Help to Who? Using the
state to Help to Buy
Wednesday June 5th, 2013!
!  John Stewart, Director of Economic
Affairs, Home Builders Federation!
!  Toby Lloyd, Head of Policy, Shelter!
!  Dr Christian Hilber, Reader, Department of
Geography and Environment, LSE!
!  Chair: James Lloyd, Director, Strategic
Society Centre!
!
!  When is it the role of government to underwrite private
mortgage lending?!
!  Why are UK banks not offering higher loan-to-value
mortgages? Is this a function of temporary institutional
constraints or an assessment of UK house-price risk?
How will lenders assess this risk when Help to Buy
ends?!
!  What outcomes are Help to Buy trying to achieve? Do
these outcomes cohere with wider housing policy
objectives?!
!  What are the distributional consequences of Help to
Buy? Who will benefit from the scheme? What does
Help to Buy mean for the aspiration agenda?!
!  What does international and historical experience tell
us about the role of the state in financing private
house purchases?!
Help to Who?
Using the State to Help to Buy
John Stewart
Director of Economic Affairs, HBF
5 June 2013
Presentation Outline
•  Economic context
•  Mortgage policy proposals
•  High LTV mortgage availability
•  Mortgage schemes: key details
•  Impact: volumes or prices
•  International comparisons
ECONOMIC CONTEXT
90.0
92.0
94.0
96.0
98.0
100.0
102.0
104.0
106.0
108.0
110.0
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
GDPPeak=100
Quarters from peak
Comparing Recessions (GDP peak=100)
1973-
1979-
1990-
2008-
Source: Office for National Statistics; HBF
Chart 3.1 GDP and sectoral output (from Bank of England
Inflation Report, May 2013)
(a) Chained-volume measures. GDP is at market prices. Indices of sectoral output are at basic prices. The figures in parentheses show 2009 weights in gross value added.
Housing contribution to GDP
Housing within GDP
•  Household expenditure: 13.5%
•  Capital formation: 3.3%
Of which
Newly built homes: ~1.4%
Net new build jobs: 2.4 direct and supply chain
Housing contribution to GDP
Things are looking up [ in the US]. Led
by rising house prices, the US recovery
is likely to accelerate this year.
(Lawrence Summers, FT, 3 June 2013)
MORTGAGE POLICY
PROPOSALS
Should Government
underwrite mortgages?
•  Temporary interventions
•  Aspiration: help to buy own home
•  Support home building: GDP, jobs
•  dramatic intervention to get our housing market
moving (George Osborne Budget speech)
Should Government
underwrite mortgages?
…Government s view that the current scarcity
of high loan-to-value lending is primarily a
cyclical issue rather than a symptom of a
longer-term structural change in the mortgage
market.
(Treasury. Help to Buy: Mortgage Guarantee. Scheme
Outline)
Mortgage policies
•  Funding for Lending scheme:
to lower rates, increase net lending
•  Help to Buy: Equity Loan:
deposit gap and affordability
•  Help to Buy: Mortgage Guarantee:
deposit gap
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
June April January January May Q3 March December
FLS
starts
HtB:
Equity
Loan
starts
HtB: Mtg
Guarantee
starts
FLS
ends
General
Election
HtB:
Equity
Loan
ends
HtB: Mtg
Guarantee
ends
Bank
rate
starts
rising?
Perfect storm in 2016?
•  Mortgage rates rising (FLS and bank
rate) => affordability deteriorates
•  As support for new build ends
•  And mortgage support for high LTV
mortgages ends
HIGH LTV MORTGAGE
AVAILABILITY
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
-
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
MedianLoan-to-Value(LTV)
Mediandeposit(£000)
First-time Buyer Median Deposit & LTV (UK)
Median deposit Median LTV
Source: CML
FSA: 95%+ LTVs = 0.2% all mortgages 2011/12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1992Q1
1993Q1
1994Q1
1995Q1
1996Q1
1997Q1
1998Q1
1999Q1
2000Q1
2001Q1
2002Q1
2003Q1
2004Q1
2005Q1
2006Q1
2007Q1
2008Q1
2009Q1
2010Q1
2011Q1
2012Q1
2012Q3
%regardingas'MajorConstraint'
HBF Survey: 'Major' Demand Constraints (GB)
Mortgage rates Mortgage terms Mortgage availability House prices
Why few high LTV mortgages?
•  Funding crisis from 2007 H2 + need for low
risk to secure funding => restrict lending to
less risky, low LTV
•  Basle capital requirements => LTV mortgage
rate premium higher than in past*
•  Lender fear of falling house prices?
* 95% mortgages currently in range 5-6%
MORTGAGE SCHEMES
KEY DETAILS
HtB: Equity Loan
•  New build, England only (at present)
•  All builders can apply
•  At least 5% deposit
•  Government equity loan: 10-20%
•  Price cap £600,000
•  Projected take up: 74,000 sales, £3.5bn (around
£17.5bn new home sales)
•  April 2013 - March 2016
HtB: Mortgage Guarantee
•  New & second hand, UK
•  At least 5% deposit
•  Price cap £600,000
•  Govt guarantees portion* of repossession losses (7 yrs)
•  Normal 95% LTV affordability & credit criteria
•  Projected take up: 190,000 sales pa, £130bn mortgages
•  January 2014 - December 2016
* 95% of losses down to 80% of purchase price
HtB: Mortgage Guarantee
Key issues to be resolved
•  Value of commercial fee to Treasury – match
commercial MIG rates?
•  Capital relief?
•  Mortgage rates (especially vs NewBuy)?
•  Withdrawal: taper vs cliff edge?
Future Government needs Financial Policy
Committee (FPC) agreement to renew
IMPACT
VOLUMES OR PRICES?
Impact: volumes or prices?
•  HtB: Equity Loan
New build supply response – though may not be
25,000 pa
•  HtB: Mortgage Guarantee
Some new build supply; second-hand supply (buyers
who are sellers*); plus 190,000 pa is gross – net
additional transactions lower
*CML: 326,000 home mover mortgages 2012 plus add cash buyers with
home to sell (e.g. trade downs)
Impact: volumes or prices?
Other constraints on price increases
•  Will all lenders take part?
•  Will Mortgage Guarantee apply to new & second-
hand?
•  Lenders tight 95% affordability & credit scoring
•  MMR => some buyers constrained
•  Will valuers constrain increases?
•  Affordability deteriorates as prices rise
Impact: volumes or prices?
•  And if prices surge, surely a response from
Treasury, Monetary Policy Committee (MPC),
Financial Policy Committee (FPC) – post General
Election?
•  Poisoned chalice for new Government?
INTERNATIONAL LESSONS
Help to Who?
Using the State to Help to Buy
John Stewart
Director of Economic Affairs, HBF
5 June 2013
Help to Buy:
An  academic’s  view  based  on  
economic theory and empirical evidence
Christian Hilber
London School of Economics
June 2013
Strategic Society Centre Public Debate – Help to Who? Using the state to Help to Buy – London, 5 June 2013
?
Overview
2
1. What will Help-to-Buy achieve?
 What does economic theory predict?
 Supporting empirical evidence
2. Who benefits?
 Winners and losers – not who you might
think…
3. What should the government (not) do?
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
Starting  point:  A  real  problem…
3
 House prices in UK are extraordinarily high
 UK has second highest buying price per square
metre in the world (only topped by tiny Monaco!)
(Globalpropertyguide.com; last accessed March 2013)
 And we live in extremely cramped housing!
 A new-build house in UK is 38 percent smaller
than in densely populated Germany and 40
percent smaller than in the even more densely
populated Netherlands (Statistics Sweden, 2005)
 Might  ‘Help  to  Buy’  solve  this  problem?
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
Insights  from  ‘Economics  101’
4
 Main effect of Help to Buy
 Equity loans and the mortgage guarantee both boost
demand for housing, especially of first-time-buyers
 Higher willingness-to-pay, all else equal
 Also: starter homes and new builds are
reasonably closes substitutes for other
types of housing (incl. rental)
 Positive effect on aggregate demand for
housing
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
Insights  from  ‘Economics  201’
5
 Policy strongly affects ability of potential
first-time buyer to afford down-payment
on starter home
 Additional boost to housing demand
 Because  of  capital  gains  &  ‘moving  up  the  
housing  ladder’  feeds  through  to  trade-up
homes
 Has substantial impact on overall housing
market (Ortalo-Magné & Rady 2006)
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
The  demand  side…
6
House
prices
Housing
stock
Demand w/o HtB
Demand w HtB
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
What about supply?
7
 UK planning system extraordinarily inflexible
 Since 1947: virtually no fiscal incentives at local
level to permit development
 Government  reforms  since  2010  not  (yet)  ‘biting’
 Underlying causes?
 UK = highly centralized country, virtually no fiscal
power at local level
 Political power tilted towards homeowners
(NIMBYs or better: BANANAs)
 Perhaps  world’s  most  restrictive  planning  
system…
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
The  supply  side…
8
House
prices
Housing
stock
Long-run supply
Demand w/o HtB
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
The  effect  of  Help  to  Buy…
9
House
prices
Housing
stock
Demand w/o HtB
Long-run supply
Demand w HtB
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
Evidence
10
 Hilber and Vermeulen (2010, 2012)
 Demonstrate that tight local planning
constraints in parts of England (in conjunction
with strong demand) are to a good extent
responsible for extraordinarily high house
prices
 Had the SE the restrictiveness of the NE, house
prices in the SE would be 25% lower
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
Evidence (cont.)
11
 Hilber and Turner (forthcoming)
 Mortgage interest deduction in US
 Raises house prices in regulated cities
 Reduces homeownership attainment in these
cities
 Zero overall effect on homeownership
attainment
 Why? Subsidy pushes up prices in constrained
places and prevents marginal would-be-buyers
from becoming homeowners
 US wastes 100 Billion US-dollar each year!
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
Winners and Losers
12
 Main beneficiaries = Existing owners of
owner-occupied housing
 Mainly wealthy & elderly population
 First time buyers not better-off
 Mobile renters worse-off
 Typically poor & young
 Tax payers bear cost of schemes & risk
 But wealthy also pay more taxes
 Zero sum game?
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
We  may  ALL  be  losers…
13
1. Taxes needed to finance scheme have a
‘deadweight  loss’
 Pure welfare loss for society
2. Systemic  risk  (…yet  again)
 Government  does  not  only  provide  ‘implicit  
government  guarantee’  but  directly bears
various costs and risks
 If housing markets collapse then government
takes  direct  hit…
 Unlikely? Perhaps, but…
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
What should the government (not) do?
 Subsidies to consumers are ineffective,
costly & risky
 Must  tackle  ‘supply  side’  problems  instead!
 Give strong incentives to local authorities (and
NIMBYs) to facilitate construction of new
housing and expansion of existing housing
 One idea (of many): Introduce proper local
property  tax  and  get  rid  of  e.g.  ‘absurd’  stamp  
duty (Mirrlees Review 2011; Hilber & Lyytikäinen
2013)
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
And what can we learn from the
US housing crisis?
 Securitization can improve social welfare in
principle BUT…
 Design and implementation of securities market in US
was flawed + markets were poorly regulated
 Lessons from the US debacle
1. Ensure competition – no monopoly or duopoly
2. ‘Too  big  to  fail’  is  bad  – commit to no government
backing, so investors face true risks
3. Regulation ought to focus on market efficiency and
systemic risks
 It appears British politicians may not have
learned these  lessons….
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
References
16
 Globalpropertyguide.com
(http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/most-expensive-
cities; last accessed: 28 March 2013)
 Hilber, C. and T. Lyyitkäinen (2013) ‘Housing  Transfer
Taxes and Household Mobility: Distortion on the Housing
or Labour Market?’, London School of Economics, mimeo,
April 2013). (Paper presented at the CEMMAP Workshop
on Housing: Microdata, Macro Problems, May 2013)
 Hilber, C and T. Turner (forthcoming) ‘The Mortgage
Interest Deduction and its Impact on Homeownership
Decisions,”  Review of Economics and Statistics.
 Hilber, C. and W. Vermeulen (2010) The Impacts of
Restricting Housing Supply on House Prices and
Affordability – Final Report, London: Department for
Communities and Local Government.
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
References (cont.)
17
 Hilber, C. and W. Vermeulen (2012) ‘The  Impact of Supply
Constraints on House Prices in England’,  London  School of
Economics, SERC Discussion Paper No. 119, September
2012.
 Mirrlees, J., Adam, S., Besley, T., Blundell, R., Bond, S.,
Chote, R., Gammie, M., Johnson, P., Myles, G. and
Poterba, J. (2011) Tax by Design: the Mirrlees Review.
Oxford University Press.
 Ortalo-Magné, F. and S. Rady (2006) ‘Housing  market  
dynamics: on the contribution of income shocks and credit
constraints’,  Review of Economic Studies, vol. 73(2), pp.
459-485.
 Statistics Sweden (2005) Housing Statistics in the
European Union 2004, Karlskrona: Boverket,
Publikationsservice.
Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
Q & A
Thank you!
Presentation with references & hyperlinks
is downloadable from:
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hilber/
18
1Thursday, 6 June 13
Until there’s a home for everyone
Who does Help to Buy need to help?
Toby Lloyd
Head of Policy
2
A decade of big change in renting
3
Change among renter groups
4
Is it a ‘choice’ between renting/owning?
!  2/3s of renting families want to own but don’t
think they’ll ever be able to afford
!  Fewer than 1 in 10 renting families value
flexibility of renting
!  44% of parents feel their children would have a
better childhood if they had more stability
!  Fewer than half of renting families can save
more than £50 a month
5
Why not? Is it a lack of lending?
6
Why not? Is it house prices?
7
Affordability for median families
90% mortgage on a median local home
59% affordable
8
Affordability for median families
90% mortgage on a median local home 95% mortgage on a median local home
59% affordable 49% affordable
9
Pen portrait:
Jo and Dave in Watford
!  Earn £50k (1.5x median local FTE)
!  Local median house price is £208,000
!  Would need to earn £5,500 more to afford a
90% mortgage
!  Would need to earn an extra £8,500 to afford a
95% mortgage
10
Affordability for lower quartile
families
90% mortgage on a median local home
18% affordable
11
Affordability for lower quartile families
90% mortgage on a median local home 95% mortgage on a median local home
18% affordable 12% affordable
12
!
!
!
!
Strategic Society Centre

32-36 Loman Street

London

SE1 0EH

info@strategicsociety.org.uk!
www.strategicsociety.org.uk

Twitter: @sscthinktank !
!
The Strategic Society Centre is a registered charity (No. 1144565)
incorporated with limited liability in England and Wales (Company No.
7273418).!

Help to Who? Using the state to help to buy

  • 1.
    Help to Who?Using the state to Help to Buy Wednesday June 5th, 2013!
  • 2.
    !  John Stewart,Director of Economic Affairs, Home Builders Federation! !  Toby Lloyd, Head of Policy, Shelter! !  Dr Christian Hilber, Reader, Department of Geography and Environment, LSE! !  Chair: James Lloyd, Director, Strategic Society Centre! !
  • 3.
    !  When isit the role of government to underwrite private mortgage lending?! !  Why are UK banks not offering higher loan-to-value mortgages? Is this a function of temporary institutional constraints or an assessment of UK house-price risk? How will lenders assess this risk when Help to Buy ends?! !  What outcomes are Help to Buy trying to achieve? Do these outcomes cohere with wider housing policy objectives?! !  What are the distributional consequences of Help to Buy? Who will benefit from the scheme? What does Help to Buy mean for the aspiration agenda?! !  What does international and historical experience tell us about the role of the state in financing private house purchases?!
  • 4.
    Help to Who? Usingthe State to Help to Buy John Stewart Director of Economic Affairs, HBF 5 June 2013
  • 5.
    Presentation Outline •  Economiccontext •  Mortgage policy proposals •  High LTV mortgage availability •  Mortgage schemes: key details •  Impact: volumes or prices •  International comparisons
  • 6.
  • 7.
    90.0 92.0 94.0 96.0 98.0 100.0 102.0 104.0 106.0 108.0 110.0 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 GDPPeak=100 Quarters from peak Comparing Recessions (GDP peak=100) 1973- 1979- 1990- 2008- Source: Office for National Statistics; HBF
  • 8.
    Chart 3.1 GDPand sectoral output (from Bank of England Inflation Report, May 2013) (a) Chained-volume measures. GDP is at market prices. Indices of sectoral output are at basic prices. The figures in parentheses show 2009 weights in gross value added.
  • 9.
    Housing contribution toGDP Housing within GDP •  Household expenditure: 13.5% •  Capital formation: 3.3% Of which Newly built homes: ~1.4% Net new build jobs: 2.4 direct and supply chain
  • 10.
    Housing contribution toGDP Things are looking up [ in the US]. Led by rising house prices, the US recovery is likely to accelerate this year. (Lawrence Summers, FT, 3 June 2013)
  • 11.
  • 12.
    Should Government underwrite mortgages? • Temporary interventions •  Aspiration: help to buy own home •  Support home building: GDP, jobs •  dramatic intervention to get our housing market moving (George Osborne Budget speech)
  • 13.
    Should Government underwrite mortgages? …Governments view that the current scarcity of high loan-to-value lending is primarily a cyclical issue rather than a symptom of a longer-term structural change in the mortgage market. (Treasury. Help to Buy: Mortgage Guarantee. Scheme Outline)
  • 14.
    Mortgage policies •  Fundingfor Lending scheme: to lower rates, increase net lending •  Help to Buy: Equity Loan: deposit gap and affordability •  Help to Buy: Mortgage Guarantee: deposit gap
  • 15.
    2012 2013 20142015 2016 June April January January May Q3 March December FLS starts HtB: Equity Loan starts HtB: Mtg Guarantee starts FLS ends General Election HtB: Equity Loan ends HtB: Mtg Guarantee ends Bank rate starts rising?
  • 16.
    Perfect storm in2016? •  Mortgage rates rising (FLS and bank rate) => affordability deteriorates •  As support for new build ends •  And mortgage support for high LTV mortgages ends
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20.
    Why few highLTV mortgages? •  Funding crisis from 2007 H2 + need for low risk to secure funding => restrict lending to less risky, low LTV •  Basle capital requirements => LTV mortgage rate premium higher than in past* •  Lender fear of falling house prices? * 95% mortgages currently in range 5-6%
  • 21.
  • 22.
    HtB: Equity Loan • New build, England only (at present) •  All builders can apply •  At least 5% deposit •  Government equity loan: 10-20% •  Price cap £600,000 •  Projected take up: 74,000 sales, £3.5bn (around £17.5bn new home sales) •  April 2013 - March 2016
  • 23.
    HtB: Mortgage Guarantee • New & second hand, UK •  At least 5% deposit •  Price cap £600,000 •  Govt guarantees portion* of repossession losses (7 yrs) •  Normal 95% LTV affordability & credit criteria •  Projected take up: 190,000 sales pa, £130bn mortgages •  January 2014 - December 2016 * 95% of losses down to 80% of purchase price
  • 24.
    HtB: Mortgage Guarantee Keyissues to be resolved •  Value of commercial fee to Treasury – match commercial MIG rates? •  Capital relief? •  Mortgage rates (especially vs NewBuy)? •  Withdrawal: taper vs cliff edge? Future Government needs Financial Policy Committee (FPC) agreement to renew
  • 25.
  • 26.
    Impact: volumes orprices? •  HtB: Equity Loan New build supply response – though may not be 25,000 pa •  HtB: Mortgage Guarantee Some new build supply; second-hand supply (buyers who are sellers*); plus 190,000 pa is gross – net additional transactions lower *CML: 326,000 home mover mortgages 2012 plus add cash buyers with home to sell (e.g. trade downs)
  • 27.
    Impact: volumes orprices? Other constraints on price increases •  Will all lenders take part? •  Will Mortgage Guarantee apply to new & second- hand? •  Lenders tight 95% affordability & credit scoring •  MMR => some buyers constrained •  Will valuers constrain increases? •  Affordability deteriorates as prices rise
  • 28.
    Impact: volumes orprices? •  And if prices surge, surely a response from Treasury, Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), Financial Policy Committee (FPC) – post General Election? •  Poisoned chalice for new Government?
  • 29.
  • 30.
    Help to Who? Usingthe State to Help to Buy John Stewart Director of Economic Affairs, HBF 5 June 2013
  • 31.
    Help to Buy: An academic’s  view  based  on   economic theory and empirical evidence Christian Hilber London School of Economics June 2013 Strategic Society Centre Public Debate – Help to Who? Using the state to Help to Buy – London, 5 June 2013 ?
  • 32.
    Overview 2 1. What willHelp-to-Buy achieve?  What does economic theory predict?  Supporting empirical evidence 2. Who benefits?  Winners and losers – not who you might think… 3. What should the government (not) do? Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 33.
    Starting  point:  A real  problem… 3  House prices in UK are extraordinarily high  UK has second highest buying price per square metre in the world (only topped by tiny Monaco!) (Globalpropertyguide.com; last accessed March 2013)  And we live in extremely cramped housing!  A new-build house in UK is 38 percent smaller than in densely populated Germany and 40 percent smaller than in the even more densely populated Netherlands (Statistics Sweden, 2005)  Might  ‘Help  to  Buy’  solve  this  problem? Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 34.
    Insights  from  ‘Economics 101’ 4  Main effect of Help to Buy  Equity loans and the mortgage guarantee both boost demand for housing, especially of first-time-buyers  Higher willingness-to-pay, all else equal  Also: starter homes and new builds are reasonably closes substitutes for other types of housing (incl. rental)  Positive effect on aggregate demand for housing Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 35.
    Insights  from  ‘Economics 201’ 5  Policy strongly affects ability of potential first-time buyer to afford down-payment on starter home  Additional boost to housing demand  Because  of  capital  gains  &  ‘moving  up  the   housing  ladder’  feeds  through  to  trade-up homes  Has substantial impact on overall housing market (Ortalo-Magné & Rady 2006) Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 36.
    The  demand  side… 6 House prices Housing stock Demandw/o HtB Demand w HtB Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 37.
    What about supply? 7 UK planning system extraordinarily inflexible  Since 1947: virtually no fiscal incentives at local level to permit development  Government  reforms  since  2010  not  (yet)  ‘biting’  Underlying causes?  UK = highly centralized country, virtually no fiscal power at local level  Political power tilted towards homeowners (NIMBYs or better: BANANAs)  Perhaps  world’s  most  restrictive  planning   system… Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 38.
    The  supply  side… 8 House prices Housing stock Long-runsupply Demand w/o HtB Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 39.
    The  effect  of Help  to  Buy… 9 House prices Housing stock Demand w/o HtB Long-run supply Demand w HtB Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 40.
    Evidence 10  Hilber andVermeulen (2010, 2012)  Demonstrate that tight local planning constraints in parts of England (in conjunction with strong demand) are to a good extent responsible for extraordinarily high house prices  Had the SE the restrictiveness of the NE, house prices in the SE would be 25% lower Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 41.
    Evidence (cont.) 11  Hilberand Turner (forthcoming)  Mortgage interest deduction in US  Raises house prices in regulated cities  Reduces homeownership attainment in these cities  Zero overall effect on homeownership attainment  Why? Subsidy pushes up prices in constrained places and prevents marginal would-be-buyers from becoming homeowners  US wastes 100 Billion US-dollar each year! Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 42.
    Winners and Losers 12 Main beneficiaries = Existing owners of owner-occupied housing  Mainly wealthy & elderly population  First time buyers not better-off  Mobile renters worse-off  Typically poor & young  Tax payers bear cost of schemes & risk  But wealthy also pay more taxes  Zero sum game? Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 43.
    We  may  ALL be  losers… 13 1. Taxes needed to finance scheme have a ‘deadweight  loss’  Pure welfare loss for society 2. Systemic  risk  (…yet  again)  Government  does  not  only  provide  ‘implicit   government  guarantee’  but  directly bears various costs and risks  If housing markets collapse then government takes  direct  hit…  Unlikely? Perhaps, but… Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 44.
    What should thegovernment (not) do?  Subsidies to consumers are ineffective, costly & risky  Must  tackle  ‘supply  side’  problems  instead!  Give strong incentives to local authorities (and NIMBYs) to facilitate construction of new housing and expansion of existing housing  One idea (of many): Introduce proper local property  tax  and  get  rid  of  e.g.  ‘absurd’  stamp   duty (Mirrlees Review 2011; Hilber & Lyytikäinen 2013) Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 45.
    And what canwe learn from the US housing crisis?  Securitization can improve social welfare in principle BUT…  Design and implementation of securities market in US was flawed + markets were poorly regulated  Lessons from the US debacle 1. Ensure competition – no monopoly or duopoly 2. ‘Too  big  to  fail’  is  bad  – commit to no government backing, so investors face true risks 3. Regulation ought to focus on market efficiency and systemic risks  It appears British politicians may not have learned these  lessons…. Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 46.
    References 16  Globalpropertyguide.com (http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/most-expensive- cities; lastaccessed: 28 March 2013)  Hilber, C. and T. Lyyitkäinen (2013) ‘Housing  Transfer Taxes and Household Mobility: Distortion on the Housing or Labour Market?’, London School of Economics, mimeo, April 2013). (Paper presented at the CEMMAP Workshop on Housing: Microdata, Macro Problems, May 2013)  Hilber, C and T. Turner (forthcoming) ‘The Mortgage Interest Deduction and its Impact on Homeownership Decisions,”  Review of Economics and Statistics.  Hilber, C. and W. Vermeulen (2010) The Impacts of Restricting Housing Supply on House Prices and Affordability – Final Report, London: Department for Communities and Local Government. Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 47.
    References (cont.) 17  Hilber,C. and W. Vermeulen (2012) ‘The  Impact of Supply Constraints on House Prices in England’,  London  School of Economics, SERC Discussion Paper No. 119, September 2012.  Mirrlees, J., Adam, S., Besley, T., Blundell, R., Bond, S., Chote, R., Gammie, M., Johnson, P., Myles, G. and Poterba, J. (2011) Tax by Design: the Mirrlees Review. Oxford University Press.  Ortalo-Magné, F. and S. Rady (2006) ‘Housing  market   dynamics: on the contribution of income shocks and credit constraints’,  Review of Economic Studies, vol. 73(2), pp. 459-485.  Statistics Sweden (2005) Housing Statistics in the European Union 2004, Karlskrona: Boverket, Publikationsservice. Intro /Problem Theory Evidence Who benefits? What (not) to do? References
  • 48.
    Q & A Thankyou! Presentation with references & hyperlinks is downloadable from: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hilber/ 18
  • 49.
    1Thursday, 6 June13 Until there’s a home for everyone Who does Help to Buy need to help? Toby Lloyd Head of Policy
  • 50.
    2 A decade ofbig change in renting
  • 51.
  • 52.
    4 Is it a‘choice’ between renting/owning? !  2/3s of renting families want to own but don’t think they’ll ever be able to afford !  Fewer than 1 in 10 renting families value flexibility of renting !  44% of parents feel their children would have a better childhood if they had more stability !  Fewer than half of renting families can save more than £50 a month
  • 53.
    5 Why not? Isit a lack of lending?
  • 54.
    6 Why not? Isit house prices?
  • 55.
    7 Affordability for medianfamilies 90% mortgage on a median local home 59% affordable
  • 56.
    8 Affordability for medianfamilies 90% mortgage on a median local home 95% mortgage on a median local home 59% affordable 49% affordable
  • 57.
    9 Pen portrait: Jo andDave in Watford !  Earn £50k (1.5x median local FTE) !  Local median house price is £208,000 !  Would need to earn £5,500 more to afford a 90% mortgage !  Would need to earn an extra £8,500 to afford a 95% mortgage
  • 58.
    10 Affordability for lowerquartile families 90% mortgage on a median local home 18% affordable
  • 59.
    11 Affordability for lowerquartile families 90% mortgage on a median local home 95% mortgage on a median local home 18% affordable 12% affordable
  • 60.
  • 61.
    ! ! ! ! Strategic Society Centre
 32-36Loman Street
 London
 SE1 0EH
 info@strategicsociety.org.uk! www.strategicsociety.org.uk
 Twitter: @sscthinktank ! ! The Strategic Society Centre is a registered charity (No. 1144565) incorporated with limited liability in England and Wales (Company No. 7273418).!