The document summarizes a student paper arguing that the best explanation for humans' reliable cognitive abilities in deductive reasoning is the God Hypothesis. The paper introduces the reliability challenge question of what causes our reliable logical thinking. It outlines the student's argument that the God Hypothesis is most probable because alternative explanations fail and the God Hypothesis has five supporting reasons. The document also defines key terms like logic, deductive inference, reliability, and the reliability challenge.

1. The God Hypothesis as the Best Explanation for the Reliability of our Cognitive
Mechanisms for Deductive Inference
By Aaron Ramsey
PHI 492: SIP
December 11, 2014
I. Introduction
The problem I address has to do with knowing what the cause is of our reliability
on logic. Humans clearly rely on logic – that is evident. More specifically, our brains
have cognitive faculties which think logically. Why do our cognitive faculties assume the
deductive rules of logic? What is the cause or origin of our having reliable cognitive
mechanisms for deductive inference?1
That is the question posed in this paper. The layout
of this paper is:
I. Introduction
II. My Argument
III. Definitions of Terms
IV. Introduction to the Reliability Challenge
V. Defense of Premise One
VI. Defense of Premise Two
VII. Conclusion
In section II, I will introduce my argument. In section III, in order to better understand
the terms used, I will elaborate on my definitions. In section IV, I will introduce the
reliability challenge more thoroughly by explaining what the problem is about. In section
1
Alvin Plantinga, “Naturalism Defeated,” Calvin College, (1994): 2, accessed November 11, 2014,
http:/www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtuallibrary/articles/plantinga_alvin/naturalism_defeated.pdf.
1

2. V, I will defend the first premise of my argument which will include rebuttals of the three
alternative explanations. Section VI, I will defend the second premise which will include
a defense of my five reasons and answers to objections. Finally in section VII, I will
conclude.
II. My Argument
I argue that humans have reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference
because God designed them to be reliable, i.e. God is the cause of their reliability.2
This is
the essence of the “God Hypothesis.” Our cognitive mechanisms are reliable (in how they
are trustworthy to produce true beliefs and in how they employ deductive logic) for
deductive inference because God designed our mechanisms to operate that way. That is,
they operate in a way that they are rationally capable of adopting logical rules and using
them to form true beliefs.3
In short, our cognitive mechanisms are reliable for logic
because God chose to make us that way.
I argue that the God Hypothesis (GH) is the best explanation (i.e. the most
probable explanation) for our reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference
because (1) the alternative explanations are defeated by strong objections (i.e. objections
supported by adequate evidence) rendering them improbable and (2) there are five good
reasons for GH (i.e. undefeated reasons supported by adequate evidence), rendering GH
probable. The following is a summary of my argument:
1. The alternative explanations are defeated by strong objections (i.e.
objections supported by adequate evidence) rendering them improbable.
2
I assume the Christian God of the Bible.
3
When I say “adopting,” what I mean is that God designed our cognitive mechanisms in such a way that
our intellect has the potential to progress or develop higher reason capacity, therefore having the capability
of “adopting” logical rules.
2

3. 2. There are five good reasons for GH (i.e. undefeated reasons supported by
adequate evidence) rendering GH probable.
3. Therefore, GH is the best explanation (i.e. the most probable explanation)
for our reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference.
Given premises one and two are true, the conclusion necessarily follows. This is logically
self evident. Support for my first premise includes strong objections to these alternative
explanations, rendering each of them defeated and therefore improbable:
(1) Rational Insight
(2) Concept Constitution
(3) Naturalistic Evolution
Support for my second premise includes five good reasons supporting GH (undefeated
reasons supported by adequate evidence), rendering GH probable:
(1) GH explains the evidence for intelligent design in human cognition.
(2) GH is logically consistent with itself (not self-defeating).
(3) GH explains the existence of necessarily true propositions.
(4) GH explains the existence of intentional states of human consciousness.
(5) GH explains reliable human cognitive capabilities to produce true beliefs.
III. Definitions of Terms
Now I will explain the meanings of the following terms: Logic, deductive
inference, reliability, cognitive faculty/mechanism, and causation.
“Logic might be defined as the science of inference; inference, in turn, as the
drawing of a conclusion from premises…Logic, then, is primarily concerned with
3

4. arguments.”4
Logic involves analyzing the process of reasoning. Joshua Schechter, a
specialist in philosophy and epistemology of logic helps clarify what is meant by “logic”
in the following quote: “‘logic,’ as I use the term here, does not concern an artificial
formal language but propositions that can be expressed in natural language and believed
by ordinary thinkers.”5
That is to say, “logic,” in this paper, refers to propositional logic.
“Propositional logic, also known as sentential logic, is that branch of logic that studies
ways of combining or altering statements or propositions to form more complicated
statements or propositions.”6
A proposition, or statement, is either true or false. True
propositions reflect the way reality really is such as the proposition that Barack Obama is
the current President of the US in 2014.7
Connective words such as “and,” “or,” “some,”
“all,” as well as negations such as “not” are used in propositional logic.8
Thus, it is this
kind of logic that I will be referring to. As Schechter assumes, I also assume that
propositions are the primary bearers of logical truth and logical falsity and that logical
truths are necessary truths and logical falsehoods are necessarily false. 9
Lastly, it is
assumed that classical logic is “at least approximately correct.”10
Deductive reasoning is “reasoning that involves deductive rules of inference” of
which rules of inference are “intimately connected” to the logical concepts (discussed in
the previous paragraph).11
Reasoning assumes logical rules, and therefore logic is the
structure of reasoning. “Inference” is the “process of drawing a conclusion from premises
4
Daniel Bonevac, “philosophy of logic,” The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 679.
5
Joshua Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” Philosophical
Perspectives, 24 (2010): 437.
6
Kevin Klement, “Propositional Logic,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, January 1, 2014,
accessed December 11, 2014. http://www.iep.utm.edu/prop-log/.
7
I assume the correspondence theory of truth.
8
Klement, “Propositional Logic.”
9
Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” 437.
10
Ibid., 438.
11
Ibid., 442.
4

5. or assumptions.”12
That is, I might infer from the premise “I am running” that therefore,
“I am moving.” This is a deductive inference because the conclusion follows necessarily
from the premise. Another example would be to infer that “2+2” is equal to “4”
necessarily. It would be impossible for it to be any other way. Deductive rules of
inference are therefore based on the logical concepts that we assume in ordinary
conversation. In one sense, “‘deduction’ refers to an inference in which a speaker claims
the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises.”13
That is to say, it is the “drawing”
of a conclusion from a sequence of previous sentences by employing a “rule of
inference.”14
Here are some examples of deductive rules of inference: Modus Ponens: If p then
q. p. Therefore q. Modus Tollens: If p then q. Not q. Therefore not p. Hypothetical
Syllogism: If p then q. If q then r. Therefore, if p then r. This is a small sample of rules of
deductive inference which are agreed upon, valid forms of argumentation. That is, the
structure in which they are presented is logically valid and thus the conclusion is
necessarily truth preserving. These are examples of good reasoning. However, there are
of course fallacious forms of argumentation in which the premises do not yield the truth
in the conclusion.
There are two meanings of reliability: (reliability in the first sense) the meaning of
“reliability” in this case is whether the cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference are
trustworthy for producing true beliefs. Are the mechanisms for deductive inference
trustworthy for generating true beliefs? If they are trustworthy in doing this then they are
12
David H. Sanford, “inference,” The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi (New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 426.
13
Charles Sayward, “deduction,” The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi (New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 212.
14
Ibid., 211.
5

6. reliable, meaning they are repetitively used and consistently produce true beliefs in their
conclusions which are drawn. If the mechanisms are not consistently producing true
beliefs but instead producing falsehoods, then they are unreliable. Thus, reliability in this
first sense is concerned with whether the mechanisms produce true belief. The second
meaning (reliability in the second sense) is that they (the mechanisms) “rely” on
deductive logic. To say that our cognitive mechanisms “rely” on deductive logic means
they employ it or utilize it in order to use valid deductive reasoning. If the mechanisms
are relying on deductive logic then we would say the mechanisms are successfully
utilizing valid deductive logic. If the mechanisms are not relying on deductive logic, then
that would mean the mechanisms are disconnected from deductive logic; the mechanisms
are not utilizing deductive logic at all.
The “reliability challenge” refers to a question which I will attempt to answer in
this paper. Joshua Schechter introduces two reliability challenges, but it is the second
reliability challenge that I address in this paper. The second reliability challenge uses the
term “reliability” in the first sense and the second sense: “What explains the reliability of
our cognitive mechanism for deductive inference?”15
Basically what I mean by a cognitive faculty is the mental domain in a person’s
brain which is used for thinking and reasoning.16
This is the part of a person’s brain that
is designated for activities like solving puzzles, playing games, discovery and creativity,
and human reasoning in general.17
Aristotle was the first philosopher to articulate
psychological “faculties” of the brain, except for him, it was the science of the “soul.” He
introduced faculties such as nutrition, perception, desire, and intellect. Mind being “the
15
Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” 442.
16
William Bechtel, “cognitive science,” The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 150.
17
Bechtel, “cognitive science,” 151.
6

7. part of the soul by which it knows and understands.” 18
Aristolte’s “mind” faculty is a
close comparison to what I am talking about, but the intellect is closer because it will
relate more specifically to the mind’s ability to use deductive inference. The mind faculty
is broad in how it includes the faculty of reason and beyond, encompassing knowledge a
priori and a posteriori.19
The intellect is more specific to reasoning. Thus, as Schechter
writes, “this is a more fundamental – and much more general – explanatory challenge.”20
That explains what kind of cognitive faculty I will be concerned with. Cognitive
mechanisms are different from cognitive faculties. The mechanism is more specific than
the faculty because every faculty has “mechanisms” or mental functions which refer to
the cognitive mechanics within the faculty. These mechanisms function with the purpose
of producing thought at a very basic level. At this level, the brain’s thought processes are
very intricate and mysterious. This paper will mainly discuss the mechanisms within the
faculty of the intellect.
Causation in this context will involve looking for the “cause” or antecedent factor
which determines our having reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference. The
standard view of a causal relation is that it is a pair of events with two roles: cause and
effect.21
In the case of the reliability challenge, the causal-event is unknown (what we are
trying to figure out) but the effect is known. The effect-event taking place is our having
reliable cognitive mechanisms – mechanisms which work properly for deductive
inference. Hume objects to the standard view, saying that “we always presume, when we
18
Christopher Shields, “Aristotle’s Psychology,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, January 11,
2000, accessed November 11, 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/index.html#4.
19
J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 85.
20
Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” 442.
21
Jonathan Schaffer, “The Metaphysics of Causation,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February
2, 2003, accessed November 6, 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/.
7

8. see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects,
similar to those we have experienced, will follow from them.”22
Hume’s skepticism led
him to conclude that the “causal” relations that people presume are not necessarily causal,
but merely a result of repeated custom – that there is no necessary causal connection.
“The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate
scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and
consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite
distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the
smallest hint of the other.”23
Kant responds, “It is impossible ever to comprehend through
reason how something could be a cause or have a force, rather these relations must be
taken solely from experience.”24
So, I will side with Kant on this and say that Hume’s
mistake is that he is forgetting that cause and effect can be proved through observation in
experience, but not solely through pure reasoning. In William Lane Craig’s and J.P.
Moreland’s book, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, they explain
“event-event (or state-state) causation where one state of affairs serves as a cause for
another state of affairs (the moving of one ball causes the moving of a second ball).”25
This is the standard view of causation that I will assume.
IV. Introduction to the Reliability Challenge
Now, I will clarify the meaning of “reliability challenge.” The challenge is: “What
explains the reliability of our cognitive mechanism for deductive inference?”26
And when
the question uses the word “explains,” it means a causal explanation. In Joshua
22
Graciela De Pierris, “Kant and Hume on Causality,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, June 4,
2008, accessed November 6, 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-hume-causality/#KanAnsHum.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 362.
26
Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” 442.
8

9. Schechter’s article on the “Reliability Challenge,” Schechter offers David Lewis’ answer
to the question, which he claims his view to be “widely accepted that Lewis is
mistaken.”27
Lewis’ answer is that since logical truths are necessary truths, there is no
need to explain our reliability on logic: “Simply believing the logical truths is an
infallible way to get it right.”28
Lewis’ view is that the mere belief in the logical rules is
enough to explain the reliability of our cognitive mechanisms for logic. Schechter
disagrees with Lewis, thinking Lewis does not address the heart of the issue. Schechter
writes, “the reliability of our beliefs can be explained in terms of the reliability of the
underlying cognitive mechanisms that generate them. The challenge, rather, is to explain
the reliability of these mechanisms.”29
So, Lewis’ mistake is that he points to the belief as
the causal explanation for our reliability when the belief (that is, its underlying “cognitive
mechanism”) is the very thing we are trying to explain why it is reliable. So, it seems that
Lewis does not fully answer the question. The challenge is to explain the reliability of the
cognitive mechanisms, not the belief.30
So, Schechter claims that to fully answer the reliability challenge for logic,
“satisfying answers to both the operational and etiological questions must be provided.”31
Here are the definitions for each:
The Operational Question: How does our cognitive mechanism for deductive inference
work such that it is reliable?
The Etiological Question: How is it that we have a cognitive mechanism for deductive
inference that is reliable?32
27
Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” 443.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid., 444.
30
Ibid.
31
Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” 444.
32
Ibid.
9

10. Schechter answers the operational question very candidly. He says, “Our deductive
mechanism works via the employment of deductive rules of inference. The mechanism is
reliable because the deductive rules we employ are necessarily truth-preserving. That’s
all that need to be said.”33
The second question is more difficult. It has to do with
“Etiology,” which is the branch of knowledge concerned with causes.34
Thus the question
is asking, what is the cause of our having reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive
inference? The mere fact that we have reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive
inference begs for a causal explanation. Schechter points out how our cognitive faculties’
reliance on logic is not necessary, but a contingent fact in need of explanation: “There
was certainly no guarantee that we would come to have reliable deductive rules... This is
the crux of the reliability challenge for logic.”35
Was it through a process that our brains
evolved to where it could employ these deductive rules? Is that the cause? Or is there a
trigger in our brains which turns on or off depending on when we want to think? If so,
have our brains always been that way? Perhaps it is neither.
V. Defense of Premise One
My thesis was that GH is the best explanation (i.e. the most probable) for our
reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference. The first premise in support of my
thesis was that the alternative explanations are defeated by strong objections. I will
defend the first premise in this section. It consists of three alternative explanations which
are each defeated by strong objections, rendering each alternative improbable due to their
failure to causally explain our reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference. The
33
Ibid., 445.
34
“Etiology,” Merriam-Webster.com, accessed November 5, 2014. http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/etiology.
35
Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” 445.
10

11. alternative explanations are (1) rational insight, (2) concept constitution, and (3)
naturalistic evolution.
1. Rational Insight
Schechter offers a few different explanations which he believes all fail. The first
is Rational Insight. This is the view that our reliability on deductive inference can be
explained by appeal to a kind of rational insight, that is, a cognitive faculty that has the
capacity to “see” that certain deductive inferences are good or true.36
This is an
explanation which Schechter says has a couple weaknesses. The first is that there is no
independent evidence that we have a faculty of rational insight. The second is that the
mechanism behind rational insight is very mysterious. Schechter argues that this appeal
to a faculty of rational insight is of “no help whatsoever” in answering the etiological
question for deductive inference.37
He explains that it does nothing to meet this challenge
because it does not explain how it is that we have a reliable mechanism.38
That is, it does
not explain what the cause is of our reliable mechanism because rational insight is in
need of a cause itself. If it is the faculty of rational insight that explains the reliability,
how is it that we came to develop this faculty? This explanation just pushes the problem
back even further.39
2. Concept Constitution
The second proposal Schechter offers is that our deductive reliability can be
explained “purely by virtue of the nature of concepts and concept possession.”40
That is to
say, the deductive rules we employ help to constitute the meanings of the logical
36
Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” 449.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” 449.
40
Ibid.
11

12. concepts (ideas) we possess. Also, the idea is that the semantic values of logical concepts
are assigned so as to make its constitutive rules reliable.41
Thus, “the deductive rules we
employ are concept-constituting, and thus are guaranteed to be reliable.”42
The first
problem with this is that most conceptual roles fail to correspond to genuine concepts
because we cannot understand certain words without a concept.43
If I use words which
have no concepts, they are meaningless and thus incomprehensible. The second problem
is that “the semantic values of genuine concepts are not always assigned so as to make
their constitutive rules reliable.”44
That is, they are not always bound to good logic, which
means they are not necessarily truth preserving. Schechter explains that this “concept-
constitution” proposal provides only a “very partial explanation of our reliability.”45
An
explanation of how it is that we have good conceptual roles is still needed.
3. Naturalistic Evolution
Schechter offers his own view of how to explain the etiological problem in his
article, Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability about Logic?46
He says we have a
cognitive mechanism for deductive inference that is reliable because we have evolved
from our descendants by natural selection to develop and employ reliable deductive
rules.47
He states that his position rests on two main ideas, the first of which we have
already discussed in this paper: “We are reliable about logic because we are reliable in
our deductive reasoning. The second is that being a reliable deductive reasoner conferred
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid., 450.
44
Ibid., 451.
45
Ibid.
46
Joshua Schechter, “Could Evolution Explains Our Reliability About Logic?” Brown University, (2013):
10-24, accessed November 11, 2014.
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/onlinepapers/schechter/Evolution.pdf.
47
Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” 452.
12

13. a heritable survival or reproductive advantage upon our ancestors.”48
That is, we inherited
this trait of being a “reliable deductive reasoner.” He thinks that this is the most
promising explanation available.49
He explains, “possessing highly reliable general-
purpose reasoning mechanisms is useful for survival-enhancing tasks such as problem
solving and planning for future contingencies.”50
He further explains that evolutionary
explanations can only explain “population-level facts.”51
So he poses a third reliability
challenge: “How is it that our population predominately includes thinkers with reliable
cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference?”52
Schechter’s straightforward
explanation is that “our ancestors were selected for employing reliable deductive rules – a
heritable trait – and this explains why it is that we, their descendants, employ reliable
deductive rules.”53
Schechter argues that our ancestors found different types of planning
strategies to help themselves survive. As a result of these pressures for our ancestors to
survive, they learned to employ rules which were cognitively economical for their
survival. These deductive rules were a byproduct. “Employing reliable deductive rules is
a heritable trait, and so we came to employ them, too.”54
This explanation seems
attractive because it might explain the creature’s desire to adopt deductive logical rules as
a tool for ensuring survival and reproductive advantage.
I think evolution is an interesting proposal, but I would argue that it is not the best
causal explanation for our cognitive mechanisms. One important distinction to be made
here is whether Schechter is referring to unguided human evolution or guided. It is
48
Schechter, “Could Evolution Explains Our Reliability About Logic?” 3.
49
Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” 452.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid., 454.
52
Ibid.
53
Schechter, “Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability About Logic?” 10-11.
54
Schechter, “Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability About Logic? 35-36.
13

14. probably the case that he is referring to unguided evolution because he never mentions a
causal agent guiding the process. That would mean he is advocating a Darwinian
evolutionary view which purports that the process of genetic mutations is totally random
and unguided (no causal agent involved). The opposite would be to invoke a causal agent
such as God or a designer of some kind whom has interacted in the evolutionary changes
over time. In this section, I will refute the Darwinian evolutionary explanation which is a
view without God, i.e. a process of evolution that is totally naturalistic. It is in fact an
inadequate explanation for the reliability of our cognitive mechanisms for deductive
inference because: (1) the probability of human cognition evolving through a random
undirected process is astronomically unlikely, (2) naturalistic evolution does not explain
the capability of our cognitive capabilities to produce true beliefs (3) naturalistic
evolution is self defeating because it provides grounds for itself to distrust our own noetic
equipment.55
The consequence of evolution as an inadequate explanation is that it is very
improbable. Once I have explained how these problems refute Schechter proposed
reasons for evolutionary explanation, there will not be enough evidence to suggest that
the cognitive faculty of rationality is a result of millions of years of evolution from
“descendants” before us. We will see that this proposal lacks support and that unless we
invoke a God that guided the process of evolution, there is not enough explanatory power
to say that natural selection was the driving force of this development in the brain.56
In
order to present a worthy case, Schechter would need to resolve these objections and
explain exactly how natural selection could have produced the complexity and specificity
within human cognition.
55
Our system of beliefs
56
In other words, we will see that Darwinian evolution as a cause of the development in the brain is an
inadequate explanation because of the reasons provided. This renders the explanation very improbable
given that it does not account for the evidence of reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference.
14

15. In support of my first reason, I will point to a few sources which are the basis for
my claim. These include William Dembski’s The Design Inference and Stephen C.
Meyer’s Signature in the Cell. Dembski writes that the main significance of the design
inference is that it detects and measures information.57
Dembski constructs a “generic
chance elimination argument” in which he argues “specifications in conjunction with
low-probability events reliably indicate design.”58
In other words, that one can reasonably
reject the chance hypothesis as a cause for an event if the probability of it occurring is
small enough. This is relevant to the improbability of evolving human cognition because
the cells which make up the cognition in the brain each posses information-rich DNA.
Meyer’s main argument is that this information could not be generated by an unguided
process such as evolution. Meyer reveals the conclusion of the small probability of
generating a protein:
What does this mean? It means that if every event in the universe over its entire history
were devoted to producing combination of amino acids of the correct length in a prebiotic
soup (an extravagantly generous and even absurd assumption), the number of
combinations thus produced would still represent a tiny fraction – less than 1 out of a
trillion trillion – of the total number of events needed to have a 50 percent chance of
generating a functional protein - any functional protein of modest length by chance
alone.59
Meyer goes on to explain the even smaller chances of generating a cell: “Taking all those
resources -10139
possible events into account only increases the probability of producing a
minimally complex cell by chance alone to, at best, 1 chance in 1040,861
, again, an
57
William A. Dembski, The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance Through Small Probabilities (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 228.
58
Stephen C. Meyer, Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design (New York, NY:
HarperOne, 2009), 364.
59
Meyer, Signature in Cell, 218.
15

16. unimaginably small probability.”60
Meyer notes additionally, “In other words, the
universe itself does not possess the probabilistic resources necessary to render probable
the origin of biological information by chance alone.”61
Thus, the resources in order to
produce one human cell by an unguided evolutionary process are highly improbable. In
Meyer’s book, he surveys the past 50 years of failed attempts to explain the “origin of the
functionally specified genetic information required to build a living cell.”62
This led him
to the conclusion that not an unguided process is the best explanation for the existence of
genetic information in DNA, but that an intelligent cause is the best explanation.63
In support of my second reason, Plantinga argues that evolution is not interested
in true belief, but only interested in behavior because behavior is what is important for
surviving well and adapting to changing environments. The belief content (whether the
belief is true or false) is not a necessary effect of the process of evolution.64
The
implication of this is that evolutionary explanation does not adequately account for
human ability to hold true beliefs. Plantinga presents five possible scenarios (of which I
will mention three) in which evolution can account for selection of adaptive behavior but
does not account for faculties which produce true beliefs. These scenarios demonstrate
the unlikelihood that evolution would generate belief which has a causal connection to
behavior. The first evolutionary scenario is “epiphenomenalism: their behavior is not
caused by their beliefs.” The second is “it could be that their beliefs do indeed have
causal efficacy with respect to behavior, but not by virtue of their content.” The third is
60
Ibid., 219.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Stephen C. Meyer, “Signature in the Cell: Intelligent Design and the DNA Enigma,” The Blackwell
Companion to Science and Christianity, eds. J.B. Stump and Alan G. Padgett, (Blackwell Publishing,
2012), 279.
64
Plantinga, “Naturalism Defeated,” 4.
16

17. that the beliefs are “causally efficacious--'semantically' as well as 'syntactically'--with
respect to behavior, but maladaptive: from the point of view of fitness these creatures
would be better off without them.”65
To support my third reason, I will point to Alvin Plantinga’s argument which
comes to the conclusion that, “Therefore, I have a defeater for my belief that naturalism
and evolution are true.”66
The argument goes like this: Because the probability of our
beliefs being reliable is fairly low, as argued, or we could take the position to be agnostic
as to the probability of our beliefs being true, therefore we have a defeater of a
naturalistic evolutionary explanation itself because it is included in our system of beliefs
which we have reason to distrust. Thus, the rational course of action is to reject belief in
the naturalist evolutionary explanation because the course of action to believe in it is
defeated by its unreliability, making it still defeated.67
One might respond to this by
saying that he has independent evidence in support of his belief to think it is true. But
Plantinga responds to this objection by calling this “pragmatically circular.”68
That is,
Plantinga writes, “it won’t help to argue that they can’t be wildly mistaken; for the very
reason for mistrusting our cognitive faculties generally will be a reason for mistrusting
the faculties generating the beliefs involved in the argument.”69
Thus, we have reason to
believe that because the beliefs generated by evolution are not necessarily true beliefs, the
proposal of an unguided evolutionary process is self defeating because it cannot account
for its own proposal. Our faculties of generating true beliefs are in doubt and we should
then mistrust them by either adopting agnosticism about evolution or rejecting it all
65
Plantinga, “Naturalism Defeated,” 6-9.
66
Meyer, “Signature in the Cell: Intelligent Design and the DNA Enigma,” 103.
67
Alvin Plantina, Warrant and Proper Function (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993), 231.
68
Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 234.
69
Ibid.
17

18. together. The reliability of our cognitive mechanism on this view is thus doubtful, which
in turn causes mistrust of itself.
VI. Defense of Premise Two
My thesis was that GH is the best explanation (i.e. the most probable) for our
reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference. The first supporting premise was
that the alternative explanations are defeated by strong objections (rendering them
improbable), which we saw in the previous section. The second supporting premise (this
section) is that there are five good reasons for GH (i.e. undefeated reasons supported by
adequate evidence), which render GH probable. This section consists of two parts: (1)
defense of these five reasons and (2) answers to objections to these reasons.
1. Defense of Five Reasons
(1) GH explains the evidence for intelligent design in human cognitive mechanisms.
(2) GH is logically consistent with itself (not self-defeating).
(3) GH explains the existence of necessarily true propositions.
(4) GH explains the existence of intentional states of human consciousness.
(5) GH explains reliable human cognitive capabilities to produce true beliefs.
To support my first reason, I think GH explains the evidence for intelligent design
in human cognitive mechanisms because (1) Anything that possesses marks of intelligent
design was probably caused by an intelligent designer, (2) human cognition possesses
marks of intelligent design, and therefore (3) human cognition was probably caused by an
intelligent designer. Premise one is probably true. If we grant that something possesses
marks or signs of intelligent design, and the chances of these marks being caused by a
random process are very low, then we have good reason to think that the cause of the
18

19. marks of intelligent design were in fact an intelligent designer. The skeptic might object,
saying that it is still possible that the marks of intelligent design were caused by a random
process, despite all of the evidence to the contrary. It might be possible, but which is
more probable? No, I think the probability of marks of intelligent design being caused by
an intelligent designer is higher because the marks or signs are of intelligent design, not
something else. A reasonable person should look at the clues he has to work with, and if
the clues (marks or signs) suggest intelligent design over random process, that is the more
rational judgment. The second premise might be controversial. However, I think it is
evident, as Stephen C. Meyer and William Dembski argue that the DNA in the cell
possesses marks of intelligent design. This argument applies to human cognition because
human cognition is a part of the brain which is made up of human cells. The information-
rich content found in the DNA of the cell is a clear sign of intelligent design because only
an intelligent designer could cause such specified complexity. This leads us to the
conclusion that human cognition was caused by an intelligent designer. The reason God
is the best candidate for the intelligent designer is because God is the only known agent
who could cause such an event as to code the DNA in the cell. This raises the probability
higher than any other explanation that he is the best explanation for the complexity in
human cognition.
My second reason is “GH is logically consistent with itself (not self-defeating).”
The God hypothesis is the proposal that God is the cause of our reliable cognitive
mechanisms for logic, including deductive inference. God is not only logically possible,
but He exists in reality, being uncaused (eternal) and consistent with himself. Thus, there
is nothing contradictory or self defeating about God’s nature. Christian theologian and
19

20. mathematician Vern Poythress writes, “logic transcends the world, including the world of
human persons…It belongs to God as a feature of his speech. It displays his attributes
because it is an aspect of his character. Hence, we rely on God every time we think and
every time we engage in logical reasoning.”70
That is to say, logic originates from God
and God uses it. The very idea of God being incoherent or logically inconsistent is
impossible because that would render God to be false, which is the opposite of who he
claims to be: “I am the way the truth and the life” John 14:6. God exists necessarily, and
thus it would be impossible for him to not exist. Why think the God Hypothesis is self
defeating? What could possibly be self defeating about God freely choosing to create our
cognitive mechanisms so they could reliably produce true beliefs and rely on deductive
inference? There are no evident defeaters to this proposal, and thus we are justified in
believing it.
My third reason is that GH explains the existence of necessarily true propositions.
That is, necessary states of affairs including propositions. The necessarily true
proposition that 2+2=4 or that A=A is necessarily true because it could not possibly be
false. It is true in all possible worlds. The fact that necessary things such as these two
propositions exist implies that there must be a necessary cause. But what could cause a
necessary thing such as a necessary truth? Can contingent things such as humans cause
necessary things? I think only a necessary being such as God could cause a necessary
proposition to exist. Poythress writes, “In fact, possibility and necessity make no sense
without God as their foundation. God’s character is the limit of possibility.”71
One might
object by saying that we produce necessary truths all the time. But that is not true – we
70
Vern S. Poythress, Logic: A God-Centered Approach to the Foundation of Western Thought (Wheaton,
IL: Crossway, 2013), 80.
71
Poythress, Logic, 502.
20

21. discover necessary truths, but we do not produce them or cause them to exist. In history,
humans have discovered necessary truths such as math equations like the examples I gave
or much more complex ones. These necessary truths have always been true, but someone
came along and discovered them. One might also object by saying that some necessary
states of affairs are causeless, and therefore require no explanation. However, this
objection violates the principle of sufficient reason, which states that everything must
have a sufficient reason or cause for its existence. The sufficient reason for God’s
existence lies within his being, because he is the origin of reason itself, as well as the
foundation of necessity and possibility.72 73
Necessary truths can only be produced by a
necessary cause and God is the only explanation for this because he is the only necessary
being capable of this.
My fourth reason is that the GH explains the existence of intentional states of
human consciousness.74
William Lane Craig uses this reason in a debate with Alex
Rosenburg on the issue, “Is faith in God reasonable?”75
Craig argues: If God did not exist,
intentional states of consciousness would not exist. But intentional states of
consciousness do exist. Therefore, God exists. Craig explains, “Only mental states or
states of consciousness are about other things. In The Atheist’s Guide to Reality:
Enjoying Life without Illusions (2011), the materialist Alex Rosenberg recognizes this
fact, and concludes that for atheists, there really are no intentional states. Rosenberg
72
Douglas Groothuis, Christian Apologetics: A Comprehensive Case for Biblical Faith, (Downer’s Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2011), 203.
73
Poythress, Logic, 502.
74
William Lane Craig, “Does God Exist?” Reasonable Faith with William Lane Craig,
November/December 2013, accessed December 11, 2014. http://www.reasonablefaith.org/popular-articles-
does-god-exist.
75
“Is Faith in God Reasonable? Full Debate with William Lane Craig and Alex Rosenberg,”
Biola University, February 2, 2013, accessed December 1, 2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhfkhq-CM84.
21

22. boldly claims that we never really think about anything.”76
If there is no God, then what
can account for human states of intentionality – our ability to think about things?
Rosenberg, a specialist in philosophy of biology admits that there are no intentional states
if God does not exist, confirming Craig’s first premise. Craig concludes, “This seems to
me to be a reductio ad absurdum of his atheism. By contrast, for theists, because God is a
mind, it’s hardly surprising that there should be other, finite minds, with intentional
states. Thus, intentional states fit comfortably into a theistic worldview.”77
Therefore,
since God has an intentional mind, it is sensible that he would supplant us with
intentionality so that we might also think about things such as the nature of God and his
creation.
The fifth and last reason is that “GH explains reliable human cognitive
capabilities to produce true beliefs.” Our mechanisms rely on deductive logic in order to
as Alvin Plantinga would say “function properly,” that is, as they should, by employing
deductive logic which in turn guarantees arriving at the truth. The reason I argue that God
created us this way is because he wants us to be able to hold true beliefs so that humans
can believe in the Gospel and therefore be saved. This is why Plantinga’s understanding
of a properly functioning cognitive faculty is one that is working according to how it was
designed, and also “being aimed at truth,” or truth preserving.78
So, to say that our
cognitive mechanisms rely on deductive logic means they employ deductive logic in
order to use valid deductive reasoning, i.e. “function” properly, in order to come to the
conclusion that Jesus is Lord. This is a legitimate reason for why our cognitive faculties
employ logic. Why else would we have this capability to produce true beliefs? If the
76
Craig, “Does God Exist?”
77
Ibid.
78
Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 17.
22

23. cognitive mechanisms do not rely on deductive inference, then they will not use it as a
tool for good reasoning and the result will be irrational thinking, or raving. That is, the
cognitive mechanism would divorce valid deductive inference and thus malfunction,
which would not lead to truths but to falsehoods. Plantinga elaborates on the purpose of
all cognitive faculties, not only the faculty of the intellect which I am concerned with. He
writes, “the purpose (function) of our cognitive faculties is to provide us with true or
verisimilitudinous [the quality of seeming real79
] beliefs, and that, for the most part, that
is just what they do.”80
This quote illuminates the purpose of all our cognitive faculties by
explaining that they are meant to be used for arriving at true beliefs. Additionally, the
Biblical evidence supports the fact that God supplanted knowledge of himself in all
people (Romans 1:18-25). If we assume the true belief that we know God based on the
Bible, then we can infer that God is the cause of our true belief. Thus, God is the cause of
our reliable mechanisms for logic as the Bible says humans know God because of his
general revelation in creation.
2. Answers to Objections
1. Objection: The concept of God is logically incoherent because God in three
persons is impossible.
Answer to Objection: This objection rejects not the idea that God could have
created our reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference; rather, it rejects the
idea of God himself as in incoherent being. That is to say, it is a rejection of the doctrine
of the Trinity as logically incoherent. Westminster Shorter Catechism number six
summarizes the Trinity: “There are three persons in the Godhead: the Father, the Son, and
79
“Verisimilitude,” Merriam-Webster.com, accessed December 11, 2014. http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/verisimilitude.
80
Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 217.
23

24. the Holy Ghost; and these three are one God, the same in substance, equal in power and
glory.”81
The objection I am responding to is the charge that the Trinity is logically
incoherent, meaning there lays a contradiction in the concept of the Trinity. Norman
Geisler answers this objection in his Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics. He
argues that the doctrine of the Trinity does not violate the philosophical law of non-
contradiction because the doctrine of the Trinity is the belief that there are three persons
in one nature.82
He writes, “This may be a mystery, but it is not a contradiction. That is, it
may go beyond reason’s ability to comprehend completely, but it does not go against
reason’s ability to apprehend consistently.”83
We may not be able to understand the
Trinity with our own cognitive mechanisms relying on logic, but it does not follow that it
is a contradiction. The Trinity is self-consistent because it is not “three persons in one
person,” which would be a contradiction. It is self-consistent because it is God in three
persons, the originator of logic and the foundation of logic.84
We may not be able to
understand how three persons is one God, but that is because we cannot completely
understand God. There are other reasons for thinking the Trinity is the most plausible
doctrine of God. Craig and Moreland present an argument from the social Trinitarian
view. This is the view that it is possible for God to be one soul with three centers of self-
consciousness, intentionality and volition.85
This is a possibility that is not contradictory,
yet explains how God might be three persons in one nature. The Biblical view of God is
81
“Westminster Shorter Catechism,” Reformed.org, accessed November 12, 2014.
http://www.reformed.org/documents/wsc/index.html?
_top=http://www.reformed.org/documents/WSC_frames.html.
82
Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books,
1999), 732.
83
Ibid.
84
Poythress, Logic, 114, 291.
85
Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 594.
24

25. that he is a Trinity, as the Westminster Shorter Catechism confirms, as well as the Bible
assumes.
2. Objection: You are not justified in claiming “there are no better explanations”
because you have not exhaustively searched for a better explanation.
Answer to Objection: It is true that my proposed explanations which failed are not
exhaustive. There are other explanations for our reliable cognitive mechanisms which I
have not considered. This paper shows that GH is the best explanation available with
regard to the alternatives which I have presented. The alternatives are dominant
explanations but not the only explanations. GH is the best explanation because it does not
succumb to the problems that all of the alternatives face.
3. Objection: (to Reason Five): GH is not the best explanation for our cognitive
capabilities to produce true beliefs by means of deductive inference because Darwinian
Evolution is a more plausible explanation for the following reason: Plantinga’s argument
from the improbability of our cognitive mechanisms reliably developing via Darwinian
Evolution is fallacious. It is fallacious because his argument from possible scenarios in
which evolution could have produced false beliefs contradicts the theory of Darwinian
evolution. That is, none of those scenarios are possible on the Darwinian evolution model
because none of those scenarios are consistent with Darwinian Evolution. Darwinian
evolution necessarily implies that the strongest creatures evolve to become better
survivors over time. There is no possible scenario in which creatures would evolve to
become weaker survivors, or produce false beliefs. These “possible” scenarios proposed
by Plantinga are not actually possible because they are inconsistent with the Darwinian
evolutionary model – these scenarios are impossible given Darwinian evolution.
25

26. Darwinian evolution implies that creatures evolving must become stronger survivors as a
result of competitive environmental pressures. Being able to produce true beliefs is
essential to accomplishing this. A hunter cannot capture his prey if his belief of where the
prey is at is always false. Thus, in every possible world on an evolutionary model, the
hunter who is evolving to become a better survivor must evolve cognitive mechanisms
which produce true beliefs because they are essential for his learning more effective ways
of survival, hence evolving into a stronger creature.
Answer to Objection: I agree with the objector: Yes, given the evolutionary
model, it does necessarily imply the evolving creature to become a better survivor hence
generating true beliefs. The problem is that this model is incredibly improbable! This one
scenario in which the world could have been is astronomically improbable because of the
trillions of alternative possibilities. What are the chances of our world resembling a
Darwinian evolutionary model as opposed to any other model? With no guiding force
besides chance (which is always fair) to direct which possible world to be actualized, the
probability of the evolutionary model being the world that was actualized is
astronomically small. As we recall from Meyer’s book, Signature in the Cell, when
chance (no guiding force) is the decider of whether our world will contain biological life,
the number of possible events in the universe make the probability of creating a single
cell “at best, 1 chance in 1040,861
… an unimaginably small probability.”86
Thus, Plantinga
is in fact arguing very conservatively by presenting five possible worlds in which humans
could not have been able to produce true beliefs. The fact is that there are countless other
possibilities in which the evolutionary model was not the actualized world, making the
probability of its actually occurring very small to say the least.
86
Meyer, Signature in the Cell, 219.
26

27. 4. Objection: The probability of Darwinian evolution is in fact 100% certain
because evolution is a necessary truth – it is the only possible world. It follows that the
cause of our reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference is actually Darwinian
evolution by natural selection.
Answer to Objection: There is no reason to think that Darwinian evolution is the
only possible world. Possible worlds are traditionally understood by philosophers to
mean ways in which the world could have been. Darwinian evolution is one possible
world while theism is another. “History, from the very beginning, could have unfolded
quite other than it did in fact: The matter constituting a distant star might never have
organized well enough to give light; species that survived might just as well have died
off; battles won might have been lost…”87
The point is that evolution is only one possible
world and there are countless imaginable possible alternative worlds which could have
been actualized. Moreland and Craig define a possible world as a way the world “might
be.”88
Necessity de re is “the necessity of a thing’s possessing a certain property… If
something has a property essentially, then it has it in every possible world in which it is
true that this thing exists.”89
The result of a thing’s necessary existence is its necessity de
re because it would have to exist in every possible world including the ones in which it
exists. There is no reason to think evolution is de re necessary because there are countless
other ways in which the world might have been.
VII. Conclusion
The conclusion of this paper is that the God Hypothesis is the best
explanation (i.e. the most probable) because (1) the alternative explanations are defeated
87
Christopher Menzel, “Possible Worlds,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, October 21, 2013,
accessed November 16, 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/.
88
Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 50.
89
Ibid.
27

28. by strong objections (objections supported by adequate evidence) rendering them
improbable and (2) there are five good reasons for GH (i.e. undefeated reasons supported
by adequate evidence) rendering GH to be probable. These were the alternative
explanations which were defeated by strong objections: (1) Rational Insight, (2) Concept
Constitution, and (3) Naturalistic Evolution. These were the reasons for GH: (1) GH
explains the evidence for intelligent design in human cognitive mechanisms. (2) GH is
logically consistent with itself (not self-defeating). (3) GH explains the existence of
necessarily true propositions. (4) GH explains the existence of intentional states of human
consciousness. (5) GH explains reliable human cognitive capabilities to produce true
beliefs.
Therefore, we are justified in believing that God is the best explanation. That is,
He is the most probable explanation for the cause and origin of our cognitive mechanisms
for deductive inference. Since all of the alternative explanations are defeated, rendering
them improbable, and there are good, undefeated reasons for GH, it is rational to believe
that GH is the best explanation for the cause of our reliable cognitive mechanisms for
deductive inference because GH is the most probable explanation. Thus, our ability to
think logically and reliably come to true conclusions is probably the consequence of God
creating our cognitive faculties in such a way. Given this, what should our response be? It
should be an attitude of gratefulness to God for blessing us with such capabilities. God
didn’t have to give us our ability to think logically, but he did. He did by his own free
will. “To you, O God of my fathers, I give thanks and praise, for you have given me
wisdom and might, and have now made known to me what we asked of you, for you have
made known to us the king’s matter.” Daniel 2:23.
28

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