The document discusses Georgia's E-Verify program, which requires state contractors to verify the employment eligibility of employees through an online federal database. It outlines how the program has been implemented in Georgia through legislation phasing in the requirement for all state contractors based on employee headcount. It provides guidance to public employers and contractors on how to incorporate the E-Verify requirements into contracts to ensure compliance and avoid legal issues. Key points covered include registration procedures, timelines for verifying new hires, potential for database errors, and antidiscrimination policies.

1. The E-Verify Program in Georgia
On June 9, 2008, President George W. Bush amended Executive Order
12989 to combat the purported inefficiency inherent in employing illegal
workers. The operative thrust of the president’s amendment was to
mandate that federal contractors participate in the federal E-Verify
program. The E-Verify program, a free online database operated jointly
by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), formerly United States
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) and the Social Security
Administration (SSA), allows employers to check the employment eligibility
of any worker. Absent a more expansive state law, the E-Verify program
is required only for employers performing federal contracts. A number of
states, however, have moved to expand the E-Verify program, requiring
state contractors to participate in the program as well. Currently, eight
states, including Georgia, require state contractors to participate.1
Georgia began to phase in mandatory participation for state contractors
in 2007 with the passage of the Georgia Security and Immigration
ComplianceAct, found at Georgia Code Sections 13-10-90 and 13-10-91.
This law requires all state contractors or subcontractors physically
performing services for a public employer, defined as “every department,
agency, or instrumentality of the state or a political subdivision of the
state,”2
to register and participate in E-Verify. Initially, the law applied
only to contractors or subcontractors employing 500 or more employees.
As of July 1, 2008, the law now applies to all contractors or subcontractors
employing 100 or more employees. Also, beginning July 1, 2009, the law
will have universal application to all state contractors and subcontractors,
regardless of the number of employees.3
1
Julia Preston, “Employers Fight Tough Measures on Immigration,” NY Times, A1,
July 6, 2008. The other seven states are: Mississippi, Missouri, Minnesota, Oklahoma,
Colorado, Arizona, and Utah.
2
06 SB529/AP (2007), available at: http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/fulltext/
sb529.htm.
3
It is not settled whether the number of employees should be based on the total
number of employees working for a contractor or subcontractor, or whether the
number applies only to the number of employees performing work under the contract
being considered.
Construction Law Review
www.alston.com
Contents:
The E-Verify Program
in Georgia 1
Announcement 4
State and Federal
Case Updates 4
California 4
Colorado 4
Georgia 5
Kentucky 6
New York 6
North Carolina 7
Pennsylvania 7
Texas 8
Federal 9
In the News 10
Breaking News:
Georgia Legislature
Amends the Mechanic’s
Lien Statute 11
Mark Your Calendar 13
August 2008

2. 2
Therefore, Georgia public employers and contractors need to consider implementing
E-Verify through the language in their contracts and subcontracts. Most public employers
and contractors will want to require contractors and subcontractors to register and
begin participating in E-Verify before any work commences on the underlying contract.
An affidavit from the contractor or subcontractor certifying registration and participation
is also recommended.
Attention should be given to contracts currently being entered into which will be in effect
for more than one year. While a contractor or subcontractor employing fewer than
100 employees today is not required to participate in E-Verify, beginning July 1, 2009,
that contractor or subcontractor will be required to participate. As well, a contractor
or subcontractor may hire new employees over the course of contract performance,
suddenly forcing the contractor or subcontractor to register and participate. Thus, we
recommend drafting language requiring participation in the program before work begins
for all contractors and subcontractors with 100 employees or more and also requiring
registration and participation within three to five business days of meeting the mandatory
threshold of the Georgia Security and Immigration Compliance Act for contractors and
subcontractors not currently meeting the threshold. As an alternative, the public employer
or contractor may wish to proactively mandate all contractors and subcontractors to begin
participating now, in order to avoid compliance gaps in the future.
Once a contractor or subcontractor knows it is required to participate, implementing the
E-Verify process is the next concern. To begin participating in E-Verify, a contractor or
subcontractor should register at https://www.vis-dhs.com/EmployerRegistration. At the
completion of the registration process, the employer, or an authorized representative
of the employer, will be required to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
which sets out the terms and conditions between the employer, SSA and DHS. Public
employers and contractors may wish to request a copy of the MOU from contractors
and subcontractors in order to verify registration.
Another critical issue, once participation begins, is the sensitive time constraints on
the E-Verify process. Contractors and subcontractors are only permitted to check the
employment eligibility of employees hired after signing the MOU. As well, contractors and
subcontractors may only verify a new hire’s employment eligibility after the employee has
accepted an offer of employment and after the contractor or subcontractor has completed
a Form I-9 for the new employee. Finally, the contractor or subcontractor must initiate
the verification, at the latest, within three business days after the new employee’s actual
start date. It should also be noted that the employee’s start date cannot be accelerated
or postponed based on the results of an E-Verify search, unless a final non-confirmation
is received.4
In the event of a final non-confirmation, the contract should require that
such employees no longer be employed by the contractor or subcontractor.
4
The error rate of the E-Verify program is heavily debated. The United States Chamber of Commerce
has put the error rate as high as 20 percent. DHS has claimed the error rate is 0.3 percent; however,
a DHS spokesperson also admitted that the program cannot verify a worker’s eligibility seven percent
of the time. Michael Welles Shapiro, “Businesses Slam E-Verify Provision,” Island Packet, Feb. 9,
2008, available at: http://www.islandpacket.com/266/story/221907.html.

3. 3
The time constraints mentioned above are intended to ensure that contractors
and subcontractors do not use the E-Verify program as a tool to discriminate
against potential new employees. Regardless of the final process chosen
by the contractor or subcontractor, verification of new employees should be
conducted in a consistent manner, without consideration of the new employee’s
race, national origin, sex or any other characteristic prohibited by law. Public
employers and contractors may wish to reinforce these underlying regulations
with anti-discrimination language in the contract.
While many E-Verify employers have used the system with ease, the practical
downside of the use of the system is that, by the government’s own admission, the
error rate is 8.5 percent. These errors are cases where U.S. citizens, or otherwise
authorized workers, are not given a green light to unrestricted employment.
The errors occur because the databases used for the E-Verify program, which
are maintained by the government, contain records for some workers that are
inaccurate or out of date. Sometimes, the legal worker must make one or a
series of visits to different federal agencies in an attempt to acquire the proper
agency classification and have the employment authorization block removed.
Employers can also be impacted by these errors, as well. For example, there
are documented instances of employers who have been successfully sued by
workers wrongfully terminated or denied employment on the basis of a faulty
E-Verify report. Thus, employers should keep the potential for error in mind
when critical employment termination decisions are made.
These procedural regulations constitute the most significant issues for public
employers and contractors to consider in their state government contracts
and subcontracts in Georgia. In addition to these broader issues, the contract
language should also anticipate which party will be responsible for any training
and costs associated with participating in E-Verify. As well, the contract should
provide that failure to properly participate in E-Verify is a ground for termination
of the contract after written notice and failure to cure. Finally, public employers
and contractors will want to implement a flow down provision, requiring any lower-
tier contractors physically performing services under the contract to implement
the E-Verify guidelines.
- Donald Brown5
5 Special thanks to Eileen Scofield of the Labor and Employment Group for her assistance in
writing this piece. Ms. Scofield, who is located in Alston and Bird’s Atlanta office, has over
22 years of experience concentrating on immigration law, and her insight into the new E-Verify
Program is much appreciated. Ms. Scofield may be contacted at eileen.scofield@alston.com
or at 404.881.7375.

4. 4
ANNOUNCEMENT
The Construction and Government Contracts Group is pleased to announce that
Daniel F. Diffley has been elected a partner in the firm, effective January 1, 2008.
STATE AND FEDERAL CASE UPDATES
California
Contractors Must be Licensed Before Performing Preparatory Tasks
Related to a Construction Contract
Under Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 7031, a contractor must be licensed at the time work is
performed under a construction contract in order to sue to collect compensation for that
work. In Great West Contractors, Inc. v. WSS Ind. Construction, Inc., the California Court
of Appeals held that a contractor’s preparatory acts, including drafting shop drawings
and ordering materials, were acts performed in furtherance of the contract and subject
to the requirements of § 7031. Because the contractor performed the preparatory
acts before its license was issued, the contractor had no right to sue for payment.
162 Cal. App. 4th 581, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 8 (2008).
Colorado
General Contractor May Not Require Subcontractor “To Perform Its
Paving Work at Midnight Using Teaspoons”
Construction contracts often give general contractors discretion to dictate how, when,
and where a subcontractor is to perform its work. But contractors are limited by a
duty of “good faith and fair dealing” toward their subcontractors. In New Design
Construction Company, Inc. v. Hamon Contractors, Inc., the Colorado Court of Appeals
held that a general contractor breached this duty of good faith and fair dealing when it
changed the subcontractor’s paving schedule from sequential to simultaneous paving
of five bridges without promptly notifying the subcontractor. The court reasoned that
without such a limit upon the general contractor’s discretion, the contractor could have
ordered the subcontractor “to perform its paving work at midnight using teaspoons.”
Thus, the duty of “good faith and fair dealing” requires contractors to give timely notice to
subcontractors of a reasonable workload and schedule. --- P.3d ----, 2008 WL 2522306
(Colo. App. June 26, 2008).

5. 5
Georgia
Absent Clear and Unmistakable Evidence that the Parties had an
Agreement to Arbitrate, A Trial Court Must Independently Determine
Whether the Parties Agreed to Arbitrate Prior to Affirming an
Arbitration Award
In Panhandle Fire Protection v. Batson-Cook Co., a general contractor sought to
arbitrate a dispute with its subcontractor; however, there was a legitimate dispute as
to whether the parties’final agreement had encompassed an arbitration agreement.
The GC claimed that the parties had agreed to arbitrate any disputes in Atlanta,
while the subcontractor claimed that the final agreement did not require arbitration
in Georgia. During the arbitration proceedings, the subcontractor sent several
letters to the arbitrator denying the existence of an arbitration clause and refusing
to participate. Ultimately, the arbitrator found for the GC and a trial court issued a
final judgment confirming the arbitration award. Upon appeal, the Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment, finding that the trial court should have conducted
an independent (de novo) examination of whether the parties had agreed to
arbitrate any disputes. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that without “clear
and unmistakable evidence” that the parties had an agreement to arbitrate, a trial
court must “independently determine whether the parties contractually agreed to
the arbitration” prior to affirming an arbitration award. Additionally, the Court of
Appeals refused to find that the subcontractor’s letters to the arbitrator objecting
to arbitration constituted consent to arbitrate. This case was returned to the trial
court for an independent determination of whether the parties mutually assented
to the arbitration agreement. 653 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. App. 2007).
Construction Contracts Orally Modified by the Owner May Be
Enforceable Against the Owner Even Where Price Is Uncertain
In Reebaa Construction, Inc. v. Chong, the Georgia Supreme Court issued
an opinion which undermines “uncertainty of price” as a defense to an orally
requested change to a construction contract. In this case, the owner originally
hired a contractor to finish his 4,000 square foot basement for a total price of
$96,000. Throughout the course of the project, the owner requested significant
changes, including marble floors and granite countertops, which the contractor
warned would significantly increase the project cost. The owner reassured
the contractor that “money was no object” and that he should be billed for
the additional work. Ultimately, these orally requested changes increased
the project’s price by $128,000. When the owner attempted to avoid these
extra costs by claiming that the oral requests for changes were too indefinite
to enforce, the Supreme Court found that the owner had freely and knowingly
amended its original contract and had waived any right to repudiate the
amended construction contract on the grounds that price was too uncertain.
As such, the contract as modified was enforceable and the owner was required
to pay the additional cost. 657 S.E.2d 826 (Ga. 2008).

6. 6
Kentucky
Three New Pro-Contractor Laws (effective July 15, 2008)
HB 106 creates new sections of KRS Chapter 433 to control theft of recyclable metals by
requiring recyclers and junk dealers to keep a register identifying sellers of nonferrous
metals, catalytic converters, beer kegs and railroad ties. This documentation procedure
should reduce the theft of increasingly valuable metals from construction sites.
HB 534 amends KRS § 342.340 to require the Kentucky Department of Workers Claims
to provide notice to a certificate holder, beneficiary or any individual provided proof of
insurance, when a workers’ compensation insurance policy has lapsed, expired or has
been canceled, terminated or not renewed. Thus, a contractor will be notified when its
subcontractors no longer have valid workers’ compensation insurance, so long as the
contractor is named as an additional insured that has been provided proof of insurance
coverage by the subcontractor.
SB 100 amends various statutes to allow for items of equal quality and durability to be
substituted for the items specified in state funded construction projects under certain
circumstances. These “best value” substitutes must substantially conform to the contract
specifications, but may result in greater cost savings to the contractor.
New York
Regular Safety Meetings Do Not Create Constructive Notice of a Specific
Instance of a Dangerous Condition
In Geonie v. O.D. P. N.Y., Ltd., a worker who injured himself by stepping into an
opening left by the removal of a tile from a raised floor on the construction site sued the
general contractor for negligence. Although the danger of removed tiles was generally
discussed at the general contractor’s weekly safety meetings with their subcontractors,
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that there was no evidence
that the general contractor had actual notice of the specific unsafe condition. In other
words, the fact that the issue was discussed in weekly safety meetings did not put the
general contractor on constructive notice of the actual removed tile which caused the
worker’s injury. Finding no other evidence that the general contractor had notice of
the unsafe condition, the Court dismissed the worker’s negligence claim. As a result,
general contractors are not disadvantaged by holding regular safety meetings with
subcontractors and workers. Rather, regular safety meetings may help to demonstrate
a general contractor’s satisfactory supervision and control over the worksite, and will
not automatically put the general contractor on constructive notice of specific instances
of dangerous conditions. 50 A.D.3d 444, 855 N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).

7. 7
North Carolina
If the Construction Company Acted Negligently, It May Not Recover
On Workers’ Compensation Lien Even If Another Tort-Feasor Had
the Last Clear Chance to Avoid the Injury.
By its plain language, North Carolina General Statute section 97-10.2(e)
provides that an employer may recover from a third-party tort-feasor the amount
of workers’ compensation benefits paid by the employer to its injured employee,
but that the third-party may raise the employer’s contributory negligence in
causing the employee’s injury as a complete defense to the employer’s action.
In Outlaw v. Johnson, the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered for the
first time whether the “last clear chance” doctrine applied as an exception to the
bar on a negligent employer’s ability to recover on its workers’ compensation
lien. In this case, a steamroller operator employed by a construction company
was injured by a truck driver after the truck negligently collided with the
steamroller on the highway. A jury found that the negligence of both the truck
driver and the construction company contributed to the operator’s injury, but
that the driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. Under these
circumstances, the construction company argued that it should be allowed
to recover against the driver on its workers’ compensation lien, despite the
language of N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2(e), because the driver’s negligence was the
proximate cause of the operator’s injury. The Court of Appeals disagreed,
finding that “it is clear from the provisions of [the statute] that it was and is the
intent of the legislature that non-negligent employers are to be reimbursed for
those amounts they pay to employees injured by the negligence of third parties.”
As such, N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2(e) bars a negligent employer from recovery even
where a jury has found that the employer’s negligence was not the proximate
cause of the employee’s injury. 660 S.E.2d 550 (2008).
Pennsylvania
Measured Mile Approach is a Reasonable Basis for Calculating
Damages in a Construction Contract
In James Corporation v. North Allegheny School District, a contractor sued a
school board, alleging breach of contract and seeking acceleration damages. In
a matter of first impression, a Pennsylvania appellate court held that there was
sufficient evidence to support a damages calculation using the “measured mile”
approach, and thus, upheld a trial court’s previous award of damages using the
calculation. The court noted that the law in Pennsylvania only requires that a
claim for damages be supported by a reasonable basis for calculation. Under
the “measured mile” analysis, the amount of damages is equal to the difference
between the cost of completing work not subject to delay or acceleration with
the cost of completing work during the period of impact. In order to calculate
damages under this method, the work compared need not be exactly the same.

8. 8
Where a contractor alleges a loss of productivity, the court noted that the measured mile
approach is the preferred method of computing damages, and as such, is a reasonable
method to use when calculating damages. 938 A.2d 474 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007).
Texas
Subcontractors and Their Liability Insurers Are Entitled to Recoup
Contractual Payments From Third-Party Tort-feasors If Traditional
Requirements of Subrogation Are Satisfied.
In Frymire Engineering Company, Inc. v. Jomar International, Ltd., a subcontractor and
its liability insurer brought an action against the manufacturers of an allegedly faulty
valve the subcontractor had installed in a hotel in order to recover payments made to
the hotel owner for water damage incurred as a result of the valve. In its contract with
the hotel’s general contractor, the subcontractor had agreed to pay for any damages
caused to the general contractor or the hotel owner by reason of the subcontractor’s
performance of the work and to obtain liability insurance to cover this indemnity
obligation. When a water line installed by the subcontractor ruptured at the site of a valve,
the subcontractor’s insurer indemnified the hotel owner for the resulting damage
according to the contract, and the subcontractor and insurer then sued the valve
manufacturer to recoup the indemnification payment. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the manufacturers, holding that the
subcontractor lacked standing to assert its claims because it failed to establish a right
to equitable subrogation. In Texas, a party seeking equitable subrogation must show
it involuntarily paid a debt primarily owed by another in a situation that favors equitable
relief. The Court of Appeals determined that the subcontractor “paid the hotel owner to
satisfy its own contractual obligation” and that the payment was voluntary and did not
unjustly enrich the manufacturers. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that
(1) the subcontractor satisfied its summary judgment burden by providing evidence that
a defect in the valve primarily caused the rupture, and therefore, the manufacturers were
primarily responsible for the resulting damage; (2) although the subcontractor’s decision
to contract with the hotel owner was voluntary, “its duty to honor that contract was not,”
so the subcontractor had involuntarily extinguished the debt; and (3) in light of the hotel
owner’s inaction, the manufacturers would be unjustly enriched if the subcontractor was
not permitted to pursue its claims. With these findings, the Supreme Court of Texas
enabled subcontractors attempting to recoup contractual payments from alleged third-
party tortfeasors to meet the traditional requirements of equitable subrogation.
__ S.W.3d __, 2008 WL 2404961 (Tex. June 13, 2008).

9. 9
Federal
Prime Contractor’s Use of Government Money to Pay Subcontractor’s
“False Claim” Held Insufficient for Liability Under False Claims Act
In Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, the United States
Supreme Court resolved a split in the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal over
whether fraud liability under the False Claims Act (FCA) could derive merely
from a prime contractor’s use of “government money” to pay a subcontractor’s
false claim. In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that, to establish
liability under the False Claims Act, the court must find a “direct link” between
the false or fraudulent statement and payment of a claim with Treasury funds:
If a subcontractor or another defendant makes a false statement to a private
entity and does not intend the Government to rely on that false statement
as a condition of payment, the statement is not made with the purpose of
inducing payment of a false claim “by the Government.” In such a situation,
the direct link between the false statement and the Government’s decision to
pay or approve a false claim is too attenuated to establish [fraud] liability.
The Allison Engine decision clarifies that it is no longer sufficient under the
FCA to show that a false claim (or false statement made in support of a claim)
was “presented” for payment and paid with federal monies. Rather, the
Court’s decision establishes that the false record or statement be “material”
to the Government’s (not a third party’s) approval and payment of a claim.
553 U.S. ___ (2008).

10. 10
inthenews Partner Jeff Belkin published “Prospective Damages and CDA Certification:
The Real Daewoo Issue” in Andrews Litigation Reporter, Vol. 21, Issue 18, January
14, 2008. Mr. Belkin also spoke on February 29, 2008, at the seminar “Untangling
the Web of Urban Development: The Challenges and Opportunities of Mixed-Use
Projects,” sponsored by the Georgia State University College of Law.
Partner Bill Hughes spoke on “Risk Mitigation in Contracts for Electric Power
Projects” at the Colectric Partners Spring Workshop in Atlanta on May 19, 2008.
Jeff Belkin and Lydia Jones published “Energy Savings Performance Contracts:
A Critical Look” in the Government Contract Litigation Reporter (June 2, 2008).
On June 6, 2008, Alston Bird hosted a Construction Owners Seminar at the
Georgia Tech Conference Center in Atlanta, Georgia. The Seminar featured
the following presentations:
“The Changing Role of Electronic Data in Construction Disputes” by•
Jenna Moore Colvin with Joseph M. Bellott of Electronic Litigation Services
“Administrative Process and Internal Controls to Prevent Liens and Other•
Disputes” by Deborah Cazan
“Pursuing Claims for Defects and Late Completion” by Bill Hughes•
“Avoiding Construction Delay Claims and Disputes” by John Spangler•
Gregg Bundschuch and Dave Collings of Ames Gough also spoke on•
“The Secret to Getting Your Money’s Worth Out of Bonds and Insurance”
On July 17, 2008, Alston Bird hosted a Government Contracts Seminar,
featuring Jeff Belkin’s presentation, “The Nuts and Bolts of Public Contracting:
Managing Risk and Maximizing Reward.”
Copies of many of the above publications are available on the Alston and Bird
Web site at http://www.alston.com/resources/otherpublications/

11. 11
Breaking News:
Georgia Legislature Amends the Mechanic’s Lien Statute
On February 20, 2008, the Georgia Senate passed Senate Bill 374, which
will become effective March 31, 2009. This Bill amends portions of Georgia’s
mechanic’s lien statute, O.C.G.A. § 44-14-360, et al. Highlights of the changes
to the statute include
* A change to the time frame in which to file a lien:
The amendment requires a claimant to file his claim of lien within 90•
days (rather than 3 months) after the completion of the work.
Also, now a claimant has 2 days in which to send his claim of lien to•
the owner of the property after filing the lien.
* A change to the time frame in which to file suit to enforce a lien:
The amendment requires a claimant to commence a lien action within•
365 days from the date of filing the claim of lien – not from the time
the amount of the lien “became due.”
* A change to the language of the lien:
The statutory lien form has been modified such that liens filed after•
March 31, 2009, will now specify that the date the “claim became due”
is “the same as the last date the labor, services, or materials were
supplied to the premises.”
The lien form must also include the following statement in at least•
12 point bold font: “This claim of lien expires and is void 365
days from the date of filing of the claim of lien if no notice of
commencement of lien action is filed in that time period.”
Failure to include the above language shall invalidate the lien and•
prevent it from being filed.
* Changes in the wording of lien waivers:
The amendment requires all lien waiver forms to be in boldfaced•
capital letters in at least 12 point font.
The new lien waiver forms must include the following statement:•
“NOTICE: WHEN YOU EXECUTE AND SUBMIT THIS DOCUMENT,
YOU SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL
THE AMOUNT STATED ABOVE, EVEN IF YOU HAVE NOT
ACTUALLY RECEIVED PAYMENT, 60 DAYS AFTER THE DATE
STATED ABOVE UNLESS YOU FILE EITHER AN AFFIDAVIT OF
NONPAYMENT OR A CLAIM OF LIEN PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION

12. 12
OF SUCH 60 DAY PERIOD. THE FAILURE TO INCLUDE THIS NOTICE
LANGUAGE ON THE FACE OF THE FORM SHALL RENDER THE FORM
UNENFORCEABLE AND INVALID AS A WAIVER AND RELEASE UNDER
O.C.G.A. SECTION 44-14-366.”
* Changes for the Affidavits of Non-Payment:
The affidavits must now also be in boldfaced capital letters in at least•
12 point font.
The affidavit must be filed if the contractor is not paid within 60 days of the•
date that the waiver form is executed, rather than the 30 days required by
the prior version.
New statutory language is required at the bottom of the statutory Affidavit of•
Non-Payment forms.
Copies of the Affidavit must be sent by registered or certified mail or statutory•
overnight delivery to the owner, and to the contractor where a notice of
commencement has been filed, within seven days of filing the Affidavit.
* Lien Discharge Bonds:
The process for releasing a lien by filing of bond has also been amended.•
Beginning March 30, 2009, the party filing the bond shall send notice of filing
such bond and a copy of the bond by registered or certified mail to the lien
claimant within seven days of filing such bond.
The failure to send the notice of filing the bond and copy of the bond does not•
invalidate the bond for purposes of discharge of a claim of lien.
* Notice of Contest of Lien:
In order to assist owners in removing clearly invalid liens, the legislature•
discarded the current method specified for removing such liens and replaced
it with an entirely new accelerated process for challenging a lien’s validity.
Under this new section, an owner may shorten the time for commencing a lien
action by filing a Notice of Contest of Lien in the superior court clerk’s office.
The Notice of Contest of Lien is a statutory form which must be in boldfaced•
capital letters in at least 12 point font.

13. 13
MARK YOUR CALENDAR
The filing of this notice shortens the time within which a claimant may•
commence a lien action to 60 days from receipt of the notice. If the
claimant fails to file an action within these 60 days, the lien will expire
and be void.
For all our clients in the construction industry, the above changes represent
a significant departure from the original statutory procedures. As such, all
those involved in construction — including owners, general contractors and
subcontractors — will be well advised to consult with their attorney regarding
these changes and how they will affect business practices. At a minimum,
standard lien forms and lien waiver forms must be amended to conform with
the new requirements, and supervisors and employees on the ground must
be educated as to the new timelines and requirements for the lien process.
As always, Alston Bird looks forward to assisting our clients in navigating and
complying with these new requirements.
PartnerBillHugheswillbespeakingattheCoal-GenConferenceinLouisville,
Kentucky, onAugust 13, 2008, on the topic “Building Coal Gasification and
Carbon Capture Projects” and at the Power-Gen International Conference
in Orlando, Florida, on December 4, 2008, on “Gasification, Synfuels and
Carbon Capture Storage.”

14. © Alston Bird llp 2008
This Construction Law Review is published byAlston Bird to provide a summary of
significant developments to our clients and friends. It is intended to be informational
and does not constitute legal advice regarding any specific situation. This material
may also be considered advertising under the applicable court rules.
MEMBERS OF ALSTON BIRD’S CONSTRUCTION
AND GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS GROUP
John I. Spangler, III, Chair
404.881.7146
john.spangler@alston.com
Jeffrey A. Belkin, Partner
404.881.7388
jeff.belkin@alston.com
Donald G. Brown, Associate
404.881.7865
donald.brown@alston.com
Deborah Cazan, Associate
404.881.7667
debbie.cazan@alston.com
Jenna Moore Colvin, Associate
404.881.4483
jenna.colvin@alston.com
Daniel F. Diffley, Partner
404.881.4703
dan.diffley@alston.com
A. McCambell Gibson, Partner
404.881.7769
mac.gibson@alston.com
J. Andrew Howard, Associate
404.881.4980
andy.howard@alston.com
William H. Hughes, Jr., Partner
404.881.7273
bhughes@alston.com
Trinh H. Huynh, Associate
404.881.4397
trinh.huynh@alston.com
Lydia A. Jones, Associate
404.881.4779
lydia.jones@alston.com
Julie R. Ross, Associate
404.881.7648
julie.ross@alston.com
Michael Shanlever, Associate
404.881.7619
mike.shanlever@alston.com
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