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Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment
Author(s): Steven T. Anderson, Daniel Friedman and Ryan Oprea
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 100, No. 4 (SEPTEMBER 2010), pp. 1778-1803
Published by: American Economic Association
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American Economie Review 100 (September 2010): 1778-1803
http-J/www. aeaweb. or g/article s.php?doi=10.1257/aer. 100.4.1778
Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment
By Steven T. Anderson, Daniel Friedman, and Ryan Oprea*
El Mut?n, perhaps the world's largest remaining iron ore deposit, was opened to private inves
tors in the 1980s but, due to the high cost of developing the remote Bolivian site, there were no
takers for two decades. In late 2005, spurred by rising commodity prices, the Brazilian company
EBX finally seized the opportunity, preempting rivals based in China and India.1 Numerous
similar examples can be found in the annals of mining and oil companies (Raymond F. Mikesell
et al. 1971).
The strategic problem is as old as humanity: the value of a grove of figs fluctuates as the fruit
ripens (or is attacked by worms) and the first band of hunter-gatherers to seize it eats better than
neighboring bands. High tech firms today face similar issues when they introduce a new product.
Delaying introduction might allow the product niche to expand, but new substitutes or changes in
standards might shrink the niche. A rival could preempt the niche or it could vanish entirely due
to a disruptive new technology (Clayton M. Christensen 1997). Similar considerations apply to
retailers deciding when to open a "big box" outlet in a market too small to handle more than one
store, and also apply to academic researchers investigating a hot new topic.
In this paper we study such situations both theoretically and empirically. We formalize them
as preemption games, ...
Deal or No Deal, That is theQuestion The Impact of Increasi.docxtheodorelove43763
Deal or No Deal, That is the
Question: The Impact of Increasing
Stakes and Framing Effects on
Decision-Making under Risk
ROBERT BROOKS, ROBERT FAFF, DANIEL MULINO AND
RICHARD SCHEELINGS
Department of Accounting and Finance Faculty of Business and Economics,
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we utilize data from the Australian version of the TV game
show, ‘Deal or No Deal’, to explore risk aversion in a high real stakes setting.
An attractive feature of this version of the game is that supplementary
rounds may occur which switch the decision frame of players. There are four
main findings. First, we observe that the degree of risk aversion generally
increases with stakes. Second, we observe considerable heterogeneity in
people’s willingness to bear risk – even at very high stakes. Third, we find that
age and gender are statistically significant determinants of risk aversion,
while wealth is not. Fourth, we find that the reversal of framing does have a
significant impact on people’s willingness to bear risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of decisions under uncertainty is fundamental to modern
economics and finance. This paper contributes to a recently developing
empirical literature that adopts the central research question: How risk averse
are individuals? Subsidiary questions regarding risk aversion that we address
include its heterogeneity and how it varies with individual demographic
characteristics (especially age, wealth and gender). While the theoretical
literature on risk aversion and expected utility theory is large and long-
standing, the literature explicitly testing for risk aversion is comparatively
small. Such empirical tests as exist, either in laboratory or field experiments
involving real stakes, have mostly been confined to small cash values. There has
been a recent debate doubting the applicability of such estimates when
extrapolated to high real stakes (see Rabin 2000). Our paper exploits an
Australian game show dataset to explore the nature of risk aversion of
contestants who face an environment of very high stakes.
r 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2009. Published by Blackwell
Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
International Review of Finance, 9:1–2, 2009: pp. 27–50
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2443.2009.01084.x
‘Deal or No Deal’ is a half-hour TV game show in which contestants make a
series of choices between a sure thing and a lottery.1 It is ideal for studying a
range of issues relating to economic decision making. The show consists of a
chosen contestant faced with 26 suitcases, randomly containing amounts
ranging from 50 cents to US$200,000 dollars. There are up to nine ‘normal’
rounds in the main stage of the game. Unlike other versions of the show, the
Australian version of ‘Deal or No Deal’ also involves the potential for one of two
extra rounds – the Chance round and the S.
Successful Essay Example. College Essay Examples - 9 in PDF ExamplesVioleta Cressman
College Essay Examples - 9+ in PDF | Examples. Writing a successful essay. Sample Argumentative Essay.doc. 018 Sample Essay Writing Example ~ Thatsnotus. Critical essay: 10 successful harvard application essays. Admission essay: Being a college student essay. College Essay Examples - 13+ in PDF | Examples. 24 Greatest College Essay Examples – RedlineSP. 001 Essay Example Best Essays ~ Thatsnotus. How to write a good academic essay.
Essay Summary of Bilingual Education - PHDessay.com. Educating Emergent Bilinguals Essay Example | Topics and Well Written .... The advantages of bilingual education essay 1268 words. Bilingualism Essay – Telegraph. Taxonomy of Bilingualism: 3. School and Academic Levels of Bilingualism .... Bilingual education pros essay - gcisdk12.web.fc2.com. (PDF) Understanding Bilingual Education 1: Analyzing Purposes of .... Being Bilingual: Important Skill in a Globalized World Free Essay Example. The Effectiveness of Bilingual Education in K-12 Setting Essay Example .... Bilingual education. Bilingual Education. Pin on Bilingual education. Benefits of Bilingualism: Why Is Bilingual Education Important. Language Acquisition and Being Bilingual Free Essay Example. Bilingual Original Essay | Multilingualism | Second Language .... Bilingual Education Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays .... Bilingual education Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written .... Bilingual education term papers. (PDF) Transitional Bilingual Education and Two-Way Immersion Programs .... (PDF) Strategies for First-Year University ESL Students to Improve .... Being Bilingual: The Challenges and Opportunities of Bilingual Essay. ⭐ Bilingualism essay. Bilingual Profile Essay. 2022-10-12. Bilingual education essay | Proessay.com. 10 EL 104 - Bilingual Education and The Bilingual Education Policy In ....
This document is a research project submitted by a student to their professor. It examines what factors affect the target premium distribution of cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving US targets. Specifically, it analyzes how target cash reserves, growth opportunities, and other characteristics impact the variance in premiums paid. The student uses a sample of over 21,000 US deals from 1986 to 2011 to calculate target premiums and conducts a regression analysis to isolate which bidder and target traits influence premium levels. The main findings are that cross-border acquirers pay higher premiums, targets with more cash reserves receive a 2% higher premium on average, and targets with fewer growth opportunities earn a 4% higher premium.
The Psychology and Neuroscience of Financial Decision MakingTrading Game Pty Ltd
Financial decisions are among the most important life-shaping decisions that people make. We review facts about financial decisions and what cognitive and neural processes influence them. Because of cognitive constraints and a low average level of financial literacy, many household decisions violate sound
financial principles. Households typically have underdiversified stock holdings and low retirement savings rates. Investors overextrapolate from past returns and trade too often. Even top corporate managers, who are typically highly educated, make decisions that are affected by overconfidence and personal history. Many of these behaviors can be explained by well-known principles from cognitive science.
A boom in high-quality accumulated evidence–especially how practical, low-cost ‘nudges’ can improve financial decisions–is
already giving clear guidance for balanced government regulation
This document summarizes a laboratory experiment that examines how users value risky prospects based on different disclosure formats. The experiment tests two hypotheses:
1) Users will value risky prospects higher when the maximum potential outcome is disclosed rather than the minimum, due to cognitive anchoring effects.
2) For a given disclosed value, users will discount their valuations in a strategic disclosure condition where disclosures are chosen by an opportunistic agent, compared to a random disclosure condition.
The experiment is designed to test whether the cognitive anchoring effect from one-sided disclosures persists even when disclosures are chosen strategically, addressing limitations of prior research that has not examined both cognitive and strategic disclosure factors together.
Behavioral Public Choice The Behavioral Paradox of Gove.docxtaitcandie
Behavioral Public Choice:
The Behavioral Paradox of
Government Policy
W. Kip Viscusf & Ted Gayer”
I. Overview
W hat are the economic justifications for governm ent inter
vention in the economy? In a m arket economy, prices coordi
nate the activities of buyers and sellers and convey inform ation
about the strength of consum er dem and for a good and the
costs of supplying it. Because trade is voluntary, buyers and
sellers only m ake exchanges w hen both parties benefit. Under
ideal m arket conditions, this process leads to an efficient alloca
tion of goods w ithout governm ent intervention.
However, economics has long recognized instances in which
markets can fail to lead to an efficient outcome. The long-standing
view is that either market power or the nonexistence of markets
causes market failures. Market power is present w hen some indi
viduals or firms are price makers (for example, monopolists) ra
ther than participants in a perfectly competitive environment.
Such situations typically lead to the production of a less than effi
cient quantity of goods. The problem of market power is the pur
view of industrial organization economics and antitrust policy. * 1
The nonexistence of markets, or the failure of a robust market to
arise, can occur for a num ber of reasons, such as asymmetric in
formation (when one party in a transaction has information that is
not available to another) and public goods (when a good is non
rival and nonexcludable in consumption and thus likely to be un-
* University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management,
Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Ave. South, Nashville, TN 37203. [email protected]
vanderbilt.edu. We are grateful to the Mercatus Center for their support.
**Vice President and Director, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution, 1775
Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036. [email protected]
1. H arvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Fin a n c e 46-48 (10th ed. 2013).
mailto:[email protected]
974 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 38
dersupplied by the market). Another cause for the nonexistence of
markets is externalities, which occur when transactions impose
costs or benefits on a third party that are not considered in the
market exchange. A classic example is when a factory produces
and sells a good to a consumer to their m utual advantage, but the
pollution generated by the production of the good has a negative
impact on the health of nearby residents. A market for the clean
air in the affected area would not emerge if high transaction costs
of organizing the pollution victims prevented the parties from
negotiating.2 The market system will fail to internalize the health
costs imposed by the factory's operations and lead to inefficiently
high production and health consequences.
For about a century, economists have argued that policymakers
should rely, when possible, on market-based principles in design
ing regulations to address thes.
Deal or No Deal, That is theQuestion The Impact of Increasi.docxtheodorelove43763
Deal or No Deal, That is the
Question: The Impact of Increasing
Stakes and Framing Effects on
Decision-Making under Risk
ROBERT BROOKS, ROBERT FAFF, DANIEL MULINO AND
RICHARD SCHEELINGS
Department of Accounting and Finance Faculty of Business and Economics,
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we utilize data from the Australian version of the TV game
show, ‘Deal or No Deal’, to explore risk aversion in a high real stakes setting.
An attractive feature of this version of the game is that supplementary
rounds may occur which switch the decision frame of players. There are four
main findings. First, we observe that the degree of risk aversion generally
increases with stakes. Second, we observe considerable heterogeneity in
people’s willingness to bear risk – even at very high stakes. Third, we find that
age and gender are statistically significant determinants of risk aversion,
while wealth is not. Fourth, we find that the reversal of framing does have a
significant impact on people’s willingness to bear risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of decisions under uncertainty is fundamental to modern
economics and finance. This paper contributes to a recently developing
empirical literature that adopts the central research question: How risk averse
are individuals? Subsidiary questions regarding risk aversion that we address
include its heterogeneity and how it varies with individual demographic
characteristics (especially age, wealth and gender). While the theoretical
literature on risk aversion and expected utility theory is large and long-
standing, the literature explicitly testing for risk aversion is comparatively
small. Such empirical tests as exist, either in laboratory or field experiments
involving real stakes, have mostly been confined to small cash values. There has
been a recent debate doubting the applicability of such estimates when
extrapolated to high real stakes (see Rabin 2000). Our paper exploits an
Australian game show dataset to explore the nature of risk aversion of
contestants who face an environment of very high stakes.
r 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation r International Review of Finance Ltd. 2009. Published by Blackwell
Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
International Review of Finance, 9:1–2, 2009: pp. 27–50
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2443.2009.01084.x
‘Deal or No Deal’ is a half-hour TV game show in which contestants make a
series of choices between a sure thing and a lottery.1 It is ideal for studying a
range of issues relating to economic decision making. The show consists of a
chosen contestant faced with 26 suitcases, randomly containing amounts
ranging from 50 cents to US$200,000 dollars. There are up to nine ‘normal’
rounds in the main stage of the game. Unlike other versions of the show, the
Australian version of ‘Deal or No Deal’ also involves the potential for one of two
extra rounds – the Chance round and the S.
Successful Essay Example. College Essay Examples - 9 in PDF ExamplesVioleta Cressman
College Essay Examples - 9+ in PDF | Examples. Writing a successful essay. Sample Argumentative Essay.doc. 018 Sample Essay Writing Example ~ Thatsnotus. Critical essay: 10 successful harvard application essays. Admission essay: Being a college student essay. College Essay Examples - 13+ in PDF | Examples. 24 Greatest College Essay Examples – RedlineSP. 001 Essay Example Best Essays ~ Thatsnotus. How to write a good academic essay.
Essay Summary of Bilingual Education - PHDessay.com. Educating Emergent Bilinguals Essay Example | Topics and Well Written .... The advantages of bilingual education essay 1268 words. Bilingualism Essay – Telegraph. Taxonomy of Bilingualism: 3. School and Academic Levels of Bilingualism .... Bilingual education pros essay - gcisdk12.web.fc2.com. (PDF) Understanding Bilingual Education 1: Analyzing Purposes of .... Being Bilingual: Important Skill in a Globalized World Free Essay Example. The Effectiveness of Bilingual Education in K-12 Setting Essay Example .... Bilingual education. Bilingual Education. Pin on Bilingual education. Benefits of Bilingualism: Why Is Bilingual Education Important. Language Acquisition and Being Bilingual Free Essay Example. Bilingual Original Essay | Multilingualism | Second Language .... Bilingual Education Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays .... Bilingual education Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written .... Bilingual education term papers. (PDF) Transitional Bilingual Education and Two-Way Immersion Programs .... (PDF) Strategies for First-Year University ESL Students to Improve .... Being Bilingual: The Challenges and Opportunities of Bilingual Essay. ⭐ Bilingualism essay. Bilingual Profile Essay. 2022-10-12. Bilingual education essay | Proessay.com. 10 EL 104 - Bilingual Education and The Bilingual Education Policy In ....
This document is a research project submitted by a student to their professor. It examines what factors affect the target premium distribution of cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving US targets. Specifically, it analyzes how target cash reserves, growth opportunities, and other characteristics impact the variance in premiums paid. The student uses a sample of over 21,000 US deals from 1986 to 2011 to calculate target premiums and conducts a regression analysis to isolate which bidder and target traits influence premium levels. The main findings are that cross-border acquirers pay higher premiums, targets with more cash reserves receive a 2% higher premium on average, and targets with fewer growth opportunities earn a 4% higher premium.
The Psychology and Neuroscience of Financial Decision MakingTrading Game Pty Ltd
Financial decisions are among the most important life-shaping decisions that people make. We review facts about financial decisions and what cognitive and neural processes influence them. Because of cognitive constraints and a low average level of financial literacy, many household decisions violate sound
financial principles. Households typically have underdiversified stock holdings and low retirement savings rates. Investors overextrapolate from past returns and trade too often. Even top corporate managers, who are typically highly educated, make decisions that are affected by overconfidence and personal history. Many of these behaviors can be explained by well-known principles from cognitive science.
A boom in high-quality accumulated evidence–especially how practical, low-cost ‘nudges’ can improve financial decisions–is
already giving clear guidance for balanced government regulation
This document summarizes a laboratory experiment that examines how users value risky prospects based on different disclosure formats. The experiment tests two hypotheses:
1) Users will value risky prospects higher when the maximum potential outcome is disclosed rather than the minimum, due to cognitive anchoring effects.
2) For a given disclosed value, users will discount their valuations in a strategic disclosure condition where disclosures are chosen by an opportunistic agent, compared to a random disclosure condition.
The experiment is designed to test whether the cognitive anchoring effect from one-sided disclosures persists even when disclosures are chosen strategically, addressing limitations of prior research that has not examined both cognitive and strategic disclosure factors together.
Behavioral Public Choice The Behavioral Paradox of Gove.docxtaitcandie
Behavioral Public Choice:
The Behavioral Paradox of
Government Policy
W. Kip Viscusf & Ted Gayer”
I. Overview
W hat are the economic justifications for governm ent inter
vention in the economy? In a m arket economy, prices coordi
nate the activities of buyers and sellers and convey inform ation
about the strength of consum er dem and for a good and the
costs of supplying it. Because trade is voluntary, buyers and
sellers only m ake exchanges w hen both parties benefit. Under
ideal m arket conditions, this process leads to an efficient alloca
tion of goods w ithout governm ent intervention.
However, economics has long recognized instances in which
markets can fail to lead to an efficient outcome. The long-standing
view is that either market power or the nonexistence of markets
causes market failures. Market power is present w hen some indi
viduals or firms are price makers (for example, monopolists) ra
ther than participants in a perfectly competitive environment.
Such situations typically lead to the production of a less than effi
cient quantity of goods. The problem of market power is the pur
view of industrial organization economics and antitrust policy. * 1
The nonexistence of markets, or the failure of a robust market to
arise, can occur for a num ber of reasons, such as asymmetric in
formation (when one party in a transaction has information that is
not available to another) and public goods (when a good is non
rival and nonexcludable in consumption and thus likely to be un-
* University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management,
Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Ave. South, Nashville, TN 37203. [email protected]
vanderbilt.edu. We are grateful to the Mercatus Center for their support.
**Vice President and Director, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution, 1775
Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036. [email protected]
1. H arvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Fin a n c e 46-48 (10th ed. 2013).
mailto:[email protected]
974 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 38
dersupplied by the market). Another cause for the nonexistence of
markets is externalities, which occur when transactions impose
costs or benefits on a third party that are not considered in the
market exchange. A classic example is when a factory produces
and sells a good to a consumer to their m utual advantage, but the
pollution generated by the production of the good has a negative
impact on the health of nearby residents. A market for the clean
air in the affected area would not emerge if high transaction costs
of organizing the pollution victims prevented the parties from
negotiating.2 The market system will fail to internalize the health
costs imposed by the factory's operations and lead to inefficiently
high production and health consequences.
For about a century, economists have argued that policymakers
should rely, when possible, on market-based principles in design
ing regulations to address thes.
You are on the right track. Here are a few sugg.docxtarifarmarie
You are on the right track. Here are a few suggestions:
1. I would work on making each slide more visually appealing. Here is
a before/after example:
Before:
After (kept title only in the orange section, numbered the four step,
centered the text):
2. You can tell me more in each of your notes section, you are a little
brief.
3. Please make sure you tell me where you are getting your information
on each slide.
Behavioral Public Choice:
The Behavioral Paradox of
Government Policy
W. Kip Viscusf & Ted Gayer”
I. Overview
W hat are the economic justifications for governm ent inter
vention in the economy? In a m arket economy, prices coordi
nate the activities of buyers and sellers and convey inform ation
about the strength of consum er dem and for a good and the
costs of supplying it. Because trade is voluntary, buyers and
sellers only m ake exchanges w hen both parties benefit. Under
ideal m arket conditions, this process leads to an efficient alloca
tion of goods w ithout governm ent intervention.
However, economics has long recognized instances in which
markets can fail to lead to an efficient outcome. The long-standing
view is that either market power or the nonexistence of markets
causes market failures. Market power is present w hen some indi
viduals or firms are price makers (for example, monopolists) ra
ther than participants in a perfectly competitive environment.
Such situations typically lead to the production of a less than effi
cient quantity of goods. The problem of market power is the pur
view of industrial organization economics and antitrust policy. * 1
The nonexistence of markets, or the failure of a robust market to
arise, can occur for a num ber of reasons, such as asymmetric in
formation (when one party in a transaction has information that is
not available to another) and public goods (when a good is non
rival and nonexcludable in consumption and thus likely to be un-
* University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management,
Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Ave. South, Nashville, TN 37203. [email protected]
vanderbilt.edu. We are grateful to the Mercatus Center for their support.
**Vice President and Director, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution, 1775
Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036. [email protected]
1. H arvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Fin a n c e 46-48 (10th ed. 2013).
mailto:[email protected]
974 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 38
dersupplied by the market). Another cause for the nonexistence of
markets is externalities, which occur when transactions impose
costs or benefits on a third party that are not considered in the
market exchange. A classic example is when a factory produces
and sells a good to a consumer to their m utual advantage, but the
pollution generated by the production of the good has a negative
impact on the health of nearby residents. A market for the clean
air in the affected.
Legal Analytics versus Empirical Legal Studies - or - Causal Inference vs Pre...Daniel Katz
This document provides an overview of legal analytics and empirical legal studies, comparing their methods and goals. Legal analytics uses machine learning and predictive modeling to predict outcomes, while empirical legal studies uses social science methods like regression analysis to determine the causal impact of policies. Both aim to improve legal rules and institutions but use different tools - prediction vs. causal inference. Prediction is important for tasks like litigation strategies, while causal inference is best for evaluating policy interventions. Recent work has shown growing interest in both rigorous predictive modeling of legal data as well as combining predictive and causal techniques.
The document describes developing machine learning models to predict outcomes of cases in the US Court of Appeals using historical data. Neural networks and XGBoost classifiers were developed and evaluated on a dataset of over 2,000 court cases. The models achieved encouraging accuracy levels between 36-98%, though limitations included the small dataset size. Significant factors identified included the appeals court, nature of prior rulings, applicant type, and judges' ideological leanings. Future work could focus on decision trees to characterize outcomes and simplify the models.
Electronic copy available at httpssrn.comabstract=1629786.docxSALU18
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1629786
1
Behavioral Portfolio Analysis of Individual Investors
1
Arvid O. I. Hoffmann
*
Maastricht University and Netspar
Hersh Shefrin
Santa Clara University
Joost M. E. Pennings
Maastricht University, Wageningen University, and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Abstract: Existing studies on individual investors’ decision-making often rely on observable socio-demographic
variables to proxy for underlying psychological processes that drive investment choices. Doing so implicitly ignores
the latent heterogeneity amongst investors in terms of their preferences and beliefs that form the underlying drivers
of their behavior. To gain a better understanding of the relations among individual investors’ decision-making, the
processes leading to these decisions, and investment performance, this paper analyzes how systematic differences in
investors’ investment objectives and strategies impact the portfolios they select and the returns they earn. Based on
recent findings from behavioral finance we develop hypotheses which are tested using a combination of transaction
and survey data involving a large sample of online brokerage clients. In line with our expectations, we find that
investors driven by objectives related to speculation have higher aspirations and turnover, take more risk, judge
themselves to be more advanced, and underperform relative to investors driven by the need to build a financial
buffer or save for retirement. Somewhat to our surprise, we find that investors who rely on fundamental analysis
have higher aspirations and turnover, take more risks, are more overconfident, and outperform investors who rely on
technical analysis. Our findings provide support for the behavioral approach to portfolio theory and shed new light
on the traditional approach to portfolio theory.
JEL Classification: G11, G24
Keywords: Behavioral Portfolio Theory, Investment Decisions, Investor Performance, Behavioral Finance
*
Corresponding author: Arvid O. I. Hoffmann, Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics,
Department of Finance, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 43 38 84 602. E-mail:
[email protected]
1
The authors thank Jeroen Derwall and Meir Statman for thoughtful comments and suggestions on previous
versions of this paper. Any remaining errors are our own.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1629786
2
I. Introduction
The combination of increased self-responsibility for retirement and an aging population has led a
growing number of people to become accountable for their own financial futures. Considering
the significant impact of current investment choices on future lifestyles (Browning and Crossley,
2001), it is important to understand how individual investors differ when it comes to the
triangular relationshi ...
The author conducted an experiment to analyze the disposition effect among 58 student subjects. In a simulated financial market, subjects decided whether to hold or sell assets over 20 periods as values fluctuated. The majority of subjects exhibited the disposition effect by selling winning assets too early and holding losing assets too long. Correlations between the disposition effect and variables like gender, age, major, and risk aversion were explored but inconclusive due to small sample sizes for some groups. Overall, the experiment provided evidence that the disposition effect is present among most investors.
Decision makers often face powerful incentives to increase risk-taking on behalf of others either through bonus contracts or competitive relative performance contracts. Motivated by examples from the recent financial crisis, we conduct an experimental study of risk-taking on behalf of others using a large sample with subjects from all walks of life. We find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly requires “financial psychopaths” in order to flourish, but is diminished by social concerns. We believe the research reported here is the first to experimentally investigate the effects of incentives on risk-taking on behalf of others, and to do so on a large scale using a random sample of the general population.
By Ola Andersson, Håkan J. Holm, Jean-Robert Tyran and Erik Wengström
To read more research articles, please visit https://www.hhs.se/site
This document provides an overview of crowd-funding and equity crowd-funding, which is the focus of the thesis. It defines crowd-funding as raising money from the public through the internet, and identifies different types including donation-based, reward-based, peer-to-peer lending, and equity-based crowd-funding. Equity crowd-funding involves businesses connecting with large groups of people online to offer shares in their company. This poses unique legal challenges around investor protection given that the general public is investing in early-stage companies they may not fully understand the risks of. The thesis will examine regulatory approaches to investor protection in equity crowd-funding in Europe and the United States.
The reason why should undergo into the arbitrage trading is very simple and its because its risk free investment option. Though it contains certain risk if one fails to follow the protocol define for Arbitrage Trading. Usually Arbitrage is risk free until and unless there is no financial crises.
The article discusses some problems with using single-security event studies in securities litigation. Single-security event studies suffer from lower statistical power, an inability to account for confounding information, and upward bias in measuring price impact compared to event studies using multiple securities. The limited time period and number of events to analyze with a single security make the study design more vulnerable to criticism. While event studies can help assess market efficiency, courts should not over-rely on their results given limitations of the single-security approach. Experts must recognize event studies are a useful tool but not dispositive and are subject to the interpretation of the courts.
Pick at least one study discussed in the chapter per relevant meth.docxkarlhennesey
Pick at least one study discussed in the chapter per relevant methodology (case study, different experiments, survey, observational research, secondary data analysis, event history analysis, archival data analysis, historical ethnography, content analysis) and retrieve the full text. (For convenience, select studies published as journal articles, rather than research monographs).
Summarize the purpose of the study as identified by the author(s) and the methodology chosen for it in a 2 – 3 page essay
Box 2.1 A Case Study: The Revco Medicaid Fraud Case
A clearer idea of the challenges confronting the white collar crime researcher can be acquired by looking at one specific example of such research. Diane Vaughan’s Controlling Unlawful Organizational Behavior (1983) studied the Revco Medicaid fraud case in which a large drugstore chain in Ohio initiated a computer-generated double-billing scheme that cost the government $500,000 in Medicaid funds. Company officials, however, believed they were entitled to these funds because of perceived inequities they attributed to inefficient or unfair reimbursement practices.
Vaughan first developed a file on this case by “snowballing” bits and pieces of information, which led in turn to further leads. But Vaughan, trained as a sociologist, was confronted with an early obstacle posed by the need to master the many specialized languages involved in the case: the computer language of the Welfare Department’s Division of Data Services, that department’s “Medicaid language,” and the financial language of the corporation (Vaughan 1983).
Conversely, Vaughan’s tendency to use sociological language had to be “translated” to become comprehensible to the personnel of these different organizations.
A second challenge involved the Revco Corporation’s concerns about revealing secrets that would be useful to its competitors, as well as affecting employee morale and generating undesirable publicity. Thus, it resisted Vaughan’s requests for access despite the fact that Revco was essentially claiming to be the victim in the case. Means of gaining cooperation from the various investigatory and prosecutorial agencies involved in the case also had to be negotiated; individual bureaucrats were reluctant to assume responsibility for providing access.
This led to a third basic challenge. The involvement of eight large, complex organizations in this single case required Vaughan to face difficult strategic and ethical choices: how to gain the trust and confidence of the various parties involved without revealing confidences, becoming intrusive, or becoming an advocate for any particular party. In analyzing the mass of often-conflicting information collected, researchers must be conscious of and resistant to different possible biases. Despite all these obstacles, Vaughan was able to produce an informative study of one corporation’s encounter with and control of criminal conduct.
The difficulties involved in studying the Revco case ...
Discipline Differences in Contract Cheating - International Center for Academ...Thomas Lancaster
This presentation, from the International Center for Academic Integrity Conference 2020, discusses how contract cheating differs across different academic disciplines and subject areas. It brings together wider research in the field with findings from two recent studies conducted by the presenter.
TESTING FOR MORAL HAZARD IN FINANCIAL NETWORKSPer Bäckman
This document summarizes a master's thesis that tests for moral hazard in financial networks. It develops a simulation model to show that players in financial markets can exploit their position within a network. The simulation constructs a network where one firm defaults on an external asset, causing the default to spread through the system as the asset is repackaged and resold. However, the initiating firm only bears part of the consequences due to risk sharing in the network, giving it an incentive to engage in risky behavior. The thesis reviews literature on financial contagion theory, network theory and game theory to develop this model. It then outlines the methodology and intended results sections to analyze data from the simulation to determine how different network structures and positions within them influence
The Three Forms of (Legal) Prediction: Experts, Crowds and Algorithms -- Prof...Daniel Katz
The Three Forms of (Legal) Prediction: Experts, Crowds and Algorithms -- Professors Daniel Martin Katz & Michael J. Bommarito - Illinois Tech Law / Univ of Michigan CSCS (Updated Version)
According to the NASW Code of Ethics section 6.04 (NASW, 2008), .docxaryan532920
According to the NASW Code of Ethics section 6.04 (NASW, 2008), social workers are ethically bound to work for policies that support the healthy development of individuals, guarantee equal access to services, and promote social and economic justice.
For this Discussion
, review this week’s resources, including
Working with Survivors of Sexual Abuse and Trauma: The Case of Rita
and “The Johnson Family”. Consider what change you might make to the policies that affect the client in the case you chose. Finally, think about how you might evaluate the success of the policy changes.
By Day 3
Post
an explanation of one change you might make to the policies that affect the client in the case. Be sure to reference the case you selected in your post. Finally, explain how you might evaluate the success of the policy changes.
Working With Survivors of Sexual Abuse and Trauma: The Case of Rita
Rita is a 22-year-old, heterosexual, Latina female working in the hospitality industry at a resort. She is the youngest of five children and lives at home with her parents. Rita has dated in the past but never developed a serious relationship. She is close to her immediate and extended family as well as to her female friends in the Latino community. Although her parents and three of her siblings were born in the Dominican Republic, Rita was born in the United States.
A year ago, Rita was sexually assaulted by an acquaintance of a male coworker. Rita and a female coworker met Juan and Bob after work at a local bar for a light meal and a few drinks. Because Rita had to get up early to work her shift the next day, Bob offered to drive her home. Instead of taking Rita directly home, however, he drove to a desolate spot nearby and assaulted her. Afterward, Bob threatened to harm her family if she did not remain silent and proceeded to drive her home. Although Rita did not tell her family what happened, she did call our agency hotline the next day to discuss her options. Because Rita’s assault occurred within the 5-day window for forensic evidence collection of this kind, Rita consented to activation of the county’s sexual assault response team (SART). Although she agreed to have an advocate and the sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) meet her at the hospital, Rita tearfully stated that she did not want to file a police report at that time because she did not want to upset her family. The nurse examiner interviewed Rita, collected evidence, recorded any injuries, administered antibiotics for possible sexually transmitted infections, and gave Rita emergency contraception in case of pregnancy. The advocate stayed with Rita during the procedure, supporting her and validating her experience, and gave her a referral for individual crisis counseling at our agency.
My treatment goals for Rita included alleviation of rape trauma syndrome symptoms that included shame and self-blame, validation of self-worth and empowerment, and processing how it would feel to discl.
According to the text, crime has been part of the human condition si.docxaryan532920
The document provides instructions for a 4-6 page paper on criminal law. It asks the student to:
1) Determine if the Ex Post Facto Clause can prohibit increased federal minimum sentencing guidelines and provide a rationale.
2) Explain the distinction between criminal, tort, and moral wrongs, and support or criticize the premise that moral laws have higher standards than criminal law.
3) Identify and discuss the differences between solicitation and conspiracy to commit a crime, and support or criticize the unilateral approach to conspiracy convictions.
4) Identify the four goals of criminal law and discuss how they effectuate protecting the public and preventing innocent convictions.
According to Ronald Story and Bruce Laurie, The dozen years between.docxaryan532920
Conservatives came to dominate American politics between 1968 and 1980 by capitalizing on social unrest and challenging the New Deal coalition. They embraced ideas and policies that emphasized free markets, deregulation, and tax cuts. These policies shaped American society into the 21st century by promoting economic growth while also increasing inequality.
According to Kirk (2016), most of your time will be spent work with .docxaryan532920
According to Kirk (2016), most of your time will be spent work with your data. The four following group actions were mentioned by Kirk (2016):
Data acquisition: Gathering the raw material
Data examination: Identifying physical properties and meaning
Data transformation: Enhancing your data through modification and consolidation
Data exploration: Using exploratory analysis and research techniques to learn
Select 1 data action and elaborate on the actions performed in that action group.
Reference: Kirk, A. (2016). Data Visualisation: A Handbook for Data Driven Design (p. 50). SAGE Publications.
.
According to the Council on Social Work Education, Competency 5 Eng.docxaryan532920
According to the Council on Social Work Education, Competency 5: Engage in Policy Practice:
Social workers understand that human rights and social justice, as well as social welfare and services, are mediated by policy and its implementation at the federal, state, and local levels. Social workers understand the history and current structures of social policies and services, the role of policy in service delivery, and the role of practice in policy development. Social workers understand their role in policy development and implementation within their practice settings at the micro, mezzo, and macro levels and they actively engage in policy practice to effect change within those settings. Social workers recognize and understand the historical, social, cultural, economic, organizational, environmental, and global influences that affect social policy. They are also knowledgeable about policy formulation, analysis, implementation, and evaluation.
Walden’s MSW program expects students in their specialization year to be able to:
Evaluate the implication of policies and policy change in the lives of clients/constituents.
Demonstrate critical thinking skills that can be used to inform policymakers and influence policies that impact clients/constituents and services.
This assignment is intended to help students demonstrate the behavioral components of this competency in their field education.
To prepare
: Working with your field instructor, identify a social problem that is common among the organization (or its clients) and research current policies at that state and federal levels that impact the social problem. Then, from a position of advocacy, identify methods to address the social problem (i.e., how you, as a social worker, and the agency advocate to change the problem). You are expected to specifically address how both you and the agency can effectively engage policy makers to make them aware of the social problem and the impact that the policies have on the agency and clients.
The Assignment (2-3 pages): Social Problems is Ex-cons finding Jobs Opportunities in State of California. The Agency is Called "Manifest" the website is Manifest.org
Identify the social problem
Explain rational for selecting social problem
Describe state and federal policies that impact the social problem
Identify specific methods to address the social problems
Explain how the agency and student can advocate to change the social problem
You are expected to present and discuss this assignment with your agency Field Instructor. Your field instructor will be evaluating your ability to demonstrate this competency in their field evaluation. In addition, you will submit this assignment for classroom credit. The Field Liaison will grade the assignment “PASS/FAIL,” see rubric for passing criteria.
.
According to Kirk (2016), most of our time will be spent working.docxaryan532920
According to Kirk (2016), most of our time will be spent working with our data. The four following group actions were mentioned by Kirk (2016):
Book: Kirk, A. (2016). Data visualisation a handbook for data driven design. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
Data acquisition: Gathering the raw material
Data examination: Identifying physical properties and meaning
Data transformation: Enhancing your data through modification and consolidation
Data exploration: Using exploratory analysis and research techniques to learn
Select 1 data action and elaborate on the actions preformed in that action group.
.
According to Kirk (2016), most of your time will be spent working wi.docxaryan532920
According to Kirk (2016), most of your time will be spent working with your data. The four following group actions were mentioned by Kirk (2016):
Data acquisition: Gathering the raw material
Data examination: Identifying physical properties and meaning
Data transformation: Enhancing your data through modification and consolidation
Data exploration: Using exploratory analysis and research techniques to learn
Select 1 data action and elaborate on the actions preformed in that action group.
.
According to Davenport (2014) the organizational value of healthcare.docxaryan532920
According to Davenport (2014) the organizational value of healthcare analytics, both determination and importance, provide a potential increase in annual revenue and ROI based on the value and use of analytics. To complete this assignment, research and evaluate the challenges faced in the implementation of healthcare analytics in the Health Care Organization (HCO) or health care industry using the following tools:
The paper must also address the following:
Application of PICO (problem, intervention, comparison group, and outcomes) to the challenge identified in your research.
The paper:
Must be two to four double-spaced pages in length (not including title and references pages) and formatted according to APA style as outlined in the
Ashford Writing Center. (Links to an external site.)
Must include a separate title page with the following:
Title of paper
Student’s name
Course name and number
Instructor’s name
Date submitted
Must use at least three scholarly sources in addition to the course text.
Must document all sources in APA style as outlined in the Ashford Writing Center.
Must include a separate references page that is formatted according to APA style as outlined in the Ashford Writing Center.
.
According to the authors, privacy and security go hand in hand; .docxaryan532920
According to the authors, privacy and security go hand in hand; and hence, privacy cannot be protected without implementing proper security controls and technologies. Today, organizations must make not only reasonable efforts to offer protection of privacy of data, but also must go much further as privacy breaches are damaging to its customers, reputation, and potentially could put the company out of business. As we continue learning from our various professional areas of practice, its no doubt that breaches have become an increasing concern to many businesses and their future operations. Taking Cyberattacks proliferation of 2011 into context, security experts at Intel/McAfee discovered huge series of cyberattacks on the networks of 72 organizations globally, including the United Nations, governments and corporations.
Q: From this research revelation in our chapter 11, briefly state and name the countries and organizations identified as the targeted victims?
.
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You are on the right track. Here are a few suggestions:
1. I would work on making each slide more visually appealing. Here is
a before/after example:
Before:
After (kept title only in the orange section, numbered the four step,
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Behavioral Public Choice:
The Behavioral Paradox of
Government Policy
W. Kip Viscusf & Ted Gayer”
I. Overview
W hat are the economic justifications for governm ent inter
vention in the economy? In a m arket economy, prices coordi
nate the activities of buyers and sellers and convey inform ation
about the strength of consum er dem and for a good and the
costs of supplying it. Because trade is voluntary, buyers and
sellers only m ake exchanges w hen both parties benefit. Under
ideal m arket conditions, this process leads to an efficient alloca
tion of goods w ithout governm ent intervention.
However, economics has long recognized instances in which
markets can fail to lead to an efficient outcome. The long-standing
view is that either market power or the nonexistence of markets
causes market failures. Market power is present w hen some indi
viduals or firms are price makers (for example, monopolists) ra
ther than participants in a perfectly competitive environment.
Such situations typically lead to the production of a less than effi
cient quantity of goods. The problem of market power is the pur
view of industrial organization economics and antitrust policy. * 1
The nonexistence of markets, or the failure of a robust market to
arise, can occur for a num ber of reasons, such as asymmetric in
formation (when one party in a transaction has information that is
not available to another) and public goods (when a good is non
rival and nonexcludable in consumption and thus likely to be un-
* University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management,
Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Ave. South, Nashville, TN 37203. [email protected]
vanderbilt.edu. We are grateful to the Mercatus Center for their support.
**Vice President and Director, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution, 1775
Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036. [email protected]
1. H arvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Fin a n c e 46-48 (10th ed. 2013).
mailto:[email protected]
974 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 38
dersupplied by the market). Another cause for the nonexistence of
markets is externalities, which occur when transactions impose
costs or benefits on a third party that are not considered in the
market exchange. A classic example is when a factory produces
and sells a good to a consumer to their m utual advantage, but the
pollution generated by the production of the good has a negative
impact on the health of nearby residents. A market for the clean
air in the affected.
Legal Analytics versus Empirical Legal Studies - or - Causal Inference vs Pre...Daniel Katz
This document provides an overview of legal analytics and empirical legal studies, comparing their methods and goals. Legal analytics uses machine learning and predictive modeling to predict outcomes, while empirical legal studies uses social science methods like regression analysis to determine the causal impact of policies. Both aim to improve legal rules and institutions but use different tools - prediction vs. causal inference. Prediction is important for tasks like litigation strategies, while causal inference is best for evaluating policy interventions. Recent work has shown growing interest in both rigorous predictive modeling of legal data as well as combining predictive and causal techniques.
The document describes developing machine learning models to predict outcomes of cases in the US Court of Appeals using historical data. Neural networks and XGBoost classifiers were developed and evaluated on a dataset of over 2,000 court cases. The models achieved encouraging accuracy levels between 36-98%, though limitations included the small dataset size. Significant factors identified included the appeals court, nature of prior rulings, applicant type, and judges' ideological leanings. Future work could focus on decision trees to characterize outcomes and simplify the models.
Electronic copy available at httpssrn.comabstract=1629786.docxSALU18
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1629786
1
Behavioral Portfolio Analysis of Individual Investors
1
Arvid O. I. Hoffmann
*
Maastricht University and Netspar
Hersh Shefrin
Santa Clara University
Joost M. E. Pennings
Maastricht University, Wageningen University, and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Abstract: Existing studies on individual investors’ decision-making often rely on observable socio-demographic
variables to proxy for underlying psychological processes that drive investment choices. Doing so implicitly ignores
the latent heterogeneity amongst investors in terms of their preferences and beliefs that form the underlying drivers
of their behavior. To gain a better understanding of the relations among individual investors’ decision-making, the
processes leading to these decisions, and investment performance, this paper analyzes how systematic differences in
investors’ investment objectives and strategies impact the portfolios they select and the returns they earn. Based on
recent findings from behavioral finance we develop hypotheses which are tested using a combination of transaction
and survey data involving a large sample of online brokerage clients. In line with our expectations, we find that
investors driven by objectives related to speculation have higher aspirations and turnover, take more risk, judge
themselves to be more advanced, and underperform relative to investors driven by the need to build a financial
buffer or save for retirement. Somewhat to our surprise, we find that investors who rely on fundamental analysis
have higher aspirations and turnover, take more risks, are more overconfident, and outperform investors who rely on
technical analysis. Our findings provide support for the behavioral approach to portfolio theory and shed new light
on the traditional approach to portfolio theory.
JEL Classification: G11, G24
Keywords: Behavioral Portfolio Theory, Investment Decisions, Investor Performance, Behavioral Finance
*
Corresponding author: Arvid O. I. Hoffmann, Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics,
Department of Finance, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 43 38 84 602. E-mail:
[email protected]
1
The authors thank Jeroen Derwall and Meir Statman for thoughtful comments and suggestions on previous
versions of this paper. Any remaining errors are our own.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1629786
2
I. Introduction
The combination of increased self-responsibility for retirement and an aging population has led a
growing number of people to become accountable for their own financial futures. Considering
the significant impact of current investment choices on future lifestyles (Browning and Crossley,
2001), it is important to understand how individual investors differ when it comes to the
triangular relationshi ...
The author conducted an experiment to analyze the disposition effect among 58 student subjects. In a simulated financial market, subjects decided whether to hold or sell assets over 20 periods as values fluctuated. The majority of subjects exhibited the disposition effect by selling winning assets too early and holding losing assets too long. Correlations between the disposition effect and variables like gender, age, major, and risk aversion were explored but inconclusive due to small sample sizes for some groups. Overall, the experiment provided evidence that the disposition effect is present among most investors.
Decision makers often face powerful incentives to increase risk-taking on behalf of others either through bonus contracts or competitive relative performance contracts. Motivated by examples from the recent financial crisis, we conduct an experimental study of risk-taking on behalf of others using a large sample with subjects from all walks of life. We find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly requires “financial psychopaths” in order to flourish, but is diminished by social concerns. We believe the research reported here is the first to experimentally investigate the effects of incentives on risk-taking on behalf of others, and to do so on a large scale using a random sample of the general population.
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This document provides an overview of crowd-funding and equity crowd-funding, which is the focus of the thesis. It defines crowd-funding as raising money from the public through the internet, and identifies different types including donation-based, reward-based, peer-to-peer lending, and equity-based crowd-funding. Equity crowd-funding involves businesses connecting with large groups of people online to offer shares in their company. This poses unique legal challenges around investor protection given that the general public is investing in early-stage companies they may not fully understand the risks of. The thesis will examine regulatory approaches to investor protection in equity crowd-funding in Europe and the United States.
The reason why should undergo into the arbitrage trading is very simple and its because its risk free investment option. Though it contains certain risk if one fails to follow the protocol define for Arbitrage Trading. Usually Arbitrage is risk free until and unless there is no financial crises.
The article discusses some problems with using single-security event studies in securities litigation. Single-security event studies suffer from lower statistical power, an inability to account for confounding information, and upward bias in measuring price impact compared to event studies using multiple securities. The limited time period and number of events to analyze with a single security make the study design more vulnerable to criticism. While event studies can help assess market efficiency, courts should not over-rely on their results given limitations of the single-security approach. Experts must recognize event studies are a useful tool but not dispositive and are subject to the interpretation of the courts.
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Pick at least one study discussed in the chapter per relevant methodology (case study, different experiments, survey, observational research, secondary data analysis, event history analysis, archival data analysis, historical ethnography, content analysis) and retrieve the full text. (For convenience, select studies published as journal articles, rather than research monographs).
Summarize the purpose of the study as identified by the author(s) and the methodology chosen for it in a 2 – 3 page essay
Box 2.1 A Case Study: The Revco Medicaid Fraud Case
A clearer idea of the challenges confronting the white collar crime researcher can be acquired by looking at one specific example of such research. Diane Vaughan’s Controlling Unlawful Organizational Behavior (1983) studied the Revco Medicaid fraud case in which a large drugstore chain in Ohio initiated a computer-generated double-billing scheme that cost the government $500,000 in Medicaid funds. Company officials, however, believed they were entitled to these funds because of perceived inequities they attributed to inefficient or unfair reimbursement practices.
Vaughan first developed a file on this case by “snowballing” bits and pieces of information, which led in turn to further leads. But Vaughan, trained as a sociologist, was confronted with an early obstacle posed by the need to master the many specialized languages involved in the case: the computer language of the Welfare Department’s Division of Data Services, that department’s “Medicaid language,” and the financial language of the corporation (Vaughan 1983).
Conversely, Vaughan’s tendency to use sociological language had to be “translated” to become comprehensible to the personnel of these different organizations.
A second challenge involved the Revco Corporation’s concerns about revealing secrets that would be useful to its competitors, as well as affecting employee morale and generating undesirable publicity. Thus, it resisted Vaughan’s requests for access despite the fact that Revco was essentially claiming to be the victim in the case. Means of gaining cooperation from the various investigatory and prosecutorial agencies involved in the case also had to be negotiated; individual bureaucrats were reluctant to assume responsibility for providing access.
This led to a third basic challenge. The involvement of eight large, complex organizations in this single case required Vaughan to face difficult strategic and ethical choices: how to gain the trust and confidence of the various parties involved without revealing confidences, becoming intrusive, or becoming an advocate for any particular party. In analyzing the mass of often-conflicting information collected, researchers must be conscious of and resistant to different possible biases. Despite all these obstacles, Vaughan was able to produce an informative study of one corporation’s encounter with and control of criminal conduct.
The difficulties involved in studying the Revco case ...
Discipline Differences in Contract Cheating - International Center for Academ...Thomas Lancaster
This presentation, from the International Center for Academic Integrity Conference 2020, discusses how contract cheating differs across different academic disciplines and subject areas. It brings together wider research in the field with findings from two recent studies conducted by the presenter.
TESTING FOR MORAL HAZARD IN FINANCIAL NETWORKSPer Bäckman
This document summarizes a master's thesis that tests for moral hazard in financial networks. It develops a simulation model to show that players in financial markets can exploit their position within a network. The simulation constructs a network where one firm defaults on an external asset, causing the default to spread through the system as the asset is repackaged and resold. However, the initiating firm only bears part of the consequences due to risk sharing in the network, giving it an incentive to engage in risky behavior. The thesis reviews literature on financial contagion theory, network theory and game theory to develop this model. It then outlines the methodology and intended results sections to analyze data from the simulation to determine how different network structures and positions within them influence
The Three Forms of (Legal) Prediction: Experts, Crowds and Algorithms -- Prof...Daniel Katz
The Three Forms of (Legal) Prediction: Experts, Crowds and Algorithms -- Professors Daniel Martin Katz & Michael J. Bommarito - Illinois Tech Law / Univ of Michigan CSCS (Updated Version)
Similar to American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to.docx (13)
According to the NASW Code of Ethics section 6.04 (NASW, 2008), .docxaryan532920
According to the NASW Code of Ethics section 6.04 (NASW, 2008), social workers are ethically bound to work for policies that support the healthy development of individuals, guarantee equal access to services, and promote social and economic justice.
For this Discussion
, review this week’s resources, including
Working with Survivors of Sexual Abuse and Trauma: The Case of Rita
and “The Johnson Family”. Consider what change you might make to the policies that affect the client in the case you chose. Finally, think about how you might evaluate the success of the policy changes.
By Day 3
Post
an explanation of one change you might make to the policies that affect the client in the case. Be sure to reference the case you selected in your post. Finally, explain how you might evaluate the success of the policy changes.
Working With Survivors of Sexual Abuse and Trauma: The Case of Rita
Rita is a 22-year-old, heterosexual, Latina female working in the hospitality industry at a resort. She is the youngest of five children and lives at home with her parents. Rita has dated in the past but never developed a serious relationship. She is close to her immediate and extended family as well as to her female friends in the Latino community. Although her parents and three of her siblings were born in the Dominican Republic, Rita was born in the United States.
A year ago, Rita was sexually assaulted by an acquaintance of a male coworker. Rita and a female coworker met Juan and Bob after work at a local bar for a light meal and a few drinks. Because Rita had to get up early to work her shift the next day, Bob offered to drive her home. Instead of taking Rita directly home, however, he drove to a desolate spot nearby and assaulted her. Afterward, Bob threatened to harm her family if she did not remain silent and proceeded to drive her home. Although Rita did not tell her family what happened, she did call our agency hotline the next day to discuss her options. Because Rita’s assault occurred within the 5-day window for forensic evidence collection of this kind, Rita consented to activation of the county’s sexual assault response team (SART). Although she agreed to have an advocate and the sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) meet her at the hospital, Rita tearfully stated that she did not want to file a police report at that time because she did not want to upset her family. The nurse examiner interviewed Rita, collected evidence, recorded any injuries, administered antibiotics for possible sexually transmitted infections, and gave Rita emergency contraception in case of pregnancy. The advocate stayed with Rita during the procedure, supporting her and validating her experience, and gave her a referral for individual crisis counseling at our agency.
My treatment goals for Rita included alleviation of rape trauma syndrome symptoms that included shame and self-blame, validation of self-worth and empowerment, and processing how it would feel to discl.
According to the text, crime has been part of the human condition si.docxaryan532920
The document provides instructions for a 4-6 page paper on criminal law. It asks the student to:
1) Determine if the Ex Post Facto Clause can prohibit increased federal minimum sentencing guidelines and provide a rationale.
2) Explain the distinction between criminal, tort, and moral wrongs, and support or criticize the premise that moral laws have higher standards than criminal law.
3) Identify and discuss the differences between solicitation and conspiracy to commit a crime, and support or criticize the unilateral approach to conspiracy convictions.
4) Identify the four goals of criminal law and discuss how they effectuate protecting the public and preventing innocent convictions.
According to Ronald Story and Bruce Laurie, The dozen years between.docxaryan532920
Conservatives came to dominate American politics between 1968 and 1980 by capitalizing on social unrest and challenging the New Deal coalition. They embraced ideas and policies that emphasized free markets, deregulation, and tax cuts. These policies shaped American society into the 21st century by promoting economic growth while also increasing inequality.
According to Kirk (2016), most of your time will be spent work with .docxaryan532920
According to Kirk (2016), most of your time will be spent work with your data. The four following group actions were mentioned by Kirk (2016):
Data acquisition: Gathering the raw material
Data examination: Identifying physical properties and meaning
Data transformation: Enhancing your data through modification and consolidation
Data exploration: Using exploratory analysis and research techniques to learn
Select 1 data action and elaborate on the actions performed in that action group.
Reference: Kirk, A. (2016). Data Visualisation: A Handbook for Data Driven Design (p. 50). SAGE Publications.
.
According to the Council on Social Work Education, Competency 5 Eng.docxaryan532920
According to the Council on Social Work Education, Competency 5: Engage in Policy Practice:
Social workers understand that human rights and social justice, as well as social welfare and services, are mediated by policy and its implementation at the federal, state, and local levels. Social workers understand the history and current structures of social policies and services, the role of policy in service delivery, and the role of practice in policy development. Social workers understand their role in policy development and implementation within their practice settings at the micro, mezzo, and macro levels and they actively engage in policy practice to effect change within those settings. Social workers recognize and understand the historical, social, cultural, economic, organizational, environmental, and global influences that affect social policy. They are also knowledgeable about policy formulation, analysis, implementation, and evaluation.
Walden’s MSW program expects students in their specialization year to be able to:
Evaluate the implication of policies and policy change in the lives of clients/constituents.
Demonstrate critical thinking skills that can be used to inform policymakers and influence policies that impact clients/constituents and services.
This assignment is intended to help students demonstrate the behavioral components of this competency in their field education.
To prepare
: Working with your field instructor, identify a social problem that is common among the organization (or its clients) and research current policies at that state and federal levels that impact the social problem. Then, from a position of advocacy, identify methods to address the social problem (i.e., how you, as a social worker, and the agency advocate to change the problem). You are expected to specifically address how both you and the agency can effectively engage policy makers to make them aware of the social problem and the impact that the policies have on the agency and clients.
The Assignment (2-3 pages): Social Problems is Ex-cons finding Jobs Opportunities in State of California. The Agency is Called "Manifest" the website is Manifest.org
Identify the social problem
Explain rational for selecting social problem
Describe state and federal policies that impact the social problem
Identify specific methods to address the social problems
Explain how the agency and student can advocate to change the social problem
You are expected to present and discuss this assignment with your agency Field Instructor. Your field instructor will be evaluating your ability to demonstrate this competency in their field evaluation. In addition, you will submit this assignment for classroom credit. The Field Liaison will grade the assignment “PASS/FAIL,” see rubric for passing criteria.
.
According to Kirk (2016), most of our time will be spent working.docxaryan532920
According to Kirk (2016), most of our time will be spent working with our data. The four following group actions were mentioned by Kirk (2016):
Book: Kirk, A. (2016). Data visualisation a handbook for data driven design. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
Data acquisition: Gathering the raw material
Data examination: Identifying physical properties and meaning
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Title of paper
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American Economic Association
Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment
Author(s): Steven T. Anderson, Daniel Friedman and Ryan
Oprea
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 100, No. 4
(SEPTEMBER 2010), pp. 1778-1803
Published by: American Economic Association
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American Economie Review 100 (September 2010): 1778-1803
http-J/www. aeaweb. or g/article s.php?doi=10.1257/aer.
100.4.1778
Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment
By Steven T. Anderson, Daniel Friedman, and Ryan Oprea*
El Mut?n, perhaps the world's largest remaining iron ore
deposit, was opened to private inves
tors in the 1980s but, due to the high cost of developing the
remote Bolivian site, there were no
takers for two decades. In late 2005, spurred by rising
commodity prices, the Brazilian company
EBX finally seized the opportunity, preempting rivals based in
China and India.1 Numerous
similar examples can be found in the annals of mining and oil
companies (Raymond F. Mikesell
et al. 1971).
The strategic problem is as old as humanity: the value of a
grove of figs fluctuates as the fruit
ripens (or is attacked by worms) and the first band of hunter-
3. gatherers to seize it eats better than
neighboring bands. High tech firms today face similar issues
when they introduce a new product.
Delaying introduction might allow the product niche to expand,
but new substitutes or changes in
standards might shrink the niche. A rival could preempt the
niche or it could vanish entirely due
to a disruptive new technology (Clayton M. Christensen 1997).
Similar considerations apply to
retailers deciding when to open a "big box" outlet in a market
too small to handle more than one
store, and also apply to academic researchers investigating a hot
new topic.
In this paper we study such situations both theoretically and
empirically. We formalize them
as preemption games, using standard simplifications to put the
strategic issues into sharp focus.2
In our games, the opportunity is available to a known number n
+ 1 of investors; it has a publicly
observed value Vthat evolves according to geometric Brownian
motion with known parameters;
each investor has a privately known avoidable cost of investing;
and the first mover preempts and
obtains the entire value V.
Our model builds on an active literature reviewed in Marcel
Boyer, Eric Gravel, and Pierre
Lasserre (2004) that studies preemption contests for investments
with option values. Unlike most
of this literature (e.g., Steven R. Grenadier 2002; Helen Weeds
2002; Romain Bouis, Kuno J.M.
Huisman, and Peter M. Kort 2009), firms in our model are
4. uncertain of their rivals' costs. A
trade-off for this added piece of realism is that unlike some of
this literature but like much clas
sic auction theory, preemption is complete; the winner takes all
of the returns from investment.
A separate literature considers preemption in very different
environments related to R&D (e.g.,
* Anderson: National Minerals Information Center, US
Geological Survey, Reston, VA 20192 (e-mail: Sanderson?
usgs.gov); Friedman: Economics Department, University of
California-Santa Cruz, 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz,
CA 95064 (e-mail: [email protected]); Oprea: Economics
Department, University of California-Santa Cruz, 1156 High
Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 (e-mail: [email protected]). We
are grateful to Jerome Bragdon and Todd Feldman for
research assistance, to Nitai Farmer, Adam Freidin and James
Pettit for programming support, and to the National
Science Foundation (grant IIS-0527770) and the University of
California for funding. We received helpful comments
from Robert Jerrard, Vijay Krishna, Robert B. Wilson, James C.
Cox, Donald Wittman, participants at the 2008 UCSB
Experimental and Behavioral Workshop, from seminar
audiences at Cal Poly SLO, CUNY-Baruch, George Mason,
Houston/Rice, and Texas A&M Universities, and from three
anonymous referees of this Review. All mistakes are our
own.
1
Arai, Adriana, and Andrew J. Barden. 2006. "Bolivia Rules Out
Brazil's EBX for $1.1 Bin Project (Update2)."
Bloomberg, April
5. 24.http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&refer
=latin_america&sid=a2LjvfEFCDW 2
Reality, of course, is always more complex. In the El Mut?n
example, Bolivia's newly elected government shut
down EBX's operations in 2006, citing environmental and other
concerns, and in late 2007 signed a 40-year concession
contract with the Indian firm Jindal. Other parts of the story are
more consistent with our model. The number of serious
rivals was always reasonably clear. The true costs of the
Brazilian and Indian firms (and their Chinese rival, Shandong)
1778
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VOL. 100 NO. 4 ANDERSON ETAL.: PREEMPTION GAMES
1779
Jennifer F. Reinganum 1981; Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole
1985; Heidrun C. Hoppe and
Ulrich Lehmann-Grube 2005) and to market entry (e.g., Dan
Levin and James Peck 2003).
Bart M. Lambrecht and William R.M. Perraudin (2003) is our
direct predecessor. Like us,
they draw on real options theory to investigate preemption of a
stochastic investment opportunity
by competitors whose costs are private information. Our
theoretical results extend theirs by cov
6. ering more than two competitors, and by relaxing a restrictive
technical assumption. Our model,
unlike theirs, is explicitly rooted in auction theory as well as in
real options theory. Indeed, spe
cial cases of our model include Dutch auctions as well as
deferral options.
Our theoretical contribution appears in Section I. We
characterize the symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the preemption game with an arbitrary
number of players. Players' BNE
strategies take the form of a threshold value at which the
opportunity is seized immediately. The
mapping from realized cost to equilibrium threshold is
characterized in two different ways: by
an ordinary differential equation and also by a recursion
equation. We show that the auction and
real option special cases lead to useful bounds on the BNE
strategies.
Section II describes a laboratory experiment informed by the
theory, using software cre
ated expressly for the purpose. It presents the main
treatments?Competition (triopoly) versus
Monopoly, and High versus Low Brownian parameters?and
obtains four testable hypotheses.
Section III explains other aspects of the laboratory
implementation.
Section IV presents the results. The first three hypotheses fare
quite well: the triopoly market
structure leads to much lower markups (threshold value less
7. cost) than the monopoly structure;
the Brownian parameters have a major impact in the predicted
direction in Monopoly but (again
as predicted in BNE) have negligible impact in Competition;
and the lowest cost investor indeed
is far more likely to preempt than her rivals. The evidence is
mixed on the last hypothesis: at the
low cost end of the scale, investors' markups indeed tend to
decline in cost, but the predicted
relationship breaks down at higher costs. However, these
departures from prediction turn out to
have very little impact on subjects' actual earnings.
Following a concluding discussion, an Appendix collects
mathematical derivations and the
main proofs. Other Appendices available online provide
additional mathematical details, discuss
the lesser-known econometric techniques, report supplementary
data analysis, and reproduce
instructions to subjects. Our theoretical contribution
incorporates and extends the PhD disserta
tion of Anderson (2003). A companion paper, Oprea, Friedman,
and Anderson (2009) describes
a related laboratory experiment concerning the monopoly (n
=
0) case only.
I. Theoretical Results
This section analyzes two situations. In the first, called
monopoly, a single investor / has sole
access to an investment opportunity. In the second, called
competition, two or more investors
with private information concerning their own costs have access
to the same opportunity, and the
8. first to seize it renders it unavailable to the others.
were, in no small part, private information due to confidential
subsidies arranged by their own governments as well as
confidential understandings with the Bolivian government. The
firms faced the hazard that the Bolivian government
might renationalize El Mut?n, or declare it a protected national
park, before any of them could seize the opportunity
(Barden and Arai 2006; Patrick J. McDonnell 2008. "Bolivia
opening up huge iron ore deposit to mining." Los Angeles
Times, May 28.
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/28/business/fi-iron28
(accessed October 31, 2008).).
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1780 the american economic review september 2010
A. Monopoly
An investor / with discount rate3 p > 0 can launch a project
whenever she chooses by sinking
a given cost Ct > 0. The present value V of the project evolves
via geometric Brownian motion
with drift parameter a < p and volatility parameter a > 0:
(1) dV= aVdt + aVdz,
9. where z is the standard Wiener process. That is, the value
follows a continuous time random walk
in which the appreciation rate has mean a and standard
deviation o per unit time. At times t > 0
prior to launching the project, the investor observes V(t). If she
invests at time t, then she obtains
payoff [ V(t)
?
Ci]e~pt. The project is irreversible and generates no other
payoffs. Thus, the task
is to choose the investment time so as to maximize the expected
payoff.
The solution goes back to Claude Henry (1974) and has been
widely known since Robert
McDonald and Daniel Siegel (1986); see Chapter 5 of Avinash
K. Dixit and Robert S. Pindyck
(1994) for a detailed exposition. The optimal policy takes the
form: wait until V(t) hits the
threshold
(2) VM(Q) = (1 + w)Ct,
then launch immediately. Note that the threshold is proportional
to cost, and that the wait option
premium w > 0 is an algebraic function of the volatility, drift
and discount parameters <r, a and p.
Specifically,
(3) w
=
10. j^j,
where ? =
- +
B. Competition
Now consider the case that each investor has n > 1 rivals. All
investors / = 1,2,...,ai -f- 1
have access to the same investment opportunity, whose value V
again evolves according to geo
metric Brownian motion (1). Each investor / again knows her
own cost Ch but doesn't know the
other investors' costs Cj9j ^ i. She regards them as independent
draws from a cumulative dis
tribution function, H(C), with a positive continuous density
function h(C) on support [CL, q/].
The first investor to launch, say at time tt > 0, obtains payoff
[V(f/)
-
C^e~p%i and the other
investors obtain zero payoff. All this is common knowledge.
The resulting preemption game is
denoted r(?9n,ti).
The preemption game has a unique symmetric Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (BNE). It is char
acterized by an increasing function V*(C/) that maps the
investor's cost into a threshold value,
above which she immediately invests. We now sketch the
derivation and offer some intuition; the
Appendix spells out the derivations and the main proofs.
11. a
+ 2p J2. > 1.
3
Recall that the discount rate reflects pure time preference, the
expiration hazard, and possibly risk aversion. As
explained in the next section, the laboratory experiment focuses
on the expiration hazard, sometimes informally
referred to as "preemption by Nature."
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VOL. 100 NO. 4 ANDERSON ETAL.: PREEMPTION GAMES
1781
Using notation m, V0 and C defined below, the expected
discounted payoff E[ V{t)
can be written out as the following objective function:
(4) F(mChn) = V*(m)
-
?]
Vm)
1 - H{m)
1 - H(C)
The choice variable in (4) is m G [CL, Cv], interpreted as the
cost-type that the investor chooses
12. as her potential "masquerade."4
The first factor in the objective function (4) is simply the profit
(or "markup") [V*(m)
?
C,]
obtained at the time of successful investment. The second
factor, [V0/V*(m)]?, accounts for the
time cost of delaying investment and the expiration hazard,
given that V0 is the current value of
the investment project. The Appendix shows that the
monopolist's value function consists of only
these first two factors. It also notes that with competitors (n >
0), the restriction p > a can be
relaxed and consequently (4) is valid for ? > 0, while of course
(2-3) is valid only for ? > 1.
The third and final factor, [(1
-
H(m))/(l
-
H(C))]n, is the probability that the n rivals all
have higher costs (and therefore will not preempt), conditioned
on the fact that none of them has
already invested. That conditioning is reflected in the
denominator. Let V > VQbc the "highest
peak" so far achieved by the random walk. Then C is the
corresponding cost, i.e., V
=
V*(C).
13. Since the preemption game is over as soon as the first investor
moves, it turns out that the BNE
threshold strategy is independent of V, C and V0 within the
relevant range.
The key to obtaining the BNE is the best response (or
"truthtelling") property that investor i
maximizes (4) at m
=
Ct. The associated first-order condition can be expressed as the
following
ordinary differential equation (ODE):
(5) V"(Q =
nh(C.) [V(Q
-
C,]V(Q
For reasons explained in the next subsection, we also impose
the boundary condition
(6)
This boundary value problem has a unique solution V* that
characterizes the symmetric BNE
threshold for our preemption game. The Appendix shows that it
can also be expressed as a con
ditional expectation and that it satisfies
(7) V*(C) = c + Jc [vy)
1 - H(y)
14. Li-ff(c)j
dy.
THEOREM 1: Let the cumulative distribution function H have a
continuous density h with full
support [CL, Cy], where 0 < CL < Cv < oc. Let it be common
knowledge among all investors i
= 1,..., n + 1 that Vs investment cost C, is an independent
random variable with distribution H
and is observed only by investor i. Then
1. for any ? > 0, boundary value problem (5-6) has a unique
solution V* : [CL, Cy]
?> R,
4
Of course, the threshold value itself is the natural choice
variable but, as in auction theory, it turns out that m is
more convenient since V*(-) is invertible.
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1782 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER
2010
2. a function V* satisfies the recursion equation (7) if and only
if it solves the boundary
problem (5-6), and
15. 3. the premption game T[?,n,H] has a symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium in which each
investor i's threshold is V* evaluated at realized cost Cv
To obtain V* numerically, one can use the Euler method of
integrating the ODE (5) backward
from the upper boundary value (6). Alternatively, one can take
an initial approximation (such as
the auction solution V defined in the next subsection),
substitute it for V* in the last expression in
(7) to obtain a better approximation, and iterate. The BNE
threshold function V* is a fixed point
of this mapping.
Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) use slightly different methods
to derive an ODE that is con
sistent with equation (5) for the special case that (a) there are
only two investors (duopoly),
and (b) H has an increasing modified hazard rate Ci[h(Ci)]/[l
?
H(Ci)]. Their methods rule out
asymmetric BNE. Our method considers only symmetric BNE
but has several compensating
advantages. It covers (n -f 1) > 2 investors, allows arbitrary
hazard rates, connects explicitly to
auction theory, and leads to a streamlined and unified analysis
of useful special cases.
Theorem 1 assumes that H has a continuous positive density on
the entire support interval,
and that the upper endpoint is finite and the lower endpoint is
positive. It follows from Lusin's
16. theorem (e.g., Walter Rudin 1966, 53-54) that such functions
are a dense subset of all distribu
tion functions on [0, oo), so these assumptions are not
especially onerous. Still, it would be of
interest to explicitly consider distributions with discrete support
(e.g., a finite set of cost "types")
or asymmetric cases in which some investors are known to have
different cost distributions than
other investors. Perhaps "ironing" techniques in the spirit of
Roger B. Myerson (1981) would be
useful for such extensions.
Consider again the special case n
? 0, monopoly. Since n is a factor in the numerator in
(5), it might seem at first that the expression is identically zero.
However, the last paragraph of
the Monopoly subsection of the Appendix (ending with equation
(21)) notes that in this case
the denominator V*(C,-)
?
?[V*(Ci)
?
C,]
= 0 and that this last expression characterizes the
monopoly solution.
The Appendix shows that, at any realized cost Ch the monopoly
solution VM(Ci) is an upper
bound on the competitive solution V*(C,-). The intuition is
simple but revealing. In monopoly, an
17. investor increases her threshold up to the point that the greater
profit margin just balances the
greater threat of "preemption by Nature," i.e., the expiration
hazard. With competition, the inves
tor must also consider preemption by other investors, so she
finds the balance at a lower threshold.
The special case ?
= 0 is also instructive. Here the middle factor of the objective
function (4)
disappears, yielding
Apart from the denominator, which disappears in the first order
condition, this is a familiar
objective function from auction theory. Thus the ODE (5)
collapses to the ODE for bid functions
in a reverse Dutch (or reverse first price) auction:
C. Special Cases, Intuition, and Bounds
(8) F(mC?n) = [V?
-
C,]
1 - H{m) T
A-H(C).
(9) v"(Q = [V(Q
-
q
nh{Ci)
18. [l-H(Q]
'
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VOL. 100 NO. 4 ANDERSON ET AL.: PREEMPTION GAMES
1783
The boundary condition (6), of course, remains unchanged.
Hence, with ?
= 0, we obtain an
isomorphism between threshold values in preemption games and
bids in auctions.
The "auction" solution V(Q) to boundary value problem (9, 6) is
another upper bound on the
solution to the more general boundary value problem (5, 6). The
intuition again is that the inves
tor chooses the threshold to balance greed (a larger profit
margin) and fear (of preemption) at the
margin. Completely eliminating a preemption threat (in this
case from Nature, by setting ?
= 0,
e.g., by setting a > 0
=
p) sets an upper bound on the balance point.
19. The BNE threshold V*(C^) also has a natural lower bound,
given by the classic Marshallian
(i.e., zero net present value) investment rule V?(C/)
=
Ct. Recall that the boundary condition (6)
imposes this rule, but only at the highest possible cost Cv. The
intuition for the boundary condi
tion is compelling. An investor with the highest possible cost
faces Bertrand competition: every
rival will find it profitable to undercut any positive markup she
might seek.
These bounds and special cases are summarized in the following
THEOREM 2: Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, the BNE
threshold V*(Q) is an increas
ing, continuously differentiable function bounded below by the
Marshallian threshold function
V?(Ci)
=
Ci and bounded above by the monopoly threshold VM(Q). It is
also bounded above by
the solution V(Ct) to (9, 6) and is tangent to V(C,) at the upper
endpoint Cv.
Finally, consider special cases of the cost distribution. If H has
a constant density (i.e., is uni
form) or a continuous decreasing density, then it can be shown
(see the Online Appendix) that
the BNE threshold function V* is concave.
20. Our experiment employs the uniform distribution H on [CL,
Cv. In this case, (5) reduces to
[VQ
-
Q]V(Q
XQ
-
?[VQ
- C
In the special case ?
? 0, we then get the well-known ODE from William Vickrey
(1961)
(11) vxc^lViQ-Clf^-r,
with analytic solution
nQ + Cv
('<?) no -1 vh-ma - ci) l^c
(12) V**(Q) n + 1
COROLLARY 1: Let H be the uniform distribution on [CL, Cv],
let n be an integer > 1, and let
V**(Ci) be given by Equation (12). For ? > 0, the Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium threshold function
V*(C,), the solution to (10, 6) on [CL, Cv], is concave, bounded
21. above by V**, tangent to V** at
CUf and bounded below by the Marshallian threshold function
V7?(Q)
=
Ct.
Thus when the cost distribution is uniform, an upper bound (and
often a good approximation)
of the BNE threshold V* is the function
(13) V^Q^miniV^V^C,)}.
The monopolist threshold binds in (13) at lower cost
realizations for high values of ? and low
values of n.
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1784 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER
2010
Panel A Panel B
Figure 1. BNE Threshold Values for Triopolies with Costs
Drawn Independently from the Uniform
Distribution on [50,80]
Note: "High" refers to the case ?
= 2.25 with option premium w
22. = 0.8, and "Low" refers to the case ?
= 3.00 with
option premium w
= 0.5.
It is well known from auction theory that the bid function V(C)
converges to the Marshallian
threshold function V?(C)
= C as the number of rivals n ?> oo. Theorem 2 implies that the
same
is true of the BNE threshold function V*(C). Since the bound V
converges to the lower bound V?
in the large number limit, we conclude that the BNE markups
V*(C)
? C converge to zero as the
number of rivals increases.
D. Numerical Example
Figure 1 shows the numerical solution V* to the boundary value
problem (10, 6) for triopoly
(n = 2), given the uniform cost distribution on [CL, Cv}
=
[50,80], for ?
= 2.25 and ?
= 3.00.
The first ? value is referred to as "High" because it generates
higher monopoly thresholds (via
option premium w
23. =
0.8) than the second ? value, which has w
= 0.5 and is referred to as
"Low." Panel A includes the monopoly thresholds VM. Panel B
shows the BNE threshold func
tions at finer resolution, together with the Marshallian lower
bound V?(C/)
=
C, and the Vickrey
upper bound V**(Ct). One can see that the two BNE threshold
functions lie close together and
that, as claimed in Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, both are tangent
to the Vickrey bound at the upper
endpoint.
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VOL. 100 NO. 4
Table 1
ANDERSON ETAL.: PREEMPTION GAMES
I?Binomial Parameters and Number of Subjects Studied in Each
Treatment
24. 1785
Treatment 77 p q Replications
Low 0.03 0.524 0.007 36 subjects
High 0.03 0.513 0.003 36 subjects
E. Discrete Approximations
Brownian motion is an idealization. Our experiment uses a close
binomial approximation of
the continuous time process. Specifically, it has a fixed time
interval At
= 0.003 minutes (i.e.,
200 milliseconds) for each discrete step of the value path, and
three binomial parameters:
(i) the step size 77 > 0 of the proportional change in value, i.e.,
the current value V becomes
either (1 + 77)Vor (1
?
77)Vat the next step;
(ii) the uptick probability p G (0,1), i.e., the probability that the
next step is to (1 + 77) Vrather
than to (1
?
77) V; and
(iii) the expiration probability q G (0,1), i.e., the probability
that the current step is the last, and
the opportunity disappears.
25. As noted in the Online Appendix, the discrete binomial
parameters (p,q,rj,At) map into the
Brownian parameters (a,cr,p). The Brownian parameters in turn
have a sufficient statistic, ?,
which determines the monopoly (n
=
0) threshold and the BNE (n > 0) threshold. Thus, our
choices of n and the binomial parameters in the laboratory allow
us to manipulate the equilib
rium thresholds and thus to test the theory's predictive power.
II. Treatments and Hypotheses
Two binary treatment variables, Parameters and Structure, allow
us to test the major predic
tions of the model. Parameters fixes the time step at At
= 0.003 (in minutes) and the step size
at 77
= 0.03. Parameters = Low is shorthand for p = 0.524 and q =
0.007, corresponding
to ? ? 3.0 and option premium w ? 0.5, as in the numerical
example of the previous section.
Likewise, Parameters = High is shorthand for p
= 0.513 and q = 0.003, corresponding to
? ? 2.25 and w ? 0.8. These configurations differ considerably
from each other, yet both yield
value paths "in the money" often enough, and jagged enough, to
maintain subjects' interest.
Table 1 summarizes this treatment variable for easy reference.
26. The second treatment variable is Structure. When Structure =
Monopoly, the subjects make
investment decisions with no rivals (n
=
0) and therefore no risk of preemption by another
investor. When Structure = Competition, the subjects compete
in triopolies (n
=
2). In each
Competition period the subjects are randomly reassigned to one
of three or four separate markets,
each with three investors.
Each period each subject's cost is drawn independently from
t/[50,80], the uniform distribu
tion with support [50, 80]. Sessions begin with a ten-period
Monopoly block, Monopolyl, con
tinue with 25 periods of Competition, and end with Monopolyll,
another ten-period Monopoly
block. The data analysis focuses on the Monopolyl (hereafter
simply Monopoly) and Competition
block. The online Appendix analyzes Monopolyll data and
obtains parallel (but somewhat more
diffuse) results.
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1786 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER
2010
50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Cost
Figure 2. Predicted Markups by Treatment
Figure 2 plots markups, i.e., threshold value less cost. For both
High and Low parameters, the
dotted lines represent Monopoly markup, V*M(C)
?
Ch and the solid lines represent BNE mark
ups in Competition, V7*(Ci)
?
Cv The figure shows that the Competition markups are every
where much lower than the corresponding Monopoly markups.
Our first hypothesis is that the
markups observed in the experiment will have the same ordering
as these theoretical constructs.
HYPOTHESIS 1: (Structure.) Markups chosen by subjects in the
Monopoly treatments signifi
cantly exceed markups chosen in the Competition treatments.
Another striking aspect of Figure 2 is that the Monopoly line for
the High parameter vector
28. is far above the corresponding Low line, while under
Competition the two lines are very close
together. The second hypothesis is that the experimental data
will reflect this aspect of the theory.
HYPOTHESIS 2: (Parameters) Markups chosen in the High
Monopoly treatment significantly
exceed those in Low Monopoly, while chosen markups have the
same distribution in the High
Competition data as in Low Competition.
Recall that the symmetric BNE strategy V*(Cf) is increasing in
cost Cf. A direct implication is
that the investment opportunity is always seized by the lowest
cost investor. Allowing for some
behavioral noise, we obtain the following efficient sorting
hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3: (Efficiency) Under Competition, the most
efficient (lowest cost) subject is the
one most likely to preempt the others.
A final observation from Figure 2 is that, under our parameters,
Competition markups decrease
in costs. The reason is that the BNE threshold slope V*'(Cf) <
1; indeed the approximate thresh
old function (13) has a slope of 2/3, so the theoretical markup
slope in Competition is close to
-1/3.
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VOL. 100 NO. 4 ANDERSON ETAL.: PREEMPTION GAMES
1787
Figure 3. Subject Screen under Competition at the End of a
Period
HYPOTHESIS 4: (Monotonicity.) Under Competition, observed
markups are decreasing in
cost.
A complementary hypothesis, drawn from real options theory
and observable in Figure 2,
is that Monopoly markups are instead increasing in cost. This is
a central hypothesis tested by
Oprea, Friedman, and Anderson (2009) who find strong
empirical support.
III. Implementation
Experiments were conducted using customized software called
InvestmentTiming. Figure 3
shows the user interface. The lightly shaded band (colored blue
on subjects' screens) indicates the
cost range, [50,80], which was held constant throughout the
session and announced publicly. The
horizontal line (colored red on subjects' screens) represents the
subject's own cost that period; its
status as private information was also announced publicly.
The current value of investment, V(t), was represented by a
jagged line (colored green on sub
30. jects' screens) that evolved from the right, as on a seismograph.
During each period the value line
was initialized at 50 (the lower bound of the cost distribution)
and evolved from there according
to the binomial parameter vector, High or Low, chosen for that
session. The vertical axis rescaled
if the value line ever rose out of the displayed bounds.
Subjects were not allowed to invest when the value line was
below their own cost, to prevent
negative earnings, nor could they invest after the random ending
time. At all other times, subjects
could attempt to invest by tapping the space bar at their
computer terminal.
In the Monopoly treatment, an investment attempt prior to
period end was always successful,
immediately netting a subject V(t)
?
C, points. Subjects in the Competition treatment were not
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1788 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER
2010
told whether or when their competitors invested until after the
period was over.5 This semi
31. strategy method gives us access to more data, while still giving
subjects the real-time choice
experience that we feel helps them adapt to the stochastic
environment.6
After the period ended, subjects were told the time at which
each subject in their group
attempted investment, the value at which they attempted
investment, the costs of each competi
tor, and the resulting profits: V(t)
?
Cj to the subject who invested first, and zero to the others. In
the Monopoly treatment, of course, there were no other subjects
in the group.
All cost draws, value sequences and period endings were made
only once for each parameter
set, and were repeated in all sessions for that treatment. In one
session under High parameters,
a software malfunction during period 30 (toward the end of the
Competition block) led to four
missing periods which have been dropped from the dataset.
Subjects were given instructions in two parts, reproduced in the
Online Appendix. First,
instructions pertaining to monopoly periods were distributed
and read aloud. Binomial param
eters and exchange rates for the session were written on a white
board and were pointed out
several times before play began. Following six unpaid practice
periods, we conducted the first
32. Monopoly block. Then the second part of the instructions,
pertaining to Competition, was dis
tributed and read aloud. The instructions were identical across
sessions; only the parameters
written on the white board varied.
Experiments were conducted at the University of California,
Santa Cruz, using inexperienced
undergraduate subjects recruited from a large online database of
volunteers. Subjects each were
paid a $5 showup fee. They earned five cents per point in
Monopoly periods and (to maintain
a comparable payout rate in triopoly) 15 cents per point in
Competition periods. Low sessions
averaged one hour and 30 minutes, while High sessions
averaged close to two hours. On average,
subjects in the Low treatment earned $15.21, and subjects in the
High treatment earned $12.57.
IV. Results
Subjects frequently failed to invest prior to the random end of
the period. Efforts to invest at
particularly high values are therefore censored in many periods,
while efforts to invest at lower
values are more likely to be observed. Consequently the sample
of observed investment decisions
is downward biased.
We employ two different techniques to correct the bias. The
first is to construct product limit
33. (PL) estimates (E. L. Kaplan and Paul Meier 1958) of the
empirical cumulative distribution func
tion of markups. As explained in the Online Appendix the PL
procedure uses all data (including
all instances of censoring) to construct maximum likelihood
nonparametric estimates. The esti
mates are graphed for each treatment in Figure 4.
Panel A of Figure 4 suggests that investment behavior is
considerably different under
Competition than under Monopoly. For example, the median
markups (where the graph crosses
the horizontal line at 0.5) are about 5 or 6 for both Competition
treatments versus about 12 for
Low Monopoly and about 21 for High Monopoly. The observed
ordering seems consistent with
the first two hypotheses.
Panel B of Figure 4 compares observed distributions (solid
lines) with the predicted distribu
tions (dashed lines), obtained as PL estimates on artificial data
generated by applying theoretical
functions V* and to the realized cost draws. In the Competition
panel, the predictions for
High and Low parameters are very close together. The CDFs for
observed markups for High
5
As the Appendix Remark Al shows, this design choice does not
alter the BNE. 6
Implementing the full strategy method would require us to
constrain the strategy space, e.g., to a choice of thresh
old V(C), excluding, a priori, nonstationary and other sorts of
34. strategies that subjects might otherwise use.
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VOL. 100 NO. 4 ANDERSON ET AL.: PREEMPTION GAMES
1789
Panel A
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 701 > / 4o
Markups
Panel B
Competition Monopoly
Markups Markups
Figure 4. Product Limit Cumulative Distribution Functions
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1790 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER
2010
and Low parameters are also close to each other, and only
35. slightly more diffuse than the predic
tions. In the Monopoly panel, the predictions for High
parameters are about 15-20 points higher
(i.e., to the right of) those for Low parameters at each
percentile. Above the thirtieth percentile,
the CDFs for observed markups have the same ordering and
about the same spacing above the
eightieth percentile, but for the most part they fall well below
(i.e., to the left of) the theoretical
predictions.
Our second approach to the censoring problem is to examine a
data subsample in which, for
exogenous reasons, censoring is rare. Theory guides the
subsampling: in BNE for Competition
there is no censoring in periods in which the maximum, v, of
the value line is above 80. Likewise
in the Monopoly prediction there is no censoring when v
exceeds 120 in the Low treatment
or 144 in the High treatment. We refer to the sets of such
periods as "feasible" samples, since
in theory investment was feasible for all investors. Note that v
is uncorrelated with cost and,
because it is unknown to subjects ex ante, it should also be
uncorrelated with the chosen markup.
The feasible samples turn out, in fact, to be nearly uncensored.
In Competition periods, we
observe nearly 97 percent of 660 decisions in the subsample
(versus 85 percent of 1,039 deci
sions overall), while in Monopoly periods we observe over 98
percent of 72 decisions (versus
61 percent of 519 overall). Therefore standard econometric
36. tools can be used confidently on the
feasible samples.
A. Treatment Level Hypothesis Tests
The PL estimates in Figure 4 seem consistent with the first two
hypotheses. To formalize the
inferences, we estimate the following nested random effects
regression on the feasible sample:7
(14) Vjit
?
Cjit
= 7 + ipHighj + nMonopolyt + ?Highj Monopolyt + i/j + ut +
ejit.
The left-hand side is the observed markup, Highj is an indicator
variable taking a value of 1
in High parameter set sessions and 0 otherwise, and Monopolyt
is an indicator variable for
Monopoly periods. The variable Vj is a random effect on
sessions and ut is a random effect on
individual subjects, both assumed to be normally distributed
with a mean of zero. Together these
account for within subject and within session correlations.
Finally, ejit is a normally distributed,
mean zero disturbance term.
Results are displayed in Table 2. Estimates of treatment effects
are constructed from the coef
ficient estimates as follows: Competition Low
37. = 7; Competition High =7 + 7/;; Monopoly Low
= 7 + n and Monopoly High
=
'y + i/j + K + S. Thus Hypothesis 1, that Monopoly markups
exceed Competition markups, translates to 7 + n > 7 (or k > 0)
for Parameters
= Low, and
translates to 7 + ip -f n + S > 7 + i> (or n + ? > 0) for
Parameters
=
High. Table 2 confirms
the Low case: k is significantly greater than zero at the one
percent level. A Wald test confirms
the High case: k + ? is greater than zero (p
?
0.000).
FINDING 1: Consistent with Hypothesis 7, markups are
significantly lower under Competition
than under Monopoly given either Low or High Parameters.
The second hypothesis is that investment values are sensitive to
binomial param
eters under Monopoly but not under Competition. Equation (14)
translates the hypothesis as
7
Here we pool data from all treatments and make cross treatment
comparisons. For consistency, we uniformly apply
the most stringent criterion, v > 144. Using the less stringent
38. criteria where applicable (e.g., v > 80 in Competition
blocks) does not appreciably change the estimates and does not
alter the results of the hypothesis tests reported below.
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VOL. 100 NO. 4 ANDERSON ETAL. : PREEMPTION GAMES
Table 2?Estimates (and standard errors) from Nested Random
Effects Model (14)
1791
Variable Coefficient Estimate
Intercept 7 5.929
(1.542)***
High ^ -0.866
(1.839)
Monopoly K 12.979
(2.128)***
High x monopoly 5 9.184
(2.784)***
Note: Variables High and Monopoly are dummies for the
39. Parameter and Structure treatment
variables.
***
Significant at the 1 percent level.
**
Significant at the 5 percent level.
*
Significant at the 10 percent level.
y + ^ + K + ?>~/+K(pr'ip + ?>Q), but 7 H- ̂ is no greater than 7
(or ip is insignificantly
different from zero). A Wald test indicates that i? + S is indeed
significantly larger than zero
(p
=
0.019). Table 2 reports that -0 is insignificantly different from
zero. Thus:
FINDING 2: Consistent with Hypothesis 2, investment values in
Monopoly periods are signifi
cantly larger under High parameters than Low parameters, while
there is no significant differ
ence in Competition periods.
B. Preemption, Markups and Cost in Competition
The third hypothesis is that the lowest cost investor (the
efficient one) will usually preempt her
rivals. Figure 5 shows the fraction of times that the preemptor
has the lowest, middle, and highest
cost. In both treatments the lowest cost investor wins roughly
40. 80 percent of the time, while the
highest cost investor wins about four percent of the time in the
Low treatment and hardly ever
in the High treatment. Equally important, the exceptional cases
are mostly when costs are very
close. On average, the difference between the middle and low
cost draws is (Cv
?
CL)/(n + 2)
=
(80
-
50)/(3 + 1)
= 7.5 points, but in periods when a second lowest cost subject
preempts
the lowest cost subject, the median difference is only 2.5.
Likewise, when a highest cost subject
preempts the lowest cost subject, the median difference is only
4, as compared to an a priori aver
age of (2) (7.5)
= 15 points. To summarize,
FINDING 3: Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the lowest cost
investor usually preempts the other
investors, and the highest cost investor rarely preempts the
other investors.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that under Competition, the target markup
M
41. =
V(C)
? C is decreasing
in the cost of investment C; indeed, the BNE functions decline
almost linearly. In testing this
hypothesis, we focus on the feasible subsample (periods in
which v > 80). Figure 6 shows the
average markups by cost range for each treatment. The first
impression is that there is no relation,
and that markups are approximately constant. To check this
impression, we estimate the follow
ing nested random effects regression
(15) va
~
Ca
= a + bCit + Vj + it,- + eit
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1792 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER
2010
Lowest r Second Highest
42. Cost rank
Figure 5. Probability of Preempting Both Rivals as a Function
of Cost Rank
Note: The fraction of cases in which the highest cost competitor
successfully invests in the
High treatment is 0.006, too small to be seen in the figure.
where w, and Uj are random effects on subjects and session
respectively (both assumed normal
with mean zero) and e is an error term distributed N(0,o%). The
column labeled (1) in Table 3
reports the cost coefficient estimates, which are negative but
significantly smaller (in absolute
value) than the predicted coefficients shown in the previous
column. Indeed, one can see from
the standard errors that these coefficient estimates are not
significantly different from zero.
Moreover, the intercept estimates are less than half of the BNE
intercepts.
An alternative hypothesis is that subjects use cognitively
simpler constant markup strategies.
The Online Appendix characterizes the Nash Equilibrium (NE)
in threshold strategies con
strained to be constant across costs. In the NE of the
constrained game, the slope coefficient is of
course zero and the intercept turns out to be 7.15 (resp. 7.81) in
the Low (resp. High) treatment. In
column 1, under both treatments, the slope is insignificantly
different from zero, and 95 percent
43. confidence intervals for the intercepts cover the NE values.
Thus, column 1 is consistent with the
constrained Nash equilibrium.
Before rejecting Hypothesis 4, however, one should recall that
the incentives for playing BNE
strategies are not constant across costs. Figure 6 includes a
dashed line charting the expected
earnings from BNE play according to equation (4). Earnings
drop rapidly, so deviations from
the BNE strategy are cheap at higher costs. Could weak
incentives at higher costs confound
our statistical inference? A closer look at Figure 6 confirms that
the BNE prediction does much
better in the lower cost part of the range, where expected
earnings are far larger. Indeed, in
the Low treatment, the open circles lie parallel to the prediction
line over the range E(ttbne)
> 1 (or C < 60), and in the High treatment this relationship
continues over the wider range
E(ttbne) > 0.1 (or C < 70).
To follow up, we rerun (15) on the subsample in which
E(irBNE) > 0.1, and report the results
in column 2 of Table 3. As predicted in Hypothesis 4, the slope
coefficient is indeed much more
negative than in column 1 and is quite significant in the High
treatment. In the more stringent
subsample E(irBNE) > 1.0 reported in column 3, the estimated
slope coefficient is almost exactly
the BNE value in the Low treatment and is marginally more
negative than the BNE value in the
High treatment.
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VOL. 100 NO. 4 ANDERSON ETAL.: PREEMPTION GAMES
Panel A. Low Panel B. High
1793
10 4
Q_ 13
co
2
BNE markup
- BNE expected earnings
10 4
cl 3
Cost Cost
Figure 6.
Notes: Average observed markups by cost interval are shown as
open circles for the feasible
subsample, v > 80, of Competition periods. The BNE markups
45. appear as solid lines, and the
expected earnings from BNE play (given by equation (4))
appear as dashed lines.
To extend this line of thought, suppose that behavioral noise is
inversely related to expected
earnings. Specifically, assume e
~
N(0, o-2v/E(ttbne)), i.e., the error term e is heteroskedastic with
a
variance inversely proportional to expected earnings in BNE,
and re-run (15) accordingly. Column
4 in Table 3 reports the results. In both treatments, there is a
negative relationship between markups
and costs that is economically and statistically significant. In
the High treatment, both intercept
and slope are indistinguishable from BNE levels by Wald tests.
In the Low treatment the empirical
intercept is lower than the BNE intercept and the slope term is
somewhat less negative.8
FINDING 4: Except at higher costs (where expected payoff is
very small), the observed markups
are consistent with BNE in the High Competition treatment, and
they also decline in cost in the
Low treatment Overall, the payoff-weighted evidence supports
Hypothesis 4.
Finding 4 begs the question of how much money subjects leave
on the table due to behavioral
noise. Would subjects significantly improve earnings by
46. reducing the noise? To put it another
8
Our estimates also imply the predicted positive relationship
between value and cost. Our markup regressions are of
the form Vit
-
Cit
? a + ?Cit. Adding Cit to both sides we see that Vit
= a + (? + 1)C?. Adding 1 to any of our cost
coefficient estimates from Table 3 yields a positive number
confirming the model's prediction.
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1794 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER
2010
Table 3?Coefficient Estimates (and standard errors) from
Nested Random Effects Regressions (15) for the
Feasible Sample, v > 80
BNE Overall ?(tt) > 0.1 ?(tt) > 1
(1) (2) (3)
Weighted
51. 251
Notes: Wald Tests (e.g., "Intercept
=
BNE") report p-values from Wald test of the equality of
estimated coefficients to
the BNE coefficients. Columns 1-4 report results for the full
feasible sample, for subsamples in which BNE play pro
vides expected returns exceeding 0.1 and 1, and for a weighted
regression in which error amplitude is assumed to be
inversely proportional to expected return in BNE.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*
Significant at the 10 percent level.
way, is BNE a better response to the empirical distribution of
investment choices than subjects'
actual strategies?
To answer such questions, we calculate the gains to BNE: what
each subject would have earned
had she unilaterally played the BNE throughout the experiment,
less what she actually earned.
Figure 7 shows that the median gain is quite small: about 1.24
points (or $0.18) per session in
Low and 1.52 points (or about $0.22) in High. A Wilcoxon test
cannot distinguish these medians
from zero (p
52. = 0.4943 in Low and p
? 0.1896 in High). Overall, then, behavioral noise seems
rather inexpensive.
FINDING 5: Against the empirical distribution of play, the
differences between actual
earnings and the earnings obtained from BNE strategies are
economically and statistically
insignificant.
The finding pertains to individual deviations to BNE. Would
earnings significantly increase if
all subjects coordinated on BNE strategies? In the Low
treatment, such coordination would lead
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VOL. 100 NO. 4 ANDERSON ET AL.: PREEMPTION GAMES
1795
Panel A. Low
12n
104
13
ct
53. d
Panel B. High
12t
104
5* 8H c
CD
I 6i
44
24
0-S
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
BNE gains
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
BNE gains
Figure 7. Histograms of Gains from Unilaterally Deviating to
BNE Strategies
Calculated by Subject
the median subject's earnings to increase by 2.36 points, which
is marginally different from zero
(p
?
0.0912). In the High treatment, by contrast, the median subject
would earn 4.24 points less
54. were they all to coordinate on the BNE (p
=
0.0006). Thus, BNE play would not substantially
improve average earnings in either treatment.
V. Discussion
Our exploration of preemption games uncovered several new
regularities. On the theoretical
side, we were able to extend previous work to obtain precise
predictions of behavior in compe
tition. In Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), each investor waits
until the value of the invest
ment opportunity hits a specific threshold that depends on that
investor's private cost. Using
both a recursion equation and an ordinary differential equation,
we characterized the symmetric
BNE threshold function for an arbitrary number of competitors
and over relevant parameter
ranges. Special cases of the parameters give threshold functions
identical to known expressions
in real options theory and in auction theory. These expressions
in turn provide useful bounds and
approximations. For example, in triopoly with uniformly
distributed costs, the BNE markup of
threshold over cost decreases by about $1 for each $3 increase
in cost.
The laboratory experiment confirmed most of the theoretical
predictions. Observed invest
ment thresholds indeed were much lower in triopoly competition
55. than in monopoly. Changes in
the parameters driving the stochastic value process had a strong
effect (in the predicted direc
tion) in monopoly but (again as predicted) no detectable effect
in competition. We also confirmed
the sort of efficiency predicted in BNE: lower cost investors are
far more likely to preempt than
their higher cost rivals.
Other laboratory findings provide more qualified support for the
BNE theory. The advantage
to following the BNE strategy is much greater at lower costs,
and behavior there cannot be dis
tinguished from BNE. At higher costs, however, expected
earnings drop quickly and the BNE
prediction appears to break down. Thus the data seem consistent
with BNE when it matters most,
and the data deviate more when deviations make little
difference. The upshot is that our subjects
on average earn as much as in BNE.
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1796 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER
2010
Future laboratory work could investigate behavior for different
market structures. We focused
56. on triopoly (n
?
2) and suspect that higher values of n will push behavior to
noisy approxima
tions of the Marshallian threshold. We skipped the duopoly case
(n
?
1) to gain more separation,
but future work could investigate it. Perhaps, as in many other
laboratory duopolies,9 there will
be frequent attempts to collude. Likewise, future work could
investigate different parameter con
figurations. We chose certain parameter variations a priori, and
the results generally conformed
to theory. Conceivably the behavioral impact of other parameter
variations could differ from the
theoretical predictions in interesting ways.
Our experimental design did not support a serious investigation
of learning behavior. Behavior
generally conformed to equilibrium theory even early on, but
the long term trends are unclear.
Future research could investigate learning in the preemption
game in sessions with 50-100 peri
ods. Such sessions could also manipulate feedback on other
players' costs and markup choices
in order to identify patterns of social learning. An expanded
strategy method might also offer
new insights into players' reasoning. After receiving her cost
draw, each player could be offered
a menu including the option to seize the opportunity manually
57. (as in our experiment) or to pro
gram a threshold agent (by filling in the threshold value) or to
program any other sort of para
metric agent that interests the researcher.
Our study examined winner-take-all preemption for several
reasons: it brings the central stra
tegic issues into sharp focus, it connects nicely to real options
theory and to auction theory, and
in many important cases it is a reasonable simplification of
reality. (To this list we add that win
ner-take-all preemption permits clean laboratory
implementation via the semi-strategy method;
see Remark Al in the Online Appendix.) However, many other
important cases involve partial
preemption. For example, in larger communities a second or
third big box store may be viable,
and in some new research areas a second (or even a seventh)
paper may be valuable. A clear next
step is to extend our work in this direction.
To conclude, our work bridges the gap between two active
fields that previously had little con
tact: real options and auctions. Perhaps our results will lead to
more two-way traffic, empirical
as well as theoretical.
Monopoly.?Let the gross value of investment V be governed by
the stochastic differential
equation
where z is the standard Wiener process. A key insight from real
options theory10 is that when
58. future values are discounted at rate p > 0, the expected present
value of waiting for appreciation
R > 1 is R~?, where
Appendix
(16) dV= aVdt + aVdz,
(17)
9
For recent examples, see Martin Dufwenberg and Uri Gneezy
(2000) and Steffen Huck, Hans-Theo Normann and
J?rg Oechssler (2004). 10
Samuel Karlin and Howard M. Taylor (1975, 357-364) use the
Laplace transform and the Martingale theorem to
obtain the result. Appendix A of our working paper, Anderson,
Friedman, and Oprea (2008), includes a streamlined
two-page derivation of the Monopoly optimum.
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VOL. 100 NO. 4 ANDERSON ETAL.: PREEMPTION GAMES
1797
In particular, if the current gross value is VQ and the investor
will seize the opportunity when V
hits threshold Vx > V0, then the discount factor is
59. (18) Ys.
When there are no rivals (n
=
0), an investor with avoidable fixed cost C > 0 seeks to
maximize
the expected discounted profit E[(V
?
C)e~pt). In view of (18), the problem reduces to finding a
threshold Vx to maximize [Vx
?
C}[V0/Vx]?. The associated first order condition is
(19)
with solution
(20)
0 = 1
v,
- c
V, = Vu = -( ?
?-l
?_
c.
60. If ? > 1, then (20) gives the optimal threshold we seek. If ??
[0,1], e.g., if a > p in (17), then
the expected discounted profit increases in V] over the entire
domain [C, oo), so there is no finite
optimal threshold. Note that (19-20) can also usefully be written
(2i) vyc)
-
?[vM(c)
-
c]
= o.
The Preemption Game.?Let T[?,n,H] be the preemption game in
which each player ("inves
tor") i
= l,...,n+ 1 chooses a measurable threshold function Vtr.
[CL,Q/]
??
[0,oc), draws real
ized cost Ci independently from cumulative distribution H on
[CL,Cu], and seizes the investment
opportunity at the first time tt that Vin (16) hits V^C,). In view
of (18), player f s (expected) payoff is
?Pt[t,<tj Vy^i], (22) [VAQ
-
c,]
vxc.)
61. given initial value V0 in (16). We seek a symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (SBNE) of
T[?9n,H]9 that is, a single threshold function V* such that if all
other investors j ^ i choose
Vj
=
V*(Cj) then investor / maximizes payoff (22) at any cost draw
Cf G [CL,Q/] by choosing
threshold V*(C,).
To characterize the SBNE, suppose that all rivals use the same
increasing differentiable thresh
old function V(Cy). Let V0
=
V(t0) be the current gross investment value, let V
?
maxse^0 t^V{s)
be
the highest value yet observed, and let C
=
V~l(V) be highest cost draw that would already have
led a rival to invest. Investor i can assume that all C; > C, since
otherwise the game is already
over and his choice is moot.
The unconditional probability that any one rival j has cost C,
higher than C is 1
62. ?
H(C),
and the probability conditional on C} > C is (1
?
H(C))/(l
?
H(C)). If investor / chooses
threshold Vx
=
V(m), the probability that any particular rival will not preempt
therefore is
(1
-
H(m))/(l
-
H(C)l and
(23) Pt[ti<tj V;Vi]
= 1
-
H(m)
11 - H(C)
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1798 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER
2010
It is convenient to combine this preemption probability with the
discount factor and write
(24) 1
-
G(m)
=
lV(m)i
1 - H(m)
L 1 - H(C)
Assume that the cost distribution H has density h with full
support on the interval [CL, Cjj], where
0 < CL < Cu < oo. The definition (24) of G then ensures that G
has a positive and continuous
derivative g. Note also that 1
-
G(Q/)
= 0 since 1 - H(CV)
= 0.
Given investment cost Ch investor f s problem reduces to
finding a threshold Vx
=
64. V(m) that
solves
(25) max [V(m)
-
Ct] [1
-
G(m)
me[C,Cu}
The FOC is
(26) V'(m)[
-
G(m)]
-
[V(m)
-
Q]g(m) = 0.
In SBNE, investor i will find it advantageous to use the same
threshold function V as the other
investors. Accordingly, insert the "truthtelling" condition m
?
Ct into (26) and simplify notation
by setting Ci
= C, to obtain
65. (27) VXC)[l-G(C)]-[V(C)-C]g(C)=0.
Rearranging slightly, write
(28) -Cg(C) = V'(C)[l
-
G(C)}
-
V(C)g(C) = -fc [V(C)(1
-
G(C))}
and integrate both sides of (28) from C
=
C, to Cw using 1
?
G(CV)
= 0, to obtain
(29)
?Cu
Je ^(y) ^
= 0 - V(C)[1
-
G(C)].
Hence the SBNE threshold function V = V* must satisfy
(30) VC)
66. 1
1 - G(C) r
^-?G[y|y > C].
Since // and hence G are smooth strictly increasing functions,
equation (30) ensures that V* is
also smooth and increasing in C.
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VOL. 100 NO. 4 ANDERSON ETAL.: PREEMPTION GAMES
1799
Of course, the function G is itself defined in terms of V*.11 To
obtain an explicit recursion
formula, first integrate by parts to get yg(y) dy
=
Cv- CG(C)
-
f?U G(y) dy. Then (30)
reads
(31)
1 - G(C)
C[l
67. -
G(C)} + 3c V(y) -H{C)J
= C + Cuvc)
1 - H(y)
1 - H(C)
dy.
The last expression shows that V*(C) is equal to C plus a
positive markup, which shrinks to 0 as
C approaches its upper endpoint C
=
Q/.
Note that V0 and V
=
V*(C) drop out of the formula (31) for V*, as well as from the
bound
ary value problem (5-6). Therefore the opportunity to observe
rivals' actions does not influence
thresholds; V*(C) can be set as soon as the investor draws cost
C, and subsequent observations
are irrelevant. The logic parallels the strategic isomorphism of
Dutch and first price auctions.
To obtain the boundary value problem satisfied by V*, first
insert (24) into (25) to obtain the
objective function (4) in the text. Use the product rule to take
the derivative of equation (4) with
68. respect to m and cancel like terms (or, alternatively, take the
derivative of InF) and evaluate at
the "truthtelling" point m
=
C{, to obtain the FOC:
(32) V'(Ci) nhiCt)
[ViCd-Q] VQ) [l-tf(Q)]
= 0.
Solve (32) for V*' to obtain equation (5). As noted in the text,
the boundary condition (6) comes
from the economics of the situation. At the highest possible cost
realization, the existence of
rivals known to have equal (or lower) cost induces Bertrand
competition and drives the markup
to zero.
The following lemma is proved in online Appendix A, using
straightforward estimates.
LEMMA Al: Assume that ? > 1, that all rivals use a threshold
function with inverse 7 such
that 7' > 0, and that the hypotheses of Theorem 1 hold. Let the
threshold value y maximize the
competitor's payoff given cost realization C G [CL,Q/]. Then y
< V*M(C).
11
Here we depart from the auction literature, e.g., Vijay Krishna
(2002, 14-19).
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1800 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER
2010
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
The key step in part 1 is to show that the RHS of the ODE (5) is
Lipschitz continuous in V*. A
potential problem is that the denominator factor 1
-
H(C) 0 as C / Cv. But given the bound
ary condition (6), the numerator factor V*(C)
?
C0. Indeed,
(33) V*'{Cu) = Jim
[V*(C)
-
C)V*{C) nh{C)
c/cuv*(C)
-
?[VC) -C])- H{C)i
nhjC^VjCu) V(C)
- C
70. VCV)
-
?{V*(Cu)
-
Cv] c/cu -H{C)
nh(Cv) V*CV)
- 1
-KCu)] 1-/3 Cu
=
-niV'XCv)
-
1],
using L'H?pital's rule. Hence V*'(Cu)
=
n/(n + 1), so we have Lipschitz continuity in an e neigh
borhood of the upper boundary point.
A second potential problem is that the other denominator factor
V*(C)
?
?[V*(C)
?
C] might
be zero (or negative). For ? < 1 the factor obviously is positive.
For ? > 1 we have
71. (34) V(C)
-
?[V*{C) -C}=y-?[y-C]
=
?C-(?- l)y >?C-(?- )VM(C)
VM{C)
-
?[VM(C)
-
C]
0,
since V*(C)
= y < VM(C) by Lemma Al, and the last expression is 0 by (21).
Since the denominator is continuous on the closed interval [CL,
Cu
?
e], it achieves a positive
minimum value and thus is bounded away from zero. It follows
that the RHS of the ODE (5)
is positive, bounded, and Lipschitz continuous in V*.
Consequently, the classic Picard-Lindelof
theorem (e.g., see Chapter 8 of Morris W. Hirsch and Stephen
Smale 1974) guarantees that a
solution V* to the boundary problem (5-6) exists and is unique.
For the second part of the Theorem, suppose that V* satisfies
72. the recursion equation
(31). Note that the integrand f(C,y) in the last term of (31) is
the product of two increasing
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VOL. 100 NO. 4 ANDERSON ET AL.: PREEMPTION GAMES
1801
functions of C, so df(C,y)/dC > 0. Indeed, using the product
rule, one obtains df(C,y)/dC
= ((?V'(C)/V(C)) + nh(C)/{
-
H{C))) f(C,y). Differentiating both sides of (31), we get
(35) V*'(C) = 1
-
f(Q C) + J dy
for all C G [CL, Q/). The last equality follows from subtracting
C from both sides of (31). Divide
(35) through by the markup V*(C)
? C > 0 to obtain (32). As noted earlier, this can be rewrit
ten as the ODE (5). In the limit as C / Cv, the integral term
vanishes in (31) and we obtain the
boundary condition (6).
73. Conversely, suppose that V* solves the boundary value problem
(5-6). Then the derivation
(27-31) ensures that it also satisfies the recursion formula (31).
To establish part 3 of the Theorem, let W(C9 m) be the expected
payoff to investor / when she
draws cost C and employs threshold V{
=
V*(m), assuming each other investor j sets threshold
V*(Cj). We complete the proof by showing that setting m
= C, i.e., truthtelling, always maxi
mizes W(C,m).
Assume that m > C; otherwise the investor already would have
ended the game. Consequently
V*(m) > V > V0 and, by (25) and (30),
(36) W(C,m) = [V*(m)
~
C] [1
-
G(m)]
where the last expression uses integration by parts: J^u yg(y) dy
?
Cv
?
mG(m)
74. ?
JCm" G(y) dy.
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1802 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER
2010
But (36) and the Mean Value Theorem (MVT) yield a point x
such that
(37) W(C,C)
-
W(Qm) = [m
-
C]G(m) + ? G(y) dy
= [m- C]G(m) + [C
-
m]G(x)
=
[m- C][G(m)
-
G{x)} > 0,
75. since G is increasing and the number x guaranteed by the MVT
is between m and C. Hence m
= C is indeed a best response, and V* is indeed a symmetric
BNE.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2:
The RHS of ODE (5) is positive and continuous, so its solution
V* is increasing and continu
ously differentiable. The Marshallian lower bound follows from
the fact that V*(C)
= C ensures
zero profit, which dominates the negative realized profits from
setting the threshold V*(C) <
C. To see that VM is an upper bound for the SBNE threshold,
note that the investor seeks thresh
old Vx to maximize [Vx
-
C] [V0/Vx]? [(1
-
H(V*-Vx)))/(l
-
H(C))}n. The optimum threshold
value V,
=
V*(C) must satisfy the FOC
n = __1_J_ _ nh[V*-Vx)]V^XVx) K } Vi-C Vx i _ H[V*-VX)}
'
76. By (19), at Vx
=
VM the RHS of (38) reduces to
(39) - W < 0. V ; 1 - H[V*-l{Vx)}
Since the RHS of (19) is negative for Vx > VM(C no value of
Vx > VM can satisfy the FOC (38).
On the other hand, since the first RHS term in (38) goes to +oo
as Vx C while the other terms
remain bounded, the continuity of the RHS in Vx guarantees a
solution to (38) at some value
Vx G (C, VM(C)), i.e., VM is indeed an upper bound.
A similar argument shows that the auction bid function V is also
an upper bound. Evaluating
the RHS of (38) at Vx
?
V(C), the first and third terms disappear due to the FOC that
character
izes V, and the remaining term, -?/Vx, is negative. Again,
higher values of Vx only make the
RHS of (38) more negative, but we know that the RHS is
positive for sufficiently small values
of Vx. Hence the intermediate value theorem again guarantees a
solution to (38) at some value
vx e (c, v(O).
Recall that (33) showed that V*'(Q/)
=
n/(n + 1), independent of ?. Since V7*
= V in the spe
77. cial case ?
= 0, we have V(CV)
=
n/(n + 1)
=
V*'(Cn). Of course, V*(Q,)
=
Cu= V(Cu), so
V and V* are indeed tangent at Cv.
A substantially expanded version of the preceding material is
available as online Appendix A.
REFERENCES
Anderson, Steven T. 2003. "Strategie Timing of Investment:
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Contentsp. 1778p. 1779p. 1780p. 1781p. 1782p. 1783p. 1784p.
1785p. 1786p. 1787p. 1788p. 1789p. 1790p. 1791p. 1792p.
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1801p. 1802p. 1803Issue Table of ContentsThe American
Economic Review, Vol. 100, No. 4 (SEPTEMBER 2010) pp.
1299-1935, i-xiiFront MatterDOUGLASS C. NORTHMorally
Motivated Self-Regulation [pp. 1299-1329]Identifying the
Elasticity of Substitution with Biased Technical Change [pp.
1330-1357]Social Comparisons and Contributions to Online
Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens [pp. 1358-
1398]Are Health Insurance Markets Competitive? [pp. 1399-
1431]Wage Risk and Employment Risk over the Life Cycle [pp.
1432-1467]The Law of the Few [pp. 1468-1492]Technology
Capital and the US Current Account [pp. 1493-1522]Sovereign
82. Risk and Secondary Markets [pp. 1523-1555]Pavlovian
Processes in Consumer Choice: The Physical Presence of a
Good Increases Willingness-to-Pay [pp. 1556-
1571]Determinants of Redistributive Politics: An Empirical
Analysis of Land Reforms in West Bengal, India [pp. 1572-
1600]Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature
[pp. 1601-1615]Strategic Redistricting [pp. 1616-1641]A Price
Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms [pp. 1642-1672]Consumption
Taxes and Redistribution [pp. 1673-1694]When Does
Communication Improve Coordination? [pp. 1695-
1724]Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution [pp. 1725-1758]Shorter
PapersElections, Capital Flows, and Politico-Economic
Equilibria [pp. 1759-1777]Preemption Games: Theory and
Experiment [pp. 1778-1803]"Watta Satta": Bride Exchange and
Women's Welfare in Rural Pakistan [pp. 1804-1825]Self-
Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the
Principal-Agent Relationship [pp. 1826-1846]The Gender Wage
Gap and Domestic Violence [pp. 1847-1859]Constrained School
Choice: An Experimental Study [pp. 1860-1874]Financing
Development: The Role of Information Costs [pp. 1875-
1891]Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination—Large-
Scale Experimental Evidence [pp. 1892-1912]Social Identity
and Preferences [pp. 1913-1928]Bidding with Securities:
Comment [pp. 1929-1935]Back Matter
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