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Similar to Asymmetric Power Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific Due to Cyber Warfare
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Asymmetric Power Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific Due to Cyber Warfare
- 2. Hill 2 Introduction The twentyfirst century has witnessed the beginnings of a monumental shift within the balance of power in the AsiaPacific. While many critics and scholars attribute this shift to American decline, the responsibility should be more readily associated with a rising China. As China grows, other regional actors, the United States included, increasingly seek to develop economic ties with it; yet to stem Chinese aggression and expansion, these same actors must also increasingly depend upon the U.S. military presence within the region. The resulting dichotomy of Chinese economic might and U.S. military investment has led many scholars to predict the emergence of a struggle for regional hegemony in the near future. Though this shift in influence 1 presents numerous such implications for the regional dynamics of the AsiaPacific, most scholars fail to take into consideration how the implications presented by a second, simultaneous and parallel shift affect the regional structure of power. This secondary shift revolves around an ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA) that is systematically replacing conventional means of warfare with unconventional and asymmetric methods. 2 Under the basic realist tenet that economic might transfers to military might, many 3 assume that China’s rise will lead it to, and possibly even beyond, military parity with the United States. After all, China already possesses or is developing the production capabilities for stealth fighters, nuclear submarines, antiship ballistic missiles, and aircraft carriers. Combine this with decades of phenomenal economic growth, and one might wonder what America can possibly do 1 Hugh White, The China Choice: Why American Should Share Power, (Australia: Black Inc., 2012). 2 Eliot Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs, Mar/April 1996, Vol. 75, Issue 2. 3754. 3 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” in Karen Mingst and Jack Snyder, Essential Readings in World Politics, Second Edition, (New York: Norton, 2004). 311.
- 3. Hill 3 to match pace. The answer is much and more. The increasing integration of military capability with electronic communication networks has led to the advent of a new and overwhelmingly U.S.dominated combat domain – the cyber domain – which potentially stands to reshape conventional security landscapes through asymmetric means. 4 While the cyber realm technically came into existence in 1969 with the birth of the ARPANET, it has only recently factored into international security concerns and military 5 tactics. So, unlike the four preexisting domains of warfare – land, sea, air, and space – there exists relatively little academic research on the topic, and many scholars remain unfamiliar with it. This relative ambiguity leads to a number of concerns that must be addressed in order to update conceptions of the international political system. First, what is cyber warfare and what impact has its development had on conventional military conflicts? What new threats arise from the cyber realm, and what are the United States and the nations of the AsiaPacific doing to confront and/or inflict them? And most importantly, as the nature of conflict becomes less traditional, what implications will cyber warfare have for regional power structures? This paper addresses these issues and their corresponding implications through an applied analysis of developing cyber warfare capabilities and operations in the crucible of a wired and evolving AsiaPacific region. Defining “Cyber” 4 “Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain: Are the Mouse and Keyboard the New Weapons of Conflict?” The Economist, July 1, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16478792. 5 Stephen Segaller, Nerds 2.0.1: A Brief History of the Internet, (New York: TV Books, 1999). 1923.
- 4. Hill 4 A basic understanding of cyberrelated terminology is absolutely essential to understanding the implications the cyber domain presents to modern warfare. In conventional usage, the prefix “cyber,” refers to electronic communications over computer networks, both wired and wireless. However ambiguity and a lack of clarity currently surround all things cyber, even cyberrelated terminology. This paper will utilize the vocabulary and definitions found in the Cyberspace Operations Lexicon developed by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), which defines cyberspace as, “A Domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.” This domain includes the internet, but also standalone 6 networks, such as the intranet of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which is not connected to the World Wide Web, or a closed system, such as the computers and systems at an Iranian nuclear testing facility. Cyber Warfare refers to, “An armed conflict conducted in whole or part by cyber means. Military operations conducted to deny an opposing force the effective use of cyberspace systems and weapons in a conflict. It includes cyber attack, cyber defense, and cyber enabling actions.” 7 The most common cyber attack – “a hostile act using computer or related networks or systems, and is intended to disrupt and/or destroy an adversary’s critical cyber systems, assets, or functions” – is a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack, where hackers – individuals who 8 access computer networks by circumventing security measures – coopt a large number of computers to rapidly and repeatedly visit a website. This overloads the servers and causes the 6 James E. Cartwright, “Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations,” U.S. Department of Defense, 2010. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.
- 5. Hill 5 site to crash. Other examples include computer viruses, such as Stuxnet, a sophisticated computer worm that was introduced to an Iranian nuclear testing facility in 2010 and caused the centrifuges there to spin so fast they broke apart and destroyed significant infrastructure at the facility. Warfare also involves espionage, which in the cyber domain would include such 9 malware as the Flame virus, which recorded sensitive audiovisual data, documents, and network traffic before sending it to unknown servers abroad. A similar, though so far rarely 10 implemented attack would involve capturing and controlling a system, such as a power grid or government server and either shutting it down or rerouting resources in order to damage the system. The defensive side of cyber warfare consists of, “The integrated application of DoD or US Government cyberspace capabilities and processes to synchronize in realtime the ability to detect, analyze and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities, and outmaneuver adversaries, in order to defend designated networks, protect critical missions, and enable US freedom of action.” Cyber 11 defense, which is often used interchangeably with the term, “cyber security,” primarily relies on the same underlying technologies used to protect personal computers – firewalls, antimalware programs, and data encryption, even at the level of national infrastructure. The resources available to the U.S. government further allow it to engage in cyber countermeasures, effectively setting traps that inflict significant damage on the systems of wouldbe hackers. In addition, the federal government and private corporations invest heavily in the physical security of cyber 9 Kristin M. Lord and Travis Sharp, America’s Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in the Information Age, Vol.1, Center for a New American Security, June 2011. 13. 10 “The Flame: Questions and Answers,” SecureList Website, Kaspersky Labs, May 28, 2012. https://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193522/The_Flame_Questions_and_Answers. 11 Cartwright, ibid.
- 6. Hill 6 infrastructure, such as servers, cables, and root clusters – regional hubs of internet traffic. But while the cyber domain may utilize a similar vocabulary as the four traditional combat domains, it differs significantly in its implementation. Conventional Warfare vs. Cyber Warfare Clausewitz famously defined war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” elaborating that “force…is thus the means of war,” and “to render the enemy powerless…is the true aim.” In this sense, cyber warfare is very much the same as 12 conventional warfare – actors use force, in this case a cyber attack, with the aim of crippling an enemy. However in cyber warfare, force employment – whether through offense, defense, or deterrence – and those external factors that shape strategic decisions can differ wildly from their traditional counterparts. Historically, defense has held a strategic advantage over offense, both in terms of cost and ease. But warfare in the cyber domain sees this trend reversed, and offense dominates 13 defense. Comparatively, offensive cyber operations are exponentially cheaper than defensive 14 countermeasures. Furthermore, offensive operations require far less effort and complexity. A 12 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 14. 13 Ibid., 159162. 14 Lord and Sharp, ibid., 28 .
- 7. Hill 7 successful and potentially crippling attack can be launched by a single person with minimal training from one simple personal computer for a few hundred dollars. One expert has estimated that, with 100 million dollars, a regime could form a top tier cyber force capable of penetrating U.S. cyber defenses within two years. Both costs represent mere fractions of the billions spent 15 in the United States alone on cyber security measures. The inherent difficulty associated with identifying an attacker further complicates cyber defense, but it also lowers the threat of retaliation against cyber attacks, effectively limiting the credibility of cyber deterrence. Despite the increasing levels of integration between the cyber domain and military operations, cyberspace was never designed for defense. Indeed its very nature as an expansive, yet poorly defined domain poses immense problems for national security by removing the traditional geographic constraints and advantages that have long shaped the landscape of traditional warfare. Controlling trade routes, sea lines of communication, and geographic barriers such as mountains and deserts both strengthened defenses and provided offensive advantages, and it constrained the strategic movement of forces as well. However, previous RMAs which created the air and space domains drastically decreased geographic limitations in twentieth century warfare, and now, with the advent of the cyber domain, militaries in the twentyfirst century can completely transcend such constraints. Only the budgets and ingenuity of actors restrict warfare in cyberspace, as the cost of defensive operations far surpasses that of offensive operations. The lack of clearly defined borders within cyberspace and the low barriers to entry lead to yet another problem – the inability to successfully identify the enemy. Tracking a successful 15 Ibid., 20.
- 8. Hill 8 attack to its source and correctly identifying the perpetrator often proves extremely difficult, if not impossible. The Stuxnet and Flame malware for instance, though generally attributed to a joint effort by the U.S. and Israeli intelligence communities, took months to trace and significant debate remains over the exact nature of their origins. This anonymity minimizes the risk of 16 retaliation and further encourages offensive cyber operations, especially as a means of asymmetric warfare employed by a smaller entity against a larger, stronger opponent. The United States, well regarded as the most powerful and competent force in the cyber domain, averages over 1.8 billion attacks per month against the executive and legislative branches of government alone. 17 While cyber warfare favors offense, it functions best in a supplementary capacity, augmenting traditional warfare to improve efficiency and minimize risk by targeting infrastructure. Moore’s Law, developed by a cofounder of Intel, states that “the number of transistors on a computer chip will double roughly every two years, resulting in constantly increasing computing power at decreasing cost.” The implication of this exponential 18 innovation in computing means that increasingly integrated weapons and communications technologies can be developed faster and made more widely available than ever before, drastically lowering the barriers to entry, especially when compared with the four preexisting domains of warfare – land, sea, air, and space – each of which can be astronomically expensive. This increase in efficiency coincides with a decrease in humantohuman interaction as combatants gain the capability to launch attacks from the comfort and safety of an office desk. 16 “Cyberattacks on Iran – Stuxnet and Flame,” The New York Times, last updated Aug. 9, 2012. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/computer_malware/stuxnet/index.html. 17 Lord and Sharp, ibid., 20. 18 Lord and Sharp, ibid., 21.
- 9. Hill 9 The lack of an international legal regime or welldefined norms of behavior further compound the problems presented by the affordability and lack of transparency currently associated with warfare in the cyber domain. No international organization or legal body has clearly defined what behaviors constitute a cyber war or the consequences that would result from such a conflict. Furthermore, no international institution has clearly differentiated cyber war from cyber terrorism or cybercrime, nor which legal regime – law enforcement, intelligence collection, or military operations – would actually apply to such operations. Nor has it been 19 determined whether a cyber attack even constitutes a use of force, as most offensive operations target information and inflict little if any kinetic or physical damage. Existing international 20 norms and laws are beholden to the first four domains of warfare and have yet to account for the cyber domain. . But while cyber operations may inflict less kinetic damage, the potential costs of a cyber attack are much higher. A 2007 report estimated that a full scale cyber attack against U.S. critical infrastructure could cost $700 billion. The lack of a legal regime means that no cyber 21 Geneva Convention exists to prohibit attacks on civilian entities, which in turn has expanded the array of traditional targets, blurring the line between the civilian and military spheres. Most attacks are directed against critical infrastructure, the “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital that the incapacity or destruction of such may have a debilitating impact on the 19 Thomas C. Wingfield, “International Law and Information Operations,” in Cyberpower and National Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press and Potomac Books, Inc.). 541. 20 Ibid., 526. 21 Jayson M. Spade, “China’s Cyber Power and America’s National Security,” U.S. Army War College, 2011. 32.
- 10. Hill 10 security, economy, public health or safety, [or] environment,” of the nation. To operate 22 efficiently in the information age, these systems increasingly rely on electronic communication networks, making them vulnerable to cyber attacks, so even a minor disruption could potentially destroy property or even cause civilian deaths. Furthermore, since the private sector controls over 85% of U.S. critical infrastructure, further expanding the ramifications of a large cyber attack across into global financial markets, potentially making the figure of $700 billion an underestimate. 23 Cyber warfare presents a number of new challenges to the conventional security landscape, often contradicting previously reliable tenets of warfare. The staggering offensive advantages of waging war in cyberspace – the low costs and risk of identification or retaliation and potential for higher results – are leading to increasingly aggressive and technically advanced attacks across all areas of life. These new threats are driving state and private actors to rapidly increase both their offensive and defensive capabilities in the cyber domain, redefining traditional concepts of regional power structures in the process. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the AsiaPacific. Cyber Threats to U.S. Interests in the AsiaPacific The AsiaPacific, home to both developing and highly developed countries, strategic rivalries and territorial disputes, and highly advanced technologies, presents a unique case study to consider the implications for power dynamics raised by the cyber domain, especially in light 22 Examples would include power grids, communication lines, oil pipelines, water supplies, stock exchanges, financial institutions, and multinational corporations. See Cartwright, ibid., 5. 23 Lord and Sharp, ibid., 23
- 13. Hill 13 like Operation Titan Rain, most frequently target cabinet level government agencies. Discovered in August 2005, Titan Rain enabled Chinese hackers to penetrate DOD networks for two years before being detected. Ministries of Defense, Finance, and Foreign Affairs tend to be targeted 28 the most frequently and aggressively, especially in Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. To date, Chinese hackers have penetrated foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence agencies across the globe, most notably through the GhostNet cyber espionage network that, by March 2009, had penetrated security systems on over 1300 host networks in 103 countries. 29 The intelligence gathered from such operations, combined with an ability to access and shut down critical infrastructure, creates a significant strategic advantage for the PRC and only hastens its rise in prominence. The Russian Federation China is not the only cyberjuggernaut to be found in the AsiaPacific; the Russian Federation also has a storied history of cyber warfare and is considered by many members of the IC to be even more sophisticated than China in the cyber domain. Russia first addressed concerns over cyberspace a mere eight months into the first presidential administration of Vladimir Putin with the release of the first Russian Federation Information Security Doctrine in September, 2000. The Doctrine and related amendments, grant the government significant controls over the flow of digital information on Russian servers, and the Russian government owns the vast majority of the country’s internet infrastructure. More recently, the government released its first official public document detailing the Russian military’s role in cyberspace, the 28 Krekel, ibid., 6770. 29 Ibid., 74.
- 14. Hill 14 Conceptual Views on the Activity of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Information Space, at an information security conference in Berlin on 14 December 2011. Both documents, and many more of lesser significance, portray official Russian cyber operations as primarily defensive in nature. However, the Russian government has been blamed for several welldocumented cyber attacks – most notably a 2007 cyber war with Estonia, and the use of cyber attacks to augment kinetic military action in the 2008 South Ossetia War. In the Estonia attacks, Russian hackers launched large scale DDOS attacks against Estonian government, media, and financial servers in response to the Estonian government’s decision to relocate a Sovietera war memorial. The attacks were so massive that they effectively forced Estonia to temporarily disconnect from the internet after the attacks threatened to cripple their banking and transportation sectors. The 2008 instance showed more sophistication, disabling 30 large swaths of Georgian internet infrastructure ahead of Russian military advances and crippling communication both within Georgia and with the outside world. Like their Chinese 31 counterparts, these attacks, though generally attributed to the Russian government, tend to rely on third party civilian hackers and large scale criminal enterprises. Russia has been further implicated in numerous attacks on the United States. In 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that both China and Russia had penetrated the U.S. power grid, navigating the length of the system and leaving behind malware that could potentially disrupt the system. The most recent large scale cyber espionage operation, dubbed Red October by 32 Kaspersky Lab, has been described as originating from Russianspeaking attackers. Though no 30 “Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain,” ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Siobhan Gorman, “Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated by Spies,” The Wall Street Journal. April 8, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914805204099085.html.
- 15. Hill 15 one has yet attributed the attack to the Kremlin specifically, the sophisticated Flamelike nature of the malware together with the diplomatic and government nature of its targets indicate government involvement of some form. The five year operation stole intelligence information, access information for classified systems, and data from personal mobile devices primarily from targets located throughout Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and former USSR republics. 33 Since Putin reassumed the presidency in May 2012, not only has he continued to voice his concerns over the state of Russian cyber capabilities, announcing plans for a Russian cyber command, but he has also initiated his own East Asian pivot, becoming more active in regional 34 dialogues and investing heavily in Siberia and the Russian Far East. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea While China and Russia quickly come to mind when discussing modern technological threats in Asia, few people naturally think of the DPRK. Much of their technical capabilities rely on outdated, Cold War era technologies, and most of the privileged citizens with access to a computer network are restricted to the domestically developed intranet – a DPRKonly network that has never been connected to the World Wide Web to ensure continued government control over the flow of outside information within their borders. While the internet has penetrated the 35 borders of the DPRK, user privileges remain heavily regulated and primarily restricted to prominent government and military officials in Pyongyang. Despite such limited access, 33 “Kaspersky Lab Identifies Operation “Red October,” an Advanced CyberEspionage Campaign Targeting Diplomatic and Government Institutions Worldwide,” Virus News. Kaspersky Lab, Jan. 14, 2013. http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2013/Kaspersky_Lab_Identifies_Operation_Red_ October_an_Advanced_Cyber_Espionage_Campaign_Targeting_Diplomatic_and_Government_Institutio ns_Worldwide. 34 David J. Smith, “Russian Cyber Operations,” Potomac Institute Cyber Center. July, 2012. 2. http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/article/1273/Russian%20Cyber%20Operations.pdf. 35 Scott Thomas Bruce, “A DoubleEdged Sword: Information Technology in North Korea,” Analysis from the EastWest Center, No. 105, October 2012, AsiaPacific Issues Series. 2.
- 16. Hill 16 however, a 2003 study ranked the DPRK tenth in the world with regards to its ability to launch cyber attacks. 36 Although it is only now developing wireless networks and less than three percent of the population uses any form of modern telecommunications service at all, Pyongyang actually possesses a substantial telecommunications infrastructure. Beginning in 1990, the government 37 used assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to lay high speed fiber optic cables beneath the streets of Pyongyang. By October 10, 2000, a ThaiDPRK joint venture telecommunications company had run fiber optic lines capable of transmitting data at a rate of 2.5GB per second between Pyongyang and nine provincial capitals, and Hunchun in China’s Jilan Province as well. In 2002, the North Korean government launched the 38 Kwangmyong, a closednetwork intranet, complete with websites, message boards, chat functions, and other normal internet capabilities. Since that time, China has helped the DPRK 39 circumvent UN and U.S. sanctions on the import of telecommunications technology in order to 40 establish a relatively strong and wellcontrolled computer network. The North Korean government has shown considerable interest in expanding their internet presence, having launched a number of collaborative IT projects with Syracuse University in New York, and even going so far as to send a twelve member delegation to Google headquarters in Mountain View, 36 Kay Hear, Patricia A. H. Williams, and Rachel J. Mahncke, “International Relations and Cyber Attacks: Official and Unofficial Discourse,” (paper presented at the 11th Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, Nov. 30 – Dec. 2, 2010). 9. 37 Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “North Korea on the Cusp of Digital Transformation,” Nautilus Institute Special Report – October 20, 2011. 1. 38 Ibid. 89. 39 Bruce, ibid. 40 Ibid. 2830.
- 17. Hill 17 California. What network and cyber capabilities the DPRK does currently possess have been 41 placed at the full disposal of a dedicated 3000 personnel cyber warfare unit within Office 121. 42 According to a North Korean hacker who defected in 2007, the entire cyber operations staff of the combined DPRK central government and armed forces stands at or around 30,000 personnel. Hackers that comprise this unit are drawn from across the country and trained from 43 as young as age 10 at the Mangyongdae Schoolchildren’s Palace and later at the DPRK’s top 44 universities, including the Pyongyang Automation University (formerly Mirim University) which employs Russian professors from the Funze Military Academy to train approximately 100 worldclass hackers a year for the North Korean military. Other universities send promising 45 hackers abroad to hone their skills in more technologically advanced environments. 46 The DPRK has been accused of intruding into water and drainage systems, penetrating U.S. and ROK government agencies, stock exchange websites, news media, and financial institutions. Given the attribution problems associated with cyber warfare, confirmation of attackers’ origins can be difficult, and Pyongyang generally denies responsibility. In July of 2009, DPRK hackers launched a massive DDOS campaign against U.S. and South Korean government and financial sector websites. While no information was stolen, the attacks did 41 Ibid. 27. 42 Sunny Lee, “U.S. Strategy toward North Korea’s Cyber Terrorism,” (paper presented at the 2011 Dupont Summit, Carnegie Institution for Science, Washington, D.C. Dec. 2, 2011). 8, 11. 43 “N.Korea Trains Up Hacker Squad,” The Chosunilbo, Mar. 8, 2011. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/03/08/2011030800611.html. 44 Hear, Williams, and Mahncke, ibid. 45 S. Lee, ibid., 8. 46 Jeremy Laurence, “North Korea Hacker Threat Grows as Cyber Unit Grows: Defector,” Reuters, Jun. 1, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/01/uskoreanorthhackersidUSTRE7501U420110601.
- 18. Hill 18 expose critical vulnerabilities in both nations’ cyber defenses. In 2010, the North attempted to 47 disrupt the G20 Summit in Seoul by attacking the city’s water and drainage systems. In May 48 2011, DPRKbased hackers penetrated and shut down the credit card and ATM services of the Nonghyup bank for over a week. On March 20, 2013, amidst the latest round of escalation on 49 the Korean Peninsula, DPRK hackers shut down the networks of three of the South’s major banks and its three largest TV broadcasters. They were then able to target and corrupt operating systems connected to the network with a new sophisticated malware. The ROK Defense 50 Ministry elected to establish a new department to oversee new cyber deterrence policies in response. 51 As the DPRK cyber threat grows, it may eventually be considered more dangerous than the country’s nuclear weapons program. The North’s current nuclear stockpile is small, their launching capabilities limited, and thanks to the threat of a massive nuclear retaliation, considered by many to be a mere deterrent. But without the possibility of deterrence or the threat of retaliation, a large scale North Korean cyber attack could potentially cause catastrophic damage to the critical infrastructure of the United States. While they have yet to cause serious or 47 “U.S. Eyes N. Korea for ‘Massive’ Cyber Attacks,” MSNBC.com, July, 9, 2009. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31789294/ns/technology_and_sciencesecurity/t/useyesnkoreamassive cyberattacks/#.UMuTOGP3U5. 48 Hear, Williams, and Mahncke, ibid., 9. 49 Laurence, ibid. 50 Mihoko Matsubara, “Lessons from the CyberAttacks on South Korea,” The Japan Times. March 26, 2013. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/03/26/commentary/lessonsfromthecyberattacksonsouthk orea/#.UZJyvLW872t. 51 Kim Eunjung, “Defense Ministry to Establish Cyber Policy Department,” Yonhap News Agency. April 2, 2013. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/techscience/2013/04/02/0601000000AEN20130402005300315.HTML.
- 20. Hill 20 having created thousands of advanced computer viruses primarily targeting the PRC. Most 54 recently, the budget for fiscal year 2013 allocates funding for the establishment of an experimental facility for simulated cyber warfare. 55 The Republic of Korea The Republic of Korea, one of the world’s most wired countries, established the Korean Information Security Agency (KISA) in 1996 to develop reactionary capabilities to respond and recover from cyber attacks. Following the DPRK’s DDOS campaign July of 2009, however, 56 the Ministry of National Defense consolidated computing and data centers into the Consolidated Defense Information Data Center to establish “networkcentric defense information systems,” with the passage of the Defense Informatization Act on February 4, 2010. With U.S. 57 assistance, the ROK also launched a Cyber Warfare Command in early 2010. Current cyber forces consist of 1000 personnel but are under consideration for significant expansion. Also in 58 2010, South Korea began holding ROKUS Information Assurance Working Group Meetings and participating in semiannual DODsponsored International Cyber Defense Workshops. In 59 2012 these two allies began holding U.S.ROK Cyber Policy Consultations to “strengthen 54 Mulvenon, ibid. 157161. 55 Thanya Kunakornpaiboonsiri, “Taiwan to Beef Up Cyber Warfare Unit: Report,” FutureGov, Sept. 5, 2012. http://www.futuregov.asia/articles/2012/sep/05/taiwanbeefcyberwarfareunitreport/. 56 Jeffrey Carr, Inside Cyber Warfare: Mapping the Cyber Underworld, (Sebastopol: O’Reilly, 2012). 258. 57 “2010 Defense White Paper,” Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Mar. 31, 2011. 158163. 58 Kim Eunjung, “S. Korea to Upgrade Preparedness against North’s Cyber, Nuclear Attacks,” Yonhap News Agency, Aug. 29, 2012. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/08/29/18/0301000000AEN20120829008600315F.HTML. 59 Ibid., 165
- 21. Hill 21 cooperation with respect to protection of, and access to…cyberspace domains and to promote the resilience of critical infrastructure, including the security of information and space systems.” 60 Japan In their most recent report, Armitage and Nye discuss the increasing importance of cyber operations to national security and call for the establishment of a joint U.S.Japan cyber security center, noting that, “Without common safeguards and standards in information assurance, U.S.Japan communication channels are increasingly vulnerable to outside infiltration.” But 61 until very recently, Japanese concepts of cyber operations have focused more on establishing interoperability with U.S. communications systems and modernizing domestic military forces than developing a capacity for cyber warfare. In 2008, however, the Defense Ministry began 62 progressing toward a cyber RMA through the development of a defensive cyber weapon capable of tracing attacks to their source and shutting down infected computers along the way. 63 Following a 2+2 meeting in 2011, Japan announced plans to establish a bilateral strategic policy dialogue on cyber security issues with the United States. In 2012, the Ministry of Defense 64 announced that it would send a liaison to U.S. Cyber Command to collaborate with the United States on the creation of a Self Defense Force cyber defense unit. The Japanese government 65 60 “Joint Communique: The 44th U.S. – ROK Security Consultative Meeting,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 24, 2012. 6. 61 Richard L Armitage. and Joseph S. Nye, “The U.S.Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, August, 2012. 62 Sugio Takahashi, “The Japanese Perception of the Information TechnologyRevolution in Military Affairs: Toward a Defensive InformationBased Transformation,” in Goldman and Mahnken, ibid. 63 “Govt Working on Defensive Cyberweapon / Virus Can Trace, Disable Sources of CyberAttacks,” Daily Yomiuri Online, Jan. 3,2012. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120102002799.htm 64 Hillary Clinton et. al, “Toward a Deeper and Broader U.S.Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership,” Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, June 21, 2011. 65 “Japan, U.S. to Review Defense Guidelines,” The Japan Times Online, Nov. 11, 2012. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20121111a8.html.
- 22. Hill 22 has yet to clearly define what constitutes an offensive cyber operation or act of cyber warfare, keeping open the possibility of Japanese cyber operations that might otherwise violate the country’s constitutional restrictions on offensive military action. ASEAN Member States ASEAN nations began seriously looking into cyber defense issues as early as the 2004 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and are currently working to integrate their national CERTs – Computer Emergency Response Teams – in order to strengthen government network security and assist each other in combatting cyber attacks. Most developed nations established CERTs, 66 which are offshoots of a DARPA initiative, by the mid2000s. These teams do not constitute defensive measures or cyber warfare units so much as reactionary response units designed to help government systems quickly recover from a cyber attack. Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines, however, are known to have cyber defense units. Myanmar has also used cyber warfare since the 1990s, primarily against opposition forces within its own borders. 67 Australia Australia has been criticized by some as “laggard,” in establishing competent national 68 cyber security programs, having just released their first cyber security strategy in 2009 and 69 establishing a Cyber Security Operations Centre in January of 2010. However, they have worked diligently alongside their allies to boost their presence in the fifth domain, formally 66 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), “Ensuring a Safer Cyber Security Environment,” CSCAP Memorandum No. 20, May 2012. 3. “Member Teams,” Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team, 2012. http://www.apcert.org/about/structure/members.html 67 Carr, ibid., 253. 68 Gary Waters, Desmond Ball, Ian Dudgeon, Australia and CyberWarfare, (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008). ix. 69 “Cyber Security Strategy,” Commonwealth of Australia, 2009.
- 24. Hill 24 dynamics of the region, potentially altering the balance of power beyond the sort of regional bipolarity between the United States and China that many scholars currently predict. The prospect of cyber warfare fosters cooperation throughout the region, strengthening traditional alliances, and unifying nonallied nations against an intangible, pervasive threat. The United States currently works very closely with both South Korea and Australia to develop and strengthen their cyber warfare capabilities, and they are beginning to extend these efforts to Japan. The United States may also assist its other regional allies – Thailand and the Philippines – as well as its strategic partner, Singapore. U.S. relations with these countries have drawn criticism during the Obama administration’s socalled pivot for nominal military investments or for troop reductions, but in reality the United States contributes much more to the defense of 72 these nations than may first be apparent. Indeed, the region in general is experiencing a heightened degree of cooperation, with nearly twenty nations coordinating cyber security efforts through the AsiaPacific CERT (APCERT). Should cyber operations be used to complement kinetic warfare against an ASEAN member state, one can reasonably assume that others will come to their aid by hosting internet traffic on other servers, as was the case in 2008 when Estonia and Poland volunteered to host websites of the Georgian government while it was under cyber attack from Russia. Though the 73 cyber threat has brought many nations together, these increased levels of regional cooperation may potentially widen the U.S. – China power split by providing yet another avenue for 72 Bruce Klingner and Dean Cheng, “U.S. Asian Policy: America’s Security Commitment to Asia Needs More Forces,” The Heritage Foundation, Aug. 7, 2012. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/americassecuritycommitmenttoasianeedsmoreforc es. 73 Jeremy Kirk, “Estonia, Poland Help Georgia Fight Cyber Attacks,” IDG News Service. Aug. 12, 2008. http://www.pcworld.com/article/149700/cyberattacks.html.
- 25. Hill 25 dependence upon a continued U.S. presence. Alternatively, it may boost Putin’s goal of a Russian resurgence in the AsiaPacific, providing a new option that may be perceived as less hostile by Beijing. Some of the most influential aspects of the cyber domain are its offensive dominance and affordability, which have to some extent, offset the offensive superiority of countries like China and the United States. Nye explains that, as offensive cyber capabilities grow, and defensive capabilities grow more expensive, smaller powers will see a rise in parity of military capability: “The characteristics of cyberspace often reduce power differentials among actors, and thus provide a good example of the diffusion of power that typifies global politics in this century. The largest powers are unlikely to be able to dominate cyberspace as much as they have dominated other domains like sea or air. While powerful nations have greater resources, they also have greater vulnerabilities.” 74 This exposure to new and increasing vulnerabilities results from the progressive integration of societies, economies, and militaries through electronic communications technology in cyberspace. While this may demand more resources be devoted to national defenses, it also reduces the need for a large troop presence, and thus may slow the escalation of conventional military forces that many foresee occurring in the AsiaPacific. Interestingly, this has made China and Russia the loudest voices in calling for the establishment of an international legal framework for cyberspace. While China possesses 75 extensive cyber capabilities, the central government feels increasingly threatened by the developing cyber potential of neighboring states as well as the internet’s capacity to foment domestic unrest. The government’s response to the latter has been infamously dubbed, “The 74 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Power and National Security in Cyberspace,” in America’s Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in the Information Age, Vol.2, ed. Kristin M. Lord and Travis Sharp, Center for a New American Security, June 2011. 7. 75 USCC, ibid., 165166.