factors is also
important as how the factors develop into terrorist acts becomes critical (see Figure 3: Terrorism Development (I)
– Diagram of the Process and Feedback of Terrorism in Society (1) on p. 38 and Figure 4: Terrorism Development
(II) – Diagram of the Process and Feedback of Terrorism in Society (2) on p. 38.)
Another group that has produced the policy documents and underlying research are the CT practitioners
in the international community, namely the UN. They have come up with several structures to determine factors.
These factors were formalized under the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS) in
September 2006. The UNGCTS defines eight factors that it calls the “conditions conducive” to terrorism. These
conditions are what all UN-led CT efforts seek to combat through the initiatives of all entities involved. The Plan
of Action of the UNGCTS includes eight prescriptions for how the UN can work, under its charter, to prevent the
conditions conducive. It also focuses on how the UN can prevent and combat terrorism, increase its capacity to
do so, and protect human rights and the rule of law. The UNGCTS focuses not only on the factors and remedies,
but also which entities are best suited to be leaders in initiatives.
According to the UNGCTS, there are seven conditions conducive to terrorism. They are: “prolonged
unresolved conflicts”, “dehumanization of victims of terrorism”, “lack of rule of law and violations of human
rights”, “ethnic national and religious discrimination”, “political exclusion”, “socio-economic marginalization”,
and “lack of good governance”.82
The majority of these conditions are targeted by development work, particularly
those related to social, economic and political status. The UNGCTS focuses on these conditions as needing to be
addressed from multiple perspectives as they are complex issues. For example, the UNGCTS “[reiterates] our
determination to ensure the timely and full realization of the development goals and the objectives agreed at the
81
Joseph K. Young, and Michael G. Findley, "Can peace be purchased? A sectoral-level analysis of aid’s influence on
transnational terrorism," Public Choice 149, no. 3-4 (2011): 378.
82
United Nations General Assembly. 60th
Year, “Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006
[without reference to a Main Committee (A/60/L.62)] 60/288. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,”
(A/RES/60/288), September 8, 2006, Annex Plan of Action Heading I.[Hereafter referred to as the United Nations Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS)]; “United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism,” United Nations, accessed on June
23, 2013, http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml.

Boyer 23
major United Nations conference summits, including the Millennium Development Goals. We reaffirm our
commitment to eradicate poverty and sustained economic growth.”83
It continues to say that “to pursue and
reinforce development and social inclusion agendas at every level as goals in themselves, recognizing that success
in this area, especially on youth unemployment, could reduce marginalization and the subsequent sense of
victimization that propels extremism and the recruitment of terrorism.”84
This perspective firmly roots the need
for development work to reduce the conditions conducive to terrorism.
What can be gleaned from the current state of academic literature on the subject is this: first, scholar bring
their biases to the subject and as a result, their studies reflect these biases; second, there are more predictors than
there are scholars willing to study them so perhaps attempting to reduce to a group of indicators (like the Human
Development Index among others) would be a worthwhile investment to ensure standards of measure; and third,
the length of time that it takes to process this data will most likely continue to be outpaced by the needs of policy-
makers and civil society who need to be able to argue for new policies and address new challenges in the field.
Why Development Matters to Countering Terrorism
Development is critical to countering terrorism because it addresses the types of social issues that
researchers and policy-makers link to terrorism. Alleviating the pervasive conditions should then logically reduce
terrorism. What kinds of programs fall under development? What kinds of issues are included?
Development organizations provide a plethora of services. These range from financial investment to
public health services; education to gender-based empowerment. Drawing from the markers of the Millennium
Development Goals, the major issues that development organizations work on are poverty, hunger, access to
education gender equality and empowerment, reduction of child mortality, improvement of maternal health,
combating major global diseases, and ensuring environment sustainability.85
There are thousands upon thousands
of these organizations that operate with these kinds of missions. Websites like Charity Navigator86
can pull up lists
of organizations by what they do to provide a picture of what types of services development organizations provide
– they also will show you the big organizations whose names are familiar (like World Vision International, Oxfam
International, Care International and Kiva) while also having profiles of thousands of smaller organizations that
also work internationally.
Understanding why development is critical to countering terrorism is closely linked to understanding the
causes of terrorism. While there is little consensus on exactly what causes terrorism, it seems in very simple terms
that it’s those lacking other means with which to help themselves that turn to terrorism. NGOs can provide an
83
UNGCTS, Annex Section I, paragraph 5.
84
Ibid., Annex Section I, sub paragraph 6.
85
“UN Millenium Project | About the MDGs,” UN Millenium Project, accessed on October 5, 2013,
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/index.htm
86
Charity Navigator is available online at charitynavigator.org. Its information is free.

Boyer 24
alternative by providing the tools for empowerment – whether it is economic or otherwise – or by partnering with
a local organization to bolster infrastructure and social services. NGO’s commitment to the social mission also
makes it more likely that the investments, whether they are monetary, goods or services, are provided to the
intended recipients than if channeled through a government more invested in bolstering its own power and tenure.
At the end of the day, development organizations directly manage the problems that are at the core of terrorism
and are thus critical to combatting it in the long term.
The International Counter-Terrorism Framework
The majority of the international framework for counter-terrorism has been developed since 2001 with
the United Nations leading quite a few dimensions of the initiative. However, other international bodies are also
involved. There are several types of approaches in the international counter-terrorism, which each have their own
date of creation for implementation: targeted sanctions, AML/CFT approaches and comprehensive policies. The
following section will outline the major international documents and actors that make up the international counter-
terrorism framework.
The UN-Led Counter-Terrorism Structure
The UN-led efforts to counter-terrorism began with targeted sanctions against alleged terrorists began in
1999 with the creation of the UN Security Council (UNSC) 1267 Committee. The 1267 Committee was created
through UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 1267.87
It was charged with listing individuals and entities connected to al-
Qaeda and the Taliban and charged member-states of the UN to freeze their assets and implement a travel ban.
Passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the targeted sanctions are binding on all UN member-states.88
While
only members of al-Qaida and the Taliban are sanctioned under this regime, additional targeted sanctions regimes
have been created to deal with other international terrorist threats, like al-Shabaab.89
The AML/CFT structure began as a collaboration between governments to protect the international
financial system in 1989. The resulting organization, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF90
), has produced
recommendations, best practices and oversight mechanisms. The recommendations were revised in 1996, 2001,
2003 and 2012 and have paid particular attention to money-laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) issues.
The recommendations and best practices were incorporated into the international CT framework in 2005 in
UNSCR 1617, which “strongly urge[d]” that member-states use the 40+9 the best practices for AML/CFT under
87
“Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated
individuals and entities,” United Nations Security Council, accessed on June 23, 2013,
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ (hereafter 1267/1989 Website).
88
1267/1989 Website.
89
“United Nations Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, accessed on February 5, 2013,
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/index.shtml.
90
The FATF is abbreviated GAFI for the French name of the organization. Both acronyms are used and are sometimes used
together as FATF-GAFI.

Boyer 25
UNSCR 1373.91
FATF, unlike the UN, is not representative of most of the world as it only has 36 members.92
Its
observers are FATF Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) and international organizations involved in AML/CFT.93
Most
states that are not members of FATF have an FSRB in their region that oversees the use of the 40+9 for that area,
and some states are members of multiple FSRBs, but not all states are members of FATF or an FSRB.94
The result
remains that FATF has little accountability to most of the world despite that its recommendations have been
endorsed by the UNSC and are used by CTED as best practices for assessing compliance.
The United Nations has passed several fundamental documents for the international counter-terrorism
framework. Beyond the sanctions regimes, the UNSC passed UNSCR 1373 following 9/11 to create the Counter-
Terrorism Committee (CTC), which ensures that all member-states are implementing counter-terrorism policies
in their states. Subsequent resolutions have strengthened the mission of the CTC and formalized its group of
experts into the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). The UN General Assembly
(UNGA) passed the UNGCTS in September 2006, which outlined the concerns of all the members of the UN. It
also created the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to implementing the UNGCTS Plan of
Action.95
CTITF is responsible for coordinating efforts between UN bodies, offices, agencies and outside actors.
To focus on a set of documents as the most critical for the international counter-terrorism framework, it
is most important to focus on those from FATF, the UNGCTS, and the resolutions from the UNSC that are passed
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These documents (see list in Appendix 2 on p. 45) give states a complex list
of requirements with which they must comply. This becomes particularly challenging in the case of AML/CFT as
the requirements demand a high level of control over the financial sector while the UNGCTS supports the
development work of NGOs as a counter-terrorism measure.
International Organizations Involved in UN-Led Counter-Terrorism
Beyond the UN structure, there are a large number of international bodies that are involved in counter-
terrorism. The UNGCTS names many of the organizations, agencies and bodies involved in counter-terrorism.
These include: The CTITF the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), the CTC and CTED, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the International
91
UNSCR 1617
92
“FATF-GAFI.ORG – Financial Action Task Force (FATF),” The Financial Action Task Force, accessed on August 8,
2013, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/.
93
Ibid.;
94
Ben Hayes, “Counter-Terrorism, ‘Policy Laundering’ and the FATF: Legalising Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society,”
Statewatch and Transnational Institute Report, 16-17. The FSRBs are The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG)
(40 members), Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) (29 members), Eurasian Group on Money Laundering
(EAG) (8 members), Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) (14 members), Financial
Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD) (12 members), Inter Governmental Action Group
against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) (15 countries), Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task
Force (MENAFATF) (18 members), and Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) (29). See Hayes for additional discussion.
95
“Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force,” United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
(CTITF), accessed on July 21, 2013, https://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/index.shtml (hereafter CTITF Website).

Boyer 26
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Maritime
Organization, the World Customs Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).96
Other
UN bodies included in the counter-terrorism process include the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), United
Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights (OHCHR) and the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism, and the United Nations
Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). All of these bodies have counter-terrorism mandates
in some form and work together to ensure specific dimensions related to expertise are overseen.
An Overview of Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)
The AML/CFT regime operates through several channels. First, there are the UNSC sanction regimes.
Second, there are the financial counter-terrorism policy standards set by UNSCR 1363 and subsequent resolutions
that are monitored by the CTC and CTED. Third, FATF and FSRBs use a list of recommendations to implement
AML/CFT and mutual conduct evaluations for compliance. These regimes affect NGOs insomuch as NGOs may
be targeted as suspected offenders, or be asked to comply with requirements to ensure they are not being exploited.
Implementation of the UNSC sanctions is relatively straight forward. Every individual, company or
organization listed must have all of their assets frozen and they cannot be granted travel documents.97 An individual
may ask their state to appeal to the UNSC to have their named removed. Since 2009, individuals can also apply for de-
listing through a political process via the Office of the Ombudsperson98. For implementation purposes, every listing
from the 1267/1989 lists become Designated Terrorists (DTs) or Designated Terrorist Organizations (DTOs) at a
national level and subjected to the same sanctions as though the state had labeled them a terrorist organizations and
frozen their assets through a state process. NGOs can be listed like any other organization.
State-level policy implementation functions under the oversight of the CTC and CTED. As it attempts to
contain and prevent both money laundering and terrorist financing, it operates on the coordination of oversight of
suspicious transactions through the formal financial system. By identifying situations that are most likely criminal
transactions through suspicious transaction reports (STRs), the governments can identify financers; trace the funds to
perpetrators and control terrorism. The efforts are coordinated by a national Financial Investigation Unit (FIU), which
serves as a clearinghouse for all STRs and investigates the transactions for links to terrorism.99
Any transactions that
link to a DTO or DT will be flagged as an STR as will transactions to countries with relaxed banking laws where money
can’t be traced, or transactions over $10,000 (or multiple transactions in close proximity totaling over $10,000).100
(See
96
UNGCTS, Annex Section III.; CTITF Website.
97
See “Comparative Table Regarding the United Nations Security Council Committees Pursuant to Resolutions 1267
(1999), 1989 (2011), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004),” United Nations Security Council Committees, n.d.,
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/comparative_table.pdf for how individuals are listed
98
1267/1989 Website, “Office of the Ombudsperson – Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, accessed on
June 23, 2013, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/.
99
See CTED, “Technical Guide to the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001),”
100
See CTED, “Technical Guide to the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001),”

Boyer 27
Figure 5: Model of How the AML/CFT Operates on a National LevelFigure 5: Model of How the AML/CFT
Operates on a National Level on p.4040).
The aim of the state-level policy structure is to promote due-diligence and monitoring within the banking
system. By raising the difficulty for terrorists to transfer money, it becomes more likely that they will be caught. It also
forces them out of the formal markets and into alternate systems. These systems are also the systems frequently used
by diaspora groups to send money, often called alternative remittance systems (ARSs), and are difficult to monitor. The
best practices for state-level policy comes from the FATF Recommendations. The CTC and CTED began using the
FATF Recommendations explicitly following UNSCR 1617 in 2005.
The implementation of the FATF Recommendations from the FATF and the FSRBs is in the form of mutually
administered evaluations and are in addition to the oversight of the CTC and CTED. The FATF and the FSRBs have a
high standard for rating states as compliant with AML/CFT measures. One of the consistently lowest rated areas is that
of NGO sector control. States with good ratings from the FATF or their respective FSRB, are often criticized by other
groups as being repressive of civil society.101
The CTC and CTED, and the FATF and the FSRBs use Recommendation 8 and the Interpretive Note for
Recommendation 8 (INR8) as the basis for preventing abuse and exploitation of the NGO sector. Recommendation 8102
encourages states to place the NGO sector under scrutiny, especially those NGOs that operate in high risk areas. The
driving theory champions a risk-based approach, but that the damage from any financing that could slip through would
be devastating.103
Recommendation 8 is built on the premise that CSOs “play a vital role in the world economy and in many
national economies and social systems.”104 INR8 lists among the reasons that CSOs are appealing to terrorist
organizations that they enjoy the public trust, often have little oversight, have access to national or international
networks, and frequently operate using currency.105 Recommendation 8 thus seeks to protect the sector from abuse or
exploitation106
while allowing legitimate activity to continue; it seeks to do this by preventing, and in cases where that
is not possible, prosecuting cases of “terrorist financing and other forms of terrorist support.”107
The Interpretive Note
101
Hayes, “Counter-Terrorism, ‘Policy Laundering’ and the FATF: Legalising Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society,”30-
35.
102
Recommendation 8 was known as Special Recommendation VIII (SRVIII) prior to February 2012 when the FATF
Recommendations were revised. See the FATF Website for more information about the revision of the Recommendations in
February 2012.
103
Bricknell, Samantha. 2011. “Misuse of the non-profit sector for money laundering and terrorist financing (cover story).”
Trends & Issues in Crime & Criminal Justice no. 424: 1.
104
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), “Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8 (Non-Profit Organisations)” in The FATF
Recommendations International Standards On Combating Money Laundering And The Financing Of Terrorism &
Proliferation, (Paris: FATF, 2012), p. 54 [Hereafter cited as INR8]. Note that the FATF Recommendations were revised in
February 2012, but the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8 (INR8) remained unchanged until the limited update was
released in June 2013, but the limited updated does not appear to have been integrated into the interpretive note; rather it
provides an analysis of how one should interpret INR8.
105
Ibid.
106
Most documents from international organizations and policy-makers specify the difference between complicit and
exploited NGOs.
107
Ibid., 55, paragraph 5(c).

Boyer 28
remains relatively broad in its general principles as it notes that national NGO sectors are unique and that states must
undertake “targeted approaches”.108 It also encourages cooperative relationships between the “public, private and NPO
sector” as well as “flexibility in developing a national response to terrorist financing”.109
The measures named by INR8 are more extensive and detailed. The recommendation that states undertake
periodic reviews of their NGO sectors, and in theory produce typology reports as well as risk assessments seems in line
with a risk-based assessment and informed policy. INR8 focuses on all of the measures that should be taken at the
highest risk level and when investigations may be the most frequent. It also encourages raising a universal level of
record keeping on the part of all NGOs – and in many states this might be applied to all organizations that are CSOs
because of national sector structure. It also provides guidelines for investigations of NGOs and information sharing
among states. In its original form, INR8 demonstrates that Recommendation 8 provided more guidelines for scrutinizing
and investigating NGOs than protecting them from exploitation.
In June 2013, there was a limited update to the INR8 to reflect the growing need to protect legitimate activities
of NGOs. According to the update “[r]ecommendation 8 may be misinterpreted or misused to suppress NPO activities
no related to terrorist financing with the consequence of making the functioning and operation of NPOs more difficult.
Where Recommendation 8 is misinterpreted, NPOs have problems in fulfilling their tasks.”110 Unlike the previous
INR8, this update provides some concrete examples about what kinds of tools exist in different spaces. It also
encourages engaging with the types of oversight that exists in the NGO sector – in other words, NGO accountability
mechanisms. The focus of the update is to stress the need for standards of NGO sector practices where transparency,
management, administration and the like are the focus as well as financial record keeping and investigation by
government bodies.
Where Does CFT Meet Civil Society and NGOs?
On the surface, it appears that international counter-terrorism policies should benefit from the work done
by NGOs as well as the measures taken under the AML/CFT regime. However, there has been considerable
criticism, particularly regarding how the AML/CFT regime has affected NGOs since 2001, particularly as the risk
to the sector has been continually stated as very low.111
The following analysis will discuss how the AML/CFT
regime has affected NGOs since 9/11. The three areas that will be discussed are the encroachment upon and the
108
INR8, 55, paragraph 5(e).
109
INR8, 55, paragraph 5(d) and 5(f).
110
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), “Best Practices: Combatting the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations
(Recommendation 8): Limited update to reflect the revised FATF Recommendations and the need to protect NPOs’
legitimate activities,” (Paris: FATF, June 2013), 5, paragraph 11. (Hereafter cited as FATF, “Limited Updated.”)
111
APG, “Typologies Report,” 15-16; Samantha Bricknell, “Misuse of the Non-Profit Sector for Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing (cover story),” Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, no. 424 (2011): 1; Samantha Bricknell,
Rob McCusker, Hannah Chadwick, and David Rees,“Misuse of the non-profit sector,” Research & Public Policy Series no.
114 (2011): 13-15; Samantha Bricknell, Rob McCusker, Hannah Chadwick, and David Rees. 2011. “Minimizing abuse:
Balancing risk with impact,” Research & Public Policy Series no. 114 (2011): 50-51; Emile van der Does de Willebois,
“Nonprofit Organizations and the Combatting of Terrorism Financing: A Proportionate Response,” World Bank, World
Bank Paper no. 208 (2010): 8, 14-15.

Boyer 29
violation of rights, uneven applications of laws and finally analysis of overall trends.
Encroachment on and the Violation of the Fundamental Rights of NGOs
The encroachment upon and the violation on the fundamental rights of NGOs are of great concern to
society at large. As discussed previously, the rights of NGOs are based in the fundamental freedoms of individuals
(see Rights and Protections of the NGO Sector) and can by infringed upon in a variety of ways. With the recent
focus on security for terrorism prevention, it has been asserted that lines have been blurred between protecting
and suppressing the NGO sector.
The discussion of trade-offs between oversight of NGOs and government policies that infringe on NGO
rights dates back to the mid-1990s when the World Bank proposed a handbook of best practices for NGOs. This
draft suggested that governments be able to review all records, finances and activities of NGOs, and encouraged
auditing. It also suggested regular auditing of large NGOs, indicating that size alone could draw extra
attention.112
Furthermore, the mechanisms recommended would erode the freedom of association; the argument
was made that people could associate and form organizations but there should be no requirement that it was
administered by the government where the group must obtain a “legal personality”.113
While this issue was
responded to by the World Bank with the argument that only individuals enjoy the right to Freedom of Association,
two European Court of Human Rights decisions in 1998 effectively nullified this argument.
The same problem has emerged in the post 9/11 era with the AML/CTF framework because of
implementation. While laws criminalizing ML and TF are critical to security, their implementation has infringed
upon certain rights of NGOs. To start, the INR8 recommends that all CSOs undergo a form of registration to
ensure that none are false fronts for terrorist organizations; this presents the same problem as with the World
Bank’s Handbooks where requiring associations to create “legal personalities” in regards to the right of Freedom
of Association.
Other forms of unequal applications exist, like, for example in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was rated
largely compliant with SR8 (then SRVIII) under a joint FATF/MENAFATF evaluation in 2010. The evaluation
even considered the NPO regulation in Saudi Arabia to “outclass” other systems in other jurisdictions. Entirely
overlooked, however, was that no organizations could be formed without royal decree.114
Beyond the barriers to
formation, organizations are closely monitored in behavior by government ministries, and are required to obtain
prior approval before communicating with regional and international peers.115
112
Patricia Armstrong, “The Limits and Risks of Regulation: The Case of the World Bank-supported Draft Handbook on
Good Practices for Laws Relating to NGOs,” in NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations, eds. Lisa Jordan
and Peter van Tuijl (London: Routledge, 2006): 72.
113
Ibid.
114
Ben Hayes, “Counter-Terrorism, ‘Policy Laundering’ and the FATF: Legalising Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society,”
34.
115
Ibid.

Boyer 30
Egypt has been one of the most well-known cases of highly restrictive policies over CSOs and it was
endorsed by the World Bank as being compliant with SR8 (then SRVIII) in May 2009.116
Its NGO law has been
described as “one of the most restrictive in the world” yet it is one of only five countries rated as compliant with
SR8.117
The Ministry of Insurance and Social affairs is able to dissolve NGOs and appeals can take years because
of the inundated court system.118
Another example of a restrictive regime over NGOs being endorsed by the FSRB is MENAFATF rating
Tunisia as compliant in 2007.119
Similar to Egypt, Tunisia had created a system of CSO registration that made it
difficult to register new organizations and criminalized those who operate or participate in unregistered
organizations.120
The government blocks certain types of organizations from registering, including human rights
and democracy organizations.121
Problems with the policies became clear following the Tunisian Revolution in
2011 and there have been calls to change the laws violate the laws on freedom of association and assembly and
prevent social work by organizations.122
These types of problems are not limited to the Middle East. The United States practice that extends the
AML/CFT policies into a more sweeping policy of “material support” has come under severe criticism (see below
– Overall Trends). Other countries have used AML/CFT policies to crack down on civil society activities that are
seen as possible threats to the state, like social movements or organization of non-citizens.123
As time progresses,
newer and stricter laws are being adopted. At the end of 2012, Statewatch published a report entitled “Counter-
Terrorism, ‘Policy Laundering’ and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society” that addresses
major legal concerns in the United States, Myanmar, Egypt, Tunisia, India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Russia,
Colombia, Paraguay, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone and the European Union.124
Like the issues flagged
above, these provide only a snapshot of the challenges within states and do not cover the challenges for INGOs
that must adapt to varying implementation.
The largest concern about the violation of the rights of NGOs, and really CSOs as a group, is that each
step that removes a pieces of rights in the quest for the greater good is also a step that makes it possible to remove
more rights. In the case of countries where the rights of civil society are already tenuous, counter-terrorism
regulation provides a security driven justification to continue violating these rights and suppressing any
challenges. Without these rights, development INGOs face higher costs – financially, socially, politically – than
they already do. Development work functions better when programs have local partners on the ground to help
116
Ibid.,. 31.
117
Ibid.
118
Ibid.
119
Ibid.
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid..
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid., p. 32-33.
124
Ibid., p. 30-35.

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